MCDP 1-1

Strategy

S
S E MPE R FIDE LI

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 142 000007 00

 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20350-3000

4 April 2018

CHANGE 1 to MCDP 1-1

Strategy

1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of

all applicable and appropriate terms, except those terms governed
by higher authority. No other content has been affected.

2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

ROBERT S. WALSH
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Numbers:

Publication: 142 000007 00
Change: 142 000007 01
 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20350-1775

12 November 1997

FOREWORD

This publication is designed to give Marine leaders a solid, com-

mon understanding of the fundamental nature of military strategy
that is inherent in each military action. Its intent is to give the
reader the basic knowledge required to think “strategically,” that
is, to be able to examine the particulars of any specific situation
and understand the political and military factors behind the use of
military force.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1 provides the

foundation for thinking strategically. This foundation will enable
Marines to better understand their roles in a particular situation
and to consider the implications of their actions on the military
strategy being employed and the political objectives that strategy
is intended to achieve.

Just as it is important to appreciate what this publication is

designed to do, it is equally important to understand what this
publication does not seek to do. It does not attempt to provide a
solution to current strategic problems, nor is it concerned with
details of current American strategy. MCDP 1-1 does not assume
that war and military strategy are exclusively a matter of interna-
tional or interstate behavior, and the concepts discussed in it are
not limited to any particular kind of warfare or level of conflict.
Nor does Strategy prescribe any particular strategy, any particular
process for the making of strategy, or any specific techniques and
procedures for handling military forces. It is meant to educate the
mind of future commanders or, more accurately, to guide them in
their self-education, not to accompany them to the battlefield.

Chapter 1 explores the complex nature of the strategic environ-

ment, including the relationship between war and politics and the
key factors at work in any strategic situation. Chapter 2 discusses
the essential elements of any strategy, the relationship of ends and
means, and the interaction among political objectives, national
strategy, and military strategy. Chapter 3 looks at a variety of
strategies as they might be developed in different strategic situa-
tions. Chapter 4 synthesizes the concepts presented in the first
three chapters by focusing on how strategy is made, who makes
it, what moral criteria guide strategic decisions, and what pitfalls
may occur in the making of strategy.

This publication is primarily for field grade officers. However,

Marines at all levels require a broad perspective and an under-
standing of how the effects of their actions can influence the attain-
ment of our national objectives. Furthermore, Marines of any rank
or specialty can easily find themselves working for senior leaders
with strategic responsibilities. Those leaders need subordinates
who understand the strategic environment and can provide intelli-
gent and insightful advice on the strategic situation. Therefore, as a
foundation for strategic thought, this publication should be read
and understood by Marines at all levels of command both in the
operating forces and the supporting establishment.

C. C. KRULAK
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 142 000007 00

© 1997 United States Government as represented by the Secretary

of the Navy. All rights reserved.
 MCDP 1-1

Strategy

Introduction. The Study of Strategy

Chapter 1. The Strategic Environment

The Nature of Politics and War—Further Defining War—The
Nature of War-Making Political Entities—Strategic Constants
and Norms–The Physical Environment–National Character–War
and the State–The Balance of Power Mechanism—The Trinity

Chapter 2. Strategy: Ends and Means

National Strategy—Ends in National Strategy–Survival and
Victory–Political Objectives—Means in National Strategy—Adapt-
ing Ends to Means, and Vice Versa—Ends in Military Strategy–
Relationship Between Political and Military Objectives–Distinguishing
Between Erosion and Annihilation Strategies

Chapter 3. Strategic Opposites

Defensive and Offensive Strategies—Symmetrical and
Asymmetrical Strategies—Deterrence: Strategies of Reprisal
or Denial—Standardized or Tailored Strategies—Strategy by
Intent or by Default—Evaluating Opposing Strategies
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Chapter 4. The Making of Strategy

The Strategy-Making Process–The Strategic Assessment–Political
Objectives–Military Objectives and the Means to Achieve Them–
Strategic Concepts—Who Makes Strategy?—Just War—
Strategy-Making Pitfalls–Strategic Panaceas–Emphasizing
Process Over Product–The Fait Accompli–Limited and Unlimited
Wars–Paralysis and Recklessness

Conclusion

Notes
 Introduction

The Study of Strategy

“The nation that draws too great a distinction between its

scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cow-
ards and its fighting done by fools.”1

—Unknown
 The Study of Strategy

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting,

stresses that war is fundamentally political in character and that
war must serve policy. What matters ultimately in war is strategic
success: attainment of our political aims and the protection of our
national interests. History shows that national leaders, both politi-
cal and military, who fail to understand this relationship sow the
seeds for ultimate failure—even when their armed forces achieve
initial battlefield success. Battlefield brilliance seldom rescues a
bad strategy.

The United States Marine Corps is a key instrument in the execu-

tion of American national strategy. Marine expeditionary forces
possess extraordinary strategic reach. As an expeditionary force-
in-readiness, the Marine Corps has been consistently called upon
to implement key elements of our national security strategy and
its supporting national military strategy. While the Marine Corps
is not a strategy-making organization in the sense of designing a
national military strategy or even drafting strategies to fight par-
ticular wars, the effective execution of strategy requires an under-
standing of both its intent and its context. In order to carry out our
responsibilities to the Nation, Marines must possess the strategic
skills and understanding necessary to participate effectively in the
strategic environment of the 21st century.

Introduction-3
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

There are three important reasons to develop a fundamental

understanding of strategy:

 Marines will find themselves working for senior leaders who

participate directly in the development of strategy. Such lead-
ers need subordinates who understand their requirements and
the environment they work in.
 An understanding of how strategy is made allows Marines to
see the larger picture. It enables them to better grasp the intent
that underlies the military actions in which they participate and
the constraints placed upon the use of military force during
these actions. It also helps Marine leaders provide useful
answers to questions posed by their subordinates concerning
the purpose and objectives behind our involvement in a partic-
ular operation.
 By the very nature of their profession, all Marines are engaged
in the execution of strategy. Every military action has potential
strategic implications. Modern media coverage has intensified
both the awareness of and sensitivity towards any military
action. Marines must understand that the “distance” between
local or tactical actions and the effects of these actions at the
strategic or political level may be very short. Sometimes a
seemingly unimportant action by any participant—a general, a
platoon leader, or even one single Marine—can have a power-
ful political impact.

Introduction-4
 The Study of Strategy

MCDP 1-1 focuses on military strategy in its most fundamental

sense, exploring the question “How do military means relate to
political ends?” It provides a conceptual basis to help us to
understand both our own and our enemies’ political and military
objectives, the relationships among them, and the nature of any
particular situation in which military means might be used. It
explores how political entities integrate military means with the
other elements of their power in order to attain their political
ends. A common conceptual understanding of these matters
helps Marines develop the adaptability that our warfighting phi-
losophy demands.

Introduction-5
 Chapter 1

The Strategic Environment

“The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far

from the battlefield, in political, social, and economic fac-
tors which explain why armies are constituted as they are,
and why their leaders conduct them in the way they do.”1

—Michael Howard

“That the factors are infinitely varied and difficult to deter-

mine is true, but that . . . is just what emphasises the neces-
sity of reaching such firm standpoints as are attainable. The
vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must we
be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin
to lay a course.”2

—Julian Corbett
 The Strategic Environment

At its most basic, strategy is a matter of figuring out what we need

to achieve, determining the best way to use the resources at our
disposal to achieve it, and then executing the plan. Unfortunately,
in the real world, all of these things are not easily done. Our strate-
gic goals are complex and sometimes contradictory and may
change in the middle of a military endeavor. The resources at our
disposal are not always obvious, can change during the course of a
struggle, and usually need to be adapted to suit our needs. Our
adversary often refuses to fit our preconceptions or to stand still
while we erect the apparatus for that adversary’s destruction.

THE NATURE OF POLITICS AND WAR

Before we can usefully discuss the making and carrying out of mil-
itary strategy, we must understand the fundamental character of
politics and the violent expression of politics called war. Let us
start by analyzing Clausewitz’s description of war as both an in-
strument of policy and of politics with the addition of other means.3

War is a social phenomenon. Its logic is not the logic of art, nor of
science or engineering, but rather the logic of social transactions.
Human beings interact with each other in ways that are funda-
mentally different from the way the scientist interacts with chem-
icals, the architect or engineer with beams and girders, or the
artist with paints. The interaction that concerns us when we speak
of war is political interaction. The “other means” in Clausewitz’s
definition of war is organized violence. The addition of violence

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

to political interaction is the only factor that defines war as a dis-

tinct form of political interaction—but that addition has powerful
and unique effects.

The two different terms we have used, policy and politics, both
concern power. While every specific war has its unique causes,
war as a phenomenon is fundamentally concerned with the distri-
bution and redistribution of power.4

Power is sometimes material in nature: the economic power of

money or other resources, for example, or possession of the physi-
cal means for coercion (weapons and armed personnel). Power is
just as often psychological in nature: legal, religious, or scientific
authority; intellectual or social prestige; a charismatic personality’s
ability to excite or persuade; a reputation, accurate or illusory, for
diplomatic or military strength.

Power provides the means to attack and the means to resist attack.
Power in itself is neither good nor evil. By its nature, however,
power tends to be distributed unevenly in ways that vary greatly
from one society to another.

Power manifests itself differently and in different places at differ-

ent times. In Japan, during the 16th through 19th centuries, real
political power was exercised by the shogun, who was formally
subordinate to the emperor. Later, senior Japanese military leaders
were for a time effectively controlled by groups of fanatical junior
officers. King Philip II of Spain, whose power was rooted in a
landed aristocracy, was surprised to discover the power that

1-4
 The Strategic Environment

Europe’s urban bankers could exercise over his military strategy.

American leaders were similarly surprised by the power of the dis-
parate political coalition that forced an end to the Vietnam War.
One of the major problems of strategy is to determine where and in
what form real power lies and to identify those relatively rare
points where military power can be applied effectively.

Politics is the process by which power is distributed in any society:

a family, an office, a religious order, a tribe, a state, a region, the
international community. The process of distributing power may
be fairly orderly—through consensus, inheritance, election, or
some time-honored tradition—or chaotic—through assassination,
revolution, or warfare. Whatever process may be in place at any
given time, politics is inherently dynamic, and not only the distri-
bution of power but the process by which it is distributed is under
constant pressure for change.

A key characteristic of politics is that it is interactive—a coopera-

tive or competitive process. It cannot be characterized as a rational
process because actual outcomes are seldom what was consciously
intended by any one of the participants. Political events and their
outcomes are the product of conflicting, contradictory, sometimes
compromising, but often adversarial forces. That description
clearly applies to war.

Policy, on the other hand, can be characterized as a rational pro-

cess. The making of policy is a conscious effort by a distinct polit-
ical body to use whatever power it possesses to accomplish some
purpose—if only the mere continuation or increase of its own

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

power. Policy is a rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned

purposes and actions of individuals in the political struggle. War
can be a practical means, sometimes the only means available, for
the achievement of rational policy aims—that is, the aims of one
party in the political dispute. Hence, to describe war as an
“instrument of policy” is entirely correct. It is an act of force to
compel our opponent to do our will.

Do not, however, confuse rationality with intelligence, reasonable-

ness, or understanding. Policies can be wise or foolish: they can
advance their creators’ goals or unwittingly contradict them. They
can be driven by concern for the public good or by the most craven
reasons of self-interest. Rationality also implies no particular kind
of goal, for goals are a product of emotion and human desire. The
goal of policy may be peace and prosperity, national unity, the
achievement of ideological perfection, or the extermination of
some ethnic minority or competitor.

Remember too that policy, while it is different from politics, is

produced via a political process. Even the most rational of policies
is often the result of compromises within the political group. Such
compromises may be intended more to maintain peace or unity
within the group than to accomplish any external purpose. They
may, in fact, be irrelevant or contrary to any explicit group goal.
Policy is therefore often ambiguous, unclear, even contradictory,
and subject to change or to rigidity when change is needed.

1-6
 The Strategic Environment

Clausewitz’s reference to war as an expression of politics is there-

fore not a prescription, but a description. War is a part of politics.
It does not replace other forms of political intercourse but merely
supplements them. It is a violent expression of the tensions and
disagreements between political groups, when political conflict
reaches a level that sparks organized violence. Thus war—like
every other phase of politics—embodies both rational and irratio-
nal elements. Its course is the product not of one will, but of the
collision of two or more wills.

To say, then, that war is an expression of both politics and policy

with the addition of other means is to say two very different
things to strategy makers. First, it says that strategy, insofar as it
is a conscious and rational process, must strive to achieve the pol-
icy goals set by the political leadership. Second, it says that such
policy goals are created only within the chaotic and emotional
realm of politics.

Therefore, the military professional who says, “Keep politics out

of this. Just give us the policy, and we will take care of the strat-
egy,” does not understand the fundamentals of strategy. Strategists
must operate within the constraints of policy and politics. The
only alternative would be for military strategy to perform the func-
tions of policy and for military leaders to usurp political power,
tasks which are generally unsuited to both military strategy and
military leaders.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

FURTHER DEFINING WAR

We acknowledge that war is an expression of politics and policy
with the addition of violent means. Still, this description does not
fully explain war.

