RECENT JUDGEMENTS OF SUPREME COURT

2018

CONTAINING CONSTITUTIONAL, CIVIL ,CRIMINAL , PROCEDURE,LIMITATION, SPECIFIC RELIEF,

MOTER ACCIDENTS ETC.

COMPILED BY

PARTH SHANKAR MISHRA

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2744

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RANJAN GOGOI, ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, R. BANUMATHI, JJ.
RAVI & ANR.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

4. “Last seen together” is certainly a strong piece of circumstantial evidence against an accused. However, as it
has been held in numerous pronouncements of this Court, the time-lag between the occurrence of the death and
when the accused was last seen in the company of the deceased has to be reasonably close to permit an inference
of guilt to be drawn. When the time-lag is considerably large, as in the present case, it would be safer for the
Court to look for corroboration. In the present case, no corroboration is forthcoming. In the absence of any other
circumstances which could connect the accused appellants with the crime alleged except as indicated above and
in the absence of any corroboration of the circumstance of ‘last seen together’ we are of the view that a
reasonable doubt can be entertained with regard to the involvement of the accused appellants in the crime
alleged against them. The burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would not shift in the
aforesaid fact situation, a position which has been dealt with by this Court in Malleshappa vs. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 399 wherein the earlier view of this Court Mohibur Rahman vs. State of Assam,
(2002) 6 SCC 715 has been extracted. The said view in Mohibur Rahman (supra) may be profitably extracted
below:

“10. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the
accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused
and the crime. There may be cases where, on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of
the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational mind may be persuaded
to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the
victim suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide. In the present case there is no such
proximity of time and place. As already noted the dead body has been recovered about 14 days after the date on
which the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused. The distance between the two places is about 30-
40 km. The event of the two accused persons having departed with the deceased and thus last seen together (by
Lilima Rajbongshi, PW 6) does not bear such close proximity with the death of the victim by reference to time or
place. According to Dr. Ratan Ch. Das the death occurred 5 to 10 days before 9-2-1991. The medical evidence
does not establish, and there is no other evidence available to hold, that the deceased had died on 24-1-1991 or
soon thereafter. So far as the accused Mohibur Rahman is concerned this is the singular piece of circumstantial
evidence available against him. We have already discussed the evidence as to recovery and held that he cannot be
connected with any recovery. Merely because he was last seen with the deceased a few unascertainable number of
days before his death, he cannot be held liable for the offence of having caused the death of the deceased. So far
as the offence under Section 201 IPC is concerned there is no evidence worth the name available against him. He
is entitled to an acquittal.”
2018 0 AIR(SC) 2486; 2018 5 Supreme 381; 2018 0 Supreme(SC) 501;
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
E. SIVAKUMAR – Petitioner(s)
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

(a) Administration of justice – Precedence – Judgment of co-ordinate Bench – Impugned judgment considering
and distinguishing earlier judgments – Not a case of disregarding binding decision or precedent of the
Coordinate Bench – No error, more so being a possible view. (Para 7)

(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173 – Entrusting investigation to CBI – Accused has no right
to be heard during investigation – Not impleading and not hearing the accused while directing investigation by
CBI – Not a ground to interfere in the order. (Para 9)

(c) Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 173 – Transfer of investigation to CBI – Court discussing all
aspects exhaustively – Not required to give any special reason for entrusting investigation to CBI. (Para 10)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2118; 2018 4 Supreme 560; 2018 0 Supreme(SC) 422;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
Nishan Singh & Others – Appellant(s)
Versus
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Through Regional Manager & Others –

(a) Administration of justice – Concurrent finding of fact by courts below – A plausible view – Cannot be
interfered. (Para 11)

(b) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Contributory negligence – Would arise only when both parties
are involved in the accident due to rash and negligent driving – Courts below taking view that only one vehicle
was driven rashly and negligently – No question of contributory negligence. (Para 12)

(c) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 140 – Owner of a vehicle involved in an accident can be fastened
liability to pay compensation even if his vehicle was not driven rashly and negligently. (Para 13)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2493

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.K. SIKRI, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.
Kalpana Mehta and others – Petitioners
Versus
Union of India and others

Parliamentary democracy in India is qualitatively distinct from the UK.

Parliamentary Standing Committee report can be taken aid of for the purpose of interpretation of a statutory
provision as also for existence of a historical fact.

