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202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 111656. March 20, 1996.

MANUEL MANAHAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Contracts; Lease; A lessor’s acquiescence to lessee’s continued

possession of a personal property is in effect a continuation of the
contract under the concept of an implied new lease on a month to
month basis under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.—Thus, when
IFC filed Civil Case No. 26078, it correctly pursued its remedy,
and the court, after upholding IFC, aptly awarded damages to the
latter. IFC, however, neither opted to cancel its lease contract
with petitioner nor to see to the execution of the decision in Civil
Case No. 26078, the net effect of which failure was to permit the
contract to remain in force in accordance with Article 1659 of the
Civil Code. The decision, it should be noted, was promulgated on
03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for
thirty-six months from May 1976 or until April 1979. IFC’s
acquiescence thereafter to petitioner’s continued possession was,
in effect, a continuation of the contract under the concept of an
implied new lease on a month to month basis under Article 1670,
of the Civil Code. The contract subsisted until IFC demanded the
return of the equipment on 23 June 1981. From that moment,
petitioner could well be made to answer for the corresponding
civil liabilities of a possessor in bad faith, such as for the loss or
deterioration of the thing leased regardless of the cause of such
loss or deterioration, i.e., whether on account of his fault or not.
Same; Same; The Civil Code provisions on the lease of real
property which are not peculiar to immovable property could be
made applicable to personal property.—While the Civil Code
contains no special provisions covering personal property, its
provisions, however, on the lease of real property which are not
peculiar to immovable property could be made applicable.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa under
Article 315(b) of the Revised Penal Code.—The elements of this

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crime are: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on

commission,

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 203

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

for administration or under any other circumstance involving the

duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or
diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or
a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such conversion,
diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (d) that there
be demand for the return of the property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although a contract of lease
is not fiduciary in nature, still the clause “any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return” personal
property is broad enough to include a “civil obligation.”—
Petitioner did receive the dump truck from IFC under a lease
contract with the specific provision under paragraph 10 thereof
requiring petitioner to return the equipment to IFC “at the
expiration of the period or extended period hereof or earlier
termination of (the) agreement.” Although a contract of lease is
not fiduciary in nature, still the clause “any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return” personal
property is broad enough to include a “civil obligation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equally essential before the
offense of estafa under Art. 315(b) of the Revised Penal Code can be
considered committed, is that the refusal or failure to deliver or
return is, in turn, predicated on misappropriation or conversion by
the accused of the subject of the obligation.—Equally essential,
however, before the offense can be considered committed, is that
the refusal or failure to deliver or return is, in turn, predicated on
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the subject of
the obligation. The appellate court has ruled that petitioner’s
“unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long
time that he indisputably could have done so constituted abuse of
confidence and virtual conversion.” This conclusion looks to be too
sweeping. Although, clearly, petitioner has incurred default in his
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obligation to return the leased unit, it is, nonetheless, unrebutted

that he did exert all efforts to recover and retrieve, albeit
belatedly and to no avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. The facts
on record contrast, in our view, to the idea of a refusal to comply
with an undertaking to return the property on account of
misappropriation or conversion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for it to be a felony—ineptitude should not be
confused with criminal intent.—Not to be overlooked is that this
felony

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Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

falls under the category of mala in se offenses that require the

attendance of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for it to be a felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea. Petitioner might have been an inept businessman in
failing to promptly obtain possession of the dump truck in Tarlac
following the expiration of the sublease in favor of Gorospe; such
ineptitude, nevertheless, should not be confused with criminal
intent.
Criminal Law; Civil Liability; Damages; An acquittal based
on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability where a mere
preponderance of evidence is required.—An acquitted person,
nevertheless, cannot always escape from civil liability in the
attendance of facts from which such liability might arise.
Corollarily, an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the
accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt
him from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is
required. Petitioner must, therefore, be held responsible for the
value (P55,000.00) of the lost dump truck.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Homer N. Mendoza for petitioner.