One frequent error is to describe war as something that takes

place exclusively between nations or states. First, nations and
states are different things. The Kurds are a nation, but they have
no state. The Arabs are a nation with several states. The Soviet
Union was a state whose citizens represented many different
nationalities. Second, many—possibly most—wars actually take
place within a single state, meaning that at least one of the partic-
ipants was not previously a state. Civil wars, insurrections, wars
of secession, and revolutions all originate within a single existing
state, although they sometimes attract external intervention. Wars
may spill across state borders without being interstate wars, as in
Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds. Third, most interstate wars are
fought not by individual states, but by coalitions. Such coalitions
often involve nonstate actors as well as state governments.

Another mistake is to limit our definition of war to sustained,

large-scale military operations. Here the defining condition is one
of scale and duration. Under headings such as “Military Opera-
tions Other than War,” this approach lumps many forms of politi-
cal conflict that clearly satisfy Clausewitz’s definition of war with
other events—such as humanitarian assistance—that do not.

1-8
 The Strategic Environment

In its broadest sense, war refers to any use of organized force for
political purposes, whether that use results in actual violence or
not. When we speak of warfare, however, we almost always mean
actual violence of some considerable scale that is carried out over
some considerable period of time. A single assassination, while
certainly a violent political act, does not constitute a war. On the
other hand, large-scale, long-term violence alone does not neces-
sarily mean war either. For example, over a 25-year period—
1969 through 1994—some 3,000 people were killed in Northern
Ireland for an average of 120 deaths per year in a population of
1.5 million.5 For that same period, there were approximately 291
murders per year committed in Washington, D.C. in an average
population of 642,000.6 The former situation is widely recog-
nized as war, while the latter is not. The difference is a matter of
organization. The perpetrators, victims, and targets of the vio-
lence in Northern Ireland reflect distinct political groups engaged
in a power struggle. The violent death rate in Washington, D.C.,
roughly five times higher, seems to reflect random violence—a
sign of social dysfunction rather than of some purposeful group
movement toward any political goal.

From all this, we can say that war is—

 Organized violence.
 Waged by two or more distinguishable groups against each
other.
 In pursuit of some political end.

1-9
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

 Sufficiently large in scale and in social impact to attract the

attention of political leaders.
 Continued long enough for the interplay between the op-
ponents to have some impact on political events.

THE NATURE OF
WAR-MAKING POLITICAL ENTITIES

Military professionals often seek a “scientific” understanding of

war. This approach is appealing because the human mind tends to
organize its perceptions according to familiar analogies, like the
powerful images of traditional Newtonian physics. Such compar-
isons can be very useful. Our military doctrine abounds with
terms like “center of gravity,” “mass,” and “friction.”

The attempt to apply a scientific approach can result in some mis-

leading ideas. For example, some political scientists treat political
entities as unitary rational actors, the social equivalents of New-
ton’s solid bodies hurtling through space. Real political units,
however, are not unitary. Rather, they are collections of inter-
twined but fundamentally distinct actors and systems. Their
behavior derives from the internal interplay of both rational and
irrational forces as well as from the peculiarities of their own his-
tories and of chance. Strategists who accept the unitary rational
actor model as a description of adversaries at war will have diffi-
culty understanding either side’s motivations or actual behavior.

1-10
 The Strategic Environment

Such strategists ignore their own side’s greatest potential vulnera-

bilities and deny themselves potential levers and targets—the
fault lines that exist within any human political construct.

Fortunately, the physical sciences have begun to embrace the

class of problems posed by social interactions like politics and
war. The appropriate imagery, however, is not that of Newtonian
physics. Rather, we need to think in terms of biology and particu-
larly ecology.7

To survive over time, the various members of any ecosystem must

adapt—not only to the external environment, but to each other.
These agents compete or cooperate, consume and are consumed,
join and divide, and so on. A system created by such interaction is
called a complex adaptive system.

Such systems are inherently dynamic. Although they may some-

times appear stable for lengthy periods, their components con-
stantly adapt or fail. No species evolves alone; rather, each species
“co-evolves” with the other species that make up its environment.
The mutation or extinction of one species in any ecosystem has a
domino or ripple effect throughout the system, threatening damage
to some species and creating opportunities for others. Slight
changes are sometimes absorbed without unbalancing the system.
Other slight changes—an alteration in the external environment or
a local mutation—can send the system into convulsions of growth
or collapse.

One of the most interesting things about complex systems is that

they are inherently unpredictable. It is impossible, for example, to

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

know in advance which slight perturbations in an ecological sys-

tem will settle out unnoticed and which will spark catastrophic
change. This is so not because of any flaw in our understanding
of such systems, but because the system’s behavior is generated
according to rules the system itself develops and is able to alter.
In other words, a system’s behavior may be constrained by exter-
nal factors or laws but is not determined by them.

For all of these reasons, systems starting from a similar base

come to have unique individual characteristics based on their spe-
cific histories.

The reason we use the complex adaptive system as a model is that

it provides insight into human political constructs. Humans build
all sorts of social structures: families, tribes, clans, social classes,
street gangs, armies, religious groups or sects, commercial corpo-
rations, political parties, bureaucracies, criminal mafias, states of
various kinds, alliances, and empires, to mention just a few.
These structures participate in separate but thoroughly inter-
twined networks we call social, economic, and political systems.
Those networks produce markets, elections, and wars.

Such networks and structures create their own rules. The unpre-
dictable nature of these complex systems makes it difficult to pre-
dict the outcome of specific events. We can normally analyze,
describe, and explain economic, military, and political events
after they have occurred, but accurately forecasting the course of
such interactions is difficult to do with any consistency.

1-12
 The Strategic Environment

When we say that politics and war are unpredictable, we do not

mean that they are composed of absolute chaos, without any sem-
blance of order. Intelligent, experienced military and political
leaders are generally able to foresee the probable near-term
results, or at least a range of possible results, of any particular
action they may take. Broad causes, such as a massive superiority
in manpower, technology, economic resources, and military skill,
will definitely influence the probabilities of certain outcomes.

Conscious actions, however, like evolutionary adaptations, seldom

have only their intended effects. Events wholly outside the range
of vision of political and military leaders can have an unforeseen
impact on the situation. New economic and social ideas, techno-
logical innovations with no obvious military applications, changes
in climatic conditions, demographic shifts, all can lead to dramatic
political and military changes. Enemy actions, friction, imperfect
knowledge, low order probabilities, and chance introduce new
variables into any evolving situation.

The problem for strategists is how to develop a lasting and effec-

tive strategy in the face of the turbulent world of policy and poli-
tics. Despite the difficulty of understanding the interaction of
political entities, they must strive to comprehend the nature of the
problem, anticipate possible outcomes, and set a strategic course
likely to achieve the desired objective. At the same time, strategists
must sense the complex nature of this environment and be pre-
pared for both the unexpected setbacks and the sudden opportuni-
ties it is likely to deliver.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

STRATEGIC CONSTANTS AND NORMS

In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, originally published in
1911, Sir Julian Corbett wrote–

The vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must

we be in seeking points of departure from which we begin to
lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that
will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influ-
ences . . . . [T]he theoretical study of strategy . . . can at least
determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it
becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to
produce certain effects.8

Despite the complexity of interactions in the political realm, it is

possible to discern elements that are present in any strategic situa-
tion. These elements are at the core of the strategic environment
and are the base from which the strategist develops an under-
standing of a specific set of circumstances. Because these elements
are present in any strategic situation, we refer to them as constants
and norms. While the particular aspects of these constants and
norms present themselves differently in each strategic situation, an
understanding of their fundamental nature provides a point of
departure for its analysis.

To help understand the distinction between constants and norms

and the fluctuations of a specific policy or conflict, we can use the
following analogy. Annual seasonal climates of most regions of
the world are predictable. Yet the weather on a given day cannot
be predicted far in advance with any confidence. Still, annual
vacationers in northern Pennsylvania know that a warm day in

1-14
 The Strategic Environment

January is colder than a cold day in July, and a snow skier does
not plan a ski trip for July, nor does a water skier plan on water
skiing in January. Extreme variables in temporary weather pat-
terns do not affect the long-term power and influence of global
climate patterns.

The Physical Environment

Geography and its related aspects are a constant in any strategic
situation. All parties in a conflict must cope with the physical
environment. One strategic affairs expert has noted—

Misguided strategists who misinterpret, misapply, or ignore the

crushing impact of geography on national security affairs learn
their lessons painfully, after squandering national prestige,
lives, and treasure.

Strategic masters manipulate the physical environment,

exploit its strengths, evade its weaknesses, acknowledge con-
straints, and contrive always to make nature work for them.9

The physical environment encompasses not only the traditional

elements of geography such as land forms, terrain, oceans and
seas, and climate, but also spatial relationships, natural resources,
and lines of communications. Together, these factors exert con-
siderable influence on a particular strategic situation. The politi-
cal, economic, and social makeup of a nation results in part from
its physical environment. We refer to Great Britain, the United
States, and Japan as “maritime nations,” while Germany, Russia,
and China have been traditionally labeled “continental powers.”
The location and distribution of natural resources may on the one
hand be a cause of conflict and, at the same time, be a major

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

determinant of a conflict’s outcome. The nature of the interaction

between political entities is in large part determined by their geo-
graphic relationships. Relations between states that border on one
another are normally considerably different from those between
states separated by oceans and continents.

In order to understand the nature of a problem, strategists must

understand the role of the physical environment in each situation.
Geography influences the way that all elements of national power
are applied. While the effect of geography on a conflict varies
with the nature, location, and duration of that conflict, the physi-
cal environment always has an impact. Strategists must analyze
and understand the local, regional, and sometimes global effects
of this environment in order to use the elements of power effec-
tively in a specific strategic situation.10

National Character
Each nation, state, or political entity has its own distinct char-
acter. This character is derived from a variety of sources: loca-
tion, language, culture, religion, historical circumstances, and so
forth. While national character is always evolving, changes gen-
erally occur only over the course of decades and centuries and
may be imperceptible to the outside observer. As such, national
character can be looked upon as a norm or constant. National
character is akin to global climate patterns that change very
slowly through history.

Over three centuries, the British national character ran as deep

and sure as the Gulf Stream across the North Atlantic. During this

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 The Strategic Environment

time, British national reaction to aggression from France, Ger-

many, or, more recently, Argentina, was marked by many con-
stants. Throw in a resolute and inspirational leader (the elder
William Pitt, Winston Churchill, or Margaret Thatcher), add a vil-
lainous opponent bent on European domination (Napoleon, the
Kaiser, or Hitler), and the British response to aggression was both
consistent and predictable.

This is not to say that the British reacted the same way in each sit-
uation. The mood and inclination of the British public have been
influenced by various swirls and eddies during periods and
moments when issues were confused, threats ambiguous, and
hopes for peace strong. For example, the British first attempted to
avoid war with Germany by acceding to Hitler’s demands at the
now infamous Munich Conference of 1938. Then when Germany
invaded Poland a year later, natural inclinations and hopes for
peace vanished into a steeled determination to wage war.

Consider too the Russian response to invasions from the West. The
Russians have never deliberately adopted a strategy of retreating
hundreds of miles into their interior without first trying to stop an
invader near their borders. The point is that they have demonstrated
an ability to retreat deeply into their own country if they must do so
in order to survive and ultimately prevail. This demonstrated ability
was a matter of historical record to be considered by Charles XII of
Sweden in 1708, Napoleon in 1812, Kaiser Wilhelm III in 1914,
and Hitler in 1941. It is no coincidence that of these invaders, the
only one to succeed (Germany in World War I) was the one that
adopted a strategy containing a viable political component, in this
case the support of internal revolution, used in conjunction with

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

the military component. The Germans in World War I considered

knowable Russian physical and moral characteristics and devised
an effective political-military strategy accordingly. Napoleon and
Hitler had access to similar knowledge but largely ignored the
Russian character in relying on a purely military strategy.

Judging the national character of an adversary (or an ally) goes

well beyond traditional orders of battle and related calculations
regarding military and economic power. It requires consideration
of national history, culture, religion, society, politics—every-
thing that contributes to the makeup and functioning of a nation.
The strategist must compile a complete dossier on a nation simi-
lar to that commonly prepared on enemy commanders. In the
popular movie Patton, an impatient Field Marshal Rommel
interrupts his aide: “Enough! Tell me about the man” (referring
to General Patton). Rommel wanted to know about Patton’s per-
sonality: Was he a gambler? Would he attack sooner rather than
later? What was his style of warfare and leadership? What did
his troops think of him? Rommel wanted a psychological profile
of the opposing commander to help him understand his adversary.
At the strategic level, success in war is facilitated by having a
similar comprehensive psychological profile of each nation or
political group involved in the conflict, to include enemies, allies,
potential enemies or allies, and even one’s own nation.

It is of critical importance that sweeping dogmatic assertions do

not govern the analysis of national characters. Such assertions
often spring from ethnocentristic attitudes and a failure to examine
the true nature of a political presence. Rather, what is required is
rational, objective, and informed thought about the makeup of a

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 The Strategic Environment

national character and its possible effects on a nation’s action or

reaction to an event.

War and the State

The state has been effective in all forms of politics, including war.
It has been so effective, in fact, that virtually all of the world’s
land surface and its people are now recognized as belonging to
some more or less effective territorial state. While entities other
than the state make war, a state will almost always become
involved either in self-defense or in assertion of its monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence. Thus, we must look upon the state
as one of the strategic norms or constants when we are confronted
with a specific strategic problem.

While it has been said that “war made the state, and the state
made war,”11 the state has over time held in remarkable check the
human tendency toward violence. Averaged over the first 90 years
of the 20th century, even Germany’s annual rate of war deaths is
lower than that of many typical primitive societies.12 Although
warfare between states has continued, successful states have been
able to control the costly endemic local warfare typical of non-
state societies.

