I.

Difference between special proceedings and civil actions

G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo,
and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age.

Troadio Manalo left several real including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine
Shop with offices

Eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government.
However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were
granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Motions of the petitioners were denied by the RTC but instead granted letters of administration

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the
petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family and that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have
been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari

Issue: whether the petition is an ordinary civil action and should be dismissed because of the lack of
averment of prior compromise?

Ruling: No. The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. The said petition for the issuance of letters of administration contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as
the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of
the estate rest. The petition in SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of
his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no
room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

Also, Article 222 of the Civil Code which states that “No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035” is applicable
only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether
at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No.
92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein)
merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against
petitioners.

G.R. No. 133000 - October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano,
together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the
Six children.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married
to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory
heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already
distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not
anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person

Issue: whether the has the authority to rule that the sale is an advancement of inheritance

Ruling: No.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in
this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted
and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense,
but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics
of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice."

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 144915 February 23, 2004

CAROLINA CAMAYA vs. BERNARDO PATULANDONG, respondent.

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised,
among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Mangulabnan. The pertinent portion of her will reads:

The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong, respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the
executor.

During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI admitted the will to probate.

On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will in this wise

On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A.
Patulandong refused to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil which modified the
testator’s will.

Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court

On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the
copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.

However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the partition is
without prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court

On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for
probate of the codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.

On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the
cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his
name.

Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale dated
February 19, 1991.

On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the codicil to
probate and declaring the Deed of sale and the TCT in favour of Camaya to be Void.

ISSUE: Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and
ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale;

RULING: Yes

In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties
and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of
sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession
and ownership of the property.

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

FACTS:

Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank deposits and interests in
certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. Milio
Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
Miguelita’s estate.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and
unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
“paraphernal properties.”

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the
estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them
“would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners.”

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued
directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the
declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the
partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,” considering that there is yet
no determination “whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or
owned in a joint venture.”

The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.”
It also ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant
petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by
petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership
between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’”

ISSUE:

May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?

RULING:

It is already recognized that probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its
purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. As a rule,
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title

However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate
court was actually to determine the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the
intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties,
then it means that she has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be
given her day in court. The intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the
propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelitas estate.

Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of
petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real
intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course
should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other
person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of
an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

G.R. No. L-19064 January 31, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAZ E. SIGUION TORRES vs. CONCHITA TORRES
Facts: Alberto filed a petition in the CFI of Rizal as one of the legitimate children of Siguion Torres
who died intestate. The petition is for the issuance of LOA with respect to the properties left by the
decedent. Such petition was opposed by Conchita, also one of the heirs on the ground that the heirs
of the deceased had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

This was answered by petitioner who, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by
the heirs, contended that attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed
thus needing the court's intervention. It was also claimed that some properties of considerable value
were not included in said extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental answer to the opposition,
subsequently filed, petitioner likewise alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00
from third persons, a fact which he claimed was not incorporated in the petition, through oversight.
The CFI finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed
the petition.

Issue: whether or not the petition for letters of administration be granted.

Ruling: No.

It appears from the pleadings filed therein that the petition to place the estate under administration
was predicated mainly on the alleged inability of the heirs to agree on a physical division of the
properties. The alleged existence of an indebtedness and non-inclusion in the list incorporated in the
deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties that form part of the estate, seemed to be
merely an afterthought as the reference to them was made only in the answer to the opposition and
motion for dismissal of the petition, and is not made under oath. There is also no allegation as to the
particulars of the debt and the omitted properties sufficient to identify them. In the circumstances,
we agree with the lower court that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased is not here necessary.

Where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no
necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the
settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either extrajudicially or through an
ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for court intervention, as contended by
appellant, in view of the heirs' failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided
physically, the latter, under the aforequoted Rule, have still the remedy of an ordinary action for
partition.

This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of P50,000.00. It is
to be noted, however, that appellant, as heretofore observed, did not specify from whom and in
what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare allegation that, "the estate has an
existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to
constitute a cause of action. It must be for this reason that the lower court, notwithstanding the
existence of such averment in appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the
petition filed by said appellant.

Nor does the unverified statement that there are other properties not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of an administration
proceeding because the same questions that may arise as to them, viz, the title there and their
partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an
ordinary action of partition.

ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJO

FACTS:

Filed before the CFI on November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions having
direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate
on March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga. In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas,
one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the
deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the
enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death
of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were
the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276 executed by four (4)
other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No.
496 (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's participation
in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any other material
pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the
November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632,
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the
final settlement of the deceased's estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not when the requirements of section 1, Rule 74 are present, extrajudicial settlement or
partition in case of disagreement becomes mandatory for the settlement of estate of the deceased.

RULING:

No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum requirements of the aforementioned
section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents
claim that there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary.
In other words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the heirs so
long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age.
We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion
to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not
desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs
to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of
partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of
action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of
the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word
shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its
used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely
to the discretion of the heirs.

G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. vs. ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor
appellee.

Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City
of Manila.

Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

The judge refused to probate the will because no will was presented and its contents and due
execution were proven by open statements in open court by witnesses.

