Cases in Constitutional Law II Article III Bill of Rights
Cases in Constitutional Law II Article III Bill of Rights
service or retired.[2]
PRIMACY AND HIERARCHY OF Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various
RIGHTS: reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July
EN BANC 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings
and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth
[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003] of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari The equipment/items and communication facilities which
seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and
(First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name
dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA.
the return of the confiscated items to respondent These items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this Aside from the military equipment/items and
case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
presentation of its evidence. $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on
3 March 1986.
Antecedent Facts
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit,
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at
successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of
EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill- Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) person who rode in a car went to the residence of
to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and money and owned by MGen Ramas.
the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is
R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the
have used the military equipment/items seized in her Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On
house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties
income. manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army
officer and his other income from legitimately acquired
This money was never declared in the Statement of property by taking undue advantage of his public office
Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an and/or using his power, authority and influence as such
intention to cover the existence of these money because officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it subordinate and close associate of the deposed President
not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Ferdinand Marcos.[5]
Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos,
Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board,
would have never been known. after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to
believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6]
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
Boards consultant. Although the amount of equipment in favor of the State.
P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative
unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60. Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended
Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his
IV. CONCLUSION: property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate
facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City
unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and and the cash, communications equipment and other items
$50,000 US Dollars. confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the The records of this case are hereby remanded and
trial, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No.
of further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner
to the evidence already presented or to change the of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of
averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in
the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture. connection herewith.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its (1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance
inability to proceed to trial because it had no further with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to involve the same issues.
file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the (2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary
court to take drastic action. investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT
constitute a prima facie case against him. DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND
THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items
confiscated. The Courts Ruling
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case
Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or case states that the AFP Board conducted the
nominees have any interest or participation. investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in
relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its
ejusdem generis that is- jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of graft
and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is
the former President. However, the same AFP Board precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth
Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution was accumulated by a subordinate of former President
begins with such statement, it ends with the following Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1[22]
recommendation: clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent
need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
V. RECOMMENDATION: President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say that
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the
Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the
otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20] pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive
prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and
its amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. (a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action
1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
specific and limited purpose. immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the including the take-over or sequestration of all business
Amended Complaint do not show that the properties enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his during his administration, directly or through his
capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
allegedly owned and suggested that these properties connections or relationships; and
were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate
income without showing that Ramas amassed them (b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses
because of his close association with former President committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No.
resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas 1.
accumulated his wealth because of his close association
with former President Marcos, thus: However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft categories, require a previous authority of the President
Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1.
respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the
virtue of his close association or relation with former Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti- assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants
Graft Board should be read in the context of the law and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
creating the same and the objective of the investigation
which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG,
Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order should investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis supplied) falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as
on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which
the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the explains why private respondents only filed their Motion
Solicitor General.[27] The Ombudsman Act or Republic to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held
Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any
power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file stage of the proceeding.[30] Thus, we hold that there was
forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
amassed after 25 February 1986.[28] vested by law and not by the parties to an action.[31]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the
President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No.
the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the
authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.[32] The
there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under
amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that estoppel.[33]
there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the
PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG dismissing the case before completion of the
to investigate and cause the prosecution of private presentation of petitioners evidence.
respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379,
the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the We disagree.
case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken
by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the
mandates that an agency of government be allowed to records of this case, we find that petitioner has only
exercise only the powers granted to it. itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of
its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four
Petitioners argument that private respondents have years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner
waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only
by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner
deserves no merit as well. had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However,
despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing
Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial Even before the date set for the presentation of its
powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for
limited. Unless given additional assignment by the Leave to Amend the Complaint.[34] The motion sought to
President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill- charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of
gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as
cronies.[29] Without these elements, the PCGG cannot having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano
claim jurisdiction over a case. alone x x x.
Private respondents questioned the authority and The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the
jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute presentation of petitioners evidence since petitioner did
not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended
April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended
presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 Complaint, which would only prolong even more the
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its disposition of the case.
evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner
manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino
of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case
expressing its view on the matter, to wit: since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute the case against private respondents. This
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the
narration of the above events because this case has been Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against
ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay private respondents.
hereon has been due to the inability of the government to
produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of dismissing the case before completion of the
the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the
fact that this Court has been held to task in public about Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond
the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in
such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
situation where a case already in progress will revert back house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
where appropriate action could have been undertaken by petitioners case since these properties comprise most of
the plaintiff Republic.[35] petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it against private respondents if these properties are
was conducting a preliminary investigation on the inadmissible in evidence.
unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated
by RA No. 1379.[36] The PCGG prayed for an additional On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served
four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The at Dimaanos residence a search warrant captioned Illegal
Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not
presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed
on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in
court of the result of the preliminary investigation the the seizure receipt together with other items not
PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized
gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines;
presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000
concerned x x x.[37] Still on the date set, petitioner and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990,
petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the
Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already raiding team conducted the search and seizure on March
pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint. revolution.[39] Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
only itself to blame for failure to complete the Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave by the will of the Filipino people.[40] Petitioner asserts
petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the that the revolutionary government effectively withheld
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
private respondents exclusionary right. revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum,
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S.
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Puno:[42]
Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage
at the time of the search. Therefore, the government A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow
may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano of the established government in any country or state by
and use the same in evidence against her since at the time those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden,
of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any radical and fundamental change in the government or
constitutional right. political system, usually effected with violence or at least
some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments. of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the
As succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation first order itself.
No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was
done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively
Constitution.[41] The resulting government was peaceful one, and more popularly known as the people
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no power revolution that the Filipino people tore themselves
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the
that the revolutionary government, as the de jure unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law. From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution
has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical
government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 reforms in their system of government or institutions by
Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the force or a general uprising when the legal and
actual and effective take-over of power by the constitutional methods of making such change have
revolutionary government following the cessation of proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 unavailable. It has been said that the locus of positive
(immediately before the adoption of the Provisional law-making power lies with the people of the state and
Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to from there is derived the right of the people to abolish,
individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and to reform and to alter any existing form of government
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration without regard to the existing constitution.
of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during
the interregnum. xxx
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in
However, we rule that the protection accorded to fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had
remained in effect during the interregnum. earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met
revolutionary government were the supreme law because by little resistance and her control of the state
no constitution limited the extent and scope of such evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 key officers of the administration, the departure of the
Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the
Military signaled the point where the legal system then in authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under
effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.
(Emphasis supplied)
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
Constitution remained operative during the interregnum sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights.
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to include
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before specific language recognizing the validity of the
the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders. The following discourse by
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations
the take-over of private property by mere executive of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due
process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something
Rights. schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.
During the interregnum, the government in power was
concededly a revolutionary government bound by no For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas
constitution. No one could validly question the lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand,
because there was no Bill of Rights during the he argues that everything the Commission is doing is
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of
sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand,
the Freedom Constitution. almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what
matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some
Commission on Good Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it
sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of
Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, ordinary due process, hence they are asking for
and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes
validity of sequestration orders, thus: remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say
grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the
foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three
of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should reasons:
be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies
and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional
already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom normalization. Very much at the heart of the
Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the
President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the
protect the interest of the people through orders of heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical;
sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of
also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for
the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide
even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend without the support of Section 8. If not sustained,
to become ingrained. The committee report asks for however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must
extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
months after the convening of Congress, and Congress
may even extend this longer. The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by
staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law.
repeated become vice. What the committee report is From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil
asking for is that we should allow the new government to benefit of law for my nations safety sake. I ask the
acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights. Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations
sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to
shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
they have a vested right to its practice, and they will
fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas
an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a against the amendment excepting sequestration orders
democratic revolution. from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still
adopted the amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII
Third, the argument that what matters are the results of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration
disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like orders would not stand the test of due process under the
Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim Bill of Rights.
by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson,
it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973
The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration
the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of
government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom
price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, The revolutionary government, after installing itself as
specifically the due process in the search and seizure the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which
either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant
highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to
dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it all individuals within its territory and subject to its
would become convinced of the values enshrined in the jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present
Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the
estimation. revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
For these reasons, the honorable course for the interference with his privacy, family, home or
Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of correspondence.
the committee report and allow the new Constitution to
take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall
Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been doing has be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the
been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.[46] Thus, the revolutionary government was also AJ AMORES
obligated under international law to observe the
rights[47] of individuals under the Declaration. Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to
seize only for weapons. What else, aside from the
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth
Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Dimaano?
Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration
as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be
as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know
international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the reason why your team also seized other properties
the revolutionary government did not repudiate the not mentioned in said search warrant?
Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated
the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility raid, I was informed that the reason why they also
for the States good faith compliance with its treaty brought the other items not included in the search
obligations under international law. warrant was because the money and other jewelries were
contained in attach cases and cartons with markings Sony
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes.
Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were
orders of the revolutionary government became subject containing firearms, they forced open these containers
to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered only to find out that they contained money.
such directives and orders void. The Provisional
Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the xxx
1973 Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution
served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you
government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers know the reason why your team seized this money instead
entrusted to it by the people. of weapons?
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of A. I think the overall team leader and the other two
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by officers assisting him decided to bring along also the
government officers were valid so long as these officers money because at that time it was already dark and they
did not exceed the authority granted them by the felt most secured if they will bring that because they
revolutionary government. The directives and orders might be suspected also of taking money out of those
should not have also violated the Covenant or the items, your Honor.[49]
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the Cross-examination
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The
warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, Atty. Banaag
specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items Q. Were you present when the search warrant in
specifically described in the warrant. connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners A. Yes, sir.
witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not
included in the warrant, thus:
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with
search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged
and five (5) boxes of ammunition? Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
AJ AMORES
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you
conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Q. In the fiscals office?
Dimaano?
A. Yes, sir.
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance
together with the MSU elements, your Honor. Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the
.45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge? included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. Yes, your Honor.
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the and his assistant to bring along also the jewelries and
search warrant, any other properties or contraband which other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken
could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth but they brought along also these articles. I do not really
Dimaano? know their reason for bringing the same, but I just
learned that these were taken because they might get
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some lost if they will just leave this behind.
hidden items, for instance, the communications equipment
and money. However, I did not include that in the xxx
application for search warrant considering that we have
not established concrete evidence about that. So when Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they
were not also included in the search warrant?
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had
reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering
Miss Elizabeth Dimaano? that the money was discovered to be contained in attach
cases. These attach cases were suspected to be
A. Yes, your Honor.[50] containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in
the course of the search the contents turned out to be
xxx money. So the team leader also decided to take this
considering that they believed that if they will just leave
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along the money behind, it might get lost also.
with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles
A. Forty, sir. that were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer
Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.
vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian [1] Composed of Justices Regino Hermosisima, Jr.,
that the warrant did not include the monies, Francis Garchitorena and Cipriano del Rosario.
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that
the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not [2] Republic v. Migrino, G.R. No. 89483, 30 August 1990,
particularly describe these items and the raiding team 189 SCRA 289.
confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team
had no legal basis to seize these items without showing [3] Records of the Sandiganbayan [hereinafter Records],
that these items could be the subject of warrantless pp. 53-55.
search and seizure.[52] Clearly, the raiding team
exceeded its authority when it seized these items. [4] An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
these items are contraband per se,[53] and they are not, Proceedings Therefor.
they must be returned to the person from whom the
raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that [5] Records, p. 14.
such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely
that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as [6] Ibid., p.16.
basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be [7] Ibid., p. 166.
returned immediately to Dimaano.
[8] Ibid., p. 286.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated [9] Supra, note 2.
18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037, remanding the records of this case to the [10] G.R. No. 94595, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 474.
Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence
may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner [11] Supra, note 2.
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of
any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are [12] Rollo, p. 21.
AFFIRMED.
[13] Supra, note 10.
SO ORDERED.
[14] Supra, note 2.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur. [15] Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice [16] Supra, note 2.
Vitug in his concurring opinion.
[17] Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
[18] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115906, 29
Panganiban, J., in the result. September 1994, 237 SCRA 242.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official [19] Presidential Decree No. 1769 Amending PD 360
leave. dated December 30, 1973 adjusting the authorized
grades in the command and staff structure of the AFP
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the dated 12 January 1981. The ranking is as follows:
separate opinion of J. Reynato Puno.
Chief of Staff, AFP General (0-10) [31] Monsanto v. Zerna, G.R. No. 142501, 7 December
2001, 371 SCRA 664; Republic v. Estipular, G.R. No.
Vice Chief of Staff, AFP Lt. General (0-9) 136588, 20 July 2000, 336 SCRA 333.
Commander of Major Services, AFP Maj. General (0-8) [32] Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[22] WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have [35] Records, p. 347.
been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives and close associates both [36] Ibid., p. 346.
here and abroad;
[37] Ibid., p. 395.
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-
gotten wealth; [38] Ibid., p. 422.
[24] Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties [41] Proclamation No. 3, Provisional Constitution of the
Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former Republic of the Philippines, provides:
President Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their Close
Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon
Agents or Nominees dated 12 March 1986. C. Aquino was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
[25] Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of their WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in
Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, and/or defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees amended;
dated 7 May 1986.
xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
[26] Amending Executive Order No. 14 dated 18 August
1986. See also Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15 and G.R.
No. 146738, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108; Mun. of San
[27] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, 16 August Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 220
1991, 200 SCRA 667. (1997).
[28] Section 15 (11), RA No. 6770. [42] A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA
589.
[29] Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[43] No. L-75885, 27 May 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
[30] Cudia v. CA, 348 Phil. 190 (1998).
[44] Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze freedom of expression [Article 19(1 & 2)]; (9) The right
orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in of peaceful assembly shall be recognized [Article 21]; (10)
relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain Everyone shall have the right of freedom of association
operative for not more than eighteen months after the with others [Article 22(1)]; (11) All persons are equal
ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may to the equal protection of the law [Article 26].
extend said period.
[46] Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon (1951); Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil.
showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of 256 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90
the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be Phil. 107 (1951); Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70
registered with the proper court. For orders issued (1951).
before the ratification of this Constitution, the
corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed [47] Among the rights enshrined in the Declaration are:
within six months from its ratification. For those issued (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone or in
after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding association with others [Article 17(1)]; (2) Everyone has
shall be commenced within six months from the issuance the right to take part in the government of his country,
thereof. directly or through freely chosen representatives
[Article 21(1)]; (3) Everyone has the right to work, to free
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of
automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is work and to protection against unemployment [Article
commenced as herein provided. 23(1)].
[45] Among the rights of individuals recognized in the [48] Section 1, Article I of the Provisional Constitution
Covenant are: (1) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of provides: The provisions of xxx ARTICLE IV (Bill of
his life [Article 6(1)]; (2) No one shall be subjected to Rights) xxx of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, remain
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or in force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part
punishment. [Article 7]; (3) Everyone has the right to of this provisional Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived [49] TSN, 18 April 1989, pp. 115-117.
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law. Anyone [50] Ibid., pp. 136-138.
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by [51] Ibid., pp. 144-146.
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to release [Article 9(1 & 3)]; [52] Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule
(4) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time against warrantless search and seizure have been
of the arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be judicially formulated as follows: (1) search incidental to a
promptly informed of the charges against him [Article lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure
9(2)]; (5) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a of evidence in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5)
State shall, within that territory, have the right to waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. unreasonable search and seizure. (People v. Que Ming Kha,
Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his G.R. No. 133265, 31 May 2002; Caballes v. Court of
own. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, 15 January 2002; People v.
enter his own country [Article 12(1, 2 & 3)]; (6) Everyone Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA
charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be 561).
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law
[Article 14(2)]; (7) Everyone shall have the right of [53] People v. Lim, G.R. No. 141699, 7 August 2002; Del
freedom of thought, conscience and religion [Article Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, 31 May 2001, 358
18(1)]; (8) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions SCRA 373.
without interference. Everyone shall have the right to
SECOND DIVISION temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic
confines of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to
[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005] arrive at what might seem the desirable solution. But
easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. leads to a result that may be morally correct, but legally
ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI wrong.
DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in
their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles
Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District involved in this case will comfort those who maintain that
Court of Hawaii, petitioners, vs. HON. SANTIAGO our substantive and procedural laws, for all their
JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad
of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief
the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its sought by the petitioners is expressly mandated by our
court appointed legal representatives in Class Action laws and conforms to established legal principles. The
MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in
namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., order to correct the legally infirm and unabashedly unjust
respondents. ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May
DECISION 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States
District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii,
TINGA, J.: against the Estate of former Philippine President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, brought forth by ten Filipino citizens[2] who each alleged
and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
While the restoration of freedom and the fundamental detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or
structures and processes of democracy have been much military forces during the Marcos regime.[3] The Alien
lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Courts
however, have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by
wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial aliens for tortious violations of international law.[4]
law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf
murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of
dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
extended through the same caprice or whim that between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily
characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage executed or had disappeared while in the custody of
done was not merely personal but institutional, and the military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the
proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000)
award of reparations due within the confines of the members; hence, joinder of all these persons was
restored rule of law. impracticable.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of The institution of a class action suit was warranted under
human rights violations[1] who, deprived of the Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil
opportunity to directly confront the man who once held Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the
absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified
instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-
clash has been for now interrupted by a trial court ruling, classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance
seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the victims.[5] Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered
petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary
Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3
order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge
them by a foreign court. There is an understandable Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for
Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents dated 28 July 1999. From this denial, petitioners filed a
($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth orders of respondent judge.[11] They prayed for the
Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.[6] annulment of the questioned orders, and an order
directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC)
for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of
that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is
favor the US District Court awarded damages.[7] They the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action
argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of
petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after damages. They also point out that to require the class
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos
Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render
become final and executory, and hence should be inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.[8] Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition
of every action.
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to
dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of
correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only Rights of the Constitution, which provides that Free
paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of person by reason of poverty, a mandate which is
over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing
Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived
No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair,
of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that inequitable, and unjust.
an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is
not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to
only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, intervene in this case.[12] It urged that the petition be
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.[9] granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the
enforcement and execution of the District Court
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Ranada[10] of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati
dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of
judge opined that contrary to the petitioners submission, a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the
the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable principle that once a case has been decided between the
of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment same parties in one country on the same issue with
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another
definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination country.[13] The CHR likewise invokes the principle of
of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, comity, and of vested rights.
Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper The Courts disposition on the issue of filing fees will
amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for courts
Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been confronted with actions enforcing foreign judgments,
paid. particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no
basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based
on the special circumstances of the petitioners as victims
of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged allegation of P 400,000.00 - P 10.00
human rights abuses.
...
An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily
evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear (Emphasis supplied)
letter of the law when he concluded that the filing fee be
computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one
value of the property in litigation. hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-
party, etc. complaints and complaints-in-interventions,
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied and on the other, money claims against estates which are
on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for
the filing fee of over P472 Million. The provision states: purposes of the present petition is whether the action
filed with the lower court is a money claim against an
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.- estate not based on judgment.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final
for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does
etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all not make any distinction between a local judgment and a
clerical services in the same time, if the total sum foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish,
claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the we shall not distinguish.
property in litigation, is:
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00 instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis
of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00 property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the
but less than P 150,000.00 amount of indebtedness or the mortgagees claim.[14] In
special proceedings involving properties such as for the
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00 allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the
value of the property.[15] The aforecited rules evidently
less than P 200,000.00 have no application to petitioners complaint.
4. P 200,000.00 or more but Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso
on actions where the value of the subject matter cannot
less than P 250,000.00 - P 1,500.00 be estimated. The provision reads in full:
3. All other actions not SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a
judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
involving property --- P 600.00 jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing
the fees. (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the
property shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the In either case, the judgment or final order may be
basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action law or fact.
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.[16] Neither the complaint nor the award of There is an evident distinction between a foreign
damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an
any real property of the Marcos Estate. action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive
upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam,
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive,
when he concluded that the filing fees should be of a right as between the parties and their successors in
computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section interest by a subsequent title.[21] However, in both
7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of
should apply in determining the filing fees for an action jurisdiction or notice to the party,[22] collusion,
to enforce a foreign judgment? fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the
party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is defend against the enforcement of such decision in the
required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment local forum. It is essential that there should be an
in this jurisdiction. opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations its efficacy.[25]
have established a usage among civilized states by which
final judgments of foreign courts of competent It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment[26],
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case
different countries.[17] This principle was prominently of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the
affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign
Guyot[18] and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence judgment, and in order for the court to properly
beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.[19] The determine its efficacy.[27] Consequently, the party
conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally overcoming the presumption of its validity.[28]
contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which was taken from the California Code of Civil The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must
Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in
Act of March 11, 1872.[20] Remarkably, the procedural the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of
a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in the
purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest
for the enforcement or protection of a right,[29] and and quietness.[33] If every judgment of a foreign court
clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
conclusive judgment upon title or the presumptive immaterial the previously concluded litigation.[34]
evidence of a right.[30] Absent perhaps a statutory grant
of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the support the proposition that the subject matter of the
regular courts.[31] complaintthe enforcement of a foreign judgmentis
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive,
the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical
foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of
allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the
may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an assailed Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that point without equivocation:
are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint
for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action The Rules use the term where the value of the subject
emanates from the violation of the right of the matter cannot be estimated. The subject matter of the
complainant through the act or omission of the present case is the judgment rendered by the foreign
respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for the court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums
enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages of money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court
from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be
right through the same manner of action, the cause of estimated; indeed, it can even be easily determined. The
action derives not from the tortious act but from the Court is not minded to distinguish between the
foreign judgment itself. enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said
judgment, and separate the two, for purposes of
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff
Using the above example, the complainant will have to suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed
establish before the court the tortious act or omission to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that
committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to the subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million, but
rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the
circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on value of such enforcement cannot be estimated.[35]
the facts, and from there the right to and amount of
damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the
enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary
the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos Estate cites
it prescinds. Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of
Appeals, which ruled:
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues
are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the [I]n determining whether an action is one the subject
foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation
fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
issues.[32] Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as the
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the
Regional Trial Courts). enforcement of foreign judgments.
On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,[36] from which Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
the rule in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
latter cases:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
xxx However, where the basic issue is something other probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
defendant perform his part of the contract (specific (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
of judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
considered such actions as cases where the subject of exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided,
instance.[37] That where there are several claims or causes of action
between the same or different parties, embodied in the
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
include legality of conveyances and money deposits,[38] irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
validity of a mortgage,[39] the right to support,[40] the same or different transactions;
validity of documents,[41] rescission of contracts,[42]
specific performance,[43] and validity or annulment of (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
judgments.[44] It is urged that an action for entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such
enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
class. his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self- issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
evident that while the subject matter of the action is issue of possession.
undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the
effect of a providential award would be the adjudication (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
primarily for the enforcement of the foreign judgment, interest therein where the assessed value of the
but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
argument since there is no denying that the enforcement thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
award of a definite sum of money. thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
point of reckoning, we must examine its possible shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
ramifications. Petitioners raise the point that a lots.[45]
declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign
judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the doctrine affirmed in this decision is grounded solely on
cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to
of rights and interests over property or a sum of money. the the internationally recognized policy of
But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action preclusion,[46] as well as the principles of comity, utility
to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment and convenience of nations[47] as the basis for the
itself, and the cause of action arising from the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and
adjudication of such judgment. enforcement of foreign judgments. The US Supreme
Court in Hilton v. Guyot[48] relied heavily on the concept
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the of comity, as especially derived from the landmark
instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the
even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under Conflict of Laws of 1834.[49] Yet the notion of comity
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus has since been criticized as one of dim contours[50] or
negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an suffering from a number of fallacies.[51] Other
examination of the provision indicates that it can be conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign
relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory
for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no or the modern doctrine of obligation.[52]
other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such
complaint: There have been attempts to codify through treaties or
multilateral agreements the standards for the
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: these have not borne fruition. The members of the
European Common Market accede to the Judgments
xxx Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to
participating countries all of such obstacles to
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any recognition such as reciprocity and rvision au fond.[53]
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or The most ambitious of these attempts is the Convention
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
quasi-judicial functions. Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in
1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.[54]
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that While it has not received the ratifications needed to have
the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment it take effect,[55] it is recognized as representing
is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same current scholarly thought on the topic.[56] Neither the
time, it is also an action based on judgment against an Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the
estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) Convention.
of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable
For this case and other similarly situated instances, we theory behind the recognition and enforcement of
find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it foreign judgments or a universal treaty rendering it
does, other actions not involving property. obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of
such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the and Vagts note:
petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable
of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount . . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on
required for other actions not involving property. The private international law, each following a quite separate
petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, path, is not one conducive to the growth of a transnational
and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent community encouraging travel and commerce among its
judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing
and dismissed the complaint. stressing the identity or similarity of the values that
systems of public and private international law seek to
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in further a community interest in common, or at least
this case, one which should disabuse the notion that the reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal
systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of
an important role in both fields.[57] the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the
case.[65] The public policy defense can safeguard against
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation
worldwide renown, points out: if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is
noxious to our constitutional values.
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing
foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or
end is to protect the reasonable expectations and conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
demands of the parties. Where the parties have foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with principles of international law, by virtue of the
irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
judgment issued by the court.[58] obligations.[66] The classical formulation in international
law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
There is also consensus as to the requisites for from the combination two elements: the established,
recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice
this jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 rule of law requiring it.[67]
are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of
international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, While the definite conceptual parameters of the
Second, Conflict of Laws, states that a valid judgment recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have
rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a not been authoritatively established, the Court can
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among
States, and on its face, the term valid brings into play those generally accepted principles of international
requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the law.[68] As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread
subject matter and parties.[59] Similarly, the notion that practice among states accepting in principle the need for
fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to
foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no
jurisprudence and commentators,[60] as well as the binding universal treaty governing the practice is not
doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute a indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but
clear mistake of law or fact.[61] And finally, it has been only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules
recognized that public policy as a defense to the governing the procedure for recognition and
recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a enforcement.
variety of concerns in international practice which may
lead to a denial of recognition.[62] Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that
the procedure for recognition and enforcement is
The viability of the public policy defense against the embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or
enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions.
in this jurisdiction.[63] This defense allows for the In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section
application of local standards in reviewing the foreign 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its
judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the
presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
judgment is against a person.[64] The defense is also jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
recognized within the international sphere, as many civil action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as
law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived
which may result in a denial of recognition when the from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may
be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular value of the foreign property as determined by the
state,[69] but they all prescind from the premise that standards of the country where it is located.
there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however
generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids
judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject
the status of opinio juris in international practice. matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign
judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign
the procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the
39 derive their efficacy not merely from the procedural complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the
rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment
Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the may, for purposes of classification under the governing
Supreme Court,[70] and could very well be abrogated or procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section
revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other
is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws actions not involving property. Thus, only the blanket
of the land, including generally accepted principles of filing fee of minimal amount is required.
international law which form part thereof, such as those
ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of
foreign judgments.[71] the Constitution, which states that [F]ree access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right poverty. Since the provision is among the guarantees
recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a
Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to
foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right.
such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, Given our preceding discussion, it is not necessary to
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought
mistake of law or fact. by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign courts if the controversy can be settled on other
judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant grounds[73] or unless the resolution thereof is
assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted indispensable for the determination of the case.[74]
practices and principles in international law. Indeed,
there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39
the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive
property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the
award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination, petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the
computed in accordance with the applicable laws and Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if
standards of the forum.[72] The vagaries of inflation, as any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
well as the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This
date may very well translate into an award virtually ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and
unenforceable in this country, despite its integral no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability
validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement thereof of the Final Judgment before the courts under the
were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any
enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and other issue which may legitimately be presented before
the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the
if applied to an award involving real property situated in trial court, but within the confines of the matters for
places such as the United States or Scandinavia where proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other
real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial
well require that the filing fee be computed based on the court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the
decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed [11] Petitioners correctly note that they are precluded
orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order from filing an appeal on certiorari under Section 1, Rule
REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which bars an appeal
No costs. taken from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice and dictates the aggrieved party to file an
SO ORDERED. appropriate civil action under Rule 65 instead. See Rollo,
p. 9
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. [12] In a Resolution dated 4 December 2000. Rollo, p. 282.
[2] Namely Celsa Hilao, Josefina Hilao Forcadilla, Arturo [16] Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502 (2001).
P. Revilla, Jr., Rodolfo G. Benosa, Danila M. Fuente, Renato
Pineda, Domiciano Amparo, Chistopher Sorio, Jose Duran, [17] Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises,
and Adora Faye De Vera. Rollo, pp. 42-47. Inc., G.R. No. 137378, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA 722,
734; citing Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore, Manila,
[3] Except for Celsa Hilao, who instead alleged that her Philippines, 1995 Edition, p. 543.
daughter, Liliosa Hilao, had been tortured then executed
by military personnel during martial law. Id. at 42-43. [18] 159 U.S. 113 (1895)
[4] Id. at 42. [19] 47 Phil. 189 (1925). While the Philippine Supreme
Court in this case refused to enforce the judgment of the
[5] Id. at 35. Hongkong Court on the ground of mistake of law or fact,
it was reversed on appeal to the US Supreme Court.
[6] The Opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Betty B.
Fletcher and concurred in by Circuit Judge Harry [20] Id. JJ. Malcolm and Avancea, dissenting.
Pragerson. Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer filed an
opinion concurring and dissenting in part, her dissent [21] See also Borthwick v. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, G.R.
centering on the methodology used for computing No. L-57338, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 129, 235; Philippine
compensatory damages. Rollo, pp. 84-132. International Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77085, 26 April 1989, 172 SCRA 810, 819.
[7] Under Section 58 of the US Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the judgment for compensatory damages in a [22] Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such
class suit is awarded to a randomly selected. Petitioner as those relating to the service of summons or court
Joel Lamangan was among the randomly selected process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to
claimants of the Torture subclass awarded damages by appear and represent a defendant and the formal
the US District Court. See Rollo, p. 71. requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum. Asiavest Merchant Bankers
[8] Now Section 48, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil (M) Berhad v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 13, 29 (1991).
Procedure.
[23] Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this
[9] Since increased to P600.00. jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e.,
fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the
[10] Now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go
to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party
against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend
the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense.
In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the [36] 133 Phil. 526 (1968).
very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in
obtaining the consent to a contract is deemed already [37] Id. at 528.
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the
recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment. [38] Rollo, at 326, citing Arroz v. Alojado, 19 SCRA 711
Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., (1967).
supra note 17.
[39] Ibid citing Bunayog v. Tunas, 106 Phil. 715 (1959)
[24] See, e.g., Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co.,
144 Phil. 72, 77 (1970); Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen and [40] Id. citing Baito v. Sarmiento, 109 Phil. 148 (1960).
Company, Inc., supra note 20.
[41] Id. citing De Rivera v. Halili, 9 SCRA 59 (1963).
[25] Roeher v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003,
404 SCRA 495, 503. [42] Id. citing Bautista v. Lim, 88 SCRA 479 (1979) and
De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 94 (1998).
[26] An action must be brought in the second state upon
the judgment recovered in the first. J. Salonga, Private [43] Id. citing Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA
International Law (3rd ed., 1967), at 500; citing Goodrich, 203 (1988); Ortigas & Company v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89
600, 601; Chesire, 628; II Beale, 1377. But see E. Scoles (1983).
and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1982), at 969, which
recognizes that civil law countries provide a procedure to [44] Id. citing Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 (1990) and
give executory force to the foreign judgment, as Filipino Pipe Workers Union v. Batario, Jr., 163 SCRA 789
distinguished from the Anglo-American common law (but (1988).
not statutory) practice of requiring an action on the
judgment. [45] As amended by Rep. Act No. 7691.
[27] See Philsec Investment Corp. v. Court of Appeals, [46] Supra note 32.
G.R. No. 103493, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.
[47] Supra note 17.
[28] Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 112573, 9 February 1995, 241 SCRA 192, 199. [48] Supra note 18.
[29] See Section 3(a), Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure. [49] H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems:
Materials and Text (2nd ed., 1976), at 775.
[30] Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause
of action. Section 1, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure. A [50] Ibid.
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of Civil [51] See Salonga, supra note 27, at 66.
Procedure.
[52] Id. at 502-503.
[31] See Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 76595. 6 May 1988, 161 SCRA 122, 133. [53] Scoles & Hays, supra note 27, at 970.
[32] Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 916. [54] Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51, at 808. A decision
rendered in one of the Contracting States shall be
[33] Ibid. entitled to recognition and enforcement in another
Contracting State under the terms of this Convention (1)
[34] Salonga, supra note 27, at 514; citing Cheshire, 803. if the decision was given by a court considered to have
jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention, and (2)
[35] Rollo, p. 30. Emphasis omitted. if it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review in
the State of origin. Convention on the Recognition and estaran en la pobre tessitura de tener que dictar
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and sentencias contrarias a nuestras leyes, costumbres y
Commercial Matters, Chapter II, Article 4. orden pblico. Esto es absurdo. Querubin v. Querubin, 87
Phil. 124, 133. (1950).
[55] To date, only Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Kuwait have either ratified or acceded to the Convention. [64] See Section 48, Rule 39, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[56] Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51. [65] Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 979.
[57] Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51,at 776. [66] [It] is generally recognized that, subject to
[exceptions], a rule of general customary international
[58] Salonga, supra note 51, at 502. law is binding on all States, whether or not they have
participated in the practice from which it sprang. H.
[59] Steiner & Vagts, supra note 27, at 779. A policy Thirlway, The Sources of International Law,
common to all legal systems is to provide for the final International Law (ed. by M.Evans, 1st ed., 2003), at 124.
resolution of disputes. The policy is furthered by each
nations adoption of a view of jurisdiction in the [67] Not only must the acts concerned amount to a
international sense which recognizes the foreign courts settled practice, but they must also be such, or be
assertion of jurisdiction as satisfying its own notions of carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief
due process in circumstances in which it itself would have that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence
asserted jurisdiction. Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 976; of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief,
citing Hay, International versus Interstate Conflicts Law i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in
in the United States, 35 Rabels Zeitschrift 429,450 n. the very notion of the opinion juris sive necessitatis.
101 (1971) and Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports
(D.D.C. 1964). Salonga, in affirming the rule of want of 1969, p. 3, para. 77; cited in H. Thirlway, ibid.
jurisdiction, cites the commentaries of Cheshire, Wolff,
Goodrich and Nussbaum. [68] The problems that arise in the enforcement of
foreign judgments are generally to be solved by the
[60] See, e.g., Salonga, supra note 27 at 513. principles of international law. The Philippines by its
Constitution, adopts the generally accepted principles of
[61] Ibid; citing Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q.B. (1844) international law. F. Gupit, Enforcement of Foreign
288; Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S. 1863) 341; Godard Judgments and Arbitral Awards, XXIII J. Integ. Bar.
v. Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139 (1870); Vadala v. Lawes 25 Q.B.D. Phil. 3, at 69.
(1890) 319, 316; cf. Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609, 56
S.Ct., 80 L.Ed. 881 (1936); Cheshire, 661-664; Wolff, [69] Divergent practices do not necessarily preclude
268; Goodrich, 603. recognition of a customary norm. In reviewing the
question of the existence of customary rules forbidding
[62] Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 978. the use of force or intervention, the International Court
of Justice pertinently held: It is not to be expected that
[63] Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is in the practice of States the application of the rules in
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the question should have been perfect, in the sense that
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not States should have refrained, with complete consistency,
be applied. Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., 378 from the use of force or from intervention in each others
Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999); citing Philippine Conflict of Laws, internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a
Eight Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46. Las sentencias de rule to be established as customary, the corresponding
tribunals extranjeros no pueden ponerse en vigor en practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with
Filipinas si son contrarias a las leyes, costumbres y orden the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary
pblico. Si dichas decisiones, por la simple teora de rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of
reciprocidad, cortesa judicial y urbanidad internacional States, should, in general, be consistent with such rules,
son base suficiente para que nuestros tribunales decidan and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a
a tenor de las mismas, entonces nuestros juzgados given rule should generally have been treated as breaches
of that rule, not as indications of recognition of a new EN BANC
rule. (emphasis supplied) Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports
1986, p. 14, para. 186; citing in H. Thirlway, supra note 66. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
[70] And other inferior courts, relative to their FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
jurisdictions. MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
[71] Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Const., which states The RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national vs.
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and
international law as part of the law of the land and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations. L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas &
Associates for petitioners.
[72] Indeed, the valuation of foreign money judgments
remains a matter of debate in international law. In the Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private
United States, Section 144 of the Restatement, Second, respondent.
Conflicts of Laws (1971) adopts the rule that the forum
would convert the currency into local currency as of the
date of the award. However, this rule has been criticized. MAKASIAR, J.:
In England, the judgment debtor may now effect payment
either in the foreign currency in the amount due or in local The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
currency equivalent to the foreign currency on the date Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
of payment. French and German law similarly permit the legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
expression of a judgment in foreign currency. Soles & respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
Hays, supra note 27, at 973. petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
[73] Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995). Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union.
[74] Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, 25 May 1994,
232 SCRA 553, 557. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
to be participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from
8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed
the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
xxx xxx xxx With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming
Company, Inc.
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the
right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
(Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]),
as the right of the employer to discharge for cause
(Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, Separate Opinions
L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial
Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select his employees or to discharge BARREDO, J., dissenting:
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right
by interfering with the countervailing right of self I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense
organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 of duty compels me to dissent.
[1941])...
The background of this case may be found principally in
xxx xxx xxx the stipulation of facts upon which the decision under
review is based. It is as follows:
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity
that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference 1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,
with the employees' right of self-organization or as a Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and operating
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with
collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila,
the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the which is the employer of respondent;
Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
If free expression was accorded recognition and Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor
protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic organization, and the respondents herein are either
Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed the officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free 3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more learned of the projected mass demonstration at
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
the mass demonstration was not against the company nor Police Department to be participated by the first shift
any of its officers. (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as well as those working in
the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered: 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. countered that it was rather too late to change their
Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be
all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) held the following morning; and
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
Benjamin Pagcu. PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which
5. That the Company asked the union panel to are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin MARCH 4, 1969.
Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has demonstration did in fact occur and in the process
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management; Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union 3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation of
that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly the existing collective bargaining agreement and without
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed
reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the to report for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of 4. That the above acts are in violation of Section
absence approved by the Company, particularly the 4(a) subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15
officers present who are the organizers of the of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike; dispositive part of which read's:
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming
another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Mills Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and from further committing the same and its
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March representatives namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano,
3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
representatives that while all workers may join the Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and considered to have lost their status as employees of the
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All those Although it is alleged in the petition herein that
who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be petitioners were notified of this decision on September
dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they
were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October arguments were filed out of time.
30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the
following day. (See Annex K.) October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and
at the same time lodged the present petition with this
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, Court.
1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of the
court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not (respondents did not file their brief), the case is now
disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of before us for resolution.
the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, 1. That the judgment appealed from is a final
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) judgment — not merely an interlocutory order — there is
days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of
for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would not render the
Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed decision incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the
five (5) days after the expiration of the period therefor Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines)
also specified in the same rules. vs. Pan American Employees Association, which runs thus:
'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is Examining Division or his representative to compute the
the one raised by respondent private firm, namely, that compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated
in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their its judicial functions and thereby rendered an incomplete
motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the
support thereof within the periods respectively fixed in overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And
the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations the report would still have to be submitted to the
acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of
its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing the order itself. That there was no specification of the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial L-8718, May 11, 1956).
Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision finality in the sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the
dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the
opinion. jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question in
the affirmative.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks
thereof. to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so
within five (5) days from the date on which he received
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next
file its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider. follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be
submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously
of its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration. with the motion, the same section commands the 'the
movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the
date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.'
Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that arguments were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days
"(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods shall be late, as aforesaid.
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any.
supporting arguments, as the case may be". It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of time
was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to
has since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith or
Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the
forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments
its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of on the 27th.
whether the arguments in support of said motion were or
were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to
Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May speed up the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing
20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to reconsider rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing
is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of supporting arguments". That no-extension policy should
reconsideration comes final. And so also, where the have placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply
arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration folded its arms, sit by supinely and relied on the court's
are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the
pre forma motion for reconsideration although arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in by that time the reglementary period had expired.
essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free
Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for
that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
the ground that the arguments in support thereof were arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect
filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the denied the motion for extension.
motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and unappealable. We may not review the same.
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion precedent, which has not been in any way modified, much
to reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion
of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners'
the five-day reglementary period to file a motion for pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to constitutional grounds.
August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough,
said arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
And the judgment had become final. predicated on an exposition of the constitutional
guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that
21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the
present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above
his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr.
motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully
schedule of counsel which would not enable him to do so state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in
within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The the light of its attendant circumstances, this case does
not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the
guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed,
freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other
closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding of pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect
constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the
however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional respondent court as being null and void because it
rights may be protected by the courts only when their sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
jurisdiction over the subject matter is unquestionably
established and the applicable rules of procedure In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our
consistent with substantive and procedural due process resolution as follows:
are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en banc
know, this principle is applied to annul or set aside final under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
of due process. I have not come across any instance, and
none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a
constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a xxx xxx xxx
denial of due process.