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner Manuel L. Manahan, Jr., seeks, in a petition

1
for
review on certiorari, the reversal of the decision of the
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Court of Appeals affirming with modification the judgment

2
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, which
has found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of estafa.
On 10 May 1976, petitioner, as lessee, and IFC Leasing
and Acceptance Corporation (“IFC”), as lessor, entered into
an Equipment Lease Agreement (Contract No. LC-2644)
over an

________________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and concurred in by

Associate Justices Serafin E. Camilon and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
2 Presided by Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles.

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VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 205

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Isuzu dump truck (Motor No. E120-206525 and Serial No.

TMK47E-1732972). The lease was for a period of thirty-six
(36) months from May, 1976, at a monthly rental 3
of
P3,541.20 with an initial “deposit” of P24,000.00. The4
dump truck was delivered to petitioner on 30 April 1976.
The parties, on 16 September 1976, entered into another
Equipment Lease Agreement (Contract No. LC-2729) over
one unit of Kimco Hough JH65CN Payloader 5
(Motor No.
10282261 and Serial No. JH65CN8484) to last for forty-
eight (48) months beginning 6
September of 1976 at a
monthly rental of P5,311.80.
On 15 March 1977, IFC filed a complaint for a sum of
money, with replevin and damages, against petitioner
before the then
7
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case
No. 26078). IFC averred that petitioner had incurred
“several defaults” and owed, in rentals and expenses, the
sum of P160,110.18 as of 20 February 1977 on the lease of
the dump truck and another P249,975.44 as of 05 March
1977 on the lease of the payloader. Aside from said
amounts, IFC also prayed for 12% interest thereon, plus an
equivalent of 20% of the sum, conformably with the terms
of the two lease agreements. 8
On 03 April 1978, the court rendered a decision, the
decretal portion of which stated:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendant (a) confirming the right of the
plaintiff to the ownership and possession of the personal

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properties heretofore described; (b) ordering the defendant to pay

the plaintiff:
“(1) On the first cause of action: The sum of P160,110.18, plus
interest at 12% from February 20, 1977 until fully paid, and a
further amount equivalent to 20% of the amounts due, as
attorney’s fees;

_______________

3 Exh. A.
4 Exh. B.
5 The agreement was not attached to the records.
6 Exh. D.
7 Exh. D.
8 Presided by Judge Eutropio Migriño.

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206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

“(2) On the second cause of action: The sum of P249,975.44, plus

interest thereon at 12% from March 5, 1977 until fully paid, and
the further sum equivalent to 20% of the amount due as
attorney’s fees; and
“(c) To pay the costs.
9
“SO ORDERED.”

It would appear that an execution of the decision was not

pursued. Instead, on 23 June 1981, IFC’s counsel, Attorney
Jose Redoblado, sent a letter to petitioner about his still
unsettled accounts under the two contracts. Since the
demand had not been heeded, IFC, this time, charged
petitioner with estafa. The information was filed on 15
March 1983 and raffled to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati; it read:

“That in or about and during the period from April 30, 1976 and
September 7, 1976, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, in accordance to a Lease Agreement
received from IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION One (1) Unit Isuzu Dump Truck and One (1)
Unit Kimco Hough JH65CN Payloader all valued at P110,000.00,
with the obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return
the said equipments upon termination of the lease period, but
accused far from complying with his obligation, with intent of
gain, grave abuse of confidence and to defraud the herein

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complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the said equipments, and despite
demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return
the said equipments, to the damage and prejudice of said IFC-
LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, represented by
one ARMANDO M. MARCELO, in the aforementioned amount of
P110,000.00.
10
“Contrary to law.”

When arraigned on 25 July 1983, petitioner pleaded “not

guilty” to the charge.

