Administration without Borders

Author(s): Jonathan GS Koppell

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 70, Supplement to Volume 70: The Future of
Public Administration in 2020 (December 2010), pp. S46-S55
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
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 Jonathan GS Koppell
Arizona State University

Part 1: 2020: Administration without Borders

The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly

Jonathan GS Koppell is director of the To thrive in 2O2O, we must conceive of the field of crisis and the remarkable events of the last several
School of Public Affairs at Arizona State Uni-
public administration in the broadest possible terms. years, coming on top of waves of reform and innova-
versity. His most recent book, World Rule:

Accountability, Legitimacy and the Design Phenomena that typically have been treated peripherally tion, suggest that remaining within existing disciplin-
of Global Governance, was published by the in our literature are emerging center stage in recent years, ary borders risks marginalization of our field. Only by
University of Chicago Press in August 2010.
confirming that the "old" boundaries of our discipline do forcefully resisting the academic tendency to bur-
He also has written on public-private hybrid

organizations and financial regulation. not reflect contemporary reality. After reviewing three key row ever deeper within disciplinary confines can we
E-mail: [email protected] developments - the rise of mixed and nongovernmental maintain our vitality. The emerging world of public
institutions in public policy, the increasing importance administration without borders requires a significant
of market mechanisms, and the assertion of meaningful reorientation.

global regulation - an argument is made for a broader

reconception of "publicness" that goes hand in hand with In this brief essay, I will highlight three ascend-
the embrace of governance in lieu of administration. ant institutional forms and practices that transcend
boundaries that traditionally define the study of pub-
most formidable enclosures are those that lic administration. This list is not comprehensive, nor
go unrecognized, creating a confinement so should this essay be read as an indictment of our field
profound that those entrapped are unaware for "missing" these developments. All of the topics
of the boundary. In the movie The Truman Show, Jim have been looked at by scholars of public administra-
Carrey's character is the subject of a "reality" television tion (and other disciplines), but because they are not
show, living his entire life within an elaborate sound- easily accommodated within our existing bins, they
stage. He exists in this state of ignorance, with his every have not been embraced as core issues in our field.
move providing entertainment for the viewers at home,
until a sequence of developments reveals the very • First, organizations that mix characteristics of
real limits of his world. Alerted to his containment, governmental and nongovernmental entities now
he is driven to break out of this bubble, overcoming play a central role in the delivery of public goods
obstacles thrown in his path by the shows producer, and services in almost every policy arena.
who suggests that the neatness • Second, market mechanisms
of Truman's artificially circum- in the regulation and alloca-
scribed world is preferable to the tion of scarce resources seem to
The adventures of Dwight
chaos beyond its limits. be favored in numerous policy
Waldo and his acolytes are areas.

not (yet) the stuff of reality • Third, cross-border coopera-

The adventures of Dwight
Waldo and his acolytes are not television, but as public tion and, in some cases, relianc
(yet) the stuff of reality televi-
administration scholars we now on institutions that span natio
sion, but as public adminis- find ourselves similarly confined states is an increasingly com-
tration scholars we now find mon response to transnational
by boundaries that have arisen
ourselves similarly confined around our field over the last public policy challenges.
by boundaries that have arisen
around our field over the last hundred years. To remain Each of these developments
hundred years. To remain
relevant in 2020, we must step is considered before turning
relevant in 2020, we must step beyond the lines that define to a discussion of the changes
beyond the lines that define our our field but do not reflect required in our collective mind
field but do not reflect contem- set to push these matters to the
contemporary realities.
porary realities. The financial forefront. Essentially, I argue th