Issue: whether or not holographic wills can be probated without the will itself.

Ruling: No.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed."

In the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity like in notarial wills are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.

Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's handwriting? His
witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify,
because there is no way to compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or
proven to be, in the testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper
millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his
inability to prove its falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they
may have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof
have taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the
knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that they have not
"been shown" a document which they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course,
the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by
exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what
witness or lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the
handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his statement: he has seen
and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the
oppositor would practically be at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the
execution, but also as to the contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation?

We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or probate to a document
containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but apparently mutilated,
the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations and
testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will.
The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code (Spanish) the
will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance
with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.7

Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the holographic
will to be fatal.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial judge's
disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find it
hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who had received
nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to
give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to
another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust
it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to
Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the will.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we
think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec.
6.

G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960

FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.

Facts:

Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the
holographic will, submitted the said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the
sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness Francisco Azaola testified
that he saw the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the
same was handed to him and his wife; that the witness testified also that he recognized all the
signatures appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the; that said witness, Azaola,
testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting
of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the
testatrix; that said witness, in answer to a question of his counsel admitted that the holographic will
was handed to him by the testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her".

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

Issue: whether or not in the probate of a holographic will, three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix should be presented in case the will’s
authenticity is contested.

Ruling: No.

Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall
be required.

In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court
deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not
required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code),
it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is
contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments. But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the
execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is
holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three
witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely
directory and is not mandatory.

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO LAXA (Formalities of a Notarial will)

Facts:

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is
her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on
page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Limpin, Francisco and Faustino. The three attested to the Will’s
due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted
as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa

More than four years after the death of Paciencia , Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the
probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his . Antonio filed
an opposition. Later, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate of
Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and concluded that the
authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

Issue:

Whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.
Ruling: Yes.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate
proceedings. This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal,
such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities
are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the
critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence
of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in
the Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as
well as the voluntary nature of said act.

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. LORENZO LAXA (Proof of insanity in probate of notarial will)

Facts:

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is
her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on
page 38 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Limpin, Francisco and Faustino. The three attested to the Will’s
due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted
as notary public.

Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and
their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. More than four years after the death of
Paciencia , Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour. Petitioner Antonio filed an opposition

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much
so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and concluded that at
the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of
mind to have testamentary capacity.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. It
ratiocinated that "the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to
render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will." Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings
were not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind.

Issue: Whether paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will.

Ruling: No.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies
on the shoulders of the petitioners. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will.

Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less
before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind
lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence
was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed
of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out
by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she
executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She
was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born
after the execution of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

G.R. No. L-46134 April 18, 1939

In the Matter of the Intestate of Proceso de Guzman.

NICOLASA DE GUZMAN vs. ANGELA LIMCOLIOC

Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The deceased was first married
to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa.
After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with
whom he did not have any child.

On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of First Instance of Rizal appointed
Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. On
the 8th of the same month of January, 1937, Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that
this appointment be set aside and that she had named administratrix instead, on that ground of her
preference as the widow. The court denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
From these resolutions, Angela appealed.

In this instance the appellant contends that the trial court erred in not appointing her administratrix
of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such
administratrix without first setting the case for hearing.

The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator. This
is the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the
widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to
have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by
law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other
than surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in
the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the
circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein than the
surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges that during the marital life
of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all the
properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his second marriage with
Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind. It is true that the case was not heard for
the purpose of establishing these allegations, but when Angela asked for the reconsideration of the
appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not
justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus taking
them for granted, the court was justified in considering them when it denied the reconsideration of
its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.

If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his marriage with
Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow,
Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion equal to that
corresponding to one of the children who has received no betterment.

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

FACTS:

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr. Federico died intestate. In 1979, their
only son, Emilio Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death,
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
petitioner Emilio Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I was married
to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent and her siblings
Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their father and paternal grandparents. After her
spouse’s death, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On October
26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering
her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration.
After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate on his behalf. The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the course of the proceedings, Federico died.
The trial court rendered a decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio
III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother, the decedent.

ISSUE :

Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedent’s estate.

HELD:

The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil
Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III was reared from infancy
by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate
of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that
the CA even declared that under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have the right
of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristina’s estate.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

The petition is GRANTED.

EXECUTORS

G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987

BORROMEO VS BORROMEO

FACTS:

Dr Maximo Borromeo died testate designating Borromeo Brothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His
brother Canuto Borromeo acted as executor of the said will. The said corporation is owned by the
testator and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings have been instituted. The widow, Johanna Hofer
Borromeo filed an Urgent Motion to remove the executor due to negligence in the performance of
duties and unfitness to continue as executor. While the action was still pending, Canuto Borromeo
withdrew his joint bank account with the decedent and deposited it on his and his other brother
Exequiel’s joint account without authority from the Court. In time the petition was heard and the
judge relieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that of the unauthorized withdrawal
of the decedent’s joint account with the executor. Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that they were
joint owners of such account and either of them (decedent or Canuto) has right over it.

ISSUE: Whether or not a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawal made by Canuto which is a
ground for removal as executor of the estate.

