Resolution to the Motion for Reconsideration

(case assignment number?) Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral

Tribunal

G.R. No. 191618, 23 Nov. 2010; 7 June 2011

(follow this format for the title/heading)

Question:

Atty. Remy filed an action questioning the constitutionality of the creation of

the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). His arguments were that the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which states that
“the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election x x x of the President or Vice –President . . .” does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and also that the PET violates Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution which prohibits the members of the
Supreme Court or any other courts to be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial functions.

Are the cited arguments of Atty. Remy meritorious?

Suggested Answer:

No, Atty. Remy’s arguments are unmeritorious.

Regarding his first argument, it was previously discussed by the

Supreme Court in one of its cases that the PET is authorized by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by
the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which
drafted the present Constitution which stated that the provision’s creation
only constitutionalized what was already statutory.

Regarding Atty. Remy’s second argument, the Supreme Court

previously ruled that the set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but
it remained absolute. It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court,
as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power.

Thus, in applying the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case at bar,
Atty. Remy’s contentions are without merit.
Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 Feb.

1991

Question:

President Aangzon issued Executive Order No. 284 (E.O. No. 284) which
allows a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold in addition to
his primary position, not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation.
Katara and Toph then filed petition in the Supreme Court seeking the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 284 on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those
provided in the Constitution.

If you were the judge, how would you rule the case?

Suggested Answer:

If I were the judge, I would grant the present petition.

According to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, “the

President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their office.”

The only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in

Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.

The Supreme Court has also previously ruled that while all other
appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself.

E.O. No. 284 clearly provides for an exception for the members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants to hold more than one office during
their tenure in the government.

Thus, in applying the express provisions of the Constitution provided

above to the case at bar, as a judge, I would grant Katara and Toph
petitions and rule that E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Public Interest Center v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006

Question:

Jolina Magdangal was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission

on Good Government (PCGG) on October 30, 1998. Thereafter, during her
tenure as PCGG Chairman, she was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC). She accepted the second appointment, but waived any
renumeration that she may receive as CPLC. Marvin Agustin then filed a
petition seeking to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of
Jolina as Chairman of the PCGG and as Chief CPLC for being contrary to
Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. Marvin also maintained that respondent Elma was holding
incompatible offices.

If you were the judge, how would you rule the case?

Suggested Answer:

If I were the judge, I would grant the present petition.

It was previously decided by the Supreme Court in one of their cases

that while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B
is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution

permits an appointive official to hold more than one office only if allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position. There is no legal objection to
a government official occupying two government offices and performing the
functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial test in
determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices is that
whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office
has the right to interfere with the other.

In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the

PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various
executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving
heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential
appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC.

It was further explained by the Supreme Court that while Section 7,

Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution applies in general to all elective and
appointive officials, Section 13, Article VII, applies in particular to Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The persons cited in
the constitutional provision are the "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants." These terms must be given their common and general
acceptation as referring to the heads of the executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank
equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not
covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.

It is thus clear that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the
CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant
secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter
positions.

Therefore, in applying the rulings of the Supreme Court to the present

case, I would grant the petition raised by Marvin Agustin.
Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March 2001

Question:

Popoy Gonzales was elected President while Basha Eugenio was elected Vice-
President. Popoy, while still sitting in office, was accused of receiving P220
million in jueteng money and P70 million on excise tax. Actions on
investigation and impeachment were made. Popoy then agreed to hold a
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Later on,
Chief Justice Goliath administered the oath to Basha as President of the
Philippines. The House of Representatives and Senate both issued separate
resolutions recognizing Basha as the president of the Philippines. Months
later, Popoy filed a petition contending that he is merely temporarily unable
to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President
on leave.

Is the contention of Popoy correct? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

No, the contention of Popoy is not correct.

In the case of Estrada v. Desierto, the Supreme Court ruled that the
bills signed into law by both houses of Congress recognizing the vice-
president elect as the new President of the Philippines upon the vacancy
made by the previous president-elect is valid and also that its review
constitutes a political question.

In the case at bar, Popoy cannot successfully claim that he is a

President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress, and both houses
of congress already passed resolutions regarding their decision on Basha’s
recognition as the new president. The decision of Congress recognizing and
declaring Basha as the de jure president, as made by a co-equal branch of
government, is unquestionably a political judgment, hence cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Thus, in applying the ruling of the Supreme Court, Popoy’s argument is

considered to be untenable.

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, 3 April 2001

Question:

Popoy Gonzales was elected President while Basha Eugenio was elected Vice-
President. Popoy, while still sitting in office, was accused of receiving P220
million in jueteng money and P70 million on excise tax. Actions on
investigation and impeachment were made. Popoy then agreed to hold a
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Later on,
Chief Justice Goliath administered the oath to Basha as President of the
Philippines. The House of Representatives and Senate both issued separate
resolutions recognizing Basha as the president of the Philippines. Months
later, Popoy filed a petition contending that he never resigned as president
nor has he suffered a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office
of the President was not vacant when Basha took her oath as President.

Is the contention of Popoy correct? Explain.

Suggested Answer:

No, No, the contention of Popoy is not correct.

As discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of Estrada v. Arroyo,

resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: that there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can
be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as
the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. Whether or not a
president has resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions or
by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. This is
called the totality test, in which the Supreme Court used in ruling that
Estrada has resigned as the President.

In the case at bar, Popoy has called for a snap presidential election
where he stressed that he would not be a candidate. This act of Popoy is
indication that he had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.

Thus, in applying the ruling of the Supreme Court in the present case,
Popoy cannot feign ignorance on the fact that he agreed on the snap
presidential election, hence making this act as a form of his resignation from
his position as the President of the Philippines.
Birago v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, 7 Dec. 2010

Question:

President Ferdinand Poe signed Executive Order No. 1 (E.O. No. 1)

establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. The Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a
public office, as an ad hoc body is one. To accomplish its task, the PTC shall
have all the powers of an investigative body.

House of Representative member Cardo Dalisay then filed a petition asking

the Supreme Court to declare E.O. No. 1 as unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. The main arguments of Didi are the
following:

a. E.O. No. 1 cannot be legitimized because the delegated authority of

the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent
like the Truth Commission.
b. E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes
when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
 c. E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable, and also because it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.

Decide the merit of the case based on the following grounds.

Suggested Answer:

Regarding Didi’s first argument, E.O. No.1 is considered valid insofar

as the President has the power to create a public office that enables him to
faithfully execute his duties.

As provided by Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President

can be justified in creating PTC. Section 17 provides that “The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

It was also discussed by the Supreme Court in one of its cases that the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant
of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is
inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority
of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does
not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Concerning the second argument of Didi, the Truth Commission is not

considered to have possess quasi-judicial powers.

It was previously discussed by jurisprudence that quasi-judicial powers

involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Investigate means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. While adjudicate means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. Fact-finding is not adjudication
and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.
To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy
may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject
to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. It was also
further held that the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No.
6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies.

In the case at bar, PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The recommendation
to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected
offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,
is certainly not a function given to the commission.

On the other hand, Didi’s third and last argument is with merit.

The equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of

Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

The Supreme Court also once held that in order for a classification
under the law to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include
or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Such a
classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class,
but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be
in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory
legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the
class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the
same way as are the members of the class.

In the case at bar, E.O. No. 1 does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous
administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must
also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations
previous to that of former administration.

Thus, in applying the laws and jurisprudence provided above to the

case at bar, although E.O. No. 1 can be considered as valid with regard to
the President’s power to create a public office and the lack of PTC’s quasi-
judicial power, it must still be considered as an unconstitutional law because
of its violation of the equal protection clause which is safeguarded under the
Constitution.