Judicial notice can be taken of the Parliamentary Standing Committee report under Section 57(4) of the
Evidence Act and it is admissible under Section 74 of the said Act.

In a litigation filed either under Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the report of the
Parliamentary Standing Committee can be taken on record. However, the report cannot be impinged or
challenged in a court of law.

The Parliamentary Standing Committee report being in the public domain can invite fair comments and
criticism from the citizens as in such a situation, the citizens do not really comment upon any member of the
Parliament to invite the hazard of violation of parliamentary privilege.
Reliance can be placed upon the report of a Parliamentary Standing Committee in proceedings under Article 32
or Article 136 of the Constitution;

Once the report of a Parliamentary Committee has been published, reference to it in the course of judicial
proceedings will not constitute a breach of parliamentary privilege;

Validity of the report of a Parliamentary Committee cannot be called into question in the court. No Member of
Parliament or person can be made liable for what is stated in the course of the proceedings before a
Parliamentary Committee or for a vote tendered or given.

A finding of fact by the court must be premised on the evidence adduced in the judicial proceeding.

No Member of Parliament can be held liable for anything said by him in Parliament or in any committee. The
reports submitted by Members of Parliament is also fully covered by protection.
The course of proceedings of Parliament and the Legislature are facts of which judicial notice shall be taken by
the Court.

There is no requirement of any permission of Speaker of Lok Sabha for producing public documents as evidence
in Court.

That mere fact that document is admissible in evidence does not lead to draw any presumption that the contents
of the documents are also true and correct.

No party can be allowed to 'question' or 'impeach' report of Parliamentary Committee.

The Constitution does not envisage supremacy of any of the three organs of the State. But, functioning of all the
three organs is controlled by the Constitution. Wherever, interaction and deliberations among the three organs
have been envisaged, a delicate balance and mutual respect are contemplated. All the three organs have to strive
to achieve the constitutional goal set out for 'We the People'. Mutual harmony and respect have to be maintained
by all the three organs to serve the Constitution under which we all live.

Fair comments on report of the Parliamentary Committee are fully protected under the rights guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a).

Admissibility of a Parliamentary Committee Report in evidence does not mean that facts stated in the Report
stand proved.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2466

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
MS. X – Appellant
VERSUS
THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR.

12. In a consistent line of precedent this Court has emphasised the distinction between the rejection of bail in a
non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail after it has been granted. In adverting to the
distinction, a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in Dolatram v State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349
observed that:

“Rejection of a bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be
considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an
order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted.

Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of the bail, already granted, broadly (illustrative and not
exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion of
attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The
satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding
is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a
mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the
trial.”
These principles have been reiterated by another two Judge Bench decision in Central Bureau of
Investigation, Hyderabad v Subramani Gopalakrishnan, (2011) 5 SCC 296 and more recently in Dataram Singh
v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2018 (2) SCALE 285:

"It is also relevant to note that there is difference between yardsticks for cancellation of bail and appeal against
the order granting bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the
cancellation of bail already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail are, interference or
attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due
course of justice or abuse of the concessions granted to the accused in any manner. These are all only few
illustrative materials. The satisfaction of the Court on the basis of the materials placed on record of the
possibility of the accused absconding is another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. In other words, bail
once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by
enjoying the concession of bail during the trial."

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2721

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
THE AUTHORISED OFFICER, STATE BANK OF INDIA
Versus
M/S. ALLWYN ALLOYS PVT. LTD. AND ORS.

No civil court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a DRT
or DRAT is empowered and no civil court can determine and no injunction can be granted by any Court or
authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken under the Act.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2011

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
KURIAN JOSEPH, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, NAVIN SINHA, JJ.
SATPAL SINGH – Appellants
VERSUS
THE STATE OF PUNJAB

14. In any case, the protection under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is available to the accused only till the court summons
the accused based on the charge sheet (report under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C.). On such appearance, the accused
has to seek regular bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. and that application has to be considered by the court on its
own merits. Merely because an accused was under the protection of anticipatory bail granted under Section 438
Cr.P.C. that does not mean that he is automatically entitled to regular bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. The
satisfaction of the court for granting protection under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is different from the one under Section
439 Cr.P.C. while considering regular bail.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 1601

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
Shakti Vahini – Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and others – Respondent(s)