S46 Public Administration Review • December 2010 • Special Issue

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in order to maintain and even increase relevance in 2020, we must created as part of the New Deal persisted (Koppell 2003; Stan ton
revise our understanding of both "public" and "administration" to 2002). Indeed, the institutional form proved useful, and govern-
better match emerging practices. This means rejecting the equation of ment corporations proliferated and evolved in response to changing
"public" with "governmental" and instead taking in the full panoply of conditions (Moe 1983).
programs and institutions that create and protect public goods, regard-
less of organizational sector. It also means expanding our understand- Government corporations introduce a different logic into the
ing of "administration" to include market-based programs that eschew administrative equation by virtue of their reliance on fee-based
the state production and distribution of public goods and services that revenue generation to cover costs.1 Admittedly, most government
once defined government bureaucracy. Indeed, "governance in the corporations are not formally limited by their income; their budgets
public interest" might be a better moniker for our field than "public are not literally constrained by revenues, but managers of govern-
administration." Finally, the pressures of academic specialization that ment corporations must shape activities with the goal of breaking
keep international organizations off the radar screen of those interested even (Koppell 2003). And so the delegation of public policy respon-
in bureaucracy and administration must be overcome. sibilities in a variety of areas - housing, power generation, uranium
disposal, agriculture - often operates under a different dynamic
In his Spirit of Public Administration (1997), H. George Freder- than "normal" administration, which requires operation within an
ickson considered the meaning of "public" and "administration" appropriation not linked to agency revenue. If recent history is an
and expressed reservations about the expansion of these terms. He accurate guide, the linkage between programmatic revenue and bud-
persuasively argued that the transmogrification of public administra- get is likely to be stronger by 2020, a development that shapes the
tion into "governance" would move our field away from the very politics of policy in which that connection is drawn (e.g., highway
real matters of managing complex organizations and implementing funding, national parks) and those in which it is not.
public policy. But even in the 1 3 years since that book was pub-
lished, the practice of public administration has spilled over the Mutations of the basic government corporation have spread across
boundaries of our discipline. "Public policies" are not exclusively the governmental landscape. The federal government now boasts a
implemented by government agencies wielding traditional tools. In fairly extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example. Inspired
shaping the meaning of public administration, we should favor the in part by the Small Business Administration's Small Business
empirical over the theoretical. Investment Company program, which offers financial assistance
to privately run funds that direct capital to smaller firms, both the
Organizations Mixing Sectors Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Agency for
From its origins in the writings of ancient philosophers and our International Development oversaw portfolios of government ven-
spiritual godfather Niccolo Machiavelli to our more proximate ture capital funds (Koppel 1999). The Central Intelligence Agency s
founder Woodrow Wilson, public administration has been taken In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget wizard from the
to refer to the theory and practice of government. The view is fairly James Bond films, prompted the U.S. Army to start its own fund,
universal; scholars around the world have pursued work that hews OnPoint Technologies (Rottenberg 2006). Similar programs have
to the public administration as government line. This approach was proliferated at the state and local level (Lerner 2009).
understandable in the past, but it now feels artificial. The last few
decades have seen reliance on a wide variety of institutions to deliver The quirkiness, obscurity, and peculiar names associated with these
public policy (O'Leary, Gerard, and Bingham 2006; Seidman 1988; and other organizations that break the mold of government bureau-
Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Pushed by changes in budget rules, cracies have kept the study of quasi-government out of mainstream
fiscal constraints, and a belief that market instruments are more public administration studies. But the centrality in the financial
effectively wielded by institutions designed to function in the mar- crisis of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored
ketplace, there has been a proliferation of public- private hybrids, enterprises (GSEs) that originated as government corporations,
partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental entities, underscores the need to pay more attention to institutions that do
and other nontraditional approaches to public management (Kettl not fit into the typical categories of bureaucratic study. For one
2006). In the last two years, we have even witnessed an unantici- thing, the effects of the Fannie and Freddie collapse will be far-
pated American revival of a different variation on quasi-government, reaching. As Congress wrestles with the future of these two compa-
government ownership of for-profit enterprises. nies, other quasi-governmental entities such as the Federal Home
Loan Bank system (which also plays a central role in the U.S. hous-
None of this is new - either as a phenomenon or as a subject in ing finance system and is even more obscure to students of Ameri-
public administration discourse. Public authorities predate the can government than the GSEs) will be drawn into the discussion
United States as mechanisms for the delivery of collective goods (Hoffmann and Cassell 2002).
that endow entities outside the formal government bureaucracy
with pseudo-governmental powers (Doig 2001; Walsh 1978). In Moreover, the activities of quasi-governmental organizations cannot
the United States, public authorities - and their cousins, special be detached from "normal" government. Not only will the financial
districts and other municipal corporations - are familiar parts of implications of the GSEs' collapse still be felt in 2020, their restruc-
the local governance landscape (Foster 1997; Leigland 1994). The turing has put the entire federal approach to housing and financial
modern era of federal experimentation began during World War I, regulation on the table as well. Most fundamentally, the Fannie
during which there was a population boom of government corpora- and Freddie debacle calls into question the ability of bureaucrats to
tions to facilitate wartime production. Although these entities were effectively administer government participation in markets. Policies
dissolved following the Great War, the government corporations that that harness the creditworthiness of the U.S. government are