States are normally replaced by other states. If a state fails to con-

trol the use of violence, it will likely be destroyed or taken over
by some new group willing and able to take on this fundamental
function of the state. This new leadership may be another state or
possibly a supranational alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or the United Nations. It could also be a

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

revolutionary government evolving out of what was formerly a

nonstate political presence.

This is not to say that states or the interrelated system of states

does not change or that strategists can always rely on stability in
the international arena. From 1950 to 1980 in Africa, 47 new
states won their independence. In late 1988, after 73 years of colo-
nial rule, Africa’s last colony, Namibia, gained its independence.13
The United States, which sees itself as a young state, in fact has
the oldest constitutional system on earth. Many people alive today
were born when most of Europe was ruled by kings or emperors.
Powerful states and ideologies, commanding formidable military
machines, have entered and left the world stage while those people
grew up. The Soviet Union, one of the most powerful nations in
human history, covering a sixth of the world’s surface and encom-
passing hundreds of millions of human beings, lasted less than a
human lifetime.

However, on balance, we can look upon the state as remarkably

tough and enduring. While political movements and individual
states and governments that wage wars evolve and change, we
must address any particular conflict or strategic problem in the
context of the state system. Strategists must take into account the
actions and reactions not only of their adversary, but also the
actions and reactions of other states and nations. At the same
time, we should remember that there is nothing permanent about
any particular political entity. This lack of permanence is import-
ant because it reminds us that every enemy, no matter how seam-
less and monolithic it may appear, has political fault lines that can
be exploited.

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 The Strategic Environment

The Balance of Power Mechanism

We have already noted that politics and policy are concerned with
the distribution of power and that conflict often arises out of
attempts to change the distribution of power. One of the ways
political entities achieve stability in the distribution of power and
avoid a continuous state of conflict is by seeking to maintain a
“balance of power.” The balance of power is a mechanism
intended to maintain the status quo in the distribution of power.14 It
describes a system in which alliances shift in order to ensure that
no one entity or group of entities becomes dominant. The balance
of power is “at once the dominant myth and the fundamental law
of interstate relations.”15

The term “balance of power” is usually used in reference to states,

but it is applicable to any system involving more than one political
power center. The balance of power can be global, as it was during
the Cold War, regional/local, as it was among Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and the other Persian Gulf states, or internal to one state or
territory, as it was among the various clans in Somalia.

Balance of power considerations are usually at work in any strate-

gic situation. Thus, we can consider the balance of power as a stra-
tegic norm or constant. Balance of power systems have appeared
frequently in world history. Normally, such a system is created
when several entities vie for supremacy or at least independence,
yet none individually has the power to achieve it alone.

A balance of power system breaks down for two reasons. The first
is when one or more of the participants in the system rebel against

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

it. Their goal is to eliminate all competitors and achieve domi-

nance. In modern Europe, this goal has been attempted by a num-
ber of states and their leaders such as Germany under Hitler and
France under Napoleon. The rebels have never fully succeeded,
largely because they have to take on multiple enemies. Ambitious
powers must always be wary of what Clausewitz called the culmi-
nating point of victory.16 This is the point at which one competi-
tor’s success prompts its allies and other groups to withdraw their
support or even throw their weight against it.

The second threat to the balance of power system is the power vac-
uum that occurs when there is no authority capable of maintaining
order in some geographic area. Power vacuums are disruptive to
the balance of power in two distinct ways. First, the disorder in the
vacuum tends to spread as violent elements launch raids into sur-
rounding areas or commit other provocative acts. The disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has provided many
examples of this sort. Another example is the disintegration of
Yugoslavia that resulted in NATO intervention in Bosnia. Second,
a power vacuum may attract annexation by an external power. If
this act threatens to add substantially to the annexing entity’s
power, other states will become concerned and may interfere.
Many Russians saw NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in this light.
NATO’s agreement to Russian participation in that mission was an
attempt to mitigate such concerns.

Some have argued that the balance of power is no longer a useful

concept in the post-Cold War world dominated by a single mili-
tary superpower. However, it is clear that on a regional and local
level the concept of balance of power remains a useful basis for

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 The Strategic Environment

strategic analysis. The balancing mechanism remains a useful

strategic tool and is applicable to all levels.

Strategists must be aware of the dynamics of various balance of

power systems involved in a strategic problem. Like the “invisible
hand” of market economics, the balance of power mechanism is
always at work, regardless of whether the system’s participants
believe that it is a good thing. It influences our actions as well as
those of our adversaries, allies, and neutral powers.

Consider the case of the Gulf War. One of the motives for partici-
pation in the conflict by the U.S. and other Coalition forces was
concern over the prospect of a region dominated by Iraq. Con-
versely, one of the postwar concerns was to avoid the creation of a
power vacuum that could lead to increased instability in the region
or greater influence by Iran. Finally, the dynamics of relations
within the Coalition also involved reconciling sometimes differing
views on balance of power issues. In any coalition, some partici-
pants may be only temporary allies with long-term goals that may
diverge widely from one another. Thus, balance of power consid-
erations were at work from start to finish during this conflict.

THE TRINITY
This chapter has described the nature of the strategic environ-
ment. This environment is defined by the nature of politics and
the interactions of political entities that participate in the political

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

process. The strategic environment is complex and subject to the

interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some ele-
ments of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of
conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by
forces that defy rational explanation. We can discern certain fac-
tors that are at work in any strategic situation—the constants and
norms—and use them as a framework to help understand what is
occurring. At the same time, we realize that each strategic situa-
tion is unique and that in order to grasp its true nature, we must
comprehend how the character and motivations of each of the
antagonists will interact in these specific circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are

made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remark-
able trinity” that is—

composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which

are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance
and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam;
and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of
policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the
second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law,

deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relation-
ship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or
seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would con-
flict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it
would be totally useless.

1-24
 The Strategic Environment

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a bal-

ance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended
between three magnets.17

Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by

the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At
any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other
two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined
by the dynamic interplay among them. The effective strategist must
master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.18

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 Chapter 2

Strategy: Ends and Means

“You [military professionals] must know something about

strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and
politics and diplomacy and history. You must know every-
thing you can about military power, and you must also un-
derstand the limits of military power.

You must understand that few of the problems of our time

have . . . been solved by military power alone.”1

—John F. Kennedy
 Strategy: Ends and Means

Strategy, broadly defined, is the process of interrelating ends and

means. When we apply this process to a particular set of ends and
means, the product—that is, the strategy—is a specific way of
using specified means to achieve distinct ends. Strategy is thus
both a process and a product. Any discussion of ends and means in
war must begin with two basic points. First, as we have observed,
war is an expression of politics. The ends or goals of any party
waging war—even though those goals may be social, economic,
religious, or ideological in nature—are by definition political
goals. Second, wars are fought by political entities that have
unique characteristics and often very dissimilar goals and
resources. In order to understand any conflict, we must appreciate
the ways in which the means and ends of the participants may vary.

NATIONAL STRATEGY
Our primary interest is in military strategy, the art and science of
employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of
national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.2
However, in order to place military strategy in its proper context,
it is necessary to understand national strategy. Military strategy is
subordinate to national strategy, which is the art and science of
developing and using political, economic, military, and informa-
tional powers, together with armed force, during peace and war,
to secure the objectives of policy.3 Of necessity, we must begin

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

with national strategy and describe how ends and means must be
related at the very highest levels before we can proceed to deter-
mine military objectives and strategies.

At the highest levels, ends are expressed as national interests.

Interests are a nation’s wants, needs, and concerns. Specifically,
national interests normally involve four main areas: survival and
security, political and territorial integrity, economic stability and
well-being, and stability. Conflict can arise as a result of a threat
(or perceived threat) to any one of these four areas. Interests are
central to a discussion of strategy because interests signal a
nation’s desires and intentions to other nations. As discussed ear-
lier, nation and state are not synonymous.

Certain interests that a nation sees as essential are referred to as

vital interests. Vital interests are distinguished from other inter-
ests by the fact that nations are usually unwilling to compromise
on them and are often prepared to resort to conflict in support of
them.4 Thus, when examining a strategic situation, a strategist
must identify not only what interests are at stake but also which
interests one or more of the participants view as vital.

National interests are often vague or consist of highly generalized

abstractions. While national interests underpin national strategy,
the specifics of the strategy must focus on more concrete ends. The
specific goals and aims of national strategy are often referred to as
objectives. Objectives are the ends a nation must achieve to pro-
mote, protect, or attain its interests. Objectives tend to be more tan-
gible than interests because they normally describe specific
activities or conditions which must be attained. Objectives provide

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

the departure point for national strategy in that they describe what
a state is actually trying to do.5

In peacetime, national interests and objectives lead to specific pol-

icies and commitments. Policy is a pattern or patterns of actions
designed to attain specific objectives. Policy can represent a broad
course of action or intent. Policy is the ways (methods or patterns)
by which strategy reaches its objectives. Commitments are expres-
sions of a nation’s intention to use its instruments of national
power. Whereas policy might express general intent, a course of
action, or restraints on action, commitments pledge nations to take
specific actions at specific times and places. While conflict is
always related to some national interest or objective, it is normally
the outgrowth of a specific policy or commitment.

The articulation of national interests, objectives, policies, and

commitments linked to use of the instruments of national power
is sometimes referred to as “grand strategy,” “grand national
strategy,” or, currently in the United States, “national security
strategy.” Grand strategies or national security strategies are
implemented by subordinate strategies—political or diplomatic
strategies, economic strategies, national military strategies, and
so forth—for the use of each of the instruments of national power.

Knowledge of this peacetime strategic framework (see figure on

page 2-6) is required in order to comprehend the origins of any
particular conflict situation. However, it is even more important
to understand the links among national strategy, military strategy,
and other supporting strategies during conflict. Without this fun-
damental understanding, it will be difficult to establish the

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Relationship of political objectives

to national strategy and supporting strategies.

appropriate relationship between policy and the military action

intended to carry out the policy.

In war, the national strategy focuses the instruments of national

power6 on achieving its political ends or objectives as articulated
by the political leadership. Diplomatic, economic, military, and
informational actions are linked through supporting strategies
that contribute to attaining the objective of national strategy.

Military strategy, in turn, applies the military instrument of

national power towards the accomplishment of the political
objectives of the overall national strategy. The departure point for

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

military strategy, therefore, is the objectives of the national strat-

egy. From there, military strategy must identify a military goal or
objective that will lead to accomplishment of the political objec-
tive. The military objective then provides the basis for the identi-
fication of specific ways to accomplish that objective. The
selection of one of these courses of action and its further develop-
ment results in a strategic concept that embodies the key compo-
nents of the chosen military strategy. The military strategy is not
developed in isolation from the other instruments of national
power. The military objectives and strategy must also be compat-
ible with the diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives
and strategies.

Strategists must be able to analyze the overall strategic situation

and appreciate the larger context in which military strategy is
executed. In order to formulate and implement an effective mili-
tary strategy, they must understand the ends and means of the
larger national strategy as well as the strategies of the enemy,
allies, and related neutral parties. In order to develop this under-
standing, we now look more deeply at ends and means within
national strategy.

ENDS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

Survival and Victory
There are only two fundamental national strategic goals in any
conflict: survival and victory. Any specific aims that we may

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

pursue will reflect one or both of these two goals. Survival is the
minimum goal of opponents and a prerequisite for victory. Vic-
tory is normally associated with the achievement of the political
aims of the war, but it also requires an end to the war and the
reestablishment of peace. The strategist must strive to under-
stand what survival and victory mean in the specific situation at
hand to each of the struggle’s participants.

Survival is the continued existence of the political entity that is at

war. However, survival can mean different things to different
political entities. Survival often equates to the continuance of a
way of life or the well-being of the population. Threats to this
type of survival are usually met with fierce resistance. Sometimes
the survival of a particular individual or group will take priority
over the interests of the whole. In such a case, strategies that seek
to compel submission by threatening the interests of the nation or
of its people may have little direct impact. Finally, some political
groups or ideological movements are willing to fight on until they
are destroyed. Their hopes of survival lie in leaving behind a
heroic legend to influence future generations or in making some
other kind of lasting statement to humanity or God. For these
groups, even the threat of annihilation may have little impact on
their actions.

Victory can be as hard to define as survival. Victory normally

means the accomplishment of the specific political aims for which
the group went to war. In practice, however, victory may mean
merely ending the war on terms less unfavorable to oneself than to
the enemy. If the costs of continuing a military struggle come to

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

exceed the value of the goal, meaningful victory is unattainable.

Given the nature of war, however, such cost-benefit analysis is
more easily described than accomplished. A major problem with
victory as a goal is that victory is an emotion-laden word. The
accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not
satisfy the emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not
feel like victory. Because we cannot precisely measure the value of
most wars aims or accurately judge the cost of their attainment, it
is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting
exceeds the value of victory.

The main point in this discussion of survival and victory is that

the problem of identifying what survival and victory mean to var-
ious participants in war can be extremely difficult. Our analysis
must involve a multitude of considerations that are different in
every conflict.

Political Objectives

Political entities go to war for a variety of reasons, ranging from

the simple, such as seizing or protecting a valuable piece of terri-
tory, to the abstract such as “defending national honor” or “main-
taining the balance of power.” Despite their diversity, political
objectives in war can be labeled as either limited or unlimited.
The distinction is fundamental. An unlimited political objective
amounts to the elimination of the opponent as a political entity. A
limited political objective, on the other hand, is one in which the
enemy leadership can survive and remain in power. See figure on
pages 2-10 and 2-11.