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court
Without support from any provision of the constitution or en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of
any law or from any judicial precedent or reason of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and
principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly substantial merits of the case.
asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted
as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which III
is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction ISSUES
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even 1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition
Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, the government for redress of grievances constitute
in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple bargaining in bad faith? and,
reason that in both of those cases, the accused were
denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled Do the facts found by the court below justify the
to testify against himself as a witness for the declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty of
prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the
to be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense persons allegedly responsible therefore?
after his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues respondent court refused to act one way or another on
involved in those cases are a far cry from the one now the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9,
before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were 1969?
denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying
their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court IV
of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon
ARGUMENT bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that
the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently without their officers. It must be stated that the
dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join
because such conclusion is country to the evidence on the demonstration because most of them belonged to the
record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory. first shift; and
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
freedom to assemble and petition the duly constituted demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
authorities for redress of their grievances, the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA
petitioners were charged and then condemned of is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
bargaining in bad faith. evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was not before it went through. We can even say that it was the
even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved
hence, a violation of the provisions of the "no-lockout — the same and yet while the demonstration was in
no strike" clause of the collective bargaining agreement. progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and
However, this allegation and proof submitted by the consequently dismissed those who participated.
respondent company were practically resolved when the
respondent court in the same decision stated Records of the case show that more or less 400 members
categorically: of the union participated in the demonstration and yet,
the respondent court selected the eight officers to be
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the dismissed from the union thus losing their status as
demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. employees of the respondent company. The respondent
We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any court should have taken into account that the company's
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and action in allowing the return of more or less three
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the
(Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.) union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the
eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R.
bargained in bad faith is not tenable because: No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion
stated in the decision by the court, while there is a
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on
respondent company; . demonstration or go on strike because it will change the
terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA.
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union It follows that the CBA is over and above the
and the respondent company convened twice in a meeting constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
requested that the employees and workers be excused Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because
but the respondent company instead of granting the it will appear that the rights of the union is solely
request or even settling the matter so that the hours of dependent upon the CBA.
work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the
employees of mass dismissal; One of the cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in proceedings before the Court of Industrial
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the Relations is that "the decision must be rendered on the
request of the company that the first shift shall be evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to in the record and disclosed to the parties affected."
(Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining respondent court;
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that
know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, petitioners are not raising any issue of due process. They
G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.) do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is
null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that they fault the respondent court for having priced the
there is no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained involved over and above their constitutional right to
in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their
individual petitioners is without basis either in fact or in grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in
law. no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action
affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that: proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners as a mere error of judgment rather than that of
have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this
consequently lost their status as employees of the Court to roundly and indignantly condemn private
respondent company did not meet the meaning and respondent now for the grievous violation of the
comprehension of "substantial merits of the case." fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to
Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question,
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the when that specific issue has not been duly presented to
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust,
of the case is whether under the facts and circumstances for the simple reason that the manner this case was
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
"illegal strike" and therefore in violation of the "no strike transgression.
— no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent
submit, that the respondent court had altogether opined court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding
and decided that such demonstration does not amount to petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the
a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
have been absolved of the charges against them. having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining
its own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question
petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The stand of has no constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume
the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in
principle in logic as "non-siquitor"; not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that management and proprietary attributes claimed by the
the freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances respondent private firm — still, We cannot rightly hold
against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties
our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions,
fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by
assembly is paramount to the provision in the Collective law; litigations would be endless, no questions would be
Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the finally settled; and titles to property would become
constitutional provision would be null and void. These precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen
fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is these include constitutional issues not affecting the
in the interpretation, construction or application of a validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is
constitutional precept not constituting a denial of due not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner
process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words,
party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute constitutional issues, no matter how important they may
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the
affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances, applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
for the more paramount considerations that inform the involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a
principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say judgment of the industrial court is already final and
this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the executory, this Court would be devoid of power and
main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law authority to review, much less alter or modify the same,
or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
basic holding that infringement of constitutional jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation
guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We
courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments. should pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised
by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in
of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is
Secretary of Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And,
Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is one of our (the in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than
Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra.,
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon which is being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid
and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for
the case at bar, the petitioners have not raised, they are its four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We
not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of
the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably reconsideration but even their argument supporting the
discussed in the main opinion. same within the prescribed period, "the judgment
(against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme
Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if
a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due the finality and enforceability of their judgments are
process renders its judgment or decision null and void, made contingent on the correctness thereof from the
and, therefore, subject to attack even after said constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or
judgment or decision has become final and executory. I not they are correct is something that is always
have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the
the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable
main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well as the members themselves are changed, I cannot
prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a
jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even
effort. without any showing of denial of due process or want of
jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as of such court may still be set aside or reopened in
if I could go along with petitioners under the authority of instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38
our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the
under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines6 Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law
(reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of of respecting judgments once they have become final,
the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute
reflection that the very power granted to us to review in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only
decisions of lower courts involving questions of law(and when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and
executory judgments may be set aside,9 and this only authority and binding force of existing doctrines
when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of
10 maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which
inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order.
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I
Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776: trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe
should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not
efficient administration of justice that once a judgment as I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would
has become final, the winning party be not, through a like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. the true and correct meaning and implications of decision
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely
upon any attempt to prolong them. involving cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court
refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in its determination to accord substantial justice to the
in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus: parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which
were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should already final and executory. It too obvious to require
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very extended elucidation or even reference any precedent or
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end authority that the principle of immutability of final
to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one
to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore,
irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to
within his power, to determine and redetermine them substantial justice.
term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one
party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of
and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to
then litigation might become more intolerable than the maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule
wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.). Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does
not implement on reinforce or strengthen the
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the
Judge de los Angeles, same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the the petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to mere
rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
at bar, I said then: law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready funds
not escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of
inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule
judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of
opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if discussion and with barely a brief statement of the
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of prejudice to supplementing the same by making the
Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the necessary exposition, with citations laws and authorities,
instant case are concerned." in the written arguments the be filed (10) days later. In
truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do advising the court and the other party that the movant
not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental
it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the
or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone
question. Said rule provides: concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six litigation is prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases
copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of
receives notice of the order or decision, object of the vital industries in which labor-management problems
motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations interests of justice and concerned that the attitude of
of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by each party at every imports juncture of the case be
registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. settlement may, if possible, be explored.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be There can be no reason at all to complain that the time
submitted with arguments supporting the same. If the fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the
arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motion filed petitioners was no more than the following:
motions, upon notice Court, the movant shall file same
within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also
file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant. Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the
registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the same is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the adduced during the hearing of the above entitled case.
motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the
Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary to bear Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to
oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the file their respective arguments within ten (10) days
corresponding order or notice to that effect. pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules
of Court.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the for Reconsideration be admitted.
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.). Manila, September 27, 1969.
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
as everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their
for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy inability to comply with the rule. Not only that,
petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred
written arguments in support of their motion, and, the their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their
only excuse offered for such delay is that both the Petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31,
President of the Union and the office clerk who took 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to file
charge of the matter forgot to do what they were "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five
Court, as I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to negligence and honest mistake committed by the
observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the President of the respondent Union and on office clerk of
Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in
Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference. brief, consisted allegedly of the President's having
forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite
In this connection, I might add that in my considered previous instructions and of the said office employee
opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work
judgments are in a sense more substantive than instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was
procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked
have the effect of either creating or terminating rights these allegations, for, under probably more justification
pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation
concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered previous case this wise:
such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or
authority to alter or modify the same enhances such We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
substantive character. Moreover, because they have the respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in
effect of terminating rights and the enforcement due time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal
thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court
nature also of rules of prescription, which again are notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are employed by litigants who fail to observe procedural
inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place
failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated
abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29
may be lost by prescription, and be has no reason to January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457,
complain because public policy demands that rights must December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of
be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air
waived. Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the
self-evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present case
I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court has already become final and executory, nay, not without
suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how
aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it
Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case,
suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not without pronouncement as to costs.
under our supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative
agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
order to hasten the administration of substance justice,
this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to For having carried out a mass demonstration at
amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has done it for Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged
the purpose of reviving a case in which the judo has abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days'
already become final and executory. prior notice to respondent employer company, as against
the latter's insistence that the first shift 1 should not the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
participate but instead report for work, under pain of company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise
dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal from that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for
employment of the eight individual petitioners as union having included the first shift workers in the mass
officers and organizers of the mass demonstration. demonstration against its wishes was but an act of
arbitrary vindictiveness.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty
on respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the
unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction to
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was afford protection to labor be given true substance and
not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights
against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal without due process — which is but "responsiveness to
of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
discretion in fact and in law. justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
unfair labor practice since respondent firm conceded Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the arbitrariness."2
union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the union up
to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed
the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join orders of the respondent court and concur in the
the demonstration in accordance with their previous judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the Separate Opinions
collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as
would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found BARREDO, J., dissenting:
by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was
not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense
dispute between the protagonists, but merely the of duty compels me to dissent.
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable
the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of The background of this case may be found principally in
free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for the stipulation of facts upon which the decision under
redress of grievance against alleged police excesses. review is based. It is as follows:
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing 1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and operating
filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with
five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila,
of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should which is the employer of respondent;
likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the 2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor
motion for reconsideration due to such negligence — organization, and the respondents herein are either
which was not acted upon by respondent court — should officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice
that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through 3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
their summary dismissal from employment, simply learned of the projected mass demonstration at
because they sought in good faith to exercise basic Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It Police Department to be participated by the first shift
should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as well as those working in
the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All those
5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969; who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be
dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. countered that it was rather too late to change their
Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be
all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) held the following morning; and
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de
Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
Benjamin Pagcu. PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which
5. That the Company asked the union panel to are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY
confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin MARCH 4, 1969.
Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel,
confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has demonstration did in fact occur and in the process
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute
with Management; Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union 3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation of
that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly the existing collective bargaining agreement and without
prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed
reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the to report for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of 4. That the above acts are in violation of Section
absence approved by the Company, particularly the 4(a) subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15
officers present who are the organizers of the of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike; dispositive part of which read's:
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming
another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Mills Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist
Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and from further committing the same and its
Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March representatives namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano,
3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
representatives that while all workers may join the Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for
regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby
joining the demonstration and should report for work; and considered to have lost their status as employees of the
thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support
petitioners were notified of this decision on September of its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they
were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the
In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October arguments were filed out of time.
30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the
following day. (See Annex K.) October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and
at the same time lodged the present petition with this
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, Court.
1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of the
court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief
reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not (respondents did not file their brief), the case is now
disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of before us for resolution.
the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, 1. That the judgment appealed from is a final
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) judgment — not merely an interlocutory order — there is
days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of
for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would not render the
Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed decision incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the
five (5) days after the expiration of the period therefor Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines)
also specified in the same rules. vs. Pan American Employees Association, which runs thus:
'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is Examining Division or his representative to compute the
the one raised by respondent private firm, namely, that compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated
in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their its judicial functions and thereby rendered an incomplete
motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the
support thereof within the periods respectively fixed in overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And
the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations the report would still have to be submitted to the
acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of
its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing the order itself. That there was no specification of the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial L-8718, May 11, 1956).
Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision finality in the sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the
dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the
opinion. jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question in
the affirmative.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks
thereof. to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so
within five (5) days from the date on which he received
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next
file its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider. follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be
submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if
said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously
with the motion, the same section commands the 'the schedule of counsel which would not enable him to do so
movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The
date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.' arguments were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days
Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that late, as aforesaid.
"(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any.
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of time
supporting arguments, as the case may be". was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the
due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith or
has since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the
Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments
forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time on the 27th.
its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of
whether the arguments in support of said motion were or To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to
were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & speed up the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing
Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing
20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to reconsider supporting arguments". That no-extension policy should
is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of have placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply
reconsideration comes final. And so also, where the folded its arms, sit by supinely and relied on the court's
arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the
are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that
pre forma motion for reconsideration although by that time the reglementary period had expired.
seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in
essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of
Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is reconsideration on the ground that the supporting
that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect
the ground that the arguments in support thereof were denied the motion for extension.
filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes "final and unappealable". We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and
unappealable. We may not review the same.
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and
pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of precedent, which has not been in any way modified, much
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion
to reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners'
of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
the five-day reglementary period to file a motion for guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted constitutional grounds.
to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to
August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are
said arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. predicated on an exposition of the constitutional
And the judgment had become final. guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly
for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the
21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above
present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr.
his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully
motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in
the light of its attendant circumstances, this case does their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court
not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue. of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the
guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed,
freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other
closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding of pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect
constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the
however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional respondent court as being null and void because it
rights may be protected by the courts only when their sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
jurisdiction over the subject matter is unquestionably
established and the applicable rules of procedure In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our
consistent with substantive and procedural due process resolution as follows:
are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be
often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en banc
know, this principle is applied to annul or set aside final under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
of due process. I have not come across any instance, and
none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a
constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a xxx xxx xxx
denial of due process.
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court
Without support from any provision of the constitution or en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of
any law or from any judicial precedent or reason of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and
principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly substantial merits of the case.
asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted
as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which III
is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the
proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction ISSUES
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may
be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even 1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise
after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition
Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, the government for redress of grievances constitute
in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple bargaining in bad faith? and,
reason that in both of those cases, the accused were
denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled Do the facts found by the court below justify the
to testify against himself as a witness for the declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty of
prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the
to be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense persons allegedly responsible therefore?
after his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues respondent court refused to act one way or another on
involved in those cases are a far cry from the one now the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9,
before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were 1969?
denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying
IV Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the
request of the company that the first shift shall be
ARGUMENT excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to
bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration
dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, without their officers. It must be stated that the
because such conclusion is country to the evidence on company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join
record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory. the demonstration because most of them belonged to the
first shift; and
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of
freedom to assemble and petition the duly constituted Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the
authorities for redress of their grievances, the demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
petitioners were charged and then condemned of right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA
bargaining in bad faith. is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in change the terms or conditions of employment because it
bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was not was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been before it went through. We can even say that it was the
alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
hence, a violation of the provisions of the "no-lockout — employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved
no strike" clause of the collective bargaining agreement. the same and yet while the demonstration was in
However, this allegation and proof submitted by the progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and
respondent company were practically resolved when the consequently dismissed those who participated.
respondent court in the same decision stated
categorically: Records of the case show that more or less 400 members
of the union participated in the demonstration and yet,
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the the respondent court selected the eight officers to be
demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. dismissed from the union thus losing their status as
We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any employees of the respondent company. The respondent
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and court should have taken into account that the company's
the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' action in allowing the return of more or less three
(Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.) hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the
union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air
bargained in bad faith is not tenable because: Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R.
No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the stated in the decision by the court, while there is a
respondent company; . collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on
demonstration or go on strike because it will change the
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA.
and the respondent company convened twice in a meeting It follows that the CBA is over and above the
to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
requested that the employees and workers be excused statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
but the respondent company instead of granting the Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because
request or even settling the matter so that the hours of it will appear that the rights of the union is solely
work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the dependent upon the CBA.
employees of mass dismissal;
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be
respected in proceedings before the Court of Industrial
Relations is that "the decision must be rendered on the constitutional provision would be null and void. These
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected." consideration in the deliberation of the case by the
(Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 respondent court;
U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that
the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to petitioners are not raising any issue of due process. They
know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is
G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.) null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that
they fault the respondent court for having priced the
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein
there is no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of involved over and above their constitutional right to
the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their
in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in
individual petitioners is without basis either in fact or in no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action
law. affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the
proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that: themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action
as a mere error of judgment rather than that of
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this
have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and Court to roundly and indignantly condemn private
consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent now for the grievous violation of the
respondent company did not meet the meaning and fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to
comprehension of "substantial merits of the case." allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question,
Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the when that specific issue has not been duly presented to
complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust,
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit for the simple reason that the manner this case was
of the case is whether under the facts and circumstances brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on transgression.
"illegal strike" and therefore in violation of the "no strike
— no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent
Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding
submit, that the respondent court had altogether opined petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the
and decided that such demonstration does not amount to charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted
have been absolved of the charges against them. to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining
Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question
its own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the has no constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume
petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The stand of for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in
the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
principle in logic as "non-siquitor"; freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the
management and proprietary attributes claimed by the
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that respondent private firm — still, We cannot rightly hold
the freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties
against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions,
agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by
fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and law; litigations would be endless, no questions would be
assembly is paramount to the provision in the Collective finally settled; and titles to property would become
Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the
precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further
them at any time in the future".3 reflection that the very power granted to us to review
decisions of lower courts involving questions of law(and
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is these include constitutional issues not affecting the
in the interpretation, construction or application of a validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is
constitutional precept not constituting a denial of due not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner
process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words,
party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over
erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute constitutional issues, no matter how important they may
than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the
affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances, applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those
there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations
for the more paramount considerations that inform the involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a
principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say judgment of the industrial court is already final and
this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the executory, this Court would be devoid of power and
main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law authority to review, much less alter or modify the same,
or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of
basic holding that infringement of constitutional jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation
guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We
courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments. should pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised
by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in
of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is
Secretary of Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And,
Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is one of our (the in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than
Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra.,
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon which is being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid
and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for
the case at bar, the petitioners have not raised, they are its four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We
not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of
the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably reconsideration but even their argument supporting the
discussed in the main opinion. same within the prescribed period, "the judgment
(against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme
Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if
a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due the finality and enforceability of their judgments are
process renders its judgment or decision null and void, made contingent on the correctness thereof from the
and, therefore, subject to attack even after said constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or
judgment or decision has become final and executory. I not they are correct is something that is always
have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the
the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable
main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well as the members themselves are changed, I cannot
prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a
jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even
effort. without any showing of denial of due process or want of
jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as of such court may still be set aside or reopened in
if I could go along with petitioners under the authority of instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38
our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the
under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines6 Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law
(reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of of respecting judgments once they have become final,
even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory
in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this
when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness,
executory judgments may be set aside,9 and this only authority and binding force of existing doctrines
when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of
10 maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which
inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order.
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I
Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776: trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe
should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not
efficient administration of justice that once a judgment as I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would
has become final, the winning party be not, through a like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. the true and correct meaning and implications of decision
Courts must therefore guard against any scheme of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely
upon any attempt to prolong them. involving cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court
refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in its determination to accord substantial justice to the
in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus: parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which
were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should already final and executory. It too obvious to require
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very extended elucidation or even reference any precedent or
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end authority that the principle of immutability of final
to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one
to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore,
irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to
within his power, to determine and redetermine them substantial justice.
term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one
party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of
and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to
then litigation might become more intolerable than the maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule
wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the
Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.). Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does
not implement on reinforce or strengthen the
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the
Judge de los Angeles, same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the the petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial
unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to mere
rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is
the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
at bar, I said then: law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion
for reconsideration is too short, especially for the
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready funds
not escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the
point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of
inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved
51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion
Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy
reconsideration could have been only one day if discussion and with barely a brief statement of the
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of prejudice to supplementing the same by making the
Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the necessary exposition, with citations laws and authorities,
instant case are concerned." in the written arguments the be filed (10) days later. In
truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do advising the court and the other party that the movant
not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental
it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the
or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone
question. Said rule provides: concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be
warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six litigation is prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases
copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of
receives notice of the order or decision, object of the vital industries in which labor-management problems
motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best
oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations interests of justice and concerned that the attitude of
of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by each party at every imports juncture of the case be
registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. settlement may, if possible, be explored.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be There can be no reason at all to complain that the time
submitted with arguments supporting the same. If the fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the
arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motion filed petitioners was no more than the following:
motions, upon notice Court, the movant shall file same
within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also
file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant. Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the
registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the same is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the adduced during the hearing of the above entitled case.
motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the
Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary to bear Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to
oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the file their respective arguments within ten (10) days
corresponding order or notice to that effect. pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules
of Court.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be
sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the for Reconsideration be admitted.
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.). Manila, September 27, 1969.
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
as everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has done it for
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their the purpose of reviving a case in which the judo has
inability to comply with the rule. Not only that, already become final and executory.
petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their
written arguments in support of their motion, and, the Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred
only excuse offered for such delay is that both the their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their
President of the Union and the office clerk who took Petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31,
charge of the matter forgot to do what they were 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to file
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
Court, as I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable
observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the negligence and honest mistake committed by the
Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). President of the respondent Union and on office clerk of
And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference. respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in
brief, consisted allegedly of the President's having
In this connection, I might add that in my considered forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite
opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of previous instructions and of the said office employee
judgments are in a sense more substantive than having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work
procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was
have the effect of either creating or terminating rights busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked
pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment these allegations, for, under probably more justification
concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation
such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or previous case this wise:
authority to alter or modify the same enhances such
substantive character. Moreover, because they have the We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered
effect of terminating rights and the enforcement respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in
thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the due time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal
nature also of rules of prescription, which again are Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge
inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a employed by litigants who fail to observe procedural
prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The
failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place
abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of
may be lost by prescription, and be has no reason to excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29
complain because public policy demands that rights must January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457,
be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of
waived. judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these
self-evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the
I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present case
suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules has already become final and executory, nay, not without
aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how
Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it
suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case,
under our supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative without pronouncement as to costs.
agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in
order to hasten the administration of substance justice, TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to
For having carried out a mass demonstration at their summary dismissal from employment, simply
Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged because they sought in good faith to exercise basic
abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It
prior notice to respondent employer company, as against should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from
the latter's insistence that the first shift 1 should not the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent
participate but instead report for work, under pain of company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise
dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal from that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for
employment of the eight individual petitioners as union having included the first shift workers in the mass
officers and organizers of the mass demonstration. demonstration against its wishes was but an act of
arbitrary vindictiveness.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty
on respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the
unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction to
demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was afford protection to labor be given true substance and
not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights
against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal without due process — which is but "responsiveness to
of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
discretion in fact and in law. justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor official action marred by lack of reasonableness.
unfair labor practice since respondent firm conceded Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the arbitrariness."2
union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the union up
to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed
the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join orders of the respondent court and concur in the
the demonstration in accordance with their previous judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
requests.
Footnotes
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the
collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as 1 L-7428, May 24, 1955.
would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found
by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was 2 American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.
not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial
3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-
dispute between the protagonists, but merely the
93; Tanada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable
1952 ed., 71.
the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of
free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for 4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
redress of grievance against alleged police excesses. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, Emphasis supplied.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing 5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been
filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary 6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press,
five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence 1955, pp. 13-14.
of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should
likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of 7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64,
cited by Justice Castro in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24
discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the
SCRA, 663, 692.
normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their
motion for reconsideration due to such negligence —
8 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs.
which was not acted upon by respondent court — should Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-520.
have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice
that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963), 371 U.S. 415, 22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,
433, 9 L. Ed. 2nd 405, 418. 574, 20 L. Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1. 23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R. et. al., Sept. 27,
1967, 21 SCRA 226, 232, 233, 661, 662, 663-664, 211 21
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, SCRA 233.
cited by Mr. Justice Castro in his concurring opinion in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895. 25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24
SCRA 663, 692, Aug. 19, 1968; see also concurring opinion
12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA of Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil.
481, 489; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-66, 131.
1175.
26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432,
Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28; Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99 27 Fay vs. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Phil. 346; Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil. 71;
Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State Board 28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. Barnette, supra.
1628, 1638.
28-a Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C. L-25665, May
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285-298.
vs. Bresler (May 18, 1970), 398 U.S. 6, 20; see also
Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96- 29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
113.
29a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et. al., September
15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 58, 61-63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97 Phil.
956; Pangasinan Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20,
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra. 1960, 108 Phil. 89, Local 7, etc. vs. Tabigne, Nov. 29, 1960,
110 Phil. 276; Luzon Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963,
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494. 8 SCRA, 447; Manila Metal, etc. vs. C.I.R., July 31, 1963,
8 SCRA 552.
18 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs.
Texas, 326 U.S. 517. 30 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82; Mercado vs. Go
Bio, 48 O.G. 5360.
19 Pickering vs. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563, 574,
(1968). 30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-
31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs.
Security Bank and Trust Co., April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5
503, 515; Caltex vs. Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, SCRA 304, 312, 312; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275.
1198-99; Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO July
30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801,806, 807, De Leon vs. National 30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.
Labor Union, 100 Phil., 792; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil. 1008
Continental Manufacturing Employees Assoc., et. al. vs. 30-d 28 SCRA 933-934.
C.I.R., et al., L-26849, Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 204.
30-e L-28714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.
21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs.
Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147; Largent vs. Texas, 318 30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.
U.S. (1943) 418; Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413;
Lovell vs. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444; Grosjean vs. 30-g 34 SCRA 742-743.
American Press Co. (1936) 297 U.S. 233; Subido vs.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 393; Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 31 A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24
1970 Ed., pp. 90-93. SCRA, 690-692; Emphasis supplied.
Footnotes
3 Pan Realty Corp. vs. CA, 167 SCRA 564: Del Pozo vs.
Penaco, Ibid., p. 577.
6 Rollo, p. 16.
On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T.
mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses
by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project
entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality if the Coronado’s continuously resists the order.
allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of
a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to
Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was
of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to
years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, vacate the store as long as same place and area would be
extendible for another 20 years.8 given to her in the new public market; and (3) in case her
proposals are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in
the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against the demolition.
her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156.
Pertinent portions of the letter read: On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the
strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and
x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and
Municipal Council and the opinion rendered by the Laguna Angeles supervising the work.
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered view,
however, arrived at after consultation with my legal Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed
counsel, that our existing lease contract is still legally civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished
binding and in full force and effect. Lest I appear to be property as amounting to ₱437,900.0018
defiant, let me reiterate to you and the council that we
are willing to vacate the said building provided that a new On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband
contract is executed granting to us the same space or lot Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional
and the same area. I believe that our proposal is most Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19 for
reasonable and fair under the circumstance. If you are damages with preliminary injunction against the
not amenable to the said proposal, I concur with the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T.
position taken by the Council for you to file the Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles.
appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to The complaint was soon after amended to include the
enable our court to finally thresh out our Spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida
differences.141avvphi1 and Teddy Coroza as formal defendants because they
were then the occupants of the contested area.
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
to vacate the portion of the public market she was
occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; 1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant
else, a court action will be filed against her. Municipality and defendant Municipal Mayor from leasing
the premises subject of lease Annex "A" hereof, part of
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, which is now occupied by PNP Outpost and by the
Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Municipal Collectors’ Office, and the equivalent adjacent
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by area thereof, and to cause the removal of said stalls;
Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of
the Resolution reads: 2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the
equivalent corner area of the leased areas being now
Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang assigned to other persons by defendants Municipality
IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. and/or by defendant Municipal Mayor, and to allow
Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na
pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15 3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. 4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter16 to Visitacion severally, the following –
informing her of the impending demolition of her store
the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a (a) ₱437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other
reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right items therein;
to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and
that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of (b) ₱200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful
detainer case against her. She further replied that if the (c) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
demolition will take place, appropriate administrative,
criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor
(d) ₱30,.00 for attorney’s fees and ₱700.00 for every appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being
attendance of counsel in court. deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice action separately from the criminal action shall be
and equity may warrant in the premises.20 recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action
had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21 therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case
against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case
before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
1996, an Information22 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall
and Angeles was filed, which reads: be deemed abandoned.24
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable on 16 November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22
accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan
Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then issued an Order25 DISMISSING the case against
the Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles. The germane portion of the Order reads:
Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of In view of the submission of the death certificate of
Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein charged accused/defendant Alberto S. Angeles, and there being
in relation to, while in the performance and taking no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are
confederating with each other, and with evident bad hereby DISMISSED.
faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable
negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17
criminally cause the demolition of a public market stall September 2002. As a result, the counsel of the late
leased by the municipal government in favor of one Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the
Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor
ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter Comendador’s death.
in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
(₱437,900.00). decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their
separate pleas of "Not Guilty." WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP- In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused
4064 (94)23 with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty
before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently reads: Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability months imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
arising from the offense charged shall at all times be maximum.
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in
the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for
dismissing the cases against the accused Alberto S. Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that the
Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his
reiterated. criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its
Resolution31 granted the Motion insofar as the extinction
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the
Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action
S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to is an independent civil action.
pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the
destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages; Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost of the
suit. The prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction
court found no aggravating circumstances in the under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-
commission of the crime. Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
In view of this court’s finding that the defendant spouses gross negligence. He also contended that he and his co-
Alida and Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants of the accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the
subject market stalls from which they cannot be validly market and, thereby, no liability was incurred.
ejected without just cause, the complaint against them is
dismissed. The complaint against defendant spouses On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the
Benita and Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it death of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of
appearing that they are similarly situated as the spouses the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor
Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given Comendador’s criminal liability but also his civil liability.
the option to accept market space being given to her by She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused
the municipality, subject to her payment of the public officials when they performed the demolition of
appropriate rental and permit fees. the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming
arguendo that there was indeed liability on the part of
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having the accused public officials, the actual amount of
become moot and academic. damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no
basis and was not duly substantiated.
The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador
is likewise denied for lack of merit.26 Liability of the accused public officials
under Republic Act No. 3019
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration27 of the Decision alleging Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:
that there was only an error of judgment when he
complied with and implemented the order of his superior, In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
liability when a public officer commits in good faith an corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
error of judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its declared to be unlawful:
Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that good faith cannot be xxxx
argued to support his cause in the face of the court’s
finding that bad faith attended the commission of the (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
offense charged. The Court further explained that the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
invocation of compliance with an order of a superior is of benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be official, administrative or judicial functions through
described as having the semblance of legality inasmuch as manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
it was issued without the authority and therefore the inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
same was patently illegal."29 officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain.
permits or other concessions. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties
which apparently was attended by evident bad faith,
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as
accused are public officers or private persons charged in there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the
conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store.
the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a
preference to the other party; and (5) that the public state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.33 ulterior purposes.37
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused
and civil liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner public officials committed bad faith in performing the
Mayor Comendador as here represented by his widow demolition.
Victoria Bueta.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable respondents’ structure is a public nuisance. The
that the first two requisites of the criminal offense were abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
present at the time of the commission of the complained possible if it is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that
acts and that, as to the remaining elements, there is which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance,
sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was regardless of location and surroundings.39 In this case,
an undue injury suffered on the part of the Spouses the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per
Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had
with evident bad faith when they performed the not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was
demolition of the market stall. certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A.
Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.40 To
Causing undue injury to any party, including the quote:
government, could only mean actual injury or damage
which must be established by evidence.34 An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial
establishment) cited above and found out the following:
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently
interpreted as "actual." Undue has been defined as "more 1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.
than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, 2. It is located within the market site.
rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of
any legally protected interest of another." Actual 3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to
that in civil law.35 4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being
exposed to fire.41
It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by
the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not
accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor
caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. law,42 the present Local Government Code43 does not
We affirm the finding that: expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.44 And
even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is
xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was provided for by the present code, the accused public
carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of
any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the been for the fact that the resolution of the
contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil
was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the
building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition We laid down the following guidelines in People v.
without legal order in this case was not among those Bayotas:46
provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally
impossible provision. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was placed Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits45 in to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
Code provides that, through estoppel, an admission or the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person senso strictiore."
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon. The representation made by Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
the municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
to continuously operate its store binds the municipality. may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
benefits of the store operation and later on claim the these other sources of obligation from which the civil
illegality of the business. liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
1997, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his
counsel with no objection on the part of the prosecution. e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)
The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and
issued an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an
Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor Comendador action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by
died and an adverse decision was rendered against him way of filing a separate civil action47 and subject to
which resulted in the filing of a motion for Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
reconsideration by Mayor Comendador’s counsel, the Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground enforced either against the executor/administrator or
that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
survived the death of the accused. The Sandiganbayan obligation upon which the same is based as explained
upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition above.
was not appealed.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
extinguished their criminal liabilities. criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death; and liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any And, Art. 32(6) states:
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the latter for damages:
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as (6) The right against deprivation of property without due
it is on the criminal.48 process of law;
The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human xxxx
Relations, were cited by the prosecution to substantiate
its argument that the civil action based therein is an In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether
independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
accused during the pendency of the case. criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the
Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
action was dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was preponderance of evidence.
extinguished upon the death of the accused. The law
provides that: As held in Aberca v. Ver:
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the [Art. 32 of the New Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in
arising from the offense charged shall at all times be the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in to violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50
the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to applicability of the law on human relations. First, the
reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized. complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the
(Emphasis ours) information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for
damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor
We agree with the prosecution. Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s right to due process.
Thus:
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the
case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same xxxx
arose directly from the crime committed. However, in
this case, the civil liability is based on another source of In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in
obligation, the law on human relations.49 The pertinent question, the individual natural defendants did not only
articles follow: act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power
which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations
Art. 31 of the Civil Code states: were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute an
invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising process of law.
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
civil action may proceed independently of the criminal xxxx
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely
violation of the right to private property of the Spouses based on due process violations was filed even ahead of
Bombasi. The accused public officials should have the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the
accorded the spouses the due process of law guaranteed deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his
by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her
Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the
already shown, justify demolition of the store without above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985
court order. This Court in a number of decisions51 held Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is,
that even if there is already a writ of execution, there therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was
must still be a need for a special order for the purpose correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the
of demolition issued by the court before the officer in civil and criminal cases before it although their
charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of
over the contested property.52 The pertinent provisions Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil
are the following: liability "arising from the offense charged."
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, We must, however, correct the amount of damages
there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable awarded to the Spouses Bombasi.
notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides: To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the
execution. – When the property subject of execution best evidence obtainable.55 In this case, the Court finds
contains improvements constructed or planted by the that the only evidence presented to prove the actual
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except lost items56 prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer
upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the commissioned by the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former costs.
has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time
fixed by the court. As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport
Corporation v. People of the Philippines,57
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no
interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that
a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the respondents failed to prove that the damages to the
parties for the issuance of a special order of terrace caused by the incident amounted to ₱100,000.00.
demolition.53 The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual
damages claimed by private respondent were the
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
case has successfully been litigated, underscores the Regal, Jr. amounting to ₱171,088.46 and the receipt
independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to
case was even filed by the municipality. private respondent for ₱35,000.00 representing cost for
carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his
on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court
arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of awarded ₱150,000.00 as actual damages to private
an otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such
provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and ₱150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by
observe honesty and good faith.54 plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate
court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the
amount of ₱100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the Spouses Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary
the appellate court merely declared: loss in the impairment of their store. Based on the record
of the case,64 the demolished store was housed on a two-
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they story building located at the market’s commercial area
contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely and its concrete walls remained strong and not affected
demolish the apartment in question considering the by the fire. However, due to the failure of the Spouses
nature of the damages sustained as a result of the Bombasi to prove the exact amount of damage in
accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award of accordance with the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds
₱150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff- that ₱200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable
appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable under the circumstances.
amount.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly,
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003
claimed by the respondent-claimant’s witness as to the is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
actual amount of damages "should be admitted with Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S.
extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating
assertion, it should be supported by independent Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the
evidence." The Court further said that whatever claim finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil
the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not
in consideration of his particular self-interest.59 There appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T.
must still be a need for the examination of the Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is
documentary evidence presented by the claimants to extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The
support its claim with regard to the actual amount of Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T.
damages. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De
Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the
The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount
as an exhibit60 partakes of the nature of hearsay of ₱200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
evidence considering that the person who issued them ₱100,000.00.
was not presented as a witness.61 Any evidence, whether
oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is Costs against the petitioners-appellants.
not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but
on the knowledge of another person who is not on the SO ORDERED.
witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the Associate Justice
hearsay evidence rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 WE CONCUR:
to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the Chief Justice
actual damages claimed, this Court grants temperate Chairperson
damages for ₱200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by
the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in CONCHITA CAPIO MORALES
accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been Associate Justice
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
case, be proven with certainty. The amount of temperate Associate Justice
or moderated damages is usually left to the discretion of
the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in CERTIFICATION
mind that the temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory.63 Without a doubt,
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, 16 Id. at 116.
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was 17 Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), p. 147.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division. 18 ₱400,000.00 representing the cost of the concrete
building; ₱37,900.00 representing the cost of damage and
RENATO C. CORONA loss inside the building.
Chief Justice
19 Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94).
1 Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Teresita 21 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 23267.
J. Leonardo-De Castro per raffle dated 7 March 2011.
22 Records, pp. 1-2.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
23 Then pending with the Regional Trial Court of San
2 The Decision dated 28 April 2003 was penned by Pablo City, Laguna.
Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao with Associate
Justices Gregory S. Ong and Ma. Cristina G. Cortez- 24 Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), p. 77.
Estrada, concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 40-71.
25 Id. at 22.
3 Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
26 Id. at 73-74.
4 Municipal Administrator of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
27 Rollo (G.R. 159017-18), p. 72.
5 Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. 28 Id. at 81.
6 Present occupants of the premises being claimed by 29 Resolution (Re: Motion for Reconsideration) of the
Spouses Cesar and Visitacion Bombasi. Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, dated 21 July 2003.
9 TSN, 11 August 1997, p. 24. 32 Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 3-39, dated 25 July
2003 filed by Paulino S. Asilo; Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), pp.
10 TSN, 31 July 1997, pp. 30-32. 12-43, dated 5 September 2003 filed by Victoria Bueta
Vda. De Comendador, widow of the late Mayor
11 Now Department of Public Works and Highways. Comendador.
12 Formal Offer of Evidence as admitted by the 33 Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010.
Sandiganbayan, Exhibit "H-5."
34 Avila, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 366 Phil. 698, 703 (1999).
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), pp. 112-113.
35 Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820 (1998).
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 17-18.
36 Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 132 (2002).
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), p. 115.
37 Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966).
38 Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, 14 July 2006, 55 Polo v. People, G.R. No. 160541, 24 October 2008, 570
495 SCRA 85, 93. SCRA 80, 84 citing People v. Tigle, 465 Phil. 368 (2004).
39 Jurado, Civil Law Reviewer, 20th ed., 2006, p. 411. 56 Exhibits "I" and "I-1" formally offered by the
prosecution.
40 Exhibit C-1 of the Prosecution. Records, Vol. II, p. 215.
57 G.R. No. 152040, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 284, 296-
41 Records, Vol. III, p. 180. 297.
42 Local Government Code of 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 58 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
337. Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).
44 Section 149 of Local Government Code of 1983. Powers 60 Records, Vol. III, p. 217; Exhibit "I."
and Duties. -
61 People v. Narciso, 330 Phil. 527, 536 (1996).
(I) The sangguniang bayan shall:
62 Philippine Home Assurance Corporation v. Court of
xxxx Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268 (1996) citing Baguio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93417, 14 September 1993,
(ee) Provide for the abatement of nuisance; 226 SCRA 366, 370.
45 Records, Vol. III, pp. 187-196. 63 College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc.,
G.R. No. 155604, 22 November 2007, 538 SCRA 27, 40-
46 G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 41.
255-256.
64 Memorandum Letter of Laguna District Engineer
47 It must be noted that the independent civil action was Wilfredo A. Sambrano. Records, Vol. III, p. 181.
instituted ahead of the criminal case before both cases
were jointly heard before the Sandiganbayan. 65 Rule 132, Section 20, Proof of private document. —
Before any private document offered as authentic is
48 People v. Bayotas, supra note 58 at 251. received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either:
49 Preliminary Title, Chapter 2, Civil Code of the
Philippines. (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or
50 G.R. No. L-69866, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 590, 601,
as quoted from Joseph Charmont French Legal (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
Philosophy, Mcmillan Co., New York, 1921, pp. 72-73. handwriting of the maker.
54 Id. at 236-237.
EN BANC October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 fourteen (14) years for each charge.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded
vs. the request to the National Bureau of Investigation
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch
ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents. 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.
DECISION
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent.
That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari him.
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private validity of the Order of Arrest.
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April
10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
Special Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no be reversed.
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision
granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the
The facts are: validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and April 10, 2001.
the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner
Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled
Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo,
Administrative Region. Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo,
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
judge. solely to criminal proceedings.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion In his comment on the petition, private respondent
for reconsideration of the Order denying his application maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
respondent to post bail, thus: prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that
further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
granted subject to the following conditions:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
forfeited in favor of the government;
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that
Court; this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of
whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice
and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
and Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan
Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
4. Accused is required to report to the government Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held
prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal
they further desire, manifest before this Court to proceedings," thus:
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction,"
if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
forfeited in favor of the government and that the as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein when a person has been arrested and detained for
accordingly. violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do
SO ORDERED. not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the
to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the On a more positive note, also after World War II, both
presumption of innocence is not at issue. international organizations and states gave recognition
and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted principles contained in the said Declaration are now
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas recognized as customarily binding upon the members of
corpus finds application "only to persons judicially the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the
that are not criminal in nature. rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to The Philippines, along with the other members of the
private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
growing importance of the individual person in public every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore,
corresponding duty of countries to observe these has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the that those detained or arrested can participate in the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
The modern trend in public international law is the authorities are under obligation to make available to
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and every person under detention such remedies which
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
the individual person may properly be a subject of remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right
doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the various international treaties giving recognition and
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg protection to human rights, particularly the right to life
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for Purganan is in order.
acts characterized as violations of the laws of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
significant events show that the individual person is now quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
a valid subject of international law.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to authorities to enable the requesting state or government
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal directed against him or the execution of a penalty
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency requesting state or government."
of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of
conventions to uphold human rights. a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It
the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential
pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
"To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It
committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial
the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one
deportation proceedings. that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object
is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges
have been filed may be released on bail pending the But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b)
of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail. the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition
is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
justification why it should not also be allowed in Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to serve the interest of justice." We further note that
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of
invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;"
of the person detained is not in issue. and that release from provisional arrest "shall not
prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for request for extradition is received subsequently."
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
respect for the promotion and protection of human administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not the demanding state following the proceedings.
impaired. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The detention should be reasonable.
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the Records show that private respondent was arrested on
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
for over two (2) years without having been convicted of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should
him bail. be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and
to due process under the Constitution. will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should
not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that court to determine whether private respondent may be
the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition evidence."
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
granted bail. extradition proceedings with dispatch.
2 90 Phil. 70 (1951).