RULING:

Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken from the joint account in the Bank was done by
Canuto with representation as executor of the estate of deceased Dr.Maximo. There was bad faith in
the concealment of property belonging to the decedent’s estate. Canuto should have deposited the
P23, 930.39 on the estate and not at his disposal. It then constituted as hiding such property from
the widow and he, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of the said property.
Conflict between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal
or resignation of the former, who has thereby become unsuitable to discharge the trust. According
to Rule 82, sec 2, if an executor neglects to settle his account and settle the estate according to law,
the court may remove him or, in its discretion permit him to resign.
G.R. No. L-50277 February 14, 1980

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DOMINADOR TUMANG, MAGDALENA A. TUMANG vs. GUIA T.
LAGUIO AND HER MINOR CHILDREN

FACTS:

In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang and pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A.
Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings
definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children — Melba Tumang
Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had
already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them, and in order for such
properties to be transferred in their names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the
proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appenee's
daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix and
executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors
contended that there could be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to render an accounting of the cash
and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts.

RULING:

Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court may requite until the estate
is wholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view
of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts
rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served and the
conflict between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made.
Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate after
he has filed an account should file a supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so,
but that it is only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of final account that
representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account." It is only in a case where the
petition to compel an executor to account after he has accounted and has been discharged fails to
allege that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically
denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting should be denied.

G.R. No. L-48140 May 4, 1942

SINFOROSO PASCUAL vs. PONCIANO S. PASCUAL, ET AL

FACTS:

The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940,
while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were
pending in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga against Ponciano S.
Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in
Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of
the defendants.

Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong
venue and pendency of another action.

RTC: granted the motion on the ground that the action should have been brought by the executor or
administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. However, RTC declared that such amendment did not cure the
insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action.

ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the executor and not by the plaintiff-heir?

HELD: No.

Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the
property or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his
executor or administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the
heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or
administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place.

Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S.
Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring
an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied.
And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is
that the fishpond be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating that the action
is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased.

G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
uneknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will. On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz, Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the
will was executed under undue influence. On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate
which the testator bequeathed was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons. On July 28, 1993,
petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of
the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the
titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that
he actually filed his opposition to respondent.

Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Despite
petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance
the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court should grant possession of all properties of the estate to
the executor of the will.

RULING: No.

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses of administration," Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly
provides: Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer
estate not willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for
the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had
been previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses
on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved
again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for
the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for
administration before releasing any further money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of
the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding
rents after renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to
the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true
account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.

G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING
THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP

FACTS:

Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the
settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the
RTC of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office,
representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed
administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the
preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.

In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in May 1955.

In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office, took
over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of
the estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment,
for their own behalf and for their respective clients.

On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late
Raymond Triviere filed its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the RTC
had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for
Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an
accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court.

Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be
paid. LCN, then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse
was then resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and
the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were
entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not claim the same from the funds
of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the expenses incurred as executor or
administrator of the estate of Triviere.

HELD:

No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees
allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation provided by
will controls unless renounced. When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not
charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.

The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs no statutory construction. Here, in
attempting to exempt itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents
conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges
that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce that it was an administrator.

ADMINISTRATORs

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON

Facts:

9 months after Domingo Gabriel died, his son Roberto Gabriel filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for letters of administration. The court directed the publication of the order in the newspaper
"Mabuhay," once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed, Roberto was
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order appointing
Roberto as administrator. Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the
estate was published in the "Metropolitan News."
Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto, filed a claim alleging that the decision in a civil case between her
and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. The
oppositors herein, including the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition claiming that (I) they
were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter, should be preferred over Roberto Gabriel; (3) Roberto Gabriel has a conflicting
and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4)
most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of
ownership to the oppositors herein and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to
be administered by private respondent.

The probate court denied the opposition since no proof was adduced to show that Roberto Gabriel is
unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust.

The oppositors filed a certiorari before the CA claiming that the order of preference stated in the
Rules of Court provides that the surviving spouse, who in this case is Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, is first in
the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator

Also, as between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence Nilda Gabriel,
as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over Roberto Gabriel, who is an illegitimate son

Roberto Gabriel contends that the preference in the Rules of Court may be disregarded by the court
where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for 30 days after the decedent's
death. In this case, the oppositors failed to do so.

Issue: Whether or not Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of
her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her
husband?

Ruling: No.

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is
not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the
permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an
alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would
entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the
legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

G.R. No. L-12132 December 22, 1958

Intestate Estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia vs. MARIA JIMENEZ, ET AL

Facts:

It appears that Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix on June 13, 1950. Failing to submit an
account of her administration up to June 18, 1955, she was ordered by the lower court, on motion of
the oppositors-appellees to submit said accounting. During the hearing of the statement of accounts
subsequently presented by Elena Cotia, it was established that she spent for family expenses and
attorney's fees the total sum of P64,650 without prior judicial authority. The oppositors-appellees
therefore filed a motion for her removal as administratrix not only because she neglected to submit
the accounting required by the Rules and to settle the estate, but because she had made
unauthorized disbursements.

Issue: whether or not Elena Cotia should be removed as an administrator by reasons of illegal
disbursement of funds?