2-9
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

LIMITED
POLITICAL OBJECTIVE
OPPOSING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SURVIVES

INTIMIDATE CAUSE REDUCE TAKE

CHANGE ENEMY SLICE
IN POLICY MILITARY OF
CAPACITY TERRITORY

Limited and unlimited political objectives.

When a political entity seeks an unlimited political objective, its

enemy’s leadership is to be removed (perhaps merely deposed,
perhaps exiled, imprisoned, or executed), while the enemy’s for-
mer assets (territory, population, economic resources) may be
absorbed, redistributed, or eradicated. Absorption can mean
many things. With the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia began an
effort to systematically reabsorb each of the newly established
states with the intent to reestablish a new Yugoslavia under Ser-
bian control.

On the other hand, the United States’ invasion of Panama suc-

cessfully disposed of the current regime but upon reconstitution
left the Panamanian people in control of their government. Both
cases provide examples of unlimited political objectives. The
first demonstrates the desire to remove the current leadership
and absorb territory, population, and resources. The second

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

UNLIMITED
POLITICAL OBJECTIVE
OPPOSING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IS REMOVED

CHANGE CHANGE CONQUER/ EXTERMINATE

REGIME FORM OF ABSORB (GENOCIDE)
GOVERNMENT/
RULING CLASS

Limited and unlimited political objectives—Continued.

demonstrates the desire to remove the current leadership and

redistribute the sources of power.

An unlimited political objective, then, may embrace anything

from merely deposing a particular leader to physically extermi-
nating an entire people or culture. Ideological revolutionaries,
would-be world conquerors, and both sides in most true civil
wars7 tend to seek unlimited political objectives. Occasionally,
defensive alliances seeking to eliminate a habitual aggressor will
also pursue an unlimited political objective.

Conversely, a limited political objective includes anything short

of eliminating the political opponent. It is envisioned that the
enemy leadership will remain in control after the conclusion of
hostilities, although some aspects of its power (influence, terri-
tory, resources, or internal control) will be reduced or curtailed.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Limited political objectives are characteristic of states seeking

better positions in the international balance of power, clans vying
for political position within a larger society, mafias or street
gangs battling for “turf,” and reformist political movements.

MEANS IN NATIONAL STRATEGY

In the purest sense, the means in war is combat—physically at-
tacking the enemy or defending against enemy attacks upon us.
However, war is not limited to purely military means. In fact, mil-
itary means are only one element used to implement a national
strategy. The relative importance placed on the military element
of the national strategy varies greatly depending on the nature and
the particular circumstances of the struggle. All of the instruments
of power—diplomatic, economic, military, and informational—
must be brought to bear and exploited to the fullest in war.

Diplomacy is the art of employing communications and estab-

lishing relationships in the global environment. Ideas, prestige,
and commitment are the currencies of the field. The diplomatic
instrument uses a nation’s international position combined with
diplomacy to achieve national objectives. Diplomatic tools may
include negotiations, political recognition, treaties, and alliances.
While the diplomatic instrument is normally emphasized before
hostilities actually begin, it remains a key element of the national
strategy in any conflict situation. In certain situations (especially
military operations other than war), the diplomatic instrument

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

continues to be the main effort, even after the commitment of

military forces.

The economic instrument uses the application of material re-

sources to achieve national objectives. Nations employ economic
means to protect their own industries and markets, to improve the
quality of life of their people, to stabilize the economy and gov-
ernment of friends and allies, and to deter destabilizing and hostile
actions by other nations. Specific economic means include regula-
tion of trade practices, loans and loan guarantees, monetary and
investment policies, foreign aid, subsidies, and technology trans-
fers. As with the diplomatic instrument, the economic instrument
generally has primacy over the military instrument during peace
and is often used before military force during a crisis; changes in
trade or monetary policy, economic sanctions, or some type of
embargo are frequently the first steps taken in an effort to influ-
ence an adversary’s behavior. However, economic considerations
continue to be at the forefront of any conflict, and the use of eco-
nomic measures to support the friendly war effort and to under-
mine the enemy’s ability to resist continue throughout the course
of a war.

The military instrument is the use of force or the threat to use

force to achieve national objectives. Military power is the sum of
a nation’s weapons and equipment, trained manpower, organiza-
tions, doctrines, industrial base, and sustainment capacity. The
military instrument can be employed in a variety of ways that are
short of combat such as training allies, establishing presence, or
acting as a show-of-force. However, the main use of military

2-13
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

power is in conflict. While the military instrument is often the

main effort during war, the nature and objectives of the particular
conflict must be examined to determine the appropriate relation-
ship between the use of military force and the application of the
other instruments of national power.

The informational instrument (previously known as the psycho-

logical element or instrument) refers to the use of information and
ideas to advance the interests and achieve the objectives of the
nation. The objective in the use of the information instrument is
to influence the perceptions and attitudes of allies, adversaries,
and interested observers. Informational tools include the expres-
sion of intent and motive propaganda and press releases, informa-
tion and personalities, food drops and medical care for refugees—
in short, anything that affects the rational or emotional compo-
nents of the human mind.

While less tangible than the others, the power of ideas and infor-
mation is real and should not be underestimated. With the infor-
mational instrument, a nation can create a psychological impact
causing responses ranging from awe or admiration to fear or
loathing. This psychological impact can influence not only politi-
cal and military leaders but the societies of the nations involved
and world opinion. It can generate sympathy or antipathy inspired
by the culture, ideas, values, and stated cause and objectives for
which the parties are fighting.

The instruments of national power overlap and interconnect. Dip-

lomats’ power to sway other governments is greatly dependent on
those governments’ awareness of economic and military power
and on their assessment of a nation’s willingness to use that power.

2-14
 Strategy: Ends and Means

Economic power is bolstered by military power that can defend

economic interests. Military power is often dependent on the dip-
lomats’ ability to gain basing rights and overflight permission
from other countries or to enlist them in alliances and coalitions.
Military power is directly dependent on the financial and techno-
logical strength of the nation’s economy.

Military professionals naturally concentrate on the military

means of strategy, but they should also be conscious of the other
means that can be exploited and must be defended in the larger
political struggle. Most importantly, they must understand that
military force is an inappropriate tool for the solution of most
political difficulties. Force is at best a necessary means for clear-
ing obstacles to more peaceful solutions. This appreciation of the
role of force is a vital component of military professionalism, for
military leaders have a responsibility to ensure that political lead-
ers understand both the capabilities and the limitations of the mil-
itary instrument.

In appraising the relationship between the military and nonmili-

tary instruments of our national power in any given situation, we
must be prepared to ask:

 How can our military capabilities complement or assist the

other instruments of national power in achieving our political
goals?
 How can diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments
of our national power aid our military efforts?
 How might our uses of force impede or imperil the achievement
of our political goals?

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

We must seek to achieve our goals as economically as possible

and with the right combination of means—diplomatic, economic,
military, and informational. The way in which we combine these
means in any given conflict will be greatly affected by the kind of
strategy we pursue and by the strategic goals we seek.

ADAPTING ENDS TO MEANS, AND VICE VERSA

When discussing strategy in the abstract, we often treat means
and ends as fixed. In practice, however, we frequently adjust
both. The occurrences of war—successes and failures, lessons
learned, new ideas, the entry of new combatants—may cause us
to shift both our means and our goals. As our resources increase,
as we gain confidence in our abilities, and as we find our enemy
more vulnerable than we had imagined, we tend to expand our
goals. On the other hand, when we find our resources or abilities
inadequate, we cut our ambitions to match.

Given time, determination, and creativity, means can be devel-

oped to achieve many reasonable goals. Means are adjustable to
some degree at every level. Moreover, our ends can affect the
means available to us. War aims that evoke popular enthusiasm
can give leaders access to resources otherwise unavailable. The
emotions created by violence can help war to feed itself, as it
energizes people to greater efforts and sacrifices than would be
otherwise obtainable.

2-16
 Strategy: Ends and Means

Another example of the different ways strategic means can be

adjusted to match strategic ends can be found in the shifting Amer-
ican strategy of the Cold War. From the Truman administration on,
the American government pursued the goal of containing the
Soviet Union. The means adopted, however, tended to shift from
administration to administration.8

President Eisenhower’s administration employed a strategy

labeled “massive retaliation,” which relied on the United States’
nuclear superiority to deter Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union
possessed huge conventional forces but could not match the
American nuclear capability. Eisenhower wished to avoid build-
ing and maintaining large conventional forces, arguing that
nuclear weapons provided “more bang for the buck.” Rather than
attempt to match the Soviet’s conventional military power, mas-
sive retaliation threatened a nuclear response to any aggressive
move by the Soviet Union.

Although containment remained the broad goal, President Ken-

nedy’s following administration had an entirely different approach
to means. The strategic situation was changing to some extent
because of the very success of the earlier massive retaliation strat-
egy. The Soviets’ nuclear arsenal was growing, and they had
found a way around the American nuclear umbrella by sponsoring
numerous “wars of national liberation.” It became necessary to
confront the Soviets with conventional and counterinsurgency
forces as well as with nuclear arms. The Kennedy administration
formulated the strategy of “flexible response,” requiring forces
capable of deterring and, if necessary, fighting the Soviets at all
levels of conflict.

2-17
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

The resources and commitments necessary to carry out “flexible

response” proved too costly for the Nation, and President Nixon’s
administration again changed the means used to pursue the goal
of containment. The strategy of détente was intended to convince
the Soviets to restrain themselves based upon a combination of
pressures and inducements. Among these pressures and induce-
ments were the conduct of direct negotiations with the Soviet
Union on issues such as arms control, the establishment of links
to the People’s Republic of China, and a new set of policies
toward United States’ allies which has been called “the Nixon
doctrine.” The Nixon doctrine emphasized establishment of a
series of bilateral and multilateral alliances to contain Soviet
expansion. The United States would provide economic and mili-
tary support to its allies, many of whom bordered on the Soviet
Union or one of its clients. Military aid consisted primarily of air
and naval support along with the implicit protection offered by
the United States’ nuclear capabilities. As a result of the United
States’ experience in Vietnam, however, the commitment of
United States’ ground units would occur only in cases of long-
standing treaty obligations such as in Western Europe or Korea.

ENDS IN MILITARY STRATEGY

Just as a national strategy will have a number of political objec-
tives, a particular military strategy will have a number of specific
military objectives. However, there are only two fundamental
ends behind the use of military force. The first is to physically

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

overpower the enemy’s military capacity, leaving the enemy

unable to resist our demands. The other is to inflict such high
costs on the enemy that negotiations on our terms becomes a
favorable option. The first of these alternatives represents what
we call a strategy of annihilation.9 In an annihilation strategy, our
military objective is unlimited: we seek to eliminate the enemy’s
ability to resist, thus leaving the enemy helpless to oppose the
imposition of our will. The second alternative is a strategy of ero-
sion.10 Here, our military objective is limited: we seek only to
raise the enemy’s costs so high that the enemy will find ending
the war on our terms more attractive than continuing to fight.

The goal of a strategy of annihilation is to deprive the enemy of

the ability to resist, to make the enemy militarily helpless. Annihi-
lation does not require the complete physical destruction of the
enemy’s military forces. Rather, it requires that the forces be so
demoralized and disorganized that they become unable to effec-
tively interfere with the achievement of our political goals. What
is being annihilated—literally “made into nothing”—is the
enemy’s physical means to oppose us.

Normally, a strategy of annihilation is viable only when one of

the participants possesses some very great superiority over the
other in terms of brute strength, military skill, leadership, techno-
logical capabilities, or morale. Without such an advantage, anni-
hilation strategies often fail, resulting in protracted conflicts and
requiring such a commitment of resources that one or all the par-
ties find themselves exhausted before the enemy can be elimi-
nated. The 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War and the Bosnian conflict
from 1992 to 1995 are representative examples of what happens

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

when states pursue annihilation strategies without the necessary

advantages. Sometimes the necessary superiority can be obtained
through surprise, although this is hard to achieve and dangerous
to rely on. If the opponent has any strategic depth, the opponent
may recover from surprise before victory is assured.

The objective of the second approach—a strategy of erosion—is

to convince the enemy that settling the political dispute will be
easier and the outcome more attractive than continued conflict.
To put it another way, erosion strategies seek to present the
enemy with the probability of an outcome worse in the enemy’s
eyes than peace on the adversary’s terms. This is accomplished
through eroding or wearing down the enemy’s will to fight, rather
than destroying the enemy’s ability to resist.

Erosion strategies are used to pursue a limited political objective

when one combatant is either unable or unwilling to destroy the
opponent’s war-making capability. In many cases, an erosion
strategy is required simply because the enemy is too powerful or
difficult to annihilate. In other cases, this approach is used
because one party does not want or need to destroy the other’s
military capacity. Perhaps the goal requires such a modest con-
cession from the enemy that it is reasonable to believe the enemy
will acquiesce after modest resistance. In another example, there
may be a continuing need to keep the opponent’s military forces
in existence as a buffer or as a factor in the balance of power.

Relationship Between Political and Military Objectives

Political objectives and military objectives are very different
things. Political objectives describe, in a sense, where we want to

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

go. Military objectives describe what we have to accomplish mil-

itarily in order to get there.

If the political objective is unlimited, the military strategy must

be unlimited. Conversely, a limited political objective may call
for a military strategy with limited objectives—that is, an erosion
strategy. In Afghanistan, the Mujahidin and their Western backers
sought a limited political objective: to get the Soviet Union to
withdraw from the struggle. Accordingly, they pursued an erosion
strategy, seeking to make the Afghan adventure too costly for the
Soviet government to sustain.

