2019/2/23 Proof of impossibility - Wikipedia

Proof of impossibility
A proof of impossibility, also known as negative proof, proof of an impossibility theorem, or negative
result, is a proof demonstrating that a particular problem cannot be solved, or cannot be solved in general. Often
proofs of impossibility have put to rest decades or centuries of work attempting to find a solution. To prove that
something is impossible is usually much harder than the opposite task; it is necessary to develop a theory.[1]
Impossibility theorems are usually expressible as universal propositions in logic (see universal quantification).

One of the most famous proofs of impossibility was the 1882 proof of Ferdinand von Lindemann, showing that the
ancient problem of squaring the circle cannot be solved, because the number π is transcendental (non-algebraic) and
only a subset of the algebraic numbers can be constructed by compass and straightedge. Two other classical problems
—trisecting the general angle and doubling the cube—were also proved impossible in the nineteenth century.

A problem arising in the sixteenth century was that of creating a general formula using radicals expressing the solution
of any polynomial equation of fixed degree k, where k ≥ 5. In the 1820s, the Abel–Ruffini theorem showed this to be
impossible using concepts such as solvable groups from Galois theory, a new subfield of abstract algebra.

Among the most important proofs of impossibility of the 20th century, were those related to undecidability, which
showed that there are problems that cannot be solved in general by any algorithm at all. The most famous is the
halting problem.

In computational complexity theory, techniques like relativization (see oracle machine) provide "weak" proofs of
impossibility excluding certain proof techniques. Other techniques like proofs of completeness for a complexity class
provide evidence for the difficulty of problems by showing them to be just as hard to solve as other known problems
that have proved intractable.

Contents
Types of impossibility proof
Proof by contradiction
Proof by descent

Types of disproof of impossibility conjectures

The existence of irrational numbers: The Pythagoreans' proof
Impossible constructions sought by the ancient Greeks
Angle trisection and doubling the cube
Squaring the circle
Constructing an equilateral n-gon
Euclid's parallel axiom
Fermat's Last Theorem
Richard's paradox
Can this theorem be proved from these axioms? Gödel's proof
Will this computing machine lock in a "circle"? Turing's first proof
Can this string be compressed? Chaitin's proof
Does this Diophantine equation have an integer solution? Hilbert's tenth problem
In social science
In natural science
See also
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Notes
References

Types of impossibility proof

Proof by contradiction
One widely used type of impossibility proof is proof by contradiction. In this type of proof it is shown that if
something, such as a solution to a particular class of equations, were possible, then two mutually contradictory things
would be true, such as a number being both even and odd. The contradiction implies that the original premise is
impossible.

Proof by descent
One type of proof by contradiction is proof by descent. Here it is postulated that something is possible, such as a
solution to a class of equations, and that therefore there must be a smallest solution; then starting from the allegedly
smallest solution, it is shown that a smaller solution can be found, contradicting the premise that the former solution
was the smallest one possible. Thus the premise that a solution exists must be false.

This method of proof can also be interpreted slightly differently, as the method of infinite descent. One postulates that
a positive integer solution exists, whether or not it is the smallest one, and one shows that based on this solution a
smaller solution must exist. But by mathematical induction it follows that a still smaller solution must exist, then a yet
smaller one, and so on for an infinite number of steps. But this contradicts the fact that one cannot find smaller and
smaller positive integers indefinitely; the contradiction implies that the premise that a solution exists is wrong.

Types of disproof of impossibility conjectures

There are two alternative methods of proving wrong a conjecture that something is impossible: by counterexample
(constructive proof) and by logical contradiction (non-constructive proof).

The obvious way to disprove an impossibility conjecture by providing a single counterexample. For example, Euler
proposed that at least n different nth powers were necessary to sum to yet another nth power. The conjecture was
disproved in 1966 with a counterexample involving a count of only four different 5th powers summing to another fifth
power:

275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 = 1445.

A proof by counterexample is a constructive proof.

In contrast, a non-constructive proof that something is not impossible proceeds by showing it is logically contradictory
for all possible counterexamples to be invalid: At least one of the items on a list of possible counterexamples must
actually be a valid counterexample to the impossibility conjecture. For example, a conjecture that it is impossible for
an irrational power raised to an irrational power to be rational was disproved by showing that one of two possible
counterexamples must be a valid counterexample, without showing which one it is.

