SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211892. December 6, 2017.]

INNODATA KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, INC. , petitioner, vs. SOCORRO

D'MARIE T. INTING, ISMAEL R. GARAYGAY, EDSON S. SOLIS,
MICHAEL A. REBATO, JAMES HORACE BALONDA, STEPHEN C.
OLINGAY, DENNIS C. RIZON, JUNETH A. RENTUMA, HERNAN ED
NOEL I. DE LEON, JR., JESS VINCENT A. DELA PEÑA, RONAN V.
ALAMILLO, ENNOH CHENTIS R. FERNANDEZ, FRITZ J. SEMBRINO,
DAX MATTHEW M. QUIJANO, RODOLFO M. VASQUEZ, MA. NAZELLE
B. MIRALLES, MICHAEL RAY B. MOLDE, WENDELL B. QUIBAN,
ALDRIN O. TORRENTIRA, and CARL HERMES CARSKIT , respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of
App eals (CA), Cebu, Twentieth (20th) Division, dated August 30, 2013 and its
Resolution 2 dated March 12, 2014 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06443 which reversed and
set aside Decision 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on May 31,
2011. HTcADC

The factual and procedural antecedents, as evidenced by the records of the case,
are the following:
Petitioner Innodata Knowledge Services, Inc. (IKSI) is a company engaged in data
processing, encoding, indexing, abstracting, typesetting, imaging, and other processes
in the capture, conversion, and storage of data and information. At one time, Applied
Computer Technologies (ACT), a company based in the United States of America, hired
IKSI to review various litigation documents. Due to the nature of the job, ACT required
IKSI to hire lawyers, or at least, law graduates, to review various litigation documents,
classify said documents into the prescribed categories, and ensure that outputs are
delivered on time. For this purpose, IKSI engaged the services of respondents Socorro
D'Marie Inting, Ismael R. Garaygay, Edson S. Solis, Michael A. Rebato, James Horace
Balonda, Stephen C. Olingay, Dennis C. Rizon, Juneth A. Rentuma, Hernan Ed Noel I. de
Leon, Jr., Jess Vincent A. dela Peña, Ronan V. Alamillo, Ennoh Chentis R. Fernandez,
Wendell B. Quiban, Aldrin O. Torrentira, Michael Ray B. Molde, Fritz J. Sembrino, Dax
Matthew M. Quijano, Rodolfo M. Vasquez, Ma. Nazelle B. Miralles and Carl Hermes
Carskit as senior and junior reviewers with a contract duration of five (5) years.
On January 7, 2010, however, respondents received a Notice of Forced Leave
from IKSI informing them that they shall be placed on inde nite forced leave effective
that same day due to changes in business conditions, client requirements, and
specifications. Hence, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement
or payment of separation pay, backwages, and damages against IKSI.
Subsequently, IKSI sent respondents separate notices dated May 27, 2010
informing them that due to the unavailability of new work related to the product stream
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 and uncertainties pertaining to the arrival of new workloads, their project employment
contracts would have to be terminated.
On November 10, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA), in the consolidated cases of NLRC
RAB VII Case No. 01-0159-10, NLRC RAB VII Case No. 01-0182-10, and NLRC RAB VII
Case No. 02-0301-10, declared that there was no illegal dismissal, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby rendered
declaring that complainants were not constructively dismissed but were placed
on forced leave as a cost-saving measure. Consequently, herein respondents are
directed to recall complainants back to work as soon as work becomes
available. Complainants are likewise directed to report back to work within ten
(10) days from receipt of the order of respondents to report back to work,
otherwise, their failure to do so would be construed as an abandonment. In the
event that reinstatement is no longer feasible, in lieu thereof, separation pay is
granted equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction
of six (6) months is considered as one (1) whole year, sans backwages.
The claim for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 4
The NLRC, on May 31, 2011, affirmed the LA Ruling with modification, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, in that in lieu of reinstatement, to pay the twelve (12)
complainants-appellants namely: Michael A. Rebato, Hernan Ed Noel L. de Leon,
Jr., Wendell B. Quiban, Fritz Sembrino, Ismael R. Garaygay III, Edson S. Solis,
Stephen Olingay, Ronan Alamillo, Jess Vincent A. dela Peña, Dax Matthew M.
Quijano, Juneth A. Rentuma and Socorro D'Marie T. Inting, the total amount of
Php563,500.00.
SO ORDERED. 5
Undaunted, the employees elevated the matter to the CA Cebu, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the NLRC's part. On August 30, 2013, the CA granted their
petition and reversed the assailed NLRC ruling, thus:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, this petition is GRANTED . The
assailed Decision dated May 31, 2011 and Resolution dated August 26, 2011 of
public respondent in NLRC Case No. VAC-01-000042-2011 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE . Petitioners Socorro D'Marie Inting, Ismael R. Garaygay, Edson S.
Solis, Michael A. Rebato, James Horace Balonda, Stephen C. Olingay, Dennis C.
Rizon, Juneth A. Rentuma, Hernan Ed Noel I. de Leon, Jr., Jess Vincent A. dela
Peña, Ronan V. Alamillo, Ennoh Chentis R. Fernandez, Wendell B. Quiban, Aldrin
O. Torrentira, Michael Ray B. Molde, Fritz J. Sembrino, Dax Matthew M. Quijano,
Rodolfo M. Vasquez, Ma. Nazelle B. Miralles and Carl Hermes Carskit are
declared to have been illegally dismissed by Innodata and hence, each of them
is entitled to the payment of the following:
(a) Backwages reckoned from the start of their employment up to the
nality of this Decision with interest at six percent (6%) per annum,
and 12% legal interest thereafter until fully paid;
(b) Separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as
one (1) whole year, to be computed from the date of their
employment up to the finality of this decision;
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 (c) Moral damages of Php50,000 and exemplary damages of
Php25,000; and
(d) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10 percent (10%) of the total award.
The case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the labor arbiter for the
computation of the amounts due each petitioner.
Costs on private respondent Innodata.
SO ORDERED . 6
IKSI then led a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated March 12, 2014. Hence, the instant petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed an error when it
reversed the NLRC, which declared that respondent employees, as mere project
employees, were validly placed on oating status and, therefore, were not illegally
dismissed. aScITE

The Court rules in the negative.

