G.R. No.

189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal
justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet
been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final
adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest
in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.3

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically
begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the
accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to
efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other hand,
society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.7 Other
recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the
accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and
the avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.9

Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10

The Facts

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.13 It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal
should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical
condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in
prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14

For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be allowed pending
appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction. It made a
preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15

Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to
an appellant pending appeal.

The Issue

The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does
the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically
be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
 (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant
sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should
automatically be granted.

Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition

Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail
the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is
proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16

Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of
the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less
proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court
of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by
denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.

We disagree.

It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of
its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a
case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.

Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount
to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of
Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness
in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such
implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave
caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of
ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting
bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a
substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but
followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.

At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this
connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:

… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration
of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s Interpretation

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals
with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk
of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances)
not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.

The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:

Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in
the following rules:

xxx xxx xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in
 Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be
granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the
same thinking:

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.

Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail
is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis
supplied)

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and
(2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow
bail.

On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination
of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny
or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will
not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to
use the less stringent sound discretion approach.

Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.

In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the
grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the
determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The
implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.

Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the
appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances is present.

However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.30 Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders
nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary."

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the
part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.31 In
view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,33 among other
things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending
appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the
appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that
the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-
wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending
appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that
the lower court’s exercise of discretionary power was sound,36 specially since the rules on
criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of
Appeals except for substantial error.37

Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to
those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in
statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive.
The provision categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence,
under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.

Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s interpretation
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought
to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending
appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more
lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must
be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without
those conditions.

Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?

Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal

Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.

The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. —
After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance,
the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.

Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After
conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at
the discretion of the court.

Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a
capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules
of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in
1988 to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.

Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is
an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of
the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:

The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction,
be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the
effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution
of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a)
of the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in
the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal
before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:

1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days
from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the
fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;

2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons
thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10)
days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The
appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis
supplied)

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter
of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule.
(3a)

SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party. (n)

SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is
an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)

SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,

not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)

The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.

The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is,
bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.

The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense
by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by
reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any
stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by
reclusion perpetua.39

The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of
a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down
more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court
has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in
particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal"
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.

Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal?
What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a
rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after
due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal
is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail —
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has
even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular
No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail.
After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied
upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to
escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already
effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) 1avv phi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial
disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail
despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court
and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.