The existence of irrational numbers: The Pythagoreans'

proof

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The proof by Pythagoras (or more likely one of his students) about 500 BCE has had a profound effect on
mathematics. It shows that the square root of 2 cannot be expressed as the ratio of two integers (counting numbers).
The proof bifurcated "the numbers" into two non-overlapping collections—the rational numbers and the irrational
numbers. This bifurcation was used by Cantor in his diagonal method, which in turn was used by Turing in his proof
that the Entscheidungsproblem (the decision problem of Hilbert) is undecidable.

It is unknown when, or by whom, the "theorem of Pythagoras" was discovered. The discovery can hardly
have been made by Pythagoras himself, but it was certainly made in his school. Pythagoras lived about
570–490 BCE. Democritus, born about 470 BCE, wrote on irrational lines and solids ...

— Heath,

Proofs followed for various square roots of the primes up to 17.

There is a famous passage in Plato's Theaetetus in which it is stated that Teodorus (Plato's teacher)
proved the irrationality of

taking all the separate cases up to the root of 17 square feet ... .[2]

A more general proof now exists that:

The mth root of an integer N is irrational, unless N is the mth power of an integer n".[3]

That is, it is impossible to express the mth root of an integer N as the ratio a⁄b of two integers a and b that share no
common prime factor except in cases in which b = 1.

Impossible constructions sought by the ancient Greeks

Three famous questions of Greek geometry were how:

1. ... with compass and straight-edge to trisect any angle,

2. to construct a cube with a volume twice the volume of a given cube
3. to construct a square equal in area to that of a given circle.
For more than 2,000 years unsuccessful attempts were made to solve these problems; at last, in the 19th century it was
proved that the desired constructions are logically impossible.[4]

A fourth problem of the ancient Greeks was to construct an equilateral polygon with a specified number n of sides,
beyond the basic cases n = 3, 4, 5 that they knew how to construct.

All of these are problems in Euclidean construction, and Euclidean constructions can be done only if they involve only
Euclidean numbers (by definition of the latter) (Hardy and Wright p. 159). Irrational numbers can be Euclidean. A
good example is the irrational number the square root of 2. It is simply the length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle
with legs both one unit in length, and it can be constructed with straightedge and compass. But it was proved centuries
after Euclid that Euclidean numbers cannot involve any operations other than addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, and the extraction of square roots.

Angle trisection and doubling the cube

Both trisecting the general angle and doubling the cube require taking cube roots, which are not constructible
numbers by compass and straightedge.
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Squaring the circle

is not a Euclidean number ... and therefore it is impossible to construct, by Euclidean methods a
length equal to the circumference of a circle of unit diameter[5]

A proof exists to demonstrate that any Euclidean number is an algebraic number—a number that is the solution to
some polynomial equation. Therefore, because was proved in 1882 to be a transcendental number and thus by
definition not an algebraic number, it is not a Euclidean number. Hence the construction of a length from a unit
circle is impossible[6], and the circle cannot be squared.

Constructing an equilateral n-gon

The Gauss-Wantzel theorem showed in 1837 that constructing an equilateral n-gon is impossible for most values of n.

Euclid's parallel axiom

Nagel and Newman consider the question raised by the parallel postulate to be "...perhaps the most significant
development in its long-range effects upon subsequent mathematical history" (p. 9).

The question is: can the axiom that two parallel lines "...will not meet even 'at infinity'" (footnote, ibid) be derived from
the other axioms of Euclid's geometry? It was not until work in the nineteenth century by "... Gauss, Bolyai,
Lobachevsky, and Riemann, that the impossibility of deducing the parallel axiom from the others was demonstrated.
This outcome was of the greatest intellectual importance. ...a proof can be given of the impossibility of proving certain
propositions [in this case, the parallel postlate] within a given system [in this case, Euclid's first four postulates]".
(p. 10)

Fermat's Last Theorem

Fermat's Last Theorem was conjectured by Pierre de Fermat in the 1600s, states the impossibility of finding solutions
in positive integers for the equation with . Fermat himself gave a proof for the n = 4 case using his
technique of infinite descent, and other special cases were subsequently proved, but the general case was not proved
until 1994 by Andrew Wiles.