Though our political objective is limited, it does not necessarily

follow that our military strategy must also be limited (see figure).
The Gulf War provides an example of an unlimited military

Relationship between political and military objectives.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

strategy applied successfully in pursuit of a limited political

objective. The Coalition had a limited political objective: restore
Kuwait’s independence. In order to attain this objective, however,
it was necessary to destroy all capability of the Iraqi forces to
resist and forcibly eject them from Kuwait. Thus, the Coalition
employed a strategy of annihilation, pursuing the total defeat of
Iraq’s military capacity within the Kuwait theater of operations.

Strategies of annihilation are conceptually simple. The focus of

operational efforts is the enemy’s armed forces and the object is
to render them powerless. Those forces may be annihilated
through battle or through destruction of the social or industrial
infrastructure that supports them. The main effort is the armed
forces. The diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments
of national power support the military effort. Victory is easily
measured: when one side’s fighting forces are no longer able to
present organized resistance, the other side has won.

By comparison, erosion strategies involve many more variables.

In erosion strategies, there is a much wider choice in the designa-
tion of a main effort among the instruments of national power, the
relationship of military force to the other instruments of power,
and the definition of victory. Attacks may be focused on the
enemy’s armed forces, as in an annihilation strategy, or some other
valuable resource such as territory, commerce, or financial assets
may be seized, threatened, or neutralized. Military forces are nor-
mally the main effort in the seizing and holding of territory. Suc-
cessful embargoes and the freezing of financial assets, on the other
hand, often depend primarily on diplomatic and economic power.
It may also be possible to undermine an enemy’s domestic or

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 Strategy: Ends and Means

international political position through the use of informational or

psychological operations.

Victory in a strategy of erosion can be more flexibly defined or

more ambiguous than is the case with an annihilation strategy.
The enemy’s submission to our demands may be explicit or
implicit, embodied in a formal treaty or in behind-the-scenes
agreements. Convinced that we have made our point, we may
simply “declare victory and go home.” A compromise may allow
both sides to claim success. Victories in erosion strategies thus
tend to be undramatic, but they can have tremendous political
consequences. The West’s success in its containment of the Com-
munist bloc, essentially a very long-term erosion strategy, offers a
powerful example.

Distinguishing Between Erosion and Annihilation Strategies

Although annihilation and erosion are conceptually quite differ-
ent, in practice it is often hard to distinguish between them. There
are several reasons for this ambiguity. First, annihilation and ero-
sion become practically indistinguishable when one side or both
pursue annihilation, but neither has an overwhelming military
superiority. In such a case, unlimited political and military objec-
tives can be obtained only through “slugging it out.” This guaran-
tees roughly comparable losses on both sides and can lead to
negotiated settlements, even though one or both sides originally
sought unlimited objectives.

Second, these two strategies can overlap, or one can lead to the
other. Sometimes it is the threat of annihilation that forces the

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

enemy to make a deal. In that case, the difference between an ero-

sion strategy and one of annihilation is that the enemy is offered
an option of settling the issue before being made helpless. Con-
versely, if an enemy cannot be worn down through an erosion
strategy into accepting a settlement, it may be necessary to switch
to a strategy of annihilation.

Third, a strategy that has not yet fully taken shape may be ambig-
uous. In some cases, this ambiguity reflects calculation: either the
strategy is decided but is being disguised, or the strategist has
goals that can be fulfilled via either approach and is waiting to see
how his/her opportunities develop. In other cases, ambiguity
reflects poor strategy making: the strategy maker does not know
what he/she wants to achieve or how to achieve it. Ultimately,
however, a successful strategy must turn out to be one or the
other. At war’s end, a strategy that has neither eliminated the
enemy’s ability to resist nor worn down the enemy’s will to con-
tinue the struggle is a strategy that has failed.

The distinction between strategies of annihilation and erosion is

fundamental. The successful strategist must be able to distinguish
which strategy is being pursued or should be pursued in a given
situation. The ability to determine which strategy is appropriate
in turn depends upon the strategist’s understanding of the ends of
national strategy and the means employed to achieve those ends.
Without this foundation, it is impossible to arrive at the specifics
of a particular military strategy: the determination of military
objectives, the identification of the appropriate means to achieve
those objectives, and the development of the strategic concept.

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 Chapter 3

Strategic Opposites

“Grand strategy must always remember that peace follows

war.”1

—B. H. Liddell Hart

 Strategic Opposites

It is crucial to distinguish between annihilation and erosion strate-

gies and to understand who is pursuing which goal and why.
There are, however, a great many other dimensions to any strate-
gic situation. The dynamics of a struggle are affected not only by
the differing political and military goals of the antagonists but by
similarities and differences in their character, the kinds of forces
they employ, the techniques they use, and the ways they see—and
are seen by—the world. In making a strategic assessment, such
factors are more important than a simple numerical comparison
of units and equipment.

In this chapter, we will examine several sets of strategic opposites

that are helpful in understanding the nature of the strategic prob-
lem. All of these pairs of opposites do not necessarily apply to
every strategic situation, nor do these approaches necessarily
influence each other. For example, whether a strategy is symmet-
rical or asymmetrical has little bearing on whether it is annihila-
tive or erosive. Nonetheless, a grasp of these concepts will help
us to formulate the questions we must ask as we try to understand
the specific problem before us.

DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE STRATEGIES

The strategic attacker is the antagonist seeking to add to his/her
relative power. It usually is the side that initiates a war, although
defenders sometimes launch preemptive attacks. An attacker may
be seeking to completely overthrow the balance of power or may

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

simply want an upward adjustment in his/her relative position.

This distinction affects the kinds of strategies both sides pursue
and the intensity of the struggle.

The strategic defender is the participant that wants to keep what

he/she has or to maintain his/her relative position in a balance of
power system. In many important respects, defense is inherently
stronger than offense. The strength of the strategic defense
derives from human psychology and the balance of power mecha-
nism as well as the forces of friction and inertia. People are natu-
rally willing to endure great sacrifices in defense of their homes
and homelands and much less willing to endure such sacrifices in
military adventures abroad. An aggressor’s action frequently
causes anxiety and hostility in neighboring allied and neutral
countries; they often interpret a challenge to the existing balance
of power as a threat and are more naturally inclined to support the
defender. Friction and inertia are normally on the side of the
defender as well: it is inherently easier to hold onto something
than to take it away from someone else.

These political and psychological strengths of the strategic

defense are present in all wars, even those in which territorial
gains and losses are not a major factor. The strength of the defense
is often reinforced operationally since the attacker is normally
moving away from his/her base of supply and the center of his/her
political power, while the defender is falling back on his/hers.

Note, of course, that this superiority of the strategic defense is not

an absolute. Obviously, a defender with few resources and poor

3-4
 Strategic Opposites

leadership is not stronger than an attacker with vastly greater

resources and good leadership. However, all other things being
equal, the defender has the advantage.

At the tactical and operational levels, the roles of attacker and

defender may frequently change hands or even be shared more or
less evenly. At the strategic level, however, the roles tend to be
fixed throughout any given conflict. In World War II, for
instance, the Western Allies held the advantages of the strategic
defense even as their armies marched into Germany. They were
perceived as being restorers of the balance of power rather than as
threats to it. However, in some situations, the roles of strategic
attacker and defender can be reversed. When war is endemic in a
society, when the origins of the conflict are poorly remembered,
or when the war guilt has come to be equally shared, the advan-
tages of the original defender tend to be lost. In such a case, the
balance of power mechanism usually tends to support the current
defender and to oppose whichever contender seems momentarily
to have the initiative.

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL STRATEGIES

Strategies can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. That is, the
contending powers may pursue mirror-image ends or rely on sim-
ilar means, or they may pursue quite different kinds of goals or
apply dissimilar means.2

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

A symmetrical military strategy is one that attempts to match—or

rather, to overmatch—the enemy strength for strength, to beat the
enemy on his/her own terms. An asymmetrical strategy is one
that attempts to apply one category of means against another cat-
egory, to use some means to which the enemy cannot effectively
respond in kind.

Many wars are fought between very different enemies and are thus
profoundly asymmetrical in character. For example, a terrorist
organization may wage war against a government or even against
the international community as a whole. The terrorist campaigns
of the Irish Republican Army against the United Kingdom and the
Palestine Liberation Organization against Israel are illustrations.
Most states would like nothing better than for terrorists to act sym-
metrically and resort to open battle, which would make them vul-
nerable to the state’s superior conventional military forces. On the
other hand, terrorists may also seek to provoke a symmetrical
response: the purpose of many terrorist attacks is to provoke gov-
ernments into actions that antagonize ordinary citizens such as
restrictive security measures or even reprisals in kind. These acts
undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the government and
play into the hands of the terrorist strategy. Because of the funda-
mentally different natures of the adversaries, the political effects
of these similar actions are dramatically different.

Most real-world strategies are a mixture of symmetrical and

asymmetrical elements, and it is often difficult to determine the
overall balance between them. Thus any discussion of symmetry

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 Strategic Opposites

or asymmetry in war is a matter of degree as well as kind. The use-

fulness of the concept is that it helps us analyze the dynamics of a
struggle. For example, the American strategy of containment
during the Cold War always involved strong elements of both
symmetry and asymmetry. From a military standpoint, Eisen-
hower’s massive retaliation policy was fundamentally an asym-
metrical strategy: the United States would reply to any type of
Soviet aggression “by means and at places of our own choos-
ing.”3 This was generally interpreted to mean a U.S. nuclear
response to a conventional Soviet provocation. From the national
strategic standpoint however, Eisenhower’s strategy was broadly
similar to the Soviet Union’s in that both relied primarily on
deterrence rather than on the actual application of military force.
The Kennedy administration’s subsequent flexible response
strategy was militarily a symmetrical strategy of matching the
Soviets strength for strength. However, it also took advantage of
economic and political asymmetries.

There is no innate advantage or disadvantage to either a symmet-

rical or asymmetrical strategy. The choice depends on the situa-
tion and on the constraints of time and creativity. The interplay
between symmetry and asymmetry in any struggle is unique and
covers a wide range of possibilities. In India’s post-World War II
struggle for independence, for example, British military power
was overthrown by the most asymmetrical approach imaginable:
Gandhi’s campaign of nonviolence.

A particular strategy must take into account the similarities and

differences between the opponents and must—when necessary or

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

advantageous—seek to create new ones. The effective strategist

is not biased in favor of either symmetry or asymmetry but is
keenly aware of both and of the interplay between them.

DETERRENCE:
STRATEGIES OF REPRISAL OR DENIAL

Deterrence means dissuading an enemy from an action by means

of some countervailing threat. There are essentially two methods
of deterrence: denial and reprisal.

To deter by denial means to prevent an enemy’s action by con-

vincing the enemy that his/her action will fail. Conceptually, this
is a symmetrical approach (although the actual means of denial
may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical). For example, a state
may deter conventional invasion by maintaining sufficiently
credible forces to defend its borders. It may deter the use of poi-
son gas by training and equipping its forces and population to
function effectively in a chemical warfare environment. Terrorists
may be deterred from attacks on airports by tight security.

The second approach, reprisal, is conceptually asymmetrical. We

may concede that the enemy is capable of taking an action against
us, but we must convince the enemy that the gain from such an
action will not be worth the cost. For example, a state weak in
conventional forces may seek to deter enemy occupation by cred-
ibly preparing to wage a long, painful guerrilla war of resistance.

3-8
 Strategic Opposites

Conventional invasion might also be deterred through the threat

of nuclear retaliation.

There are overlaps between denial and reprisal. Tight airport

security may deter terrorists by convincing them either that their
efforts will fail (denial) or that they will be caught and punished
(reprisal). A demonstrated capability to wage chemical warfare
may deter a gas attack both by denying the enemy an advantage
and by threatening to retaliate in kind.

As these examples indicate, in practice denial and reprisal are often

more effective when applied in tandem. The ability of one side to
deny its enemy an advantage cannot always be absolutely convinc-
ing, especially if the other side is inclined to take risks. Deterrence
by denial also implies a certain passivity. An enemy may be will-
ing to test the defenses if the enemy believes that failure carries no
further penalty. On the other hand, while deterrence by reprisal
compensates for some of the weakness of denial, reprisal has its
own weaknesses. Retaliation, even if carried out successfully, may
come too late to avoid suffering significant damage.

STANDARDIZED OR TAILORED STRATEGIES

Usually, when we talk about the conscious formulation of a partic-
ular strategy, we are talking about a specific way of using specific
means to reach specific ends. This is a strategy “tailored” to deal

3-9
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

with a particular problem. Our means are finely adapted to fit our
ends, and vice versa.

There are classes of problems, however, that do not initially lend

themselves to such tailoring. These problems usually fall into one
or both of two categories:

 First, we lack the time to tailor a unique response to a specific

problem. This can be the case in rapidly unfolding strategic
problems or when we are unwilling or unable to adapt for some
other reason.
 Second, we lack the specific knowledge needed to craft a
unique strategy but recognize the problem as fitting a certain
pattern.

In such cases, we normally adopt a standardized strategy, whether

or not it is truly appropriate to the specific problem.

Standardized and tailored strategies are not mutually exclusive.