Ruling: Yes.

The lower court did not abuse its discretion in removing the administratrix, Elena Cotia. The
appealed order finds express sanction in Section 2, Rule 83, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that the court may remove an administrator who neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law. What is more, the family expenses and attorney's fees in the aggregate amount of
P64,650 paid by the administratrix out of the estate without previous authority of the court, is
seemingly in disregard of Section 3, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court, to the effect that the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person shall receive, under the direction of the court,
such allowances as are provided by law.

G.R. No. L-6476 November 18, 1955

FRANCISCO DE BORJA as Executor of the Estate vs. BIENVENIDO A. TAN

Facts:

On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate
of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated on April 2,
1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. One of the heirs appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals but later his motion for dismissal of the appeal as granted. All the records of the
case were destroyed or lost during the last Pacific war but were on January 1, 1946, reconstituted.
On March 26 of that year Francisco de Borja qualified as executor and administrator.

The lower courts then appointed Crisanto de Borja as co-administrator due to francisco’s inability to
administer the estate by reason of his weakness and being unable to see.

On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to anyone
appointed respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator. Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a
notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja as co-administrator and the order denying
the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the corresponding record on appeal. By order of
December 27, 1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give
due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator
was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable.

Issue: whether the appointment of Jose Borja as co-administrator is valid?

Ruling: Yes.

a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular
administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration the
circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated
administrator, is and has for several years been one only in name due to his physical and mental
disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator
there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-
administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general administrator.

G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912

JOSE McMICKING vs. BENITO SY CONBIENG

FACTS:

Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, died sometime on February 1902 in Amoy, China.
Engracio Palanca was appointed as administrator of the estate left by Jose, which estate was partly
located in Hong Kong and partly in the Philippines. Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao
executed bonds as sureties of Palanca who thereafter took possession of all the properties of Jose.
Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palanca was required to furnish a new bond, which
new bond was subsequently filed through new sureties.

Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estate and Doroteo Velasco was appointed as its
administrator with sureties Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto. Mariano Ocampo was
also survived by his heirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his estate and 3 sons in China to whom
he left the remaining 1/3 of his estate. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampo’s estate administrator filed a
complete report and inventory of the latter’s properties, together with a statement of all his debts
and liabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed an instrument signed by all of the persons
interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partitition of the estate among
themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations
against the estate. Such partition agreed to was affirmed and approved by an order of the court and
Doroteo, in pursuance of such order and after having settled all liabilities of the estate delivered all
of the properties to the respective devisees and legatees leaving no property of the estate in his
hands.

Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as the administrator of Margarita
Jose’s estate by reason of the fact that Palanca failed and refused to render an account of the
property and funds of the said estate and even failed and refused to deliver such property and funds
to his successor Jose McMicking who was appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate in
Palanca’s stead. Palanca retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the same,
and never returned to the Philippines. Due to these circumstances McMicking instituted a claim
against the estate of Mariano Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approved such claim
and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had
sufficient funds. No payment was made to Margarita Jose’s estate.

McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto who died in 1905.
Pio was one of the sureties of Doroteo Velasco when he was appointed as administrator of Mariano
Ocampo’s estate. Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito Sy Conbieng was appointed as
administrator. The committee appointed by the court to appraise and hear claims against Pio’s
estate disallowed McMicking’s claim and such finding of the committee was affirmed by said lower
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Pio de la Guardia Barretto’s estate is liable
for the claim made by Jose McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s estate.

RULING: No.

Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against Pio de la Guardia Barretto’s estate
affirmed.

Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety, would not have been liable himselfhad this
action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety
cannot be. The basis of the liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the
principal. If the latter incurs no liability, the former incurs none. The administrator who complies
with the law incurs no liability to any person.

The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s original claim was made and to which
Doroteo Velasco was appointed as administrator was already partitioned at the time the claim was
made.

Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed of a deceased person and
the due making of the inventory of the property and the taking possession thereof by such
administrator, an agreement is made between the owners thereof under the will already probated
partitioning the same between them under said sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery
of the property to such partitioning owners by such administrator, under proper proceedings and
order of court and after compliance with the provisions of such sections, is, in effect, a discharge of
such administrator as to all future obligations and responsibilities in relation to said property. In
other words, if he turns such property over to the owners thereof after a partition among them was
made in complete accordance with said sections, and he performs his full duty as such administrator,
neither he nor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act. An administrator cannot be held
to accountability for property over which he has no power or control or jurisdiction and in which he
has no legal interest. The thing on which he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn
wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the law, secs. 596 and 597) which appointed him, there is
a complete revocation of the original appointment dating from the day of the removal from his
hands of the property which he was appointed to administer.
The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction and no legal interest in the property
anymore because by such partition, the estate passes out of existence. The whole property is taken
from the administrator and passed on to the owners. They become the absolute owners thereof,
subject only to the liability of divestiture on the happening of certain events; but even such
divestiture may be avoided by paying the debt, which is the moving cause thereof.