Administration without Borders S47

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immensely appealing on paper, but the administration challenges for government officials, inside and around these organizations.
cannot be overlooked when confronted with events of the last two Consider another class of sector-spanning institutions that has
years. The regulatory administration was clearly overwhelmed, but received attention in recent years: sovereign wealth funds. These are
the problem runs deeper. In the midst of a mortgage credit crisis, vast accumulations of capital, often accrued from the sale of natural
members of Congress used Fannie and Freddie to stimulate or sus- resources, controlled by governments. Most attention has gone to
tain markets even as the condition of their balance sheets was going the funds associated with petrostates such as Russia, Kuwait, United
from bad to catastrophic. Senators suggested lowering the GSEs' Arab Emirates, and Norway, but there are others with wealth that
capital requirements even as the federal government put billions on is not derived from oil and gas sales (e.g., China, Singapore). And
the line to cover company losses to keep propping up house prices there are massive funds controlled by subnational governments,
(Duhigg 2008). One cannot understand such developments - and including American entities such as the Alaska Permanent Fund,
the administrative challenge for government officials working in this and various state pension funds, most notably Calpers.
area - without a strong understanding of the business logic driving
the institutions at the heart of this policy arena. Each of these entities offers a formidable public administration chal-
lenge as the leaders and staff of these organizations - some govern-
Our collective comfort with the incongruity of government spon- ment employees and some retained management firms - seek to
sorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now seems fairly quaint. As balance revenue maximization, risk management, and other policy
publicly traded companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, considerations in portfolio management (Kimmitt 2008). Recently,
the GSEs unambiguously owe a profitable return to their sharehold- attention has been focused on the estimates of returns offered by pen-
ers even as they meet regulatory demands for fiscal safety and attain- sion fund managers. Slight changes in these estimates have profound
ment of public policy goals (Koppell 2003). The companies are now budgetary implications for the states and municipalities that rely on
effectively government agencies, maintaining a shareholder struc- these entities to meet their obligations to retired employees (Walsh
ture mostly as a means of keeping their liabilities off-budget. The 2010). So the decision to rely on hybrid organizations raises myriad
spectacle of firms with no implicit government guarantee receiving novel policy questions, but the successful implementation of such an
bailouts in 2008 and 2009 actually eclipsed this development. With approach requires an equally profound réévaluation of administra-
the federal government now the dominant shareholder in General tive assumptions (Justice and Miller 2010). Scholars focused on the
Motors, AIG, Chrysler, and Citigroup, the problem of murkiness administrative issues raised by hybrid government can make a valu-
in corporate objectives is more widespread; claims that maximizing able contribution to policy debates by highlighting the implementa-
shareholder value is the unchallenged corporate purpose for these tion pitfalls that are often unconsidered in the policy-making process.
American state-owned enterprises are undermined by the thorny
reality of government officials seeking to impose policy objectives The mixing of sectors is hardly limited to government and for-profit
(e.g., saving dealerships from elimination) (King 2009). Similarly, firms; the thickening of ties between government and nonprofit orga-
financial institutions that accepted Troubled Asset Relief Program nizations is also undermining the public administration as govern-
funds are assailed for their practices - from nonlending to executive ment syllogism. Nonprofits are now vital instruments of public policy
compensation - with the linkage between dissatisfaction and their in a host of domains (Clerkin and Gronbjerg 2007). They receive
receipt of government largesse quite explicit. favorable tax treatment and direct grants, of course, and also are
engaged as contractors for federal, state, and local agencies (Dionne
Public administration scholars must confront such developments and Chen 2001). This trend seems to transcend partisan dividing
head on, and they must not be deterred by the "business-y ' aspects of lines (White 2009). President Barack Obama kept in place the Office
quasi-government. Corporations in which the public has a material of Faith-Based Initiatives established in the White House by George
interest must be an integral part of our disciplinary territory. Leaving W. Bush, a particular species of collaboration that may have been
such institutions to be studied by scholars from other fields is more seen as endangered under a Democratic administration (Allard 2009).
than an interdisciplinary turf concession, it is an ideological choice
with policy consequences. To leave analysis of the corporations owned Schools of public administration have generally embraced students
wholly or in part by the federal government, or those receiving bil- who aspire to manage nonprofit organizations, reflecting the need
lions in taxpayer funded bailouts, to economists, finance professors, to offer an attractive product to potential master's students in an
and scholars from fields other than public administration is to deny environment that has seen declining interest in government employ-
the "publicness" of this phenomenon. By examining these newly cre- ment. The field of public administration should remain synchro-
ated creatures as subjects of public administration inquiry, however, nized with this curricular demand, or scholars may find themselves
we can (and should) make clear that steps taken with respect to these out of place in the very schools that are our home. Again, I am not
entities must be examined in more than mere economic or financial suggesting that this is not happening. In education, health, hous-
terms. Indeed, extending the umbrella of public administration to ing, and other areas, public administration scholars have looked at
cover such entities - and explicating the administrative complexi- nonprofits, but this remains a secondary topic in our field.
ties of such arrangements - may reduce the likelihood of Uncle Sam
holding equity in these firms 10 years from now. Treating boundary-spanning organizations - both familiar and
novel - as core subjects of public administration scholarship is
There are both policy and administration dimensions to these devel- important for another reason. One might argue that although these
opments. The former receives more attention, but the latter is of types of organizations are instruments or consequences of govern-
primary interest here. Government-sponsored enterprises and other ment policy, they are at the margins of our disciplines traditional
mixed institutions introduce distinctive imperatives and constraints focus. But the effects of introducing these creatures into the

