TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. No Topic Page No.

1. Re Arundhati Roy Page No- 3

2. A.S Mohammed Rafi v State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 1 SCC 688 Page No- 5

3. Tushar D. Bhatt. V. State of Gujarat & Another (2009) 11 SCC Page No- 8
678

4. Dr. D.C. Saxena, Contemnor v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India Page No-10
[AIR1996SC 2481]

5. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, (AIR 2000 SC 3049) Page No- 12

6. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP (AIR 2016 SC 3302) Page No- 14

7. Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, Page No-16

Bombay (1984 1 SCR 414)

8. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v Union of India (8 AIR 2003 SC 73 9) Page No-18

9. R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106. Page No- 20

10. Nortanmal Chauraria v M.R. Murli & Anr. (AIR 2004 SC 2440) Page No-22
 1. Re Arundhati Roy

FACTS

Following a Supreme Court order on the Narmada Bachao Andolan case, that allowed for the
height of the dam to be increased, the Respondent wrote an article entitled 'The Greater Common
Good' The Court thereafter issued an order directing that the Respondent should ‘desist from acting
in a manner which has a tendency of hindering the due administration of justice.’
Subsequently, however, Narmada Bachao Andolan and the Respodent laid a Dharna in front of the
SC, shouting abusive slogans against the court, ascribing lack of integrity and dishonesty to the
institution. This led to contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. Along
with the denial, Respondent’s response to the show cause notice criticized the Court for issuing
proceedings in the first place. On the basis of the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings
were initiated against the Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. 

ISSUES

Whether the paragraphs in Ms. Roy’s affidavit amounted to contempt of court under the Contempt
of Courts Act?

RULES

 The Constitution of India, 1950

 Article 19(1)(a)- Freedom of Speech and Expression and Article 19(2)- Exceptions to
Article 19(1)(a)
 Article 129- Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such
a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
 Section 2(c)- Definition of criminal contempt
 Section 12- Punishment for contempt of court
 Section 14- Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.
 Section 15- Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.
 
ANALYSIS

The preliminary argument of the Respondents seeking recusal of the judges who issued notice of
contempt in the instant matter was rejected by the Court. The decision of denying recusal appears to
be fallacious as it goes against the law laid down u/S. 14 of the Act. Principle of natural justice, due
process requirement after the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, and ordinary notions of justice
demanded the judge to refuse to hear the matter and to recuse from the Bench.  There is a tendency
to inherit bias in contempt proceedings initiated by the court suo-motu, thus creating a scope pf
injustice and violation of the cherished freedoms of the contemnor. It dismissed as irrelevant the
Respondent’s argument that the issue of whether truth could be pleaded as a defence to contempt
proceedings had to be determined.

The Court stated that the purpose of the contempt proceedings was to maintain public confidence in
the judicial system. In order to be considered fair criticism, the Court said that the statement “must
be made in good faith and in the public interest, which is to be gauged by the surrounding
circumstances including the person responsible for the comments, his knowledge in the field
regarding which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be achieved.”  Further,
the Court distinguished the instant case from that of P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker where the SC
considered criticisms of judiciary made by a person who used to be a part of the Judiciary. Thus,
liability in contempt cases will differ depending upon the person who makes criticism of the
judicial system.  Further, the observation of the SC to the effect that the law "punishes the archer as
soon as the arrow is shot no matter if it misses to hit the target" reflects another anomaly in the law
(as interpreted) to the requirement of mens rea in a charge of contempt.

 CONCLUSION

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines criminal contempt as that which ‘scandalizes the court’
or ‘prejudices judicial proceedings’ without providing any explanation of these key terms. There
are few restraints on the exercise of this power and more often than not, it is likely to be exercised
arbitrarily. The Court has more than once failed to realize that the authority of the court which is
imposed by penalties under contempt powers can procure submission, but not respect.
2. A.S Mohammed Rafi v State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 1 SCC 688

 
BENCH: Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra
 
FACTS:
A resolution was passed by the Coimbatore Bar Association exhorting its members not to defend
the policemen who were the accused in a particular criminal case. The resolution was challenged
before the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court made some observations about the
Coimbatore Bar Association in its judgment. A civil appeal was filed before the Supreme Court
seeking to quash the observations made against it. While granting the plea of the Coimbatore Bar
Association in Civil Appeal No. 10304-10308 of 2010 that the observations made against it in the
impugned judgment of the High Court of the Madras should be quashed, the Supreme Court also
considered the validity and propriety of the resolution passes by the Bar Association. 

