VOL.

141, JANUARY 27, 1986 189

Samonte vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-44841. January 27, 1986.

CIPRIANO E. SAMONTE, FROILAN E. SAMONTE, LORENZO

E. SAMONTE, TEODULA E. SAMONTE, CON-STANCIA E.
SAMONTE, and the late MIGUEL SAMONTE as represented by his
heirs REMEDIOS B. SAMONTE, NENITA E. SAMONTE,
DIONICIO B. SAMONTE, and ANTONIO SAMONTE, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BENILDA C.
ACOSTA, and SALVADOR C. ACOSTA, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Prescription; Absence of judicial summons that

could interrupt possession for purposes of prescription; Claim of ownership
of property having been filed only after more than 10 years, ordinary
acquisitive prescription sets in.—The Appellate Tribunal correctly affirmed
the Decision of the Trial Court based on ordinary acquisitive prescription,
except that the required period should have been stated as starting from May
23, 1947 when BENILDA executed the Affidavit, Exhibit “7”, before Judge
Si-meon Ramos of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. In that
Affidavit, BENILDA claimed ownership over the DISPUTED PROPERTY.
No judicial summons, which could interrupt possession for purposes of
prescription (Article 1123, Civil Code) had been served on BENILDA. Neither
have private respondents been served with judicial summons prior to the
institution, on April 3, 1970, of Case No. 4569-11 of the then Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte.
Same; Same; Same; Antichresis; Execution of instrument of an-tichresis
based on testimonial evidence, not legally sufficient; Presumption of
possession in concept of owner; Case at bar.—It is also our opinion that
respondent Court correctly invoked Article 541

______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Samonte vs. Court of Appeals

of the Civil Code in concluding that private respondents should now be

deemed the owners of the DISPUTED PROPERTY. Petitioners’ claim that an
instrument of antichresis had been executed by PLACIDA and VICTORIA in
the latter part of 1930, based on testimonial evidence, cannot be considered
legally Sufficient. An unregistered lease for 50 years, enforceable against the
successors-in-interest of the lessee, could have been as easily alleged. A
comment which we might make is that on or about 1930, an express contract
of antichresis would have been unusual.
Same; Same; Same; Laches; For filing complaint for recovery of
property only after more than 27 years, petitioners are guilty of laches.—As
to respondent Court’s indirect finding of laches, we repeat hereunder the
following statement in Pangadil vs. Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 116
SCRA, p. 353: “It is equally unbelievable that in the span of time from
December 1941 up to the date that Civil Case No. 2187 was filed on January
7, 1969, a period of more than twenty-seven years, the petitioners would not
have taken any step to verify the status of the land of their father which had
been in the possession of the private respondents during all the time,
particularly as to the possibility of redeeming the supposed mortgage their
father had constituted thereon. Their inaction for such a considerable period
of time reflects on the credibility of their pretense that they merely intended to
confirm an oral mortgage, instead of a sale of the land in question.”

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision
of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 55914-R affirming that
of the Trial Court and declaring private respondents the owners of the
lands in suit.
The antecedents of the case follow:

1. In 1930, PLACIDA Espiritu was the owner of five (5) parcels

of rice land situated in Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
2. Sometime during the last days of 1930, according to petitioners
(Folio-8), or on September 7, 1931, according to

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Samonte vs. Court of Appeals

private respondents (Exhibit “7”), those five parcels were

transferred from PLACIDA to VICTORIA Mendoza (Folio-
142).
 3. Two of the five parcels were subsequently washed away by a
river (Folio-10, Exhibit “1-B”). The remaining-three parcels
constitute the property subject of this case (the DISPUTED
PROPERTY).
4. PLACIDA passed away in December, 1941 (Folio-9), the
petitioners herein being her heirs.
5. VICTORIA died on April 19, 1937 (Exhibit “7”), succeeded
by her mother Salvadora Feri, who died in 1947 (Folio-9),
succeeded by her daughter BENILDA Mendoza (sister of
VICTORIA) who died on 11 November 1962 (Respondents’
Brief, p. 3), and was succeeded by her adopted children, the
private respondents herein (Folio-9).
6. There is documentary evidence that BENILDA had claimed
ownership of the DISPUTED PROPERTY on May 23, 1947
(Exhibit “7”), reiterated on December 2, 1952 (Exhibit “6”).
7. On April 3, 1970, petitioners instituted Case No. 4569-11 of
the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, which started
the present proceedings, their claim being for the return to them
of the DISPUTED PROPERTY for the reason that possession
thereof was transferred to VICTORIA by their mother
PLACIDA only by way of antichresis. Private respondents
defended, stating that VICTORIA had purchased the
DISPUTED PROPERTY on September 7, 1931.

