117. People vs. Lovedioro, G.R. No.
112235, 29 November 1995
Facts:
Appellant fired a gun at SPO3 Lucilo who was later pronounced dead. He was positively identified by
Nestor Armenta and was charged and convicted of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court and cited the testimony of Armenta that he should have been
charged with the crime of rebellion as he was identified as a member of the New Peoples’ Army and that
the killing of Lucilo was “a means to or furtherance of subversive ends” would have been absorbed in the
crime of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135. Also, he contends that he did not fire a fatal shot but merely
acted as a lookout so he should only be guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion
under paragraph 2 of Art. 135.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding him guilty of the crime of murder instead of rebellion.
Ruling:
No. The crime was murder, not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6968, rebellion is
committed in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very
nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is
that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a
political character.
In the case of People vs Hernandez, the court ruled that “political crimes are those directly aimed against
the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as,
being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color
by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In
deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be
conclusively demonstrated.”
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions are couched in terms so general
and non-specific that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made
towards the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was
never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.
Furthermore, in the case at bar, it bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did
appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same
reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a
political purpose.