 
ISSUES:
1. Whether professional standards and ethics require advocates to defend all accused persons.
2. Whether the resolution passed by the Bar Association not to defend accused policemen in
criminal cases violates the right to be defended under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. 
 

RULES:
1. Article 22(1) in The Constitution of India 1949
 2. Article 142 in The Constitution of India 1949
 

ANALYSIS:
The legality of the Bar Association resolution that none of its members will appear for an accused
came up for consideration in this case. It has been noticed that several Bar Associations have
passed resolutions in the past as follows-
 That they will not defend a particular person or persons in a particular case.
 When there are clashes between the policemen and lawyers, that no one will defend the
policeman in the criminal case.
 That they will not defend a person who is alleged to be a terrorist or a person accused of a
brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape case.
 
There is ample evidence to show that Indian Lawyers have never shirked their responsibility on the
ground that they would become either unpopular or it is personally dangerous for him to defend
such persons. It was noticed that in spite of such high traditions established by Bar, several
instances have occurred about the refusal to defend certain accused persons like-

a. The revolutionaries in Bengal during British rule were defended by lawyers.

b. Indian communists were defended in the Meerut conspiracy case.
c. Razakars of Hyderabad were defended
d. Sheikh Abdullah and his co-accused were defended.
 e. Alleged assasins of Mahatma Gandhi and Indira Gandhi were defended.
f. Dr. Binayak Sen has been defended, and
g. Bhulabhai Desai defended the accused in INA trials in Red Fort at Delhi (1945 to 1946).
 
The Constitution of India and Rules framed by Bar Council of India imposed a duty on the lawyers
to defend the causes and not to refuse to accept briefs. The Constitutional provisions guarantees
that no person arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be the
ground of his arrest and shall not be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice. The rules framed by the Bar Council of India provides that an advocate is
bound to accept any brief in Courts or tribunals before any other authorities in or before which he
proposes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case.
 

CONCLUSION:

Thus, the Court held that professional ethics requires that a lawyer cannot refuse a brief, provided a
client is willing to pay his fee, and the lawyer is not otherwise engaged. Hence, the action of any
Bar Association in passing such a resolution that none of its members will appear for a particular
accused, whether on the ground that he is a policeman or on the ground that he is a suspected
terrorist, rapist, mass murderer, etc. is against all norms of the Constitution, the Statute and
professional ethics. It is against the great traditions of the Bar which has always stood up for
defending persons accused for a crime. Such a resolution is, in fact, a disgrace to the legal
community. The Court declared that all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India are null and
void and the right minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy
and rule of law to be upheld in this country. Thus, a resolution of the Bar, that no member of the
Bar will appear for a particular accused, is against all norms of the Constitution, the statute and
professional ethics. It is also against great traditions of the Bar which took cases where persons
were accused of treason and other serious offences.

Democracy and the rule of law can be maintained only by providing access to justice through legal
profession and no person shall be denied of the right to be defended by a lawyer. The Supreme
Court’s decision upholding the right of a person to be defended by a lawyer and corresponding duty
of the lawyer to defend strengthen, not only the cause of legal profession but also strengthens the
rule of law and democracy in the Country.
 3. Tushar D. Bhatt. V. State of Gujarat & Another (2009) 11 SCC 678

Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, J.M. Panchal

FACTS:

1. The appellant had joined service of respondent as Food Inspector. The appellant worked for
14 years as Food Inspector at Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar. In 1996, he was transferred to
Rajkot where remained for three years. Again, the appellant was transferred to Bhuj.
However, he did not join duty at Bhuj. Though the appellant was relieved on 05.10.1999
from Rajkot, yet he did not join duty at Bhuj. 
2. The Assistant Commissioner, Bhuj called upon the appellant to immediately join the duty,
but the appellant did not comply with his direction. The appellant on 17.01.2000 filed a
reply to the show cause notice and bluntly refused to join duty at Bhuj. Ultimately, the
appellant was suspended from the service. 
3. The appellant was served with a charge-sheet on 05.05.2000 containing seven charges 

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is liable under Rule 6 and other Provisions of Gujarat Civil Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules for continuous absence from services and disobeying the Head of the
office?

RULES:

1. Rule 6 and other Provisions of Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules for
disobeying the orders of Head of the office 

ANALYSIS:

Now, hearing the matter, the Division Bench observed that the appellant flouted the order of
transfer and deliberately remained absent from the duty without leave for over six months and he
indulged in the practice of brow-beating the superior officers and using intemperate language. 
The legal position has been crystallized in number of judgments that transfer is an incidence of
service and transfers are made according to administrative exigencies. In the instant case, in the
entire tenure of more than 18 years, the appellant was only transferred twice. The appellant's
transfer order cannot be termed as mala fide. The appellant was not justified in defying the transfer
order and to level allegations against his superiors and remaining absent from official duties. In the
interest of discipline of any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the
employees cannot be countenanced.

In Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, This court observed that
Transfer from one place to another is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public
administration. Similarly, in Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India and Others Court held that absence
from duty without proper intimation is indicated to be a grave offence warranting removal from
service.

After thoroughly examining the matter in the instant case, the court dismissed the appeal
considering that the appeal is devoid of any merit  and on consideration of the totality of the facts
and circumstances of this case, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment. 

CONCLUSION:

The appellant in the present matter failed to show cause as to why one of the punishments indicated
in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules should not be imposed on
him. The appellant has been giving improper and unaccepted justifications for failing to obey the
order of Head and remaining absent from his duties. It is thus concluded that the court in hearing
the present case has very well dismissed the appeal against the appellant as the appellant failed to
give answers for his unjustified and clearly seemed to be deliberate absence from his duty calling
him to be liable under the Provisions of Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
 4. Dr. D.C. Saxena, Contemnor v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India [AIR1996SC 2481]

FACTS

The petitioner made wild allegations against the then chief justice, A.H. Ahmadi, in a second writ
petition, after losing his first one, filed against the then Congress president, P.V. Narasimha Rao,
for allegedly avoiding to pay his dues to the exchequer. The petitioner imputed that Chief Justice
Ahmadi had allowed the President to avoid payment of dues treating him as a class by himself, and
that the CJI should not be allowed to take judicial immunity, and was liable to criminal prosecution.

ISSUE

Whether imputation put by the Contemnor on the Chief Justice of India amount to Contempt of the
court?

RULES

Article 129 of the Constitution of India, 1950

Section 2(c) and Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

ANALYSIS 

The Court in this regard referred to the scope of the Freedom of speech and expression as
guaranteed under article 19. Such freedom encompasses that a citizen is entitled to bring to the
notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution including judiciary suffers
from. Indeed, the right to offer healthy and constructive criticism which is fair in spirit must be left
unimpaired in the interest of the institution itself. Judges have their accountability to the society and
their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to defend and
uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour.
However, in E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar MANU/SC/0071/1970:
1970CriLJ1670, it was held by the Supreme Court that the freedom of speech and expression as
guaranteed under Article 19 does not protect a person from Scandalising the judges or courts as the
same tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and
tantamount to contempt.

In the context of section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, Scandalising the court would mean
hostile criticism of judges as judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a judge in connection
with office he holds is dealt with under law of libel or slender. 