(a) Honour crimes – Honour crime is genus and honour killing is species – Fulcrum of issue, violation of
Constitutional rights – Any kind of torture or torment or ill-treatment in the name of honour tantamount to
atrophy of choice of an individual relating to love and marriage by any assembly – Illegal. (Para 39, 40)

(b) Rule of law – Two adult individuals agreeing to enter into wedlock – Consent of family or community or
clan not necessary – Such consent only has pious primacy – Articles 19 and 21, Constitution of India. (Para 41)

(c) Constitution of India – Article 21 – Life and liberty sans dignity and choice – Meaningless – States’ duty.
(Para 43, 48)
 (d) Honour Crimes – Prohibitive degrees for marriages relate to recognition of matrimonial status – Prohibition
of sex determination under Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition on Sex Selection)
Act, 1994 and spreading awareness to sustain sex ratio – Has nothing to do with institution of marriage. (Para
46)

(e) Honour crimes – Khap panchayat – No such assembly should take the law into their hands – They cannot
assume character of law implementing agency – Such acts being illegal and impermissible cannot be recognized
or accepted. (Para 47)

(f) Honour crimes – Bringing a law appositely covering the field of honour killing recommended – Guidelines
for preventive, remedial and punitive measures issued. (Para 52, 53)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2171; 2018 0 CrLR 321; 2018 5 Scale 607; 2018 4 Supreme 215; 2018 0 Supreme(SC) 339;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Ranjan Gogoi, R. Banumathi, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
K.K. Mishra – Appellants
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.

(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 199(2) r/w 199(4) – Sanction order taking cognizance of three
statements – None of the statements having any reasonable connection with discharge of public duties by or the
office of the Hon'ble Chief Minister – Section 199(2) and 199(4) not attracted – At best ordinary complaint of
defamation could be lodged before a Magistrate u/s 199(6) – Instantly, press conference by appellant on
21.06.2014 – Sanction accorded for filing complaint on 24.06.2014 and complaint filed the same day in haste – No
scrutiny by public prosecutor – Complaint held not maintainable. (Para 11, 14)

(b) Administration of criminal justice – Appellant convicted and sentenced on basis of complaint filed u/s
199(2) and (4), CrPC – Appellant’s appeal pending before High Court – Complaint held not maintainable by
Supreme Court – Conviction, sentence and appeal theragainst all become non est – All proceedings quashed –
Article 142, Constitution of India. (Para 15)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 753; 2018 2 SCC 649

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
M/S NEERJA REALTORS PVT LTD – Appellant
VERSUS
JANGLU (DEAD) THR. LR. – Respondent

(a) Code of civil Procedure, 1908 – Order V, Rule 20 and 17 – Service of summons – affixing a copy of summons
at the house where the defendant is known to have last resided – Instantly not done – Ex parte order rightly set
aside by High Court. (Para 15)

Ex Parte decree – Option to defendant

16. In Bhanu Kumar Jain v Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 a Bench of three Judges of this Court has held
that :

“An appeal against an ex parte decree in terms of Section 96(2) of the Code could be filed on the following
grounds:

(i) the materials on record brought on record in the ex parte proceedings in the suit by the plaintiff would not
entail a decree in his favour; and

(ii) the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.”

A defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is passed has two options: The first is to file an appeal. The
second is to file an application under Order IX Rule 13. The defendant can take recourse to both the proceedings
simultaneously. The right of appeal is not taken away by filing an application under Order IX Rule 13. But if the
appeal is dismissed as a result of which the ex-parte decree merges with the order of the Appellate Court, a
petition under Order IX Rule 13 would not be maintainable. When an application under Order IX Rule 13 is
dismissed, the remedy of the defendant is under Order XLIII Rule 1. However, once such an appeal is dismissed,
the same contention cannot be raised in a first appeal under Section 96. The three Judge bench decision in Bhanu
Kumar Jain has been followed by another bench of three Judges in Rabindra Singh v Financial Commissioner,
Cooperation, Punjab, (2008) 7 SCC 663 and by a two Judge bench in Mahesh Yadav v Rajeshwar Singh, (2009) 2
SCC 205. In the present case, the original defendant chose a remedy of first appeal under Section 96 and was
able to establish before the High Court, adequate grounds for setting aside the judgment and decree.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2447

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
Chhotanben and Anr. – Appellants
Versus
Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar And Ors. – Respondents