_______________

9 Records, pp. 190-191.

10 Records, p. 1.

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VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 207

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

At the trial, Melecio Rayosa, records custodian of the IFC,

and Leonardo Gado, a security guard and liaison officer of
the Bureau of Land Transportation (“BLT”), were
presented by the prosecution at the witness stand. Rayosa
identified
11
the lease agreement covering the Isuzu dump
truck and the delivery receipt showing that 12
petitioner
received the equipment on 30 April 1976. Rayosa said
that the collection department of IFC demanded from
petitioner the payment of unpaid monthly rentals, and that
the demand was followed by a letter, dated 23 June 1981,
of Atty. Redoblado to petitioner asking that the latter’s 13
separate accounts under the lease contracts be settled.
Rayosa confirmed the14
civil case previously filed by IFC
against petitioner. Gado testified,
15
mainly, that the
original registration certificate
16
of the Isuzu dump truck
was surrendered to the BLT.
Parenthetically, the payloader, the leased equipment
under Contract No. LC-2729, would appear to have, in fact,
been recovered by IFC and later disposed of by it.
Petitioner admitted having entered into the lease
contracts with IFC, receiving 17
the subject units and failing
to return the dump truck. Apparently, the truck was
subleased to one Mr. Gorospe for the hauling of aggregate
materials. After the sublease was terminated, petitioner
tried to retake possession of the unit but he was

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unsuccessful. Testimony was adduced that in June 1983,

malefactors, numbering about ten persons, allegedly “men
of Gorospe and Espino,” dismantled the truck, loaded the
parts into another truck, and left only its chassis. The
matter was reported to the barangay captain but “nothing
happened.” Petitioner was furious when informed of the
incident but there was not much, he said, that he could

_______________

11 Exh. A.
12 Exh. B.
13 Exh. C.
14 TSN, January 9, 1985, p. 6.
15 Exh. F.
16 TSN, May 8, 1985, p. 3.
17 TSN, March 3, 1988, p. 3.

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208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
18
do.
On 27 July 1989, the trial court rendered its decision
convicting petitioner of estafa; hence—

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused

guilty beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum
and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P55,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
19
“SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending,

among other things, that the fourth element of the crime of
estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the thing received to the prejudice of another,
was not present in this case. He averred that his failure to
return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond
his control, and that it was not he but other persons,
particularly Gorospe and Espino 20
and their men, who
unlawfully detained the vehicle. 21
On 21 May 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision which affirmed, except for the penalty which was
modified, the trial court’s judgment; thus:

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“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the

appealed decision, with the modification that the proper penalty
which the appellant should suffer is the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Costs
against appellant.
22
“SO ORDERED.”

_______________

18 Testimony of Leolando Mallari, TSN, March 16, 1988, pp. 14-20.

19 Rollo, p. 18.
20 Brief for Accused-Appellant, CA Records, pp. 38 & 43.
21 Through Associate Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo, Serafin E. Camilon
and Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
22 Rollo, p. 24.

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The appellate court ratiocinated that—

“Under Article 315, subdivision 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised

Penal Code, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are:

“1) that money, goods, or other personal property be received

by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
“2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt;
“3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another;
“4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.

“x x x      x x x      x x x.

“ ‘All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The dump truck, a
personal property was received by the accused who was under obligation
to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return the said equipment upon the
termination of the lease period. Accused did not return the equipment to
the offended party as accused subleased it to a certain Mr. Gorospe,
although accused has no authority to sub-lease the equipment to a third
person. Granting therefore that Manuel Manahan, Jr. has no intention of

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defrauding the owner of the truck, accused certainly committed abuse of

confidence when he sub-leased the equipment without the knowledge and
consent of the owner. In sub-leasing the truck to Mr. Gorospe, accused
assumed the right to dispose of it as if it is his (Viada, 446) thereby
committing conversion.’ (p. 3, Appealed Decision)

“The appropriation or conversion of money or property

received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the essence of
estafa through misappropriation. The words ‘convert’ and
‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon. (Saddul, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 192 SCRA 277).
“Appellant’s contention that one element of estafa, that is,
misappropriation or conversion, is not present in the case at bar,
is untenable. It must be recalled that under the lease agreement

