Tan Poh Khiang V Malayan Banking BHD - (201
Tan Poh Khiang V Malayan Banking BHD - (201
A
Tan Poh Khiang v Malayan Banking Bhd
primary and co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. As there was no A
record of the second defendant having been discharged as a guarantor as
compared to several other guarantors under the plaintiff ’s letter of acceptance
of Novel Villa’s offer of settlement, the JC held that the plaintiff had a valid
cause of action against the second defendant under the terms of the guarantee
for the balance sum due and owing by Novel Villa under the overdraft loan B
facility. The second defendant was therefore held to be liable for the balance
due as pleaded and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. In this appeal, the
second defendant raised the issues of whether the second defendant had been
discharged from his liability upon the acceptance of Novel Villa’s settlement
C
proposal by the plaintiff; and whether the second defendant was discharged
from his liability when the plaintiff had accepted the lesser sum of RM1.3m
from Novel Villa and had discharged all 13 landed properties.
apabila plaintif telah menerima jumlah lebih kecil RM1.3 juta daripada Novel A
Villa dan telah melepaskan kesemua 13 hartanah.
A Cases referred to
Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1; [2012]
4 MLRA 595, FC (refd)
Lee Wah Bank Limited v Joseph Eu [1981] 1 MLJ 11, FC (refd)
B Legislation referred to
Contracts Act 1950 ss 81, 86, 87, 88, 92
Appeal from: Civil Suit No MT4–22–884 of 2003 (High Court, Johor Bahru)
C Yeo Chun Ming (CM Yeo & Assoc) for the appellant.
Nas Idalina bt Nasruddin (Tan & Lee) for the respondent.
THE FACTS
F [2] Around November 1995, Novel Villa, the principal borrower, took an
overdraft loan facility of RM1.8m from the plaintiff.
[3] The said overdraft loan facility was secured by a charge dated
18 December 1995 (‘the charge’) on 13 pieces of land and a letter of guarantee
G and indemnity dated 28 November 1995 (‘the guarantee’) given by nine
guarantors, including the second defendant.
[4] In July 2001, Novel Villa defaulted on its repayment obligations with
the plaintiff under the overdraft loan facility. The plaintiff proceeded to recall
H
the loan facility.
[5] Novel Villa made a settlement proposal to the plaintiff vide letter dated
9 April 2003 (p 332, AR Jld 2) whereby it proposed a sum of RM1.3m as
I settlement of the outstanding overdraft amount. The plaintiff accepted Novel
Villa’s proposal vide letter dated 16 May 2003 (p 333, AR Jld 2) and had also
agreed to discharge five out of the nine guarantors (not including the second
defendant).
822 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
[6] It was not disputed, and in fact had been confirmed by the plaintiff ’s A
main witness ‘PW1’, the bank officer in charge of the said overdraft loan
facility, that the settlement was concluded with the payment of RM1.3m by
Novel Villa to the plaintiff and the security properties comprising the 13 pieces
of land were accordingly discharged.
B
[7] Notwithstanding the said settlement, the plaintiff in this suit claimed
against the second defendant and three other guarantors for an alleged
‘shortfall’ of debt due from Novel Villa to the plaintiff, being the guarantors
who were not purportedly discharged under the said settlement. This appeal C
concerned the second defendant only as a guarantor (judgment in default had
been entered against the first, third and fourth defendants who did not contest
the plaintiff ’s action).
[8] After a full hearing, the learned JC held that by accepting Novel Villa’s
offer of settlement, and thereby releasing the charged properties, the plaintiff as
the creditor had not discharged Novel Villa’s entire liability under its contract
with the plaintiff. There was, thus, no unilateral variation of the terms of the E
contract for s 86 of the Contracts Act 1950 (‘the Contracts Act’) to apply to
discharge the second defendant of his liability as guarantor. Further, the
guarantee was so worded that it made the liability of the guarantors primary
and co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. As there was no record of the
second defendant having been discharged as a guarantor as compared to several F
other guarantors under the plaintiff ’s letter of acceptance of Novel Villa’s offer
of settlement, the learned JC held that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action
against the second defendant under the terms of the guarantee for the balance
sum due and owing by Novel Villa under the overdraft loan facility. The second
defendant was therefore held to be liable for the balance due as pleaded and G
judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
THE APPEAL
H
[9] Before us, the second defendant raised two issues, they were:
(a) whether the second defendant as guarantor had been discharged from
his liability upon the acceptance of Novel Villa’s settlement proposal by
the plaintiff; and
I
(b) whether the second defendant as guarantor was discharged from his
liability when the plaintiff had accepted the lesser sum of RM1.3m from
Novel Villa and had discharged all 13 landed properties.
We will consider these two issues together.