Often a standardized strategy provides the point of departure for a
tailored strategy that evolves as the situation develops. If we run
into certain types of problems often enough, we develop stan-
dardized responses that are generally appropriate to that type of
problem. Experience has taught us they will work more often
than not. In many cases, standardized strategies are designed to
gain time to find an appropriate, specific solution.

Standardized strategies are not fixed; they can be changed and

improved, usually on the basis of experience. These strategies

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 Strategic Opposites

build a certain reputation that may strongly influence the behavior

of friends, foes, and neutrals. Standardized strategies generally
find expression not within a single war, but over the course of
many conflicts. Such a strategy’s immediate payoff in any particu-
lar case may be less than completely satisfying, but it can offer
great advantages over the long term.

As an example, the United States has employed a standardized

strategy of providing nation-building support to defeated enemies.
During the period of reconstruction, the United States assists in
rebuilding the defeated states’ industrial base and infrastructure.
Two notable examples are the reconstruction of Germany and
Japan following World War II. More recently, the United States
provided postconflict aid to Grenada, Panama, and Haiti.

In its conduct of war, the United States pursues a standard strat-

egy that includes respect for the independence of allies, relatively
mild occupation policies, the generous and systematic reconstruc-
tion of conquered states, as well as a persistent economic isola-
tion of hostile nations. These policies reflect a recognition that
wars end and that the victors must live with the survivors. This
approach also makes it easier for other states to act as American
allies and difficult for enemies to create and sustain popular resis-
tance to American power and influence. Combined with the
American reputation for overwhelming firepower and a demon-
strated willingness to use it in war, such policies have contributed
greatly to America’s strategic success.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

STRATEGY BY INTENT OR BY DEFAULT

Not all strategies are the product of conscious thought. Warfare is
driven by politics, and rational calculation is only one of many
factors in politics. Strategies by intent are those developed pri-
marily through the rational consideration of options and their
likely implications. Strategies by default, on the other hand, are
those dictated by circumstances or determined primarily by ideol-
ogies, unconscious assumptions, and prejudices that prevent strat-
egists from considering all of their options in what many would
consider a fully rational manner. While conceptually distinct, the
two are rarely mutually exclusive; most strategies involve ele-
ments of both intent and default.

Consider the Russian strategic response to invasion by Germany

in World War II. The Russian intent was to defend their country at
the border. The strength of their enemy forced the Russians into a
strategy of delay and withdrawal until the invader could be worn
down sufficiently to be defeated. Conversely, the Nazis’ blind
adherence to their racial ideologies led to their failure to take
advantage of the indifferent attitudes of the Belorussian and
Ukrainian peoples towards the Soviet regime. Had they pursued a
rational policy towards the population of occupied Soviet terri-
tory, they might have undermined the growth of a powerful parti-
san movement behind their lines.

The functioning of coalitions offers another illustration of the

interplay between strategies of intent and default. Coalition war-
fare is often entered into as part of an intentional strategy. How-
ever, strategies adopted by the coalition are complicated or even

3-12
 Strategic Opposites

subverted by the ideological motivations of the participants. Dicta-

torships generally have difficulty participating in coalition warfare.
However sensible it might be to cooperate with other political enti-
ties in pursuit of common goals, dictatorships by their very nature
demand the right to make decisions unilaterally. They attempt to
treat potential allies as servants, subordinating others’ interests
completely to their own. Theocratic states that find their justifi-
cation for existence in the demands of God may have a similar
difficulty in making rational strategic compromises. Liberal de-
mocracies that are cooperative, compromising, balance-of-power
entities internally are much more likely than dictatorships or theo-
cracies to demonstrate these same characteristics in their external
relationships. They are also more likely to attempt to treat very dif-
ferent kinds of political entities as if they shared those values.

What we have described are only tendencies. Insightful and strong-

willed leaders occasionally overcome such tendencies. Strategists
must seek to understand which elements of their own and the
enemy’s strategies are fixed by nature and which are subject to con-
scious change. A policy that seeks to convince the enemy to change
his/her behavior will fail if he/she is incapable of change.

EVALUATING OPPOSING STRATEGIES

The purpose of presenting the sets of opposing strategies in this
chapter is analytical rather than prescriptive. We must use these

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

concepts to understand what we, our allies, our enemies, and rele-
vant neutral forces are doing and why. They deepen our under-
standing and throw new light on sometimes inscrutable
opponents. Faced with the possibility of war, however, the strate-
gist must return to the fundamentals we described in chapter 2:
What are the political objectives of each participant? Are they
limited or unlimited? How do the opponents perceive each other’s
objectives? The answers to these questions will have implications
for the fundamental character of any resulting conflict and the
adoption of a particular strategy. We must appreciate which ele-
ments of the situation are fixed and which are subject to con-
scious change. We must be prepared to deal with the constants
and norms as well as uncertainty and ambiguity. Only then can
we intelligently discuss the strategy-making process, as we do in
the following chapter.

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 Chapter 4

The Making of Strategy

“Modern warfare resembles a spider’s web—everything

connects, longitudinally or laterally, to everything else;
there are no ‘independent strategies,’ no watertight com-
partments, nor can there be.”1

—John Terraine
 The Making of Strategy

Having considered the nature of the environment within which

strategy is made, the fundamental goals of all strategies, and
some ways to categorize a strategy, we now consider how strat-
egy is actually made.

THE STRATEGY-MAKING PROCESS

Despite all that we have said about the nature of politics and policy,
people generally think of strategy making as a conscious, rational
process—the direct and purposeful interrelating of ends and means.
In fact, strategy is very seldom if ever made in a fully rational way.

Each political entity has its own mechanism for developing strat-
egy. While certain elements of the strategy-making process may
be clearly visible, specified in a constitution and law or conducted
in open forum, many aspects of the process are difficult to observe
or comprehend. Participants in the process itself may not fully
understand or even be aware of the dynamics that take place when
dealing with a specific strategic situation. Thus, it is impossible to
define any sort of universal strategy-making process. It is possible,
however, to isolate certain key elements that any strategy maker
must take into account to arrive at a suitable solution to a particu-
lar problem. We must focus on these elements if we are to under-
stand the strategy and strategic context of any particular conflict.

Strategy making is in effect a problem-solving process. In order

to solve a particular problem, the strategist must understand its

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

nature and identify potential solutions. We start with the nature of

the problem and the particular political ends of each of the partic-
ipants in the conflict. This helps us to identify the specific politi-
cal objectives to be accomplished. These objectives lead to
development of a national strategy to achieve them. From there,
we proceed to military strategy.

While it is difficult to specify in advance the content of a military

strategy, it is easier to describe the questions that military strategy
must answer. First, we must understand the political objectives
and establish those military objectives that enable us to accom-
plish the political objectives. Second, we must determine how
best to achieve these military objectives. Finally, we must trans-
late the solution into a specific strategic concept: Will our strat-
egy result in the requirement for multiple theaters or multiple
campaigns? What are the intermediate goals and objectives
within these theaters and campaigns that will achieve our political
objectives? The military strategic concept incorporates the
answers to these questions and provides the direction needed by
military commanders to implement the strategy.

The Strategic Assessment

When confronted with a strategic problem, strategists must first
make an assessment of the situation confronting them. This assess-
ment equates to the observation-orientation steps of the observa-
tion-orientation-decide-act loop.2 While the factors involved and
the time constraints at the strategic level are different from those at
the tactical or operational levels, the principle is the same: without
a basic understanding of the situation, decisionmaking and action
are likely to be seriously flawed.

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 The Making of Strategy

The assessment begins with observing and orienting to the strate-

gic landscape. Strategists look at the factors discussed in chapter 1:
the physical environment, national character, the interplay between
the states, and balance of power considerations. Once they have an
appreciation for the landscape, they must focus on and determine
the nature of the conflict.

Assessing the nature of the conflict requires consideration of

questions like these: What value do both sides attach to the politi-
cal objectives of the war? What costs are both sides willing to
pay? What is the result of the “value compared to cost” equation?
What material, economic, and human sacrifices will the partici-
pants endure? For how long? Under what circumstances? Will the
societies expect regular, measurable progress? Will they patiently
endure setbacks and frustration?

Such questions are fundamentally related to the ends of the con-

flict and the means employed to achieve those ends. The answers
to these questions are required to determine the nature of the
political objectives—the ends—of the conflict and the value to
both sides of those political objectives. The value of the objec-
tive, in turn, is a major indicator of the resources—the means—
that both sides will likely commit and the sacrifices they will
make to achieve it. An understanding of both ends and means is
required in order to develop an effective military strategy.

Political Objectives
Political objectives are the starting point for the development of a
strategy. The first step in making strategy is deciding which polit-
ical objectives a strategy will aim to achieve. In order to design

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

the military action that will produce the desired result, the mili-
tary strategist needs to know what that desired result is, that is,
what the political objective is. From the political objectives, the
military strategist can develop a set of military objectives that
achieve the political objectives.

In theory, the setting of political objectives seems like a rela-

tively straightforward proposition, and sometimes it is. The World
War II stated political objective of unconditional surrender by the
Axis powers was simple. In practice, however, setting political
objectives involves the solving of not one but several complicated
and interrelated problems. Multiple problems require the simulta-
neous pursuit of multiple and imperfectly meshed—sometimes
even conflicting—strategies. The constant pressures and long-
term demands of our economic and social strategies tend naturally
to conflict with the demands of preparedness for the occasional
military emergency. The demands of warfighting, of coalition
management, of maintaining domestic unity, and of sustaining the
political fortunes of the current leadership often pull us irresistibly
in different directions. It is always crucial to remember that mili-
tary strategy making is but one element of the much broader
dynamic of political interaction that goes into the making of
national strategy.

At a minimum, the determination of political objectives must

establish two things in order to form the basis for the development
of a sound military strategy. First, it must establish definitions for
both survival and victory for all participants in the conflict. As dis-
cussed in chapter 2, without an understanding of how each partici-
pant views its survival and victory, it will be impossible to

4-6
 The Making of Strategy

identify the military strategy that can attain either goal. Second,
the political leadership must establish whether it is pursuing a
limited or unlimited political objective. The identification of the
nature of the political objective is essential to ensuring the right
match between political and military objectives.

Military Objectives and the Means to Achieve Them

With an understanding of the political objectives, we then turn to
selection of our military objectives. Military objectives should
achieve or help achieve the political goal of the war. At the same
time, the use of military power should not produce unintended or
undesirable political results. Fighting the enemy should always
be a means to an end, not become an end in itself.

As with political objectives, the choice of military objectives may

seem relatively simple. However, selection of military objectives
is not a trivial matter. First, strategists may select a military objec-
tive that is inappropriate to the political objectives or that does
not actually achieve the political objective. Second, there may be
more than one way to defeat an enemy. As an example, will it be
necessary to defeat the enemy army and occupy the enemy coun-
try or might a naval blockade accomplish the objective? Third,
the pursuit of some military objectives may change the political
goal of the war. Successful pursuit of a particular military objec-
tive may have unintentional effects on the enemy, allies, neutrals,
and one’s own society. This is particularly true in cases where a
delicate balance of power is in place; achieving a given military
objective may alter the balance of power in such a way that the
resulting political situation is actually less favorable to the victor.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Successful military strategies select a military goal or goals that

secure the desired political objectives, not something else.

The designation of limited or unlimited political objectives is a

necessary prerequisite to selecting the type of warfighting strat-
egy that will be employed—either a strategy of annihilation or a
strategy of erosion. The choice of an erosion or annihilation strat-
egy drives the selection of specific military objectives, the design
of our military actions, the effects we hope to achieve, and the
weight we give to our military efforts relative to the use of other
elements of our national power.

In annihilation strategies, the military objective is to eliminate the

military capacity of the enemy to resist. This almost always
involves the destruction of major elements of the enemy’s military
forces. Attacks against other targets—seizing territory, striking
economic capacity, or conducting informational or psychological
warfare against the enemy leadership or population—are normally
pursued only when they are directly related to degrading or
destroying some military capability. Thus, specific military objec-
tives and the means for striking at those military objectives grow
out of the assessment of the nature and functioning of the enemy’s
military capacity.

In contrast, the focus of an erosion strategy is always the mind of

the enemy leadership. The aim is to convince the enemy leader-
ship that making concessions offers a better outcome than con-
tinuing resistance. The military objectives in an erosion strategy
can be similar to those in an annihilation strategy, or they can be
considerably different.

4-8
 The Making of Strategy

The first category of targets in an erosion strategy is the same as

in an annihilation strategy: the enemy’s armed forces. If the
enemy is disarmed or finds the threat of destruction to be credi-
ble, the enemy may submit to the conditions presented. On the
other hand, certain assets that have limited military importance
but are of critical economic or psychological value—a capital city
or key seaport—may be seized. Similarly, the enemy’s financial
assets may be frozen or trade may be blockaded. Again, if sub-
mission to stated demands is less painful for enemy decisionmak-
ers than continuing to do without the lost asset, they may concede
defeat. A third possible target in an erosion strategy is the enemy
leadership’s domestic political position. Money, arms, and infor-
mation can be provided to internal opponents of the leadership.
The purpose is to make enemy leaders feel so endangered that
they will make peace in order to focus on their domestic enemies.

Choosing military objectives and the appropriate means to pursue

those objectives requires the consideration of two closely related
concepts: the center of gravity and the critical vulnerability.3

A center of gravity is a key source of the enemy’s strength, provid-

ing either the physical or psychological capacity to effectively
resist. The utility of the concept is that it forces us to focus on what
factors are most important to our enemy in a particular situation
and to narrow our attention to as few key factors as possible.