G.R. No. L-27486 November 18, 1927

In the matter of the estate of J. H. Ankrom, deceased. HEIRS OF RAFAEL GREGOIRE vs. ALBERT L.
BAKER

FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified as his administrator. The
administrator filed his inventory of the assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which
inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens certificate of title and containing an area
of more than 930 hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom
for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, or P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Panama. It appears that the total recognized claims against the
estate amounted originally to P76,645.13, but four of the creditors, having claims in the amount of
P1,639.82, have been paid in full, leaving a balance owing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater
part of which is comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of the estate stood upon the
original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these
intestate proceedings were being conducted, the administrator discovered that a year and a half
before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this mortgage had been executed, Ankrom appears to
have made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of
Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable
considerations. In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an
amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon,
the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. The court made an order,
approving of the omission by the administrator of said property from the inventory; and it is from
this order that the present appeal is here being prosecuted.

HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts
and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of
such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any
creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not
commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or
administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the
creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be
commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the
judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such
creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such
other expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy of the heirs of Gregoire is, therefore, to
indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of
the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in
fraud of creditors.

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980

FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, vs. THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one
Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as
executor.

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that
all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation
Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on
September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to
dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; that a motion for the appointment of a
special administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved
motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an
executor.

The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special
administrator.

ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order d denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a
special administrator

RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay in granting letters

testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge
of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.

Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a
special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound,
that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any
cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a
contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal
pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the
parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased.

The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:

(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.

(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to
the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased
Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor.

There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of
the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija Branch V, against the herein private respondents.

Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the private respondents,
postponed the hearing of the probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to
September 20, 1978.

The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:

The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of
decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great
waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a
pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary
administration can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass
into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.

It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of the
deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is
claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year.
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the
estate as regards the products.

All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80,
Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982

ROWENA F. CORONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a
holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G.
Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three
weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper
and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under
Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde,
Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and
appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix. On November 21, 1980, Rowena
filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and for the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the
United Nations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte as Special Administratix. On
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion"
and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for his appointment as Special
Administrator because the Special Administratix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no
interest to be protected. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and
took her oath of office before a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its
Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the
surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78,
of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as
Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is
not among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact
that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's
estate is nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.

ISSUE:

Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding the appointment of the surviving husband as special
administrator

HELD:

This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the allegations,
arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee,
Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by
the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment
on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and
equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective
interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the
Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE

G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

Alan Sheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

Facts:

The will of Alice Sheker was admitted by the court and thereafter all creditors were ordered to file
their respective claims against the estate. On Oct. 7, 2002, a contingent claim for agent's commission
in the total amount of P481,250.00 was filed by petitioner.

However, the executrix of the estate moved for the dismissal of the money claim on the ground that
no docket fee was paid, no certification for non-forum shopping was attached, and no written
explanation was made as to why there was no personal service of the claim. The court thereon
dismissed the claim.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the money claim for failure to pay the docket
fee, attach a cert. of non-forum shoping, and make a personal service.

Ruling: Yes.

The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court because such calls also for
practicabiliy for it to apply other than the absence of special provisions.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is
an initiatory pleading.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment
of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees
within a reasonable time.

On the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally “might have been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's residence and
the respondent court is very far.
G.R. No. 170498 January 9, 2013

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:

On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money
against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
00-42105 and was assigned to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaint that
it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500
plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502,
140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all
crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager, in
1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced
before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its answer with
counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for
allegedly undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could not be
found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18
Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC and were crossed or for
payee’s account only

The RTC denied Metrobank’s motion

The RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo

indebido"27 – a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid.
Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts that must be included in the claims
required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased’s estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023, not
before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate should be allowed.

Ruling: No.

Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule86, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court. A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the
claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event
that may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent
one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court:

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. – All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in
the notice.
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the
affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party
complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends
on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be
filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Comi and, as such, should have been so filed in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023.

G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988

HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR. vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION

FACTS:

Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding case filed by private respondent Luis Tan for
the settlement of the estate of the late Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan, allegedly the only
surviving son of Dominga Garcia who died sometime in 1930 in Canton, China, filed for the issuance
of the letters of administration in favor of Alfonso Atilano. Garcia left a parcel of land located in
Davao City which is under the possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court set the
petition for hearing and the said order and petition were duly published. After the private
respondent Tan had begun presentation of evidence, the parties entered into a compromise and the
petitioners withdrew their opposition to the intestate proceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the
City of Davao filed a joint motion asking the respondent court to take notice of the agreement which
in substance seeks to proceed with the determination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall be
determinative of their respective claims against the estate. Petitioners filed their opposition and the
respondent court issued an order taking note of the agreement. Private respondent Tan filed a
motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be heirs of
the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the ground that
they are barred for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the respondent court which directed that the filing of claims against the
estate be filed within 6 months after the first publication of the notice is null and void and violative
of Sec 2, Rule 86 of Revised Rules of Court.

RULING: Yes.