Richard's paradox
This profound paradox presented by Jules Richard in 1905 informed the work of Kurt Gödel (cf Nagel and Newman
p. 60ff) and Alan Turing. A succinct definition is found in Principia Mathematica[7]:

Richard's paradox ... is as follows. Consider all decimals that can be defined by means of a finite
number of words [“words” are symbols; boldface added for emphasis]; let E be the class of such decimals.
Then E has [an infinite number of] terms; hence its members can be ordered as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, ... Let
X be a number defined as follows [Whitehead & Russell now employ the Cantor diagonal method].
If the n-th figure in the n-th decimal is p, let the n-th figure in X be p + 1 (or 0, if p = 9). Then X is
different from all the members of E, since, whatever finite value n may have, the n-th figure in X is
different from the n-th figure in the n-th of the decimals composing E, and therefore X is different from
the n-th decimal. Nevertheless we have defined X in a finite number of words [i.e. this very definition of
“word” above.] and therefore X ought to be a member of E. Thus X both is and is not a member of E.

— Principia Mathematica, 2nd edition 1927, p. 61

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Kurt Gödel considered his proof to be “an analogy” of Richard's paradox, which he called “Richard's antinomy”.[8] See
more below about Gödel's proof.

Alan Turing constructed this paradox with a machine and proved that this machine could not answer a simple
question: will this machine be able to determine if any machine (including itself) will become trapped in an
unproductive ‘infinite loop’ (i.e. it fails to continue its computation of the diagonal number).

Can this theorem be proved from these axioms? Gödel's

proof
To quote Nagel and Newman (p. 68), "Gödel's paper is difficult. Forty-six preliminary definitions, together with
several important preliminary theorems, must be mastered before the main results are reached" (p. 68). In fact, Nagel
and Newman required a 67-page introduction to their exposition of the proof. But if the reader feels strong enough to
tackle the paper, Martin Davis observes that "This remarkable paper is not only an intellectual landmark, but is
written with a clarity and vigor that makes it a pleasure to read" (Davis in Undecidable, p. 4). It is recommended that
most readers see Nagel and Newman first.

So what did Gödel prove? In his own words:

"It is reasonable... to make the conjecture that ...[the] axioms [from Principia Mathematica
and Peano ] are ... sufficient to decide all mathematical questions which can be formally
expressed in the given systems. In what follows it will be shown that this is not the case, but
rather that ... there exist relatively simple problems of the theory of ordinary whole numbers
which cannot be decided on the basis of the axioms" (Gödel in Undecidable, p. 4).

Gödel compared his proof to "Richard's antinomy" (an "antinomy" is a contradiction or a paradox; for more see
Richard's paradox):

"The analogy of this result with Richard's antinomy is immediately evident; there is also a
close relationship [14] with the Liar Paradox (Gödel's footnote 14: Every epistemological
antinomy can be used for a similar proof of undecidability)... Thus we have a proposition
before us which asserts its own unprovability [15]. (His footnote 15: Contrary to
appearances, such a proposition is not circular, for, to begin with, it asserts the unprovability
of a quite definite formula)" (Gödel in Undecidable, p.9).

Will this computing machine lock in a "circle"? Turing's

first proof
The Entscheidungsproblem, the decision problem, was first answered by Church in April 1935 and preempted
Turing by over a year, as Turing's paper was received for publication in May 1936. (Also received for publication in
1936—in October, later than Turing's—was a short paper by Emil Post that discussed the reduction of an
algorithm to a simple machine-like "method" very similar to Turing's computing machine model (see Post–Turing
machine for details).
Turing's proof is made difficult by number of definitions required and its subtle nature. See Turing machine and
Turing's proof for details.
Turing's first proof (of three) follows the schema of Richard's Paradox: Turing's computing machine is an algorithm
represented by a string of seven letters in a "computing machine". Its "computation" is to test all computing
machines (including itself) for "circles", and form a diagonal number from the computations of the non-circular or
"successful" computing machines. It does this, starting in sequence from 1, by converting the numbers (base 8)
into strings of seven letters to test. When it arrives at its own number, it creates its own letter-string. It decides it is
the letter-string of a successful machine, but when it tries to do this machine's (its own) computation it locks in a
circle and can't continue. Thus we have arrived at Richard's paradox. (If you are bewildered see Turing's proof for
more).
A number of similar undecidability proofs appeared soon before and after Turing's proof:

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1. April 1935: Proof of Alonzo Church (An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory). His proof was to
"...propose a definition of effective calculability ... and to show, by means of an example, that not every problem of
this class is solvable" (Undecidable p. 90))
2. 1946: Post correspondence problem (cf Hopcroft and Ullman[9] p. 193ff, p. 407 for the reference)
3. April 1947: Proof of Emil Post (Recursive Unsolvability of a Problem of Thue) (Undecidable p. 293). This has
since become known as "The Word problem of Thue" or "Thue's Word Problem" (Axel Thue proposed this
problem in a paper of 1914 (cf References to Post's paper in Undecidable, p. 303)).
4. Rice's theorem: a generalized formulation of Turing's second theorem (cf Hopcroft and Ullman[9] p. 185ff)[10]
5. Greibach's theorem: undecidability in language theory (cf Hopcroft and Ullman[9] p. 205ff and reference on p. 401
ibid: Greibach [1963] "The undecidability of the ambiguity problem for minimal lineal grammars," Information and
Control 6:2, 117–125, also reference on p. 402 ibid: Greibach [1968] "A note on undecidable properties of formal
languages", Math Systems Theory 2:1, 1–6.)
6. Penrose tiling questions
7. Question of solutions for Diophantine equations and the resultant answer in the MRDP Theorem; see entry below.

Can this string be compressed? Chaitin's proof

For an exposition suitable for non-specialists see Beltrami p. 108ff. Also see Franzen Chapter 8 pp. 137–148, and Davis
pp. 263–266. Franzén's discussion is significantly more complicated than Beltrami's and delves into Ω—Gregory
Chaitin's so-called "halting probability". Davis's older treatment approaches the question from a Turing machine
viewpoint. Chaitin has written a number of books about his endeavors and the subsequent philosophic and
mathematical fallout from them.

A string is called (algorithmically) random if it cannot be produced from any shorter computer program. While most
strings are random, no particular one can be proved so, except for finitely many short ones:

"A paraphrase of Chaitin's result is that there can be no formal proof that a sufficiently long
string is random..." (Beltrami p. 109)

Beltrami observes that "Chaitin's proof is related to a paradox posed by Oxford librarian G. Berry early in the twentieth
century that asks for 'the smallest positive integer that cannot be defined by an English sentence with fewer than 1000
characters.' Evidently, the shortest definition of this number must have at least 1000 characters. However, the
sentence within quotation marks, which is itself a definition of the alleged number is less than 1000 characters in
length!" (Beltrami, p. 108)

Does this Diophantine equation have an integer

solution? Hilbert's tenth problem
The question "Does any arbitrary "Diophantine equation" have an integer solution?" is undecidable.That is, it is
impossible to answer the question for all cases.

Franzén introduces Hilbert's tenth problem and the MRDP theorem (Matiyasevich-Robinson-Davis-Putnam theorem)
which states that "no algorithm exists which can decide whether or not a Diophantine equation has any solution at
all". MRDP uses the undecidability proof of Turing: "... the set of solvable Diophantine equations is an example of a
computably enumerable but not decidable set, and the set of unsolvable Diophantine equations is not computably
enumerable" (p. 71).

In social science
In political science, Arrow's impossibility theorem states that it is impossible to devise a voting system that satisfies a
set of five specific axioms. This theorem is proved by showing that four of the axioms together imply the opposite of
the fifth.

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In economics, Holmström's theorem is an impossibility theorem proving that no incentive system for a team of agents
can satisfy all of three desirable criteria.

In natural science
In natural science, impossibility assertions (like other assertions) come to be widely accepted as overwhelmingly
probable rather than considered proved to the point of being unchallengeable. The basis for this strong acceptance is a
combination of extensive evidence of something not occurring, combined with an underlying theory, very successful in
making predictions, whose assumptions lead logically to the conclusion that something is impossible.

Two examples of widely accepted impossibilities in physics are perpetual motion machines, which violate the law of
conservation of energy, and exceeding the speed of light, which violates the implications of special relativity. Another
is the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, which asserts the impossibility of simultaneously knowing both the
position and the momentum of a particle. Also Bell's theorem: no physical theory of local hidden variables can ever
reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics.

While an impossibility assertion in science can never be absolutely proved, it could be refuted by the observation of a
single counterexample. Such a counterexample would require that the assumptions underlying the theory that implied
the impossibility be re-examined.

See also
List of unsolved problems in mathematics – Solutions of these problems are still searched for. In contrast, the
above problems are known to have no solution.
No-go theorem, the corresponding physical notion.