Tan Poh Khiang v Malayan Banking Berhad
[2015] 1 MLJ (Umi Kalthum JCA) 823
A Whether the second defendant discharged from liability upon the plaintiff ’s
acceptance of settlement proposal and the discharge of 13 landed properties
[10] It was the second defendant’s submission that in view of the acceptance
by the plaintiff of the settlement proposal by Novel Villa, the principal
B borrower, and the due payment of the agreed sum of RM1.3m by Novel Villa
to the plaintiff, the second defendant, as a guarantor, was clearly discharged
from the guarantee by virtue of s 87 of the Contracts Act which provides as
follows:
C 87 Discharge of surety by release or discharge of principal debtor
The surety is discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal
debtor, by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the
creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor.
D [11] As such, the learned JC had erred in law and on the facts when he failed
to take into account that Novel Villa, the principal borrower, had reached an
agreement/settlement with the plaintiff, which was perfected in respect of the
outstanding overdraft amount as reflected:
E (a) in the offer letter dated 9 April 2003 from Novel Villa to the plaintiff;
and
(b) in the acceptance letter dated 16 May 2003.
[12] By these two said letters, Novel Villa had been released from the debt
F
claimed by the plaintiff and as confirmed by the plaintiff ’s only witness PW1,
Mr Jagir Singh a/l Ajmer Singh. Therefore, the second defendant as guarantor
as of right was released from the guarantee by virtue of ss 81 and 87 of the
Contracts Act.
G
[13] It was also submitted that the learned JC had erred in law and on the
facts when he took into account and failed to make the correct interpretation of
subsequent non-contemporaneous letter dated 12 July 2003 (p 335, AR Jld 2)
from the plaintiff to Novel Villa. The plaintiff ’s witness PW1, during
H cross-examination, had explained the contents of the fourth paragraph of the
said letter, wherein it was stated as follows:
NOTWITHSTANDING the above, the Bank reserves the right to demand or
request additional monies if the amount received in relation to the redemption
statement is insufficient to settle all sums due and owing to us and/or should there be
I any variation in the interest rate chargeable, it will be adjusted accordingly.
(Emphasis added.)
to mean that the term ‘to settle all sums due and owing to us’ referred to the
earlier settlement sum of RM1.3m and not any alleged ‘shortfall’ arising
thereafter (see p 64, AR Jld 1).
824 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
[14] Moreover, the fact that Novel Villa, the principal borrower, was not A
sued or even made a party to the present suit for the alleged ‘shortfall’ clearly
confirmed the settlement reached between Novel Villa and the plaintiff, and
that Novel Villa would not be sued by the plaintiff for the ‘shortfall’ now
claimed against the second defendant. This fact was confirmed by PW1 during
cross-examination where at p 63, AR Jld 1, he stated as follows: B
29.Q: Dalam tuntutan ini juga tiada tuntutan terhadap peminjam utama,
Novel Villa Sdn Bhd, setuju?
A: Setuju.
C
30.Q: Rujuk Encik Jagir Singh semula pada mukasurat 173, Bundle B.
Encik Jagir Singh, setuju bahawa tiada tuntutan dibuat terhadap
peminjam utama, Novel Villa Sdn Bhd kerana penyelesaian ini telah
dicapai di antara Plaintif dan Novel Villa Sdn Bhd, setuju?
A: Setuju. D
31.Q: Dan Encik Jagir Singh, penyelesaian di mukasurat 173 diantara
Plaintif dan Novel Villa Sdn Bhd adalah berdasarkan kepada surat
tawaran di mukasurat 172, setuju?
A: Ya, setuju. E
32.Q: Tawaran tersebut adalah RM1.3 juta, betul?
A: Betul.
[15] In view of the aforesaid position of the plaintiff, the second defendant, F
as a guarantor, was also clearly discharged from the guarantee, consonant with
the provisions of s 88 of the Contracts Act which provides as follows:
88 Discharge of surety when creditor compounds with, gives time to, or agrees not
to sue principal debtor
G
A contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the creditor
makes a composition with, or promises to give time to, or not to sue, the principal
debtor, discharges the surety, unless the surety assents to such contract.
The second defendant, as a guarantor, had never agreed to the release of Novel
Villa from its obligations to the plaintiff. H
[16] The second defendant drew the attention of the court to a subsequent
judgment in default of appearance (‘the default judgment’) 24 December 2008
entered against Novel Villa under a separate and subsequent Civil Suit No I
22–712 of 2008 at the High Court in Johor Bahru. It was noted that:
(a) in this present suit, wherein Novel Villa was not made a party, it was filed
on 24 December 2003. The subsequent suit against Novel Villa,
wherein the default judgment was entered against Novel Villa as the
Tan Poh Khiang v Malayan Banking Berhad
[2015] 1 MLJ (Umi Kalthum JCA) 825
[17] It was, therefore, submitted that the default judgment entered against
C Novel Villa under the separate and subsequent Civil Suit No 22–712 of 2008,
followed by an order for winding up by the court dated 12 May 2010
(pp 323–325, AR Jld 2), was clearly an abuse of the process of the court and an
afterthought attempt to subsequently ‘defeat’ the second defendant’s valid
defences.