(a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – For a decision under Rule 11(d) only the averments in
the plaint are germane – Written statement by respondents cannot be the basis to decide the application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) – Sale deed dated 18th October, 1996 – Appellants coming to know about it in 2013 – Trial
court rightly opining that question of limitation is a triable issue – Which of the Articles from amongst Articles
56, 58, 59, 65 or 110 or any other Article of the Limitation Act will apply to the facts of the case, may have to be
considered at the appropriate stage.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2440

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
ALAKH ALOK SRIVASTAVA – PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

23. It is submitted by Mr. Srivastava that in both the States, the cases are pending at the evidence stage beyond
one year. We are absolutely conscious that Section 35(2) of the Act says “as far as possible”. Be that as it may,
regard being had to the spirit of the Act, we think it appropriate to issue the following directions:

(i) The High Courts shall ensure that the cases registered under the POCSO Act are tried and disposed of by the
Special Courts and the presiding officers of the said courts are sensitized in the matters of child protection and
psychological response.

(ii) The Special Courts, as conceived, be established, if not already done, and be assigned the responsibility to
deal with the cases under the POCSO Act.

(iii) The instructions should be issued to the Special Courts to fast track the cases by not granting unnecessary
adjournments and following the procedure laid down in the POCSO Act and thus complete the trial in a
timebound manner or within a specific time frame under the Act.

(iv) The Chief Justices of the High Courts are requested to constitute a Committee of three Judges to regulate
and monitor the progress of the trials under the POCSO Act. The High Courts where three Judges are not
available the Chief Justices of the said courts shall constitute one Judge Committee.

(v) The Director General of Police or the officer of equivalent rank of the States shall constitute a Special Task
Force which shall ensure that the investigation is properly conducted and witnesses are produced on the dates
fixed before the trial courts.

(vi) Adequate steps shall be taken by the High Courts to provide child friendly atmosphere in the Special Courts
keeping in view the provisions of the POCSO Act so that the spirit of the Act is observed.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2039;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, NAVIN SINHA, R.F. NARIMAN, JJ.
ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & ANR.- Appellants
VERSUS
CENTRAL BURUEAU OF INVESTIVATION - Respondent

Per Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.

(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 397(2) and 482 – Section 397(2) bars revision against
interlocutory order – However, inherent powers u/s 482 could still be used against interlocutory orders for
securing ends of justice or to check abuse of the process of the Court – This power has to be exercised very
sparingly against a proceeding initiated illegally or vexatiously or without jurisdiction – Order framing charge
may not be held to be purely a interlocutory order – In a given situation can be interfered with u/s 397(2) or 482
or Article 227, Constitution of India – However, power of the High Court to interfere with an order framing
charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in an exceptional situation. (Para 18, 20, 25)

(b) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19(3)(c) – Stay cannot be granted against order framing
charges. (Para 22)

(c) Prevention of corruption Act, 1988 – Section 19 – Grant of stay – Restraint – Order must show
application of mind – Power coupled with accountability – The order granting stay must be speaking one and
conditional – Once stay is granted, proceedings should not be adjourned and concluded within two-three months.
(Para 29, 30, 33)

(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 397 and 482 r/w Article 227, Constitution of India –
Declaration of law – Order framing charge not purely interlocutory order nor a final order – Jurisdiction of
High Court not barred – Challenge should be entertained in rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of
jurisdiction – Not to re-appreciate – On grant of stay matter must be decided on day-to-day basis within two-
three months – Stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order – In
all pending matters where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after
six months from today – Trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume proceedings without waiting for any
other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced. (Para 36)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 1286; 2018 5 SCC 491

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
DWARIKA PRASAD – Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS – Respondents

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Section
13(8) r/w Section 60 of the Transfer of the Property Act – Mortgaged property can be redeemed by tendering all
dues, costs, charges and expenses before the date fixed for sale or transfer – Instantly, appellant not making
payments except an amount of 7,00,000 despite opportunities given – Held, right to redemption stood
extinguished on execution of the registered sale deed – Also held, appellant entitled to refund of 7,00,000.

2018 3 SCC 1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR, D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
Naveen Kumar – Appellant
Versus
Vijay Kumar & Ors.

Motor Vehicles act, 1988 – Section 2(30) and 50 – Person in whose name the vehicle is registered is the owner –
Successive transfers of the vehicles without change of name with the registering authority – Would not absolve
the registered owner.

12. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition
of the expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who,
for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the ‘owner’. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of
the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase,
lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a
situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be
reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of
liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), making
a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The principle underlying the
provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the
deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be
burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To
hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be
placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the First respondent was the
‘owner’ of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay
compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded
upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.