Substantive Issues

Nature of respondents' employment contracts

It is true that factual ndings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies which are

deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are
generally accorded, not only respect, but even nality, and bind the Court when
supported by substantial evidence. However, the Court may take cognizance of factual
issues when the ndings of fact and conclusions of law of the LA and/or the NLRC are
inconsistent with those of the CA, 7 as in the case at bar.
Here, the NLRC ruled that respondents were project employees. It ratiocinated
that their contracts speci cally indicated that they were to hold their positions for the
duration of the project which was expected to be completed after a maximum of ve
(5) years, or on or before July 2, 2013. 8 But the CA found that respondents'
employment contracts are xed-term, which are contrary to the Constitution and labor
laws. It then cited several cases 9 that supposedly involved IKSI itself and would reveal
that its xed-term employment contracts have been consistently held as a form of
circumvention to prevent employees from acquiring tenurial rights and benefits.
The employment status of a person is de ned and prescribed by law and not by
what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is that a contract of
employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to
the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the
contract, and the parties are never at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply entering into
contracts with each other. 1 0
Article 295 1 1 of the Labor Code provides the distinction between a regular and a
project employment:
Art. 295. Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement
of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been xed for a speci c project or undertaking the completion
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 or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
The aforecited provision contemplates four (4) kinds of employees: (1) regular
employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; (2) project
employees or those whose employment has been xed for a speci c project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee; (3) seasonal employees or those who work or
perform services which are seasonal in nature, and the employment is for the duration
of the season; and (4) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or
seasonal employees. Jurisprudence later added a fth (5th) kind, the fixed-term
employee. Based on Article 295, the law determines the nature of the employment,
regardless of any agreement expressing otherwise. The supremacy of the law over the
nomenclature of the contract and its pacts and conditions is to bring life to the policy
enshrined in the Constitution to afford full protection to labor. Thus, labor contracts are
placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts since these are imbued with public
interest and, therefore, subject to the police power of the State. 1 2
Project employment contracts, which fix the employment for a specific project or
undertaking, are valid under the law. By entering into such a contract, an employee is
deemed to understand that his employment is coterminous with the project. He may no
longer be employed after the completion of the project for which he was hired. But
project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only one party.
The employer's interest is equally important as that of the employees'. While it may be
true that it is the employer who drafts project employment contracts with its business
interest as overriding consideration, such contracts must not prejudice the employee.
13

As stated in IKSI's petition itself, the following are the basic provisions of the
employment contracts which respondents signed with the company: HEITAD

(a) the contracts are entitled "Project-Based Employment Contracts" ;

(b) the rst Whereas clause states "the Company [IKSI] desires the services of
a Project Employee for the Content Supply Chain Project";
(c) Clause 1 on Term of Employment provides:
The Employee shall hold the position of [Junior/Senior]
Reviewer and shall perform the duties and responsibilities
of such for the duration of the Project , which is expected
to be completed after a maximum of ve (5) years, or on
or before ________, (the "Term").
. . . Further, the Employee is granted one Saturday-off per
month on a scheduled basis for the duration of this
PROJECT-BASED EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT . . .
(d) The second paragraph of Clause 2 on Work Description provides:
The Employee shall render work in accordance with the
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 schedule and/or program to which he/she may be assigned or
reassigned from time to time, in accordance with the
operational requirements for the completion of the
Project. In addition, the Employee shall perform such
other duties, functions, and services related or incidental
to the Project which, for purposes of expediency, convenience,
economy, customer interest, may be assigned by the Company.
(e) Clause 5 on Termination of Employment provides:
At any time during the Term of this Contract, or any extension
thereof, the Company may terminate this Contract, upon thirty (30)
days' prior notice to the Employee . . . in the following instances:
a. th e services contracted for by the Company under
the Project is completed prior to the agreed upon completion
date; or
b. t h e speci c phase of the Project requiring the
Employee's services is sooner completed; or
c. substantial decrease in the volume of work for the
Project ; or
d. the contract for the Project is cancelled, inde nitely
suspended or terminated ;
(e) the rst paragraph of Clause 6 on Compensation and
Benefits provides:
The Employee shall receive a gross salary of . . . In addition
to his/her basic pay, Management may grant an additional
incentive pay should the Employee exceed the Project quota . 1 4
IKSI argued that based on the contract, it is undeniable that respondents'
employment was xed for a speci c project or undertaking, with its completion or
termination clearly determined at the time of the employee's engagement. Indeed,
records would disclose that respondents signed employment contracts speci cally
indicating the Content Supply Chain Project, 1 5 also known as the ACT Project, as the
project for which they were being hired, which was expected to be completed after a
maximum of ve (5) years. However, sometime in November 2008, IKSI required
respondents to work on another project called "Bloomberg," which was not included in
the original contracts that they signed and without entering into a new project
employment contracts. Such fact was never refuted by IKSI. During that time,
respondents were required to read and review decided cases in the United States of
America and they were no longer called Senior or Junior Reviewers, but referred to as
Case Classi ers. Respondents initially opposed working on said project but eventually
agreed, in fear of losing their employment altogether. Months later, they were again
required to work on the ACT Project and reverted to their previous designation as
Document Reviewers. 1 6
In the case of ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, 1 7 the Court made a pronouncement on the two
(2) categories of project employees. The project for which project employees are hired
would ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the employer. There
should be no di culty in distinguishing the employees for a certain project from
ordinary or regular employees, as long as the duration and scope of the project were
determined or specified at the time of engagement of said project employees. 1 8 ATICcS