D
[18] As such, the learned JC had erred in law and on the facts when he failed
to take into account the second defendant’s right to be released from the
guarantee pursuant to the provisions of ss 86 and 88 of the Contracts Act based
on the true position of Novel Villa at all material times.
E
[19] For the plaintiff/respondent, it was argued that vide the acceptance
letter dated 16 May 2003, the plaintiff had only accepted the proposal to settle
the matter by Novel Villa paying to the plaintiff RM1.3m and had agreed to
discharge the charge on the 13 pieces of land. That nothing was stated that the
F
acceptance was in full and final settlement of the overdraft loan facility. Further,
the plaintiff had also agreed to release five out of nine ‘paying guarantors’ which
did not include the second defendant. This fact (being not in full and final
settlement) was further reiterated in the plaintiff ’s letter dated 12 July 2003
(p 335, AR Jld 2) wherein the plaintiff had stressed that it had the right to claim
G
outstanding moneys if the redemption sum was insufficient to settle the
outstanding sum owed. Great stress was laid on the statement in para 4 of the
said letter (as quoted in para 13 above) to evince the intention of the plaintiff
to claim further sums outstanding. This intention to claim further sums
outstanding against Novel Villa was proved when the default judgment for the
H
balance of the debt due in the sum of RM1,331,274.36 as of 31 July 2008 with
interest thereafter was entered against Novel Villa, and Novel Villa was wound
up on 12 May 2010.
I [20] We had perused the two material letters dated 9 April 2003 (‘the offer
letter’) and 16 May 2003 (‘the acceptance letter’). To better understand the
import of these two letters, we reproduce them in toto as follows:
NOVEL VILLA SDN BHD (348471-U)
C/o. 32A, Jalan Pahlawan 2, Taman Ungku Tun Aminah
826 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
A Dear Sir/Madam
Re : SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
A/C NO. 501150–106276
____________________________________________________
B The above and your letter dated 09/04/2003 refer.
We are pleased to advised that our management has accepted your above proposal of
RM1.3 million and to discharge the property charged to us subject to the following
conditions :-
C - Payment is to be received within 2 month from date of our
notification hereof.
- To discharge the following paying Guarantors :-
a. Lim Chin Hoe
D b. Siow Ah Seng
c. Joseph Ee Yew Chong
d. Keh Ah Kau @ Ker Hoon Chit
e. Steven Ee Chiung Sun
E
- A copy of the Sale & Purchase agreement is to be forward to us within 2
weeks hereof.
Thank You.
Yours faithfully
F
For Maybank
‘SERVICE IS OUR BUSINESS’
sigd
G JAGIR SINGH
Authorised Signatory
Loan Management Centre
Johore
H 07-2252176 / fax : 07-2248895
cc. M/s Tan & Lee
Advocates & Solicitors
(Ref: TLA/MBBM/Lt4(155)/0112/698/cn
I [Please kept the matter in abeyance]
Malayan Banking Berhad
(3813-K)
828 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
[21] By the two letters, it was clear to us, and we accepted the submission of A
the second defendant, that Novel Villa had explicitly stated that it offered to
settle the outstanding overdraft and amount to a maximum limit of RM1.3m
in one payment. This offer was accepted by the plaintiff vide letter dated
16 May 2003. The plaintiff went further to state that it would ‘discharge the
property charged to us’ subject to the conditions that: B
10.Q: Encik Jagir Singh, I am going to read the part of the charge for you,
daripada pertengahan. It says: ‘NOVEL VILLA SDN BHD, sebuah
syarikat yang ditubuhkan di Malaysia dan mempunyai pejabat
berdartarnya di No. 26A, Jalan Shah Bandar 6, Taman Ungku Tun H
Aminah, 81300 Skudai, Johor Bahru, Johor.’
A: That’s right. Correct.
11.Q: And here is says: ‘tuanpunya tanah atas tanah yang tersebut dalam
jadual di bawah ini’, correct?
I
A: Yes, correct.