13. The submission of the Petitioner is that a failure to intimate the transfer will only result in a fine under
Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In Dr. T.V. Jose, this Court observed that there
can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But for the purposes of the Act, the
person whose name is reflected in the records of the registering authority is the owner. The owner within the
meaning of Section 2(30) is liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be fulfilled.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 3152; 2018 0 Supreme(SC) 683;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.
SHYAM NARAYAN PRASAD – APPELLANT
VERSUS
KRISHNA PRASAD AND ORS.

13. In C. Krishna Prasad v. C.I.T, Bangalore, 1975 (1) SCC 160, this Court was considering a similar question. In
the said case, C. Krishna Prasad, the appellant along with his father Krishnaswami Naidu and brother C.
Krishna Kumar formed Hindu undivided family up to October 30, 1958, when there was a partition between
Krishnaswami Naidu and his two sons. A question arose as to whether an unmarried male Hindu on partition of
a joint Hindu family can be assessed in the status of undivided family even though no other person besides him is
a member of the family. It was held that the share which a coparcener obtains on partition is ancestral property
as regards male issue. It was held as under:

“The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his
male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born
subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other
relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by
succession (see p. 272 of Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, 14th Ed.). A person who for the time being is the sole
surviving coparcener is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property. He
may sell or mortgage the property without legal necessity or he may make a gift of it. If a son is subsequently
born to him or adopted by him, the alienation, whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless
stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made by his father before he was born or begotten”. (emphasis
supplied)

14. In M. Yogendra and Ors. v. Leelamma N. and Ors. 2009 (15) SCC 184, it was held as under:

“It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole
coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is
born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say
that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any
sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a
coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.” (emphasis supplied)

15. In Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh and Ors. 2013 (9) SCC 419, a contention was raised by the
defendant No. 1 that after partition of the joint Hindu family property, the land allotted to the share of defendant
No. 2 became his self acquired property and he was competent to transfer the property in the manner he desired.
It was held that the property which defendant No. 2 got by virtue of partition decree amongst his father and
brothers was although separate property qua other relations but it attained the characteristics of coparcenary
property the moment a son was born to defendant No. 2. It was held thus:
“A person, who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener as in the present case Gulab Singh was, before
the birth of the plaintiff, was entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property.
Gulab Singh, till the birth of plaintiff Rohit Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgage and deal with the
property as his property in the manner he liked. Had he done so before the birth of plaintiff, Rohit Chauhan, he
was not competent to object to the alienation made by his father before he was born or begotten. But, in the
present case, it is an admitted position that the property which Defendant 2 got on partition was an ancestral
property and till the birth of the plaintiff he was the sole surviving coparcener but the moment plaintiff was
born, he got a share in the father’s property and became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in view of the settled
legal position, the property in the hands of Defendant 2 allotted to him in partition was a separate property till
the birth of the plaintiff and, therefore, after his birth Defendant 2 could have alienated the property only as
karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s case that Defendant 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as karta
for any legal necessity. Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire
coparcenary property are illegal, null and void. However, in respect of the property which would have fallen in
the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their
remedies in appropriate proceeding.” (emphasis supplied)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2434;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
N.V. Ramana, S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Sheila Sebastian – Appellant
Versus
R. Jawaharaj & Anr. Etc. – Respondents

(a) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 465 – A person cannot be convicted u/s 465 by solely relying on satisfaction
of ingredients u/s 464 unless and until ingredients of section 463 are also satisfied. (Para 19)

(b) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 464 – Offence of forgery – Cannot lie against a person who has not
created or signed the document. (Para 20)

(c) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 464 – Making of a document and causing it to be made – Difference –
Unless accused is maker of a false document, he cannot be convicted – Penal statute – Strict interpretation –
Instantly power of attorney falsely made by the imposter – Respondents merely acted on such document – High
Court rightly acquitting respondents. (Para 25, 26)

(d) Criminal jurisprudence – Suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of proof – Standard of proof in a
criminal trial – Proof beyond reasonable doubt.