The Petitioner, a professor of English language in clear and unequivocal language emphasised and
reaffirmed that the averments against the Hon’ble CJI were "truthfully and carefully" worded. It
therefore was derived that the accusations made by the contemnor petitioner were gross contempt.
At the height of it, he stated that since the first writ petition was not disposed of by a bench of not
less than five Judges, the writ petition was not dismissed in the eye of law and the order of
dismissal is non est and it is "not decided and disposed of constitutionally". This assertion of the
petitioner as held by the court flew in the face of the judicial finality of the order of this Court and
the assertion questioned the authority of the court. It created tendency to obstruct the administration
of justice and, therefore, was considered to be outrageous criminal contempt.

He did not tender any unconditional apology, though this Court is not bound to accept such an
unconditional apology for consideration. Considered from the totality of the facts and
circumstances, the contempt by the petitioner was considered to be of the gravest magnitude of the
contumacious conduct. 

CONCLUSION

Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the
mistakes or bias or at times even corruption. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the
development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity,
equality and justice. However, when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to
conduct himself in a matter befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free
licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the
judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to be
prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of
the judiciary would be a thing of the past. Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the present case
rightly convicted the contemnor for contempt of court and the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.
 5. Case – R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, (AIR 2000 SC 3049)

Judges - K.T. Thomas; and R.P. Sethi, JJ.

FACTS
The Appellant was appointed as legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative Bank Ltd
and retained him in that capacity for some years. The Bank later terminated the retainer ship of the
appellant and requested him to return all the case files relating to the Bank. Instead of returning the
files the appellant forwarded a consolidated bill to the Bank of Rs. 97,100/- as the balance payable
by the Bank towards the legal remuneration to which he is entitled. He informed the Bank that the
files are kept as lien and would be returned only after settling his dues. A complaint was filed by
the Managing Director of the Bank, before the Disciplinary Committee of State Bar Council
(Madhya Pradesh) under Section 36-B of the Advocates Act, the proceedings stood transferred to
the Bar Council of India. In reply which the appellant submitted before the Bar Council he admitted
that the files were not returned but claimed that he has a right to retain such files by exercising his
right of lien and offered to return the files as soon as payment is made to him.

ISSUES
1. Whether the advocate has a lien for his fees on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his
client?

Sub-issue 1: Whether an advocate keeping the files and record of the case amount to “goods
bailed”.
Sub-issue 2: Whether the advocate is liable for misconduct envisaged in Section 35 of the
Advocates Act

RULES
1. Section 171 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 (the “ICA”)- General lien of bankers, factors,
wharfingers, attorneys and policy-brokers 
2. Section 148 of the Contract Act, 1872-Bailment’, ‘bailor’ and ‘bailee’ defined 
3. Order 3, Rule 4(1) of the CPC- Appointment of pleader
4. Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India - Protection against arrest and detention in certain
cases 
5. Section 35 of the Advocate’s Act.-Punishment of advocates for misconduct.

ANALYSIS
Sub-issue 1: Whether an advocate keeping the files and record of the case amount to “goods
bailed”. 
Section 171 of the ICA uses the term “goods bailed” for things which can be retained by Attorneys
in the form of Lien. The article retained therefore has to qualify as goods defined under Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 (“SOGA”) as well as qualify the definition provided in under Section 148 of ICA.
In Union of India and Anr. v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. while determining the ambit
of the term goods under SOGA held that to become "goods" an article must be something which
can ordinarily come to the markets to be bought and sold i.e. it should be marketed or marketable.
Thus documents of case and records cannot be termed as goods. The articles retained also do not
qualify the term “bailment” as defined under Section 148 as litigation papers in the hands of the
advocate there is neither delivery of goods nor any contract that they shall be returned or otherwise
disposed of.

Sub-issue 3: Whether the advocate is liable for misconduct envisaged in Section 35 of the
Advocates Act

Misconduct envisaged in Section 35 of the Advocates Act is not defined. The Section uses the
expression "misconduct, professional or otherwise". The Court thus referred to definition of
misconduct given by Darling, J., in Re A Solicitor ex parte the Law Society that when it is shown
that an advocate in the pursuit of his profession has done something with regard to it which would
be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute
and competency, then it is open to say that he is guilty of professional misconduct.  Thus, The
Court held that the refusal to return the files to the client when he demanded the same amounted to
misconduct under Section 35 of the Act by the appellant.