The range of period specified in the Rules is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix
period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it
is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first publication of notice.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the court was not in accordance with the requirements
of Sec 2, Rule 86, what should apply then is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less
than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of first publication. The first publication of
notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus, the two claims of the petitioners
against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively were filed on
time.
G.R. No. L-14713 April 28, 1960

Intestate Estate of ARSENIO R. AFAN vs. APOLINARIO S. DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special proceeding for the settlement of intestate
estate of Arsenio Afan. The claim was allegedly due from Afan, with interest thereon, within 30 days
from August 16, 1949, as set forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22, 1957, the
administratix objected to the consideration of the claim upon the ground, among others, that it had
been filed long after the expiration of the period for the presentation of claim against said estate.
The lower court issued the order refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De Guzman
invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. He maintains that his claim
was filed prior to the distribution of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now alleges, for the first
time, a "cause" why the lower court should allegedly have considered his claim. He says, in his brief
that he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of the deceased was then already in the
process of settlement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted

RULING:

No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court
shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve
nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time
before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not exceeding one month.

The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to permit the filing of a claim after the
lapse of the period stated in the first sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the following
conditions, namely (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the
permission should be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall
not exceed one (1) month. In this case, De Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim.
Moreover, the same does not allege any reason why he should be excused for his failure to file the
claim in this proceeding within the period stated in the Rules of Court.

Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of the
deceased was then already in the process of settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actual
knowledge of the present proceeding long before the filing of his claim therein on July 27, 1957. It
appears that, during the lifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De Guzman instituted, against him, a
civil case to recover the amount of the promissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision
of the trial court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial de novo. Sometime after the records had
been remanded to the lower court, Afan died. On August 15, 1955, that court issued an order
requiring counsel for his heirs to submit to the court the number of the intestate estate proceedings
of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan. This order was complied with on August 30, 1955 and a copy of
"notification" containing the required information was served upon counsel for De Guzman, as
plaintiff therein. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in said case a motion for the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased Afan, to substitute him as defendant therein. On January 24,
1956 De Guzman filed, therefore, a statement, entitled "compliance", setting forth the names, ages
and addresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by the records in Special Proceedings No.
26858, entitled 'Instance estate of Arsenio R. Afan' before the Court of First Instance of Manila," with
the prayer that said "heirs be substituted as party defendants" in Case No. 1148, "in place of the
deceased Arsenio R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his claim in such proceeding until July
27, 1957, one year and a half after the filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of
furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the filing of his claim, this
omission on the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of such extension and the order
appealed from. In one case, the Court have already held that failure to file a claim within the time
provided therefor upon the sole ground that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for
payment, is not sufficient to justify extension. Lastly, the Court also ruled in another case that where
a claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four or five months thereafter he did nothing
to present his claim, this can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect.

Therefore, De Guzman’s claim should not be granted on the ground that it was filed out of time

G.R. No. L-17175 July 31, 1962

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ vs. LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU

FACTS:

In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased to
Ricardo Gutierrez for a term to expire on May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it was found that the
dikes were opened, resulting in their destruction and in the loss of great quantities of fish inside, to
the damage and prejudice of the lessee.

Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, filed a complaint for 2 items: first, for
the sum of P32,000.00 representing advance rentals he had to the decedent and second, the sum of
P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of earned profits, that is, profits which the claimant failed to
realize because of the breach of the lease contract.

On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civil action against the executrix of the testate
for the recovery of the same amount of P60,000 referred to as the second item. In July 1957
appellant amended his claim in the testate proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of
P60,000.00, leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum of P32,000.00.

After the issues were joined in the present, the court dismissed the action for abandonment by both
parties. Appellant moved to reconsider; the court denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the claim should have been prosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary
civil action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on unrealized profits is a money claim against
the estate of the deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?

RULING:

Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's
estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have
been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money
judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. The claim in this case is based on
contract — specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87 "Upon all
contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they were personal to the
decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." A
claim for breach of a covenant in a deed of the decedent must be presented under a statute
requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on contract.

The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those to recover
real or personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. The instant suit is not one of them.

PAYMENT OF DEBT OF THE ESTATE

G.R. No. L-2360 December 29, 1949

GAVINO ALDAMIZ vs. THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MINDORO

FACTS:

A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against the intestate estate of the deceased
Florenica and Rizalina Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus,
owned and operated by the spouses Buan, collided with a private car resulting to the death of Juan
Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus was charged with homicide and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of Juan Laya had
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, and they did so. Administrators of the estate
opposed the contingent claim, arguing that the same could not be allowed because it has not been
filed before the death of the spouses. The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portion
of the estate be set aside to answer for the claim. Counsel for administrator then moved to set aside
the order, but before they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was declared premature
because the criminal conviction is not yet final, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an amended
complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissed the contingent claim on the ground
that the reason for the same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended complaint had been
filed, still, the same had not yet been acted upon.

ISSUE

Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted

RULING

The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is one that, by its nature, is dependent upon
the happening of an uncertain event, it may or may not develop into a valid claim, depending upon
that uncertain event. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the
action brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio
Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim
presented in the administration proceedings depends.

While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no claim upon the intestate estate, for
such claim would only arise after the event happened. As such, the contingent claim may not be
dismissed. Contingent claims follow the result of the action, and as such, the fact that the case is
temporarily dismissed may not terminate the claim, as only the final results of the action could do
that. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings
in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency arises which converts the
contingent claim into a valid claim, the court should then be informed that the claim had already
matured.

DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE

G.R. No. 174873 August 26, 2008

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.

Facts:

In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate and the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Syquia and Quasha of the Quasha
Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were
appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the
preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses.

RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the
estate under administration in May 1995.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law
Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the
settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion
for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients, claiming for the payment of
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late
Raymond Triviere in Special Proceedings, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted
Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment
of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the
estate as required by the court.

Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of
the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid;
especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of the estate totaling
P4,738,558.63, rendering the latter insolvent.

RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs of the deceased Triviere, after all the
years, have not received their respective shares in the Estate, declaring that there was no more need
for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate considering that the estate has no more
assets except the money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines and that both the Co-
Administrator and counsel for the deceased are entitled to the payment for the services they have
rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased as they have over a decade
now spent so much time, labor and skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time
the administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.

LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, that the awards violate Section 1, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court, as there still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65.

CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the administrators of the estate of the
late Raymond Triviere, were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not
claim the same from the funds of the estate reasoning that the award of expenses and fees in favor
of executors and administrators is subject to the qualification that where the executor or
administrator is a lawyer, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney's fees due Atty.
Syquia and the Quasha Law Offices should be borne by their clients, the widow and children of the
late Raymond Triviere, respectively.

The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 share and P150,000.00 share awarded by the
RTC to the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis that Section
1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes the distribution of the residue of the estate until
all its obligations have been paid.
Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not be construed as a final order of distribution, but
a mere interlocutory order that does not end the estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution
directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestate
proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the administration and relieves the
administrator of his duties. That the said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the
funds of the estate to the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering
that they have not received their respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out of the
reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the estate, the petitioner children and widow were being awarded
by the RTC, their shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the remaining portion of
the estate still needs to be settled. The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC
still had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner, children and widow constitute a
partial distribution of the estate and is proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1.

RULING: Yes.

Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond
Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court inapplicable.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June
2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim
against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually,
the petitioner children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all
of its obligations had been paid or provided for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the
estate, thus:

Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees,upon compliance
with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of
the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the
distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following:

[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the
subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and

[2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).

There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in
the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at
the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. It
justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow
had not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account
that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to
P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC
should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.

Petitioners invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,where the Court sustained an Order
granting partial distribution of an estate.

However, in Dael is the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable distribution of the inheritance
in accordance with law and the final judgment in the proceedings and it does not appear there are
unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should have been made or a
bond required, such partial distribution may be allowed.

No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations of the

estate of the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending
claim by LCN against the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.

Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial distribution of the decedent's estate
pending final termination of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as possible be
discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance
should not be countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts should guard with utmost zeal
and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately
protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the inheritance.

G.R. No. 174835 March 22, 2010

ANITA REYES-MESUGAS vs. ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES

Facts:

Petitioner Anita Reyes and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of Lourdes Aquino Reyes
and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of land

On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Lourdes, praying for
his appointment as administrator due to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the
other heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner, opposed the petition.

On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of
Lourdes was partitioned. A decision was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said compromise
agreement. That the parties hereto hereby agree to recognize, acknowledge and respect:

On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. 24475
in the RTC in view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate. Petitioner argued that
the settlement of the estate proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation of lis pendens could
already be cancelled since it had served its purpose.

Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise
agreement, executed "side agreements" which had yet to be fulfilled

Issue: Whether or not the annotation of the lis pendens on the title may be cancelled in view of the
termination of the settlement of estate case

Ruling: Yes.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. Once submitted to the court and stamped with judicial
approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the
sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect
of any judgment.

Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately

executory as there is no appeal from such judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to
end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such
action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision.[16]

In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters
pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. It approves
contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules
of Court.[18] It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on
September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end.

Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect
the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. The compromise agreement did not mention the
grant of a right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially approved
compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate
court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by the petitioner and respondent with regard to a
grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court.
Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475
as respondent had no right which needed to be protected. Any alleged right arising from the "side
agreement" on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an ordinary action for specific
performance in a court of general jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009

RICARDO S. SILVERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004,
Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.

On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr.
as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person
to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.

Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005
and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also
authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as
administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate
the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order.

Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 20056 recalled its previous order granting Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.

Issue: whether Nelia silverio-Dee is allowed to possess the property in Forbes park.

Ruling: No

The alleged authority given by silverio, Sr. for the respondent to occupy the property is null and void
since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order
from this Court. Section 1 of Rule 90 is explicit when it states that, “No distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligation mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes
or any of them, give a bond in a sum to be fixed by the Court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.” In fact, the Executor or administrator shall have
the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the debts and epenses of administration.

With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by the respondent of the
property in question has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the
debts and expenses of administration.

Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of
an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in
Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to
the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the
properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges,
and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.

ESCHEAT

G.R. No. 143483 January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY vs. COURT
OF APPEALS

Facts:

For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as
the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French
national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life,
respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close relative was
available to tend to her needs.
Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land.
Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be
found.

While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate
of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Since it was established that there
were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she
had been looking for a long time. The Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its
assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and setting the
date for trial on the merits.

Petitioner insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private
respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as set
forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.