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environment are felt in every traditional area of the future of our field. First, we have more
administration research, placing new demands The proliferation of entities that and more institutions that do not look like
on government bureaucracies and processes. span public and private traditional government agencies. We should
sectors . . . has first- and resist our collective tendency to treat these
The regulators and bureaucrats overseeing novel arrangements as sui generis deviations
second-order effects that ought
hybrids and firms with government owner- from a norm. The public-private hybrid is the
to influence the future of our
ship stakes, for example, are on terrain as contemporary norm, and thus the effective
field. First, we have more and administration of such entities should be a
unexplored by public administration scholars
as those they are supervising. Hybrid organi- more institutions that do not central concern and one that informs, and is
zations are linked less formally to the federal look like traditional government informed by, mainstream public administra-
bureaucracy than traditional agencies; they are tion discourse. Second, increased reliance
agencies. . . . Second, increased
often not in the budget, they are not staffed on organizations that blur the lines between
reliance on organizations that
by appointees, and they are exempt from public and private alters the burden on tradi-
blur the lines between public
management laws (Koppell 2001). Regulatory tional government bureaucracies. Many of the
relationships are de facto substitutes for these and private alters the burden core processes in which public administration
severed administrative ties (Koppell 2003). on traditional government is interested - from personnel to procurement
Goals must be translated into specific require- bureaucracies. to budgeting - are upset by the introduction
ments that can be applied without under- of these new bureaucratic beasts. And new
mining the hybrid. If the regulation is too responsibilities, discussed more in the next
onerous, the theoretical benefits promised by the quasi-governmen- section, increase the emphasis on skills (predicting markets, assess-
tal structures may be lost. On the other hand, failure to adequately ing risks) that have never been bureaucratic strengths.
regulate hybrid organizations can leave the public policy objectives
unreached thus undermining the underlying purpose. The regulator Using Markets to Deliver Public Goods
has to balance conflicting goals - financing housing for Americans Treating "market" as the opposite of "government" is just as limiting as
without threatening the fiscal health of the U.S. government, in this regarding "public" as governments synonym. Although governments
case - with no obvious solution. Adapting regulation to this task has obviously regulate markets and even participate in them as buyers and
proven a challenge, with the current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sellers, historically public administration has treated government as
situation a dramatic illustration. Even with the companies facing fis- something outside the marketplace. In the canon of public adminis-
cal disaster, Congress smacked the regulator (which it had chastised tration, attention typically is focused on government programs and
for its weak oversight of the two firms) when it attempted to set institutions that produce and distribute goods and services through a
limits on size of the portfolio size, and increased the size of the loans vertically organized bureaucracy. Similarly, regulatory responsibilities
Fannie and Freddie could purchase (Shenn and Tyson 2008). are carried out with a "command and control" approach as govern-
ment bureaucrats write rules and impose them on private actors. This
For students of public administration, such oversight follies beg the image is not accurate today - as the examples in the previous section
question of bureaucratic ability to effectively regulate the proliferat- indicate - and it certainly will not be 1 0 years from now.
ing public-private hybrid organizations. Similarly, the now com-
mon collaboration between government agencies and nonprofits Some government participation in markets has received careful
should raise concern regarding bureaucratic capacity to manage such attention from public administration scholars. Procurement, for
programs (Seiden, Sowa, and Sandfort 2006). The emergence of a example, is a core subject, and it includes, by extension, some of the
set of special companies - those financial institutions that, through most current topics, including the contracting out of government
scale or interconnectedness, are deemed "too big to fail" - raises the services (e.g., Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Frederickson
stakes considerably. With investors and business partners confident and Frederickson 2006). Other subjects inevitably touch on the gov-
that the government will step in to make them whole no matter ernment as a market participant. As an employer, for example, the
what goes wrong, the emerging burden on financial regulators will government is a major participant in labor markets, not just a regula-
dwarf those placed on GSE regulators. Government officials have tor (e.g., Fernandez, Smith, and Wenger 2007). But the field has not
been given unprecedented responsibilities, including setting com- followed as enthusiastically as public administration has entered the
pensation levels for executives of publicly traded financial institu- market in at least three ways: first, the increased reliance on market-
tions. If proposals now before Congress are adopted, government oriented tools of government, like extension of insurance and guar-
bureaucrats will be put in a position to evaluate massive financial antees; second, the transformation of regulation from a tool to curb
institutions and empowered to preemptively deconstruct them when negative behavior into a substitute for traditional government service
they pose a dire threat to the economy (Puzzanghera 2009). It is provision; and third, the emphasis on market-based approaches to
worth noting here that in-depth analysis of the agencies that will be regulation in particular substantive fields (e.g., climate change). Each
on the spot - the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Office should be seen as fertile public administration research topics.
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve - is surprisingly scarce in In 2020, public policy strategies incorporating market mechanisms
the archival pages of this journal. that are less familiar to students of bureaucracy are likely to be
most popular. The use of loan guarantees and government insur-
The proliferation of entities that span the public and private sec- ance, for example, represents an intelligent leveraging of the U.S.
tors thus has first- and second-order effects that ought to influence government's creditworthiness that does not strain the budget.