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 In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
"project" which prevents them from attaining regular status, employers claiming that
their workers are project employees have the burden of showing that: (a) the duration
and scope of the employment was speci ed at the time they were engaged; and (b)
there was indeed a project. 1 9 Therefore, as evident in Article 295, the litmus test for
determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as project
employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether or not the employees
were assigned to carry out a speci c project or undertaking, the duration and scope of
which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. 2 0
Here, while IKSI was able to show the presence of a speci c project, the ACT
Project, in the contract and the alleged duration of the same, it failed to prove, however,
that respondents were in reality made to work only for that speci c project indicated in
their employment documents and that it adequately informed them of the duration and
scope of said project at the time their services were engaged. It is well settled that a
party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence, as
allegation is not evidence. The fact is IKSI actually hired respondents to work, not only
on the ACT Project, but on other similar projects such as the Bloomberg. When
respondents were required to work on the Bloomberg project, without signing a new
contract for that purpose, it was already outside of the scope of the particular
undertaking for which they were hired; it was beyond the scope of their employment
contracts. The fact that the same happened only once is inconsequential. What matters
is that IKSI required respondents to work on a project which was separate and distinct
from the one they had signed up for. This act by IKSI indubitably brought respondents
outside the realm of the project employees category.
IKSI likewise fell short in proving that the duration of the project was reasonably
determinable at the time respondents were hired. As earlier mentioned, the
employment contracts provided for "the duration of the Project, which is expected to
be completed after a maximum of ve (5) years, or on or before _______." The NLRC
upheld the same, nding that the contracts clearly provided for the duration of the
project which was expected to end after a maximum of ve (5) years, or on or before
July 2, 2013. It is interesting to note, however, that the ve (5)-year period is not
actually the duration of the project but merely that of the employment contract.
Naturally, therefore, not all of respondents' employment would end on July 2, 2013, as
the completion of the ve (5)-year period would depend on when each employee was
employed, thus: 2 1

Hiring Date Completion

Date

Carl Hermes R. Carskit Nov. 1, '07 May 31, '12

Ismael R. Garaygay III Mar. 5, '08 Mar. 4, '13

Socorro D' Marie T. Inting Apr. 7, '08 Apr. 6, '13

James Horace A. Balonda May 12, '08 May 11, '13

Wendell B. Quiban May 12, '08 May 11, '13

Fritz J. Sembrino May 12, '08 May 11, '13

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 Edson S. Solis May 12, '08 May 11, '13

Rodolfo M. Vasquez, Jr. May 12, '08 May 11, '13

Stephen C. Olingay May 16, '08 May 15, '13

Michael A. Rebato May 19, '08 May 18, '13

Ma. Nazelle B. Miralles May 21, '08 May 20, '13

Dennis C. Rizon July 3, '08 July 2, '13

Ronan V. Alamillo July 10, '08 July 9, '13

Juneth A. Rentuma July 17, '08 July 16, '13

Jess Vincent A. Dela Peña Aug. 12, '08 Aug. 11, '13

Dax Matthew M. Quijano Nov. 17, '08 Nov. 16, '13

Michael Ray B. Molde May 18, '09 May 17, '14

Aldrin O. Torrentira May 25, '09 May 24, '14

Ennoh Chentis R. Fernandez May 28, '09 May 27, '14

Hernan Ed Noel L. De Leon, June 3, '09 June 2, '14

Jr.

This is precisely the reason why IKSI originally left a blank for the termination
date because it varied for each employee. If respondents were truly project employees,
as IKSI claims and as found by the NLRC, then the termination date would have been
uniform for all of them. TIADCc