CONCLUSION

Ruling: It was ruled that a lawyer does not have a right to lien with respect to case files and papers
of the client, wherein an Advocate has other remedies to claim his remuneration. This principle was
made concrete in this case and is still used unaltered even today.

6. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP (AIR 2016 SC 3302)

FACTS:
An appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the judgment
and order delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the High Court found
the appellant guilty of Criminal Contempt for intimidating and threatening a Civil Judge (Senior
Division),  and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of two months with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- The
High Court further directed the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to consider the facts contained in the
complaint of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) and to initiate appropriate proceedings against the
appellant for professional misconduct.

The appeal was admitted by Supreme Court and the part of the impugned judgment, which imposed
the sentence, was stayed and the appellant was directed not to enter the Court premises. Notice was
issued to the Supreme Court Bar Association, Bar Council of India and to the Attorney General.

ISSUE:

Court’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory power of Bar Council on conviction of an advocate for
criminal contempt and his right to practise

RULES:

The Advocates Act, 1961

 Section 38 Appeal to the Supreme Court –

 Section 24A. Disqualification for enrolment.—
 Article 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record - 

ANALYSIS:

In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, the court while examining its powers under
Article 129, held that this Court cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council and it is for the Bar Council to punish the advocate by debarring him from practice or
suspending his licence. It was further held that this court or the High Court can prevent the
contemnor advocate from appearing before it or other courts till he purges himself of the contempt
which is different from suspending or revoking the licence or debarring him to practice. Moreover,
the Rule for barring a lawyer from appearing in any court till he got himself purged of contempt by
an appropriate order of the court does not violate Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution nor
amounts to usurpation of power of adjudication and punishment conferred on the Bar Councils.

In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court with reference to Section 34 of the Advocates Act, it
was held that the court has a right to bar the advocate concerned from appearing before the courts
for an appropriate period of time. Regulation of right of appearance in courts is within the
jurisdiction of the courts.

In Supreme Court Bar Association, it was held that where the Bar Council fails to take action
inspite of reference made to it, this Court can invoke its appellate power under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act and exercise suo motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional
misconduct. 

In view of such failure of the statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh as
well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the
Advocates Act in view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary action.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court disposed of this appeal and upheld the conviction and the direction by the
Allahabad High Court that the advocate shall not be permitted to appear in courts in District Etah
until he purges himself of contempt. The Court also held Section 24A of the Advocates Act applies
to an advocate also and under this the enrolment of the contemnor Advocate will stand suspended
for two years. The Court also said that, as a disciplinary measure for proved misconduct, the licence
of the contemnor will remain suspended for further five years. The Court has however set aside the
imprisonment imposed on the Advocate.

7. Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, Bombay (1984 1

SCR 414)

Bench: A Sen, E Venkataramiah, R Mishra

FACTS
Group of 12 advocates practising in the two courts of Sub-Divisional Magistrates in the
Collectorate of Poona filed a complaint against two people,  (Appellant) and another under Sec. 35
of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereafter “Act”) alleging various acts of professional misconduct. The
proceedings stood transferred to the Bar Council of India under Sec. 36B of the Act. The
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India by its order dated April 23, 1976 held both the
appellant and another guilty of professional misconduct and directed that the appellant be
suspended for a period of four months and Agavane for a period of two months therefrom. These
disciplinary proceedings were appealed from as per Sec. 38 of the Act this the instant case. 

ISSUES
 Whether there was any evidence upon which the Disciplinary Committee could
reasonably find that they have been guilty of 'professional misconduct, within the
meaning of Sec. 35(1) of the Act.
 Whether the finding of the Disciplinary Committee as to professional misconduct on the
part of the appellant can be legally sustained.

RULES
Sec. 35 and Sec. 38 of the Advocates Act.

ANALYSIS
The test of what constitutes “grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duties” has
been laid down in many cases with one being the case of In re A Solicitor Ex pane the Law Society,
[1912] 1 KB 302 . Similarly, in the profession of law an act to amount to professional conduct not
be just mere negligence but also accompanied with moral delinquency on the part of the legal
practitioner.