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Given the debt being accumulated at present, it seems safe to such a way that behavior is modified without creating unintended
assume that this will be a significant virtue for the foreseeable future. consequences. Current experience with incentives created for
In a wide range of policy areas, including agriculture, housing, ethanol production is a cautionary tale. Farmers switching to fuel
trade, small business, energy, and international development, such corn production from the growth of crops for human and feedstock
approaches are already well integrated into federal policy (Salamon consumption is causing a rise in food prices (Ayre 2007). Did the
2002). They effect change not by direct expenditure, but by altering bureaucracy have the knowledge necessary to predict this outcome
the incentives of private market participants. and the ability to resist legislative will? This is a vital question for
our field. Indeed, the historic health care legislation passed in March
This approach to public administration poses many distinctive ques- 2010 will require government bureaucrats to create insurance
tions that should be embraced. It reduces outlays but increases risk exchanges whose smooth-functioning will be key to the success of
rather than debt, for instance. But the federal government has not the new system.
demonstrated its competency as a risk manager, and, with trillions
of dollars in outstanding liability, we are already sitting on an explo- As if these adaptations were not putting enough pressure on regula-
sive financial powder keg. The chain reaction stemming from the tory agencies, the place of traditional regulation in the arsenal of the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market gave vivid evidence of the government is under attack. Market-based mechanisms are offered
consequences of leverage gone awry. Yet the policy response - wise as a more preferable - and more politically feasible - approach to
or unwise - extended the government s guarantee to some of the vexing problems than conventional command and control arrange-
most troubled institutions and thus dramatically increased exposure ments. The cutting edge of this trend is emissions regulation.
of the public treasury. Congress has not seriously addressed the risk
management problem, and it will be hard-pressed to do so in the The effort to cap greenhouse gas emissions is now centered on
future, for any comprehensive management of federal risk would determining the appropriate approach. The command and con-
likely establish limits on the extension of federal guarantees. Public trol approach, after years of being pilloried, is being pushed aside
administration scholars can push this issue to the forefront by mak- by market-based approaches and enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol
ing risk management a core topic in our field (Hood, Rothstein, and (Stavins 2003; Stavins, Keohane, and Revesz 1998; Woerdman
Baldwin 2001; Pollak 1996). 2004). So the answer is not to create requirements for more efficient
smokestack scrubbers or lower-sulfur coal. Even a more traditional

Instead of turning to mixed institutions, collaborative partner- market approach, a carbon tax, is widely scorned. The popular
ships, or contractual relationships, governments often use creative solution, and the one adopted by the U.S. House of Representa-
regulatory strategies to pursue public policy objectives in ways that tives, is a cap and trade system. Trading in emissions permits places
stretch our conception of regulation. The mandate of regulatory the reduction decisions in the hands of firms, allowing them to
bodies has been expanded to include the shaping of incentives for determine the most efficient way to satisfy societal targets (Antes,
private market participants to induce creation of public goods. This Hansjürgens, and Letmathe 2008). This logic has been extended
moves away from a narrower idea of regulation as mechanism to to land use, where grazing permits and mineral extraction rights
limit negative externalities. Shifting the burden of producing public have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). This approach uses the
goods from government to private actors, this regulation might be market to determine the "value" of the privilege to consume a public
seen as inducing the creation of positive externalities. good and even shifts political activism to the marketplace by giving
environmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use privileges or
One example that has received attention in recent years is the use pollution permits.
of the Community Reinvestment Act to steer capital into poorer
communities. The law sets requirements for financial institutions These programs represent another type of regulatory governance.
to serve "whole communities" and represents a response to the The state retains some responsibility for establishing the rules of the
problem of "redlining," or the systematic avoidance of communities market. And the commodity being traded in many cases - permits,
by financial institutions (Barr 2005). By setting a regulatory require- credits, licenses - derives value by virtue of government programs
ment, this law effectively steers capital into areas where it is chroni- (Durant et al. 2004). But unlike programs that keep decisions
cally undersupplied. Critics have charged that the implementation regarding allocation and preferred method in the hands of regula-
of the Community Reinvestment Act, with insufficient attention tors, market programs shift as much discretion as possible to the
to the reliance on unscrupulous loan originators, added fuel to the market participants. Again, public administration must embrace
subprime crisis (Pressman 2008). such developments and see the decision-making processes of these
regulated firms as part of our field rather than cede this terrain to
This is precisely the type of challenge introduced by the movement other disciplines. Doing so will leave critical elements - issues of
from one type of governance to another, and a reason why it should equity, process, and governance - out of the equation.
be treated as a marked shift in public administration. Majone
(1997) calls it the substitution of regulatory governance for positive Transnational Governance

governance. For regulatory bureaucracies, this represents a reorder- In almost every policy arena, the most severe public policy problems
ing of the goals and measures of success. In such circumstances, are not confined by political boundaries. Each day brings new stories
regulatory bureaucracies depend on the regulated entities to thrive indicating the need for a deeper appreciation of the interaction
in order to achieve policy objectives. Regulators must understand between phenomena experienced on opposite sides of the globe in
the considerations driving the business calculations of firms in the realm of security, environmental protection, and public health. As
targeted areas. Any rules must be calibrated to alter these calculi in noted earlier, changes in fuel regulation on one continent are blamed