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Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

entered into by and between complainant and appellant, any

breach of the lease by the latter as lessee would entitle the lessor,
upon demand, to the return and possession of the vehicle in
question (Exh. ‘A,’ p. 175, Records). Admittedly, appellant failed
to pay the stipulated monthly rentals. Despite IFC’s demand for
the return of the vehicle and the decision rendered in its (IFC’s)
favor in Civil Case No. 26078, appellant, had failed to give the
equipment back to its rightful owner. From that time on,
appellant Manahan could already be considered to have
committed the crime of estafa. His allegation that he could not
return the chattel because it had been taken by certain persons,
namely, Mr. Gorospe and Capt. Espino, fails to persuade. He
received IFC’s demand letter on July 6, 1981 (p. 157, Records).
The judgment in Civil Case No. 26078 confirming said
corporations’ right to ownership and possession of the subject
leased equipment was rendered on April 3, 1978 (p. 191, ibid.).
The alleged taking of the vehicle was in June, 1983 (TSN, p. 5,
March 16, 1988). Had appellant returned the truck to IFC upon
the latter’s demand, such taking of the dump truck by Gorospe, if
it were true, would not have occurred. Clearly, accused’s
unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long
time that he undisputably could have done so constituted abuse of
confidence and virtual conversion.
“Appellant’s contention that he did not sublease the truck to
another cannot relieve him of any liability in the present case
either. For, during the time that said vehicle remained in the

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possession of the appellant, the complainant had been deprived of

its right to use the same. In other words, there had been a
disturbance of the property rights of the offended party. To
repeat, the words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of
23
using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own.”
24
On a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals,
finding no sufficient
25
reason to modify its decision, refused
to reconsider.

The petition before us would fault the appellate court in

concluding that petitioner is guilty of estafa given the
circum-

_______________

23 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

24 Through Associate Justices Benipayo, Martin, Jr. and Minerva G.
Reyes.
25 Rollo, p. 26.

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VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 211

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

stances heretofore narrated. Petitioner argues that the

mere act of subletting the dump truck to another person
without the knowledge and consent of the lessor does not
necessarily constitute estafa.
There is merit in the petition.
There could be no question about the fact that
petitioner, in subletting the dump truck, violated the lease
contract with IFC. The pertinent paragraph of the contract,
Exhibit A, provided:

“2. UTILITY: The Lessee agrees that the equipment under lease
shall be installed and/or utilized at its premises in Manila or such
other places as may be designated in the Schedule, and shall not,
under any circumstances be removed therefrom without the
consent of the Lessor first obtained in writing. The Lessee further
agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or
otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased equipment; x x x. If
Lessee uses or allows the leased property to be used for illegal
purposes or for purposes not permitted under this lease, Lessee
agrees to reimburse Lessor for all damages sustained by Lessor as
a result of such misuse including, without limitations, payment of
any fine or fines which may be imposed on Lessor. In addition to,
and notwithstanding its right to such reimbursement, Lessor may
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in such event at its option cancel this lease by notifying Lessee to

26
(sic) such cancellation in writing.” (Italics supplied.)

Thus, when IFC filed Civil Case No. 26078, it correctly

pursued its remedy, and the court, after upholding IFC,
aptly awarded damages to the latter. IFC, however, neither
opted to cancel its lease contract with petitioner nor to see
to the execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 26078, the
net effect of which failure was to permit the contract to
remain27
in force in accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil
Code. The

_______________

26 Records, p. 154.
27 “Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the
obligations set forth in Articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may
ask for the rescission of the contract and indemnification for damages, or
only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.”