In this case the SC held that there is a difference between the giving of improper advice and giving
of wrong legal advice. 

In an appeal under Sec. 38 of the Act the Court could not as a general rule, interfere with the
concurrent finding of fact by the Disciplinary Committee unless its finding are based on no
evidence provided or its proceeds on mere conjectures and surmises. 

The test to be applied in all such cases is whether the proved misconduct of the advocate is such
that he must be regarded as unworthy to remain a member of the honourable profession to which he
has been admitted, and unfit to be entrusted with the responsible duties that an advocate is called
upon to perform held in the case of, Pleader v. The Judges of the High Court of Madras AIR [1930]
PC 144 

The oral evidence adduced by the complainant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from the recitals of the couple in the first charge and under the second the lady
unequivocally admitted that she never approached the appellant at any time for any work.
Therefore, it cannot be said that there was fault of appellant and the DC erred in holding the
appellant guilty of professional misconduct as the complainants falls short of the required proof
although the circumstances appearing do give rise to considerable suspicion about the manner in
which they have been conducting their affairs, which deflects from the norms of professional
ethics.

CONCLUSION
 
The SC took into consideration the age of the advocates, the families they have to maintain, the
environments in which they practise and the standard which is maintained in such an environment
and therefore took a lenient stand and added as an observation that the lawyers should not go
touting for work in any circumstances and that the little extra work you get will not either make you
successful or counteract the bad impression you will make on many people inside and outside the
law. 
8. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v Union of India (8 AIR 2003 SC 73 9)

Bench- G.B. Patnaik, C.J., Doraiswamy Raju, S.N. Variava, D.M. Dharmadhikari and M.B.
Shah, JJ

FACTS
In the Supreme Court case the BCI had filed an affidavit setting out reasons for why
lawyers had gone on strike in the past, listing “local issues”, “issues relating to one section
of the bar and another section”, “issues involving dignity, integrity, independence of the bar
and judiciary”, “legislation without consultation with the bar councils”, and “national issues
and regional issues affecting the public at large / the insensitivity of all concerned”. All
those issues were within the exclusive domain of the courts or legislatures, except for
“issues involving dignity, integrity, independence of the bar and judiciary”. Only those
types of issues could be an exception to the general principle that lawyers could only pursue
a remedy to grievances in law.

ISSUE
 Whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycott of Court/s.

RULE
 Bar Council of India (Conduct and Disciplinary) Rules; Advocates Act, 1950 -
Section 7,
 Advocates Act, 1950 - Section 30, Section 34, Section 34(1), Section 38, Section
48A, Section 49, Section 50;
 Constitution of India - Article 19, Article 19(1), Article 21, Article 144, Article 145;
 Bar Council of India Rules, 1975

ANALYSIS
In this case, Several Petitions raised the question whether lawyers have a right to strike the
Court. The petitioners submitted that strike as a mean for collective bargaining is recognised
only in industrial disputes. He submitted that lawyers who are officers of the Court cannot
use strikes as a means to blackmail the Courts or the clients. He submitted that the Courts
must take action against the Committee members for giving such calls on the basis that they
have committed contempt of court. The law is that a lawyer who has accepted a Vakalat on
behalf of a client must attend Court and if he does not attend Court it would amount to
professional misconduct and also contempt of court. He submitted that Court should now
frame rules whereby the Courts regulate the right of lawyers to appear before the Court.

Abstention from work for the redressal of a grievance should never be resorted to where
other remedies for seeking redressal are available. All attempts should be made to seek
redressal from the concerned authorities, where such redressal is not available or not
forthcoming, the direction of the protest can be against that authority and should not be
misdirected, e.g., in cases of alleged police brutalities Courts and litigants should not be
targeted in respect of actions for which they are in no way responsible. No force or coercion
should be employed against lawyers who are not in agreement with the “strike call” and
want to discharge their professional duties.