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for the inflation of food prices and even stability-shattering riots on demands. Indeed, each organization - even those that are part of the
the other side of the globe. Calamity in one financial market spreads United Nations "system" of organizations - is truly distinctive.
almost instantaneously to others. Deadly diseases take advantage of
modern transportation to cross oceans in a matter of hours. Criminals In recent decades, the landscape of international organizations
prey on victims from remote corners of the Earth using wild schemes has become more diverse as nongovernmental bodies and quasi-
or devious software. The demand for raw materials in Chinas bur- governmental bodies play an increasingly prominent role in global
geoning economy drives commodity prices higher and renders cost governance. Standard-setting bodies such as the International Orga-
estimates for municipal construction projects hopelessly low. nization for Standardization or the International Electrotechincal
Commission originated as obscure industrial coordination bodies,
There is, of course, a substantial collection of international organiza- intended to ensure the interoperability of devices and mechani-
tions devoted to addressing these problems. People are most familiar cal parts. But the substantive footprint of these entities has grown
with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., over the years to include management processes and even corporate
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank) but there are many social responsibility. More specialized bodies such as the Interna-
others, some affiliated with the United Nations and others not. tional Accounting Standards Board, a nonprofit organization based
There are a host of regional organizations that work with or comple- in London, promulgate standards that are just as crucial in global
ment global efforts. And, it is important to remember, there are financial regulation as those produced by the intergovernmental
many nongovernmental bodies that play a vital role in addressing Basel Committee on Capital Standards. From an administrative
transnational challenges. The development of such organizations perspective, these standard-setting bodies represent a significant
and their assumption of meaningful roles are accelerating. The departure from standard models of governmental rulemaking. In
recent meetings of the G-20, for example, included a commitment general, the work of these entities is carried out by members - with
to better coordinate financial regulation as a response to the lessons the staff playing mostly a supporting role - who participate through
learned from the financial crisis (Financial Stability Board 2009). technical committees and working groups centered around substan-
tive areas of concern. Naturally, this creates a dynamic entirely dif-
Public administration as a field has been slower than the bureaucra- ferent from that associated with a typical Administrative Procedure
cies we study to appreciate and devote attention to this new reality. Act rulemaking exercise.
The pages of our journals feature limited discussion of the distinctive
administrative issues associated with transnational bureaucracies. This Even more intriguing, there has been a proliferation of nongovern-
is probably attributable to the way in which disciplinary lines are mental standard-setting bodies with a clear social agenda driving
drawn in political science and public administration. For the most their work. The Forest Stewardship Council and the Marine Stew-
part, international organizations are the purview of the "international ardship Council are perhaps the best known to American consum-
relations" subfield of political science. Many of the seminal scholars ers. These organizations attempt to get market power behind their
looking at international organizations were interested in organiza- standards, and, when successful, these can be every bit as compelling
tional design and administration; their work would be comfortable as the rules set forth by intergovernmental organizations. Indeed,
alongside public administration research (Haas 1964; Jacobson 1979). one key finding of my recently completed study of international
Alas, most contemporary research in this area is not as concerned with rulemaking organizations was that the adherence dynamics - includ-
administrative issues, and, for the most part, our field remains focused ing rule adoption and enforcement - were not terribly different for
on institutions within a single jurisdiction - or perhaps comparisons government and nongovernment rule-makers (Koppell 2010).
across a small number of such entities.

If the mere existence of global rulemaking

Transnational governance has been with us for bodies is not enough to attract the attention
longer than many may realize. The Universal If the mere existence of of public administration scholars, the increas-
Postal Union and the International Telecom- ing centrality of transnational rules in a wide
various global rulemaking
munications Union (née Telegraph) were variety of policy arenas - from food safety to
created in the 1 860s to facilitate smoother bodies is not enough to
money laundering to Internet commerce -
cross-border communication (Murphy 1994). attract the attention of public
ought to be. The emergence of a world
In the years since, many other international administration scholars,
government is not at hand, but the increasing
organizations have been created to deal with the increasing centrality of importance of global rulemaking bodies sug-
issues requiring global coordination and transnational rules in a wide gests a future of meaningful public adminis-
harmonization. Traditionally, these have been tration that transcends borders. And like the
variety of policy arenas -
intergovernmental organizations with a basis rise of quasi-governmental bodies domesti-
from food safety to money-
in treaties among states. The World Intel- cally, the emergence of global governance has
lectual Property Organization, for example, laundering to Internet
secondary effects at home.
has its origins in several nineteenth-century commerce - ought to be.
treaties signed to protect copyrights and trade- The intertwining of American bureaucracy
marks across borders. The International Civil with global governance organizations is a far
Aviation Organization arose to establish safety and communicationsless advanced phenomenon than the proliferation of public-private
standards when transoceanic flight became a part of everyday life. hybrids or the incorporation of market mechanisms, but it is already
Each of these organizations developed a bureaucracy, administrative an important fact of life in many policy areas (O'Toole and Hanf
procedures, and a rulemaking process suitable to a unique set of 2002). Bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
Administration without Borders S51

