Chiu Pui Chung (Dominic)

Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes

The state of nature is necessarily a state of war

In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes describes his philosophy of the state of humans in nature as “that

condition which is called war” (xiii, 8) because in a state of nature there is no “common power to

keep them all in awe” (xiii, 8). In this paper I shall explain how Hobbes’ arrives at this

conclusion of human nature by analyzing his premises based on materialism, the absence of a

‘greatest good’ and how they correlate to his theory on human desires. I shall then explain that

the human desire to strive for ‘self-preservation’ would lead to a state of war. Although Hobbes’

reasoning is valid, I argue that it fails to be sound because he has confused moral relativity with

moral subjectivity, the former of which does not actually preclude the existence of the greatest

good.

In order to understand Hobbes’ conclusion that human nature is a state of war, one must first

understand his metaphysical premises. Hobbes states that “when a thing is in motion, it will

eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it” (ii, 1). This scientific premise is interpreted

by Hobbes materialistically, that all that occur in our mind “are motions within us, relics of those

made in the sense” (iii, 2). Human desires are no exception. Since everything will forever be in

motion unless something external changes it, and desires are endeavors which are ‘small

beginnings in motion’ (vi, 1), it follows logically that desires are ‘perpetual and restless…that

ceaseth only in death’ (xi, 2). As desires are restless, people would naturally want the ‘continual

progress of the desire’ (xi, 1). This is why people seek the assurance ‘of a contented life’ (xi, 1),

that is self-preservation.

Secondly, peoples’ minds and bodies are in ‘continual mutation’ (vi, 6) due to the fact that our

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desires and thoughts are all variants of physical motion, ‘it is impossible that…all men consent

in the desire of almost any one and the same object’ (vi, 6). This is why there cannot be an

‘utmost aim’ or a ‘greatest good’ (xi, 1) for all human beings to rationally strive to achieve. For

Hobbes, although passions ‘are the same in all men’ (Introduction, 3), ‘the objects of the

passions’ are different due to people living in different circumstances and having experienced

life differently. Desires are therefore relative and may vary according to the circumstances of

individuals. Since there is no utmost aim for man, desires are also capricious and one can never

be sure that when cooperating with other humans in nature that their desires are guaranteed to

align. Therefore when ‘two men desire the same thing, which they nevertheless they cannot both

enjoy, they become enemies’ (xiii, 3).

Finally, ‘nature hath made man equal’ (xiii, 1), since all knowledge and desires are derived from

the senses, and there is neither sense perception nor an innate ‘nature’ to begin with before birth.

In other words, no one human is ‘naturally superior’ over another. This implies however, that

each and every human being has the potential to overpower another, and the weakest will always

have a chance ‘to kill the strongest’ (xiii, 1). This makes the potential for a state of war possible.

Therefore, these three premises: that of an unceasing yet unpredictable desire for self-

preservation, the impossibility to secure cooperation in nature due to a lack of a utmost aim, and

the equal potential for one to overpower another, leads to competition, which ‘inclineth to

contention, enmity and war’ (xi, 3).

The term ‘war’ here does not imply a state which only consists of battles or murders, for this is

rationally incompatible with the fundamental human desire for ‘the preservation of his own

nature’ (xiv, 1). Rather, war is defined by Hobbes as ‘a tract of time wherein the will to contend

battle is sufficiently known’ (xiii, 8). The ‘state of war’ therefore is therefore a perpetual period

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of tension and insecurity, when ‘there is no assurance to the contrary’ (xiii, 8). Furthermore, the

concept of justice only exists with law and covenants, and since in a state of nature there is

neither law nor covenant, it follows that justice does not exist in a state of nature. In Hobbes’

own words: ‘where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice’ (xiii,

13). The term ‘war’ therefore is used here simply as an observational fact, not as a moral

judgment of human beings.

Hobbes also responds to several anticipated objections to his argument. A common objection, for

example, is that the natural desire for ‘self-preservation’ is a cynical and pessimistic conclusion

of humans as evil, selfish beings. Nevertheless this is not so for two reasons: firstly as

demonstrated, this is a consistent argument stemming from Hobbes’ metaphysical premises of

ceaseless desires which, once accepted would lead to the logical conclusion of self-preservation.

Hobbes does not think that humans are cynical: he himself condemns the notion of ‘cruelty’

because men do not guarantee gain self-preservation by simply taking ‘pleasure in other men’s

great harms’ (vi, 47). Secondly, Hobbes would probably not even acknowledge the criticism of

cynicism as being valid counterargument, because concepts of good and evil do not exist as

objective criteria, and they ‘are ever used with relation to the person that useth them’ (vi, 7).

Human desires are the only standards to judge good and evil, for ‘whatsoever is the object of any

man’s appetite… he…calleth good’ (vi, 7), and vice versa for evil.

Ultimately however, Hobbes fails to distinguish between moral relativity and moral subjectivity.

For example, the fact that good and evil are relative concepts does not mean that they cannot be

objective. It could be possible that although individual desires are different from different

perspectives and different circumstances, this does not stop them from pointing towards some

common goal. In other words, a ‘greatest good’ could still exist despite our diverse objects of

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desires. Hobbes’ insistence that humans in a state of nature will necessarily regress into a state of

war therefore would not stand, because if the greatest good exists, then there is always a chance

for humans to cooperate peacefully in nature, for one would then know that what others desire

would be more or less the same for oneself.

Bibliography:
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668. Ed. E. M.
Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1994.

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