Thus, while the CA erred in simply relying on the Court's rulings on previous cases
involving Innodata Phils., Inc. since there is no substantial proof that Innodata Phils.,
Inc. and herein petitioner, IKSI, are one and the same entity, it would appear, however,
that respondents indeed entered into xed-term employment contracts with IKSI,
contracts with a xed period of ve (5) years. But project employment and xed-term
employment are not the same. While the former requires a particular project, the
duration of a xed-term employment agreed upon by the parties may be any day
certain, which is understood to be "that which must necessarily come although it may
not be known when." The decisive determinant in xed-term employment is not the
activity that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon by
the parties for the commencement and termination of the employment relationship. 2 2
The Court has previously recognized the validity of xed-term employment
contracts, but it has consistently held that this is more of an exception rather than the
general rule. Aware of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of xed-term
employment contracts, the Court has declared that where from the circumstances it is
apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial
security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy or
morals. 2 3
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 It is evident that IKSI's contracts of employment are suspect for being highly
ambiguous. In effect, it sought to alternatively avail of project employment and
employment for a xed term so as to preclude the regularization of respondents'
status. The fact that respondents were lawyers or law graduates who freely and with
full knowledge entered into an agreement with the company is inconsequential. The
utter disregard of public policy by the subject contracts negates any argument that the
agreement is the law between the parties 2 4 and that the xed period was knowingly
and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. In the interpretation of contracts, obscure
words and provisions shall not favor the party that caused the obscurity. Consequently,
the terms of the present contract should be construed strictly against the employer, for
being the party who prepared it. 2 5 Verily, the private agreement of the parties can never
prevail over Article 1700 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shops, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Thus, there were no valid xed-term or project contracts and respondents were
IKSI's regular employees who could not be dismissed except for just or authorized
causes. Any ambiguity in said contracts must be resolved against the company,
especially because under Article 1702 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt, all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the worker. The Court cannot simply allow IKSI
to construe otherwise what appears to be clear from the wordings of the contract
itself. The interpretation which IKSI seeks to conjure is wholly unacceptable, as it would
result in the violation of respondents' right to security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3
of Article XIII of the Constitution and in Article 294 2 6 of the Labor Code. 2 7
Presence of Just or Authorized Causes
for Termination of Employment
Here, IKSI placed respondents on forced leave, temporary lay-off, or oating
status in January 2010 for the alleged decline in the volume of work in the product
stream where they were assigned. When respondents led a complaint for illegal
dismissal, the LA dismissed the same for having been led prematurely, since placing
employees on forced leave or oating status is a valid exercise of management
prerogative and IKSI never really had an intention to terminate their employment. It
relied on the memoranda 2 8 which IKSI issued to respondents, the tenor of which would
show the intention to recall the affected employees back to work once the company's
condition improves. The NLRC a rmed the LA's ruling and declared that the fact of
dismissal, whether legal or illegal, is absent in this case.
Among the authorized causes for termination under Article 298 2 9 of the Labor
Code is retrenchment, or what is sometimes referred to as a lay-off, thus:
Art. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
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 least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year. AIDSTE

Retrenchment is the severance of employment, through no fault of and without

prejudice to the employee, which management resorts to during the periods of
business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal uctuations, or during lulls
caused by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant to a new
production program or the introduction of new methods or more e cient machinery, or
of automation. In other words, lay-off is an act of the employer of dismissing
employees because of losses in the operation, lack of work, and considerable reduction
on the volume of its business. However, a lay-off would amount to dismissal only if it is
permanent. When it is only temporary, the employment status of the employee is not
deemed terminated, but merely suspended. 3 0
Article 298, however, speaks of permanent retrenchment as opposed to
temporary lay-off, as in the present case. There is no speci c provision of law which
treats of a temporary retrenchment or lay-off and provides for the requisites in
effecting it or a speci c period or duration. 3 1 Notably, in both permanent and
temporary lay-offs, the employer must act in good faith — that is, one which is intended
for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under the law or under valid agreements. 3 2
Certainly, the employees cannot forever be temporarily laid-off. Hence, in order to
remedy this situation or ll the hiatus, Article 301 3 3 may be applied to set a speci c
period wherein employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in oating status. 3 4
Article 301 states:
Art. 301. When Employment not Deemed Terminated. The bona-fide
suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not
exceeding six (6) months, or the ful llment by the employee of a military or civic
duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall
reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if
he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the
resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or
civic duty.
The law set six (6) months as the period where the operation of a business or
undertaking may be suspended, thereby also suspending the employment of the
employees concerned. The resulting temporary lay-off, wherein the employees likewise
cease to work, should also not last longer than six (6) months. After the period of six
(6) months, the employees should either then be recalled to work or permanently
retrenched following the requirements of the law. Failure to comply with this
requirement would be tantamount to dismissing the employees, making the employer
responsible for such dismissal. 3 5 Elsewise stated, an employer may validly put its
employees on forced leave or oating status upon bona de suspension of the
operation of its business for a period not exceeding six (6) months. In such a case,
there is no termination of the employment of the employees, but only a temporary
displacement. When the suspension of the business operations, however, exceeds six
(6) months, then the employment of the employees would be deemed terminated, 3 6
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 and the employer would be held liable for the same.
Indeed, closure or suspension of operations for economic reasons is recognized
as a valid exercise of management prerogative. But the burden of proving, with
su cient and convincing evidence, that said closure or suspension is bona de falls
upon the employer. In the instant case, IKSI claims that its act of placing respondents
on forced leave after a decrease in work volume, subject to recall upon availability of
work, was a valid exercise of its right to lay-off, as an essential component of its
management prerogatives. The Court agrees with the LA's pronouncement that
requiring employees on forced leave is one of the cost-saving measures adopted by the
management in order to prevent further losses. However, IKSI failed to discharge the
burden of proof vested upon it. Having the right should not be confused with the
manner in which that right is exercised; the employer cannot use it as a subterfuge to
run afoul of the employees' guaranteed right to security of tenure. The records are
bereft of any evidence of actual suspension of IKSI's business operations or even of the
ACT Project alone. In fact, while IKSI cited Article 301 to support the temporary lay-off
of its employees, it never alleged that it had actually suspended the subject undertaking
to justify such lay-off. It merely indicated changes in business conditions and client
requirements and speci cations as its basis for the implemented forced leave/lay-off.
37

In light of the well-entrenched rule that the burden to prove the validity and
legality of the termination of employment falls on the employer, IKSI should have
established the bona de suspension of its business operations or undertaking that
could legitimately lead to the temporary lay-off of its employees for a period not
exceeding six (6) months, in accordance with Article 301. 3 8 The LA severely erred when
it sustained respondents' temporary retrenchment simply because the volume of their
work would sometimes decline, thus, several employees at the ACT Project stream
experienced unproductive time. 3 9 Considering the grave consequences occasioned by
retrenchment, whether permanent or temporary, on the livelihood of the employees to
be dismissed, and the avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and
to assure the employee's right to enjoy security of tenure, the Court stresses that not
every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify retrenchment.
The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to
avert such losses. The employer bears the burden of proving this allegation of the
existence or imminence of substantial losses, which by its nature is an a rmative
defense. It is the employer's duty to prove with clear and satisfactory evidence that
legitimate business reasons exist in actuality to justify any retrenchment. Failure to do
so would inevitably result in a nding that the dismissal is unjusti ed. Otherwise, such
ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who
might be merely feigning business losses or reverses in their business ventures to
dispose of their employees. 4 0AaCTcI