6 Supra, footnote 2.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal
of records pertaining to all business transactions of Supreme Court had already declared:
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of his rights to be secure against such searches and
our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
searches and seizures under consideration were which have resulted in their embodiment in the
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus fundamental law of the land.19
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
with the American common law rule, that the criminal held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
should not be allowed to go free merely "because the
constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the . . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches documentation of the right of privacy free from
and seizures is protected by means other than the unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
common-law action for damages against the searching remaining open to evidence secured by official
officer, against the party who procured the issuance of lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
the search warrant and against those assisting in the reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
laws. in a State.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
given up this approach and eventually adopted the declared enforceable against the States through the Due
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then
Judge Learned Hand: just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
action of trespass against the offending official may have from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in
Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to
through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to commission of a given crime by the party against whom
when conceded operatively enforceable against the the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge
and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
substantive protections of due process to all justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
— it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short,
the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of
could not tolerate denial of its most important those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
— to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in under which the minority usually — but, understandably
the only effectively available way — by removing the — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
incentive to disregard it" . . . . must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional party for whose benefit the illegality had been
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. committed.
Having once recognized that the right to privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of
against the States, and that the right to be secure the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House
that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded furthermore, the records, papers and other effects
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than seized in the offices of the corporations above referred
that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement other effects under their exclusive possession and
is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing
necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
ours.) courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar
their alleged possession of and control over the and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution following distinct conclusions:
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some
of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached 1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau
to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are
support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3
or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
by petitioners herein. Constitution;
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the 2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the
allegations of said petitions said motion for authority of the said search warrants were consequently
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned illegal;
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or 3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do 4. The search warrants served at the three residences of
not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the
being best to leave the matter open for determination in searches and seizures therein made are expressly
appropriate cases in the future. declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents,
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that permanent; and
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their
29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary legal standing to move for the suppression of the
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar declaring as null and void the such warrants served at
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures
the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and determination in appropriate cases in the future."
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that
the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs. I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly
declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
It is so ordered. served at places other than the three residences, and the
illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
environmental political and moral developments of this "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future An examination of the search warrants in this case will
cases and future generations. All the search warrants, readily show that, excepting three, all were directed
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly petitioners were named personally, followed by the
and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of
searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted
That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, named three corporate defendants. But the
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
papers, things and effects seized from places other than said three warrants were also the same
their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be
alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners'
are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn to be made, and were actually made, in the
from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under
or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity the control of the petitioners.
of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a
search or seizure. Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the
that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful
the suppression and return of the documents, papers and search and seizure regardless of their location at the
effects that were seized from places other than their time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
family residences. 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend
of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to papers of corporation of which the defendant was
the United States Constitution. In the many years of president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
judicial construction and interpretation of the said (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
constitutional provision, our courts have invariably defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493
regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister
Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized
Appeals. in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of
the defendant).
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to
move for the suppression or return of documents, papers In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; office, his hotel room or his automobile:
and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search
warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
security a man relies upon when he places himself or his suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
There he is protected from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by
cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is
right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the developed and refined by the common law in evolving the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious body of private property law which, more than almost any
electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
which have come to this Court over the years have whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from
involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which which they derive, due consideration has led to the
the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the
appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
supplied). constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United
States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
It has never been held that a person with requisite
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in interest in the premises searched must own the property
the records and documents seized, the petitioners have seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48
their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold whose apartment the corporate records were seized
interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y.
except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved
directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises for the return and suppression is to him of both personal
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & and corporate documents seized from his home during the
Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 course of an illegal search:
Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and
or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing property, "either his own or the corporation's was
cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The
corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary motion for the return of seized article and the
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
therefore independently gives them standing to move for granted. (Emphasis supplied).
the return and suppression of the books, papers and
affects seized therefrom. Time was when only a person who had property in interest
in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme necessary standing to invoke the protection of the
Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335
U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United
Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed
the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to
(1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand
a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of
unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared his files. The Government contended that the petitioner
that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The had no standing because the books and papers were
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and physically in the possession of the custodian, and because
seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The
premise where the search occurs." court rejected the contention, holding that
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as
the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president not to enable the question of unreasonable search and
of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
against him to demand the return and suppression of device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States,
650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:
First — he had a sufficient interest in the property Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s
seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal
inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' The latest United States decision squarely in point is
premises and had seized most of the corporation's book United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed: S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney
certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records,
qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the
and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's)
search and seizure of the corporation's books and "control and management." The papers turned out to be
records merely because the appellant did not show private, personal and business papers together with
ownership or possession of the books and records or a corporate books and records of certain unnamed
substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership.
. (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). . (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar).
Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 court which held that even though Birrell did not own the
F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers premises where the records were stored, he had
seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and
place of employment; the defendant did not claim properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S.,
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870,
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and
that the employee had a protected interest and that Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and
Villano considered also the fact that the search and It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here
seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel in question were directed solely and exclusively against
Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant If there should be any categorization of the documents,
described the records as having been used "in committing papers and things which where the objects of the
a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the
by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the
second search warrant was captioned: "United States of petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198) family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises
owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was applications filed in securing the void search warrants and
the rule even before Jones. (p. 199) (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters are personal/private of the petitioners or purely
not whether he had any interest in the premises corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. effecting the suppression and/or return of the said
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951). documents.
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above
for reargument; the United States did not appeal from cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in warrants.
Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the
Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions,
because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on
petitioners connection with the premises raided is much illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle
closer than in Birrell. of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the
quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these Footnotes
were directed against residences in the narrow sense of
the word, as long as the documents were personal papers 1Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of
of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director,
corporate papers) were held by them in a personal National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors
capacity or under their personal control. Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr.
and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events,
should order the return to the petitioners all personal and 2Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
private papers and effects seized, no matter where these Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the
were seized, whether from their residences or corporate Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon.
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court
other places were personal and private papers and of Quezon City.
effects belonging to the petitioners.
3Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955 against
Karl Beck. petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby
lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as to the
5U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, papers, documents and things found in the other premises
Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing namely: in those of the residences of petitioners, as
Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2)
Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural 15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8
Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal."
Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc.,
Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business 8Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.
Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation,
The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying 9Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Merconsel Corporation. 10In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F.
60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F.
6Inter alia. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.
7"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this 11U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil.
order in the decision to be rendered in the case, the writ 384, 394.
of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against
the use of the papers, documents and things from the 12On March 22, 1962.
following premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco
Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 13Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St.
bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area, Manila; 14Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon
(4) 527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or probable cause to be determined by the judge or justice
Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation
Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
& 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between persons or things to be seized.
Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10)
Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, 15. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural cause in connection with one specific offense to be
Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
Room 91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, describing the place to be searched and persons or things
Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South to be seized.
Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area,
Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
(19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
(20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. &
Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., 16 People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., 17Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing
Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real 18Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.
Estate Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437
Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue- 19Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed.
Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis supplied.
Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of
20Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, EN BANC
647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United States (1928) 277
US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs.
United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
21Even if remote. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
respondent-appellant.
22Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93:
Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for
Fed. 2d 650. respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for
CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: intervenor-appellee.
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is
income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on . The action of the elected representatives of the people
January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of
the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the their particular municipality and with all the facts and
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not circumstances which surround the subject and
only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its regulations are essential to the well being of the people x
validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
with citations of what they considered to be applicable
American authorities and praying for a judgment It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
preliminary injunction issued. void on its face which is not the case here. The principle
has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance harboring of transients and guests of these
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice establishments by requiring these transients and guests
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose,
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked introducing several other amendatory provisions
to declare it void on the ground that the specific method calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
legislation of this character, the resumption of other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some income of the city government." It would appear
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the sustaining any attack against the validity of the
present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
ordinance set aside. stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9
to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and
of protection associated with the due process guaranty monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other
does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the
of a police power measure being specifically aimed to operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium
of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to otherwise used,15 all of which are intended to protect
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power public morals.
which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 On the legislative organs of the government, whether
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
competence to promote public health, public morals, the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7 any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices due process or a violation of any other applicable
hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the courts.
stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in
the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of
which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine due process.16 There is no controlling and precise
entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged to which the governmental action should conform in order
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly.
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922
any governmental action for that matter, from the that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? imposed for regulating occupations or regular
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
hostile to any official action marred by lack of license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] declined to interfere with such discretion. The
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
narrow or "technical conception with fixed content persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive the determination of the amount of this kind of license
inquiry into fundamental principles of our society."20 fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially
or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21 in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter
cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to
authority. It would seem that what should be deemed implement the state's police power. Only the other day,
unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover
specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the
the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses
such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to determining the amount," here the license fee of the
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
process grounds to single out such features as the as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain citation from another decision of significance: "It is
particulars, its alleged vagueness. urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold
storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, order to secure the general comfort, health, and
the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of
be deprived of their present business or a particular our Government the rights of the individual are
mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
to pursue occupations which may in the public need and authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
interest be affected by the exercise of the police power Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
which may result from the legal exercise of that citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
power."27 authority in his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness
insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for for all.29
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
viewed as a transgression against the command of due assumption by the government of the right of
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. intervention even in contractual relations affected with
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being the person, the standard for the validity of governmental
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
when there appears a correspondence between the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property,
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct process?
amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by
Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
which runs through all these different conceptions of another due process ground by invoking the principles of
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen
regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain.
the peace and order of society and the general well-being. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law in view of the necessity for determining whether the
for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may companion or companions referred to are those arriving
be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
the public order and safety, or otherwise within the entering the room With him at about the same time or
proper scope of the police power."28 coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso
in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare which from their standpoint would require a guess as to
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for
with business and occupations. Persons and property may every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a
half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of
suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula.
alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it
to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 must not fall back upon sterile claims; its judgments are
to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and
consistently upheld that what makes a statute the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either and large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises
and differ as to its application. Is this the situation to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not
before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes
supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is appeal, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has
saying what they obviously mean."35 the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless
well and how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social
all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such development is a process of trial and error; in the making
vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given
of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a for the play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature
success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law does not regulate, laissez faire — not the individual —
principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
appealed decision.
5Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs. 6U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, 7Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave. 8U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
3282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931. 14Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969;
Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
4Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163.
Also: "To Frankfurter the police power, true to its 15U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
etymology is the power to shape policy. It defies legal
16There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the 26Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board,
alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not
the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable 27Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649,
defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who 654, citing City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann.
has always taken advantage of as he exclusively relies on, 417.
the facilities, services and accommodations offered by
petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not 28Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706,
only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-
legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
the case as it has been developed.
29Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.
17Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme
Court, (1938) pp. 32- 33. 3046 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under
American sovereignty, American Supreme Court decisions
18Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left
487. to this Court except to follow the then controlling
decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S.
19Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230. 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300 U.S. 379.
20Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
31Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940), 70 Phil.
21Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of Justice
Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
22Cu Unjieng v. Postpone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
32Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is
23Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of important to distinguish between the due process clause
Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for
Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill. 19: Drew County v. transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and
Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming, Ill Cal. those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The
46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth
68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley y. Amendment because it also collides with the principles of
Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; the First, is much more definite than the test when only
Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New the Fourteen is involved. Much of the vagueness of the
Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel., Cramer v. due process clause disappears when the specific
Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8 ; McGuigan v. prohibition of the First become its standard. The right of
Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well
Burnett 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett 32 Ala., 728, and include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature
364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830. may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of
speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well
2498 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl & Pac. Tea Co. v be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297 susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate
US 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, danger to interests which the state may lawfully
4 L. Ed 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v. protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette,
Bacolod Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966. (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
25Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L- 33269 U.S. 385 (1926).
24322, July 21, 1967.
3417 L. ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.
35Roschen v. Ward (1929), 279 U. S. 337,339. G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
BIDIN, J.:
So, after the result of that sample examined which By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen
yielded positive result, you immediately placed the Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a
accused under arrest, is that correct? tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession
of shabu is punished by law. These signatures of accused
A: I informed that that they are under arrest for are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
bringing transporting to the country suspected confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They
are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission
x x x xxx xxx wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional
rights is inadmissible against them.[18] The fact that all
Q: How did you announce your authority to the accused? accused are foreign nationals does not preclude
application of the exclusionary rule because the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights Court:
are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.[19] As a matter of fact, they could stay in jail for life?
Without the signatures of accused on the boxes of Alpen A: Yes, Your Honor.
Cereals and on the transparent plastic bags, the
prosecution is left with the testimonies of its witnesses Court:
to establish that all the eleven (11) accused transported
shabu into the country. Among the prosecution witnesses, Now in all candor and sincerity, did you actually see with
only customs examiner Danilo Gomez testified that all the your own two eyes any box being recovered from the bag
seized baggages, including those owned by accused- of Au Wing Cheung? If you are not sure, dont answer.
appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung,
contained a box or boxes of shabu. His testimony was A: I am not sure.
given credence by the trial court since he was presumed
to have performed his duties in a regular manner. Court:
However, Gomez testimony inculpating accused-
appellants was not corroborated by other prosecution How about from the bag of Wong Chuen Ming, the other
witnesses. tourist from Hongkong. In all candor and sincerity did you
actually see with your own two eyes a box being recovered
Customs collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross- from his bag?
examination that she cannot recall if each and everyone
of accused were found in possession of any box or boxes A: I am not sure.
of Alpen Cereals.[20] More significantly, the testimony of
NARCOM officer Capt. Rustico Francisco casts doubt on Court:
the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of shabu
from the baggages of accused-appellants: There are nine other accused in these cases. In all
fairness and sincerity, other than the two, did you
Court: actually see with your own two eyes boxes of cereals
being recovered from the bags of the other Malaysians
Clarificatory questions from the Court, you said that you accused in these cases?
were at the arrival area immediately after the arrival of
all these accused when your attention was called by the A: For the nine others, I am very sure, I am very sure
customs examiner, is that correct? that cereal boxes containing shabu, I am very sure.
So that you can truly say that you could note or witness A: Yes, Your Honor, for the nine.[21] (Italics supplied)
the actual examinations of the baggages of all the
accused persons here? While Capt. Francisco was categorical in stating that
boxes of shabu were recovered from the baggages
A: Yes, Your Honor. belonging to the other nine (9) accused Malaysians, he
admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez actually
Court: recovered boxes of shabu from accused-appellants
baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the
You realize, of course, the seriousness of the charges performance of duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by
against these persons? itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-
appellants to be presumed innocent especially in the light
A: Yes, Your Honor.
of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution faces of the eleven accused and tell the court if you can
witnesses.[22] remember or recall the looks of the two accused who
refused to sign. Before you do that look very carefully at
There are other circumstances that militate against the their faces.
conviction of accused-appellants. First, accused-
appellants are British (Hongkong) nationals while all the A: Wong Chuen Ming, the one with the tattoo.
other accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to imagine
how accused-appellants could have conspired with the Q: Now, you mentioned two persons look at the faces of
other accused, who are total strangers, when they do not the 10 others. Aside from the one with a tattoo and look
even speak the same language. Second, overwhelming for the other one.
evidence consisting of testimonies of accused-appellant
Au Wing Cheungs superiors was presented to show that A: The other one is the tour leader.[23]
he was a bonafide employee of Select Tours International
Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accused-appellant All the foregoing circumstances taken together with the
Wong Chuen Ming was not originally part of the tour group findings of the Court persuade us to hold that accused-
arranged by Select Tours but he was only accommodated appellants participation in the illegal transportation of
by the latter at the last minute when his package tour to shabu into the country has not been proven beyond
Cebu was cancelled by Wing Ann Travel Co. Finally, as reasonable doubt. To paraphrase an admonition expressed
testified to by Capt. Francisco, both accused-appellants by the Court in a recent case, [m]uch as We share the
adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags abhorrence of the disenchanted public in regard to the
containing shabu: proliferation of drug pushers (or drug smugglers, as in
this case), the Court cannot permit the incarceration of
Court: individuals based on insufficient factual nexus of their
participation in the commission of an offense.[24]
You made mention about two persons two of the accused
who refused to sign the plastic bags containing the WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
suspected shabu. Did you say that? REVERSED and another one entered ACQUITTING
Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung of the crime
A: Yes, Your Honor. charged, based on reasonable doubt. Their immediate
release is hereby ORDERED unless they are detained for
Court: some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
Did you not go out of your way to inquire the reasons of SO ORDERED.
the two for not wanting to sign knowing of course that
your duty as a law officer is not only to see to it that the Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,
guilty are prosecuted but to spare the innocent? Did you concur.
inquire why they refused to sign?
A: They told me their baggages did not contain any [2] TSN, testimony of Danilo Gomez, 25 September 1991,
prohibited drugs. pp. 4-13.
[18] People vs. Bandin, 226 SCRA 299 (1993); People vs.
Bagano, 181 SCRA 747 (1990).
[19] Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tasia Pao Ito, 86 SCRA 270
(1978).
BELLOSILLO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
#Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 56.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary Though nominally against person, such suits are to
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they treat
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification
process exerted over the person. above-mentioned, they are substantially property actions.
In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against
litigation may result either from a seizure of the the res; in the common law, they would be different in
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a
the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the mere hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is real action so far as
provisions of law, the power of the court over the it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition
property is recognized and made effective. In the latter
of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res. Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the
(Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.) Court of First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is
evident that the court derives its authority to entertain
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the the action primarily from the statutes organizing the
defendant for whom publication is made appears, the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general
action becomes as to him a personal action and is sense, over the cause of action is obvious and requires no
conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the
action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be voluntary submission of the defendant or by the personal
considered with reference to the principles governing service of process upon him within the territory where
actions in rem. the process is valid. If, however, the defendant is a
nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure personal process of the court, refuses to come in
proceeding and an action of attachment, concerning which voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the
the Supreme Court of the United States has used the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the sole
following language: thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object
which is the subject of the exercise of judicial power. It
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is
suit in personam, with the added incident, that the based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it
property attached remains liable, under the control of possesses over the property; and any discussion relative
the court, to answer to any demand which may be to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
established against the defendant by the final judgment defendant is entirely apart from the case. The
of the court. But, if there is no appearance of the jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as
defendant, and no service of process on him, the case the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based
becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the upon the following conditions and considerations, namely:
only effect of which is to subject the property attached (1) that the property is located within the district; (2)
to the payment of the defendant which the court may that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the
find to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 property by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the
Wall., 308.) mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the
proceedings takes the property into custody, if
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of
is not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that
considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon no other relief can be granted in this proceeding than
the court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired such as can be enforced against the property.
by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to
subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists, We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the
whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the following proposition relative to the foreclosure
preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeding against the property of a nonresident
proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by mortgagor who fails to come in and submit himself
law precisely as though the property had been seized upon personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the
attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which
ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over
an attachment the property may be seized at the the person is not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that
inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit the relief granted by the court must be limited to such
it is not taken into legal custody until the time comes for as can be enforced against the property itself.
the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental
principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is It is important that the bearing of these propositions be
here exercising a jurisdiction over the property in a clearly apprehended, for there are many expressions in
proceeding directed essentially in rem. the American reports from which it might be inferred
that the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by publication and notice; but
such is not the case. In truth the proposition that because the court in fact entered a personal judgment
jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be against the absent debtor for the full amount of the
acquired by publication and notice was never clearly indebtedness secured by the mortgage. We do not so
understood even in the American courts until after the interpret the judgment.
decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the leading case of Pennoyer vs. Neff In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner
(95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of
and of other decisions which have subsequently been foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed
rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make
jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into
publication and notice is no longer open to question; and it court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of
is now fully established that a personal judgment upon sale. In the present case the judgment which was entered
constructive or substituted service against a nonresident contains the following words:
who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies
to all kinds of constructive or substituted process, Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio
including service by publication and personal service Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is indebted in the
outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco
rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the Espanol-Filipino' . . . therefore said appellant is ordered
case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or to deliver the above amount etc., etc.
impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to
Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead
A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312 it is clearly intended merely as a compliance with the
requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff that the evidence of this it may be observed that
(supra) proceeds is that the process from the tribunals according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal
of one State cannot run into other States or countries judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to
and that due process of law requires that the defendant be rendered until after the property has been sold and
shall be brought under the power of the court by service the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
of process within the State, or by his voluntary
appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that
the question of his personal liability. The doctrine whatever may be the effect in other respects of the
established by the Supreme Court of the United States failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail
on this point, being based upon the constitutional the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such
conception of due process of law, is binding upon the irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that
is the principle that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than
against a nonresident who is not served personally within would be supplied by any form of notice that could be
the state, and who does not appear, the relief must be given to a resident of a foreign country.
confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render
a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe
173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil that we are fully aware that many reported cases can be
Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an cited in which it is assumed that the question of the
action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind
upon whom service has been effected exclusively by is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and
publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can the court is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by
be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. virtue of the publication. This phraseology was
Birch, 99 Cal., 416.) undoubtedly originally adopted by the court because of
the analogy between service by the publication and
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the personal service of process upon the defendant; and, as
judgment entered in the court below offends against the has already been suggested, prior to the decision of
principle just stated and that this judgment is void Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the
legal effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure
is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be lost to
which had already been molded into legal tradition before them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume
that case was decided have been brought down to the that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in
present day. But it is clear that the legal principle here Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
involved is not effected by the peculiar language in which
the courts have expounded their ideas. It will be observed that this mode of notification does
not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical
the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such containing the publication may never in fact come to his
gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice
law" which was secured by the Act of Congress in force may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by
in these Islands at the time this mortgage was mail the probability of his receiving it, though much
foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the
questions involving the application of the constitutional address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the
provisions relating to due process of law the Supreme regularity and security of the mail service. It will be
Court of the United States has refrained from noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative
attempting to define with precision the meaning of that to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the
expression, the reason being that the idea expressed mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but
therein is applicable under so many diverse conditions as only in the case where the defendant's residence is
to make any attempt ay precise definition hazardous and known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that
unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not,
it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are
present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short
matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation
and sale.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall
have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a
foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to nonresident, to take measures that in some way he shall
the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which be represented when his property is called into
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally notice by the ordinary publications which have usually
provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he
for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p.
residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, 450]).
or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is
merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may It has been well said by an American court:
be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal
such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of process upon the constructive notice, then our statutes
notice of this character a distinguish master of were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative
constitutional law has used the following language: declarations, without either force, or meaning; for if the
person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment
personal notice is provided for, it is rather from cannot operate upon the property, then no effective
judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the
be that the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen proceedings.
against a nonresident. Such a result would be a deplorable
one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, It will be observed that in considering the effect of this
667.) irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed
as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction
provisions relative to publication or other form of notice there can be no distinction between the much and the
against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and
in respect to the publication of notice in the newspaper it if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be
may be stated that strict compliance with the considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of
requirements of the law has been held to be essential. In jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion
Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity
(139 U. S., 137, 138), it was held that where newspaper of the judgment. In the application of the idea of due
publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly
required 20, the publication was insufficient. unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once
established, all that due process of law thereafter
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard;
relative to the sending of notice by mail, the requirement and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it
is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to
in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to
We consider this to be of some significance; and it seems reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is
to us that, having due regard to the principles upon which supposed to have been violated and the principle
the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of underlying the exercise of judicial power in these
the mortgaged property must, so far as the due process proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we
of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that
failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he no person shall be deprived of his property without due
takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier process of law has not been infringed.
might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope
containing the notice before it should reach its In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two
destination and be delivered to him. This idea seems to conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the
be strengthened by the consideration that placing upon notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the
the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such irregularity did
performance of that act is put effectually beyond the not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a
control of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in
obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still
Procedure as relates to the sending of notice by mail was necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as
complied with when the court made the order. The a simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to
question as to what may be the consequences of the pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not
failure of the record to show the proof of compliance grave enough. From this point of view, however, it is
with that requirement will be discussed by us further on. obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the
ground of the irregularity in question must fail unless it
The observations which have just been made lead to the shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that
conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, irregularity. The least, therefore, that can be required
if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an of the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had
irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; a good defense against the action to foreclose the
and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either
not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by in the motion or in the affidavit which accompanies the
publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of motion.
notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an should have acquired information as to what was
irregularity or defect in the proceedings is usually transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of
required to be supported by an affidavit showing the this rational assumption we are authorized, in the absence
grounds on which the relief is sought, and in addition to of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did have, or
this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It soon acquired, information as to the sale of his property.
is held that a general statement that a party has a good
defense to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares
must be averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its that there is a presumption that things have happened
face a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]);
is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.) and we cannot conceive of a situation more appropriate
than this for applying the presumption thus defined by
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting the lawgiver. In support of this presumption, as applied to
this aspect of the case. In this connection we quote the the present case, it is permissible to consider the
following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in probability that the defendant may have received actual
course of publication: notice of these proceedings from the unofficial notice
addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and employee of the bank's attorneys. Adopting almost the
may therefore be enforced if permitted to stand on the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United
record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their States in Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed.,
quasi equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known skill of
lapse of the term ay which it was entered, except in clear postal officials and employees in making proper delivery
cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it of letters defectively addressed, we think the
appears that the party making the application is himself presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached
without fault and has acted in good faith and with the defendant, there being no proof that it was ever
ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it
unexplained, is deemed sufficient ground for refusing the was delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to
relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something Amoy, China, there is a probability that the recipient was
is due to the finality of judgments, and acquiescence or a person sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it
unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this character, or communicate its contents to him.
since courts are always reluctant to interfere with
judgments, and especially where they have been executed Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the
or satisfied. The moving party has the burden of showing sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the
diligence, and unless it is shown affirmatively the court mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which
will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 we are now indulging would be idle and frivolous; but the
R. C. L., 694, 695.) considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show
the propriety of applying to this situation the legal
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January 29, 1910. presumption, supported by the circumstances of this
The mortgage under which the property was sold was case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the
executed far back in 1906; and the proceedings in the defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his
foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming property from the obligation which he had placed upon it;
the sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to
bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man who had him; and that he acquiesced in the consequences of those
placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 proceedings after they had been accomplished. Under
and had then gone away from the scene of his life these circumstances it is clear that the merit of this
activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected
should have long remained in ignorance of the fact that in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is
the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, it an adequate reply to say that the proponent of this
even supposing that he had no knowledge of those motion is an administrator who only qualified a few
proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more months before this motion was made. No disability on the
in keeping with the ordinary course of things that he part of the defendant himself existed from the time
when the foreclosure was effected until his death; and can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment entered
we believe that the delay in the appointment of the in the Court of First Instance.
administrator and institution of this action is a
circumstance which is imputable to the parties in interest In connection with the entire failure of the motion to
whoever they may have been. Of course if the minor heirs show either a meritorious defense to the action or that
had instituted an action in their own right to recover the the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the
property, it would have been different. law can take notice, we may be permitted to add that in
our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered unsettle judicial proceedings long ago closed, can not be
prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank became the considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which
purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy
price greatly below that which had been agreed upon in requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The
the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was
connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a member of the
which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by Supreme Court of the United States:
the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this
mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld,
therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should and that titles obtained in those proceedings be safe
serve as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical
unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The defects are adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a
upset price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels judicial sale will never realize that value of the property,
involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and
behalf of the appellant that when the bank bought in the buying that title which he has reason to fear may years
property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that thereafter be swept away through some occult and not
stipulation. readily discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed.,
15.)
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage
providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a In the case where that language was used an attempt was
foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the made to annul certain foreclosure proceedings on the
foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and ground that the affidavit upon which the order of
Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. publication was based erroneously stated that the State
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State.
cases here cited the property was purchased at the It was held that this mistake did not affect the validity
foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but of the proceedings.
by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied
in a case where the mortgagee himself becomes the In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the
purchaser has apparently not been decided by this court clerk failed to send the notice by post as required by the
in any reported decision, and this question need not here order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether
be considered, since it is evident that if any liability was this is a proper assumption; and the proposition which we
incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption
fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability that the clerk performed his duty as the ministerial
derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have officer of the court, which presumption is not overcome
already demonstrated such a liability could not be the by any other facts appearing in the cause.
subject of adjudication in an action where the court had
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil
plaintiff bank became liable to account for the difference Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption "that
between the upset price and the price at which in bought official duty has been regularly performed;" and in
in the property, that liability remains unaffected by the subsection 18 it is declared that there is a presumption
disposition which the court made of this case; and the "that the ordinary course of business has been followed."
fact that the bank may have violated such an obligation These presumptions are of course in no sense novelties,
as they express ideas which have always been recognized.
Omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec immediately after divine service, in such church as the
probetur in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal court should direct. In a certain action judgment had
presumption that the clerk performed his duty about been entered against a nonresident, after publication in
mailing this notice; and we think that strong pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the
considerations of policy require that this presumption validity of the proceedings was called in question in
should be allowed to operate with full force under the another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient
circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no periodical that publication had been made in its columns
control over the clerk of the court; and has no right to as required by law; but no proof was offered to show the
meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of
performance of his duties. Having no control over this it at the front door of the court-house. It was insisted
officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was
that the duties imposed on the clerk are performed. void for lack of jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of
the United States said:
Other considerations no less potent contribute to
strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no The court which made the decree . . . was a court of
principle of law better settled than that after general jurisdiction. Therefore every presumption not
jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of
of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been its jurisdiction. . . . It is to be presumed that the court
rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or before making its decree took care of to see that its
decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings order for constructive service, on which its right to make
from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. the decree depended, had been obeyed.
United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if
the record is silent with respect to any fact which must It is true that in this case the former judgment was the
have been established before the court could have rightly subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while in the case
acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct
brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs. proceeding for relief against it. The same general
Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.) presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, whether it is
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a the subject of direct or indirect attack the only
decedent] the court are presumed to have adjudged difference being that in case of indirect attack the
every question necessary to justify such order or decree, judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the
viz: The death of the owners; that the petitioners were record affirmatively shows it to be void, while in case of
his administrators; that the personal estate was direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may
insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased; that the in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the
private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale, were record.
within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and
that all the provisions of the law as to notices which are The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and
directory to the administrators have been complied with. that the court made its decree with the knowledge that
. . . The court is not bound to enter upon the record the the requirements of law had been complied with appear to
evidence on which any fact was decided. (Florentine vs. be amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the
Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It
this apply after long lapse of time. is true that there ought to be found among the papers on
file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section 400
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order
U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion in a case was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit
analogous to that which is now before us. It there appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to
appeared that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the speak. But the very purpose of the law in recognizing
State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a
necessary that publication should be made in a newspaper prior judgment in the face of such an omission. If we were
for a specified period of time, also be posted at the front to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the
door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, proper affidavit is not present in the file of papers which
we call the record, the result would be that in the future this case. That the clerk of the attorneys for the
every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant
that now before us would depend, for its continued at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight
security, upon the presence of such affidavit among the basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent
papers and would be liable at any moment to be destroyed notice to the right address.
by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think
that no court, with a proper regard for the security of There is undoubtedly good authority to support the
judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by position that when the record states the evidence or
law been confided to the courts, would incline to favor makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional
such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a fact, it will not be presumed that there was other or
case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact
the clerk performed his duty still maintains was otherwise than stated. If, to give an illustration, it
notwithstanding the absence from the record of the appears from the return of the officer that the summons
proper proof of that fact. was served at a particular place or in a particular manner,
it will not be presumed that service was also made at
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that another place or in a different manner; or if it appears
under the practice prevailing in the Philippine Islands the that service was made upon a person other than the
word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the
indicating the collective mass of papers which contain the record, that it was made upon the defendant also (Galpin
history of all the successive steps taken in a case and vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U.
which are finally deposited in the archives of the clerk's S., 444, 449). While we believe that these propositions
office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of are entirely correct as applied to the case where the
general information that no judgment roll, or book of final person making the return is the officer who is by law
record, is commonly kept in our courts for the purpose of required to make the return, we do not think that it is
recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in properly applicable where, as in the present case, the
actions which have been terminated; and in particular, no affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the
such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
city of Manila. There is, indeed, a section of the Code of
Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final The last question of importance which we propose to
record shall be kept; but this provision has, as a matter consider is whether a motion in the cause is admissible as
of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the
is that in the present case we do not have the assistance motion prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all
of the recitals of such a record to enable us to pass upon subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the
the validity of this judgment and as already stated the litigation will be renewed, proceeding again from the date
question must be determined by examining the papers mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been
contained in the entire file. interrupted. The proponent of the motion does not ask
the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the
affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that upon court, to the end that the litigation may again resume its
April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail regular course.
addressed to the defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands,
should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure
the court failed in his duty and that, instead of himself which expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of
sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a
upon Bernardo to send it for him. We do not think that renewal of the litigation in the same cause. This is as
this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if follows:
it had affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had
attempted to comply with this order and had directed the SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court
notification to Manila when he should have directed it to may relieve a party or legal representative from the
Amoy, this would be conclusive that he had failed to judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him
comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But
taken. as we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment
of the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is
supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first that inasmuch as the judgment is a nullity it can be
paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were
discussion, provides as follows: in fact void upon its face, that is, if it were shown to be
a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First be something in this. Where a judgment or judicial order
Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing,
deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense.
so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is
Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that
the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, even if the judgment could be shown to be void for want
setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the
aside. . . . party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some
appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this principles of law and practice, long recognized in
section is intended to supplement the remedy provided by American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the
section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved
that there is no other means recognized by law whereby party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment, if not
a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, already carried into effect; or if the property has already
procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the been disposed of he may institute suit to recover it. In
renewal of the litigation. every situation of this character an appropriate remedy
is at hand; and if property has been taken without due
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We
system of practice in civil causes, and it contains accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been
provisions describing with much fullness the various steps void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the
to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not by
end it defines with precision the method of beginning, motion in the cause. As we have already seen our Code of
conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever Civil Procedure defines the conditions under which relief
species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is against a judgment may be productive of conclusion for
declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under
accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are conditions different from those defined by law. Upon the
therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in point of procedure here involved, we refer to the case of
sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that
relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment after the lapse
which has been once concluded. of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void
on its face; and in all cases, after the lapse of the time
The motion in the present case does not conform to the limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face;
requirements of either of these provisions; and the and all cases, after the lapse of such time, when an
consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding
of First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper. in court for that purpose an action regularly brought is
preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the EN BANC
judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is
accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered. A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur. STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court,
Separate Opinions Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was
filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but it should
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of be noted that in the report of the two (2) newspapers
his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting
even equitable justification for the dismissal of the of controls was stated in the present perfect tense
eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions already been lifted; the announcement did not say that
therein do not speak well of respondent and cannot but the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange
further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, restrictions but instead says that the government "has
it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic illustration and newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday
emphasis: lifted the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions". The lifting of the last remaining exchange
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No.
said that I issued the Order dismissing the eleven (11) 960.
cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis of
newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly
letter complaint without awaiting the official publication announced the lifting of all foreign exchange regulations.
of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank The President has within his control directly or indirectly
Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, but the Finance being the Chairman of the Monetary Board which
lifting of "all foreign exchange controls" was announced decides the policies of the Central Bank.
by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's
August 11, 1992" the government has lifted ALL foreign announcement of August 10, published the following day,
exchange controls," and in the words of the Philippine nor made an announcement that the lifting of the controls
Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17
yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on (the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after
foreign exchange transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both report of said order was published) and after the
quotations supplied) not only the President made the President said on August 17, reported in the
announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new
Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying that "the foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases
Monetary Board arrived at the decision after noting how against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the
charges against the widow of former President Marcos impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of
"have become moot and academic" because of new cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and
ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in and out of how this Court reacted thereto.
the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to
"new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged
INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours later, for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular
presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was
(sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a plane
advised by the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must
Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit
Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of
cases pending in court and such a position shall stand legal US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the
scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said." mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts
such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein was
I will elaborate on two points: ordered dismissed from the government service for gross
incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
1. If the President was wrong in making the August
10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992, Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge,
newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross
and thus I should have relied on the Presidential ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust
announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the order or judgment when he granted bail to an accused
President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the
financial and legal advisers, because no one bothered to contrary recommendation of the investigating judge, and
advise the President to correct his announcements, not thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case
until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
had made another announcement as to the charges
against Imelda Marcos having been rendered moot and Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court
academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
not, to my knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
lawyer. It therefore behooved his subalterns to give him has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain
of foreign exchange controls, designed, among others to for due process and the rule of law, applies the law
encourage the entry of foreign investments). Instead of whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays
rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service
assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
announcement, these advisers have chosen to toss the prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which
had become of public knowledge. Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also
dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law
xxx xxx xxx after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume of the complainant, without affording due process to the
and expect that respondent judge is possessed with more latter and other interested parties. 36
than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his
appointment as a presiding judge in the Regional Trial Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
the City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of
and regrettable to note the nature of the arguments and firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of malice
the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate
the law. The Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of
the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this
and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and Court has repeatedly held that -
unjust judgment. 37
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and officer when required to exercise his judgment or
considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of
DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be
with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
from reemployment in the government service. 38 of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment,
and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be
immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or nothing short of harassment or would make his position
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, unbearable. 2
effective upon receipt of this decision.
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal,
SO ORDERED. or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
Kapunan, JJ., concur. administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by
him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
Bidin, is on official leave. absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to
Separate Opinions proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial
DISSENTING OPINION immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its
purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence
BELLOSILLO, J.: of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is
no choice but to apply it to the instant case.
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that
judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as
Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
been held to be protected official activity. Although a 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the
decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth
absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of
rule is consistent with the concept of judicial Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed
protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors
become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of
subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after
be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1 President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was
published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge
exchange restrictions. for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists
that there really is no need to await the publication of
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that
gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the
disqualification from reemployment in the government eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution
service. the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous
though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a
particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority necessary consequence of the belief that since the
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated.
circumstances in a different light. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and
statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons
judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
reversal has now become final for failure of the accused Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of
to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused the person charged under the old law cannot be had and
except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy the action should be dismissed. 15
to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should
respondent judge liable administratively, much more not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means
civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was
judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what
deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence,
regard may exist only when the error appears to be if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal
deliberate or in bad faith. 9 charges against accused have been eliminated and thus
strikes down the information and consequently dismisses
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally,
first, for insisting that "there was no need to await civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the
public announcement made by the President in several Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign improper consideration are sufficient defenses
exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of
and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being
"dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the
even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, premise that no one called upon to try the facts or
and without at least giving the prosecution the basic interpret the law in the administration of justice can be
opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11 infallible. 17
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized
not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of
faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied due
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing
means breach of a known duty through some motive or doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges
interest or ill will. 14 - which does not necessarily make them personally liable.
In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he
should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be under such system if he seeks to do what he may
heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused. personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of should administer his office with due regard to the
Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
sanction against a judge simply because he has committed that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge
an error in deciding the case against such person, when under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must
such error can be elevated to a higher court for review interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
and correction, the action of such person can only be
suspect." But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing
laws and established jurisprudence, his own personality,
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on character, convictions, values, experiences and
the petition before the appellate court, and consequently prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he
of the assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless is no more and no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions
speculation. And to imply that the influence of the and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply,
accused who is a prominent public figure brought about all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus,
the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records. Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United
States once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never
hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his see them with any eyes except our own." 25 Hence, time
dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the
turned out when the reversal of his decision by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have continued to set
appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming
even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or
advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from
by his administration against the accused, was quoted as this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective
saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary dispensers of everyday justice.
of the foreign exchange deregulation policy of his
administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond
said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to everybody . reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the
. . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and
Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re
advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings
decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be
that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22 in their nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases."
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of
only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge
cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the
suspicion especially from the successful appellant who basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction
feels certain that the lower court indeed erred. . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this
character being in their nature highly penal, the charge
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To
duty is the application of general law to a particular paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the
instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of the law by a
men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28 familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
(with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
the burden is on the one challenging the same to prove controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even
want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the
required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and
failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
that official duty has been regularly performed stands. respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in
office and to continue to discharge the functions and
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of
cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, 29 the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service."
respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, There is nothing in the records of the instant case which
leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief shows that respondent
against the accused, the former likewise ordered the Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern
release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which breed
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross manifest and irreversible injustice.
ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent
efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of
administrative case, respondent judge, after his this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only
defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of
possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest
has been clearly demonstrated, as in this case, not only of the judicial service.
once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly
incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge
former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent who entertained the petition for bail filed by the
Judge Muro is being administratively charged. suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding
unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other
of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on
judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave
charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant
intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard
cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting of proper procedure. And, still in
the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed
Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations of the condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to
respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that
complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge. he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that
he was charged with a litany of administrative cases, six the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro
(6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a
of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal
the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from
the records that the respondent's assailed decision was BELLOSILLO, J.:
inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose,
and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous.
proper. 37 Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has
been held to be protected official activity. Although a
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
order may curtail the independence of judges and send concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition,
the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is
their office without fear of reprisal, merely for insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the
long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might
these are necessary evils which must be endured to some become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be
extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to
law be stifled. be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this
luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his Court has repeatedly held that -
decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and
independence. And, while this Court may slightly bend . . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial
backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and officer when required to exercise his judgment or
cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits
forward and take the lead to defend him against provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be
not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
system as well. As champion — at other times tormentor upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
— of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment,
unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose nothing short of harassment or would make his position
than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the unbearable. 2
service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate,
lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal,
judgments handed down in good faith. or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
Respondent judge has impressive academic and erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot
professional credentials which, experience shows, are no be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by
he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of
evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge. 5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
JUDGE. act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial
# Separate Opinions immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its
purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence
of the judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification,
no choice but to apply it to the instant case. and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for
"dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused,
Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as and without at least giving the prosecution the basic
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the
College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty,
valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of
ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well
Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad
7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of means breach of a known duty through some motive or
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after interest or ill will. 14
President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was
published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge
exchange restrictions. for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists
that there really is no need to await the publication of
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that
gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the
disqualification from reemployment in the government eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution
service. the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous
though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a
particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority necessary consequence of the belief that since the
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated.
circumstances in a different light. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and
statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons
judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
reversal has now become final for failure of the accused Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of
to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused the person charged under the old law cannot be had and
except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy the action should be dismissed. 15
to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should
respondent judge liable administratively, much more not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means
civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was
judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what
deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. 16 Hence,
regard may exist only when the error appears to be if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal
deliberate or in bad faith. 9 charges against accused have been eliminated and thus
strikes down the information and consequently dismisses
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally,
first, for insisting that "there was no need to await civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the
public announcement made by the President in several Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign improper consideration are sufficient defenses
protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot
the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being and academic because of the new regulations that have
held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her
premise that no one called upon to try the facts or advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his
interpret the law in the administration of justice can be decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said
infallible. 17 that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not
the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the
the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes
certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been suspicion especially from the successful appellant who
pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied due
process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his
doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges duty is the application of general law to a particular
- which does not necessarily make them personally liable. instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of
In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice
should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be under such system if he seeks to do what he may
heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused. personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of should administer his office with due regard to the
Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
sanction against a judge simply because he has committed that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge
an error in deciding the case against such person, when under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must
such error can be elevated to a higher court for review interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
and correction, the action of such person can only be
suspect." But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing
laws and established jurisprudence, his own personality,
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on character, convictions, values, experiences and
the petition before the appellate court, and consequently prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and
invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he
of the assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless is no more and no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions
speculation. And to imply that the influence of the and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply,
accused who is a prominent public figure brought about all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus,
the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records. Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United
States once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never
hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his see them with any eyes except our own." 25 Hence, time
dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the
turned out when the reversal of his decision by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have continued to set
appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming
even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or
advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from
by his administration against the accused, was quoted as this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective
saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary dispensers of everyday justice.
of the foreign exchange deregulation policy of his
administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond
said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to everybody . reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the
. . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs.
assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found
deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance
of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was
Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral
before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal
in their nature highly penal in character and to be cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an
Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim
this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations of the
Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the
basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge.
. . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this
character being in their nature highly penal, the charge In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32
must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To he was charged with a litany of administrative cases, six
paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance
alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of the law by a of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all
preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge
reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions." 28 familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
(with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
the burden is on the one challenging the same to prove controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even
want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the
required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and
failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
that official duty has been regularly performed stands. respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in
office and to continue to discharge the functions and
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of
cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, 29 the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service."
respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, There is nothing in the records of the instant case which
leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief shows that respondent
against the accused, the former likewise ordered the Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern
release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which breed
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross manifest and irreversible injustice.
ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent
efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of
administrative case, respondent judge, after his this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only
defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of
possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest
has been clearly demonstrated, as in this case, not only of the judicial service.
once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly
incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge
former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent who entertained the petition for bail filed by the
Judge Muro is being administratively charged. suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding
unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly
relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate,
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent
case, 35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on judgments handed down in good faith.
respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant Respondent judge has impressive academic and
of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard professional credentials which, experience shows, are no
of proper procedure. And, still in longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all,
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It
against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of
produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all,
he knowingly rendered an unjust decision. is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT
the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro JUDGE.
was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a
disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal
is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from
the records that the respondent's assailed decision was #Footnotes
inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose,
and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a 1 Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., 200.
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order,
dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not 2 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1988, 4th ed., 454.
proper. 37
3 Rollo, 3.
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged
order may curtail the independence of judges and send 4 Rollo, 21.
the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise
their office without fear of reprisal, merely for 5 Rollo, 55.
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants
may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and 6 Ibid., 63.
long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but
these are necessary evils which must be endured to some 7 Rollo, 88.
extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the
law be stifled. 8 Ibid., 8.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the 9 Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, ponente, with
luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his Justices Luis A. Javellana and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and concurring; Rollo, 80.
independence. And, while this Court may slightly bend
backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and 10 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 13, 843.
cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step
forward and take the lead to defend him against 11 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48.
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace
not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial 12 King vs. Gallun, et al., 109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870.
system as well. As champion — at other times tormentor
— of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be 13 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.
unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous
judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing 14 Francisco, Rules of Court, 1973 ed., Vol. VII, Part
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose I, 71.
than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the
15 Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IX, Sec. 2567, 535.
35 Garganera vs. Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-227,
16 Op. cit., 71-72. September 1, 1992, 213 SCRA 149.
17 Roden vs. Connecticut Co., et al., 155 A. 721. 36 Uy, et al. vs. Dizon-Capulong,, A.M. No. RTJ-91-
766, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 87.
18 Francisco, Rules of Court, 1973 ed., Vol. VIII,
Part I, 81. 37 Zuño vs. Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, June 23,
1993.
19 State ex rel. Brunjies vs. Bockelman, et al., 240
S.W. 209. 38 Section 9, Rule 14 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
20 Lugue vs. Kayanan, et al., G.R. No. L-26826, August (Administrative Code of 1987).
29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
21 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1988, 4th ed., 454-455.
1 Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability:
22 Canon 17, Canons of Judicial Ethics. Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 149,
cited in Readings on Recruitment and Selection of Judges,
23 Canon 18, id. Supreme Court (1987), p. 60.
24 Castillo, et al. vs. Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17, 2 Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Judge Villanueva, Adm. Case
January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 124. No. MTJ- 92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 121,
citing Mendoza v. Judge Villaluz, Adm. Case No. 1797-CCC,
25 Olaivar vs. Cinco, A.M. No. 45-MJ, March 29, 27 August 1981, 106 SCRA 664, in turn citing Evangelista
1974, 56 SCRA 232. v. Judge Baez, Unnumbered CAR Case, 26 December
1974, 61 SCRA 475; Vda. de Zabala v. Judge Pamaran,
26 Cf. Alejandro vs. Pepito, G.R. No. 52090, February Adm. Case No. 200-J, 10 June 1971, 39 SCRA 430; and
21, 1980, 96 SCRA 322. Barroso v. Judge Arche, Adm. Case No. 216-CFI, 30
September 1975, 67 SCRA 161.
27 Cf. Piedra, et al. vs. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-89-
336, Resolution En Banc, October 4, 1990. 3 Ibid., citing Valdez v. Judge Valera, Adm. Matter
No. 1628- CAR, and Olaya v. Judge Valera, Adm. Matter
28 Comment, 10-11; Rollo, 30-31. No. 1676-CAR, both promulgated 31 January 1978, 81
SCRA 246.
29 Santiago, et al. vs. Santos, A.M. No. 772-CJ, April
18, 1975, 63 SCRA 392. 4 Morada v. Judge Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 7
February 1994, citing In re: Petition for the Dismissal
30 Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. from Service of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, Adm. Case No.
72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43. 3086, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 719.
31 See In re: Rafael C. Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134- 5 Ibid., citing, among others, Revita v. Rimando, 98
J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107. SCRA 619, and Ubongon v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30.
8 Mayor Roa v. Judge Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-93- 25 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (1921),
935, 11 March 1994. p. 12.
9 Arpon v. Judge de la Paz, Adm. Matter No. 41-MJ, 26 43 Phil. 212 (1922).
28 May 1975, 64 SCRA 156.
27 Adm. Matter No. 88-MJ, 25 January 1977, 75
10 Majority Opinion, p. 17. SCRA 69.
16 18A Words and Phrases 85, citing N.L.R.B. v. 30 Zuño v. Judge Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, 23
James Thompson & Co., C.A.2, 208 F.2d 743, 745. June 1993, 223 SCRA 584, cited in the Majority Opinion,
p. 26.
17 Pilipinas Bank v. Justice Tirona-Liwag, Adm.
Matter No. CA-90-11, 18 October 1990, 190 SCRA 834, 31 A.M. No. RTJ-88-246, 19 July 1990, 187 SCRA
citing Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Judge 598, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
Capistrano, Adm. Matter No. R-66- RTJ, 18 March 1988,
159 SCRA 47. 32 Garganera v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-
227, Mejorada v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-90-624,
18 Adm. Matter No. R-710-RTJ, 21 May 1993, 222 Velez v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-270, Judge
SCRA 295. Jocson v. Barredo, A.M. No. P-87-124, Jalandoon v. Judge
Jocson, A.M.
19 See Majority Opinion, p. 20. No. RTJ-88-269, Angodong, vs. Judge Jocson, A.M. No.
RTJ-88-267, and Tronco v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-
20 The Chronicle, issue of 18 August 1992. 88-279, all promulgated 1 September 1992, 213 SCRA
149, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
21 Ibid.
33 Adm. Matter No. RTJ-91-766, 7 April 1993, 221 SECOND DIVISION
SCRA 87, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
G.R. No. L-112387 October 13, 1994
34 Dinapol v. Judge Baldado, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-
92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110. MANUEL P. MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
35 Alisangco v. Judge Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter No. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, and
MTJ-91- 554, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 1. SALVADOR H. LAUREL, respondent.
36 Negado v. Judge Autajay, see Note 18. Eriberto Ignacio for petitioner.
37 See In Re: Petition for the Dismissal from Laurel Law Offices for private respondent.
Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon,
Adm. Case No. 3086, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 719.
NARVASA, C.J.:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed 15 IbId., at p. 624. See also Calderon vs. Solicitor
resolutions of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. Costs General, 215 SCRA 876.
against petitioner.
16 205 SCRA 155.
SO ORDERED.
17 Annex "G", Petition, pp. 58-75, Rollo.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
18 189 SCRA 459.
Padilla, J., took no part.
19 De Ocampo vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
#Footnotes L-19533, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 440.
1 Annex "A", Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-23. 20 185 SCRA 35, emphasis in the original.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and 5 L-37003, October 23, 1974.
the order of April 4, 1974, issued by respondent Judge is
set aside, nullified and considered as totally devoid of any 6 Petition, 6-7.
force or effect. The case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings in accordance with law and in 7 Cf. the following cases after Ling Su Fan and
consonance with this decision, more specifically that the before Philippine Maritime Industrial Union: El Banco
testimony of Miss Montano remains in the records Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918); Rubi v.
subject to the test of cross-examination, if any, by Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); Lopez v.
private respondent. Costs against Shell Philippines, Inc. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23 (1924); Macalindog v. de la
Rosa, 72 Phil. 163 (1941); Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil. 749
Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. (1954); Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v. Provincial Board of
Negros Occidental, 99 Phil. 633 (1956); Correa v. Pascual,
99 Phil. 696 (1956); Sicat v. Reyes, 100 Phil. 505 (1956);
Separate Opinions Cruzcosa v. Concepcion, 101 Phil. 146 (1957); Republic v.
Villarosa, 103 Phil. 631 (1958); Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105
Phil. 162 (1959); Philippine National Bank v. Philippine
Recording System, Inc., 107 Phil. 440 (1960); Rojas v.
BARREDO, J., concurring: Papa, 107 Phil. 983 (1960); Brito v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 108 Phil. 609 (1960); Macabingkil v. Yatco, L-
In the result. Considering the state of the dockets of our 23174, Sept. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 150; Luzon Surety Co.,
trial courts now, I cannot share the apparently liberal Inc. v. Beson, L-26865, Jan. 30,1970, 31 SCRA 313;
attitude towards postponements discernible in the main Bermejo v. Barrios, L-23614, Feb. 27 1970, 31 SCRA 764;
opinion, although in the case at bar, I agree that Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-27392, Jan. 30,
respondent judge should have taken into account the 1971, 37 SCRA 303; Central Bank v. Cloribel, L-26971,
peculiar situation of petitioner's witness, Miss Montano. April 11, 1972, 44 SCRA 307; Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd. v.
Enage, L-30111, Feb. 27, 1973, 49 SCRA 416; Aducayen v.
Flores, L-30370, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 78; Minlay v.
Sandoval, L-28901, Sept. 4, 1973, 53 SCRA 1; Carandang
v. Cabatuando, L-25384, Oct. 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 383;
Vinzons v. Ardales L-35738, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
Separate Opinions 492; Uy v. Genato, L-37399, May 29, 1974, 57 SCRA 123.
In the result. Considering the state of the dockets of our 9 34 Phil. 80.
trial courts now, I cannot share the apparently liberal
attitude towards postponements discernible in the main 10 Ibid, 99.
opinion, although in the case at bar, I agree that
respondent judge should have taken into account the 11 Cf. Salva v. Palacio, 90 Phil. 731 (1952); Sarreal v.
peculiar situation of petitioner's witness, Miss Montano. Tan, 92 Phil. 689(1953); Wack Wack Golf and Country
Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 501 (1959);
Footnotes Inocando v. Inocando, 110 Phil. 266 (1960); Vaswani v.
Tarachand Bros., 110 Phil. 521 (1960).
1 Order of Respondent Judge dated April 4, 1974.
12 53 Phil. 437.
2 Petition, par. 5.
13 Ibid, 441-442.
3 Ibid, pars. 13-14.
14 99 Phil. 633. THIRD DIVISION
MELO, J.:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in the above- On October 3, 1985, David Palmenco, et al., the
entitled cases sentencing the defendants David Palmenco, defendants in Civil Cases No. 630 and 631, filed another
Chayong Rabino, Felix Magpili, Fisco Obrero, Herminio petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the
Sison, Oscar Santos, Gerry Degra, Tino Balinas, Terio Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, docketed as Civil
Salinas, Alicia Baltazar, Remy Rosario, Diony del Rosario, Case No. 729-A, seeking to annul among others, said order
Arturo del Rosario, Hipolito Rosal, Oscar Domingo, of September 18, 1985 authorizing the issuance of a writ
Rodolfo Ordonio, Rogelio Yanga, Ignas Rabino, Primitivo of execution.
Rodrigo, Nicolas Tamayo, Victor Achinges, Pepito
Barbarin, Carlito Cielo, Aquino, Advincula, Juanito Celis, On November 11, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of
Teresa Fulgera, Florencio Borja, Fidel Aguinaldo, Nestor Antipolo, Rizal, rendered a decision in Case No. 729-A
Subia, Manuel Carlos, Cornelio Depano, Rufino Santos, and denying and dismissing the petition (See Decision of Court
Jose Libaguin, all of them, to vacate the premises in of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08124, p. 122, Rollo).
question and to restore the possession thereof of the
plaintiffs; to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P6,000.00 as Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, said
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. (p. 73, Rollo) defendants filed another petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
On May 17, 1985, upon motion by private respondents, the 08124 of respondent Court of Appeals, praying (a) to set
Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, issued a writ of aside the decision dated November 11, 1985 in Civil Case
execution directing the defendants in said cases to No. 729-A, (b) to set aside the writ of execution issued
vacate subject parcel of land. Said defendants resisted by the Municipal Trial Court in Civil Cases No. 630 and
the enforcement of the writ of execution on the ground 631, the levy on execution dated November 22, 1985 and
that they had filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint, the Certificate of Sale both issued by the Deputy
docketed as B.L. Claim No. 625, against private Regional Sheriff in said Civil Cases No. 630 and 631, and
respondents, and that the Director of Lands in said B.L. (c) to enjoin the Municipal judge from issuing an alias writ
Claim No. 625 rendered a decision on September 18, 1986, of execution and a writ of demolition (See Decision of
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08124, supra). It is to
be noted that this is the second time that this case was
. . . Accordingly, they shall, upon subdivision survey and brought to the Court of Appeals. The first one was SP No.
approval thereof at their own expense, file within sixty 05934, aforementioned.
(60) days from such approval appropriate public land
application[s], otherwise, they shall lose the right of the On December 24, 1986, the Court of Appeals promulgated
preference. Likewise, the claim of claimants-respondents its decision in SP No. 08124 dismissing the petition
to the areas occupied by them is sustained and they are (Annex E of Memorandum for Private Respondents, pp.
hereby allowed to file within the same period after 122-128, Rollo). A motion for reconsideration was filed by
approval of the subdivision survey appropriate public land petitioners therein but on December 15, 1988, the Court
[applications] failure of which they shall lose their right of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for
of preference. (p. 74, Rollo) reconsideration (Annex F, Memorandum for Private
Respondents, pp. 130-133, Rollo).
To abate the execution, defendants David Palmenco, et
al., filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and Petitioners filed in Civil Cases No. 630 and 631 an
injunction, docketed as AC-G.R. SP No.05934 of the opposition dated November 27, 1986 (pp. 134-136, Rollo
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) of CA-G.R. SP No. 16527), to the issuance of a writ of
praying, inter alia, that the decision rendered and the demolition.
December 6, 1988 null and void. On September 25, 1990,
On December 1, 1988, the other occupants of the subject the Court of Appeals denied herein petitioners' motion
parcel of land in Civil Cases No. 630 and 631, petitioners for reconsideration.
herein, filed an action for damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 1243 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Hence, the instant petition upon the following grounds:
against respondents (1) Marina Cruz and (2) Antonio Cruz
and (3) Eduardo Cruz, (4) Concepcion Cruz, (5) Teresita (a) The case of Suson vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
Cruz, (6) Mario Jose, (7) Mariano Gongora, (8) Hector 70, 75, does not apply in this case. (p. 11, Rollo)
Jose, (9) Juan S.P. Herras and (10) Pio E. Martinez, in his
capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (b) Petitioners are lawful occupants of the portions
of Antipolo, Rizal (See Decision of Court Of Appeals in of the parcel of the land decreed by the Bureau of Lands
CA-G.R. SP No. 16527, p. 33, Rollo). as alienable public domain. They cannot be deprived of
their possessory rights without due process of law. (p. 14,
On December 1, 1988, petitioners filed another action Rollo)
docketed as Civil Case No. 1311-A with the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, for annulment of the writ of (c) Respondents' cause of action in the ejectment
demolition with damages against private respondents (1) cases is anchored on ownership of said parcel of land. Now
Adora Cruz, (2) Antonio Cruz, and (3) Ruben Gongora, and that the Bureau of Lands has decreed said parcel of land
(4) Eduardo Cruz, (5) Concepcion Cruz, (6) Teresita Cruz, as alienable public in nature, respondents are not entitled
(7) Mario Jose, (8) Mariano Gongora, (9) Hector Jose, to the relief of possession. (p. 15, Rollo)
(10) Pio Martinez, (11) Juan S.P. Herras; and (12) the
Honorable Dominador Domingo (Petition, p. 9, Rollo). (d) The alias writ of demolition has varied the terms
of the decision in the ejectment cases and is, therefore,
On the same date, David Palmenco, et al., the defendants null and void. (p. 16, Rollo)
of the Civil Cases No. 630 and 631 filed an action for
injunction with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 1312- The ground propounded by petitioners may be condensed
A of the Regional Trial Court, against private respondents to one issue, namely, whether the writ of execution issued
(1) Adora Cruz, (2) Antonio Cruz, and (3) Ruben Gongora, in Civil Cases No. 630 and No. 631 may be enforced
and (4) Eduardo Cruz, (5) Concepcion Cruz, (6) Teresita against petitioners.
Cruz, (7) Mario Jose, (8) Mariano Gongora, (9) Hector
Jose, (10) Pio Z. Martinez, (11) Juan S.P. Herras, and (12) It is to be stressed that petitioners have not been
the Honorable Dominador Domingo (See Decision of Court impleaded as party defendants in Civil Cases No. 630 and
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16527, p. 33, Rollo). 631 although they are occupying portions of the parcel of
land, subject-matter of said cases. The rule is that
On December 6, 1988, the trial court in Civil Case No. judgment can not bind persons who are not parties to the
1311-A issued a restraining order directing herein private action (Vda. de Sengbengco vs. Arellano, 1 SCRA 711
respondents and the other defendants in said case to [1961]; Hollero vs. Court of Appeals, 11 SCRA 310 [1964];
refrain from implementing the alias writ of demolition. Plata vs. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718 [1964]). This rule is
anchored on the constitutional right of a person to due
Private respondents Adora Cruz, et al., filed a petition for process of law. No person shall be condemned or judgment
certiorari with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as rendered against him without due process of law. Thus,
CA-G.R. SP No. 16527, praying that the order dated this Court in Macabingkil vs. Yatco, 21 SCRA 150 [1967]
December 6, 1988 issued in Civil Case No. 1311-A be held:
annulled and that the Honorable Patricio Patajo, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, As far back as 1908, U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, this Court
Rizal, be prohibited from conducting further proceedings affixed the imprimatur of its approval on Webster's
in Civil Cases No. 1243 and No. 1311. This was the third definition of procedural due process. Thus: "By the law of
time the case was brought before the Court of Appeals. the land is more clearly intended the general law, a law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
On August 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." This court
decision in SP No. 16527 declaring the order dated in a 1924 decision, Lopez v. Director of Lands, after
quoting the above added that due process "contemplates preserve her property, the Court had not lawfully
notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is acquired jurisdiction over the property of the respondent
rendered, affecting one's person or property." It is because the premises of the respondent was not included
satisfied according to another leading decision: "If the in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases
following conditions are present, namely: (1) There must could not affect her property, much less demolish the
be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear same. In the leading case of El Banco-Espanol-Filipino v.
and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must Palanca cited in Macabingkil v. Yatco, et al., We laid down
be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or the court's constitutional requirements of due process,
over property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) thus —
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard;
and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful As applied to judicial proceedings . . . it may be laid down
hearing."(at p. 157.) with certainty that the requirements of due process [are]
satisfied if the following conditions are present namely:
It is clear that petitioners were denied due process of (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
law. They are possessors of portion of the parcel of land power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
in question yet they were not impleaded as defendants in jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of
Civil cases No. 630 and 631 for which reason any judgment the defendant or over the property which is the subject
rendered in said cases and any order of writ issued of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be given an
therein cannot be enforced against them. opportunity to be heard; (4) judgment must be rendered
upon lawful hearing.
It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any
of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition Respondent pursued various steps to protect her
had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and property from the invasion and encroachment of the
during the pendency of these ejectment cases. petitioner, abetted by her counsel and deputy sheriff.
Respondent only went to the court to protect her She filed a motion for contempt; she protested to the
property from demolition after the judgment in the Sheriff of Manila; she appealed to the Director of the
ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, Bureau of Lands; she filed an urgent motion to suspend
with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, the writ of demolition. Although the motions for
respondent remains a third person to such judgment, contempt and for suspension were heard by the court,
which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be such actions taken after the judgment had become final
enforced against her since she was not afforded her day and executory did not make the respondent a party
in court in said ejectment cases. litigant in the ejectment cases. The respondent remained
a stranger to the case and cannot be bound by the
The vital legal point here is that respondent did not judgment rendered therein, nor by the writs of execution
derive her right or interest from the defendants-tenants and demolition issued in pursuance to said judgment.
nor from the plaintiff-landlord (the herein petitioner) Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being
but from the Bureau of Lands from which she had leased wrongly demolished merely to oppose such order of
the property. She is neither a party nor successor in demolition, upon learning that the said order was directed
interest to any of the litigants in the ejectment cases. against premises not her own, is not the same as being a
party to the suit to the extent of being bound by the
We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner judgment in the case where such order of demolition was
that respondent having been duly heard by the Court, she issued. Furthermore, it must be noted that said petitions
was not deprived of her day in court and was accorded were filed after the promulgation of the decision in the
the due process of law. ejectment cases and while in the process of execution. It
is not proper to speak of an intervention in a case already
It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of terminated by final judgment. (Lorenzana vs. Cayetano,
due process were sufficiently complied with because the 78 SCRA 485, [1977] at pp. 490-492).
respondent had been duly heard. Indeed, respondent was
heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic The constitutional requirements of due process as set
conditions of procedural due process in courts. When forth in the leading case of El Banco-Espanol-Filipino v.
respondent appeared before the court to protect and Palanca, (37 Phil. 94 [1918]), reiterated in Macabingkil v.
Yatco, supra, and again in Lorenzana vs. Cayetano, supra, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
are for convenience once more quoted:
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION Contrary to law.
[G.R. No. 110353. May 21, 1998] On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
TOMAS H. COSEP, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. In an effort to escape liability, petitioner advances the
theory that private complainant was never a contractor,
DECISION but was merely a laborer entitled to a daily rate of
P20.00. Moreover, the amount of P4,500.00 he gave to
ROMERO, J.: the private complainant represents the total salary of the
other thirteen (13) workers who constructed the artesian
Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and well. Hence, he could not have withheld the said P500.00
Development Coordination Officer of Olutanga, since there was none in the first place. To bolster his
Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to contention, petitioner presented as evidence the Time
construct an artesian well for one of its localities. Hence, Book and Payroll Sheet,[1] and a Memorandum dated May
it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E. 10, 1987, issued by the Mayor of Olutanga indicating that
Alegre to undertake the said project, under a pakyaw private complainant was hired as the head laborer during
arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00 payable the construction of the artesian well.[2]
after completion of the project. Petitioner, being the
Planning Officer of the Municipality, monitored the Apparently, not impressed with petitioners defense, the
progress of the construction. Sandiganbayan, in a decision dated April 15, 1993[3] ruled
against him, viz.:
After the project was finished, petitioner secured the
amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal Treasurer. WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Tomas Cosep
However, only P4,500.00 was given to the private y Hibayan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
complainant, the balance being allegedly withheld by defined in Section 3, paragraph (b), Republic Act 3019, as
petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in amended, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
processing the papers in the Municipal Treasurers Office. imposes upon him the penalties of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine
Aggrieved, private complainant filed a complaint before (9) years and twenty (20) days, as maximum, and of
the Sandiganbayan, First Division, docketed as Criminal perpetual disqualification from public office. The court
Case No. 17503 against petitioner for violating Section orders him to pay Angelino E. Alegre, the private
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. The information reads: complainant, P500.00 representing the amount which the
accused demanded and received from him.
That on or about August of 1987, or immediately prior
and subsequent thereto, in Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur, SO ORDERED.
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Planning and Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that:
Development Officer of the said municipality, with the (a) he was not accorded an impartial trial by the
duty to administer and award government projects and to Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond
prepare the necessary documents required for money reasonable doubt to justify his conviction.
claims against the municipality of OLUTANGA,
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there, wilfully and Regarding the first assignment of error, petitioner
unlawfully demand and receive five hundred pesos bewails the fact that during his testimony the Justices
(500.00) from a certain Angelino Alegre as a of the Sandiganbayan actively participated in the
consideration for awarding the construction of the proceeding by propounding no less than sixty-eight
artesian well, Solar, Olutanga and for facilitation the questions[4] which, in his opinion, were indications of
necessary documents for the money claims of the latter partiality or prejudgment of guilt. Specifically, he cites
from the Municipality of Olutanga for constructing the the questions on pages 34 to 42 of the Transcript of
above mentioned Artesian Well. Stenographic Notes[5] as indications of the Justices
hostility against him.
We do not agree. It is well settled that whether the accused is guilty or
not of the offense charged is a question which involves a
Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused individual, determination of facts as presented by the prosecution
is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial and neutral and the defense. The duty to ascertain which is more
judge as an indispensable imperative of due process.[6] credible is lodged with the trial court which had the
Judges must not only be impartial, but must also appear opportunity to observe the witness directly and to test
to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his credibility by his demeanor on the stand. Thus, the
the decision will be just.[7] However, this is not to say Sandiganbayans factual findings are generally accorded
that judges must remain passive or silent during the respect, even finality, unless: (1) the conclusion is a
proceedings. Since they are in a better position to finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies on conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly
the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
questions to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or
for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points[8] premised on the absence of evidence on the record.[12]
and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not A re-examination of the entire proceedings of the instant
improper.[9] Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may case compels us to take exception to the aforementioned
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to general rule.
expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[10]
It must be borne in mind that criminal cases elevated by
With the above doctrines serving as guidelines, we have convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan
scrutinized carefully the questions propounded by the deserve the same thorough review by this Court as
Justices, and none was indicative of their partiality for criminal cases involving ordinary citizens, simply because
the prosecution in proving its case against the petitioner. the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
More precisely, on pages 34 to 35 of the Transcript of overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[13]
Stenographic Notes, the gist of the questions were on
the monitoring procedure being undertaken by the Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof
petitioner in supervising the project. While on pages 36 required to overcome the constitutional presumption, the
to 39, the questions dealt with the identities and accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the
qualifications of the workers who participated in the weakness or even the absence of his defense[14] for any
construction of the project. Those on pages 41 to 42, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions
referred to queries which sought to clarify the facts and case and not on the weakness of the defense.
circumstances of another case filed against the
petitioner by a certain Mr. Macapala. All told, these Going over the records and the TSN of the private
questions cannot be said to have crossed the limits of complainant, we entertain serious misgivings about his
propriety. In propounding these questions, the Justices testimony, especially after he had erred as regards
merely attempted to ferret the the truth as to the facts important facts and information, not to mention the
to which the witness was testifying. questionable lapses of memory. Indeed, for evidence to
be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of
In any case, if petitioner were under the impression that a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as
the Justices were unduly interfering in his testimony, he the common experience and observation of mankind can
was free to manifest his objection.[11] However, the approve as probable under the circumstances.[15]
records show that he answered the questions freely and
without any objection from his counsel on the alleged It is worthy to note that private complainant narrated
active participation of the Justices when he gave his that he was the one who paid the workers their wages
testimony. during the construction of the well.[16] However, it
baffles us that in paying these workers, he never
While we do not see any merit in petitioners first bothered to have them sign any payroll or voucher
assigned error, we, however, agree with him that his guilt receipt,[17] a practice which is routine for those engaged
was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by in hiring workers for construction projects. At the very
the prosecution. least, the payroll or voucher receipts are necessary, not
only for accounting purposes, but for protection against representing their salaries. This being the case, the
spurious or unsubstantiated claims that may arise. Simply P4,500.00 that he received from petitioner was even in
put, private complainants behavior was in total disregard excess of the amount which he and the other workers,
of logic and usual management practice expected from a was originally entitled to. Consequently, to affirm
prudent businessman. petitioners conviction would result in a serious injustice.
It is axiomatic that in every criminal prosecution, if the
What is incredible is the failure of private complainant to state fails to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of
remember even a single name of his workers.[18] Since six the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it fails utterly.[24]
of the thirteen (13) laborers bore his own surname Accordingly, when the guilt of the accused has not been
Alegre, it strains credulity that he could not remember proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long
any of them. Obviously, private complainants claim that standing that the presumption of innocence of the
he is a contractor is a falsehood. accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted
as a matter of right.[25]
If he were indeed one, he should have presented
documentary evidence to support his claim. In fact, the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
record is bereft of any project study, purchase order, decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicted and
delivery receipt, proofs of procurement of materials and sentenced petitioner Tomas Cosep of violating Section
other evidence which would sustain the finding that he 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner
was indeed a contractor engaged in his normal work. His Cosep is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
testimony alone in this regard is grossly inadequate, thus Costs against the appellant.
rendering the prosecutions cause inherently weak.
SO ORDERED.
Likewise, in the Time and Book Payroll Sheet[19] issued
by the Municipality, a document duly signed by the private Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
complainant stated that he was the head laborer during
the construction. In the early case of U.S. v. Purisima, J., on leave.
Carrington,[20] we have asserted the public document
character of the municipal payroll; as such, it is prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[21] The same [1] Exhibit 4, Folder of Exhibit.
can only be rebutted by other competent evidence[22]
and cannot be overcome by the testimony of a single [2] Exhibit 2, Folder of Exhibit.
witness.[23] As earlier stated, private complainant never
even offered any evidence to contravene the presumption [3] Rollo, pp. 19-38, penned by Justice Jose S. Balajadia,
that the recitals in the municipal payroll giving his status with Justices Francis Garchitorena and Narciso T.
as a head laborer were true. Besides, the Time and Payroll Atienza, concurring.
Sheet, having been signed by the Municipal Treasurer, it
is clothed with the presumption of regularity, particularly [4] TSN, November 25, 1992, pp. 34-42.
since it was not objected to by the private complainant.
[5] Rollo, p. 4.
Aside from the foregoing considerations, private
complainant signed the payroll sheet indicating his status [6] Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
as a head laborer. Therefore, this representation is
conclusive upon him and he cannot deny or disprove the [7] Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986).
same without violating the principle of estoppel.
[8] People v. Opinada, 142 SCRA 259 (1986).
All these considerations taken together, it is clear that
the prosecution failed to establish private complainants [9] Eggert v. Moster Safe Co., 730 P2d 895.
assertion that he is a contractor. Hence, we agree with
the defense that private complainant, as laborer, [10] Domanico v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 218 (1983).
together with thirteen (13) other workers was entitled
only to a total of P4,475.00 and not P5,000.00 [11] People v. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198 (1996).
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
[12] Pareo v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242 (1996).
FIRST DIVISION
[13] Fileteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996).
[G.R. No. 125498. February 18, 1999]
[14] People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 (1995).
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A.
[15] People v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 113250-52, January 14, FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA, petitioners,
1998. vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE
[16] T.S.N., November 24, 1992, pp. 20-21. PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[19] Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibit. Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are
the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development
[20] 5 Phil. 725 (1901). Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan,
while petitioner Alejandro A. Facundo is the former
[21] Sec. 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality.
[22] People v. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 (1988); People v. On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas,
Liones, 117 SCRA 382 (1982). represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an
agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by
[23] Francisco, Evidence, Third Edition, 1996, p. 517. Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Caboloan,
San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring:
[24] People v. Tiwalen, 213 SCRA 701 (1992).
1. Installation of the two (2) units diesel power generator
[25] People v. Yabut, 210 SCRA 394 (1992). (20) KVA, 220 W, Battery start and other accessories);
On 28 August 1998, the court resolved to issue the The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether
temporary restraining order prayed for. petitioners right to due process was violated by the filing
of the complaint against them by the Provincial Auditor,
Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of and (2) whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
their petition: of discretion in filing the information against petitioners.
The second questions the jurisdiction of the
I Sandiganbayan over petitioners. The third and fourth
grounds are related to the first and are subsumed
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALLOWING THE thereunder.
LITIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATING SECTION 3(E) OF THE After a meticulous scrutiny of petitioners arguments, we
ANTI- GRAFT ACT (R.A. 3019) WHEN THE NOTICE OF find the petition devoid of merit.
DISALLOWANCE STILL PENDS WITH THE
PROVINCIAL AUDITOR UNDER PETITIONER I
PROTEST SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REQUIRED Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial
ELEMENT OF 'CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY Auditor of the complaint despite the pendency of their
PARTY, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT AND GROSS opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their
NEGLIGENCE. right to due process. They submit that the issuance of a
notice of disallowance against (them) compels the
II provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or
adjudicate and decide on the written explanation for the
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending
PROCEED AGAINST ALL THE PETITIONERS AND ALL the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period
THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, PARTICULARLY THE prior to its conversion into a disallowance.[8]
ORDER OF SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE PENDENTE
LITE, ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. The italicized portion above is an excerpt from Section
44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which states in full:
III
Sec. 44.6.4. Auditors Responsibility re Evaluation of
Disallowance. It shall be the responsibility of the auditor
to exercise professional judgment in evaluating, on the nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the
basis of the facts and circumstances of each case as well auditor for good cause shown.
as the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, rules and
regulations, the grounds for a charge or Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First,
suspension/disallowance of an account or transaction. petitioners were not charged with suspension but
disallowance. Second, the written explanation referred to
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise in said section is for the purpose of lifting the suspension
sound judgment in evaluating the written explanation of or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90)
the accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for day period prior to its conversion into a disallowance, not
the purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully
time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to assert. Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in
its conversion into a disallowance. (Underscoring this case.
supplied.)
On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke Sections
The aforequoted provision should be read in conjunction 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156-B,
with Section 82 of the State Audit Code,[9] which states which respectively provide:
that:
SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL
(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily ACTIVITIES
explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by
the accountable officer concerned shall become a If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is
disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor concerned convinced that the evidence sufficiently discloses the
shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the fraud and other unlawful activities and identifies the
time for answer beyond ninety days. perpetrators thereof, he shall prepare the sworn
statements of the examining witnesses and/or other
At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a witnesses and make a report to the Manager/Regional
disallowance and a suspension. A disallowance is the Director concerned, attaching thereto copies of the
disapproval of a credit or credits to an pertinent affidavits and other supporting documents.
account/accountable officers accountability due to non-
compliance with law or regulations.[10] Thus, the auditor SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful
or improper.[11] If criminal prosecution is warranted, the Regional
Director/Manager concerned with respect to National
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of Government Agencies/government Owned or Controlled
action to debit/credit the account/accountable officers Corporations or Provincial/City Auditors with respect to
accountability pending compliance with certain local government units shall prepare a letter-complaint
requirements.[12] A notice of suspension is issued on and file the same with the Tanodbayan or the local
transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor within ten (10) days
settled except for some requirements, like lack of from receipt of the report from the examining auditor,
supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also attaching thereto copies of the sworn statements or
issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety affidavits of witnesses and other pertinent documents.
of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow
after satisfactory or valid justification is submitted by Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty
the parties concerned.[13] to file a complaint before the Tanodbayan (now the
Ombudsman) when, from the evidence obtained during
As stated in Section 82, supra, however, the suspension the audit, he is convinced that criminal prosecution is
shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is warranted. The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the
not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion
receipt or notice by the accountable officer concerned." for re-inspection pending in his office before he
The ninety-day period within which the accountable institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient
officer may answer the charge of suspension may grounds to support the same. The right to due process of
the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the criminal provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such discretion.[16] In a recent decision,[17] this Court,
institution. The respondents will still have the quoting Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[18] stated
opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the the rationale for this rule:
complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may
still raise the same defenses contained in their motion to ... The rule is based not only upon respect for the
lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial Auditor Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
later reverse himself and grant respondents motions, or practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the court
should the COA, or this Court, subsequently absolve them will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
from liability during the pendency of the preliminary assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
investigation, the respondents may ask the prosecuting conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
officer to take cognizance of such decision. The to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
prosecuting officer may then accord such decision its the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be
proper weight. compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time
It bears stressing that the exoneration of respondents they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
in the audit investigation does not mean the automatic complaint by a private complainant.
dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary
investigation, after all, is independent from the Petitioners have failed to establish any such abuse on the
investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes part of the Ombudsman.
distinct from each other. The first involves the
determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; III
the second relates to the administrative aspect of the
expenditure of public funds.[14] Petitioners next question the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo
Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in occupies a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond
entertaining the complaint filed by the Provincial Auditor the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing Sandiganbayan.
trial to proceed, despite the pendency of petitioners
motions before the auditor. Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7975[19] on 30
March 1995, the pertinent portions of section 4 of
II Presidential Decree No. 1606,[20] as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1861,[21] read as follows:
Petitioners argue that their opposition to the
disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
acceptance and completion, would betray the absence of
the elements of evident bad faith or negligence, and (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
damage. They likewise claim that the evidence does not
establish conspiracy among them. (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime, Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
however, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits.[15] The same (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
applies to the alleged absence of any conspiracy between officers and employees in relation to their office,
the accused. including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
of non-interference in the determination of the higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
xxx.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 subsequently redefined the as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court such that the Classification Act of 1989;
pertinent portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now
reads: (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- the Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, and
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, (5) All other national and local officials classified as
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
of the principal accused are officials occupying the Classification Act of 1989.
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public
commission of the offense: officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including: In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
heads; shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
other city department heads. Pambansa Blg. 129.
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher As a consequence of these amendments, the
rank; Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended,[23] as amended; R.A. No. 1379,[24] and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal will no longer have to travel to Manila to file their
Code,[25] it retains only cases where the accused are complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file
those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial
generally, national and local officials classified as Grade Court or the Municipal Trial Court in their respective
27 and higher under the Compensation and Position localities, as the case may be.
Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its
jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by To distinguish the big fish from the small fry, Congress
public officials and employees in relation to their office deemed the 27th Grade as the demarcation between
is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., those who should come under the jurisdiction of the
that which is higher than prision correccional or Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts.
imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is (While H.B. No. 9825 originally intended only officials of
enough that they are committed by those public officials Grade 28 and above as within the exclusive and original
and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the resulting law
above. However, it retains its exclusive original included officials of Grade 27.) Thus, officials occupying
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes
or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,[26] 2,[27] 14,[28] and referred to in Section 4 a. and b., are within the original
14-A.[29] and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those
below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease
the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti- Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are
Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal
occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress
big fish. Section 4, as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan provided a catchall in Section 4 a. (5), thus:
from the task of trying cases involving lower-ranking
government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular (5) All other national and local officials classified as
courts instead. The present structure is also intended to Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those Classification Act of 1989.
residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes
related to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses Such a catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical,
of a trial in Metro Manila. As the Explanatory Note of if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position
House Bill No. 9825[30] states: created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and
above.
One is given the impression that only lowly government
workers or the so-called small fry are expediently tried At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index
and convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
is that at present, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive Grades, which was prepared by the Department of Budget
and original jurisdiction over graft cases committed by all and Management (DBM) pursuant to Republic Act No.
officials and employees of the government, irrespective 6758,[31] otherwise known as the Compensation and
of rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the Position Classification Act of 1989, lists the following
highly-placed government official. This jurisdiction of the positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of
Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only Municipal Mayor I:
those occupying high positions in the government and the
military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue
original jurisdiction. In this was, the Sandiganbayan can
devote its time to big time cases involving the big fishes Assistant Regional Cabinet Secretary
in the government. The regular courts will be vested with
the jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials Assistant Regional Executive Secretary
(those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
twenty-seven (27) and below and PNP members with a Board Member I
rank lower than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will
prove more convenient to people in the provinces. They Chairman, Police Regional Appellate Board
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II
Chief of Mission, Class II
Scientist II
City Government Department Head III
Solicitor II
City Trial Court Judge
Special Prosecution Officer II
Clerk of the Commission
State Counsel IV
Commission Member I
SUC President I
Court Attorney VI
SUC Vice-President III
Court of Appeals Reporter II
Earlier, in the 1989 version of the same Index, the
Deputy Administrator I Municipal Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of 27.
It appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes
Deputy Commissioner I within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Deputy Executive Director III
Petitioners, however, claim that at the time of the
Deputy Insurance Commissioner commission of the alleged crime on or about 2 September
1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public
Director III official impleaded in this case, was receiving a monthly
salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly
Executive Clerk of Court II equivalent to a fourth step increment in Grade 24 under
the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No.
Executive Director II 6758: *
Government Corporate Attorney III SEC. 7. Salary Schedule. The Department of Budget and
Management is hereby directed to implement the Salary
Graft Investigation Officer II Schedule prescribed below:
Professor IV
Prosecutor II 1st
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that: SEC. 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their
Equivalent. Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of the
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be
compensation of government officials and employees, in accordance with the Salary Grades indicated
including those in government-owned or controlled hereunder:
corporation with original charters, taking into account the
nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the Salary
qualifications required for their positions. Grade
This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The President of the Philippines
1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII thereof,
contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then 33
President Marcos, in the exercise of his legislative
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985.[32] Vice-President of the Philippines
32
Grades) to the DBM, subject to the standards contained
President of the Senate in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing the DBM to determine
the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing
32 officials, where applicable, and to assign them the same
Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said
Speaker of the House of Representatives section.[35]
Member of a Constitutional Commission under Article IX, (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment;
1987 Constitution and
For
SEC. 19. Funding Source. The funding sources for the
Provinces/Cities amounts necessary to implement this Act shall be as
follows:
For
(a) x x x
Municipalities
(b) For local government units, the amount shall be
Special Cities charged against their respective funds. Local government
units which do not have adequate or sufficient funds shall
100% only partially implement the established rates as may be
approved by the Joint Commission under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 1188: Provided, That any partial
implementation shall be uniform and proportionate for all
1st Class positions in each local government unit: Provided further,
That savings from National Assistance to Local
100% Government Units (NALGU) funds may be used for this
purpose.
90%
x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
2nd Class
Thus, a local government officials actual salary may be
95% less than what the Salary Schedule under Section 7
prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability
85% of his or her respective local government unit. This
circumstance, however, has no bearing on such officials
3rd Class Grade. As the foregoing discussion shows, on officials
salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position,
90% and ultimately by the nature of his position the level of
difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
80% requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners
argument that Mayor Rodrigos salary determines his
4th Class Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No.
6758, and ignore the constitutional and statutory policies
85% behind said law.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Pardo, JJ., concur. [16] Bienvenido Tan, Jr., vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 128764, 10 July
1998; Rene Knecht and Cristina de Knecht vs. Hon. Aniano
* * Note, however, the P1.00 discrepancy between A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 121916, 26
petitioner's alleged salary and the salary prescribed June 1998; Leonila Garcia-Rueda vs. Wilfred L. Pacasio et
under the 4th step increment for Grade 24.* al., G.R. No. 118141, 5 September 1997; Camanag vs.
Guerrero, 268 SCRA 473 (1997); Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 659 (1996); Olivarez vs.
[1] Rollo, p. 44. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 15.
[2] Annex A of Petition, Rollo, p. 39. [17] Annie Tan vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 114332 &114895, September 10, 1998.
[3] Annex B of Petition, id., at 40.
[18] 228 SCRA 718 (1995).
[4] Annex C of Petition, id., at 41.
[19] Entitled An Act to Strengthen the Functional and
[5] Annex D of Petition, id., at 42. Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending
for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606 , as
[6] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. amended."
[7] Rollo, pp. 20-21. Italics in the original. [20] Entitled Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486
Creating A Special Court to be known as Sandiganbayan
[8] Id., at. 188. Italics in the original. and for Other Purposes, promulgated 10 December 1978.
[9] Presidential Decree No. 1445. [21] Entitled Amending the Pertinent Provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
[10] Section 2k, Commission on Audit Circular No. 85-156- Relative to the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for
B. Section 3.9 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement other purposes, promulgated 23 March 1983.
and Balances (Revised 1993) (Commission on Audit
Circular No. 94-001) which superseded COA Circular No. [22] 249 SCRA 212 (1995).
85-156-B, defines disallowance as the disapproval in audit
of a transaction, either in whole or in part. [23] Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[11] Section 19, id. See also Section 14 of the Manual on [24] Entitled, An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the
Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993). State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing
[12] Section 2r, id. Under Section 3.18 of the Manual on for the Proceeding Therefor.
Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993), a
suspension is the deferment of action to allow or disallow [25] Article 210, Direct Bribery; Article 211, Indirect
in audit a transaction pending compliance with certain Bribery; and Article 212, Corruption of Public Officials.
requirements.
[26] Creating the Presidential Commission on Good
[13] Section 21, id. See also Section 16, Manual on Government.
Certificates of Settlement and Balances (Revised 1993).
[27] Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties
[14] Cf. Ramos vs. Aquino, 39 SCRA 585 (1971). Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Development Authority Director General, Court of
Dummies, Agents, or Nominees. Appeals Presiding Justice, Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice, Secretary of the Senate, Secretary of the
[28] Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the House of Representatives, and President of the
Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. University of the Philippines.
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of Their
Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close An entity with a broad functional scope of operations and
and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, and wide area of coverage ranging from top level policy
Nominees. formulation to the provision of technical and
administrative support to the units under it, with
[29] Amending E.O. No. 14. functions comparable to the aforesaid positions in the
preceding paragraph, can be considered organizationally
[30] Introduced by Representatives Garcia (P.), Starke, equivalent to a Department, and its head to that of a
Damasing, Apostol, Abueg, Abaya, Sator, Panes and other Department Secretary.
members of the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice. GRADE 30 Positions included are those of Department
Undersecretary, Cabinet Undersecretary, Presidential
[31] An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Assistant, Solicitor General, Government Corporate
Position Classification System in the Government and Counsel, Court Administrator of the Supreme Court,
Other Purposes. R.A. No. 6758 went into effect on July Chief of Staff of the Office of the Vice-President,
1, 1989 per Section 23 thereof. National Economic and Development Authority Deputy
Director General, Presidential Management Staff
[32] A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Executive Director, Deputy Ombudsman, Associate
Compensation Systems in the National Government, and Justices of the Court of Appeals, Associate Justices of
integrating the same. the Sandiganbayan, Special Prosecutor, University of the
Philippines Executive Vice-President, Mindanao State
[33] Section 3h, P.D. No. 985. University President, Polytechnic University of the
Philippines President and President of other state
[34] Salary Grade is the numerical place on the Salary universities and colleges of the same class.
Schedule representing multiple steps or rates which is
assigned to a class. (Section 2s, P.D. No. 985.) Heads of councils, commissions, boards and similar
entities whose operations cut across offices or
[35] GRADE 33 This Grade is assigned to the President departments or are serving a sizeable portion of the
of the Republic of the Philippines as the highest position general public and whose coverage is nationwide or whose
in the government. No other position in the government functions are comparable to the aforecited positions in
service is considered to be of equivalent rank. the preceding paragraph, may be placed at this level.
GRADE 32 This Grade is limited to the Vice President of The equivalent rank of positions not mentioned herein or
the Republic of the Philippines and those positions which those that may be created hereafter shall be determined
head the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the based on these guidelines.
government, namely: the Senate President, Speaker of
the House of Representatives and Chief Justice of the xxx
Supreme Court. No other positions in the government
service are considered to be of equivalent rank. [36] Benchmark Position Schedule
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
(4) Sr. Insp. Mabanag denied that his operatives WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ZHENG
demanded money from the accused in exchange for the BAI HUI a.k.a. CARLOS TAN TY and NELSON HONG TY
latters release.[24] a.k.a. SAO YU are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section
The defense also presented, as hostile witnesses, SPO3 15, Article III, RA 6425 in relation to Section 21-B of
Gilbert Santos, PO3 Elleonito Apduhan and PNP forensic the same Act and each is accordingly sentenced to suffer
chemist Leslie Maala, all of whom previously testified for the penalty of DEATH and to pay a fine of TEN MILLION
the prosecution. PESOS (P10,000,000.00). With costs.
Appellant Nelson Hong Ty, in whose behalf Atty. Leven The arguments raised by appellants may be reduced to
Puno filed another brief, assigns similar errors on the the following issues:
part of the trial court:
(1) Whether the failure of a prosecution witness to take
I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR his oath invalidates the proceedings before the trial
WHEN IT KNOWINGLY DEPRIVED THE ACCUSED OF court.
THE COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AS
A PART OF THEIR RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL PROCESS. (2) Whether appellants were denied their right to an
impartial and disinterested tribunal.
II THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE BUY- (3) Whether the refusal of the trial judge to allow
BUST STORY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS. disclosure of the identity of the informer deprived
appellants of their right to confront and cross-examine
III THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR said witness.
IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT BOTH
ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO IN (4) Whether the prosecution proved appellants guilt
THE ACT OF SELLING METHAMPHETAMINE beyond reasonable doubt.
HYDROCHLORIDE TO A POSEUR BUYER.
(5) Whether the death penalty should be imposed upon
IV THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR appellants.
IN REFUSING DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY AND
REFUSING TO PUT ON THE WITNESS STAND THE I
ALLEGED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHO
ALLEGEDLY ARRANGED THE BUY-BUST DRAMA THAT
Appellant Nelson Hong Ty argues that the failure of SPO1 says: It is the duty of the party calling the witness to see
Jerico Bacani to take an oath before he testified that he is sworn, though, if the oath is inadvertently
deprived the accused of their right to due process. It is omitted, the objection will not be good after verdict; but
contended that they are entitled to a new trial. at once adds, The objection must be made as soon as it is
discovered, or it will be deemed waived. x x x.
That SPO1 Bacani, a witness for the prosecution, did not
take an oath before his testimony is undisputed. The Langford makes reference to the following excerpt in
omission appears to have been brought about by Hawks v. Baker,[45] also cited by appellant:
circumstances starting from the hearing of November 14,
1994. SPO3 Gilbert Santos was testifying on cross- It is the duty of the counsel offering a witness to move
examination when Atty. Leven Puno, counsel for the that he may be sworn, and thus be qualified to testify. *
defense, moved for a continuance.[32] The trial court * * Thus far the counsel for the opposite party has no
granted counsels motion.[33] At the start of the next concern with the transaction. He has a right to presume
hearing, on November 17, 1994, the prosecutor called on that the person taking the stand in the character of a
SPO1 Jerico Bacani as a witness[34]notwithstanding witness has been duly sworn. Of course, his omission to
SPO3 Santos unfinished testimony. Atty. Puno objected inquire and ascertain the fact cannot be considered as any
and reminded the court that he was still cross-examining waiver of his right to object to the incorrectness of the
SPO3 Santos.[35] In response, the prosecutor informed proceeding if the person supposed to be sworn was in fact
the court that SPO3 Santos was not present in the never sworn. No man can be considered waiving a right
courtroom[36]despite notice.[37] After some discussion which he is unconscious of possessing. * * * The defendant
between the court and counsel for the respective has not had a trial of his cause on legal evidence, but
parties,[38] Atty. Puno acceded to continue the cross- partly on that which is illegal.
examination of SPO3 Santos at a subsequent date.[39]
The court even dictated an order to that effect.[40] The Langford states that knowledge or want of knowledge is
prosecutor then offered the testimony of SPO1 the true test in determining whether there was a waiver
Bacani,[41] and conducted the direct examination, of the lack of oath. We find, however, that this test
without the witness having first taken an oath. Neither would open the door to fraud since any party can claim
did SPO1 Bacani take an oath at the continuation of his want of knowledge of the defect before verdict is
testimony on November 23, 1994. rendered. Such a claim would be exceedingly difficult to
verify. We believe that the better test would be not
The failure of a witness to take an oath prior to his whether a party had knowledge of the lack of oath but
testimony is a defect that may be waived by the whether he had the opportunity to know of the lack of
parties.[42] Appellant Nelson Hong Ty concedes to this oath. If a party ought to have known of the lack of oath
rule.[43] He asserts, however, that he did not waive his but did not object thereto, he cannot later be heard
right to object to the lack of oath, since the inadvertence raising such an objection. Thus, in State v. Embrey,[46]
was discovered only after the judgment of conviction by the Supreme Court of New Mexico held:
the trial court when counsel was preparing the brief for
automatic review by this Court. As authority for this The testimony or declarations of any unsworn person,
argument, appellant cites Langford v. United States,[44] given or made in the presence of the trial judge and of
where the Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory the parties and their attorneys, under such
declared that: circumstances that they knew or should have known what
the unsworn individual was doing and saying, may be
x x x it would seem that knowledge or want of knowledge considered by the jury as that of any sworn witness.
[of the lack of oath] is the true test in this class of cases. Where no objection is promptly made to such a
In a note to section 264b of Wigmores Edtion (16th) of proceeding, it is too late to urge the objection on motion
Greenleaf on Evidence the following appears: Whether he for new trial. (Italics supplied.)
may [have a new trial] if a witness on the other side,
testified without having been sworn at all qure? If the In the case at bar, defendant and his counsel were
omission of the oath was known at the time, it seems he present at the hearing of November 17, 1994 when SPO1
cannot; but, if it was not discovered until after trial, he Bacani was presented as a witness. They did not, however,
may. Mr. Thompson, in his work on Trials (volume 1, 365) object to the lack of oath. Nor did they pose any
objection when SPO1 Bacani continued his testimony on Q But you are sure that when you came to this Court this
November 23, 1994; Atty. Puno even cross-examined the morning, she accompanied you, is that correct?
witness. In State v. Doud,[47] the Supreme Court of
Oregon had occasion to rule that: A Yes, sir.
If the defendant had wished that the x x x witness Q And you neither received a subpoena coming from the
should have been sworn, he should have been observant Court to testify today, is that correct?
and should have mentioned the matter in the trial court.
We are certain that had the matter then been mentioned A None, sir.
an appropriate oath would have been administered. In all
likelihood, it would have produced no different effect, Q And where did she pick you up before you came to this
for all thought that an oath had been administered. It is Court?
now too late to present the objection. This assignment of
error is dismissed as lacking in merit. A From Arte Subdivision, sir.
In any event, the granting of a new trial because of said A In BBB, sir.
omission would be pointless because even if testimony of
SPO1 Bacani were excluded, it would not materially affect COURT:
the totality of the evidence for the prosecution. His
testimony is merely corroborative of those of SPO3 Q Valenzuela?
Gilbert Santos, PO2 Elleonito Apduhan and PO3 Noel
Castaeto and could therefore be dispensed with, without A Yes, your Honor.[49]
affecting the prosecutions case or prejudicing that of
the defense. A couple more questions were asked by the prosecutor
when the judge interrupted him. Apparently, the judge
II wanted to clarify where Mary Ann picked up Norlito
because when he recited his personal circumstances, he
Appellants also contend that they were deprived of their said that he resided in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan. The
right to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and clarification led to several more questions involving when
attempt to establish a pattern of partiality on the part and where Norlito and Mary Ann agreed to meet in Arte
of RTC Judge Adoracion Angeles. Subdivision. Thereafter, she ordered the prosecutor to
continue with the cross-examination.
First, they assert that the judge actively assumed the
role of the prosecutor[48] in the examination of Norlito Before the prosecutor could continue, however, the judge
Dotimas. Norlito, the watch-your-car boy, testified that again asked a series of questions, all pertaining to when
appellants did not arrive in a taxi but in a car driven by Norlito and Mary Ann first met. These questions, the
appellant Carlos Tan Ty. In resolving this argument, it defense claims, were aimed to discredit[50] the witness:
would be helpful to examine the entire transcript of
Norlitos cross-examination and the circumstances FISCAL MANANQUIL:
surrounding the questioning appellants find so
objectionable. Q After the incident, Mr. Witness, you did not
even(interrupted).
The prosecutor began the cross-examination by asking
the witness who requested him to testify. Norlito COURT: (Butts in for clarificatory questions)
answered that it was Mary Ann Ty, the wife of appellant
Carlos Ty. Asked when he was requested to testify, Q What was the date on Friday?
Norlito replied he could not remember. The prosecutor
continued: A December 9, 1994, your Honor.
Q In other words, is it your testimony now that it was Q Could it be two (2) weeks or two (2) days prior to
only on December 9, 1994 that you came to know that you December 9, 1994?
will become a witness in this case?
A I cannot remember, your Honor.
A I was told by a woman by the name of Mary Ann, your
Honor. Continue fiscal.[51]
A I cannot remember, sir/your Honor. Q Is it your testimony now that you watched only four (4)
cars from morning up to the evening?
COURT:
A Yes, your Honor.
Q How many days prior to December 9, 1994?
COURT:
A I cannot remember, sir/your Honor.
Q What are the colors of the car of the three other cars
COURT: which you washed and watched on that day, together with
the car owned by the accused driven by Carlos Ty?
Q In other words, you received P80.00 on that particular
A White, light green and blue, your Honor. day?
(interrupted) Q Did she (referring to Mary Ann Ty) promise you to give
something?
COURT: (Clarificatory questions )
A No, your Honor.
Q By the way, how much were you paid for the car which
you washed and watched? COURT:
A It depends upon the amount given by the customer. Q Is it your testimony now that you come to the Court
without receiving a subpoena and yet you abandon your
COURT: work as a car-wash boy and you will not receive any single
cent?
Q On that day, how much was given to you by the owners
of the cars you washed, the four (4) cars. A There was, your Honor.
A P20.00 COURT:
A Yes, your Honor. May I request your Honor to specify the person, he might
not know .
COURT:
COURT:
Q Is it your testimony now that you are paid for P20.00
for each car you washed? Q According to him, it was Mary Ann Ty, who fetched you
at Arte Subdivision. Is it your testimony now that it was
A Yes, your Honor. Mary Ann Ty who brought you to this Court now?
COURT:
COURT:
Q You testified a while ago that .......Was she the one who
promised to give you? Q Tell to this Court why do you still accompany her to
your house and show your house to her at Bagong Barrio,
A Yes, your Honor. Caloocan City on December 9, 1994?
COURT: A So, that, I can relate to her the incident, your Honor.
Q How much? How much did Mary Ann Ty promise to give COURT:
you today?
Q Why? Could you tell to the Court today? You cannot tell
A The amount I will earn for this day, your Honor. to her the place where you were working, and that you
still have to accompany her to your house?
COURT:
A No, sir.
Q How much?
COURT:
ATTY. PUNO:
Continue, Fiscal.[56]
Kikitain.. His earning this day, your Honor is what he said.
The cross-examination by the prosecutor proceeded until
COURT: the judge again propounded questions, picking up where
she left off. The defense construes this line of
Q Precisely, how much? questioning as badgering[57] on the part of the judge:
FISCAL MANANQUIL: Q Why did you abandon your work on December 9, 1994
and you accompanied Mary Ann Ty to your house and
Q More or less? showed to her your house?
COURT: (clarificatory questions from the Court). Q Did she give you something on that day on December
9?
Q You testified that you met Mary Ann Ty in the parking
lot on December 9, 1994, was it right? A No, your Honor.
Q And also, on that day, that you agreed with Mary Ann A Yes, your Honor.
Ty that she will fetch you at the Arte Subdivision at BBB,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila? COURT:
A Yes, your Honor. Q What time did you leave at the parking area?
A In the afternoon, sir/your Honor. Q In fairness to the witness, he is getting confused, your
Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Q About what time?
The question is one by one. I am trying to find out the
A 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, your Honor. truthfullness of his testimony, counsel
COURT: COURT:
Q What time do you usually leave the parking area, your Q Is that what happened? She just glanced at you? Who
regular time for leaving? started introducing ones self, yourself or herself?
A 6:00 oclock in the evening, your Honor. A The person by the name of Mary Ann Ty, your Honor.
COURT: COURT:
Q So, in other words, you did not earn for two (2) hours Q Who described each of you? Was she or were you the
anymore? one?
A Yes, your Honor. A She told me and I volunteered lakas-loob. She told me
to testify in this case, your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Q And yet, you claimed that you were not paid by Mary
Ann Ty? Q And you agreed?
COURT: COURT:
Anymore, Fiscal?[58] Q Where did it happen when she said you will testify and
you agreed?
The cross-examination ended with a question from the
prosecutor. The judge also propounded a few more A In our house, sir/your Honor.
questions again relating to the alleged meeting between
Norlito and Maryann. COURT:
Thereafter, Atty. Puno proceeded with the witness re- Q In the parking lot Did she tell you in the parking lot?
direct examination. After several questions by Atty. Puno
pertaining to the conversation Norlito had with Mary Ann A No, your Honor.
at the witness house, the judge interjected with her own
questions on the subject. At this point, Atty. Puno tried COURT:
to protest since the witness was getting confused. The
judge, according to appellants, only exhibited greater Q How did you bring her to your house?
vehemence and further tried to push him to the wall,[59]
thus: A She went with me, because I told her to go with me,
your Honor.
ATTY. PUNO:
COURT:
Q The first time that you and Mary Ann met each other COURT:
at the parking lot, where you were working as a car-wash
boy, what transpired between you and Mary Ann Ty in the Q How did she introduced herself to you?
afternoon of October 24, 1994?
A She told me that she is the wife of Carlos Ty.
A I was the person whom she asked or inquired to, your
Honor.[60] COURT:
It is also claimed that the judge then exploit[ed] the Q What did you talked about at the parking lot before
confusion of the witness by a maze of baffling trivials you accompanied her to your house?
[sic]:[61]
A No more, your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Q So, at the parking lot, she already asked you to testify
in this case. Q Tell to the Court what precipitated you to accompany
her to your house?
A Not yet, your Honor..
A So that she will know my house, your Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Q What REALLY transpired between you and Mary Ann
at the parking lot? Q Why do you want her to know your house?
A She asked me, your Honor. A So that we can talk, your Honor.
COURT: COURT:
Q Is it your testimony that she immediately approached Q Why, when you can already talk at the parking lot?
you at the parking lot?
A Because I was busy then, your Honor.
A She asked me, your Honor.
COURT:
COURT
Q The more you will lose your job, if you go home?
Q In other words, she approached you at the parking lot?
A I was busy and I accompanied her to our place, your
A Yes, your Honor. Honor.
COURT: COURT:
Q What then were you doing at that time? Q Why did she want to go to your house, if you know?
A I was washing car, your Honor. A So that I can narrate to her the whole incident, your
Honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Q How did she introduced herself?
Q Why? What did you tell her exactly before going to
A She introduced herself to me, your Honor. your house?
A About the whole incident, your Honor.
No, counsel, thats for clarification of the Court. I would
COURT: like to find out also some matters.
A She was the one who volunteered, your Honor. That is my manifestation, your Honor.
COURT: COURT:
Q So, it was not true that she went there in order that And that is also the observation of the Court on the
you can tell her the whole incident, because she was the matter.
one who volunteered herself to go to your house?
ATTY. PUNO:
A She volunteered to go with me to our house, so that we
can talk, your Honor. Do not know if this will be all that (interrupted).
Q For how long did you talk with each other at the parking Besides, it was the witness himself who testified that she
lot? was requested by Mary Ann Ty to testify, thats precisely
why we are going deeper (interrupted)
A Only few seconds, your Honor.[62]
COURT:
Atty. Puno manifested that the judge herself was actually
conducting the cross-examination, and a spirited No. The observation is not only in the particular point. The
discussion between counsel and the judge ensued: prosecution and the defense is entitled to their own
observation in the same way that the Court is entitled to
ATTY. PUNO: its own observation. Because, the trial court has to
observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying. As
I do not know how to tell this to the Court, Your Honor, a matter of fact, even on appeal, the findings of the trial
but I will not be true to my duty to my client if I will not court with respect to findings of fact will be given much
express this to the Courtthat the Presiding Judge weight, because we, Judges in the trial court has the
actually was doing the cross-examination. capacity to observe the demeanor of the parties to
witnesses being presented in Court. Therefore, I have to
COURT: make it on record the demeanor of the witness or the
witnesses, so that, when I make the proper evaluation and
assessment by the time a decision will be rendered in this COURT:
case, everything will have to appear on record, for the
guidance of the Court. It is the prerogative of the Everything is on record.
Presiding Judge to ask clarificatory questions on matters
which are still very vague to Him or to Her, in order that COURT:
He or She will not be misguided in the proper evaluation
and assessment of the facts of the case.. Thats it After all, it is the duty of the member of the Bench to
always aid the Court in the proper administration of
ATTY. PUNO: Justice, so that the Court should not be divested of its
right to conduct clarificatory questions. And, neither the
Your Honor, please, I agree that clarificatory questions lawyer should be a bar if the Court asks clarificatory
were to be asked by the Presiding Judge, as the latter is questions on matters which are vague, so much so, that
entitled to it. The only thing, if your Honor please, is that, the Court is not interested in this case. If at all, the
this witness is not an intelligent witness and because of Court asks clarificatory questions, it is for the purpose
this cross-examination conducted by the Presiding Judge of finding out the truth and for the purpose of aiding the
of this Court---and I am very sorry to say this---. May I Court in the proper evaluation and assessment of facts
place it on record that this witness actually got confused and evidence on records, in order, further, that the law
may be acquired properly.[63]
COURT:
On that note, the hearing of December 12, 1994 ended.
That is your assessment, simply because the Court was
able to find out, in the conduct of its clarificatory A week later, the accused filed a Motion to
questions, some matters which were not taken up by the Inhibit/Disqualify Presiding Judge,[64] contending that
Prosecuting Fiscal, like for example, the testimony of the the judge exhibited bias against the accused in her
witness that she was paid by such Mary Ann Ty, and questioning. The judge denied the motion in an Order[65]
probably thats the reason why you did not like the Court ated December 20, 1994, prompting the accused to file a
to ask that question. Thats your observation and this is petition for certiorari[66]before the Court of Appeals.
the observation of the Court. The Court of Appeals initially issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Angeles from hearing
ATTY. PUNO: the case.[67] The appellate court, however, eventually
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and lifted the
May I take exception to the observation of the Court restraining order,[68] thereby allowing trial to continue.
with regards to payment .. I believe your Honor, that he
was paid for the amount of his gana .. Like the Court of Appeals, we find no prejudice in the
judges questioning.
COURT:
From the outset, Her Honor had observed that the
Everything were placed on records. Never mind, you and witness Norlito Dotimas never looked at any of the
I cannot change the testimony of the witness at this point persons propounding the questionsthat is, until the judge
in time. So, let us not make any alteration in the testimony made her observations of record. Understandably,
of this witness. At this point in time, the Court is not yet appellants did not care to mention this fact in their
in a position to evaluate the evidence, as the Court is still pleadings. It is in the context of the judges observations,
in the process of receiving the evidence for the defense. however, that her questioning must be construed.
But, the Court should not be divested of its prerogative
to conduct clarificatory questions on the matter which The averted gaze, in our culture, is a telltale sign of
are still very vague . prevarication, and Norlitos reticent demeanor no doubt
raised suspicions in the judges mind that his testimony
ATTY. PUNO: may be a fabrication. The judge also noted in her Order
denying the motion to disqualify her that the witness was
This is my manifestation, your Honor. evasive.[69] Of course, the witness behavior could be
attributed to shyness, or even nervousness, since the would be a distorted concept of due process if in
witness was testifying in court for the first time.[70] In pursuance of such a valid objective the trial judge is to
any case, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to confirm be stigmatized as being guilty of an act of unfairness. x x
or dispel her suspicions. It was, after all, her duty to x. There is nothing on record to show that anyone of the
ascertain the credibility of the witness to enable her to judges of the trial court attempted to help the
arrive at a just verdict. In the fulfillment of this duty, prosecution. The questions propounded by the judge,
the judge dwelt at length on how Norlito and Mary Ann subject of appellants complaint, appeared to have been
first met and whether Norlito was paid in exchange for intended to elicit the truth from the witnesses. The
his testimony. It would be to curtail or limit unduly the inquisitiveness complained of by appellants counsel did not
discretion of a trial judge to impute with a sinister have the purpose of unduly harming the substantial rights
significance such minute and searching queries from the of the accused. It was only to be expected from the
bench,[71] especially in light of the witness suspicious judges who, with full consciousness of their
behavior. responsibilities, could not easily be satisfied with
incompleteness and obscurities in the testimonies. This
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some assignment of error is therefore unfounded.[86]
of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the
truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification Next, it is claimed that the judge prevented the defense
for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an from pursuing intensive inquiries of witnesses.[87]
evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had Instances are cited where the judge allegedly blocked
intimidated the witnesses for the defense.[72] The trial off[88] questions by defense counsel even when the
judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting prosecutor failed to object. Thus, when SPO3 Santos was
such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit testifying for the defense as a hostile witness, Atty.
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth.[73] Ifurung, the counsel for the defense, asked him:
Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law
and the facts, and they would be negligent in the Q I ask you Mr. Santos, are you a forensic chemist?
performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound A No, sir.
a proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome.[74] In the exercise Q. Have you ever been trained in the detection and
of sound discretion, he may put such question to the identification of drugs?
witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as
to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the A Yes, sir.
truth.[75] A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness.[76] He may propound clarificatory questions to Q. You would be able to determine a drug without use of
test the credibility of the witness and to extract the a laboratory examination?
truth.[77] He may seek to draw out relevant and material
testimony though that testimony may tend to support or A Yes, because that is similar with the one brought to the
rebut the position taken by one or the other party.[78] laboratory, sir.
It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths Q Would you be able to differentiate from other
which tend to destroy the theory of one party.[79] crystalline like tawas without conducting laboratory
examination?
To prop up their theory of bias, the defense claims that
the judge in asking questions to prosecution witnesses A The appearance of tawas is . (interrupted)
SPO3 Gilbert Santos,[80] SPO1 Gerico Bacani,[81] SPO3
Noel Castaeto,[82] and Leslie Maala[83] Actually helped COURT:
the prosecution.[84] We do not agree. As we held in
People vs. Angcap:[85] The witness is not testifying as an expert witness
x x x. At the most, there was the effort of the trial judge ATTY. IFURUNG:
to arrive at the truth and do justice to the parties. It
But he effected the arrest, your Honor. Q Will you tell us the degree of this Inspector Reyes?
But you are practically asking him of the opinion on shabu Q I am asking for his academic degree.
The witness is incompetent. He is not a chemist who can Incompetent and immaterial
determine whether the substance was shabu or not
COURT:
ATTY. IFURUNG:
Sustained.
The determination of whether the substance is shabu or
not is important for the purpose of effecting the arrest. ATTY. IFURUNG:
Q Will you tell us who was your instructor on that FISCAL CAJIGAL:
particular training?
Objection, your Honor.
A Inspector Reyes, sir.
COURT:
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court the full name of
Inspector Reyes? Sustained.
The judge need not have waited for an objection from FISCAL CAJIGAL:
opposing counsel to bar immaterial questions. A judge has
Q Mr. witness, you have a Commanding Officer in your A Yes, your Honor.
unit?
Q Why do you say so? Why did you lie to the accused and
A Yes, sir. said that you are a drug pusher?
Q And you will agree with me that your commanding ATTY. IFURUNG:
officer is the one who determines whether the operation
is a buy-bust or a raid? With due respect to this Honorable Court, we will object.
Because in that case, the Honorable Court would be now
A Yes, sir. assuming. . . (interrupted)
This was not taken on direct-examination. He said he was The Court, in the exercise of its duty and in order to find
the one who arranged with Stardust, so we object with out the truth, can ask clarificatory questions.
the line of questionings.
WITNESS:
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
In order that I could buy from him drugs, your Honor.
I am on cross-examination.
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
COURT:
x x x.
Overruled, witness may answer.
Q And lastly, why did you effect the arrest of Mr. Tan
A Our commanding Officer, sir. Ty?
Q In this particular case, you are telling this Honorable A Because of the shabu which he was bringing, sir.
Court that it was your Commanding Officer who will
determine whether the buy bust operation shall be Q When was that?
conducted against accused Zheng Bai Hui, is it not?
A On October 24, 1994 between 6:00 oclock to 7:00
A Yes, sir. oclock in the evening, sir.
Q Likewise, Mr. witness, it was your Commanding Officer Q Was that after the fact that after you have handled
who determines whether or not the two P500.00 paper the boodle money to the accused?
bills which were used together with the boodle money
should be placed with flourescent powder or not? ATTY. IFURUNG:
ATTY. IFURUNG: THE FACT in the last question, he stated negative to the
answer and I closed my examination. . . . It was answered
I will object, I think the Commanding Officer would be contrary to the answer of the accused. . . .
the best witness on this line of questionings.
COURT:
COURT:
Objection, overruled, witness may answer.
I would like to be clarified on this. You testified during
the direct-examination that you lied to the accused when A Not yet. When he was able to bring it to me and who
you said that you are a drug pusher, who has run out of hand it to me and I opened it, thats the time I gave the
stock? boodle money, your Honor/sir.
xxx that particular command, and therefore knowledgeable of
the decision-making policies therein.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
The judges query as to why SPO3 Santos pretended to be
FISCAL CAJIGAL: a drug pusher was completely relevant in determining the
legality of the entrapment. Moreover, the defense
Q Please tell to the Court what were the specific counsel had asked during the direct examination if SPO3
instructions given by your Commanding Officer before Santos lied when he allegedly told the accused that he
you effected the buy-bust operation? was a drug pusher. The judge merely asked why he lied.
The question was clearly clarificatory.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
Neither do we find anything objectionable to the
We object in the first place, there was no statement by prosecutors question on whether the accused were
the eye witness as to any instruction given by his arrested after SPO3 Santos handed over the money to
Commanding Officer with respect to that buy-bust them. It is not clear from the transcript what exactly was
operation. the ground for counsels objection.
The burden of showing need for disclosure is upon Appellants however attempt to poke holes in the
defendants.[106] The necessity for disclosure depends prosecutions case. They theorize that the buy-bust
upon the particular circumstances of each case, taking operation was merely a contrivance as indicated by the
into consideration the crime charged, the possible following so-called unmistakable hallmarks:
defenses, the possible significance of the informers
testimony, and other relevant factors. Appellants did not (a) a fictitious informant,
develop any such criteria with reference to the merits of
the case.[107] A mere request during a witness (b) no pre-arrest test-buy,
examination indicates speculation on the relevancy of his
testimony; and mere speculation an informer may be (c ) absence of pre-arrest surveillance,
helpful is not enough to carry the burden and overcome
the public interest in the protection of the (d) use of bogus/boodle money,
informer.[108] Hence, the trial court did not err in
sustaining the refusal of the witness to reveal the (e) drug sale in public,
identity of Stardust.
(f) no record of operation in the police blotter,
IV
(g) money not dusted with fluorescent powder.[112]
We come now to the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence. We are not swayed by this argument.
The elements necessary in every prosecution for the Appellants claim that the failure of the prosecution to
illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and present the informer in court demonstrates that the
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the informer is fictitious and gives rise to the presumption
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[109] that her testimony would be adverse if produced.
The Court finds that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses adequately establish these elements. The Court The rule in determining whether the informer should be
has no reason to doubt the following assessment of the presented for a successful prosecution in cases involving
trial court regarding the credibility of these witnesses: buy-bust operations is best stated in People vs.
Doria:[113]
An exhaustive scrutiny of the prosecutions evidence
shows that the accused were caught in flagrante delicto Except when the appellant vehemently denies selling
through a buy-bust operation staged b police operatives. prohibited drugs and there are material consistencies in
Both accused were positively identified by the poseur- the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are
buyer himself and by three (3) other members of the buy- reasons to believe that the arresting officers had
bust team. These eye witnesses for the prosecution were motives to testify falsely against the appellant, or that
also consistent in their testimonies concerning the only the informant as the poseur-buyer who actually
important details of the sale, to wit: (1) that the witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the
informant was at the scene and it was she who identified informant may be dispensed with as it will be merely
the two accused, (2) that Gilbert Santos acted as poseur- corroborative of the apprehending officers eyewitness
buyer, (3) that the said poseur-buyer handed the boodle testimonies. There is no need to present the informant in
money to accused Carlos Tan Ty and the latter called his court where the sale was actually witnessed and
co-accused Nelson Hong Ty who handed to the poseur- adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.
buyer a blue plastic bag containing the regulated drug,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.[110]
None of the above circumstances obtains in this case. strangers, openly and in public places, has become a
While appellants do deny selling shabu, there are no common occurrence. Indeed, it is sad to note the
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the effrontery and growing casualness of drug pushers in the
arresting officers. The arresting officers had no motive pursuit of their illicit trade, as if it were a perfectly
to testify against appellants; the claims of extortion legitimate operation.
against the arresting officers, as will be shown later,
were not firmly established. Finally, the informer was not Appellants submit, however, that this ruling applies only
even the poseur-buyer in the operation. The sale was to small level drug trafficking, and not to cases involving
actually witnessed and adequately proved by the a substantial amount of drugs, such as the one at bar. The
prosecution witnesses. The presumption laid down in distinction is illusory for it is not improbable for large
Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (e) transactions involving drugs to take place under the cover
[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if of commonplaceness. A kilo of shabu can be transported
produced, therefore, does not apply since the testimony and delivered with facility in public and it does not tax
of the informer would be merely corroborative.[114] credulity that such transactions indeed occur. While the
sale may have been made to a stranger, the lure for easy
That no test buy was conducted before the arrest is of profits can easily outweigh the risk of arrest and
no moment for there is no rigid or textbook method of prosecution. Moreover, the risk was reduced by the
conducting buy-bust operations. For the same reason, the introduction by the informant, who had regular contact
absence of evidence of a prior surveillance does not with appellant Carlos Tan Ty,[122] of the poseur-buyer to
affect the regularity of a buy-bust operation,[115] the latter.
especially when, like in this case, the buy-bust team
members were accompanied to the scene by their Equally without merit is the argument that the buy-bust
informant.[116] The Court will not pretend to establish on was not recorded in the police blotter is proof of a sham
a priori basis what detailed acts police authorities might buy-bust. A prior blotter report is neither indispensable
credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment nor required in buy-bust operations.[123]
operations.[117] The selection of appropriate and
effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is best Lastly, the failure of the NARCOM agents to use
left to the discretion of police authorities.[118] fluorescent powder on the boodle money is no indication
that the buy-bust operation did not take place. Like a
Appellants describe as implausible the testimony that prior blotter report, the use of fluorescent powder is not
they supposedly merely looked at the boodle money indispensable in such operations. The use of initials to
without counting it. We find nothing dubious in appellants mark the money used in the buy-bust operation has been
behavior. Indeed, it is totally consistent with human accepted by this Court.[124] The prosecution has the
nature. Appellants were engaged in an illegal activity and prerogative to choose the manner of marking the money
it was necessary that they act inconspicuously. The sale to be used in the buy-bust operation.[125]
was consummated in public and appellants would invite
unwanted attention if they counted the money right in Appellants raise the defense of frame-up. Frame-up is
busy Monumento. the usual defense of those accused in drug related
cases,[126] and it is viewed by the Court with
Appellants also fault the police officers for not observing disfavor[127] since it is an allegation that can be made
the purported proper procedure in the marking and the with ease.[128] For this claim to prosper, the defense
blotter of the P500 bills used as part of the boodle must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome
money. They failed to establish, however, that such a the presumption that government officials have
procedure existed. Sr. Insp. Mabanag, on the other hand, performed their duties in a regular and proper
testified that they do not even maintain a police manner.[129] Appellants have failed to provide clear and
blotter[119]since they were a special operation unit.[120] convincing evidence that they were framed by the
NARCOM agents. Appellants testimonies were
That the sale was in public does not diminish the corroborated merely by Norlito Dotimas and Mary Ann
prosecution witnesses credibility or the trustworthiness Ty. Norlito Dotimas credibility, however, remains
of their testimony. In People vs. Zervoulakos,[121] we doubtful because of his suspicious behavior and evasive
observed that the sale of prohibited drugs to complete answers while on the witness stand. Mary Ann Ty, on the
other hand, is the common-law wife of appellant Carlos operation, Garcia and his team-mates were not only
Tan Ty and the mother of his three children.[130] She authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend
has a natural interest in favoring appellants. Pitted the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. Section
against the presumption that government officials have 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rule on Criminal
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner, Procedure, reads in part as follows: Sec.5. Arrest without
the evidence for the defense simply cannot prevail. warrant; when lawfulA peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
The claim of extortion is similarly untenable. Like an presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
alleged frame-up, a supposed extortion by police officers actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
is a standard defense in drug cases[131]and must also be offense; x x x.
proven by clear and convincing evidence.[132] Again,
appellants have failed to discharge this burden. Such a Clearly, the situation in the case at bar is one where a
claim is supported only by the same unreliable evidence to person commits a crime in the presence of a police
support the claim of frame-up. officer; hence, the latter may validly arrest the offender
even without first obtaining a warrant of arrest.[136]
Appellants submit in the alternative that the facts as
presented by the prosecution reveal that the law There can be no doubt, therefore, that appellants are
enforcers instigated appellants to sell shabu to them. We guilty of the sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
find no instigation in this case. regulated drug,[137] in violation of Section 15 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act,[138] as amended.
x x x the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission Conspiracy between the appellants was evident. The
were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act transaction was successfully consummated between the
was done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to poseur-buyer and appellant Carlos Tan Ty, together with
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning his companion, appellant Nelson Hong Ty, with one
complicity in the act were present and apparently receiving the marked money and the other delivering the
assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that contraband to the poseur buyer. No other logical
class of cases where the offense is one of a kind conclusion would follow from the duos concerted action
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely except that they had a common purpose and community
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere of interest, the accepted indicia that could establish the
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if existence of conspiracy.[139] Conspiracy having been
the offense was committed by him free from the established, the accused are answerable as co-principals
influence or the instigation of the detective.[133] regardless of the degree of their participation.[140]
Here, the law enforcers received a report from their Conspiracy,[141] as used herein, refers to the manner of
informant that appellants were big time drug pushers. incurring criminal liability, and not a crime in itself.