Respondent submitted that lawyers had a right to go on strike or give a call for boycott. And
that there are many occasions when lawyers require to go, on strike or gave a call for
boycott. He submitted that this Court laying down that going on strike amounts to
misconduct is of no consequence as the Bar Councils have been vested with the power to
decide whether or not an Advocate has committed misconduct. It was argued that the Court
cannot penalise any Advocate for misconduct as the power to discipline is now exclusively
with the Bar Councils.

CONCLUSION
The Court held that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even
on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements, TV
interviews, carrying out of court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white
or any color armbands, peaceful protest marches outside and away from court premises, etc.
9. R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High
Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106.

Facts

On January 10, 1999 at about half past four in the morning a speeding vehicle crashed
through a police check-post on one of the Delhi roads and drove away leaving behind six
people dead or dying. As the speeding car hit the group of persons standing on the road some
were thrown away but two or three persons landed on the car's bonnet and rolled down to the
ground under it. The car, however, did not stop. It moved on dragging along the persons who
were caught in its underside. It halted only after the driver lost control and going down a
distance of 200-300 feet hit the road divider. At this point the occupants came down from the
car to inspect the scene. They looked at the front and the rear of the car and would not have
failed to notice the persons caught under the car who were still crying for help and who
perhaps might have been saved if they were taken out even at that stage. But the anxiety of
the car's occupants to leave the accident site without delay seemed to override all other
considerations. They got back into the car, reversed it and drove on. The car went on
dragging the unfortunate victims trapped under it to certain and ghastly death and left behind
at the accident site dismembered limbs and dead bodies of men. The police investigation
brought to light that the accident was caused by a black BMW car which was being driven by
Sanjeev Nanda. He was returning from a late- night party, under the influence of liquor,
along with some friend(s)

Issues
1. Whether the conviction of the two appellants for committing criminal contempt of court is
justified and sustainable?

2. Whether the procedure adopted by the High Court in the contempt proceedings was fair
and reasonable, causing no prejudice to the two appellants?

3. Whether it was open to the High Court to prohibit the appellants from appearing before the
High Court and the courts sub-ordinate to it for a specified period as one of the punishments
for criminal contempt of court?

4. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the punishments awarded to the
appellants can be said to be adequate and commensurate to their misdeeds?
Rules
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 34 in The Advocates Act, 1961, Article 145 in
The Constitution of India 1949, Article 215 in The Constitution of India 1949

Analysis
Suo motu cognizance taken by High Court on basis of telecast alone. The court examined the
audio and video recordings of sting operation. The findings of High Court were sustained. It
had rightly punished them by prohibiting them from appearing for a period of four months
and holding that they had forfeited their right to be designated as Senior Advocates and
imposing fine. A motivated application for recusal needs to be dealt with sternly and viewed
as interference in due course of justice leading to penal consequences. Directions given to
High Courts not having framed rules under Section 34 of Advocates Act to frame rules within
four months. The Rules should indicate need for specific notice to be issued when
punishment of debarring an Advocate from practice be imposed. Telecast of sting operation
exposing collusion between defence counsel and prosecutor did not amount to contempt of
court but the programme was intended to prevent an attempt to interfere with or obstruct the
due course of a pending matter. It was in larger public interest and served an important public
cause. Grave concerns and dismay expressed on decline of ethical and professional standards
amongst lawyers. Bar Council of India and the Bar Councils of different States cannot escape
their responsibility. High Court’s powers of superintendence over subordinate judiciary and
power of control should also be exercised to protect them from external interference that may
sometimes appear overpowering to them and to support them to discharge their duties
fearlessly. Criminal justice system should be insulated from external influences aimed to
subvert trials.