At the strategic level, the range of possible centers of gravity is

broad. The enemy’s fighting forces may be a center of gravity.
Strength may flow from a particular population center, a region
providing manpower, or a capital city. A capital city may draw its
importance from some practical application such as functioning as

4-9
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

a transportation hub or as a command and control nexus. The cap-

ital’s importance may be cultural, supplying some psychological
strength to the population. In the case of nonstate political entities,
the source of the enemy’s motivation and cohesion may be a key
individual or clique or the public perception of the leadership’s
ideological purity. Public support is often a strategic center of
gravity, particularly in democratic societies.

In contrast to a center of gravity, a critical vulnerability is a key

potential source of weakness. The concept is important because
we normally wish to attack an enemy where we may do so with
the least danger to ourselves, rather than exposing ourselves
directly to the enemy’s strength. To be critical, a vulnerability
must meet two criteria: First, the capture, destruction, or exploita-
tion of this vulnerability must significantly undermine or destroy
a center of gravity. Second, the critical vulnerability must be
something that we have the means to capture, destroy, or exploit.

If the center of gravity is the enemy armed forces, the critical vul-
nerability may lie in some aspect of its organization or its support-
ing infrastructure that is both key to the armed forces’ functioning
and open to attack by means at our disposal. During World War II,
the Allies sought to focus on the German armed forces’ logistical
vulnerabilities by attacking the German petroleum industry, ball
bearing supplies, and transportation infrastructure.

As an example of how centers of gravity and critical vulnerabili-

ties are used to determine military objectives and the means to
achieve them, consider the North’s use of General Winfield Scott’s
“Anaconda Plan” during the Civil War. The plan identified the

4-10
 The Making of Strategy

South’s physical and emotional capacity to sustain a defensive war

as one of the strategic centers of gravity. Critical vulnerabilities
associated with this strategic center of gravity included the South’s
small industrial capacity, limited number of seaports, underde-
veloped transportation network, and dependence upon foreign
sources of supply for foodstuffs, raw materials, and finished
goods. The Anaconda Plan targeted this center of gravity by
exploiting these vulnerabilities. The plan called for a naval block-
ade to wall off the Confederacy from trading with Europe, seizure
of control of the Mississippi River valley to isolate the South from
potential sources of resources and support in Texas and Mexico,
and then capture of port facilities and railheads to cut lines of
transportation. These actions would gradually reduce the South’s
military capability to resist as well as undermine popular support
for the rebellion. While initially rejected as being too passive, the
Anaconda plan revisited and reimplemented, eventually became
the general strategy of the North. Scott’s experienced analysis of
the South’s centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities resulted
in an effective military strategy which led directly to the defeat of
the Confederacy.4

An understanding of centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities

forms the core for the development of a particular military strat-
egy. Among the centers of gravity, strategists find military objec-
tives appropriate to the political objectives and the warfighting
strategy being pursued. Among the critical vulnerabilities, strate-
gists find the most effective and efficient means of achieving those
military objectives. Together these concepts help formulate the
strategic concept that guides the execution of the military strategy.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Strategic Concepts
An essential step in the making of effective strategy is the develop-
ment of a strategic concept.5 Derived from the strategic estimate of
the situation and the political and military objectives, this concept
describes the course of action to be taken. The strategic concept
should provide a clear and compelling basis for all subsequent
planning and decisionmaking.

As with the strategy itself, the strategic concept begins with the
political objectives. It should identify the military objectives to be
accomplished and how to reach them. It should establish the rela-
tionship and relative importance of the military means to the
other instruments of national power that are being employed. It
should address priorities and the allocation of resources. These, in
turn should help determine the concentration of effort within a
theater or campaign.

Sometimes a war is fought in one theater, sometimes in several. If

there is more than one theater, a choice has to be made on how to
allocate resources. This cannot be effectively done without some
overall idea of how the war will be won. The strategic concept pro-
vides this idea. Normally, military objectives are achieved by con-
ducting a number of campaigns or major operations. What should
be the objective of a given campaign? Again, it is the strategic con-
cept that answers that question. It gives commanders the guidance
to formulate and execute plans for campaigns and major operations.

4-12
 The Making of Strategy

World War II provides a clear example of the use of the strategic

concept. This concept naturally evolved throughout the course of
the war. It was modified in response to various political, economic,
and military developments and as a result of disagreements among
the Allies. It is important to note that the strategic concept was not
a single document, but rather a series of decisions made by the
leaders of the Alliance. Nevertheless, in this general strategic con-
cept, military leaders could find guidance from their political lead-
ership for the formulation of specific theater strategies and
campaign plans.

It was immediately apparent that, given the global scale of the

conflict, the strength of the enemy, and the differing political
objectives, philosophies, postures, and military capabilities of the
Allied nations, a unifying strategy was needed. The strategic con-
cept adopted by the Allies called for the defeat of Germany first,
effectively setting the division of labor and establishing priorities
between the European and Pacific theaters. As the concept devel-
oped, it forced a sequence and priority among the campaigns and
operations within theaters and set specific objectives for each of
the campaigns. Germany would be engaged through continuous
offensive action until a decisive blow could be launched from
Britain. Japan would be contained and harassed until sufficient
resources were available to go on the offensive in the Pacific.
Ultimately, this concept led to the achievement of the military and
political objective—in this case, unconditional surrender of Ger-
many and Japan.

4-13
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

WHO MAKES STRATEGY?

Strategy making is almost always a distributed process. The vari-
ous elements of any particular strategy take shape in various
places and at various times and are formed by different leaders
and groups motivated by varying concerns. Elements of the strat-
egy eventually adopted may surface anywhere in the organiza-
tion. We need to understand the particular characteristics,
concerns, and goals of all significant participants if we are to
understand a specific strategic situation.

Without a detailed examination of the particular political entity

and its strategy-making process, it is impossible to determine
who is providing the answers to a particular question. Neverthe-
less, at least in terms of the division between military and civilian
decisionmakers, it is possible to identify who should be providing
these answers.

Earlier, it was argued that certain questions have to be answered

in order to make strategy. The question, “What is the political
objective the war seeks to achieve?” must be answered by the
civilian leadership. The question, “The attainment of what mili-
tary objective will achieve, or help achieve, the political objec-
tive of the war?” should also be answered primarily by the
political leadership. They alone are in the best position to under-
stand the impact that achievement of the military objective will
have on the enemy, allies, neutrals, and domestic opinion. In
answering the question, “How can the military objective be

4-14
 The Making of Strategy

achieved?” the military leadership comes more to the fore. How-

ever, the civilian leadership will want to make sure that the
means used to achieve the military objective do not themselves
have deleterious effects, effects that may overshadow the politi-
cal objective of the war. The question, “If there is more than one
theater, how should the war effort be divided among theaters?”
is likely decided primarily by the political leadership, because
this question can be answered only with reference to the overall
structure of the war. The questions, “Within a given theater,
should the war effort be divided into campaigns?” and “What
should be the objective of a given campaign?” would seem to be
primarily military in nature. Nevertheless, decisions made here
can also affect political objectives or concerns as well as impact
on the availability and consumption of scarce human and mate-
rial resources. No political leader would want to entirely relin-
quish the decision about what the primary objectives of a
campaign should be.

Thus we can see that the making of military strategy is a responsi-

bility shared by both political and military leaders. Military insti-
tutions participate in the political process that develops military
strategy. The military leadership has a responsibility to advise
political leaders on the capabilities, limitations, and best use of the
military instrument to achieve the political objectives. Military
advice will be meaningless, and political leaders will ignore it
unless military professionals understand their real concerns and
the political ramifications—both domestic and international—of
military action or inaction.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

JUST WAR
Traditionally, Western societies have demanded two things of their
strategic leaders in war. First is success, which contributes to secu-
rity and societal well-being. Second is a sense of being in the right,
a belief that the cause for which the people are called to sacrifice is
a just one. Strategists must be able to reconcile what is necessary
with what is just. The “just war” theory provides a set of criteria
that can help to reconcile these practical and moral considerations.

Just war theory has two components, labeled in Latin jus ad bellum
(literally, “rightness in going to war”) and jus in bello (“rightness
in the conduct of war”). There are seven jus ad bellum criteria:6

 Just Cause. A just cause involves the protection and preser-

vation of value. There are three such causes: defense of self
or of others against attack, retaking of something wrongly
taken by force, and punishment of concrete wrongs done by
an evil power.
 Right Authority. The person or body authorizing the war must
be a responsible representative of a sovereign political entity.
 Right Intention. The intent in waging war must truly be just
and not be a selfish aim masked as a just cause.
 Proportionality of Ends. The overall good achieved by the
resort to war must not be outweighed by the harm it produces.
 Last Resort. We must show that there is no logical alternative
to violence.

4-16
 The Making of Strategy

 Reasonable Hope of Success. There can be neither moral nor

strategic justification for resorting to war when there is no hope
of success.
 The Aim of Peace. Ends for which a war is fought must
include the establishment of stability and peace.

Satisfying just war criteria is often not a simple or clear-cut pro-

cess. We want to believe in the ethical correctness of our cause. At
the same time, we know that our enemies and their sympathizers
will use moral arguments against us. Therefore, though the criteria
for the rightness in going to war may be met, the translation of
political objectives to military objectives and their execution can-
not violate jus in bello—rightness in the conduct or war. The
destruction of a power plant may achieve a tactical or operational
objective; however, the impact of its destruction on the civilian
populace may violate rightness in conduct and result in loss of
moral dignity, adversely affecting overall strategic objectives.

In sum, the just war criteria provide objective measures from

which to judge our motives. The effective strategist must be pre-
pared to demonstrate to all sides why the defended cause meets
the criteria of just war theory and why the enemy’s cause does
not. If a legitimate and effective argument on this basis cannot be
assembled, then it is likely that both the cause and the strategy are
fatally flawed.

4-17
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

STRATEGY-MAKING PITFALLS
Given the complexity of making strategy, it is understandable that
some seek ways to simplify the process. There are several traps
into which would-be strategists commonly fall: searching for
strategic panaceas; emphasizing process over product in strategy
making; seeking the single, decisive act, the fait accompli;
attempting to simplify the nature of the problem by using labels
such as limited or unlimited wars; falling into a paralysis of inac-
tion; or rushing to a conclusion recklessly.

Strategic Panaceas

Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescrip-

tions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic pan-
acea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics
of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and uni-
versal solution.

Examples abound. In the 1890s, the American naval writer Alfred

Thayer Mahan convinced many world leaders of the validity of his
theories centered on capital ships and concentrated battle fleets.7
These theories prompted Germany to challenge Great Britain for
naval dominance, contributing to the tension between the two
countries prior to the outbreak of World War I. Similarly, the theo-
ries of German Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen fixated on
strategies of annihilation and battles of envelopment. These pre-
scriptive theories dominated Germany’s strategic thinking in
both World Wars. The deterrence strategies embraced by Ameri-
can Cold War theorists were equally influential. American forces

4-18
 The Making of Strategy

accordingly designed for high-intensity warfare in Europe

proved inappropriate to counter Communist-inspired wars of
national liberation.

Emphasizing Process Over Product

The second major trap is the attempt to reduce the strategy-making
process to a routine. The danger in standardizing strategy-making
procedures is that the leadership may believe that the process
alone will ensure development of sound strategies. Just as there is
no strategic panacea, there is no optimal strategy-making process.
Nonetheless, political organizations, bureaucracies, and military
staffs normally seek to systematize strategy making. These pro-
cesses are designed to control the collection and flow of informa-
tion, to standardize strategy making, and to ensure the consistent
execution of policy.

Such systems are vitally necessary. They impose a degree of

order that enables the human mind to cope with the otherwise
overwhelming complexity of politics and war. However, they
may also generate friction and rigidity. Standardized strategies
can be valuable as a point of departure for tailored strategies or as
elements of larger tailored strategies. However, when the entire
process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by
default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.

The Fait Accompli

One class of strategic-level actions is worth considering as a dis-
tinct category. These are strategies in which the political and

4-19
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

military goals are identical and can be achieved quickly, simulta-

neously, and in one blow. Done properly, these actions appear to be
isolated events that are not part of larger, continuous military oper-
ations. More than raids or harassment, these actions aim to present
the enemy with an accomplished fact, or fait accompli—political/
military achievement that simply cannot be undone. In 1981, the
Israelis became extremely concerned about Iraq’s nuclear weapons
development program. They launched an isolated bombing raid
that destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility. The Israelis had no
further need to attack Iraqi targets, and Iraq had no military means
of recovering the lost facility.

A coup d’état is usually designed as a fait accompli. The political

and military objectives are the same thing: seizure of the existing
government. Noncombatant evacuations are also normally exe-
cuted as faits accomplis. In a noncombatant evacuation, one
country lands its troops for the purpose of evacuating its citizens
from a dangerous situation, as in a revolution or civil war. Once
the evacuation has been accomplished, the cause for conflict
between the state conducting the evacuation and those engaging
in the hostilities that led to it has been removed.

The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is

immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat
and clean—even “surgical.” The danger is that many attempted
faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what
turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment. This result
was normally not intended or desired by those who initiated the
confrontation. In 1983, the Argentines assumed that their swift

4-20
 The Making of Strategy

seizure of the nearby Falkland Islands could not be reversed by

far-off, postimperial Britain and that therefore Britain would
make no effort to do so. They were wrong on both counts.