Here, IKSI never offered any evidence that would indicate the presence of a bona
fide suspension of its business operations or undertaking. IKSI's paramount
consideration should be the dire exigency of its business that compelled it to put some
of its employees temporarily out of work. This means that it should be able to prove
that it faced a clear and compelling economic reason which reasonably constrained it
to temporarily shut down its business operations or that of the ACT Project, incidentally
resulting in the temporary lay-off of its employees assigned to said particular
undertaking. Due to the grim economic repercussions to the employees, IKSI must
likewise bear the burden of proving that there were no other available posts to which
the employees temporarily put out of work could be possibly assigned. 4 1
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 Unfortunately, IKSI was not able to ful ll any of the aforementioned duties. IKSI cannot
simply rely solely on the alleged decline in the volume of work for the ACT Project to
support the temporary retrenchment of respondents. Businesses, by their very nature,
exist and thrive depending on the continued patronage of their clients. Thus, to some
degree, they are subject to the whims of clients who may suddenly decide to
discontinue patronizing their services for a variety of reasons. Being inherent in any
enterprise, employers should not be allowed to take advantage of this entrepreneurial
risk and use it in a scheme to circumvent labor laws. Otherwise, no worker could ever
attain regular employment status. 4 2 In fact, IKSI still continued its operations and
retained several employees who were also working on the ACT Project even after the
implementation of the January 2010 forced leave. Much worse, it continued to hire new
employees, with the same quali cations as some of respondents, through paid
advertisements and placements in Sunstar Cebu, 4 3 a local newspaper, dated February
24, 2010 and March 7, 2010. The placing of an employee on oating status
presupposes, among others, that there is less work than there are employees. But if
IKSI continued to hire new employees then it can reasonably be assumed that there
was a surplus of work available for its existing employees. Hence, placing respondents
on oating status was unnecessary. If any, respondents — with their experience,
knowledge, and familiarity with the workings of the company — should be preferred to
be given new projects and not new hires who have little or no experience working for
IKSI. 4 4
There being no valid suspension of business operations, IKSI's act amounted to
constructive dismissal of respondents since it could not validly put the latter on forced
leave or oating status pursuant to Article 301. And even assuming, without admitting,
that there was indeed suspension of operations, IKSI did not recall the employees back
to work or place them on valid permanent retrenchment after the period of six (6)
months, as required of them by law. IKSI could not even use the completion of the
duration of the alleged project as an excuse for causing the termination of respondents'
employment. It must be pointed out that the termination was made in 2010 and the
expected completion of the project in respondents' contracts was still in 2012 to 2014.
Also, if the Court would rely on IKSI's own Notice of Partial Appeal and Memorandum
on Partial Appeal 4 5 before the NLRC dated December 10, 2010, respondents might
even had been put on oating status for a period exceeding the required maximum of
six (6) months. Evidence reveal that the assailed forced leave took effect on January 7,
2010 and IKSI eventually sent its termination letters four (4) months after, or on May
27, 2010, with the effectivity of said termination being on July 7, 2010. But as of
December 10, 2010, IKSI was still insisting that respondents were never dismissed and
were merely placed on forced leave. It was only in its Comment on Complainants'
Motion for Reconsideration dated August 3, 2011 did IKSI admit the fact of dismissal
when it appended its own termination letters dated May 27, 2010.
But even on May 27, 2010, there was still no basis for IKSI to nally make the
retrenchment permanent. While it acknowledged the fact that respondents could not be
placed on an inde nite oating status, it still failed to present any proof of a bona de
closing or cessation of operations or undertaking to warrant the termination of
respondents' employment. The termination letter 4 6 reads:
As you are probably already been aware by now, our Product Stream ACTDR of
Project CSP, have been experiencing a considerably downward trend in terms of
workload. The Company has undertaken every effort to obtain new
commitments from its clients abroad in order to proceed with the expected
volume of work under the same product stream.
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 Unfortunately, however, it has become evident that despite said efforts being
exerted by the Company, the prospect of new work related to the product stream
coming in, remains uncertain at this point. Management has already utilized all
available options, which include placing its project employees on forced leave.
This, however, cannot go on indefinitely.
It is therefore, with deep regret, that we inform you that in view of the
unavailability of work of the aforementioned product stream as well
as the uncertainties pertaining to the arrival of new workloads thereof ,
we are constrained to terminate your Project Employment Contract in
accordance with the terms and conditions stated under the
Termination of Employment of your Project Employment Contract, effective
7/7/2010.
xxx xxx xxx
It bears to point out that said termination letter did not even state any of the
following valid grounds under the law as anchor for the dismissal:
Art. 297. Termination by Employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
EcTCAD

