Girlie F.

Sandigan 2019-80031
1st year Block 4
Legal Medicine

1. Dr. Victoria L. Batiquin, et al. V. Court of Appeal

FACTS
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Hospital, Dumagueta City
and he she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said
hospital.

Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to Dr. Batiquin for pre-natal care as the
latter’s private patient sometime before September 21, 1998.

In the morning of September 21, 1998 Dr. Batiquin, along with the other physician and
nurses, performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villages and 45 minutes after successfully
delivered the latter’s baby. Mrs. Villegas remained confined at the hospital for six more days
during those periods Dr. Batiquin regularly visited her. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost her
appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter’s polyclinic who prescribed for her certain
medicines.

In the meantime, Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical certificate by Dr. Batiquin certifying
that she is fit to work so former returned to work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros Oriental.

The abdominal pains and fever keep on recurring and bothered Mrs. Villegas no end and
despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable and
she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital. Dr.
Ma. Salud Kho examined the Mrs. Villegas found her to be feverish, pale and was breathing fast.
Dr. Ma. Salud Kho suspected that either a tumor if the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which
could be cancerous. She had an x-ray of chest, abdomen and kidney and also took a blood test to
which showed an infection inside the abdominal cavity, so she suggested that Mrs. Villegas
submit to another operation to which the latter agreed.

When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish Yellow
discharge inside an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and
pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on
the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubber appeared to be part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of
the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs Villegas. The
piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr, Kho testified that she sent it
to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr, Kho’s testimony, the evidence
which mentioned the piece of rubber is a Medical Certificate, a progress record, an anaesthesia
record, a nurse’s record and a Physician discharge summary.
ISSUE Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable.

HELD

Yes

The court agrees with the Court of Appeal on the positive testimony of Dr. Kho it is definitely
established that a piece of rubber was found near private respondents Villegas uterus.
Furthermore no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her
trustworthiness unimpaired.

The court asses Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, (her positive testimony that a piece of rubber
was indeed found in private respondent Villegas abdomen) prevail over the negative testimony in
favour of the petitioners. As such the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.

This doctrine is stated thus: “where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.”

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof of negligence.
The rule when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case is not intended to
and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged.
It merely determines and regulate what shall be the prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates
the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked;
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

In the instant case, all the requisites for course to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondent were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact
cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas’ body, which
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the caesarean section private respondent Villegas under no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such
could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin.
Petitioner, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a
piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
 2. Leah Alesna Reyes, et al. V. Sister of Mercy Hospital, et al.
G.R. No. 130547, October 3, 2000

FACTS

Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five days before his death, Jorge
had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some
home medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotic, he
decided to see the doctor.
He was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic where he was attended by the respondent
Dr. Rico who gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. He was then
conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with respiratory distress.
Typhoid fever was then prevalent in the locality, suspecting that Jorge could be suffering
from it she ordered a Widal test, a standard test for typhoid fever. Other test also conducted such
as blood count, routing urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear. As the result came out,
Jorge was positive on typhoid fever.
As her shift was ended she indorsed Jorge to the respondent Banes, the latte also took
Jorge history and gave him a medical examination and derived the same result. Dr. Blanes
ordered that a compatibility test with antibiotic Chloromycetin be done on Jorge, since no
adverse reaction she ordered to administer further the same drug.
Around 1:00 a.m. Jorge’s temperature arose to 41 degrees also experienced chills and
exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsion. Dr. Blanes was able to
temporarily ease the patient’s convulsion by putting him in oxygen and putting a suction
machine. When Jorge was regained consciousness she asked him if he had a previous heart
ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past to which he replied in negative.
After 15 minutes, again Jorge started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his convulsions
returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measure taken before and in addition, Valium was
administered. But Jorge did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or
purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the
blood. At around 2:00 am Jorge died and the cause of death was “Ventricular Arrhythmia
secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid Fever.”
The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to
the wrongful administration of Chloromycetin. They contended that respondent doctors
exercised dude care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the
performance of the widal test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and
administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patients compatibility
with the said drugs.

ISSUE

Whether or not Jorge’s death was due to negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and lack
of skill or foresight of Dr. Blanes.

RULING
Jorge Death was not due to negligence, carelessness and lack of skill or foresight.

The standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known
practitioner from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the
reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physician. In the case, Dr. Marlyn Rico did
not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the
due care required under the circumstances.
While it is true that Jorge died a couple of hour after professional medical assistance was
administered, there was nothing extraordinary to his death. It was established that the result of
the widal test and the patients history of fever with chills for five days, taken with the fact that
the clinic had been getting about 15to 20 typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any
doctor of reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. Respondent doctors
and clinic’s alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman as to
justify the application of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Rico’s diagnosis had no presumption of
negligence and she is not bound to explain why any particular diagnosis is not correct.
 3. LBC AIR CARGO, INC. Ferdinand M. Yu and Jaime Tano,
V
Hon. Court of Appeals, Fourth Division, Sherwin Monterola y Oyon-Oyon,
represented by Patrocenia Grondiano y Monterola
G.R. No. 101683, February 23, 1995

FACTS

The case arose from a vehicular collision. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was
traveling on board his Suzuki Motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along the dusty
national road in Bislig, Surigao Del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air
Cargo Incorporated, driven by the defendant Jaime Tano, Jr. was coming from the opposite
direction on its way to the Bislig airport. On board were passenger Ferdinand Yu, Manager of
LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was approaching the
vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other for
the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass
by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to
settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to
reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from
the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the
severe injuries he sustained. The heir of Monterola filed a case for homicide through reckless
imprudence against Tano and a civil case against Tano, Yu, and LBC Air Cargo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident

HELD:

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extreme poor
visibility, hastily executed a left turn without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this
negligent act of Tano, which had placed the LBC van directly on the path of the motorcycle the
opposite’s direction that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence
required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and
clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of “last clear chance” (also referred to, at times, as
“supervening negligence” or as discovered peril”). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that
of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed
to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. In this case, the victim was travelling
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No
appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact that
could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. Therefore the
doctrine is not applicable.
 Tano and LBC are liable- Tano for his negligence as driver of the van and LBC for its
presumptive Negligence as employer of Tano. Yu is not liable, there being no employee-
employer relationship between him and Tano.

It is true, however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently
speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. There was contributory negligence on
the part of the victim’s part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners ‘liability for damages.
Hence, the damages due the heirs of Monterola should be reduced by 20%.