018 0 AIR(SC) 682; 2018 1 CurCC(SC) 258; 2018 1 JLJR(SC) 335; 2018 2 SCC 352; 2018 1 Supreme 358; 2018 0
Supreme(SC) 75;

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

R. K. AGRAWAL, ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.
Kanaklata Das & Ors. – Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Naba Kumar Das & Ors. – Respondent(s)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I, rule 10(2) – Impleadment in eviction suit – In an eviction suit only the
landlord and the tenant are necessary parties – Landlord has only to prove the tenant-landlord relationship and
the grounds for eviction – Question of title not germane – Any person seeking impleadment must show that he is
a necessary party – All the owners/landlords need not join in filing eviction suit against the tenant.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 1587

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Satyendra Kumar Mehra @ Satendera Kumar Mehra – Petitioner
Versus
State of Jharkhand – Respondents
(a) Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 357(2), 389 – Payment of compensation out of fine – Fine to be
utilized for compensating different circumstances u/s 357(1) – Compensation not to be paid till appeal is decided
– Trial court passing no order for payment of compensation – Section 357 coming under heading "Order to pay
compensation" nothing to do with suspension of sentence – Sentence of fine awarded by trial court not affected
by section 357(2) – Section 357(2) does not stay sentence of fine during pendency of the appeal.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 2241

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.K. Agrawal, Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Sucha Singh Sodhi (D) Thr. LRs. – Appellants
Versus
Baldev Raj Walia & Anr.

(a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2(2) – Sine qua non – Availability of the relief claimed in
second suit for being claimed in previous suit and yet not claimed – a (Para 26)

(b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2(2) – Cause of action to claim a relief of permanent
injunction and the cause of action to claim a relief of specific performance of agreement – Independent and one
cannot include the other and vice versa – A plaintiff cannot claim a relief of specific performance of agreement
against the defendant on a cause of action on which he has claimed a relief of permanent injunction. (Para 31,
32)

(c) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXXIX Rule 1(c) – Temporary/permanent injunction governed by
Order XXXIX Rule 1(c), limitation being three years – Articles 85, 86 and 87, Limitation act, 1963 – Cause of
action for specific performance arises from the date fixed for performance or date of knowledge, limitation being
three years – Held, not possible to claim both the reliefs together on one cause of action – Held plaintiff’s suit for
specific performance not barred by Order II Rule 2(2). (Para 33, 34, 35, 37)

(d) Code of civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXIII rule 1(3) – Plaintiff in his application for withdrawing the
previous suit stating that he wants to file appropriate proceedings before competent forum – Trial court
permitting – No need of specific liberty to file second suit – Order II Rule 2(2) not attracted.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 1229

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
N.V. Ramana, S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Rajendra Rajoriya – Appellant
Versus
Jagat Narain Thapak & Another – Respondents

(a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 397, 398, 399 and 401 – Extent of revisional power – Revision
court is authorized to examine correctness, legality or propriety of any findings, sentence or order. (Para 13)

(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 398 – Sessions court passing only remand order –
Observations constituting reasons for remand – Cannot be construed as taking cognizance – Dichotomy between
taking cognizance and issuing summons – No contravention of section 398 – However Sessions court committing
error in directing Magistrate to keep its observations in mind – Amounting to influencing the Magistrate. (Para
15)

(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 200 – Magistrate taking cognizance stating that Sessions
court has made out a prima facie case – Not permissible – Magistrate ought to independently apply his mind.
(Para 17)

2018 0 AIR(SC) 721, 2018 3 SCC 343

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. SIKRI, ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.
DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR. – APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
AMAR & ORS. – RESPONDENT(S)

(a) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 6, Explanation 1 (before Amendment, 2005) – Undivided interest of a
deceased coparcener – A notional partition has to be assumed immediately before his death – His share shall
devolve upon his heirs by succession – Heirs would include surviving coparcener – Such coparcener would also
be entitled to, apart from the devolution of the undivided interest of the deceased upon him by succession, his
undivided interest in the coparcenary property which he could have got in notional partition. (Para 18)

(b) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 6, Explanation 1 (after Amendment, 2005) – Provision confers upon
the daughter of the coparcener as well the status of coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son
and gives same rights and liabilities in the coparcener properties as she would have had if it had been son –
Coparcenary flows from birth – A daughter would be a coparcener from her birth having the same rights and
liabilities as that of a son – Daughter would hold property to which she is entitled as a coparcenary property –
Right to partition, being inherent, can be availed of by any coparcener including a daughter. (Para 20, 23, 24, 26,
27)

(c) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 6 – Suit filed in 2002 – Provision amended in 2005 – Suit decreed in
2007 – Rights of appellant daughters got crystallized in 2005.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 714, 2018 2 SCC 801

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.
Shafhi Mohammad - Petitioner
Versus
The State of Himachal Pradesh

Evidence Act, 1872 Section 65B(4) Electronic evidence Certificate Can be produced by a person in control of the
device, and not of opposite party Otherwise section 63 and 65 get attracted Requirement of certificate not always
mandatory Party not in possession of the device cannot be required to produce the certificate.