Previous to that case, Civil Case No. 3630-III was filed before the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by petitioners for the recovery of the
DISPUTED PROPERTY but the same was dismissed without prejudice.

8. On December 28, 1973, the Trial Court dismissed peti-tioners’

complaint on the ground that BENILDA having claimed
ownership of the DISPUTED PROPERTY since 1952, and
petitioners’ complaint having been filed only on April 3, 1970,
or more than 10 years after December 3, 1952 (date of
registration of Exhibit “6”), private respondents should be
deemed to have acquired title to the DISPUTED

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Samonte vs. Court of Appeals

PROPERTY through ordinary acquisitive prescription under the

provisions of the present Civil Code.
9. On appeal to respondent Appellate Court, the Trial Court’s
judgment was affirmed on June 21, 1976. Respondent Court
further held that private respondents being in possession of the
DISPUTED PROPERTY in the concept of owner, the legal
presumption should be that they have ownership under a just
 title, which they need not show, pursuant to Article 541 of the
Civil Code; and that petitioners had failed “to show through
convincing evidence that it was they who were the true owners;
but their evidence is purely oral.” Respondent Court also upheld
the argument that, assuming the an-tichresis, petitioners’ right to
recover the DISPUTED PROPERTY accrued in 1941 (when
“the alleged loan with its interest at 6% had been fully paid”),
and they incurred in laches in not having asserted such right
within a reasonable time, instead of waiting until 1962 (or
1970), or 17 or 29 years thereafter.
10. The Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed before this Court
on October 4, 1976. It was dismissed for lack of merit on
November 26, 1976. The dismissal was reiterated in several
subsequent Resolutions, but the Petition was eventually given
due course in the Resolution of October 19, 1977 (Folio-220).

We have decided to uphold the questioned judgment of respondent

Appellate Court.

(a) The Appellate Tribunal correctly affirmed the Decision of the

Trial Court based on ordinary acquisitive prescription, except
that the required period should have been stated as starting from
May 23, 1947 when BENILDA executed the Af-fidavit, Exhibit
“7”, before Judge Simeon Ramos of the then Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. In that Affidavit, BENILDA claimed
ownership over the DISPUTED PROPERTY. No judicial
summons, which could interrupt possession for purposes of
prescription (Article 1123, Civil Code) had been served on
BENILDA. Neither have private respondents been served with
judicial summons prior to the institution, on April 3, 1970, of
Case No. 4569-11 of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte.

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Samonte vs. Court of Appeals

(b) It is also our opinion that respondent

1
Court correctly invoked
Article 541 of the Civil Code in concluding that private
respondents should now be deemed the owners of the
DISPUTED PROPERTY. Petitioners’ claim that an instrument
of antichresis had been executed by PLACIDA and
VICTORIA in the later part of 1930, based on testimonial
evidence, cannot be considered legally sufficient. An
unregistered lease for 50 years, enforceable against the
successors-in-interest of the lessee, could have been as easily
alleged. A comment which we might make is that on or about
1930, an express contract of antichresis would have been
2
unusual.
 2
unusual.
(c) As to respondent Court’s indirect finding of laches, we repeat
hereunder the following statement in Pangadil vs. Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, 116 SCRA, p. 353:

“It is equally unbelievable that in the span of time from December 1941 up to
the date that Civil Case No. 2187 was filed on January 7, 1969, a period of
more than twenty-seven years, the petitioners would not have taken any step
to verify the status of the land of their father which had been in the
possession of the private respondents during all the time, particularly as to the
possibility of redeeming the supposed mortgage their father had constituted
thereon. Their inaction for such a considerable period of time reflects on the
credibility of their pretense that they merely intended to confirm an oral
mortgage, instead of a sale of the land in question.”

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs

against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), J., no part.

_________________

1 ART. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it.
2 De la Vega v. Ballillos, 34 Phil. 683; Barretto v. Barretto, 37 Phil. 234;
Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, 43 Phil. 770.

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194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Samson vs. Court of Appeals

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—One cannot recognize the right of another and at the same

time claim adverse possession which ripen to ownership thru acquisitive
prescription. For prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse,
continuous, public and to the exclusion of all. (Corpus vs. Padilla, 5
SCRA 814.)
Adverse possession is essential to acquisitive prescription. (Mendoza
vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788.)
Property registered under the Torrens System (Act 694) is not
subject to prescription. (Navarro vs. City of Zamboanga, 24 SCRA
610.)
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 10 years actual adverse
possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any
land in whatever was his occupancy might have commenced or continued
 and under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all
other claimants, could result in the acquisition of title thereto by
prescription. (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516.)
In bad faith or in good faith, after eight years of actual adverse
possession, the ownership of a personal property is acquired by
acquisitive prescription after eight years of actual adverse possession.
(Dim vs. Tañega, 33 SCRA 479.)

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