Poseur-buyer SPO3 Santos then pretended to be engaged Conspiracy is not punishable except when the law
in the drug trade himself and, with the help of his fellow specifically provides a penalty therefor,[142] such as in
NARCOM agents, arrested appellants in the act of conspiracies to commit treason,[143] coup detat,[144]
delivering the shabu. Hence, appellants were merely rebellion,[145] sedition,[146] and the sale of dangerous
caught in the act of plying their illegal trade.[134] drugs. The last is punishable under Section 21(b) of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[147]
Contrary to appellants contentions, no tinge of
unconstitutionality attended the arrest of appellants. When the conspiracy relates to a crime actually
What we said in People vs. Liquen[135]is sufficient to committed, the conspiracy is absorbed; it does not
dispose of this argument: constitute a separate crime, but is only a manner of
incurring criminal liability. The participants to the crime
In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by are merely held equally liable since the act of one is the
the police officers precisely to test the veracity of the act of all. It was thus error for the trial court to convict
tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator. Having appellants for Section 15, Article III, RA 6425 [punishing
caught the culprit red-handed as a result of the buy-bust the sale of regulated drugs] in relation to Section 21-B
[penalizing the conspiracy to sell regulated drugs] of the 6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin
same Act.[148] In this case, the crime (the sale of oil;
regulated drugs), and not only the conspiracy (to sell the
same) was actually committed. To hold appellants liable 7. 40 grams of more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
for violation of Section 15 alone, therefore, would be or
more precise and more in accord with the principles of
criminal law.[149] 8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of
which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
V determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs
Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for
We arrive at the imposition of the proper penalty. the purpose.
Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
Republic Act No. 7659 states: foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, quantity.
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs.- The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging From the foregoing provisions, the penalty for the sale of
from five hundred thousand persos to ten million pesos regulated drugs is based, as a rule, on the quantity
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized thereof. The exception is where the victim is a minor or
by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or where the regulated drug involved is the proximate cause
distribute any regulated drug. of the death of the victim. In such cases, the maximum
penalty prescribed in Section 15, i.e., death, shall be
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act imposed, regardless of the quantity of the prohibited
to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, drugs involved.[150] Appellants, therefore, cannot be
or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under sentenced to suffer the death penalty under this
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a exception, the conditions for its imposition not being
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided present. Their penalty ought to be determined by the
shall be imposed. quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride involved in
the sale.
In relation thereto, Section 20 of the same law, as
amended, provides: To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a
substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or instruments of the Crime.- warrant the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if
The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and there be aggravating circumstances, the death
9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article penalty.[151] Appellants however foist the probability
III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs that the substance sold could contain additives or
involved is in any of the following quantities: adulterants, and not just methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu
1. 40 grams or more of opium; could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing
the imposable penalty.
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:[152]
hydrochloride;
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not
4. 40 grams of more of heroin; done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly found inside
the bags. It is suggested that since the law, Republic Act
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; No. 7659, imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or
quantity of drugs seized or take, then laboratory tests
should be undertaken for the entire amount or quantity MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Zheng Bai Hui alias Carlos
of drugs seized in order to determine the proper penalty Tan Ty and Sao Yu alias Nelson Hong Ty are found
to be imposed. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15
of Republic Act No. 6425 and are hereby sentenced to
The argument is quaint and even borders on being each pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that the (P500,000.00) and to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
confirmatory tests were conducted on samples taken PERPETUA.
from only one (1) of the plastic packages, accused-
appellants arguments must still fail. SO ORDERED.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than sufficient to Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
justify imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act. Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A sample
taken from one (1) of the packages is logically presumed
to be representative of the entire contents of the [1] Records, p. 1.
package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.
Therefore, a positive result for the presence of drugs is [2] TSN, November 9, 1994, pp. 2-22; TSN, November 14,
indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic 1994, pp. 1-20; TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 22-30.
package from which the sample was taken. If it is then
proved, beyond reasonable doubt, x x x that accused [3] TSN, November 17, 1994, pp. 10-40; TSN, November
appellant transported into the Philippines the plastic 23, 1994, pp. 31-47.
packages from which samples were taken for tests, and
found positive as prohibited drugs, then conviction for [4] TSN, November 25, 1994, pp. 2-27; TSN, November
importing shabu is definitely in order. (Italics in the 28, 1994, pp. 2-14.
original. Underscoring supplied.)
[5] TSN, December 2, 1994, pp. 2-47.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be presumed [6] Exhibits C to C-6.
that the entire substance seized is shabu. The burden of
evidence shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise. [7] Exhibit A.
Appellants in this case have not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. [8] Exhibit B.
The sale of 200 or more grams of methamphetamine [9] Exhibits A-1 and B-1.
hydrochloride, a regulated drug,[153] is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from [10] Exhibit D.
P500,000 to P10,000,000.00.[154] No aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime. [11] Exhibits D-1 to D-3.
Hence, appellants can only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. [12] Exhibit J-4.
[18] Exhibit I. [42] See Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Wilby, 69 N.E. 2d
429 (1946).
[19] TSN, September 4, 1996, pp. 2-16.
[43] Rollo, p. 359.
[20] TSN, September 25, 1996, pp. 2-24.
[44] 76 S.W. 111 (1902).
[21] Both accused speak Mandarin, and have difficulty
speaking Filipino and English. [45] 6 Greenl. 72, 19 Am. Dec. 191.
[22] TSN, May 3, 1996, pp. 8-42. [46] 305 P.2d 723 (1956).
[23] December 12, 1994, TSN, pp. 5-30. [47] 225 P.2d 400 (1950).
[24] TSN, January 8, 1996, pp. 2-22; TSN, February 9, [48] Rollo, pp. 82 and 283.
1996, pp. 1-18.
[49] TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 11-12.
[25] TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 5-22.
[50] Rollo, p. 83.
[26] TSN, December 11, 1995, pp. 2-11.
[51] TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 13-14.
[27] TSN, May 5, 1996, pp. 2-16; TSN, June 11, 1996, pp.
2-20. [52] Id., at 15.
[30] Id., at 281-282. Underscoring in the original. [55] TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 19-21.
[33] Records, p. 55. [58] TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 24-25.
[71] People vs. Ancheta, 64 SCRA 90 (1975). [94] Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
[72] United States vs. Lim Tiu, 31 Phil. 504 (1915). witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as
to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
[73] People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 (1987). connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
[74] United States vs. Hudieres and Sagun, 27 Phil. 44 freedom from interest of bias, or the reverse, and to
(1914). elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
[76] People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 (1987). [96]TSN, November 27, 1995, p. 22.
[77] People vs. Muit, 117 SCRA 696 (1982). [97] RULES OF COURT, RULE 132, Section 8.
[78] People vs. Manalo, supra. [98] CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, Section 14 (2).
[79] People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 (1984). [99] People vs. Collantes, 208 SCRA 853 (1992).
[80] TSN, November 14, 1994. [100] People vs. Bolasa, 209 SCRA 477 (1992).
[81] TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 43-44. [101] 353 US 53, 1 L ed 2d 639, 77 S Ct 623 (1957).
[82] TSN, February 4, 1994, pp.42-44. [102] United States v. Lewis, 315 F.2d 228 (1963). See
also McCoy v. State, 140 A.2d 689 (1958).
[83] TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 15-16; TSN, November
25, 1994, p. 4. [103] People v. Dewson, 310 P.2d 1962 (1957).
[84] Rollo, pp. 296-301. [104] TSN, January 8, 1996, pp. 7-8.
[86] People vs. Angcap, supra, quoting People vs. Manalo, [106] State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70 (1972).
supra.
[107] Rugendorf v. United States, 376 US 528, 11 L ed 2d
[87] Rollo, p. 93. 887, 84 S Ct 825 (1964), citing Roviaro vs. United States,
supra.
[88] Id.
[108] State v, Battle, supra.
[89] TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 15-18. Underscoring
supplied. [109] People vs. De Vera, 275 SCRA 87 (1997).
[110] Rollo, p. 487. [129] People vs. Enriquez, supra; People vs. Lising, supra.
[111] People vs. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997). See also [130] TSN, May 3, 1996, p.8.
People vs. Atad, 266 SCRA 262 (1997); People vs. Juatan,
260 SCRA 532 (1996); People vs. Ang Chut Kit, 251 SCRA [131] People vs. Enriquez, supra. See also Manalili vs. Court
660 (1995); People vs. Flores, 243 SCRA 374 (1995); of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997); People vs. Doroja, 235
People vs. Utinas, 239 SCRA 362 (1994); People vs. SCRA 238 (1994).
Merabueno, 239 SCRA 197 (1994); People vs. Manahan,
238 SCRA 141 (1994); People vs. Go, 237 SCRA 73 (1994); [132] People vs. Bolasa, 209 SCRA 476 (1992).
People vs. Garcia, 235 SCRA 371 (1994); People vs.
Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51 (1994). [133] People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 56 Phil. 44
(1931), quoting 16 Corpus Juris, p.88, sec. 57.
[112] Rollo, p. 104.
[134] People vs. Balidiata, 222 SCRA 409 (1993).
[113] 301 SCRA 668 (1999).
[135] 212 SCRA 288 (1992).
[114] People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733 (1995).
[136] People vs. De Jesus, 205 SCRA 383 (1992).
[115] People vs. Manahan, supra.
[137] People v. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 (1994).
[116] People vs. Lacbanes, supra.
[138] Republic Act No. 6425.
[117] People vs. Go, supra, citing People vs. Roldan, 224
SCRA 536 (1993). [139] People vs. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 (1995).
[118] Id. [140] People vs. Solon, 244 SCRA 554 (1995).
[119] TSN, February 9, 1996, p. 15. [141] A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
[120] Id., at 8-9. and decide to commit it. (REVISED PENAL CODE,
ARTICLE 8.)
[121] 241 SCRA 625 (1995).
[142] REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 8.
[122] TSN, November 14, 1994, p. 9.
[143] REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 115.
[123] People vs. Ang Chut Kit, supra.
[144]144 REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 136.144
[124] People vs. Rivera, supra, citing cases.
[145] Id.
[125] Id.
[146] REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 141.
[126] People vs. Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 (1997); People vs.
Lising, 275 SCRA 807 (1997). [147] SEC. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy.- The same penalty
prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense
[127] People vs. Lacbanes, supra. See also People vs. shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to
Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996); People vs. Nicolas, 241 commit the same in the following cases:
SCRA 67 (1995); People vs. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 (1995).
(a) Importation of dangerous drugs;
[128] People vs. Tranca, supra; People vs. Agustin, 215
SCRA 725 (1992).
(b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and EN BANC
transportation of dangerous drugs;
[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for prohibited
drug users; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST
(d) Manufacture of dangerous drugs; and DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R.
(e) (e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-
of prohibited drugs. MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
[148] Rollo, p. 491. ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26,
Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she
owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General to the Marcos estate.
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6] dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the
children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional
for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On
motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme
agreements and for the enforcement thereof. Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the
ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds
sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently,
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be
family under the conditions contained therein. The placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in
aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by
its premises or whereas clauses the fact that petitioner petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated
obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six
Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial
to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28,
conditionalities are met x x x. The said decision of the 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set
Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March
Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment
petitioners request for legal assistance.[7] Consandey pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based
declared the various deposits in the name of the on the following grounds:
enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and
ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in I
favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
motion to approve the General/Supplemental PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for
PROCEEDING. reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion
II for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta
filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the
RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE- motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc
TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR and Ferdinand, Jr.
OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the
THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8] Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision,
thus denying petitioners motion for summary judgment:
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial
conference, certain facts were established, warranting a CONCLUSION
summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks
petitioners motion for summary judgment, which belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof
opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses
Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government
judgment was conducted. cannot be deemed to have been established and our
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without
In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the basis.
Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary
judgment: WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated
September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and
CONCLUSION this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12]
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner
of evidence. argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its
September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that --
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now
held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired I
as ill-gotten wealth.
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN
DISPOSITION ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS
2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines and against the A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY
respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL
transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO
equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC
together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
of the State.[10]
WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE
MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS. IMPLEADED.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the
PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED respondents motions for reconsideration and
WEALTH. supplemental motion for reconsideration were the
authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss
II decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was
incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE of authenticated translations of the decisions of the
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing
ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT: itself because respondents themselves never raised this
issue in their motions for reconsideration and
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore,
DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT this particular issue relating to the translation of the
ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore
SHAM; AND because said decisions had been previously utilized by the
Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP it.
OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the
LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER non-production of the authenticated translations of the
JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a
JUDGMENT. marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any
measure the conclusiveness and strength of what had
III been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan,
that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses
constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the (1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on
Filipino people. private respondents Answer and other documents that
had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by
filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After laches had already set in against petitioner.
several motions for extension which were all granted, the
comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the (2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to
separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March
2002. 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on
the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied whatever right it had to move for summary judgment.
on the following grounds:
(B)
A.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR
REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN. SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS
CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT
B. YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER (1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal
PROCEEDINGS.[14] statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential
elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy nature. These should be strictly construed against
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.
of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated (2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth
translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect
said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount
Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly
which does not comply with the requirements of the rules acquired during their incumbency.
may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit (a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its acquired or own the Swiss funds.
petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily,
the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further (b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
proceedings cannot and should not be considered a fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner has
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing
how much of the Swiss funds was acquired during the
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their incumbency of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965
comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the to 25 February 1986.
grounds that:
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in
(A) Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to
establish the other proper earnings and income from
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS and above their government salaries.
ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential
elements provided in paragraphs (c)[15] (d),[16] and
(e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and
is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent
acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as eager as
There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to
funds. have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our
known language. She says the authenticated official
(C) English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be
presented. This should stop all speculations on what
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs.
THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS fashion, are impertinent and improper before this Court.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS
CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE
OF THE SWISS FUNDS. ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues,
General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the the question regarding the propriety of petitioner
other written and testimonial statements submitted in Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65[19] of the
relation thereto, are expressly barred from being 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan
admissible in evidence against private respondents. Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed
out.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged
admissions together with the other statements on At the outset, we would like to stress that we are
record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no treating this case as an exception to the general rule
such judicial admissions were made by private governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of
respondents. the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under
Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is undeniably
(D) ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and
deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE notwithstanding the existence and availability of the
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA remedy of appeal.[21]
FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government
ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or
ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and
DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order
CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses
FACTS.[18] was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the charged it with the task of assisting the President in the
petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
comply with a very plain requirement of respondent President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
incidents which should be properly threshed out at the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other entities owned or controlled by them during his
matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of the administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their It is ordered by the court upon application by one party,
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents,
The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file
this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]: an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or
other documents. This is after the court summarily hears
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it both parties with their respective proofs and finds that
was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not there is no genuine issue between them. Summary
only out of considerations of simple justice but also out judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1,
of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
nearly so.
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties or any part thereof.[25]
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form,
should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no
decades have passed since the government initiated its genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.[26]
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The The theory of summary judgment is that, although an
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring
long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the
funds and other assets be finally determined and trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying Republic.
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.[23]
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with of its case for forfeiture:
finality all the issues therein.
xxx
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for
whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of several decades continuously and without interruption as
fact which would either justify or negate summary Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of
judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965
able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. on February 22-25, 1986.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for
short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of
genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the
of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise
place as a matter of right. served once as a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent
judgment was described as a judgment which a court may capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x
render before trial but after both parties have pleaded.
xxx xxx xxx
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that
based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former
First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human 15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as
Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and
was P75,000 a year xxx. P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the
period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979
to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The records
LEGITIMATE INCOME indicate that the reported income came from her salary
from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances
xxx from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council,
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development
Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Mutual Fund.
Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until
1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. 16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal
M 6221-J 1117-A-9. practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96%
represents receivables from prior years during the period
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet 1967 up to 1984.
filed by the Marcoses are summarized and attached to
the reports in the following schedules: 17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash
method under Section 38 of the National Internal
Schedule A: Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an
extremely profitable legal practice before he became a
Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof); President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law
profession during his entire presidency) and that,
Schedule B: incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20
years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof); attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his
ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any
Schedule C: Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M
that he decided to later recognize as income. There are
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2 hereof); no documents showing any withholding tax certificates.
Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any
Schedule D: known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As
previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3 hereof). in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM
and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the their kleptocracy.
Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91
in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other
1984. The sources of income are as follows: Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred
to in his return as Miscellaneous Items and Various
Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01% Corporations. There is no indication of any payor of the
dividends or earnings.
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any
income from any deposits and placements which are G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue attested that after a diligent search of IN SWISS BANKS
pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they
did not find any records involving the tax transactions of 23. The following presentation very clearly and
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to
Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of
Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its
Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or
on any filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses agents who formed those foundations or corporate
FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965. entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts
twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden,
88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes the following presentation is confined to five identified
totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-
business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or
represent expenses incurred for subscription, postage, separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
stationeries and contributions while the other deductions
in the amount of P567,097.00 represents interest H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total
deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
12% of the total gross income.
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of
amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as
amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO
income that is free for consumption, savings and Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power
investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering
the net income after tax the personal and additional him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation.
exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax- Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation
exempt salary of the President for the years 1966 until was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and
1972. Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr.
Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, members of the Board of Trustees of the said foundation.
represents the total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the
Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On
attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written
immediately preceding their ascendancy to the order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as
presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 the foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was
which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. recorded on December 14, 1971.
In computing for the networth, the income approach was
utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is 25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first
increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This
upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount 26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was
of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from legal renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of
practice is real and valid x x x. Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos
issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO
FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich
under the account Reference OSER. The Board of 31. This is the most intricate and complicated account
Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on June 25, group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups
1981. under the foundation organized by Marcos
dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret together and became one (1) account group under the
deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM
FM effected the establishment of VIBUR and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the
FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn when
and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated
Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA
on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not 32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the
made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using
as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently
securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968,
FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own
VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily bank accounts with the same bank using an American-
reveals that exactly the same securities were listed. sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous
documents in Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were
the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of accomplished forms for Declaration/Specimen
VERSO FOUNDATION. Signatures submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the
caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda signed their
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of real names as well as their respective aliases underneath.
Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A These accounts were actively operated and maintained by
notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure
Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred
accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR to XANDY FOUNDATION.
FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the
liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer 33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on
the foundations funds to another account or bank but this March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E.
was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Scheller were named as members of the Board of
Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained Trustees.
by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration
signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the 34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to
beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March
E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the
shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations
Marcos Familie signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the
Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries, the
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the
accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and
under the General Account No. 469857 totaled Irene as equal third beneficiaries.
$3,597,544.00
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI- FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of
Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter
Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf
issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to with regard to Charis Foundation.
liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to
Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST 39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was
COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained
dissolved. the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that
the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust
May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Company under the account Reference OMAL. The Board
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of
CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981.
account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened
on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of 40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May
AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust
securities listed in the safe deposit register of Co., as members of the Foundations Board of Directors.
WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December The account was officially opened with SKA on
31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the
AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides
December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of
safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo
Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the
those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as same with those listed in the safe deposit register of
of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the
certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is
FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.
balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989
amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category 41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written
NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its
documents received from Swiss authorities included a Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina
declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from
beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM the foundations German marks and US dollar accounts
and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M
indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the
Marcos Families. list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as of February
3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows
joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to
his dummies, which started with the CHARIS Avertina.
FOUNDATION.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in
VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as
directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as 42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26,
founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA
mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors.
himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the
Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance with the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The
handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August
the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was
named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda
(Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
as equal second beneficiaries.
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in
Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of 47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM
the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was
to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on
note that the foundations capitalization as well as the October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several
cost of establishing it be debited against the account of accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the
Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies
beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda
apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of 48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was
the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina
thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The
transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No.
Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents
of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-
subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of
issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated September 3,
dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971
Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied
Reference Dido, Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They
Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981. further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was
involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of
13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust
Co, as members of the Foundations Board of Directors. As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No.
The account was officially opened with the SKA on 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made
known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of
securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad 49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A
Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the statement of its rules and regulations was found among
Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that 50%
clearly see that practically the same securities were of the Companys assets will be for sole and full right
listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the
Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among their
Trinidad Foundation. children. Another Malacaang document dated October
19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis
bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator
No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00. and manager of all assets held by the company. The
Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva.
included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter
the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all
Another document signed by Raber shows that the said instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will
Palmy Foundation is owned by Marcos Familie. be signed with the word JOHN LEWIS. This word will
have the same value as the couples own personal Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro
signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
their signatures and as John Lewis.
xxx xxx xxx
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank
accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents 10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized
signatories. 11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were
transform Maler Establishment into a foundation. not privy to the transactions and that they cannot
Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets
was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler 12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the
Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment
Co., S.A. 13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Foundations Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, contents of the alleged ITRs.
for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December
31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was 14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the
still an establishment which was subsequently Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
transformed into a foundation. to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow contents of the alleged ITRs.
chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty
Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex 15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the
R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof. Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
x x x x x x.[27] Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs.
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc,
Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their 16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the
answer, stated the following: Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the
part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the
xxx xxx xxx same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and
not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
Petition. belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.
Petition in so far as it states that summons and other
court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. 17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the
Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
contents of the alleged ITRs. remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43,
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
to the activities of the BIR. transactions and as to such transaction they were privy
to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the
contents of the alleged ITRs. 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51
and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since transactions and as to such transaction they were privy
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
contents of the alleged ITRs. having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children
contents of the alleged ITRs. indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in
layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of
properties were lawfully acquired. privity or (inability to) recall because it happened a long
time ago or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, were lawfully acquired are fully insufficient to tender
26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse
to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not the issues.
privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-
Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers replete with indications of a spurious defense:
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack (b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos,
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1999 of
as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting
not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation
they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta
the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific
March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove
respondents (Marcos children) adopted; the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with
the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent
Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children; unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling
both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso
2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration vs. Villamor,[29]
dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; movement and position, entraps and destroys the other.
It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and
Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
the Marcos children; imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds
23, 1993. were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to
particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order. lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject
funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with
Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993. the other respondents that the funds were lawfully
acquired without detailing how exactly these funds were
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case
each and every allegation contained in the petition for before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual
gave were stock answers like they have no sufficient support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence
knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired
long time ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were legitimately by the Marcos family.
lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of such
assertions. Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan
were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
provides: the allegations of the petition.
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under
the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever the rules is a denial through a statement that the
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the
shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as the
deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so.
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court ruled that
to the truth of a material averment made in the if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect with having done, performed or committed a particular
of a denial.[28]
act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied,
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they denied while the fact itself is admitted.[35]
had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph
self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by
petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial
Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on
it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for
alleged.[31] forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed the
countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities.
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated: Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a denial
pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
23. The following presentation very clearly and facts:
overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of
foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its (2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million
detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or as of December, 1990.
agents who formed those foundations or corporate
entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of
of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied
as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted
the following presentation is confined to five identified by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356- Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or
separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.[32] Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.[36]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar respondents in their answer were pregnant with
as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under Republics petition for forfeiture:
layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities
for being false, the truth being that Respondents 23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25,
aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.[33] 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what to the truth of the allegation since respondents were not
is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-
that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers
not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
averments it was directed at.[34] Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33,
carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they if a defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is
were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude the equivalent to an admission.
same having occurred a long time ago, except as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or transactions was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to
information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures
the allegations since respondents were not privy to the on some of the vital documents[41] attached to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to
to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same specifically deny as required by the rules.[42]
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed
personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said
and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and documents were within their knowledge. As correctly
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz,
the allegations since respondents were not privy to the Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy
to they cannot remember with exactitude the same The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who
are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the names of
respondents answer pertained to the creation of five the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the
groups of accounts as well as their respective ending Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7)
balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the
24 to 52 of the Republics petition for forfeiture. Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of
the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that the the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the
funds involved were lawfully acquired was an Foundations as dummies.[43]
acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said
deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient
the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for knowledge or information regarding the existence of the
forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of
Swiss bank deposits. accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband
personally masterminded and participated in the
The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact
petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a[39] Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically
of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the
not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached
The respondents did not at all respond to the issues to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of
raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and the contents thereof.
amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed
admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40]
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the
balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy
respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-
was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore
records, respondent Marcoses could have easily bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss
determined the genuineness and due execution of the funds.
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and
opportunity of verifying the same from the records of PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their But, as in their answer, they failed to state and
alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully.
considered a specific denial.[44] An unexplained denial of They failed to present and attach even a single document
information within the control of the pleader, or is readily that would show and prove the truth of their allegations.
accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
constitute an effective denial.[45] provides:
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs
not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to which shall contain, among others:
what allegations of the petition are really being
challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of xxx
delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only
present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth (d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating
attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by the purpose thereof;
presenting an obviously contrived defense.
xxx
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which
is patently and necessarily within the pleaders knowledge (f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the
or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at substance of their respective testimonies.[49]
all.[47] Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to
properly tender an issue and the averments contained in It is unquestionably within the courts power to require
the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state
admitted by them. the number of witnesses intended to be called to the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of
Inc.: documents to be submitted with a description of the
nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony
Its specific denial of the material allegation of the of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at
petition without setting forth the substance of the the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular
matters relied upon to support its general denial, when issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine
such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of
could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make
therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.[48] a formal identification and specification of the issues and
their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and
submit them to the court within the specified period for affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
the prompt disposition of the action.[50] except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[51]
adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and
xxx admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the
Republics motion only demonstrated that the averments
WITNESSES of such opposition were not genuine and therefore
unworthy of belief.
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness
and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]
may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and Memoranda
xxx
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more,
introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in respondents merely made general denials without alleging
the course of the trial. facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the
hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the
documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October
of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated
stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed contrary to petitioner Republics allegation that Mrs.
ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds.
substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was
not made known either. Such cunning tactics of This is yet another indication that respondents presented
respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs.
hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or
became ripe for summary judgment. interest in the Swiss funds:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel. COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most
PJ Garchitorena: respectfully manifests:
You do not own anything? That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the
subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole
Atty. TECSON: beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various foundations alleged in the case;
Yes, Your Honor.
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-
PJ Garchitorena: entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements,
Atty. SISON: respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed
distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss
I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of
Your Honor. ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth
Your Honor.[55] no real defense. The facts pleaded by respondents, while
ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact,
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently
Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what wanting in substance and constituted no genuine issues
facts they would prove or what issues they intended to for trial.
pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our
mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now We therefore rule that, under the circumstances,
this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this summary judgment is proper.
forfeiture case to eternity.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when
Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS. summary judgment is called for. Under the rules,
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
Agreement dated December 28, 1993 pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the
nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56]
respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of
the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which
longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not
sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court
defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57] A summary to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic
judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning,
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the a candid demonstration of respondents good faith should
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that have been made to the court below. Without the
there are no important questions or issues of fact posed deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted
and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a litigation could have ended a long time ago.
matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is
premised on the assumption that the issues presented Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first
need not be tried either because these are patently filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are
devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as foxy responses like lack of sufficient knowledge or lack
to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the of privity or they cannot recall because it happened a long
Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action time ago or, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully
where there exists no serious controversy.[58] Summary acquired. But, whenever it suits them, they also claim
judgment is a procedural device for the prompt ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10%
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible
legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The charade from beginning to end.
theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer
may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise,
it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and
that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts
is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering and express admissions prior to filing the motion for
summary judgment for petitioner.[59] summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner
Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right
petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of it had to move for summary judgment."[60]
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses'
participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express
in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from
foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the filing a motion for summary judgment.
ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their
answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations
against them without stating facts admissible in evidence Rule 35
at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues
of fact. Summary Judgment
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party
purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
that the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were or any part thereof.
false.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours)[61]
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary "PER CURIAM.
judgment at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
(i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants
has been served." No fixed reglementary period is rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case was
provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
phrase "any time after the answer has been served? justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days
after the final adjournment of the term at which the case
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the
jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the
this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary
and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice.
States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by
in order. proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to
summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and
that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special
or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any Term granted both motions and the defendants have
time after the expiration of 20 days from the appealed.
commencement of the action or after service of a motion
for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a The Special Term properly held that the answer and the
party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the
asserted may move for summary judgment at any time. Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe
no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to
Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a empower the court to summarily determine whether or
motion for summary judgment may not be made until not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and
issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has there is no limitation on the power of the court to make
been served.[62] Under said rule, after issues have been such a determination at any stage of the litigation."
joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at (emphasis ours)
any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive
period is provided. On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage
of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from
our rules also provide that a motion for summary thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66]
judgment may not be made until issues have been joined,
meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary
he can move for summary judgment.[64] And like the New judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date
York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue
period within which to move for summary judgment. that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial
conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's judgment.
interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice
can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section This argument must fail in the light of the New York
1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this
case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by
joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her right
any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial.
phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff
Muzysh,[65] the New York Supreme Court ruled: was allowed to move for summary judgment even after
trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000,
should we permit it in the present case where petitioner estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
moved for summary judgment before trial.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do
answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the
litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of person has abandoned his right or declined to assert
the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the it.[70] In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one
defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on
frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties
contrary interpretation would go against the very who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original
objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to parties and their successors-in-interest".[71]
"weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the
expense and loss of time involved in a trial."[68] A careful examination of the records, however, reveals
that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy
adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the available to it, including the motion for summary
proceedings in the hope that a future administration judgment.
sympathetic to them might be able to influence the
outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary
we cannot tolerate. judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied
because of the pending compromise agreement between
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial
expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss
prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for
rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the summary judgment now under consideration by this Court.
speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of It was the subsequent events that transpired after the
them. answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner
from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the
judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and (second) motion for summary judgment years after
loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
Republic could validly move for summary judgment any
time after the respondents answer was filed or, for that In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches,
matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but
fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in also that some unfair injury to them might result unless
any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as the action is barred.[72]
indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by
respondent Marcoses. This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the
pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they
enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or
Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed interest which could be adversely affected by
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, petitioner's alleged inaction.
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."[69] But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches
had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or
judgment was based on respondents' answer and other asserts governmental rights.[73] Nor can estoppel
documents that had long been in the records of the case. validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74]
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property
a mere question of time but is principally a question of the acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be or otherwise, and
enforced or asserted.[75] Equity demands that
petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or
the people's case against the Marcoses. property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the
legitimate income of the public officer.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public
The matter of summary judgment having been thus officials during the time material to the instant case was
settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses'
was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance answer categorically admitted the allegations in
with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the
takes center stage. personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public
official who served without interruption as Congressman,
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic
property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to February 25,
forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the
income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once
2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide: served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor,
xxxxxx concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June
1976 to February 1986.[78]
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of
or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to R. Marcos.[79] The combined accumulated salaries of the
have been unlawfully acquired. Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated
May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and
xxxxxx Management Alberto Romulo.[80] The Certification
showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount
the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of
acquired the property in question, then the court shall P2,288,750:
declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of
the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
aforesaid shall become the property of the State.
Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six 1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
months before any general election or within three
months before any special election. The Court may, in 1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive
Department for administrative or criminal action, or both. 1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment
admissions made by them in their various pleadings and from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990,
documents were valid. It is of record that respondents that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
Swiss banks belonged to them. met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not
been able to procure a final judgment of conviction
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made against the PRIVATE PARTY.
judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject
Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia,
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' that:
Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the
Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby
the fact that the Associate Justices of the agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the
Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
respondents had made judicial admissions of their withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
ownership of the Swiss funds.
The stipulations set forth in the General and
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the
the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted manifest intent of respondents to enter into a
ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents
stated: willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the
Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 deposits for the simple reason that no person would
insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the deposits if he did not in fact own them.
same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by
respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully this Court that the General and Supplemental
acquired. (emphasis supplied) Agreements were null and void.[89] They insist that
nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in
evidence against them because they stood on the same
ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.s
Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, formal declarations in open court:
provides that in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
an admission of any liability and is not admissible in ATTY. FERNANDO:
evidence against the offeror.
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
nullity of said agreements was premised on the following
constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of F. MARCOS, JR.:
criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law;
(2) the PCGGs commitment to exempt from all forms of Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs
was against the Constitution; and (3) the governments ATTY. FERNANDO:
undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed
against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
and other courts encroached on the powers of the
judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in PJ GARCHITORENA:
the least bit even touched on the veracity and
truthfulness of respondents admission with respect to In connection with what?
their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made
certain admissions in those agreements, respondents ATTY. FERNANDO:
cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning
the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the
the agreements themselves were later declared null and various cases initiated by PCGG against your family?
void.
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice
Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with
19, 2000 could not have been better said: negotiations towards achieving some kind of agreement
between the Philippine government and the Marcos
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements family. The discussions that led up to the compromise
rendered the same without legal effects but it did not agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty.
detract from the admissions of the respondents Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions
made in said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding xxx xxx xxx
on the respondents.[91]
ATTY. FERNANDO:
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an
admission even if it is contained in a document which is What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you
not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, of this possibility?
either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party
thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or F. MARCOS, JR.:
delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as
competent evidence of admissions, although they may be My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always
unenforceable.[92] open, we are always open, we are very much always in
search of resolution to the problem of the family and any
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. approach that has been made us, we have entertained.
during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the And so my reaction was the same as what I have always
Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end
credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that to this problem.[94]
respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank
xxx xxx xxx partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when
a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which
ATTY. FERNANDO: is peculiarly within his own knowledge.[98]
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998,
bank? respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the
following:
PJ GARCHITORENA:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash? subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole
beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
F. MARCOS, JR.: various foundations alleged in the case;
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-
Marcos name in any of the banks in Switzerland which may entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President
necessarily be not cash.[95] Ferdinand E. Marcos;
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release,
committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said
the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights
MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm victims-plaintiffs.
abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with
the Republic for the release and transfer of the US All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of
Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without respondents that petitioner failed to prove that they
prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting acquired or own the Swiss funds and that it was only by
the ownership of the remainder. arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made
by private respondents out of context that petitioner was
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas able to treat these as judicial admissions. The Court is
admission of the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications
deposits as in fact the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss of every pleading and document submitted in this case.
deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by
the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos- ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as
Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos- an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and
Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the political implications of this case, we considered and
Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the
custodia legis: parties, even if it might have bordered on factual
adjudication which, by authority of the rules and
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is
Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted
custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle, its ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as
a distinct possibility. We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come by the party making such admission and becomes
from someone who believes that he has a marked and conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him
intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
their ownership of the said deposits. adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG,
the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or
1999, confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated: through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.[105]
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes
with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,
the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, respondents judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss
desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment deposits is definitely binding on them.
awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by
releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the
The individual and separate admissions of each (1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and
31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money
or property during his incumbency; and
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his
scope of his authority and during the existence of the salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by property.
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same
rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first
party.[106] element is clearly extant.
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title The second element deals with the amount of money or
to property from another, the act, declaration, or property acquired by the public officer during his
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and
to the property, is evidence against the former.[107] owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the
five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by
The declarations of a person are admissible against a them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of
party whenever a privity of estate exists between the these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with
declarant and the party, the term privity of estate the second element.
generally denoting a succession in rights.[108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such
to the record is competent.[109] Without doubt, privity assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion
exists among the respondents in this case. And where to the public officers salary and his other lawful income.
several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in
the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of determining whether a prima facie presumption has been
one is competent against all.[110] established in this case.
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule
ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during
prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the the names of five different foundations. We believe
Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its petitioner was able to establish the prima facie
findings and conclusions were not borne out by the presumption that the assets and properties acquired by
voluminous records of this case. the Marcoses were manifestly and patently
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough
public officer or employee has acquired during his evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the
of proportion to his salary as such public officer or balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an
employee and to his other lawful income and the income amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate
from legitimately acquired property, said property shall income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency
be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. as government officials.
xxx
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the
The elements which must concur for this prima facie Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the
presumption to apply are: known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption
that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was
duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for [who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if
forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and this interest is such that it cannot be separated from
property acquired by the respondents, and their total that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render
government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree
Regulations states: will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the
final determination of the controversy in his absence will
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
properties, and other material possessions of those
persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, There are two essential tests of an indispensable party:
whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the
income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth. presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to the other party?[116] There is, however, no fixed formula
dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing for determining who is an indispensable party; this can
evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired only be determined in the context and by the facts of the
and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A particular suit or litigation.
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed
and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal In the present case, there was an admission by
presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.[111] respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in
foundations should have been impleaded as they were controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the
indispensable parties without whom no complete estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117] Viewed against this
determination of the issues could be made. She asserts admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable
that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not
foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The
judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was
foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by neither inimical to the foundations interests nor
the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The
in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed
them their rights under the Swiss constitution and what was already generally known: that the foundations
international law.[112] were established precisely to hide the money stolen by
the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign
impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113] taken from Rule question.
19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as
parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be formal owners, must be given an opportunity to
impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption
However, failure to join an indispensable party does not that they owned a nominal share of the assets.[118] But
divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos
indispensable parties is founded on equitable herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss
not divested of its power to render a decision even in the court. The directive given by the Swiss court for the
absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
is not binding on the non-joined party.[114] purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they
might have had in the assets as formal owners. But
An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one: inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated
by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as
indispensable parties and their participation in the Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued
proceedings became unnecessary. that the failure of the Government to implead the
sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly
impleading the firms which are the res of the action was used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as
unnecessary: instruments or conduits for conversion of public funds
and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, government contracts, etc., slight reflection would
but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not
or other illicit conduct in other words, the companies fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules
themselves are not the object or thing involved in the e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying
action, the res thereof there is no need to implead them the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to
either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten amendments before trial], in relation to the rule
funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their respecting omission of so-called necessary or
part indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to
Such showing of having been formed with, or having the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead
received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, such parties is a mere technical defect which can be
does not, without more, warrant identifying the cured at any stage of the proceedings even after
corporations in question with the person who formed or judgment; and that, particularly in the case of
made use of them to give the color or appearance of indispensable parties, since their presence and
lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth at participation is essential to the very life of the action,
the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of for without them no judgment may be rendered,
impleading the former with the latter in actions to amendments of the complaint in order to implead them
recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even
personality and legal culpability from their erring after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it
members or stockholders, said corporations are not appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their
themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the identity and character as such indispensable parties.[121]
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the
Governments cause of action for recovery; their creation Although there are decided cases wherein the non-
or organization was merely the result of their members joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the
(or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to conceal dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such
the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better
therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit
actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of
there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit
no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions. of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3[122] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of
the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any
illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of
were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill- the court on its own initiative.[123]
gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack
of cause of action or ground to implead them. Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of
Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124] on
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of
indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead indispensable parties even after judgment has been
them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full
case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120] relief.[125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does
not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as
the delay is excusable.[126] Thus, respondent Mrs. decision was not dependent on the determination of the
Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts.
rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-
joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB
jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What
parties before it though not on the absent party.[127] If is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of
she really felt that she could not be granted full relief the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic
due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the
have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss
stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor
assailed the judgment rendered. of petitioner Republic.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
avalanche of documentary evidence against them, assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January
respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were
of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate
forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
Section 6 of RA 1379: plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show
to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully SO ORDERED.
acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
shall become property of the State x x x. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Carpio, J., no part.
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself
on the ground that the original copies of the [1] An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any
authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public
translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure
Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the Therefor.
unofficial translation of one of these Swiss decisions in
his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the [2] E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only
motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country,
victims. creating the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist
the President in the recovery of vast government
While we are in reality perplexed by such an resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos,
incomprehensible change of heart, there might his immediate family, relatives, and close associates, both
nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. here and abroad.
The presentation of the authenticated translations of
the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de [3] E.O. No. 2 issued twelve (12) days later, warning all
rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact persons and entities who had knowledge of possession of
and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans ill-gotten assets and properties under pain of penalties
prescribed by law, prohibiting them from concealing,
transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise [11] Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the with the separate concurring opinions of Associate
government. Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castaeda,
[4] E.O. No. 14 Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote their
14-A. respective dissenting opinions.
[5] Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the [12] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases, whether
civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the [13] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The law
also declared that the civil actions for the recovery of [14] Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.
unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379
or for restitution, reparation of damages, or [15] Sec. 3 the petition shall contain the following
indemnification for consequential and other damages or information
any other civil action under the Civil Code or other
existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against xxx
Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed independently of
any criminal proceedings and may be proved by (c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired
preponderance of evidence. during his incumbency in his past and present offices and
employments.
[6] Declared null and void by this Court on December 9,
1998 in the case of Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and [16] (d) A description of said property, or such thereof
Magtanggol Gunigundo", docketed as G.R. No. 130716. as has been identified by the Solicitor General.
[7] In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic of [17] (e) The total amount of his government salary and
the Philippines through the PCGG filed a request for other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately
mutual assistance with the Swiss Federal Police acquired property xxx.
Department, under the procedures of the International
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to [18] Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.
freeze the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in
Switzerland. [19] Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court.
IMAC is a domestic statute of Switzerland which [20] Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222
generally affords relief to the kind of request from [1996].
foreign governments or entities as authorized under E.O.
No. 2. [21] Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].
The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the [22] 240 SCRA 376 [1995].
request of petitioner Republic, and ordered the Swiss
deposits to be blocked until the competent Philippine [23] Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997].
court could decide on the matter.
[24] 69 SCRA 524 [1976].
[8] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.
[25] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the
[9] Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castaeda, Jr. and old Rules of Court.
concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. [26] Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].
[10] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218. [27] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.
dated March 10, 1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the
[28] Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the Board of Trinidad Foundation dated March 10, 1981.
old Rules of Court.
MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and
[29] 16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910]. Regulations of Maler dated October 15, 1968; (b) Letter
of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey d
[30] 197 SCRA 391 [1991]. Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Bank
dated October 19, 1968.
[31] Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246
[1973]. [42] Where an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the
[32] Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236. corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
[33] Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064. unless the adverse party under oath, specifically denies
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts xxx.
[34] 61A Am. Jur., 172-173.