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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

decision, it should be noted, was promulgated on 03 April

1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for thirty-
six months from May 1976 or until April 1979. IFC’s
acquiescence thereafter to petitioner’s continued possession
was, in effect, a continuation of the contract under the
concept of an implied new lease on a month28 to month basis
under Article 1670, of the Civil Code. The contract
subsisted until IFC demanded the return of the equipment
on 23 June 1981. From that moment, petitioner could well
be made to answer for 29the corresponding civil liabilities of a
possessor in bad faith, such as for the loss or deterioration
of the thing leased regardless of the cause of such loss or
deterioration, i.e., whether on account of his fault or not.
But did petitioner likewise incur criminal liability,
specifically under Article 315(b) of the Revised Penal Code,
for estafa? Respondents reply in the affirmative, allegedly
in petitioner’s—

“x x x misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,

money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or

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partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received

such money,

_______________

28 “Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying
the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a
notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood
that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but
for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original
contract shall be revived.”
While the Civil Code contains no special provisions covering personal property,
its provisions, however, on the lease of real property which are not peculiar to
immovable property could be made applicable.
29 “Art. 1671. If the lessee continue enjoying the thing after the expiration of
the contract, over the lessor’s objection, the former shall be subject to the
responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith.”

213

VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 213

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
30
goods, or other property.”

The elements of this crime are: (a) that personal property is

received in trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though the
obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is
conversion or diversion of such property by the person who
has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury
of another; and
31
(d) that there be demand for the return of
the property.
Petitioner did receive the dump truck from IFC under a
lease contract with the specific provision under paragraph
10 thereof requiring petitioner to return the equipment to
IFC “at the expiration of the period or extended period 32
hereof or earlier termination of (the) agreement.”
Although a contract of lease is not fiduciary in nature, still
the clause “any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return” personal property is broad enough
to include a “civil obligation.”33 Equally essential, however,
before the offense can be considered committed, is that the
refusal or failure to deliver or return is, in turn, predicated
on misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the
subject of the obligation.

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The appellate court has ruled that petitioner’s

“unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all
the long time that he indisputably could have done so 34
constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion.”
This conclusion looks to be too sweeping. Although, clearly,
petitioner has incurred default in his obligation to return
the leased unit, it is, nonetheless, unrebutted that he did
exert all efforts to recover and retrieve, albeit belatedly and
to no avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. The facts on
record contrast, in our view, to the idea of a refusal to
comply with an undertaking to

_______________

30 Article 315(b), Revised Penal Code.

31 Saddul, Jr., vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 277.
32 Exh. A-2.
33 See U.S. vs. Lim, 36 Phil. 682.
34 Rollo, p. 23.

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214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

return the property on account of misappropriation or

conversion.
Not to be overlooked is that this felony falls under the
category of mala in se offenses that require the attendance
of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful
act for it to be a felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.35 Petitioner might have been an inept businessman in
failing to promptly obtain possession of the dump truck in
Tarlac following the expiration of the sublease in favor of
Gorospe; such ineptitude, nevertheless,
36
should not be
confused with criminal intent.
At any rate, any reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused. Indispensable for conviction is—

“x x x such proof ‘to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind

the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though
strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the
contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
37
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.’ ”

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An acquitted person, nevertheless, cannot always escape

from civil liability in the 38attendance of facts from which
such liability might arise. Corollarily, an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime
charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability39
where a mere preponderance of evidence is required.
Petitioner must, therefore, be held responsible for the value
(P55,000.00) of the lost dump truck.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal

_______________

35 People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48.

36 People vs. Pacana, supra.
37 People vs. Ng, 142 SCRA 615, 622.
38 Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 231; Calalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 514.
39 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558.

215

VOL. 255, MARCH 20, 1996 215

Azcuna, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Code but he shall pay the IFC Leasing and Acceptance

Corporation the amount of P55,000.00 representing the
value of the lost dump truck with 12% interest per annum
from July 1981 (the month following the demand of 23
June 1981) until full payment of said amount. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and

Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petitioner acquitted but ordered to pay P55,000.00 to IFC

Leasing and Acceptance Corporation.

Notes.—When the implementing sheriff seized the

items not mentioned in the writ of replevin on his own
initiative, he acted beyond the scope of his authority.
(Normal Holdings and Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 194 SCRA 383 [1991])
The crime of estafa committed by an agent against his
principal is separate from the crimes of estafa committed
against individual lot buyers. (Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals,
239 SCRA 575 [1994])

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