Limited and Unlimited Wars

Another common error is the attempt to characterize a war as
either “limited” or “unlimited.” Such characterizations can be
seriously misleading. While we can generally classify the politi-
cal and military objectives of any individual belligerent in a war
as limited or unlimited, seldom can we accurately characterize the
conflict itself as limited or unlimited. To do so may leave us badly
confused about the actual dynamics of a conflict.

If we examine the conflicting aims of the belligerents in the Viet-

nam War, we can see that this was never a limited war from the
North Vietnamese perspective nor should South Vietnam have
pursued only limited political objectives. North Vietnam’s politi-
cal goal was the elimination of the South Vietnamese government
as a political entity and the complete unification of all Vietnam
under northern rule. The North Vietnamese leadership saw vic-
tory in this struggle as a matter of survival. While the North Viet-
namese military strategy against the United States was erosion,
against South Vietnam it was annihilation. The South Vietnamese
leadership was weak, enjoying little legitimacy with a population
that had no hope of conquering the North. Its only goal was to
survive. The American strategy against North Vietnam was one
of erosion. However, the United States was never able to con-
vince North Vietnam that peace on America’s terms was prefera-
ble to continuing the war.

4-21
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

All wars can be considered limited in some aspects because they

are generally constricted to a specific geographic area, to certain
kinds of weapons and tactics, or to numbers of committed com-
batants. These distinctions are the factors at work in a particular
conflict, not its fundamental strategic classification. Another
common error is the assumption that limited wars are small wars
and unlimited wars are big ones. This confuses the scale of a war
with its military and political objectives. Large-scale wars can be
quite limited in political and/or military objectives, while a rela-
tively small conflict may have unlimited political and military
objectives. The U.S. action against Panama in 1989 can be con-
sidered a very small-scale war, but both its political and military
objectives were unlimited. Panama’s capacity to resist was anni-
hilated, its regime was deposed, and its leader was put on public
trial and imprisoned. It is possible that had the United States pur-
sued more limited objectives, the result might have been a war of
attrition much more destructive to both sides.

The strategic pitfall in characterizing wars as limited or unlimited

is that such a label may lead to adoption of an incorrect strategy.
This is particularly true in the case of limited wars. There are
always temptations to limit the military means employed, even
when the political objectives demand a strategy of annihilation.
Such inclinations stem from the psychological and moral burdens
involved in the use of force, the desire to conserve resources, and
often a tendency to underestimate the enemy or the overall prob-
lem. Strategists must correctly understand the character and the
resource demands of a strategy before they choose it.

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 The Making of Strategy

Paralysis and Recklessness

Competent strategic-level decisionmakers are aware of the high
stakes of war and of the complex nature of the strategic environ-
ment. Successful decisions may lead to great gains, but failure can
lead to fearful losses. Some personalities instinctively respond to
this environment with a hold-the-line, take-no-chances mentality.
Others display an irresistible bias for action.

Unless we understand the specific problems, dangers, and poten-

tial gains of a situation, the two approaches are equally danger-
ous. Paralysis is neither more nor less dangerous than blindly
striking out in the face of either threat or opportunity. Unfortu-
nately, the very process of attempting to ascertain the particulars
can lead to “paralysis by analysis.” Strategy makers almost
always have to plan and act in the absence of complete informa-
tion or without a full comprehension of the situation.

At the same time, strategists must guard against making hasty or

ill-conceived decisions. The strategic realm differs from the tacti-
cal arena both in the pace at which events occur and the conse-
quences of actions taken. Rarely does the strategic decisionmaker
have to act instantaneously. The development of strategy demands
a certain discipline to study and understand the dynamics of a situ-
ation and think through the implications of potential actions. While
it is often possible to recover from a tactical error or a defeat, the
consequences of a serious misstep at the strategic level can be cat-
astrophic. Boldness and decisiveness, which are important charac-
teristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be
tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.

4-23
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

The strategist’s responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk

and to balance both against uncertainty. Despite the obstacles to
focusing on specific strategic problems and to taking effective
action, we must focus, and we must act. Success is clearly possible.

4-24
 Conclusion

“War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province

of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory
that it be thoroughly studied.”1

—Sun Tzu

“As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the su-

perstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foun-
dation be insecure—so, if the strategy be wrong, the skill of
the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the
brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of
their effect.”2

—A. T. Mahan
 Conclusion

We have explored the nature of politics, policy, and the political

entities that wage wars. We have examined the most fundamental
aspects of national and military strategy and have identified the
basic questions we must answer when considering the use of mil-
itary means to gain political goals. We have examined some basic
types of military strategies and the ways in which those strategies
relate to political objectives. We have also considered some of the
problems in translating our understanding of these strategic fun-
damentals into practical military action. Now we must ask, What
does this mean for us as Marines?

The modern strategic environment poses a significant challenge

for the United States and its armed forces. The collapse of the
Soviet Union has changed the existing strategic environment
from one dominated by bipolar considerations to one that is in
transition. Long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and even personal
hatreds have spawned an increase in local and interstate violence.
Terrorism, civil wars, and secessions threaten to fracture existing
states and break down regional order. The strategist can no longer
be guided by the Cold War’s overarching strategic concept of
containment. That said, strategic thinking must adjust to the
evolving strategic environment.

The Department of Defense 1997 Joint Strategy Review con-

cludes that the 21st century security environment will be charac-
terized by chaos, crisis, and conflict. Global instability will
continue to arise from the world’s littorals, where well over half
of the world’s population resides. Thus, naval expeditionary
forces will remain one of the U.S.’s most reliable and flexible
tools of global influence both for today and into tomorrow. The

Conclusion-3
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

Marine Corps will be at the center of our national security and

military strategies for addressing these challenges. Therefore,
Marines must possess the strategic skills and understanding nec-
essary to participate effectively in this environment.

As we noted at the beginning, the United States Marine Corps does

not make national strategy, nor even the military strategy for fight-
ing a particular war. However, individual Marines may well play a
role in the making of strategy. Moreover, the Marine Corps is often
intimately involved in the execution of strategy, and its effective
execution requires an understanding of both the intent and the con-
text behind the strategy. Strategic execution is not simply carrying
out a fixed plan. Rather, it is a complex matter of both initiating
action and effectively responding to events as they unfold. Without
proper grounding in the strategic situation, the political and mili-
tary objectives of the strategy, and the strategic concept, Marines
will not be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances.

The individual Marine must appreciate the complexities and diffi-

culties of strategy. Few Marines will be in a position to fully grasp
the larger strategic picture, especially while in the field executing
a mission. Nonetheless, a fundamental understanding of the prob-
lems of strategy will help Marines to appreciate the importance of
their role and their unit’s role. It will help Marines to understand
the significance of constraints like rules of engagement and to
understand why policy guidance is sometimes unclear or often
fluctuates. In the increasingly complex operations of the post-
Cold War era, an awareness of the short distance between tactical
action and its strategic impact may help individual Marines or

Conclusion-4
 Conclusion

Marine leaders to avoid actions that damage the United States’

interests or image. This awareness should not impede action, but
instead assist Marines in the evaluation of their situation and pro-
vide the basis for an intelligent response.

Marines will also serve on staffs or in commands where strategic

decisions are made. They must be prepared to participate intelli-
gently, tactfully, and energetically in the strategy-making pro-
cess. They must be prepared to ask tough questions concerning
both political and military objectives and to advise our political
leaders on the capabilities and limitations in the use of the mili-
tary instrument.

There is no shortcut to strategic wisdom. While some have pre-

dicted that the United States will be able to control the course of
future conflicts through “information dominance” or a “system of
systems,” Marines continue to believe that people, not systems or
machines, define success in war. Success in military action
whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level will con-
tinue to depend greatly upon the judgment, experience, and edu-
cation of our Marines. The concepts of this publication cannot be
mastered without serious and ongoing contemplation. Neither can
they be turned into a strategic template to be laboriously worked
through on every occasion. We must think about these concepts,
internalize them, and constantly seek to improve our understand-
ing of the strategic environment. Such an understanding, based on
a professional approach to the complexities of war and politics, is
the essence of “fighting smart.”

Conclusion-5
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

[T]here is no substitute for the judgment and intuition of

experienced and properly educated commanders.

Our goal is to equip every Marine with the thinking ability to

win on the battlefields of the 21st century.3

Conclusion-6
 Notes

The Study of Strategy

1. Unknown.

The Strategic Environment

1. Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,”

Paramaters (March 1981) p.14.

2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) pp. 8–9.

3. See Carl von Clausewitz, “War As An Instrument of Policy,” On

War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 605–610.

4. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free

Press, 1973) p.114.

5. National Geographic (September 1994) p. 32.

6. Based on the 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1996
versions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States distributed by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.).

7. For the best overall introduction to complexity theory, see M.

Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of
Order and Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). See also Alan
Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,”
International Security (Winter 1992/1993) pp. 59–92.

Notes-1
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

8. Corbett, pp. 8–9.

9. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973) p. 167.

10. Ibid., p. 168.

11. Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western

Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 42.

12. Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization, “Table 6.1, Annual

Warfare Death Rates” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 195.

13. Compton’s Interactive Encyclopedia, version 2.01VW,

“Africa” (1994).

14. Blainey, pp. 109–114.

15. George Liska, quoted in Michael Sheehan, The Balance of

Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 2.

16. Clausewitz, pp. 566–573. Do not confuse this political idea

with Clausewitz’s closely related concept of the “culminating point of
the offensive” which is primarily an operational and logistical concept.

17. Clausewitz, p. 89.

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming

the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters (Autumn 1995) pp. 9–19.

Notes-2
 Notes

Strategy: Ends and Means

1. President John F. Kennedy’s address at the U.S. Naval Acad-

emy Commencement, Annapolis, Maryland, June 7, 1961. Reprinted in
Theodore C. Sorensen et al., Let the Word Go Forth: The Speeches,
Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy (New York: Delacorte
Press, 1988) p. 243.

2. Military strategy: “The art and science of employing the armed

forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the
application of force or the threat of force.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

3. National strategy: “The art and science of developing and using

the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together
with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objec-
tives.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy:

An Introduction to National Security Process and Problems (Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988) pp. 27–28.

5. Collins, p. 3.

6. Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments

make up the instruments of national power. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified
Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 24 Feb 1995. In earlier joint doctrine
publications, instruments of national power were referred to as elements
of national power, and the informational instrument was called the psy-
chological instrument. The February 1995 edition of Joint Pub 0-2
updated this terminology.

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MCDP 1-1 Strategy

7. In a true civil war, two sides are fighting for ultimate control of
the same state or nation. The American Civil War was a war of secession;
had it succeeded, there would have been two independent nations in place
of the old United States. We call it a civil war because the secession failed
and the Union remained intact.

8. Discussions in this publication of American Cold War strategies

are strongly influenced by the analysis of John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies
of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

9. In classical military theory, the traditional term is strategy of

annihilation. See Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War Within the
Framework of Political History, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., especially
vol. 4, chap. IV (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).

10. Strategy of erosion is known as strategy of attrition in classical

military theory. The concepts are the same. We use the term erosion to
avoid confusion with the tactical concept of attrition warfare. See Hans
Delbrück, vol. 4, chap. IV.

Strategic Opposites

1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, Dictionary of

Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval
Institute, 1966) p. 311.

2. There is a long tradition of military theory involving asymmetri-

cal strategies. It appears in Chinese military theory most prominently in
Sun Tzu and in the works of Mao Zedong. A particularly clear discus-
sion appears in Edward O’Dowd’s and Arthur Waldron’s, “Sun Tzu for
Strategists,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 10 (1991) pp. 25–36. British

Notes-4
 Notes

military thinker B. H. Liddell Hart propounded asymmetry in his theory

of the “indirect approach” most powerfully in his books, The British
Way in Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), The Ghost of Napoleon
(London: Faber & Faber, 1933), and Strategy (New York: Praeger,
1954). See also Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971) especially the introduction written
by Griffith.

3. John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,”

Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Department of State
January 25, 1954).

The Making of Strategy

1. John Terraine, A Time For Courage: The Royal Air Force in the
European War, 1939–45 as quoted in Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and
Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1990) p. 8.

2. Used as a simple but effective model of the command and con-

trol process, the observation-orientation-decide-act (OODA) loop applies
to any two-sided conflict. For a detailed description, see MCDP 6, Com-
mand and Control (October 1996) p. 63.

3. Critical vulnerability is a Marine Corps doctrinal concept that

appeared first in FMFM 1, Warfighting (March 1989) pp. 35–36. The
term center of gravity found its way into our strategic vocabulary via
Clausewitz’s On War. Clausewitz used the term frequently and in a vari-
ety of meanings. See Clausewitz, pp. 595–597. For a full discussion of
center of gravity and critical vulnerability, see MCDP 1, Warfighting
(June 1997) pp. 45–47.

Notes-5
MCDP 1-1 Strategy

4. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of

Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper
Collins, 1993) p. 952. See also: Shelby Foote, Fort Sumter to Perryville
(New York: Random House, 1986) pp. 110–114.

5. Strategic concept: “The course of action accepted as the result of

the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be
done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the
military, diplomatic, economic, psychological and other measures which
stem from it.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

6. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of

War, “A Moral and Historical Inquiry” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1981) pp. xxii–xxiii.

7. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–

1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1942).

Conclusion

1. Sun Tzu, p. 63.

2. A. T. Mahan as quoted in Heinl, Dictionary of Military and

Naval Quotations, p. 311.

3. Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, before combined hearings of the Procurement and Research
and Development Subcommittees of the House National Security Com-
mittee, March 29, 1997. This testimony can also be found in “Information
Superiority,” Marine Corps Gazette (June 1997) pp. 59–60.

Notes-6