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the World Intellectual Property Organization, and, most famously, equation of "public" with "government" and seeing administration
the World Trade Organization make rules with serious ramifications in the broadest possible light to capture all of the varied approaches
for American actors. In many cases, these rules can conflict with to governance (Frederickson 1997). Divorcing the idea of "public-
American statutes and regulations, requiring adaptation on the part ness" from government can maintain the field's vitality without
of government agencies and firms. And contrary to the view that the rendering it hopelessly amorphous, as some have feared. In the most
U.S. government is unbending in the face of international norms, straightforward formulation, to be a public organization is to be of
this accommodation of international rules occurs regularly (Chayes the government. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1994) refined this
and Chayes 1991). notion to recognize the reality that many organizations that are not
literally governmental (such as government contractors or some
More importantly, the American government is taking its partici- nonprofits) are funded by governments or derive their authority
pation in such international organizations more seriously than from governments, making them public as well. Others have looked
has been the case historically (DaVaux 2000). For decades, the at the tools employed by an organization, the mechanisms used to
International Organization for Standardization, which promul- control the organization, or the expectations facing an organiza-
gates standards in a host of industrial areas, has been dominated tion as the relevant criteria to determine publicness (Antonsen and
by Europeans, giving businesses from these countries a significant Jorgensen 1997; Bozeman 1987, 2007; Pesch 2008). These concep-
potential advantage. If global standards match European standards tualizations of "public" would take in many of the developments
(and not American), the size of the potential market accessible described in this essay. Still, these approaches do not disentangle
to European firms without costly adaptation to local markets is publicness from sector because the aspects of organizational design
significant (DaVaux 2000). So participation in the deliberations of that connote publicness ultimately trace back to government (Lan
international bodies is a commonplace responsibility for American and Rainey 1992; Perry and Rainey 1988).
bureaucrats.
To frame publicness as something distinct from governmentalness,
Agencies now routinely devote staff to international issues and the quality of an organization's function, its role in society, and the
participate in global and regional transnational organizations. The impact of its activities must be captured (Bozeman and Bretsch-
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, has an international neider 1994, 219; Haque 2001). Ten years from now, we should
office. More importantly, the regulations produced by the commis- see "publicness" as a measure of the extent to which an organization
sion make frequent reference to the International Atomic Energy draws on, invokes, or affects the common interests of all members
Agency (IAEA) regulations and the requirement that American of a society (Haque 2001; Nutt and Backoff 1993; Pesch 2008;
entities comply with IAEA standards and make themselves open Wamsley and Zald 1976). We might capture publicness by look-
to IAEA inspections (NRC 2004). This type of recognition of the ing for the pursuit of collective goods and an effect on individuals'
primacy of international regulations is far from universal, but the public or civic interests.
practices of many government bureaucracies reflect international
mandates from entities such as the World Customs Union, the Uni- • Collective goods: Organizations serving a common interest
versal Postal Union, and the Convention on the Trade in Interna- should be regarded as more public (Haque 2001). Nondivisible
tional and Endangered Species. public goods are, in this sense, more public than individually
consumed goods. Thus, to illustrate with a rather extreme com-
The need for an integrated global financial regulatory architecture parison, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
was highlighted by the crisis, but active support for transnational is more public than the Coca-Cola Company, even though the
rulemaking institutions in this policy area has been growing for beverage maker serves a larger percentage of the world's popula-
some time. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, tion. Organizations that pursue profits for shareholders are less
for example, has gained prominence as shutting off the finan- public than those endeavoring to maintain collective goods such
cial spigot has become a tool to stop terrorists (Ayres 2002). The as security. Similarly, control of a common good - by a private
Securities and Exchange Commission and the nongovernmental or governmental organization - renders an organization more
Financial Accounting Standards Board consult with the Interna- public.
tional Accounting Standards Board as it develops the International • Civic interests: Publicness is about more than collectivity.
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It was announced recently Some individual considerations are highly public. State coercion
that companies listing in the United States need only prepare IFRS is public not only because it reflects government's monopoly on
accounting, thus saving them the expense of reporting their finan- violence, but also because it deprives individuals of their rights of
cial data according to GAAP standards (SEC 2007). citizenship. An organization is directly impinging on the "pub-
lic" side of the individual (Benn and Gaus 1983). Organizations
By 2020, our field should have embraced the international arena, can be differentiated on this basis. Those that affect individuals'

bringing attention from those serious about organization and purely private interests - say, their product choices - are less
administration. At a minimum, educated public administrators must public than those that affect civic interests such as voting ability
be aware of and well versed in the dynamics of global governance. or the right to purchase property.

More than any single addition to the research agenda, the most pro- Few have trouble seeing the work of governmental bodies as public
found adaptation required is that we embrace a broader understand- in character given these criteria. And government contractors
ing of "public administration" to include all forms of governance would still be seen as part of the public administration firmament
intended to serve public interests. This means moving beyond the with publicness framed in this light. For example, private prison