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust

reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. 4 7
Art. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall
be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year.
The NLRC likewise committed a grave error when it held that there was no basis
for respondents' reliance on the case of Bontia v. NLRC 4 8 on the sole ground that, in
the present case, the employees were neither actually nor constructively dismissed.
The Court a rms respondents' contention that when IKSI feigned suspension of
operations and placed respondents on forced leave, the same had already amounted to
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 constructive dismissal. And when IKSI sent letters informing them that they would be
terminated effective July 7, 2010, respondents then had been actually dismissed. In
Bontia, the manner by which the employer severed its relationship with its employees
was remarkably similar to the one in the case at bar, which was held to be an
underhanded circumvention of the law. Consolidated Plywood Industries summarily
required its employees to sign applications for forced leave deliberately crafted to be
without an expiration date, like in this case. This consequently created an uncertain
situation which necessarily discouraged, if not altogether prevented, the employees
from reporting, or determining when or whether to report for work. The Court further
ruled that even assuming that the company had a valid reason to suspend operations
and had led the necessary notice with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), it still would not be a legitimate excuse to cursorily dismiss employees without
properly informing them of their rights and status or paying their separation pay in case
they were eventually laid off. Under the Labor Code, separation pay is payable to an
employee whose services are validly terminated as a result of retrenchment,
suspension, closure of business or disease. Thus, the Court held that Consolidated
Plywood's employees should, at the very least, have been given separation pay and
properly informed of their status so as not to leave them in a quandary as to how they
would properly respond to such a situation. 4 9 Similarly, respondents never received
any separation pay when they were terminated in July of 2010 since IKSI had been
denying the existence of a dismissal, whether actual or constructive.
Withal, in both permanent and temporary lay-offs, jurisprudence dictates that the
one (1)-month notice rule to both the DOLE and the employee under Article 298 is
mandatory. 5 0 Here, both the DOLE and respondents did not receive any prior notice of
the temporary lay-off. The DOLE Region VII O ce was only informed on January 11,
2010 5 1 or four (4) days after the forced leave had already taken effect. On the other
hand, respondents received the notice 5 2 of forced leave on January 7, 2010, after the
business day of which the same forced leave was to take effect. Respondents also
pointed out that when they received said notice, they were told to no longer report
starting the next day, made to completely vacate their workstations and surrender their
company identi cation cards, and were not even allowed to use their remaining unused
leave credits, which gave them the impression that they would never be returning to the
company ever again.
Since dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee, the
requisites for a valid dismissal from employment must always be met, namely: (1) it
must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded due
process, 5 3 meaning, he is noti ed of the cause of his dismissal and given an adequate
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Our rules require that the employer be
able to prove that said requisites for a valid dismissal have been duly complied with.
Indubitably, IKSI's intent was not merely to put respondents' employment on hold
pending the existence of the unfavorable business conditions and call them back once
the same improves, but really to sever the employer-employee relationship with
respondents right from the very start. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye to IKSI's
manifest bad faith in terminating respondents under the guise of placing them on a
simple oating status. It is positively aware of the unpleasant practice of some
employers of violating the employees' right to security of tenure under the pretense of a
seemingly valid employment contract and/or valid termination. We must abate the
culture of employers bestowing security of tenure to employees, not on the basis of the
latter's performance on the job, but on their ability to toe the line. 5 4 Unfortunately for
IKSI, they chanced upon respondents who, unlike the ordinary workingman who always
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 plays an easy prey to these per dious companies, are fully aware of their rights under
the law and simply refuse to ignore and endure in silence the agrant irruption of their
rights, zealously safeguarded by the Constitution and our labor laws. HSAcaE

Procedural Issues

Tested against the above-discussed considerations, the Court nds that the CA
correctly granted respondents' certiorari petition before it, since the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in ruling that respondents were merely IKSI's project employees
and that they were validly put on oating status as part of management prerogative,
when they had satisfactorily established by substantial evidence that they had become
regular employees and had been constructively dismissed. 5 5 Grave abuse of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. 5 6 In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed
to the NLRC when, inter alia, its ndings and conclusions, as in the case at bar, are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 5 7
In the NLRC's Decision, only the following petitioners were included: Michael A.
Rebato, Hernan Ed Noel L. de Leon, Jr., Wendell B. Quiban, Fritz Sembrino, Ismael R.
Garaygay III, Edson S. Solis, Stephen Olingay, Ronan Alamillo, Jess Vincent A. dela Peña,
Dax Matthew M. Quijano, Juneth A. Rentuma and Socorro D'Marie T. Inting. On the other
hand, James Horace Balonda, Dennis C. Rizon, Ennoh Chentis R. Fernandez, Aldrin O.
Torrentira, Michael Ray B. Molde, Rodolfo M. Vasquez, Ma. Nazelle B. Miralles, and Carl
Hermes Carskit were excluded. IKSI argued that those eight (8) who were excluded did
not sign the required Veri cation and Certi cation of Non-Forum Shopping of the
Appeal Memorandum before the NLRC, and some of them also failed to execute the
Verification in the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The Court has previously set the guidelines pertaining to non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, veri cation and certi cation against
forum shopping: 5 8
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective veri cation, and non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective certi cation against forum
shopping;
2) As to veri cation, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served;
3) Veri cation is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the veri cation, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct;
4) As to certi cation against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or
a defect therein, unlike in veri cation, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of substantial compliance or the presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons;
5) The certi cation against forum shopping must be signed by all the
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 plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justi able circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certi cation against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule;
and
6) Finally, the certi cation against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justi able
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
In the case at hand, only twelve (12) of respondents were able to sign the
Veri cation and Certi cation Against Forum Shopping since they were only given ten
(10) days from the receipt of the LA's decision to perfect an appeal. Some of them
were even no longer based in Cebu City. But it does not mean that those who failed to
sign were no longer interested in pursuing their case.
In view of the circumstances of this case and the substantive issues raised by
respondents, the Court nds justi cation to liberally apply the rules of procedure to the
present case. Rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice; their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. 5 9
In a similar case, the Court found that the signing of the Veri cation by only 11
out of the 59 petitioners already su ciently assured the Court that the allegations in
the pleading were true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation; that the pleading was led in good faith; and that the signatories were
unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly had su cient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. 6 0 In the same vein, the
twelve (12) respondents who signed the Veri cation in the instant case had adequate
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in their pleadings, attesting that the
matters alleged therein have been made in good faith or are true and correct. With
respect to the failure of some of respondents to sign the Certi cation Against Forum
Shopping, IKSI cited the case of Altres, et al. v. Empleo 6 1 which ruled that the non-
signing petitioners were dropped as parties to the case. However, the reason of the
Court for removing said petitioners from the case was not because of the failure to
sign per se, but actually because of the fact that they could no longer be contacted or
were indeed no longer interested in pursuing the case. 6 2 Here, as mentioned earlier,
those who failed to sign the certi cation against forum shopping will not be dropped
as parties to the case since reasonable or justi able circumstances are extant, as all
respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense; the signatures of some or even only one of them substantially complies with
the Rule. HESIcT