2018 5 SCC 644

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. SIKRI, ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.
Soumitra Kumar Sen - Appellant
Versus
Shyamal Kumar Sen & Ors. - Respondents

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Has to be decided only on averments in
the plaint – Defence projected in written statement – Cannot be looked into for deciding application under Order
VII rule 11.

2018 1 SCC 574

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, NAVIN SINHA, JJ.
Nanjegowda @ Gowda (D) by LRs. & Anr. – Appellants
Versus
Ramegowda

There can be no adverse possession among the members of one family for want of any animus among them over
the land belonging to their family.

2018 5 Supreme 533

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. SIKRI, ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.
ATCOM TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED
VERSUS
Y.A. CHUNAWALA AND CO. & OR

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 1 – Written statement required to be filed within 30 days
extendable up to 90 days by court – Provision procedural and court can condone larger delays – but only in
exceptional cases.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 490; 2017 9 SCC 700

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ARUN MISHRA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.
Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadia – Appellant
Versus
Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya (Deceased) Through LRs & Ors. – Respondents

(a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXII, rule 4 – Bringing legal representatives of deceased defendant on
record – Instantly, defendant 7 dying prior to filing of suit – Order XXII, rule 4 applies only in case defendant
dies during subsistence of suit – Application under Order XXII, rule 4 rightly held not maintainable. (Para 6)

(b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I rule 10 – Suit for setting aside sale deed in favour of defendant 7
– Defendant 7 already dead prior to filing of suit – His legal representatives, held, necessary party – Needed to be
brought on record subject to section 21, Limitation Act, 1963. (Para 7, 14, 15)

(c) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 11 – Res judicata – Application under Order XXII, rule 4 dismissed
as not maintainable – Held, will not operate as res judicata for subsequent application under Order I, rule 10.

2017 0 AIR(SC) 5846,2018 2 SCC 93

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Adarsh Kumar Goel, Uday Umesh Lalit, JJ.
Nitya Dharmananda @ K. Lenin & Anr. – Appellant
Versus
Sri Gopal Sheelum Reddy Also Known As Nithya Bhaktananda and Anr. – Respondents

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 91 – Summoning materials not made part of charge sheet – Accused
has no right to invoke section 91 – Court, however if satisfied about bearing of the materials on framing of
charge, may invoke section 91.

2017 0 AIR(SC) 5398; 2018 1 Supreme 109

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Kurian Joseph, R. Banumathi, JJ.
Anil Kumar Yadav
vs
State (NCT) of Delhi & Anr.

18. While granting bail, the relevant considerations are:- (i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii)
character of the evidence and circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; and (iii) likelihood of the accused
fleeing from justice; (iv) the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the
society; and (v) likelihood of his tampering. No doubt, this list is not exhaustive. There are no hard and fast rules
regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for
judicious exercise of discretion by the Court.

2018 0 AIR(SC) 62
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.K. AGRAWAL, ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.
Mr. Ranvir Dewan - Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Mrs. Rashmi Khanna & Anr.

39. In the case of V. Tulasamma(supra), the learned Judge, Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, speaking for the Bench,
succinctly and in a lucid manner while analyzing the true scope of Section14(1) and (2) of the Act held as under :

“Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property
possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall be held
by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that ‘property’ includes both movable and
immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or
arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her
marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever,
and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The
language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance
the object of the Act and promote the socio-economic ends, namely, to enlarge her limited interest to absolute
ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.

Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift
or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the
terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such
property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of
Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main
provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
main provision.

Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in
favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to
confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female is
legally permissible and section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely
declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the
female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no application and the female’s limited interest would
automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under
the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of
maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

The use of terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, or
‘arrears of maintenance’ etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to
these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2).

The words ‘restricted estate’ in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and
they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh
(supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired
by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument,
decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a “restricted estate” in the property. Where, however,
property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-
existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if
the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a “restricted estate” in the property.

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