[43] Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[35] Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428,
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1995 ed.]. [44] Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43
F. Supp. 281.
[36] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the
old Rules of Court. [45] Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L-
31869, Aug. 8, 1973.
[37] Supra.
[46] Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G.
[38] Supra. 3109-3111.
[39] All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow [47] Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of
chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 [1991].
Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex
R-5 hereto attached as integral part hereof. [48] 28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].
[40] 22 SCRA 48 [1968] [49] Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but
the change(s) had no adverse effects on the rights of
[41] XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) private respondents.
Contract for opening of deposit dated March 21, 1968; (b)
Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3, 1970; [50] Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-
(d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated February 13, 49410, 169 SCRA 409 [1989].
1970; (e) Letter of instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f)
Letter of Instructions dated March 10, 1991. [51] Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the
old Rules of Court.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a)
Management agreement dated August 28, 1990; (b) [52] adopted by the Marcos children.
Letter of instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers
Geel of Furich; (c) Approval of Statutes and By-laws of [53] dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos;
Trinidad Foundation dated August 26, 1990; (d) dated October 5, 2000 as jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc
Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for
1970; (e) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by
prepared by Markers Geel dated August 28, 1970; (f) Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
Letter of Instructions to the Board of Rayby Foundation
[54] dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as [68] Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et.
filed by the Marcos children. al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976].
[55] TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999. [69] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the
old Rules of Court.
[56] Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses
Antera and Virgilio Soriano, April 20, 2001. [70] Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].
[57] Plantadosi vs. Loews, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, [71] Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956].
June 2, 1943.
[72] Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].
[58] Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].
[73] Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764,
[59] Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 October 4, 2002; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
SCRA 348 [1989]. Constitution.
[60] Rollo, pp. 2659-70. [74] Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil.
472 [1966].
[61] Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34
of the old Rules of Court. [75] Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].
[62] Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is [76] "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State
served in an action to recover a debt or a liquidated any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
demand arising, Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor", approved on June 18, 1955.
1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed;
or [77] Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered [79] Id., p. 1062.
thereon on motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or of
any other person having knowledge of the facts, verifying [80] Exhibit S.
the cause of action and stating the amount claimed, and
his belief that there is no defense to the action; unless [81] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the
the defendant by affidavit or other proof, shall show old Rules of Court.
such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the
motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend. (emphasis [82] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997
ours) ed., p. 650.
[63] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, 12; 49 C.J.S. 412, 224. [83] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V,
1980 ed., p. 64.
[64] Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT,
Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184. [84] Section 9, Article VII.
[66] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, 12; 49 C.J.S. 412, 224. [86] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the
old Rules of Court.
[67] Supra.
[87] Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.
[88] Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100. [111] Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court
Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.
[89] Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].
[112] Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.
[90] Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of
the old Rules of Court. [113] Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties.Parties in interest without whom no final
[91] Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205. determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section
[92] 31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721. 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[93] Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178. [114] 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARTIES 97 (2000).
[95] Ibid, p. 1188. [116] Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199
SE2d 223.
[96] Ibid, p. 1201.
[117] Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:
[97] 29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.
Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent
[98] 31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795. Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most
respectfully manifests:
[99] Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the
[100] Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the subject-matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole
old Rules of Court. beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the
various Foundations alleged in the case;
[101] Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.
That in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-
[102] Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256. entitled case belongs to the Estate of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos;
[103] Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.
[118] Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000
[104] Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974]. memorandum of respondent Mrs. Marcos:
[105] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the On the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally
old Rules of Court. the owner of the assets to be seized and restituted, has
not been involved in the collecting procedure pending in
[106] Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of the Philippines. Even though such opponent is nothing but
the old Rules of Court. a legal construction to hide the true ownership to the
assets of the Marcos family, they nevertheless are
[107] Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of entitled to a hearing as far as the proceedings are
the old Rules of Court. concerned with accounts which are nominally theirs. The
guarantees of the Republic of the Philippines therefore
[108] 29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211. must include the process rights not only of the
defendants but also of the formal owners of the assets
[109] 31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817. to be delivered.
The Facts
Petitioners Siochi Fishery Enterprises, Inc., Jun-Jun
Fishing Corporation, Dede Fishing Corporation, Blue Crest
Aqua-Farms, Inc. and Iloilo Property Ventures, Inc.
(petitioners) are domestic corporations of the Siochi
family. Petitioners are engaged in various businesses and
have interlocking stockholders and directors. Their
principal office is located at 31 Don B. Bautista Boulevard,
Dampalit, Malabon City.
In the course of their business, petitioners borrowed Jurisdiction over the instant petition has been acquired
from respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and upon the publication of the stay order which serves as the
from Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. As of 30 June 2004, notice of the commencement of the proceedings x x x. In
petitioners total obligation amounted to P85,362,262.05. the instant petition, all the petitioning corporations have,
as admitted also by BPI, interlocking directors which
On 15 July 2004, petitioners filed with the RTC a means that the said directors are all members of the
petition5 for corporate rehabilitation. Petitioners prayed Siochi family. In addition thereto, three (3) of the
that the RTC (1) issue a stay order; (2) declare petitioning corporations x x x hold their respective
petitioners in a state of suspension of payments; (3) principal offices in Malabon City. In line therefore with
approve petitioners proposed rehabilitation plan; and (4) the settled policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
appoint a rehabilitation receiver. Court finds it proper to include Blue Crest Aqua-Farms,
Inc. and Iloilo Property Ventures in the instant petition.
xxx
RTCs Ruling
xxxx
In its 26 July 2004 Order,6 the RTC (1) stayed
enforcement of all claims against petitioners; (2) Based on the Consolidated Schedule of Debts and
prohibited petitioners from disposing their properties, Liabilities x x x the total principal liability of the
except in the ordinary course of business; (3) prohibited petitioners is Seventy Nine Million, Eight Hundred Forty
petitioners from paying their obligations; (4) prohibited Eight [sic] Nine Hundred Twenty and 23/100
petitioners suppliers from withholding supply of goods (P79,848,920.23) Pesos. On the other hand, the
and services; and (5) appointed Atty. Cesar C. Cruz (Atty. petitioning corporations own properties among which are
Cruz) as rehabilitation receiver. titled lands located in Malabon City, Navotas, Obando,
Bulacan and Iloilo Province with an estimated value of
BPI filed with the RTC a comment to the 26 July 2004 Three Hundred Ninety Three Million Nine Hundred
Order. BPI alleged, among others, that (1) the RTC had Twenty Two Thousand and 00/100 (P393,922,000.00)
no jurisdicttion over Blue Crest Aqua-Farms, Inc. and Pesos, as appraised by the Philippine Appraisal Co., Inc. x
Iloilo Property Ventures, Inc.; (2) petitioners submitted x x. Accordingly, the petitioning corporations could still
only one affidavit of general financial condition for all be considered net worthy, capable of being rehabilitated.
five corporations; (3) the market values of petitioners
real properties were unsubstantiated and inconsistent; As regards the rehabilitation plan, the Court, contrary to
(4) the photocopies of the Transfer Certificates of Title BPI and ALAIs stand, finds the same feasible, and viable.
were incomplete; (5) the interest rate had already been A moratorium period of five (5) years on the payment of
reduced to 12%; (6) typhoons were not an excuse to its loans/obligations will enable said petitioners to
default on payments; (7) the Asian financial crisis and the generate additional capital/funds to continue its [sic]
peso devaluation did not affect petitioners; (8) business operations. This is in line with the petitioners
petitioners total liability should have been lowered from intention to source fund from its [sic] internal operations,
P79,848,920.23 to P70,135,649.50; (9) petitioners had no the growth of which is expected to favorably expand. To
sufficient cash flow to pay their debts; (10) the achieve this goal, an extension period for the payment of
rehabilitation plan was unfeasible and prejudicial to BPI; petitioners obligations is just and proper. This is precisely
and (11) petitioners did not present a liquidation analysis. the main reason why petitioners filed the instant petition
as corporate rehabilitation can, in one way, be effected
In his 14 December 2004 motion,7 Atty. Cruz prayed that by suspension of payments of obligation for a certain
the RTC issue an order directing petitioners and their period. Thereafter, payment of their loan/obligations
creditors to attend a meeting. In its 18 Januray 2005 could be ably resumed.
Order,8 the RTC denied the motion.
Further, petitioners, thru its [sic] President, is [sic] in
In its 9 January 2006 Order,9 the RTC approved the process of negotiating with prospective investors to
petitioners rehabilitation plan. The RTC held: put up additional capital and diversifying its [sic]
operation and, if still necessary, funds can still be
generated from the real estate properties of the
petitioners mentioned in Exhibit I whose value has not corporations have no sufficient cash flow to repay their
been exposed to the limit of their loan value. Aside from debts; that the proposal in the Rehabilitation Plan does
the repayment plan in an amount of Php3,241,514.83 per not ensure actual loan repayment nor respondent
quarter beginning the 1st quarter of the 6th year up to corporations recovery; that the proposed repayment
ten years thereafter, petitioners are open to period thereunder is grossly disadvantageous; and that
negotiations with their creditors, to enter into dacion en respondent corporations are undercapitalized. Instead of
pago and/or sales of assets as means of payment. discussing these issues, the court a quo merely confined
the hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. It should be
The sale of petitioners assets, as claimed by BPI, in order pointed out that while the Interim Rules direct the court
to pay off their matured obligation/s with it and not the to summarily hear the parties, it [sic] do not authorize
suspension of payments is, as the Court sees, not a the court to disregard the comment and/or opposition
solution because this would mean a forced sale of their filed by the parties, especially when there are material
assets at a much lower price thereby adding significant issues raised therein, as in the present case. The rules
loss in the value of the petitioners [sic] assets, making itself [sic] mandate a just, expeditious and inexpensive
said petitioners insolvent rather than giving it [sic] a determination of cases. Certainly, disregarding the
chance to rehabilitate their business operations. arguments raised by petitioner would not result in a just
determination of the case.
The success therefore of the rehabilitation plan largely
depends on its ability to reduce its debt obligations to a The most glaring procedural infirmity committed by the
manageable level by the suspension of payments of court a quo, however, is its failure to refer respondent
obligations. This scheme enables the petitioners to corporations petition for rehabilitation and Rehabilitation
restore their profitability and solvency and maintain it Plan to the rehabilitation receiver despite the explicit
[sic] as an on-going business, to the benefit not only of and clear mandate of the Interim Rules that if the court
the stockholders and investors but to BPI and ALAI as is satisfied that there is merit in the petition, it shall give
petitioners creditors.10 due course to the petition and immediately refer the
same and its annexes to the rehabilitation receiver x x x.
BPI appealed the RTCs 9 January 2006 Order to the
Court of Appeals. xxxx
The Court of Appeals Ruling We have likewise observed that the court a quo made an
unwarranted procedural shortcut as its finding that there
In its 20 October 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals was merit in respondent corporations petition for
set aside the RTCs 9 January 2006 Order. The Court of rehabilitation was made in the same Order approving
Appeals held: their Rehabilitation Plan. The court a quos propensity in
ignoring the procedure laid down in the Interim Rules can
In the case at bar, the proceeding before the court a quo also be seen in its failure to issue an Order directing
was rife with procedural infirmities. Under the Interim respondent corporations and their creditors to attend a
Rules, the court is directed to summarily hear the parties meeting notwithstanding the Manifestation and Motion
on any matter relating to the petition as well as any filed by the rehabilitation receiver for this purpose.
comment and/or opposition filed in connection therewith. Further, the court a quo ignored the patent defect in the
Accordingly, the creditor or any interested party is allegations in the petition for rehabilitation. A perusal of
required to file a verified opposition to or comment on the records reveals that out of the five (5) respondent
the petition for rehabilitation so as to aid the court in corporations, it is only Iloilo Property Ventures, Inc.
making an informed and rational decision as to whether or which has a threat or demand from Ayala Life Assurance,
not the petition for rehabilitation should be given due Inc. x x x. However, in their respective Affidavits of
course. Pursuant thereto, petitioner filed its Oppositions General Financial Condition, respondent corporations
and Comments wherein it raised the following significant uniformly alleged that petitioner and Ayala Life
issues, among others, viz: that the court a quo has no Assurance, Inc. will initiate legal actions including
jurisdiction over Blue Crest Aqua-Farms, Inc. and Iloilo foreclosure proceedings to enforce collection of the
Property Ventures, Inc.; that the Consolidated Schedule obligations. Interestingly, Blue Crest Aqua-Farms, Inc.
of Debts and Liabilities is misleading; that respondent alleged the same in its Affidavit of General Financial
Condition even as petitioner and Ayala Life Assurance, Statement. In their respective Affidavits of General
Inc. were not listed among its creditors in its Schedule Financial Condition x x x, the average annual income and
of Debts and Liabilities. In actuality, Blue Crest Aqua- average annual net loss for the past three (3) years prior
Farms, Inc. does not even qualify as a financially to the filing of the petition for rehabilitation are: (1)
distressed corporation as it has no threats/demands for income of P4,781,833.21 and loss of P2,079,499.80 Siochi
the enforcement of claims and its cash on hand and in Fishery Enterprises, Inc., (2) income of P65,254.48 and
bank is sufficient to pay its financial obligations. x x x loss of P1,081,921.15 Jun-Jun Fishing Corporation, (3)
income of P34,633.36 and loss of P1,051,300.03 Dede
xxxx Fishing Corporation. A scrutiny of their Consolidated
Cash Flow Statement for the past three (3) months prior
In cases where the creditors oppose the approval of the to the filing of the petition shows that respondent
rehabilitation plan, the court may only approve the same corporations cash balance is P2,839,921.70 while an
upon the concurrence of two conditions one, that the examination of respondent corporations cash flow for
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and two, that the three (3) months after the filing of the petition shows
opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. x that their cash inflow amounts to P4,788,230.59 and
xx their cash outflow is pegged at P1,574,976.76, thereby
leaving a cash balance of P3,213,253.83.
In the present case, the court a quo found the
rehabilitation of respondent corporations feasible and On the other hand, an examination of the Consolidated
viable on the basis of the following circumstances: (1) Schedule of Debts and Liabilities shows that the total
that the real properties they own have an estimated value claim of petitioner is P30,445,608.73 while that of Ayala
of P393,922,000.00 x x x as opposed to their Life Assurance, Inc. is P44,038,428.54 or an aggregate
consolidated debts and liabilities in the amount of amount of P74,484,037.27. x x x
P79,848,920.23; and (2) that the moratorium period of
five (5) years on the payment of its [sic] loans/obligations Given these facts, it can readily be seen that respondent
will enable respondent corporations to generate corporations are in dire financial condition. Their
additional capital/funds to continue its [sic] business Affidavits of General Financial Condition show that Jun-
operations from the expected growth of its [sic] internal Jun Fishing Corporation and Dede Fishing Corporation had
operations, from negotiations with prospective investors, bigger average annual net loss than average annual income
and from their real properties whose value has not been for the past three (3) years prior to the filing of the
exposed to the limit of their loan value. However, the petition for rehabilitation. x x x It must be noted that
court a quos conclusion that respondent corporations their Consolidated Cash Flow Statement and the cash
rehabilitation is feasible and viable is not supported by balance reflected reflected therein incorporates the
their financial condition, commitments and proposed amount belonging to Blue Crest Aqua-Farms, Inc. which
measures for rehabilitation/recovery. should have been excluded from the petition. Even with
the inclusion of Blue Crests money, respondent
With respect to the Appraisal Report, it bears to stress corporations cash balance is still insufficient to service
that the same was commissioned by respondent their debts. Therefore, the feasibility and viability of
corporations and petitioner was not afforded the their rehabilitation would have to depend on their
opportunity to contest the same. Also, it is extant from financial commitments to support the Rehabilitation Plan,
the records that some of the properties included therein as well as the proposed measures for
do not belong to respondent corporations but to their rehabilitation/recovery, which are reflected in their
officers, namely, Ferdinand Siochi, Mario Siochi, Jr., Rehabilitation Plan.
Gerald Siochi and Jose Patrick Siochi. Thus, these
properties should not be considered as part of xxxx
respondent corporations assets as their officers have a
separate personality from the corporation itself. x x x At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the debtors
material financial commitments are of critical value in
As to respondent corporations financial condition, the gauging the sincerity of its intention in the projected
same is reflected in their respective Affidavits of rehabilitation as these signify the debtors resolve to
General Financial Condition and Consolidated Cash Flow financially support the rehabilitation plan. Corollarily,
respondent corporations material financial commitments shareholders to pay their subscribed capital stock in full
were stated in this manner: or to order the conversion of their debts to equity or to
offer the remaining shares of stock from their
1. The petitioners intend to source fund from its internal authorized capital stock for subscription. x x x
operations, the growth of which is expected to favorably [P]etitioner correctly pointed out that the proposed
expand. rehabilitation is deemed to succeed in only one thing: to
extend the loan repayment term and does not ensure
2. The president is currently negotiating with actual loan repayment nor business recovery of the
prospective investors to put up additional fresh capital petitioners.
and diversifying its operation.
The Court of Appeals also found: MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Firstly, the sourcing of funds from their internal Associate Justice Associate Justice
operations is based on a mere expectancy. Respondent
corporations did not even allege in their Rehabilitation
Plan their operational plan or definite management which ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
would bring about growth and expansion in their internal
operations. In their Consolidated Cash Flow Statement Associate Justice
for the 15-year reahibilitation period, respondent
corporations allocated a fund of P30 million for a ATTESTATION
modernization program. But they did not sufficiently
describe and adequately explain as to how the alleged I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
modernization program would translate to a growth in or been reached in consultation before the case was
expansion of their internal operations. In fact, petitioner assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
correctly contends that inspite of the supposed Division.
modernization program on the 5th year of the
rehabilitation period, the sales projection of respondent ANTONIO T. CARPIO
corporations was constantly pegged at 5%.
Associate Justice
Secondly, respondent corporations failed to give the
specific details regarding their prospective investors who Chairperson
will supposedly put up additional fresh capital. This should CERTIFICATION
have been considered by the court a quo considering that
in their respective Affidavits of General Financial Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
Condition, respondent corporations uniformly answered and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
that none, so far, has expressed interest in investing new the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
money into respondent corporations business.24 consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Incidentally, since the time of filing on 15 July 2004 of
the petition for corporate rehabilitation, there has been RENATO C. CORONA
no showing that petitioners situation has improved or that
they have complied faithfully with the terms of the Chief Justice
rehabilitation plan.
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1114
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and dated 3 October 2011.
AFFIRMS the 20 October 2009 Decision and 22
September 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in 1 Rollo, pp. 10-42.
CA-G.R. SP No. 93278.
2 Id. at 51-75. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. FIRST DIVISION
Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and
Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring. G.R. No. 156296 November 12, 2012
17 G.R. No. 172302, 4 February 2008, 543 SCRA 657. On July 19, 2000, respondent Salvador E. Kerr (Kerr)
instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage,
18 Id. at 664. docketed as Civil Case No. 279-0-2000, against Dennis Q.
Mortel (Mortel), who duly filed an answer on August 11,
19 Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation v. 2000 through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas (Atty. Mas) of the
Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. Nos. 178768 and 180893, 25 Public Attorney’s Office. The pre-trial was re-set four
November 2009, 605 SCRA 503, 515. times for various reasons, but on the fifth setting on
December 7, 2000, Mortel and Atty. Mas were not around
20 Rollo, pp. 147-148. when the case was called. On motion of Kerr’s counsel, the
RTC declared Mortel as in default and allowed Kerr to
21 325 Phil. 145 (1996). present evidence ex parte.
In default of such payment, let the house and lot On November 14, 2001, Mortel moved for the
described in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibits reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief
"A-1" and "A-2") in the plaintiff’s complaint be sold at from judgment.9
public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the
aforesaid obligation and the costs of this suit. On December 6, 2001, the RTC granted the withdrawal of
Atty. Lacambra and Atty. Mas as counsels for Mortel, and
SO ORDERED. finally recognized Atty. Tumulak as the only counsel.10
On March 22, 2001, Mortel, through Atty. Leopoldo C. On January 16, 2002, the RTC treated Mortel’s motion
Lacambra, Jr. (Atty. Lacambra), filed a motion for new for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper and ordered
trial.3 it stricken from the records for failure of the counsel to
serve a notice of hearing with the motion for
On March 23, 2001, Atty. Mas filed his withdrawal of reconsideration.11
appearance.4
Mortel filed an urgent motion for reconsideration vis-à-
On April 5, 2001, the RTC denied Mortel’s motion for new vis the RTC’s order of January 16, 2002.12
trial, noting that Atty. Mas’ withdrawal as counsel of
Mortel had been filed only on March 23, 2001 and On June 17, 2002, the RTC denied the urgent motion for
approved by the RTC on March 26, 2001. It held that reconsideration for being a second motion for
considering that the records of the case showed that reconsideration and for being moot and academic; and
Atty. Mas had received the decision on March 1, 2001, the granted Kerr’s ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ
motion for new trial had been filed out of time on March of possession.13
20, 2001.5
Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of execution on June
On May 4, 2001, Mortel, this time through Atty. Tumulak, 20, 2002,14 and Kerr was then placed in possession of the
filed a verified petition for relief from judgment under property.
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.6
On August 26, 2002, Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed
On August 20, 2001, the RTC denied the verified petition in the CA a petition for review on certiorari with prayer
for relief from judgment on the ground that the petition for the issuance of a restraining order.15
for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period
of 60 days based on a reckoning of the start of the period On September 5, 2002, the CA issued a resolution
from March 1, 2001, the date when Atty. Mas received dismissing Mortel’s petition for review for failing to state
the notice and copy of the Order,7 to wit: the specific material dates showing that the petition had
been filed within the reglementary period, in violation of
x x x. Now, the petition for relief is again filed by a Section 6(d), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It observed
counsel whose Notice of Appearance has not been acted that Mortel thereby resorted to the wrong remedy
upon. Defendant’s counsel on record received the considering that he was assailing the propriety of the
Decision on March 1, 2001, which is the reckoning point to RTC’s order declaring him in default, against which the
count the mandatory sixty (60) days in order that a proper remedy was a petition for certiorari.16
Petition for
On October 14, 2002, Mortel sought the reconsideration
of the denial of his petition for review.17 1. Whether or not the negligence of Mortel’s previous
counsels should bind him; and
On November 18, 2002, the CA denied Mortel’s motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit because the defects 2. Whether or not Mortel was deprived of his property
of the petition for review were not corrected, and for without due process of law.
availing himself of the remedy of petition for review when
he should have filed a petition for certiorari instead.18 Ruling
Atty. Tumulak received the denial by the CA on December The petition, being meritorious, is granted.
5, 2002.19
The CA found that despite the opportunity given to him
Instead of appealing via petition for review on certiorari to do so, Mortel’s counsel erred in failing to state the
in the Supreme Court (SC), Mortel, through Atty. specific material dates required by Section 6(d) of Rule
Tumulak, filed in the CA on December 20, 2002 an urgent 43, Rules of Court to show that the petition for review
motion for extension of time to appeal to the SC.20 was filed within the reglementary period; and that Mortel
resorted to the wrong remedy by filing a petition for
On December 23, 2002, Mortel, by himself, sought an review instead of a petition for certiorari because he was
extension of time to file a petition for review on questioning the propriety of the RTC’s order declaring
certiorari.21 him as in default.25
On January 27, 2003, the Court granted Mortel’s motion Mortel’s counsel committed another error when he filed
for extension with a warning that no further extension his urgent motion for extension of time to file an appeal
would be given.22 in the CA, instead of in the SC, resulting in not stopping
the running of the period of appeal and in thereby
On January 22, 2003, Mortel, still by himself, filed his rendering the Resolution of the CA final.
petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s
dismissal of his petition for review on certiorari. As a rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct,
negligence and mistake in handling a case.26 To allow a
Issues client to disown his counsel’s conduct would render
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to
Mortel contends that: reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.27
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the
APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR Court held the client not concluded by the negligence,
RECONSIDERATION DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 2002 incompetence or mistake of the counsel. For instance, in
FROM THE RESOLUTION DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 Suarez v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court set aside the
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY judgment and mandated the trial court to reopen the case
THE PETITIONER.23 for the reception of the evidence for the defense after
finding that the negligence of the therein petitioner’s
Mortel prays that the Rules of Court be liberally counsel had deprived her of the right to present and
interpreted in his favor to allow his petition for review on prove her defense. Also, in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,29
certiorari despite the various lapses of his counsels the Court ordered restored to the petitioner her
resulting in the loss of his opportunity to assail the property that had been sold at public auction in
resolutions of the RTC. satisfaction of a default judgment resulting from the
failure of her counsel to file an answer and from counsel’s
On the other hand, Kerr insists that the CA correctly lack of vigilance in protecting her interests in subsequent
dismissed the petition because the errors of his former proceedings before the trial court and the CA. Lastly, in
counsels bound Mortel.24 Amil v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that an
exception to the rule that a client is bound by the
Accordingly, the issues to be resolved are the following: mistakes of his counsel is when the negligence of the
counsel is so gross that the client was deprived of his day he take the necessary move to protect the interest of
in court, thereby also depriving the client of his property Mortel upon learning that Mortel had been declared as in
without due process of law. default by the RTC. His non-appearance despite notice
and his subsequent inaction for his client’s cause
The relevant question becomes, therefore, whether the manifested his indifference and lack of professionalism,
negligence of Mortel’s counsels was so gross and palpable and is difficult to comprehend considering that he was
as to deprive him of his property without due process of the primary cause why Mortel was declared as in default
law. by the RTC.1âwphi1
We hold that it was. The RTC was equally responsible for Mortel’s dire plight.
It appears that Mortel engaged Atty. Tumulak to take
Mortel did not have his day in court, because he was over as counsel from Atty. Mas. Atty. Tumulak notified
unable to submit his evidence to controvert the claim of the RTC of his appearance for Mortel on December 28,
Kerr about his contractual default after the RTC 2000. The RTC could have easily noted and acted on Atty.
declared Mortel as in default due to his counsel’s failure Tumulak’s entry of appearance for Mortel, or, if the RTC
to appear at the fifth setting of the pre-trial. Yet, he still desired to require the submission of Atty. Mas’
explained that he was only late because he arrived in withdrawal as counsel, to direct such withdrawal to be
court a few minutes after the case had been called. His first submitted, especially after Atty. Mas filed his
explanation appears plausible, considering that he had withdrawal of appearance on March 23, 2001. But the RTC
unfailingly appeared in court in the four previous settings uncharacteristically did not take either of such actions
of the pre-trial. In view of the fact that it was his first on the notice of appearance but proceeded to render its
time not to be present when the case was called at the judgment on the merits, a copy of which it dispatched to
fifth setting of the pre-trial, the RTC could have allowed Atty. Mas (who received it on March 1, 2001) and to
a second or a third call instead of immediately granting Mortel himself (who received it on March 7, 2001). In
his adverse party’s motion to declare him as in default. In effect, the RTC disregarded Atty. Tumulak’s notice of his
Leyte v. Cusi,31 the Court has admonished against substitution of Atty. Mas as counsel of Mortel. The
precipitate orders of default because such orders have disregard continued for nearly a year, and the RTC finally
the effect of denying a litigant the chance to be heard. recognized Atty. Tumulak as the only counsel of Mortel
Indeed, we have reminded trial courts that although on December 6, 2001. The reason for the RTC’s disregard
there are instances when a party may be properly of and long-delayed action upon a matter as essential to
defaulted, such instances should be the exception rather the client and to the administration of justice in the case
than the rule and should be allowed only in clear cases of as the substitution of counsel is not easy to appreciate,
a litigant’s obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to especially because the RTC tendered no good reason for
comply with the orders of the court. Without such a it.
showing, the litigant must be given every reasonable
opportunity to present his side and to refute the evidence With Atty. Tumulak left out and remaining unaware of the
of the adverse party in deference to due process of developments in the case because of the RTC’s inaction
law.32 on his notice of appearance, Mortel, upon receipt of the
decision and feeling abandoned again by Atty. Tumulak,
Nevertheless, the negligence that actually warrants the his new counsel, engaged Atty. Lacambra to collaborate
undoing of the RTC’s decision was serial on the part of as his counsel. Atty. Lacambra filed on March 20, 2001 a
Atty. Mas, the RTC and Atty. Tumulak. motion for new trial. Counting from the time when Mortel
received the copy of the decision on March 7, 2001,
The primary negligence occurred on the part of Atty. Mortel probably thought that he had filed the motion for
Mas. He did not appear at the pre-trial despite being new trial within the required period. However, the RTC
notified of it. What is very disturbing is that he was then considered March 1, 2001 as the reckoning date, being
an attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office in Olongapo the date when Atty. Mas received the notice of the
City whose place of work was located in the same Hall of decision, and ruled that Mortel’s motion for new trial was
Justice of Olongapo City where the RTC was then sitting. already filed beyond the prescribed period. That action
Moreover, he did not offer any explanation for his non- of the RTC was not prudent and circumspect, considering
appearance at the pre-trial despite notice to him; nor did that the records of the case already contained since
December 28, 2000 the entry of appearance of Atty. on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly
Tumulak as replacement of Atty. Mas as Mortel’s counsel. meritorious. He stated that he had already paid the
The RTC should have at least informed either Mortel or principal of the loan and the interest, submitting in
Atty. Tumulak or both of them that it was either allowing support of his statement a receipt for P200,000.00 that
or disallowing Atty. Tumulak’s entry of appearance in Kerr had allegedly signed. He also stated that he had
order to enable Mortel to seasonably clarify his dire actually overpaid in view of his arrangement for Kerr to
situation and, if necessary, even to rectify it. That withdraw P6,000.00 each month from Mortel’s bank
prudential and circumspect approach would have been account as payment of the interest, a statement that he
easy for the RTC to take because the RTC became all too would confirm in court through the testimony of a bank
aware of the neglect of Atty. Mas in protecting the representative.33
interest of Mortel following the declaration of Mortel as
in default. In addition, the RTC could have reckoned the We held in Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals34 that
period for Mortel to bring the motion for new trial from when the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of
March 7, 2001, the date when Mortel received a copy of counsel is so great and the result is so serious that the
the decision the RTC sent to him directly, instead of client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and
March 1, 2001, the date when Atty. Mas received the copy denied his day in court, the client deserves another
of the decision, considering all the indications about Atty. chance to present his case; hence, the litigation may be
Mas having neglected the interest of Mortel. reopened for that purpose. Also, when an unsuccessful
party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting
Atty. Tumulak shared the blame for the predicament of his case because of his attorney’s professional
Mortel through his own series of errors that mirrored an delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to
ignorance of the rules of procedure. There is no question allow the party to present his side. Lastly, where counsel
that the errors deprived Mortel of the timely means to is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of
successfully undo the adverse decision rendered by the duty, which resulted in the client’s being held liable for
RTC. Atty. Tumulak’s first error was in filing a motion for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day
reconsideration vis-à-vis the RTC’s denial of the petition in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
for relief from judgment without including a proper ground.35
notice of hearing. He next filed a motion for
reconsideration vis-à-vis the RTC’s denial of his first Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a
motion for reconsideration, which the RTC then denied on liberal interpretation of the rules that gives to both
the ground of its being already a prohibited second parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the
motion for reconsideration. This was another fatal error. best way to ferret out such truth.36 Thus, a court may
The series of errors did not end there, for Atty. Tumulak suspend its own rules or except a case from them in order
opted to file in the CA a petition for review on certiorari to serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether
instead of a petition for certiorari, which was the disregard the rules in a proper case.37 To cling to the
appropriate remedy due to his alleging grave abuse of general rule of having the ignorance, negligence and
discretion on the part of the RTC. This was one more dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is only
error. The ultimate error was not any less serious, to condone rather than to rectify a serious injustice to a
because Atty. Tumulak filed in the CA instead of in this party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust
Court the motion for extension of time to appeal the CA’s his cause to his counsel.38
November 18, 2002 denial of Mortel’s motion for
reconsideration. Atty. Tumulak’s moves in behalf of WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the resolution
Mortel, no matter how well intentioned, were contrary to promulgated on September 5, 2002; ANNULS and SETS
the pertinent rules of procedure and worked against the ASIDE the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 279-0-
client’s interest. 2000 on February 28, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, in Olongapo City; and RE-OPENS Civil Case No.
The negligence and mistakes committed by his several 279-0-2000 for the reception of evidence for the
counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied due petitioner as the defendant.
process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable
asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
side, which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him
SO ORDERED. 10 Id. at 143.
1 Rollo. pp. 13-14; penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. 25 CA Rollo, pp. 95-96.
Pestafio (retired/deceased), and concurred in by
Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and 26 Saint Louis University v. Cordero, G.R. No. 144118, July
Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (retired) 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 575, 584.
2 Records, pp. 72-A-73. 27 Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, March 14, 2008,
548 SCRA 693, 708.
3 Id. at 78-82.
28 G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 274.
4 Id. at 88.
29 G.R. No. 94457, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 418.
5 Id. at 95.
30 G.R. No. 125272, October 7, 1999, 316 SCRA 317.
6 Id. at 97-107.
31 G.R. No. L-31974, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 496.
7 Id. at 125-126.
32 Id. at 498-499.
8 Id. at 125.
33 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
9 Id. at 133-134.
34 G.R. No. 133750, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 456.
EN BANC
35 Id. at 468. G.R. No. 199433 November 13, 2012
ISABELITA P. GRAVIDES, Petitioner,
36 Go v. Tan, G.R. No. 130330, September 26, 2003, 412 vs.
SCRA 123, 129-130. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PEDRO C.
BORJAL, Respondents.
37 People v. Del Mundo, G.R. Nos. 119964-69. September
20, 1996, 262 SCRA 266. DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
38 Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35 This Rule 65 petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set
at 468. aside the following issuances by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC): (1) Resolution1
dated August 25, 2011 of the First Division granting the
appeal of private respondent Pedro C. Borjal (Borjal) from
the December 7, 2010 Order2 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) Quezon City, Branch 33 in EPC No. 10-1313;
(2) Order3 dated November 23, 2011 of the Commission
En Banc denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Isabelita P. Gravides (Gravides); and (3) Entry
of Judgment4 dated November 24, 2011 declaring that
the Resolution dated August 25, 2011 had become final
and executory as of September 17, 2011.
Borjal and Gravides both ran for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay U.P. Campus in Diliman, Quezon City
during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) Elections. Results of the elections showed
that Gravides garnered a total of 2,322 votes as against
Borjal’s 2,320 votes. On October 26, 2010, the Barangay
Board of Canvassers (BBOC) officially proclaimed
Gravides as the winning candidate for the said post.
On November 5, 2010, Borjal filed an Election
Protest5alleging the following irregularities and violation
of election laws:
7.1 Harassment, corruption, and anomalous activities
committed by the BET and the Barangay Board of
Canvassers.
7.2 Valid votes cast in favor of protestant were misread
and misappreciated by the Board of Election Tellers
(BET). For instance, several ballots containing wrong
spelling (but with the same sound when read) of
protestant’s surname were not counted, there being no
candidate with the surname when read.
7.3 Valid votes for protestant were erroneously
counted/tallied in the election returns and/or
erroneously tallied as votes of protestee and other
candidates. Such that protestee and other candidates
seemed to have received more votes than those actually
cast in their favor.
7.4 Falsification, alteration, and manipulation of the votes
and related data in the election returns.
7.5 Valid votes in favor of protestant were not counted 1. A statement whether the parties have arrived at an
or were considered stray and rejected. For instance, amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;
several ballots containing protestant’s registered 2. Intention to refer the case for mediation;
nickname "Doc" were not counted for protestant, there 3. A Summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation
being no candidate with the same nickname. On the other of facts;
hand, invalid ballots such as spurious and those containing 4. The issues to be resolved or a clear specification of
markings to identify the ballots/voters, or with material facts which remain controverted;
irrelevant, derogatory writings or drawings were counted 5. Such other matter intended to expedite the disposition
in favor of protestee and other winning candidates. of the case.
7.6 The use of either fake, spurious ballots or genuine but The counsel served with this Notice is duty bound to
manufactured ballots to increase protestee’s votes. notify the party represented by him of the schedule of
7.7 Invalid ballots (prepared by persons other than the Preliminary Conference. Failure of the plaintiff or the
voters themselves) such as written-by-one person (WBO) defendant to appear in the preliminary conference shall
and/or individual ballots written-by-two persons (WBT) respectively be cause for dismissal of his/her case or a
containing protestee’s name were counted as valid votes summary judgment based solely on the complaint in
for protestee and other winning candidates.6 accordance with Rule 70, Sec. 8, par. 2 & 3 of the Rules
Borjal thus asserted that there is a need for revision, re- of Civil Procedure.9
appreciation of ballots, judicial recount and thorough During the preliminary conference, Gravides moved for
scrutiny of the election returns and minutes of voting in the dismissal of the election protest for non-compliance
the protested precincts, the results of which will change with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC as to the
the election sufficient to overcome the presumptive lead contents of the preliminary conference brief. After
of the declared winner. considering the movant’s arguments and the counter-
Gravides filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim7 arguments of the opposing counsel, the MeTC resolved to
denying the allegations of fraud, vote manipulation, grant the motion. The Order10 dated December 7, 2010
misreading/misappreciation of ballots and other thus ordered the dismissal of the election protest in
irregularities in the counting and tallying of votes, accordance with the aforesaid provisions in relation to
committed either by her or by the Board of Election Sections 5 and 6 of the same Rule.
Tellers (BET)/BBOC. Borjal appealed the order of dismissal to the COMELEC
She pointed out that the protest failed to provide a arguing that the MeTC erred (1) in applying the Rules of
detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained Civil Procedure on the preliminary conference in the
of, which would show the alleged fraud or irregularities in election protest and in misinforming him of the contents
the protested precincts. Such general and sweeping of a preliminary conference brief in its Notice of Pre-
allegations violate the provisions of A.M. No. 07-4-15- Trial Conference; (2) assuming said notice is not
SC8 or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests defective, it was issued prematurely, contrary to the
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and mandate of Section 1, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC; (3)
Barangay Officials, including non-compliance with the in applying the ruling in Cabrera v. COMELEC11
requirement of cash deposit. Neither Borjal nor his considering that the factual circumstances are not
watchers filed a challenge or raised any issue with the foursquare with the present case; and (4) in dismissing
BET or BBOC on the integrity of the ballots during the the election protest by holding that his Preliminary
voting and counting of votes in accordance with Sections Conference Brief failed to comply with the required
202 and 203 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as evidenced by contents under Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes. SC.12
On November 15, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Pre- In its Resolution dated August 25, 2011, the COMELEC’s
Trial Conference stating: First Division granted the appeal, annulled the December
This Court sets the case for preliminary conference on 7, 2010 Order of the MeTC and remanded the case for
the 18th day of November 2010 at 2:00 o’clock in the further proceedings. In finding for Borjal, the First
morning in the Session Hall of this Branch, Room 312, Division held:
Third Floor, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. First, the assailed Order of the court a quo declared the
In order to assist the Court in conducting the Preliminary Preliminary Conference Brief of Borjal non-compliant
Conference, parties are enjoined to be ready on that date with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. 07-4-15-SC in the following
regarding the following: manner:
xxxx should have been taken into consideration by the court a
The court a quo, after stating the antecedent facts of quo.
the case, the contentions of each party, and the pertinent It bears stressing that blind adherence to a technicality,
provisions of the rules, simply dismissed the election with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the
protest without specifying which of the required constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be
contents were lacking in Borjal’s Preliminary Conference countenanced. Likewise, it has been held that "on more
Brief. It would appear, based on the court’s Order, that than one occasion, this Court has recognized the emerging
the said brief did not at all contain the contents required trend towards a liberal construction of procedural rules
in Section 4 of Rule 9. to serve substantial justice. Courts have the prerogative
Examination thereof reveals, however that the same has to relax rules of even the most mandatory character,
substantially complied with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily
07-4-15-SC. end litigation and the parties’ right to due process." While
In his Preliminary Conference Brief, Borjal stated a procedural rules are intended for the expeditious
summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of disposition of election cases, this should not impede this
facts; the issues to be tried or resolved; documents to be Commission from compliance with the established
presented; witnesses to be presented; proposed number principles of fairness and justice and adjudication of
of revision committees; and a statement of his cases not on technicality but on their substantive merits.
conformity to discovery procedures or referral to the Finally, it is worth mentioning that the court a quo, in its
commissioners to facilitate the speedy disposition of the "Notice of Pre-Trial Conference," required the parties to
case. state in their respective preliminary conference briefs
Apparently, what Borjal failed to include are statements the following:
of (1) a manifestation of withdrawal of certain protested xxxx
precincts, if such is the case; and (2) in case the election Noticeably, the court a quo overlooked the rule applicable
protest or counter-protest seeks the examination, in the instant case, i.e., Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-
verification, or re-tabulation of election returns, the 4-15-SC, as it failed to include all the matters required
procedure to be followed. under the said rule. On the contrary the foregoing notice
Nonetheless, these omissions do not warrant the outright is more akin to the provision on pre-trial brief under the
dismissal of the election protest. As explained by Borjal’s Rules on Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding this, the court
counsel during the preliminary conference, withdrawal of a quo hastily dismissed the election protest for non-
certain protested precincts will be made either after or compliance with Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. 07-4-15-SC.13
during the revision. (Underscoring in the original; additional emphasis
Moreover, Borjal’s failure to provide for the procedure supplied)
to be followed in case the election protest seeks the Gravides filed a motion for reconsideration which was
examination, verification or re-tabulation of election denied by the Commission En Banc in its Order dated
returns is not fatal. A reading of the election protest November 23, 2011. The denial of the motion was based
shows that Borjal’s allegations consist mainly of election on the failure to pay the required motion fees prescribed
irregularities and frauds that resulted to an incorrect under Section 7(f), Rule 40, COMELEC Rules of
number of votes pertaining to each candidate. Hence, Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Minute Resolution
Borjal’s prayer is for the recount/revision of the ballots No. 02-130 dated September 18, 2002, in relation to
to determine the correct number of votes cast in his Section 18 of the same Rule, to wit:
favor. It Motion for Reconsideration should be accompanied by
Undoubtedly, Borjal does not seek the examination, the payment of the correct amount of motion fee and
verification or re-tabulation of the election returns; should be paid within the five (5)-day period for the filing
therefore, a statement for its procedure is not necessary of said motion.
in the instant case. There being no valid motion for reconsideration to speak
Second, it must be emphasized that Gravidez won by a of, the provision of Section 13, paragraph (c) Rule 18,
lead of merely two (2) votes. Thus, should the allegation Comelec Rules of Procedure applies, to wit:
of Borjal that some votes cast in his favor were misread Rule 18 – Decisions
and misappreciated during the counting of votes appears xxx xxx xxx
to be true in at least two (2) ballots, the election result "Sec. 13.Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –
will be different, as the same will result in a tie. This fact xxx xxx xxx
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably FAILURE OF COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT
filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become TO BE COGNIZANT OF THE MANDATORY
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in REQUISITES UNDER SECTION 4, RULE 9 OF A.M. NO.
