In his paper “Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases,” Alistair
Norcross presents a hypothetical story of a man who tortures and kills puppies for a hormone
produced as a result of the stress of torture. This hormone is used to give the man the ability to
enjoy chocolate again after he loses that ability in car crash. Alistair Norcross then compares the
torture of the puppies to the similarities of morality in factory-raised meat. After explaining
Norcross’ full argument of the morality of torturing puppies, and the production of factory-raised
meat, I will present and explain one flaw in his argument and explain why the ideas in his paper
will only ever be hypothetical.
Alistair Norcross presents the story of a man named Fred. One day Fred is visited by the
police and they find twenty-six small cages, each with a puppy inside. Fred explains that after
mutilating each one by slicing off ears, paws, and noses with a hot knife, he butchers each one by
holding them upside-down. Fred is then put on trial for animal abuse and Fred explains the
reasoning behind his behavior. Fred explains that after a car crash which resulted in head trauma,
he is unable to enjoy chocolate the way he used to. After visiting a gustatory neurologist, Fred
finds out the accident had damaged his Godiva glad. This gland is responsible for the production
of cocoamone, the hormone responsible for the pleasure given from chocolate. Fred tried to find
a commercially available source of this hormone but was unable to find a suitable option. Fred
then finds out that puppies who are tortured, and then killed, produce this hormone. This is the
reasoning behind his actions. Fred compares his actions to the actions of people who buy factory-
raised meat. The poor conditions in which these factory-raised animals live before slaughter, and
the fact that meat consumption is unnecessary for human life, make Fred’s actions, and the
actions of these factories the same in his eyes, and therefore he should not be punished for his
treatment of the puppies.
While Fred’s story is fictional and rather unimportant in the course of history, it presents
an opportunity to discuss the morality of factory-raised meat in real life. Alistair Norcross
presents several arguments as to why Fred’s reasoning is not sound, and how factory-raised
animals should not be harvested like Fred’s puppies. The first of which is comparing Fred’s
behavior to our own. In this, he begins by stating that although Fred tortured and killed the
puppies himself; if he had hired somebody to abuse the puppies, he would be viewed just as
poorly as when he had done it himself. This eliminates the innocence of the consumer in the
actions of the factories that farm their meat. The counter argument to this point is the fact that if
Fred stopped his actions, puppies would stop being tortured and killed. If a consumer of factory-
raised meat stopped purchasing meat, the companies that produce this meat would not stop the
maltreatment and slaughter of farm animals. This is due to the sheer number of people that
purchase that meat. Many people believe that because they cannot individually stop the
maltreatment of animals, they may as well enjoy the fruits of their torment. While the influence
of an individual on the meat market is fairly low, humans tend to believe that any risk of severe
injury is unacceptable when prevention is possible. For example, the odds that a plane will crash
are incredibly low. Yet it is considered impermissible to not have safety features such as life
vests and oxygen masks on board. If this is the case, then why would it be permissible to deny
farm animals a chance to survive, even with the odds as low as they are.
After Norcross has presented his argument for consumer accountability in the meat
industry, he goes on to rationalize the difference in people’s concerns. Norcross points out how
humans are selective in their arguments against the maltreatment of animals. While it is not
considered in poor taste to farm and butcher cows, pigs, and other farm animals, it is considered
unacceptable to farm and butcher puppies. An example of this is when the 2002 World Cup team
from England sent a letter to South Korea in protest of the treatment of dogs and cats raised for
food. They specifically chose those two animals to protest rather than meat production as a
whole. This is not because cats and dogs are worth more as beings, but because certain groups of
people have let sentimentality differentiate dogs and cats from farm animals. This is an
indication that it isn’t morality the deciding factor on this issue. If morality isn’t necessarily the
deciding factor, then the differences between humans and animals becomes even more important.
The fact that humans have a moral status far above other animals is why humans aren’t
even considered as a source of food, or a subject to be used for experimentation. Deciding what
determines morality then becomes even more important as to why humans are considered
unacceptable in these groups and why animals are. The traditional view that dates back to the
times of Aristotle is that rationality is what separates humans from animals. This has often been
refined to be the rationality for moral reasoning. This definition is important for the challenge of
marginal cases in which the individual is inspected, rather than the whole.
According to Norcross, with marginal cases regarding the human superior moral status,
there are two lines of thought. The first is that we do not necessarily have to give a different
moral status to marginal humans, but that we are still justified in attributing different moral status
to deserving animals. The second involves admitting that marginal humans are morally inferior
to other humans. Speaking on the first line of thought, it is difficult to justify judging a group
based on the majority. For instance, in the case of a trial regarding a group, if one member of a
group is innocent and the rest are guilty, the innocent man will go to jail. The reverse is also true,
if all are innocent with the exception of one, a guilty man will go free. This argument is
preposterous and should not be considered. The second line of thought presents a much more
complicated issue. If we allow certain humans to be viewed as morally inferior we have to
consider human sensibility and sentimentality. The thought of raising children with mental
retardation for food and medical experimentation is clearly out of the question. These arguments
of human moral superiority can offer no consistency that applies to all humans and not at least
some animals. This is the basis for Norcross’ final argument. Humans have no moral superiority
over animals, and it is considered morally impermissible to support factory-raised meat or Fred’s
puppy farming.
While Norcross’ arguments are sound and justified, he chooses to think of morality as
one overarching and consistent law. If this was the case Norcross’ view could be considered
correct, but because of human individuality this is not the case. Every person has their own moral
compass that they follow. Norcross mentions in several of his arguments how sentimentality and
sensibility plays a role in people’s views. This will make the range of acceptable topics different
depending of the culture, and the person. Who is to say the South Koreans are wrong in their
farming of dogs and cats. Although Norcross speaks on how they should both be considered in
poor taste, the inconstancy in the definition of morality makes the definitive answer Norcross
gives impossible. This is also disregarding people that have no moral compass whatsoever.
In conclusion, Norcross presents a valid and sound argument for the moral
impermissibility of factory-raised meat. He uses the comparison to Fred’s story as a way to
illustrate his points, and show the irrationality of many of the common arguments on the issue.
He further goes on to discuss the key differences between what makes humans and animals
different in terms of their morality, and their status above each other. He finally makes the
statement that factory-raised meat is morally impermissible. While the arguments he makes are
good, he assumes that morality is an objective concept. With different people and different
cultures having different morals, it is impossible to definitively state that factory-raised meat,
and the processes involved, are immoral.
Benjamin Snider