The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to
private respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to
declare the same escheated in favor of the state.

Issue: whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in favor of the
state.

Ruling: Yes.

We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person
who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the
state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."5 Since escheat is one of the
incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the
time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated
property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within
which such action must be brought.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from
the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a
claim not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by
the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be
claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.

Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but
allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the
Revised Rules of Court? In this regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal
Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at least insofar as it concerns
the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in an escheat proceeding -

In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and
exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for
escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to
have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be
the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under
a contract legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).

In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27
June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private
respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right
over the escheated properties militates against recovery.

A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive

against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or
privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners
of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due
process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore,
private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds
of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained
finality.

In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that
the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its
jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been
previously donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court
for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in question."9 Where a person comes into
an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the
property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject properties
were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear
and convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private
respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the
decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore
cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of a belated allegation
that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that courts decide only
after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and
unsubstantiated assertions.
G.R. No. 158230 July 16, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY

FACTS:

In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 (1,574 m2) from Vicenta Arcenas
and 7 Dinglasan’s. In Feb. 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow Ang Chia and
his sons Lee Bing Ho and Lee Bun Ting. On June 30, 1947, the surviving heirs of Lee Liong
extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No. 398.
When the sons died, the lot was then transferred by succession to their respective wives Elizabeth
Lee and Pacita Yu-Lee.

In the case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, involving the same lot, the Court held that even if the sale of
the property was null and void for violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an
alien, still the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the sellers from recovering title to the property. A
subsequent case over the same land was dismissed applying the doctrine of res judicata.

On Sept. 7, 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita filed a petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398
because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On Oct. 3,
2001, the Court held that the TC’s order of reconstitution was void for lack of factual support
because it was based merely on the plan & technical description approved by the Land Registration
Authority.

Meanwhile, on Jan. 26, 1995, the RP filed with the RTC a Complaint for Reversion of Title, praying
that the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab initio, thus never
forming part of the deceased’s estate, and that the lot be reverted to the public domain for the
State’s disposal in accordance with law. Respondents invoked the following as affirmative defenses:
prescription, private ownership of Lot No. 398, and Lee Liong’s being a buyer in good faith and for
value. Furthermore, respondents claimed that, being Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire
Lot No. 398 by succession.

TC ordered reversion, ruling that respondents could not acquire title to the land, the sale to their
predecessor-in-interest being null and void. CA reversed, ruling that the transfer to respondents of
the lot cured the flow in the original transaction.

ISSUE: Whether or not reversion proceedings is still viable, considering that the lot has already been
transferred to Filipino citizens

RULING: No.

This case is similar to De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan, where the Court, independently of the doctrine
of in pari delicto, sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of the
sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen.

As the Court held in Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, although ownership of the land cannot revert to the
original sellers because of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the OSG may initiate an action for
reversion/escheat of the land to the State. But in this case, subsequent circumstances militate
against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the Filipinos’ hands. The constitutional
proscription on alien ownership of lands was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of
non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is
in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after 40 years from Dinglasan v. Lee Bun
Ting, and the land has already been transferred by succession to Filipino citizens. In Chavez v. PEA,
the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.

G.R. No. 164024 January 29, 2009

LUIS B. MANESE vs. SPOUSES DIOSCORO VELASCO and GLICERIA SULIT

Facts:

On October 13, 1971, respondent Dioscoro Velasco was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-
167835 covering the alleged foreshore land by the Register of Deeds. On March 22, 1977, Velasco
sold the property to respondent Sylvia Flores, and TCT No. T-1609236 was issued in her name. On
January 4, 1981, the property was sold by Flores to Mildred Christine Flores-Tantoco and TCT No. T-
1777357 was issued in the latter’s name. Later, the property was divided into seven lots and 7 TCT
were issued in the name of Mildred Christine Flores-Tantoco. On January 18, 1992, the lots covered
by TCT Nos. T-1777808 and T-1777819 were sold back to Flores such that TCT No. T-27811210 and
TCT No. 27811011 were issued in her name.

Adjacent and contiguous to the alleged foreshore land is the agricultural land owned by petitioners.

On August 31, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages against
respondents before the RTC of Lucena City. They alleged that the issuance of the homestead patent
and the series of transfers involving the same property were null and void. They further alleged that
they applied for lease of the foreshore land and the government had approved in their favor
Foreshore, Reclaimed Land or Miscellaneous Lease Application

On December 2, 1999, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
petitioners do not have the legal personality to file the complaint since the property forms part of
the public domain and only the Solicitor General could bring an action for reversion or any action
which may have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued
on the basis of the patent;

On June 15, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that petitioners do not have the
legal personality to file the complaint. It held that the government, not petitioners, is the real party
in interest and, therefore, only the Solicitor General may bring the action in court.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are the real party in interest in this case for the reversion of
the subject land.
Ruling: No.

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not
capable of private appropriation.

Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides:

All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The action shall be instituted by
the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
Moreover, such action does not prescribe. Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the
State to recover its property acquired through fraud by private individuals. Based on the foregoing,
we rule that petitioners are not the real parties in interest in this case.

GUARDIANSHIP