The Court previously held that the signature of only one of the petitioners
substantially complied with the Rules if all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense. In cases, therefore, where it is highly
impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certi cate of non-forum shopping, it is
su cient, in order not to defeat the ends of justice, for one of the plaintiffs, acting as
representative, to sign the certi cate, provided that the plaintiffs share a common
interest in the subject matter of the case or led the case as a "collective" raising only
one common cause of action or defense. 6 3 Thus, when respondents appealed their
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 case to the NLRC and the CA, they pursued the same as a collective body, raising only
one argument in support of their rights against the illegal dismissal allegedly
committed by IKSI. There was su cient basis, therefore, for the twelve (12)
respondents to speak and le the Appeal Memorandum before the NLRC and the
petition in the CA for and in behalf of their co-respondents.
Clearly, veri cation, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a
formal requirement, not jurisdictional. 6 4 Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. 6 5 It is mainly intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of
mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in this case, the court may
simply order the correction of the unveri ed pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. 6 6 Moreover,
no less than the Labor Code directs labor o cials to use all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or
formalities, while Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that technical rules are not binding. Indeed, the application of technical rules
of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of substantial justice.
Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial
merits of the controversy. After all, the policy of our judicial system is to encourage full
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Procedural niceties should be avoided in labor
cases in which the provisions of the Rules of Court are applied only in suppletory
manner. Indeed, rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a part of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of non-compliance with the process required. For this
reason, the Court cannot indulge IKSI in its tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to
boost its self-serving arguments. 6 7
The CA, however, erred when it still considered Atty. Ennoh Chentis Fernandez as
one of the petitioners before it and included him in the dispositive portion of its
decision. It must be noted that Fernandez was one of those who led the Motion for
Execution of Decision 6 8 dated May 28, 2012, which prayed for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the LA and NLRC's rulings. The movants likewise admitted therein that
while some of them elevated the case to the NLRC, they, however, did not. Corollarily,
Fernandez should have been dropped as one of the parties to the case before the CA
since the rulings of the labor tribunals had already attained finality with respect to him.
Award of Damages

Inasmuch as IKSI failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to support the
legality of respondents' dismissal, the latter is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld
up to the date of actual reinstatement, as a necessary consequence. However,
reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case because of the palpable strained
relations between the parties and the possibility that the positions previously held by
respondents are already being occupied by new hires. Thus, separation pay equivalent
to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded in lieu of
reinstatement. 6 9
The Court sustains the CA's award of moral and exemplary damages. Award of
moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the
employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. Moral
damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
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 anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation occasioned
by the unreasonable dismissal. The Court has consistently accorded the working class
a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith, where the
motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. The award of
such damages is based, not on the Labor Code, but on Article 2220 of the Civil Code. In
line with recent jurisprudence, the Court nds the amount of P50,000.00 for each of
moral and exemplary damages adequate. 7 0
The award of attorney's fees is likewise due and appropriate since respondents
incurred legal expenses after they were forced to le an action to protect their rights. 7 1
The rate of interest, however, has been changed to 6% starting July 1, 2013, pursuant to
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. 7 2
WHEREFORE , IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the Court DISMISSES the
petition, and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Cebu, Twentieth (20th) Division, dated August 30, 2013 and Resolution dated March 12,
2014 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06443. Respondents Socorro D'Marie Inting, Ismael R.
Garaygay, Edson S. Solis, Michael A. Rebato, James Horace Balonda, Stephen C.
Olingay, Dennis C. Rizon, Juneth A. Rentuma, Hernan Ed Noel I. de Leon, Jr., Jess Vincent
A. dela Peña, Ronan V. Alamillo, Wendell B. Quiban, Aldrin O. Torrentira, Michael Ray B.
Molde, Fritz J. Sembrino, Dax Matthew M. Quijano, Rodolfo M. Vasquez, Ma. Nazelle B.
Miralles and Carl Hermes Carskit are declared to have been illegally dismissed by
petitioner Innodata Knowledge Services, Inc. and hence, the latter is hereby ORDERED
to PAY each of them the following:
a) Backwages and all other bene ts from the time compensation was
withheld on January 8, 2010 until finality of this Decision;
b) Separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as one (1)
whole year, to be computed from the date of their employment up to the nality
of this Decision;
c) Moral and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P50,000.00;
d) Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total awards; and
e) Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary
awards computed from January 8, 2010 up to June 30, 2013 and six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
The case is hereby ordered REMANDED to the labor arbiter for the computation
of the amounts due each respondent.
Costs on petitioner Innodata Knowledge Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, with Associate Justices Carmelita
Salandanan-Manahan and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla; concurring; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 53-
71.