12.Q: And here also says: ‘bagi maksud penjamin, pembayaran kepada
pemegang gadaian yang tersebut namanya di bawah ini, berserta
Tan Poh Khiang v Malayan Banking Berhad
[2015] 1 MLJ (Umi Kalthum JCA) 829
[22] As such, we were of the view that ss 87 and 88 of the Contracts Act A
applied to this case to release the second defendant, as a guarantor, from the
guarantee. We, therefore, found that the learned JC had erred in law and on the
facts when he failed to take into account the concluded settlement of Novel
Villa’s debt to the plaintiff and as confirmed by PW1, and that by virtue of s 87
the second defendant was released from the guarantee. B
[23] We did not accept the plaintiff ’s argument that the plaintiff ’s letter of
acceptance dated 16 May 2003 was not meant to be a full and final settlement
of the debt seeing that the plaintiff had nor reserved its rights to pursue the C
balance of the debt due in the same letter, and had on top of accepting the offer
of settlement of RM1.3m, had agreed to discharge the 13 charged lands. We
accepted the submission of the second defendant when he explained the
meaning of para 4 of the plaintiff ’s letter dated 12 July 2003 as being the true
meaning of the said paragraph (see para 13 above) and that it could not be D
interpreted to mean, as did the learned JC in error, the plaintiff had reserved its
right to sue Novel Villa and the guarantors for the balance of the debt due.
[24] We agreed with the second defendant’s submission that it was very
significant for the plaintiff to sue the first to the fourth defendants and not E
Novel Villa in this action in 2003, for it showed the true state of affairs between
Novel Villa and the plaintiff. We also agreed with the second defendant that the
fact the plaintiff had sued Novel Villa in Civil Suit No 22–712 of 2008, was an
after thought to defeat the second defendant’s defence in the circumstances of
this case and to bolster the plaintiff ’s argument in this case. We were not F
impressed, to say the least, with the plaintiff ’s argument pertaining to this
aspect. The said civil suit to our minds seemed to be instituted to self-serve the
plaintiff ’s case against the second defendant in this suit.
G
[25] We therefore found that the second defendant was discharged from
liability under the guarantee upon the plaintiff ’s acceptance of the settlement
proposal and the release of the 13 pieces of charged lands under the provisions
of ss 87–88 of the Contracts Act without the consent of the second defendant
(see Lee Wah Bank Limited v Joseph Eu [1981] 1 MLJ 11 at paras C–D, right). H
[26] We also found that by releasing the 13 pieces of charged lands without
the consent of the second defendant under the plaintiff ’s letter dated 16
May 2003, which were charged to the plaintiff to guarantee the full payment of
Novel Villa’s debts to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had acted in a way which was I
inconsistent with the right of the second defendant, as a guarantor. We
therefore agreed with the submission of the second defendant that he was also
discharged as a guarantor under the provisions of s 92 of the Contracts Act
which provides as follows:
Tan Poh Khiang v Malayan Banking Berhad
[2015] 1 MLJ (Umi Kalthum JCA) 831
[27] In short, we found that there was a full and final settlement of the debt
due from Novel Villa to the plaintiff which in law discharged the second
defendant as a guarantor. In making this finding, we were very well aware of the
C
principles of law pertaining to appellate jurisdiction of this court. We do not
wish to cite case authorities on this issue other than to quote a passage from the
Federal Court case of Azman bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn
Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 1; [2012] 4 MLRA 595, wherein Raus Sharif PCA at p 12
D (MLJ); p 603 (CLJ) para 23 stated as follows:
[23] The law on appellate intervention on findings of fact by a trial judge is trite. In
this context it may be useful to refer to the case of Multar Masngud v Lim Kim Chet
and Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 184, wherein it was held that an appellate court will
interfere and disturb the finding of fact by the trial judge if crucial evidence had
E been misconstrued resulting in the uncertainty on one party’s evidence and the
consistency of the other party’s evidence being disregarded. In the Privy Council
case of Choo Kok Beng v Choo Kok Hoe and Ors [1984] 2 MLJ 165 it was held that
when a trial judge had so manifestly failed to derive proper benefit from the
undoubted advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses at the trial, and in reaching his
F conclusion, has not property analysed the entirety of the evidence which was given
before him, it is the plain duty of the appellate court to intervene and correct the
error lest otherwise the error results in serious injustice. In Gan Yook Chin and Anor
v Lee Ing Chin And Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309, the Federal Court
echoed the following:
G In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind
the central feature of appellate intervention ie, to determine whether or not the
trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the
relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal
was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the
H trial court.
Clearly, the phrase … ‘insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence’ merely relate to
such a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal’s restatement that a judge
who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an
issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or
I rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of
Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention ie, that a
decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence
might be set aside on appeal.
832 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
CONCLUSION A
[28] For the reasons stated above, we had unanimously allowed the appeal
with costs of RM20,000 here and below to the second defendant/appellant.
The order of the High Court was set aside. Deposit was refunded to the
appellant. B