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G.R. No. 103702 - Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, SR

The Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the Municipality of San Narciso questioning the legal existence of the neighboring Municipality of San Andres. While Executive Order 353 that created San Andres may have been unconstitutional, the court ruled that any defects were cured by the 1991 Local Government Code, which recognized municipalities existing at that time as legally established. The court also noted that San Narciso waited over 30 years after the issuance of Executive Order 353 to file a legal challenge, during which time San Andres was operating as a legitimate local government unit.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
84 views7 pages

G.R. No. 103702 - Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, SR

The Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed by the Municipality of San Narciso questioning the legal existence of the neighboring Municipality of San Andres. While Executive Order 353 that created San Andres may have been unconstitutional, the court ruled that any defects were cured by the 1991 Local Government Code, which recognized municipalities existing at that time as legally established. The court also noted that San Narciso waited over 30 years after the issuance of Executive Order 353 to file a legal challenge, during which time San Andres was operating as a legitimate local government unit.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103702. December 6, 1994.]

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN


K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III,
BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO
MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA,
PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN
M. MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M.
MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and FRANCISCA A.
BAMBA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th
Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON;
COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O.
OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES,
RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING
AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO,
respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J :
p

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to


the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban,
Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.
Cdpr

Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to
the President and coursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the
municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24
May 1959. 1
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued
by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres
was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this
municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864
was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for
quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca,
Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed
Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of
nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local
officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to
refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.
3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 4 the

petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a


presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the
legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the
duties and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to
the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition,
averring, by way of affirmative and special defenses, that since it was at
the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres
was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner
municipality) should be deemed estopped from questioning the creation of
the new municipality; 5 that because the Municipality of San Andred had
been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be
assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto,
petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor
General. 6
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-
trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss
and to deny a judgment on the pleadings. LexLib

On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a


motion to dismiss alleging that the case had become moot and academic
with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991.
The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
"(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity
of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the
above provision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres
since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to
those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. 7
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court 8 finally dismissed
the petition 9 for lack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that
belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the
creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential
issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R. A.
7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order,
dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue
that in issuing the orders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the
lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a
municipality created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked
either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and
is inoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on
certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time,
however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been
issued with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain , speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders,
to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of
the legal issues involved." 12 Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to
submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the
procedural incongruence.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant
he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the
inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit
proceeding. 14 It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" 15 and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when
directed by the President of the Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may,
under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon
the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. 17 The
Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo
warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to
be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another." 18 While the quo warranto proceedings filed below
by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality
of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the
authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and
to act in that capacity.
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal
status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the
merits of the petition.
Cdpr

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No.
7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto
municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto
had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had
acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353,
and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition
would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case
been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal
district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after
almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San
Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In
the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San
Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a
duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of
a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a
position within one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so
also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto
proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely
raised. 20 Public interest demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for
being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice
other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact
attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive
Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for
more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor
General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a
similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but
it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all
pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal
district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres
as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement
laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted
as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits
organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued
by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by
the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the
province of Quezon. Cdpr

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the


municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the
Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful
whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create
political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which
in essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done
that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in
the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Present at the meeting when the municipal council of San Narciso,


Quezon adopted Resolution No. 8 were Municipal Mayor Godofredo M. Tan,
Vice-Mayor Jesus R. Cortez, and Councilors Maximino F. Rivadulla,
Eleuterio Aurellana, Juanito Conjares, Dominador Nadres and Felix
Aurellana. Councilor Eduardo L. Ausa was absent. The reasons for the
adoption of Resolution No. 8 are stated in the following clauses:
"WHEREAS, this body has been informed that the chance for the approval
of the bill creating the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy,
Camflora and Tala, into a regular Municipality is very slim;
WHEREAS, the reason behind such disapproval is the patent inability of the
proposed Municipality to pay its would-to-be (sic) employees at the rate
required in the Minimum Wage Law;
WHEREAS, this body in particular, and the great majority of the people of
San Andres in general, notwithstanding the provision of the Minimum Wage
Law, agitate for the separation or segregation of the abovementioned
barrios so as to have a corporate personality in the eyes of the Provincial
Board, in the eyes of Congress and in the eyes of the President;
WHEREAS, once said barrios acquire a corporate personality in the eyes of
the Provincial Board, of Congress and of the President, the development of
said barrios and practically the whole southern tip of the Bondoc Peninsula
will be hastened. (Rollo, p. 162.)
2. This act has provided for a more autonomous government for municipal
districts, amending for the purpose Art. VI, Chapter 64 of the Administrative
Code. Sec. 2 thereof states that "any first class municipal district the annual
receipts of which shall average more than four thousand pesos for four
consecutive fiscal years shall ipso facto be classified as a fifth class
municipality and shall thereafter be governed by the provisions of Articles
one to five, Chapter 64 of the same Code."
3. Rollo, pp. 77-80.
4. 15 SCRA 569, holding that the authority to create municipalities is
essential legislative in nature.
5. Invoked was the Court's ruling in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito 27
SCRA 533.
6. Rollo, pp. 81-83.
7. Rollo, p. 102.
8. Presided by Judge Antonio V. Mendez, Sr.
9. Rollo, pp. 71-74.
10. Named co-petitioners of the Municipality of San Narciso before this
Court are its municipal mayor and thirteen (13) councilors.
11. Rollo, pp. 183-185.
12. Ibid., pp. 2 & 21; Ibid., p. 50.
13. Moran, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT, Vol. 3, 1970 ed., p.
208 citing Newman v. U.S., 238 U.S. 537, 545, 56 L. Ed. 513.
14. Only in few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of
government, an example of which is when the state law allows a private
person to question the regularity of the incorporation of an entity; see E.
McQuillin, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, sec. 3.49, p. 592
(3rd ed. 1949).
15. Sec. 1(c), Rule 66, Rules of Court.
16. Sec. 3, ibid.
17. Sec. 4, ibid.
18. Sec. 6, ibid.
19. Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Tavora v. Ofiana, 83 Phil. 672; Unabia v.
City Mayor (99 Phil. 253). In Castro v. Del Rosario (19 SCRA 196), the
Court stated that the one-year limitation for filing a quo warranto
proceedings is "an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their
right thereto by abandonment."
20. Noteworthy is Section 16, Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which sets a
five-year limitation for filing a quo warranto action if its purpose is to bring
about the "forfeiture of charter" of a corporation, that period to be counted
from the time "the act complained of was done or committed."
21. Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, supra at p. 534;
SSK Parts Corporation v. Camas, 181 SCRA 675.
22. Briad Agro Development Corporation v. De la Serna, 174 SCRA 524,
532 citing Government of P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634.

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