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operators, companies that have assumed increasing responsibility for forms of public nonjurisdictional or nongovernmental policymaking
housing the nation's inmates, are carrying out a collective function and implementation" (2005, 294). Indeed, this covers a substan-
and affect the civic interests of inmates (e.g., Morris 1998). Simi- tial portion of the developments described in these pages. Much
larly, Halliburton drew questions - and charges of malfeasance - research that comes under the governance heading, Frederickson
precisely because it was carrying out the administration of public notes, complements the bread and butter of public administration,
functions in Iraq (e.g., Gibbons 2004). the "day-to-day management of an agency or organization," and
public administration could even be expanded to include "public
But there are nongovernmental organizations that might not be seen administration of governance," the management of nongovernmen-
as falling within the purview of public administration that would tal institutions and organizations" (Frederickson 2005, 300). This
seem more public when considered in the proposed approach. The starts to sound a lot like the expanded view of "public" proposed
Educational Testing Service, for example, is a New Jersey- based above. From a disciplinary marketing perspective, an imperialistic
nonprofit organization that creates and administers a range of version of governance that includes both the day-to-day challenges
academic tests that are crucial to thousands of students seeking of administration and the transformation of states and governments
admission to American universities every year. The exams are offered may be most attractive. This is perhaps broader than that which
around the world and constitute a gateway to U.S. higher educa- Frederickson contemplates. In short, governance would include the
tion. Thus, the role performed by this private entity is public in its whole of public administration as we know it and then some!
effect and broad in scope. Unsurprisingly, this
organization has been criticized by teachers, One can easily get caught up debating labels
students, parents, and concerned interest One can easily get caught up ad infinitum. Whether we use "public admin-
groups (Jackson 1986; Nordheimer and Franz debating labels ad infinitum. istration" or "governance" is less important
1997). It makes sense for public administra- Whether we use "public than the boundaries we define for our field
tion scholars in the education area to view the and the relationship of those boundaries to
administration" or "governance"
Educational Testing Service as a legitimate the world in which we are interested. In its
is less important than the
subject of inquiry. There are other examples in early days, public administration was the
boundaries we define for our
different policy arenas - such as credit rating heart of political science. Indeed, the two were
agencies that are crucial element of financial field and the relationship of essentially indistinguishable. In the years since,
architecture or the standard-setting bodies dis- those boundaries to the world however, our field has become increasingly dis-
cussed earlier - that might be more persuasive in which we are interested. connected from many of the big-picture ques-
to some (Sinclair 2005). tions and seen as being narrowly concerned
with bureaucratic processes and the implementation of government
This is not offered as a definitive approach, but rather to suggest a programs. Indeed, we ought to take umbrage at the fact that many of
sense in which publicness can be separated from governmentalness the giants of our field who pushed beyond this definition - Herbert
to redefine our disciplinary terrain. Others would undoubtedly Simon, Chester Barnard, Mary Parker Follet, and Charles Lindblom,
improve on this primitive effort. A conceptualization of publicness to name few - are now labeled something other than scholars of
that moves beyond government is consistent with an understand- public administration because they do not meet this overly restrictive
ing of "public administration" that captures varied approaches expectation. This development may be an unintended consequence
to governance. Definitions of governance generally touch on the of the rise of schools of public policy and public administration,
processes, systems, and structures (formal and informal) by which which sapped public administration scholarship out of departments
behavior is regulated and constrained (Peters 1995). Our field of political science. Or it may lie much more deeply in an overly
should be concerned with organizations that are charged with creat- eager acceptance of Wilsons politics-administration dichotomy. The
ing order in public spheres. As such, governance does not require historical explanation, however, is a topic for a different essay.
government involvement, although it certainly is very common,
and any organization engaged in governance would be, by defini- The point here is to argue for a reassertion of a more expansive con-
tion, "public" (Peters and Pierre 1998; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; ceptualization of public administration - one that is empirically and
Ruggie 2004). historically grounded - that accommodates the varied forms and
approaches to the implementation of public policy. The enthusiasm
Broadening the view of "public" in such a way that it encompasses with which many scholars have embraced the governance label
varied approaches to governance may seem like a backdoor means speaks to our collective desire to break beyond the boundaries that
of access to the governance trend. Frederickson (2005) offered an have hardened around our field. The contemporary developments
insightful critique of the faddish rise of "governance" in place of sketched in this essay are offered to force a confrontation with the
public administration. While expressing some frustration with the artificial limitations that have been placed on public administra-
knee-jerk normative desirability of "governance," which seemed to tion. Like Truman Burbank struggling to get beyond the soundstage
amorphously encompass anything that was supposedly novel and wall, we should pursue a broader conception of our field (whether
good (e.g., New Public Management), he emphasized the value it is called governance or something else) and eagerly revel in all the
of what "governance" does addio the agenda of public adminis- messiness lying beyond the borders.
tration scholars. Governance takes in, according to Frederickson
"(1) vertical and horizontal interjurisdictional and intero rganiza- Note
tional cooperation; (2) extension of the state or jurisdiction by con- 1 . Many so-called government corporations are, in many respects, indistinguishable
tracts or grants to third parties, including subgovernments; and (3) from agencies. They are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and are staffed

Administration without Borders S53

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 by presidential appointees and civil servants. Indeed, the definition of what Frederickson, H. George. 1997. The Spirit of Public Administ
constitutes a government corporation is so ambiguous that a General Accounting Jossey-Bass.

Office study of such organizations (1995) relied on entities to determine whether

they were, in fact, government corporations. ernance Everywhere. In The Oxford Handbook of Public

Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn, and Christopher Pollitt

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