Special actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) 07-4-15-SC ON THE REQUIRED CONTENTS OF HIS
days in all other actions or proceedings, following its PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BRIEF.
promulgation." VI. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A
Hence, the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
promulgated on August 25, 2011, copy of which was LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
received by protestee-appellee’s counsel on September 1, ISSUED ITS ORDER DATED NOVEMBER 23, 2011
2011, per admission in her Motion for Reconsideration DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
filed on September 6, 2011, had become final and PETITIONER DESPITE THE PLEA OF THE LATTER FOR
executoryas of September 17, 2011.14 A REVERSAL OF ITS RESOLUTION BECAUSE OF THE
Hence, this petition raising the following issues: OPPORTUNITY OF COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE
I. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A RESPONDENT, ATTY. MICHAEL D. VILLARET, WHO IS
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS A MEMBER OF THE STAFF
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT OF THE HON. COMELEC COMMISSIONER AUGUSTO
ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 25, 2011 LAGMAN, TO EXERCISE UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE
IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 4 IN PREPARATION OF THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION,
RELATION TO SECTIONS 5 AND 6, RULE 9 OF A.M. WHICH RENDERS ITS INTEGRITY, VALIDITY AND
NO. 07-4-15-SC OR THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN PROPRIETY DUBIOUS, SUSPECT AND
ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS QUESTIONABLE.15
INVOLVING ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY The petition has no merit.
OFFICIALS AND THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC The pertinent provisions of Rule 9 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
RULING IN CABRERA VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 182084, SC state:
OCTOBER 6, 2008). SEC. 4. Preliminary conference brief.—The parties shall
II. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO manner as shall ensure their receipt at least one day
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT before the date of the preliminary conference, their
ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 25, 2011 respective briefs which shall contain the following:
REVERSING THE DECISION OF BRANCH 33, METC (1) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation
QUEZON CITY JUDGE ALFREDO AMPUAN, WHICH of facts;
WAS ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. (2) The issues to be tried or resolved;
III. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A (3) The pre-marked documents or exhibits to be
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO presented, stating their purpose;
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN (4) A manifestation of their having availed or their
CONSIDERING THE NARROW LEAD OF PETITIONER intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or
OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN REVERSING THE referral to commissioners;
ORDER OF JUDGE AMPUAN DATED DECEMBER 7, 2010, (5) The number and names of the witnesses, their
DISMISSING THE ELECTION PROTEST OF PRIVATE addresses, and the substance of their respective
RESPONDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. testimonies. The testimonies of the witnesses shall beby
IV. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A affidavits in question and answer form as their direct
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO testimonies, subject to oral cross examination;
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING THE (6) A manifestation of withdrawal of certain protested or
MANDATORY RULES GOVERNING THE FILING OF counter-protested precincts, if such is the case;
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE BRIEFS AND ITS (7) The proposed number of revision committees and
REQUIRED CONTENTS UNDER SECTION 4, RULE 9 OF names of their revisors and alternate revisors; and
A.M. NO.07-4-15-SC A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION. (8) In case the election protest or counter-protest seeks
V. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A the examination, verification or re-tabulation of election
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO returns, the procedure to be followed.
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
BLAMED THE COURT A QUO FOR THE ABJECT
SEC. 5. Failure to file brief.—Failure to file the brief or to expire, or worse, had already expired. These Rules
to comply with its required contents shall have the same were purposely adopted to provide an expeditious and
effect as failure to appear at the preliminary conference. inexpensive procedure for the just determination of
SEC. 6. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the election cases before the courts. Thus, we emphasize
protestantor counsel to appear at the preliminary that the preliminary conference and its governing rules
conference shall be cause for dismissal, motu proprio, of are not mere technicalities which the parties may blithely
the protest or counter-protest. The failure of the ignore or trifle with. They are tools meant to expedite
protestee or counsel to appear at the preliminary the disposition of election cases and must, perforce, be
conference shall have the same effect as provided in obeyed.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4(c), Rule 4 of these Rules, that is, the court may Contrary to petitioner’s submissions, we find no grave
allow the protestant to present evidence ex parte and abuse of discretion in the proper consideration by
render judgment based on the evidence presented. COMELEC of the attendant circumstances warranting a
(Emphasis supplied) more reasonable and liberal application of the rules.
In Cabrera v. COMELEC,16 this Court upheld the Foremost of these is the fact that Borjal was misled by
nullification by COMELEC of the RTC orders denying the the Notice of Preliminary Conference issued by the MeTC
motion to dismiss election protest on the ground that which erroneously applied the provision on pre-trial brief
protestant’s preliminary conference brief did not contain under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The mistake
the following: (1) a manifestation of his having availed or committed by Borjal’s counsel in complying with the
intention to avail of discovery procedures or referral to court’s directive should not prejudice his cause, as no
commissioners; (2) a manifestation of withdrawal of intent to unduly prolong the resolution of the election
certain protested or counter-protested precincts, if such protest can be gleaned from his failure to include such
is the case; and, (3) in the event the protest or counter- manifestation of withdrawal of certain protested
protest seeks the examination, verification or re- precincts and of the procedure to be followed in case the
tabulation of election returns, the procedure to be election protest seeks the examination, verification, or
followed. re-tabulation of election returns.1âwphi1
Rejecting petitioner’s proffered excuse for the Another important consideration for the COMELEC was
foregoing omissions, we held that – that, unlike in Cabrera where petitioner lost by 420 votes
The petitioner’s commitment that he does not seek the to the winning candidate, only two (2) votes separated the
examination, verification or re-tabulation of election winning candidate Gravides from Borjal who placed second
returns is belied by the preliminary conference brief’s in the 2010 elections for Punong Barangay in Barangay U.P.
statement that the protestant shall present the election Campus. There were also only 25 precincts subject of the
returns as documentary evidence, and that he will present protest out of the total 36 precincts, in the barangay, as
witnesses who will testify that the entries thereon are against the 142 precincts protested in Cabrera. As
erroneous. Clearly, the testimonies of these witnesses COMELEC duly noted, the finding of just more than 2
will entail the examination or verification of the election misread or miscounted ballots during the revision or
returns. Likewise, the petitioner’s undertaking that he recount would be sufficient to overcome the lead of
does not intend to withdraw any of the protested Gravides. The paramount interest of determining the true
precincts appears inconsistent with the allegation in the will of the electorate thus justified a relaxation of
preliminary conference brief that protestant will present procedural rules.Indeed, an election protest is imbued
22 witnesses (who served as watchers) to give evidence with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
on alleged irregularities in the voting and counting in 22 uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people
precincts. Considering that there is a total of 142 is imperative.18
precincts in the locality, and in fact, the ballots in 88 We likewise fail to discern whimsicality or arbitrariness
precincts had already been revised by the trial court, the in the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
probability is great that petitioner may have to withdraw Rule 40, Section 1819 of the COMELEC Rules of
some precincts from his protest. Procedure gives discretion to the COMELEC En Banc
The Rules should not be taken lightly. The Court has either to refuse or to take action until the motion fee is
painstakingly crafted A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC precisely to paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding.20
curb the pernicious practice of prolonging election We stress that in a special civil action for certiorari, the
protests, a sizable number of which, in the past, were petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely
finally resolved only when the term of office was about reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public THIRD DIVISION
respondent for his issuance of the impugned order.21
Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason vs.
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge,
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
at all in contemplation of law."22 In other words, the
tribunal or administrative body must have issued the DECISION
assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or
despotic manner.23 Petitioner failed to discharge that PERALTA, J.:
burden and perforce the petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which
certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated August seeks to annul the Decision1
25, 2011 of the COMELEC's First Division and Order
dated November 23, 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane (EAC dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
[BRGY-SK] NO. 32-2010), as well as the Entry of issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
Judgment dated November 24, 2011 declaring that the
Resolution dated August 25, 2011 had become final and On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua
executory as of September 17, 2011, are all (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
AFFIRMED. Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition2 for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois,
and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection
order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004,
against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to
Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children
had suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that
petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children
physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions
or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody
and access to her minor children; and, that she was
threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s
financial support.
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
harm; woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm; (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public
or private places;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm; (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of child; and
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
movement or conduct: humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the denial of financial support or custody of minor children of
woman or her child of custody to her/his family; access to the woman's child/children.
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others,
children of financial support legally due her or her family, i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head
or deliberately providing the woman's children in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the
insufficient financial support; legal separation case; feeding his other children with the
food which another child spat out; and threatening the
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was
child of a legal right; repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape
when he got furious that she was asking him not to come
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat
profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling after their agreed separation and threatening her of
the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling withholding half of the financial support for the kids,
the conjugal or common money, or properties; while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of
a TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.
decisions;
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of
discretion when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an CERTIFICATION
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
contemplation of law.18 We find that the CA did not err consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by of the opinion of the Court's Division.
the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be Chief Justice
presented during the hearing on the merits on the
issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.
Footnotes
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals issued 1 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Arturo G. Tayag,
Court's issuance of the Temporary Protection Order concurring; rollo, pp. 54-58.
dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of 2 Rollo, pp. 129-132.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had 12 Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699
been reached in consultation before the case was SCRA 352, 401.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division. 13 Supra.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Two years after the charity drive, Chua contested the In its Resolution dated 4 February 2010, which was
donation to Gawad Kalinga. In a letter dated 18 March affirmed in its Joint Order dated 4 June 2010, the IAB
2008,8 she wrote Bernabe asking about the ₱26,660 believed Bernabe and resolved to dismiss the Complaint
donation. Bernabe replied that, as instructed by against her. It held that she had merely acted at the
petitioner, the funds donated by private respondent had behest of petitioner.
already been included in the OSP employees' donation to
Gawad Kalinga.9 With respect to petitioner, the IAB recommended the
filing before the Sandiganbayan of an Information for
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IAB estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b)
of the Revised Penal Code. The IAB ruled that petitioner
Claiming that petitioner and Bernabe had committed had misappropriated the funds of the charity drive by
estafa when they gave her ₱26,660 to an entirely giving the money to Gawad Kalinga, instead of using it to
different beneficiary, Chua lodged a Complaint10 against construct deep wells for the typhoon victims.
them before the IAB on 27 March 2008. The IAB, then
chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Without explanation, Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Casimiro, is the body that investigates the officials and Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the
personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman. IAB.1âwphi1 As a result, an lnfonnation for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case Number SB-10-CRM-O 110, was
In her defense, Bernabe claimed that she never filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan.12
exercised any kind of authority or discretion over the
funds, and that her actions were done only in compliance PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
with the directives of petitioner, who was her superior.
Furthermore, she averred that Chua had made a donation Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under
to the OSP, and not to Bernabe or petitioner. Bernabe Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the IAB's
highlighted the fact that the donation had not been recommendation, which was affirmed by the Ombudsman.
received in trust or under any obligation to deliver it. She
further asserted that even if the donor had violated the In our Resolution dated 11 January 2011, we noted and
condition of the donation, the remedy was to institute a granted the Manifestation and Manifestation in Lieu of
civil case for the revocation of the donation, and not to Comment dated 21 December 2010 filed by the Office of
institute a criminal case for estafa. the Solicitor General (OSG). The OSG manifested that
the JAB and Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
For his part, petitioner consistently questioned the had gravely abused their discretion in allowing Casimiro
proceedings of the IAB before Casimiro. He claimed that to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. Thus, the
under the IAB' s own rules, Casimiro should be Office of the Ombudsman through its own counsel filed
disqualified from the proceedings because both the its comment on the present action.13 Respondents stood
latter and Chua belonged to the same unit - the Office of by the validity of the indictment against petitioner.14
the Ombudsman's Central Office. Petitioner maintained
that the Complaint of private respondent was motivated On 23 October 2012, this Court required the parties to
by a vendetta against him. He insisted that he had not move in the premises.15 On 18 March 2013, petitioner
converted Chua's contribution to an unintended purpose. manifested that the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated
8 October 2012 had already absolved him in a related
administrative case finding him liable for simple 4. He is pecuniarily interested in the case or is related to
misconduct.16 However, neither of the parties indicated any of the parties within the sixth degree of affinity or
whether that CA Decision has already attained finality. consanguinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
Private respondent Chua manifested that the Special computed according to the provisions of civil law; or
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan had deferred the
proceedings against petitioner for estafa in SB-10-CRM- 5. He has, at one time or another, acted upon the matter
0110 until the resolution of the instant case by this subject of the complaint or proceeding. x x x (Emphases
Court.17 For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman supplied)
manifested that there was no relevant supervening
development that might cause the present case to In this case, there is no dispute that Chua reports to the
become moot and academic. Central Office, which is the same as the unit of
Casimiro.18 Straightforwardly, the latter should have
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner claims been disqualified from acting on her complaint against
that respondents gravely abused their discretion by petitioner.
violating their own rules of procedure when they charged
him with estafa. Despite the protest of petitioner at the very onset of the
case,19 Casimiro continued to handle the proceedings
RULING OF THE COURT against the former. Casimiro signed several Orders
requiring the submission of counter-affidavits,
We grant the petition. Respondents committed grave supporting evidence,20 position papers,21 and
abuse of discretion when they failed to observe their own rejoinders;22 and eventually issued the assailed
rules in the conduct of their proceedings against resolutions. The IAB did not rule on the objection of
petitioner. petitioner until it had already concluded the proceedings
against him.
Violation of Administrative Order No.16
The IAB ventured to justify the inclusion of Casimiro only
Administrative Order No. (A.O.) 16, Series of 2003, when it issued its assailed Resolution dated 4 February
entitled "Creation of an Internal Affairs Board," outlines 2010. It ruled that A.O. 16 did not apply, since the
the procedure for handling complaints against officials questioned charity drive transpired prior to the
and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. In assignment of Chua to the Central Office in 2006.23
arguing for the disqualification of Casimiro, petitioner
invokes Section III(N) of A.O. 16, which reads: The appreciation of the IAB is utterly incorrect. As can
be read in paragraphs 2 and 3, Section III(N) of A.O. 16
N. Disqualifications patently disqualifies a person who belongs to the same
component unit as any of the parties to the case,
The Chairman, Vice Chairman or any member of the IAB, regardless of the timeframe that the acts complained of
as well as any member of the IAB Investigating Staff, transpired. Clearly, the operative ground for
shall be automatically disqualified from acting on a disqualification arises when a member of the investigating
complaint or participating in a proceeding under the and adjudicatory body is connected to the same unit as
following circumstances: that of any of the parties to the case.
1. He is a party to the complaint, either as a respondent Now, before this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman
or complainant; points out that during the pendency of the proceedings
before the IAB, A.O. 21 entitled "Revised Rules of the
2. He belongs to the same component unit as any of the Internal Affairs Board" amended A.O. 16.24 A.O. 21
parties to the case; deleted paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III(N), thereby
removing the disqualification of IAB members belonging
3. He belongs or belonged to the same component unit as to the same component unit as any of the parties to the
any of the parties to the case during the period when the cases before them.
act complained of transpired;
This amendment acquired a questionable character, as it should not have considered an unverified and unidentified
was sought to be implemented subsequent to the breach private document as evidence in its proceeding against
by the JAB of its own rules.25 In our view, the petitioner.
supervening revision of A.O. 16 contravenes the avowed
policy of the Office of the Ombudsman to "adopt and CONCLUSION
promulgate stringent rules that shall ensure fairness,
impartiality, propriety and integrity in all its actions.26 There is no dispute that public respondents blatantly
violated their own regulations by continuously
Changing regulations in the middle of the proceedings disregarding the disqualification of Casimiro and utilizing
without reason, after the violation has accrued, does not a disallowed document as basis for the assailed ruling.
comply with fundamental fairness, or in other words, due Worse, the board did not remedy its breaches or give any
process of law.27 In Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel and Motel reason to justify its transgressions.
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,28
this Court characterized due process of law in this In Agbayani v. COMELEC,33 wherein the tribunal violated
manner: its own procedure, this Court held:
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, The petitioner has correctly pointed out that the Order
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put of the First Division of the COMELEC dismissing the pre-
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To proclamation controversy and the Resolution of the
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to COMELEC en bane denying the motion for reconsideration
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of were both penned by Commissioner Abueg, in violation of
reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is its rule that-
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as ... No member shall be the 'ponente' of an en banc
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the decision, resolution or a motion to reconsider a
sp01iing idea of fair play. decision/resolution written by him in a Division.
Violation of Administrative Order No. 7 This is still another, reason why the challenged acts must
be reversed. The Commission on Elections should be the
According to Section 4, Rule II of A.O. 7 entitled "Rules first to respect and obey its own rules, if only to provide
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman," the proper example to those appearing before it and to
supporting witnesses must execute affidavits to avoid all suspicion of bias or arbitrariness in its
substantiate a complaint against a person under proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
preliminary investigation.29 Affidavits are voluntary
declarations of fact written down and sworn to by the Therefore, by doing the exact opposite of what the rules
declarant before an officer authorized to administer command, public respondents have demonstrated their
oaths.30 patent and persistent disregard of the law. Certiorari,
therefore, lies.34 In no uncertain terms, we pronounced
Here, the IAB concluded that a "majority of the OSP in Jardin v. National Labor Relations Commission35 as
officers and employees disclaimed that they had follows:
knowledge of and consented to the turning-over of their
donations to Gawad Kalinga Foundation."31 As its basis, The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
public respondent relied upon the Manifestation dated 4 or excess of jurisdiction" has settled meaning in the
September 2008 signed by 28 officials and employees of jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
the OSP.32 whimsical exercise of judgment by the tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial power as to amount to lack of
That Manifestation, which purports to be the voice of the power. In labor cases, this Court has declared in several
majority belying the donation to Gawad Kalinga, does not instances that disregarding rules it is bound to observe
qualify as an affidavit as it was not sworn to by the constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of labor
declarants before an officer authorized to administer tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
oaths. Therefore, based on A.O. 7, public respondents
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,36 the dismissed public Decision had been reached in consultation before the
school teachers were tried by an improperly constituted case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
tribunal. The Court ruled therein that the "committees Court’s Division.
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void." MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Given that petitioner herein faced a similar predicament, Chief Justice
we likewise rule that the proceedings against him before
the IAB, as approved by the Ombudsman, are null and
void.37 Footnotes
16 Id. at 836-956; the CA Decision dated 8 October 2012 34 Luna v. Allado Construction Co., Inc., 664 Phil. 509
in CA-G.R. SP No. 114702 was penned by Associate (2011); Information Technology Foundation of the
Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 464 Phil. 173
Barza and Ramon A. Cruz. concurring. (2004); and Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission,
340 PHIL 286 (1997).
17 Sandiganbayan records, p. 217.
35 Jardin v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383
18 CA rollo, pp. 171-172; Detail of Personnel to OMB- Phil. 187 (2000).
Central Office dated 10 August 2006 and Office Order
No. 0138 dated 28 December 2006. 36 346 Phil. 940 (1997).
19 Id. at 82-148; Counter-Affidavit Ex Abudanti Ad 37 See Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149, 31
Cautelum with Reply of petitioner dated 26 August 2008. March 1992.
23 Id. at 70.
24 Id. at 574-575.
Further, in Intestate Estate of Alexander T Ty v. Court To assail the validity of the sale, Imperial and
of Appeals,95 where a stockholder filed an action against NIDSLAND sought to prove that the sale to Cruz was
the estate of another stockholder for the annulment of a simulated. This involves the application of the law on
sale of shares which the former claims was simulated for sales. As we have already held in Intestate Estate of
lack of consideration, we ruled that the jurisdiction Alexander T. Ty, the issue of whether a sale is simulated
properly belongs to the regional trial court. We explained falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. It
that "[t]he determination whether a contract is simulated does not concern an adjudication of the rights of
or not is an issue that could be resolved by applying Imperial, NIDSLAND and Napal under the Corporation
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, particularly those Code and the internal rules of the corporation. The
relative to obligations and contracts. Disputes concerning resolution of these questions requires the application of
the application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable an entire gamut of laws that goes well beyond the
by courts of general jurisdiction."96 expertise of the SEC.
The development of both the concept and application of Meanwhile, the question of whether Cruz's TCT should be
the relationship test and controversy test reveals a cancelled goes into the proper application of Presidential
growing emphasis on the delineated jurisdiction between Decree No. 152999 and related doctrines. Specifically,
the SEC and ordinary courts. The delineation is based on there is a need to take into consideration whether the
the very purpose for which the SEC was granted quasi- SEC Petition is a collateral attack on the certificate of
judicial powers in the first place. Under PD 902-A, the title which goes against the well-established rule of
SEC exercised jurisdiction over intra-corporate indefeasibility. The resolution of this question demands
controversies precisely because it is a highly-specialized the application of our laws on land title and deeds, a
administrative body in specialized corporate matters. It matter outside the ambit of the SEC's special
follows therefore, that where the controversy does not competence.
call for the use of any technical expertise, but the
application of general laws, the case is cognizable by the Indeed, our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of
ordinary courts. In Macapalan v. Katalbas- recognizing the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies.
Moscardon,97we said- However, this jurisdiction must always be viewed within
the context of its grant. The law vests quasi-judicial
It is true that the trend is towards vesting powers to administrative bodies over matters that
administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to require their particular competence and specialized
adjudicate matters coming under their particular expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not
be justification to deprive courts of law of their record, other than Imperial's statements, to support the
jurisdiction as determined by law and the Constitution. contention that the consideration was indeed grossly
Courts of law are the instruments for the adjudication of below the actual value of the Subject Property.
legal disputes. In a system of government where courts Furthermore, the SEC also found that the Deed of Sale
of law exist alongside quasi-judicial bodies, the need to was antedated to make it appear that it took place prior
harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction require a to the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Again, this
determination of whether the matter to be resolved was based solely on Imperial's testimony during the SEC
pertains to a general question of law which belongs to Hearing. We note that there was nothing in the records,
ordinary courts or whether it refers to a highly other than Imperial's bare statement, to establish this.
specialized question that can be better resolved by a
quasi-judicial body in accordance with its power vested by The SEC Decision even went further and ordered the
law. cancellation of Cruz's TCT. This did not take into
consideration the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. While
In overstepping its jurisdiction, the SEC committed grave this is not a question that we seek to resolve in these
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is the consolidated cases, we emphasize that a proper
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. It is the adjudication of this matter requires, at the very least, an
exercise of a power in an arbitrary manner. It must be so analysis of the effect of the notice of lis pendens, the
patent or gross as to amount to the evasion of a positive rights of a transferee pendente lite, and the propriety of
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or a collateral attack on a certificate of title. Clearly, the
to act at all in contemplation of law. In Air Transportation SEC is not the appropriate forum to delve into these civil
Office v. Court of Appeals, 100 we explained that grave law concepts.
abuse of discretion exists when the act is: (1) done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or The SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out the reception of evidence and the conduct of hearings
of malice, ill will or personal bias. 101 geared for the purpose of resolving issues proper for a
civil action. The resolution of a civil action requires
In Thenamaris Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 102 we preponderance of evidence as a burden of proof. On the
ruled that grave abuse of discretion exists where the other hand, cases before quasi-judicial bodies require
assailed decision of the CA displayed patent errors. In only substantial evidence. Hence, the propriety of
Air Transportation Office, the patent violation of the annulling a sale and cancelling a Torrens title-which are in
Rules of Court merited a finding that there was grave the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of
abuse of discretion. substantial evidence determined by an administrative
body raises due process concerns.
In this case, the SEC, in rendering the decision,
disregarded established law and jurisprudence on the Effects of a void judgment
jurisdiction of the SEC. Further, it adjudicated on the
rights of Cruz, cancelled the deed of sale, and took away When grave abuse of discretion taints a judgment, it
his property without giving him the opportunity to be becomes wholly void. It may be challenged by direct
heard. It is a breach of the basic requirements of due action which has for its object the declaration of the
process. nullity of the judgment. It may also be set aside through
a collateral attack.
Further, the incorrectness and impracticality of
presenting these issues before the SEC are highlighted Thus, in Guevarra, we allowed the filing of a motion for
by the reliefs granted by SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales reconsideration even if it was made beyond the
in the SEC Case. The SEC annulled the deed of sale reglementary 15-day period We based our ruling on the
between Napal and Cruz. This was based on evidence ground that the order challenged by the motion for
presented during the SEC Hearing which consisted of reconsideration was issued with grave abuse of discretion
Imperial's testimony that the price that Cruz paid for and is null and void. We explained-
the Subject Property was grossly below its value. While
we will not delve into the propriety of the SEC's factual Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
findings, we note that there appears nothing in the proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even
necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void
judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. 103 Our Torrens system serves a very important purpose. As
a general rule, a Torrens certificate of title is conclusive
Our ruling in Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation104is proof of ownership. Thus, provided that the requirements
more unequivocal.1âwphi1 In this case, we found that the of law are met, a certificate of title under the Torrens
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack system of registration is indefeasible. The value of this
or excess of jurisdiction, therefore acting outside the rule finds real meaning when viewed in practical terms. A
contemplation of law. Hence, even when the period to registration under the Torrens system confirms that the
assail the CA decision had already lapsed, we ruled that person whose name appears as owner of the land is indeed
it did not become final and immutable. A void judgment the true owner. Except for specific circumstances
never becomes final. We ruled thus- allowed by law, a person who registers his or her
ownership over a piece of land makes his or her title
The CA's actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce indefeasible because the law does not allow any other
legal effects and cannot likewise be perpetuated by a person to attack or challenge it. Because the title is
simple reference to the principle of immutability of final indefeasible, third persons interested in the registered
judgment; a void decision can never become final. "The land can simply look at the certificate of title and rely on
only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final the information stated in it. This creates stability in our
judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) system of registration. This rule is so zealously protected
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no that our laws even prohibit a collateral attack of a void
prejudice to certificate of title.
any party, and (3) void judgments." x x x105 This is the spirit that infused our ruling in Heirs of
Spouses Benito
More, our ruling in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca106on
the effects of a void judgment has reappeared Gavina and Juana Euste v. Court of Appeals.110 In this
consistently in jurisprudence touching upon the matter. case, we explained that the general rule that the direct
In this case, we said that a void judgment is "a lawless result of a void contract cannot be valid is inapplicable
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, when the integrity of the Torrens system is involved.
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its Thus, a void certificate of title cannot be cancelled in a
head."107 In concrete terms, this means that a void proceeding not instituted for the purpose. We further
judgment creates no rights and imposes no duties. Any act said-
performed pursuant to it and any claim emanating from it
have no legal effect. 108 Thus, in Heirs of Mayor x x x The effect of such outright cancellation will be to
Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals,109we nullified an impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The
auction sale of a land as well as the resulting deed of sale sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved;
and transfer certificate of title as they were the otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered
offshoot of a writ of execution carried pursuant to a void under the system will have to inquire in every instance as
judgment. to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly
issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every
Hence, because the SEC Decision was issued with grave person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on
abuse of discretion and is therefore void, all acts the correctness of the certificate of title issued
emanating from it have no force and effect. Thus, the therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind
Deed of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has no legal the certificate to determine the condition of the
effect. property. 111
Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the We cited this ruling in subsequent cases such as Rabaja
name of NIDSLAND arose from a void judgment, this Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and
Court cannot nullify them in these proceedings. The Separation Benefits System, 112 Spouses Chua v. Soriano,
indefeasibility of a Torrens title prevents us from doing 113 and Republic v. Orfinada, Sr. 114 The stability and
so. Further, we are bound by rules on jurisdiction and the reliability of the Torrens system is so important that we
nature of the proceedings before us.
cannot, in this case, undermine it for the sake of the various tribunals and the multiple remedies available
expediency. to them.
Hence, we cannot order the direct cancellation of the WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated
certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND even if they March 6, 2007 in the First Consolidated Case is
are the direct result of a void decision. The nullity of the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, we rule that Branch
certificates of title should be threshed out in a petition 4, Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City has no jurisdiction
for cancellation of title brought before the proper court. over Cruz's Petition. Thus, the Regional Trial Court's
115 Decision dated March 24, 2009 is NULLIFIED.
Moreover, there are procedural barriers that prevent us The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 13,
from determining the validity of the certificates of title 2010 in the Second Consolidated Case is also REVERSED
questioned in this case. First, we do not have jurisdiction and SET ASIDE. We rule that the Securities and
over the cancellation of certificates of title. Second, the Exchange Commission's Decision dated November 10,
nature of the action before us bars us from going into the 1998 is VOID. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance dated
certificates of title themselves. We emphasize that this January 13, 1999 executed in compliance with this
case is a petition for review on certiorari of an action for Decision is NULLIFIED. The proper parties can file the
annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of appropriate petition for cancellation of title in the trial
jurisdiction. Our ruling is anchored on the lack of court which has jurisdiction to nullify the certificates of
jurisdiction of the SEC to annul the sale to Cruz and order title issued to NIDSLAND by virtue of the void SEC
the cancellation of the certificates of title. In this Decision.
Decision, we emphasized that the proper jurisdiction to
annul the sale and to cancel the certificates of title SO ORDERED.
belongs to the regular courts, in particular, the regional
trial courts. We must thus also respect the rule on FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
jurisdiction and exercise restraint in this case. The Associate Justice
proper action to cancel the void certificates of title must
be brought before the tribunal designated by law to WE CONCUR:
possess jurisdiction over the matter. The proper party
may, however, use this Decision as it definitively settles PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
that the certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND arose Associate Justice
out of a void judgment and as such, should have no force Chairperson
and effect. This Decision is res judicata as to this
question. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Further, we also cannot rule on the validity of the sale of Associate Justice
the Subject Property to Cruz as well as Napal's obligation ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA*
to Imperial and NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of Associate Justice
Agreement. These matters require the presentation of
facts before the proper forum and through appropriate ATTESTATION
procedural remedies. While we endeavor to fully settle
legal disputes brought before us, we must also place I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
premium on the importance of rules of procedure. Rules been reached in consultation before the cases were
of procedure serve to protect the interests of litigants assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
who seek redress before the courts. They ensure that Division.
litigants plead before the proper forum that has the
necessary expertise and legal tools to fully resolve a legal PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
problem. They also ensure that litigants employ the Associate Justice
proper remedies that will allow them to successfully Chairperson, Third Division
obtain the appropriate relief. With this in mind, litigants
must be more circumspect in invoking the jurisdiction of CERTIFICATION
18 Id. at 121-122.
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, 19 Rollo (G.R. No. 178842), pp. 230-232.
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the 20 Rollo (G.R. No. 195509), p. 9-11; Rollo (G.R. No.
cases were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the 178842), p. 13.
Court’s Division.
21 Id.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice 22 Rollo (G.R. No. 178842), pp. 233-250.
49 Id. at 21-22. 70 G.R. No. L-72370, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 543.
62 G.R. No. 156380, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 630. 78G.R. No. 147995, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 741.
79 Id at 745-746. 101 Id at 221.
80 The Securities Regulation Code (2000). 102 G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014, 715 SCRA 153
81 G.R. No.L-64013, November28, 1983, 126 SCRA 31. 103 Supra note 65 at 382-383.
82 Id. at 38. 104 G.R. No. 198423, October23, 2012, 684 SCRA 344.
83 Id.; Rivera v. Florendo, G.R. No. L-57586, October 8, 105 Id. at 351. Emphasis in the original.
1986, 144 SCRA 643; Abejo v. De la Cruz, G.R. Nos. L-
63558 & L-68450-51, May 19, 1987, 149 SCRA 654, 671. 106 37 Phil.921(1918).
84 G.R. Nos. L-63558 & L-68450-51, May 19, 1987, 149 107 Id. at 949.
SCRA 654.
108 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, G.R. No. 194168,
85 Id. at 666. February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 610, 619.
86 G.R. No. 92481, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 308. 109 G. R. No. 119193, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 672.
87 Id. at 322-323. Emphasis supplied. 110 G.R. No. 120154, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 495.
88 G.R. No. 125221, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 452. 111 Id. at 509. Citation omitted.
89 Id. at 457-458. See also Saura v. Saura, Jr., G.R. No. 112 G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217-
136159, September 1, 1999, 313 SCRA 465; and Speed 218.
Distributing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351,
March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 691. 113 G.R. No. 150066, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 68, 82.
90 Supra. 114 G.R. No. 141145, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 342,
359
91 Id. at 707.
115Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sec. 108.
92 Lozano v. De los Santos, supra note 87 at 457.
95 G.R. Nos. 112872 & 114672, April 19, 2001, 356 SCKA
661
96 Id. at 668.
98 Id at 55.
100 G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014, 727 SCRA 196.
THIRD DIVISION facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon
Doctor’s Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda
January 11, 2016 Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the
right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal
G.R. No. 192914 and distal femur of the right lower extremity which
required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as a
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner, result of the accident and was unable to return to her job
vs. as the Regional Manager of COSPACHEM Product
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about
P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00 for
DECISION Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling
as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered
REYES, J.: a complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right
shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 abdominal injury and a wound on the area of his right eye
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the which required suturing. The damage sustained by the
Decision2 dated November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution3 pick-up reached P106,155.00.
dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN which affirmed with modification Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of
the Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical
Criminal Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended
(petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC]
Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical in Malaybalay City. The information reads:
Injuries and Damage to Property.
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at
The Antecedents [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City, Province of
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments5 of Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and from the there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the
assailed decision of the CA: Land Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent,
careless, imprudent manner and without precaution to
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private prevent accident [to] life and property, drive a Super Five
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Nissan Bus, color white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776
Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his owned by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan
Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three- City, as a result hit and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle,
year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven
Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the center and owned by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR., and with his
of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old
petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17 years old, riding
towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big truck from the with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in the amount
right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by of [P]105,300.00 and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and
swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane
and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and Silayan sustained the following injuries to wit:
could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus
crashed into the right side of private complainant’s pick- MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
up at a right angle.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and shoulder
immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong,
Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury the expenses incurred in the repair of the damaged
Toyota pick-up vehicle.
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
SO ORDERED.9
ROSALINDA TOOR
The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4, 2006,
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right which included an order for the arrest of the petitioner.
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via
registered mail on the ground that errors of law or
= and supracondylar femur right irregularities have been committed during trial that are
allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN that he was not able to present evidence during trial
because he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident mistakenly believed that the case against him has been
dismissed as private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr.
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country.11
such amount that they are entitled to under the law.
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner.12
to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN RELATION TO THE
FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations omitted) On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied
by the lower court pronouncing that notices have been
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, duly served the parties and that the reason given by the
with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to petitioner was self-serving.13
the Information in this case.7
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006 by
evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and
employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts laws.14
allegedly became unknown so he was not presented as a
witness by his new counsel.8 Ruling of the CA
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of
absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed, the
The fallo of the decision reads: dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the
accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3) months
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in
hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an indeterminate all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of
penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case
Mayor maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two No. 10717-00.
[2] months Prision Correc[c]ional medium as maximum.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private No pronouncement as to costs.
complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00]
Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred SO ORDERED.15
Eighty Thousand [P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses
incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of Rosalinda In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC,
Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean Silayan and the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence
presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the
petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records The petition lacks merit.
further reveals that the pictures taken after the
accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioner’s
with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which motion for new trial or to re-open the same.
are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking the
claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on the mere The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities,
basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner,
do not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In have been committed during trial.
addition, there was no existing evidence to show that
there was an improper motive on the part of the The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule
eyewitnesses.16 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move
for a new trial as baseless.17 Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The Court shall grant a
new trial on any of the following grounds:
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is
the maximum period of arresto mayor in its minimum and (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
medium periods that is – imprisonment for three (3) substantial rights of the accused have been committed
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the during the trial;
petitioner has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act
which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a (b) That new and material evidence has been discovered
less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of Article which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
(RPC).18 introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment. (Emphasis ours)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the CA, in its Resolution19 dated June 17, To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that
2010. there was an error of law or irregularities committed
when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence
review before this Court, praying that the applicable law resulting to denial of due process, a one-sided decision by
on the matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised
of facts committed by the court a quo and by the CA be Rules of Criminal Procedure against him.
given a second look.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already
The Issues been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had already
acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when
DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE- his whereabouts became unknown.
OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE
PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS The petitioner’s claims that he had not testified because
BEHALF; AND he did not know the schedule of the hearings, and
mistakenly believed that the case had already been
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit
CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE our consideration.21
APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under
PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.20 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
Ruling of the Court notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the
unjustifiable.22 It is established that notices have been outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility, together
served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail
inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for intended for them.27 (Citations omitted)
his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the
arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the
proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in which
being in violation of the constitutional right to due his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law
process are doomed to fail.23 as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards
the incident, and the people who suffered from it. While
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that: there was no showing in the case at bar that the counsel
of the petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their to blame but the petitioner himself in not exercising
respective sides of the controversy. diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that
opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 there is neither rule nor law which specifically requires
for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by
duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client.28
her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at
the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge
were not notified of said setting. Petitioner’s counsel Principe,29 the Court held that:
never notified the court of any change in her address,
while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very [W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless,
beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence
processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel or to interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where
were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its
now complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s right to plea that it was not accorded the right to due process
due process when it was by their own fault that they lost cannot elicit this Court’s approval or even sympathy. It is
the opportunity to present evidence.25 (Citation omitted) petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. x x
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had x.30 (Citations omitted)
previous notice of the criminal case filed against him and
was given the opportunity to present evidence in his Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his
defense. The petitioner was not in any way deprived of claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
his substantive and constitutional right to due process as Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence to substantiate his defense, but "A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
appearing in court at the scheduled hearings.26 are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case produced at the trial even with the exercise of
was already terminated resulting to his failure to attend reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
cases that: evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the
It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It to locate the evidence before or during trial but
is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status nonetheless failed to secure it."31 The Court agrees with
and progress of the case from time to time and cannot the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not
be had on the basis of evidence which was available during without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
trial but was not presented due to its negligence. reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable
Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
committed in the course of the trial against [the consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
petitioner’s] substantive rights do not exist."32 intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time, and place.35
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote been established in the present case.
efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto The petitioner questions the credibility of the
is required. Their application may be relaxed only when prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies
rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit
justice, which is not present here. Utter disregard of the when he turned left without looking for an incoming
Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting to the
of liberal construction.34 (Citations omitted and italics in mishap.
the original)
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented in
the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new the instant case.
trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the
grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the
the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but witnesses’ narrations of the accident credible and worthy
he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not being of belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied
diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal on all significant and substantial points.36 These
case against him and inform his counsel of his witnesses’ testimonies are as follows:
whereabouts.
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner. accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his
accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor,
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his
RPC, which provides that: passengers, was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit
at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by the
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – x x x. petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the bus and
explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not
xxxx able to do so because of the pick-up. The petitioner could
not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without was a ten-wheeler truck. He swerved to the right instead
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing collision was due to the error of the bus driver who was
to perform such act, taking into consideration his driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, marks towards the axle.37
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place. Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.’s pick-up turn
left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5
xxxx bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running
slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the overtaking the big truck from the right side. The bus
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller vehicle
the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be due to the force of the impact. He went nearer the area
of collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick- of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to
up were unconscious.38 Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow
down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow
the center of Aglayan on board her employer’s pick-up, the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove
she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to
right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck,
thrown out of the pick-up and hit her head on the entering the intersection and directly smashing into the
ground.39 pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary
precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly
at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.42
moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The
bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:
passengers.40
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side
conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it
fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and
slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while
saw the pick-up truck turning left, he applied the brakes approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver's
but because he was moving fast, the collision became view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of
inevitable. automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are
charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken
great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or which they have the right to pass.44 (Citations omitted
circumstance of significance and influence. This rule is and emphasis ours)
based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor and the conduct of the Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not
witnesses."41 The Court finds in the instant case that noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law provides
there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the rule. that the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to
let other cars in the opposite direction know his presence
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not and not the other way around as the petitioner suggests.
biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the
witnesses against the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
traffic violation and thus, he should be the one blamed CR No. 00390-MIN are AFFIRMED.
for the incident. The Court finds this without
merit.1âwphi1 SO ORDERED.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus BIENVENIDO L. REYES
driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right Associate Justice
shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound
ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, WE CONCUR:
obviously to give way to another vehicle about to enter
the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice ARTURO D. BRION*
that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the Associate Justice
same direction had already slowed down to allow passage
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 7 Id. at 80.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 8 Id. at 49.
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA 9 Id. at 45.
Associate Justice
10 Id. at 39.
ATTESTATION
11 Id. at 49-50.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was 12 Id. at 50.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division. 13 Id.
* Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated June 23 Estrada v. People, id.
29, 2015.
24 505 Phil. 339 (2005).
1 Rollo, pp. 4-34.
25 Id. at 353-354.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with
Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Leoncia R. 26 Rollo, pp. 89-90.
Dimagiba concurring; id. at 47-58.
27 GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe,
3 Id. at 60-66. 511 Phil. 176, 186 (2005).
32 Rollo, p. 56.
34 Id. at 684.
36 Rollo, p. 103.
37 Id. at 98-99.
38 Id. at 99.
39 Id. at 100.
40 Id. at 98-100.
44 Id. at 360.