Conclusion
NDTV, a news channel telecast a programme on 30 May 2007 in which the IU Khan, Special
Public Prosecutor and R.K. Anand, the Senior Defence Counsel, were seen negotiating sell
out of a prosecution witness for a very high price. According to NDTV, the programme was
based on a clandestine sting operation. Delhi High Court suo motu initiated a proceeding for
criminal contempt and issued notice to R.K. Anand and IU Khan under Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. During the pendency of the matter in the High Court, R.K. Anand
filed a petition requesting Justice Manmohan Sarin, the Presiding Judge to recuse
himself from the proceeding. He stated in the petition that he had a feeling that he was
not likely to get justice at the hands of Manmohan Sarin. He made the prayer that the
main matter be transferred to be heard by some other bench of which Justice Sarin was
not a member. The High Court held that the evidence and circumstances fully
established that both IU Khan and R.K. Anand were guilty of the charges framed
against them. It accordingly convicted them for criminal contempt of court and
sentenced them by prohibiting them from appearing in the Delhi High Court and the
Courts subordinate to it for a period of four months from the date of the judgment. The
court also recommended to the full court to divest them of the honour of being
designated as Senior Advocates and also sentenced them to a fine of Rs. 2000/- each.

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10. Nortanmal Chauraria v M.R. Murli & Anr. (AIR 2004 SC 2440)

Bench: CJI, S.B. Sinha & S.H. Kapadia.

FACTS
The relationship between the appellant and the respondents herein is that of landlords
and tenant. A rent control proceeding was initiated by the respondents against the
appellant. While the rent control proceeding was pending in the small causes court,
they allegedly misconducted themselves by reason of following acts of omissions and
commissions, On 8.10.1993 when the appellant came out of the court hall of the said
court after attending the appeal pending there, the first respondent allegedly came
from behind and hit him on his back and ran away. On 26.10.1993 while the appellant
was coming out of the court hall, the first respondent accompanied with some rowdy
elements threatened to kill him. The matter was allegedly reported to the police on the
same day. On 1.3.1995 when the learned Xth Judge left for his chamber during the
lunch break and while the appellant was leaving the court hall along with his advocate
Shri S.Vijayranjan, the first respondent kicked him on the knee of his left leg in the
court room with an intention to cause injury and further asked him not to appear in the
court for evidence. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu
upon receipt of the said complaint of the appellant initiated a proceeding. The matter
ultimately appeared to have been transferred to the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India.

RULES:
 Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and
 Section 35 of the Advocates Act,

ISSUES
 Whether an order of the Bar Council of India passed in BCI TR No.73/1997
refusing to enquire into a complaint of purported misconduct on the part of the
respondent be allowed as under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961?

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ANALYSIS:

In this case the Disciplinary Committee had considered the conduct of the appellant in
order to judge as to whether the acts on the part of the respondents amount to
misconduct. There was absolutely no reason as to why the appellant did not make any
complaint to the State Bar Council immediately of the incidents which took place on
8.10.1993 and 26.10.1993. If his contention to the effect that in relation to the incident
dated 26.10.1993 he had lodged a first information report there was absolutely no
reason as to why he did not pursue the same seriously. It is, as has been noticed by the
Bar Council of India, accepted that the police filed final forms but despite the same
the appellant did not file any protest petition or initiate any other proceeding before
criminal court. In relation to the incident dated 1.3.1995 which allegedly took place
inside the court room it was expected of the appellant or his advocate, who is said to
be a retired district judge, to bring the same to the notice of the court. Even in relation
to the incidents allegedly occurred on 8.10.1993 and 26.10.1993 no complaint was
made before the presiding officer of the court. No proceeding was initiated in relation
to the purported incident on 1.3.1995.

Hence, the findings of the Bar Council, cannot be said to be so irrational meriting
interference by this court is the question. They further placed on record that on a
querry made by to them to Mr. Upadhyay as to whether any other incident had taken
place after 1.3.1995, the learned counsel categorically stated that no such incident had
thereafter taken place. Hence the court held that the matter need not be pursued
further. The appeal was dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Professional misconduct refers to disgraceful or dishonourable conduct, not befitting

to the profession concerned. Legal profession is not a trade or business. Therefore, it
must remain a de-contaminated profession. Advocates have a duty to uphold the
integrity of the profession and to discourage corruption so that justice may be secured

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by the citizenry in a legal manner. A lawyer must strictly adhere to the norms of
profession which make him worthy as an officer of court.

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