Notes
1. Pudlák, pp. 255–256.
2. Hardy and Wright, p. 42
3. Hardy and Wright, p. 40
4. Nagel and Newman p. 8
5. Hardy and Wright p. 176
6. Hardy and Wright p. 159 referenced by E. Hecke. (1923). Vorlesungen über die Theorie der algebraischen
Zahlen. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft
7. Principia Mathematica, 2nd edition 1927, p. 61, 64 (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/u/umhistmath/AAT3201.0001.001/8
6?rgn=full+text;view=pdf) in Principia Mathematica online, Vol.1 (http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=um
histmath;idno=AAT3201.0001.001) at University of Michigan Historical Math Collection
8. Gödel in Undecidable, p. 9
9. John E. Hopcroft, Jeffrey D. Ullman (1979). Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages, and Computation.
Addison-Wesley. ISBN 0-201-02988-X.
10. "...there can be no machine E which ... will determine whether M [an arbitrary machine] ever prints a given symbol
(0 say)" (Undecidable p. 134). Turing makes an odd assertion at the end of this proof that sounds remarkably like
Rice's Theorem:

"...each of these "general process" problems can be expressed as a problem concerning a general process
for determining whether a given integer n has a property G(n)... and this is equivalent to computing a
number whose nth figure is 1 if G(n) is true and 0 if it is false" (Undecidable p 134). Unfortunately he
doesn't clarify the point further, and the reader is left confused.

References
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G. H. Hardy and E. M. Wright, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, Fifth Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford
England, 1979, reprinted 2000 with General Index (first edition: 1938). The proofs that e and pi are transcendental
are not trivial, but a mathematically adept reader will be able to wade through them.
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56, Cambridge at the University Press,
1962, reprint of 2nd edition 1927, first edition 1913. Chap. 2.I. "The Vicious-Circle Principle" p. 37ff, and Chap.
2.VIII. "The Contradictions" p. 60ff.
Turing, A.M. (1936), "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem", Proceedings
of the London Mathematical Society, 2 (published 1937), 42 (1), pp. 230–65, doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230 (http
s://doi.org/10.1112%2Fplms%2Fs2-42.1.230) (and Turing, A.M. (1938), "On Computable Numbers, with an
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem: A correction", Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, 2
(published 1937), 43 (6), pp. 544–6, doi:10.1112/plms/s2-43.6.544 (https://doi.org/10.1112%2Fplms%2Fs2-43.6.5
44)). online version (http://www.turingarchive.org/browse.php/B/12) This is the epochal paper where Turing
defines Turing machines and shows that it (as well as the Entscheidungsproblem) is unsolvable.
Martin Davis, The Undecidable, Basic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, Unsolvable Problems And
Computable Functions, Raven Press, New York, 1965. Turing's paper is #3 in this volume. Papers include those
by Godel, Church, Rosser, Kleene, and Post.
Martin Davis's chapter "What is a Computation" in Lynn Arthur Steen's Mathematics Today, 1978, Vintage Books
Edition, New York, 1980. His chapter describes Turing machines in the terms of the simpler Post–Turing machine,
then proceeds onward with descriptions of Turing's first proof and Chaitin's contributions.
Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma, Simon and Schuster, New York. Cf Chapter "The Spirit of Truth" for a
history leading to, and a discussion of, his proof.
Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 1947. A reference often cited
by other authors.
Ernest Nagel and James Newman, Gödel's Proof (https://archive.org/details/gdelsproof00nage), New York
University Press, 1958.
Edward Beltrami, What is Random? Chance and Order in Mathematics and Life, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.,
1999.
Torkel Franzén, Godel's Theorem, An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse, A.K. Peters, Wellesley Mass,
2005. A recent take on Gödel's Theorems and the abuses thereof. Not so simple a read as the author believes it
is. Franzén's (blurry) discussion of Turing's 3rd proof is useful because of his attempts to clarify terminology.
Offers discussions of Freeman Dyson's, Stephen Hawking's, Roger Penrose's and Gregory Chaitin's arguments
(among others) that use Gödel's theorems, and useful criticism of some philosophic and metaphysical Gödel-
inspired dreck that he's found on the web.
Pavel Pudlák, Logical Foundations of Mathematics and Computational Complexity. A Gentle Introduction,
Springer 2013. (See Chapter 4 "Proofs of impossibility".)

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