2. Id. at 74-76.
3. Penned by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon, with Commissioners Julie C. Rendoque and
Violeta Ortiz-Bantug, concurring; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 412-424.
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 4. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 269.
5. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 423.

6. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 70. (Emphasis in the original)

7. Dacles v. Millennium Erectors Corporation, 763 Phil. 550 (2015).

8. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 20.

9. Villanueva v. NLRC and Innodata , 356 Phil. 638 (1998); Servidad v. NLRC , 364 Phil. 518
(1999); Innodata Philippines, Inc. v. Quejada-Lopez , 535 Phil. 263 (2006); and Price v.
Innodata Phils., Inc., 588 Phil. 568 (2008).
10. Price v. Innodata Phils., Inc., supra, at 580.

11. Formerly Article 280, Department Advisory No. 01, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as Amended, Series of 2015; pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No.
10151, entitled "An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers, thereby Repealing
Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as
amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines," July 26, 2010.

12. Leyte Geothermal Power Progressive Employees-Union-ALU-TUCP v. Philippine National Oil

Company-Energy Development Corp., 662 Phil. 225, 234 (2011).
13. Id.

14. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 20-21. (Emphasis ours)

15. Id. at 332-335.

16. Id. at 264.

17. 304 Phil. 844, 850 (1994).

18. Dacles v. Millennium Erectors Corporation, supra note 7, at 560-561.

19. Id. at 558-559.

20. Id. at 560.

21. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 468-470; rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1338-1530.

22. GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, et al., 722 Phil. 161, 178 (2013).
23. Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 260 Phil. 747, 761 (1990).

24. Servidad v. NLRC, supra note 9, at 527.

25. Innodata Philippines, Inc. v. Quejada-Lopez, supra note 9, at 272.

26. Formerly Article 279, Department Advisory No. 01, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as Amended, Series of 2015; pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No.
10151, entitled "An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers, thereby Repealing
Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as
amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines," July 26, 2010.

27. Villanueva v. NLRC and Innodata, supra note 9, at 646.

28. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 145; IKSI's notice of the forced leave reads:

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   Please be informed that due to changes in business conditions, client requirements and
speci cations, we regret to inform you that you shall be placed on forced leave effective
end of business day of January 7, 2010 until further notice. We shall be calling upon you
once the Company's condition relative to work requirements stabilizes, which may
necessitate your services anew.

xxx xxx xxx

29. Formerly Article 283. Department Advisory No. 01, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as Amended, Series of 2015; pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No.
10151, entitled "An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers, thereby Repealing
Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as
amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines," July 26, 2010.
30. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., 741 Phil. 728, 740 (2014).

31. Id., citing PT&T v. NLRC, 496 Phil. 164, 177 (2005).
32. Lopez v. Irvine Construction, Corp., supra note 30, at 741.

33. Formerly Article 286, Department Advisory No. 01, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as Amended, Series of 2015; pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No.
10151, entitled "An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers, thereby Repealing
Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as
amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines," July 26, 2010.
34. PT&T v. NLRC, supra note 31.

35. Id.
36. Nasipit Lumber Company v. NOWM, 486 Phil. 348, 362 (2004).

37. Supra note 28:

  Please be informed that due to changes in business conditions, client requirements and
speci cations, we regret to inform you that you shall be placed on forced leave effective
end of business day of January 7, 2010 until further notice. We shall be calling upon you
once the Company's condition relative to work requirements stabilizes, which may
necessitate your services anew.

xxx xxx xxx

38. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., supra note 30, at 743.

39. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 268.

40. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp. , supra note 30, at 605; Nasipit Lumber Company v.
NOWM, supra note 36, at 364; Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation v. NLRC , 359 Phil.
859, 869 (1998).
41. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., supra note 30, at 744.

42. Innodata Phils., Inc. v. Quejada-Lopez, supra note 25.

43. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 370-371.

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 44. ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales, 769 Phil. 498, 523 (2015).

45. Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 398-399.

46. Id. at 503. (Emphasis ours)

47. Formerly Article 282, Department Advisory No. 01, Renumbering of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as Amended, Series of 2015; pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No.
10151, entitled "An Act Allowing the Employment of Night Workers, thereby Repealing
Articles 130 and 131 of Presidential Decree Number Four Hundred Forty-Two, as
amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines," July 26, 2010.
48. 325 Phil. 443 (1996).

49. Id.
50. Lopez v. Irvine Construction Corp., supra note 30, at 741.

51. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 186.

52. Supra note 28.

53. Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. VECO, 764 Phil. 608, 621 (2015).

54. ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales, supra note 44.

55. Dacles v. Millennium Erectors Corporation, supra note 7, at 561.

56. Id. at 557.

57. Id.
58. Spouses Salise, et al. v. DARAB , G.R. No. 202830, June 20, 2016, citing Altres, et al. v.
Empleo, et al., 594 Phil. 246, 261-262 (2008).
59. Spouses Salise, et al. v. DARAB, supra.
60. Altres, et al. v. Empleo, et al., supra note 58, at 260.

61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., 567 Phil. 323, 333 (2008).

64. Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, 708 Phil. 327, 336 (2013).
65. Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., supra note 63, at 335.

66. Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, supra note 64.

67. Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc., supra note 63.

68. Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1882-1884.

69. ICT Marketing Services, Inc. v. Sales, supra note 44.

70. SPI Technologies, Inc. v. Mapua, 731 Phil. 480, 500 (2014).

71. Tangga-an v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., 706 Phil. 339, 354 (2013).

72. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

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