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A REVIEW OF CATASTROPHIC FLOW FAILURES OF DEPOSITS OF MINE WASTE

AND MUNICIPAL REFUSE

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A REVIEW OF CATASTROPHIC FLOW FAILURES OF DEPOSITS OF MINE
WASTE AND MUNICIPAL REFUSE

G.E. BLIGHT & A.B. FOURIE

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

ABSTRACT: Catastrophic flow failures occur in mine tailings dams and dumps of discards and other mine waste with alarming
frequency. In recent years catastrophic flow failures have also occurred in dumps of municipal refuse and even in what were
considered to be carefully controlled and well engineered landfills. Apart from the environmental devastation caused by these flows,
they are also dangerous to human life and society. For examples the Buffalo Creek disaster in the USA in 1972 killed 118 people,
made 4000 homeless and destroyed 50 million US dollars worth of property and facilities, the flow slide that occurred in the
Umraniye-Hekimbasi refuse dump in Turkey in 1993, killed 39 people, destroying their homes in the process. The paper will briefly
review some of the more typical flow slides in waste materials, analysing the mechanics of failure and pointing to ways of preventing
this type of failure by a combination of sound design and operating procedures. In the case of existing deposits modified operating
procedures can be adopted, reducing the probability of failure as well as constructing deflecting structures to protect communities and
facilities from the consequences of failure.

Keywords: Flow failure, mine waste, municipal solid waste.

1 INTRODUCTION: STATISTICS, FAILURES, BREACHES,

FLOW FAILURES, EXAMPLES

1.1 Flow failures in tailings impoundments

Tailings dams, whether of the valley or ring impoundment type,

usually consist of an outer impounding dyke or dam wall that
serves to retain the body of tailings, supernatant water (and,
occasionally, storm precipitation) upstream of it. If, for any
reason, this outer impoundment is breached there will be the
danger that the impounded tailings will escape the impoundment.
Figure 1 shows statistics for 184 incidents involving tailings
dams, collected by the US National Committee on Large Dams
(1994). Here, the definition of "failure" is "any breach in the
embankment leading to a release of the impounded tailings". The
184 incidents were not all failures, nor were the failures all flow
failures. The statistics, however, show that, of the known causes
of failures or breaches, the most likely to occur are slope
instability, earthquakes and overtopping, in that order. Figure 1: Analysis of causes of tailings dam failure
Foundation and seepage failures come next, followed by (USCOLD, 1944).
structural failures. The meanings of the latter three categories are
not very clear, but they presumably include foundation shear or
piping failure, piping through the dam wall and inward collapse Hence the failure of a tailings dam dyke does not inevitably
of a decant tower or decant outfall, any or all of which could result in an escape of tailings but a dyke breach must obviously
result in breaching of an impoundment. occur before tailings can escape. At Bafokeng, overtopping
Slope instability may result in a distortion or flattening of the probably resulted in breaching of the dyke by erosion (see Figure
slope of the retaining impoundment, without any escape of 3b for mechanism), but 20 years later, the disastrous flow failure
impounded tailings, or the tailings may move only a short that occurred from the Merriespruit tailings dam (also in South
distance beyond the impoundment wall. An example of a dyke Africa), Figure 4 (13, Table 1), resulted from breaching of the
failure in which no tailings escaped is illustrated in Figure 2, dyke by overtopping, causing slope erosion and progressive shear
which shows a rotational shear failure in the outer dyke of a failure, as shown in Figure 5 (Wagener et al 1997, Blight 2000).
platinum tailings dam at Bafokeng, South Africa (Blight 1997) Figures 3a and 4 illustrate the characteristics of a tailings dam
(7, Table 1). Here, the dyke stabilized at a flatter average slope, flow failure. These include liquefaction of a large volume of the
as a result of the failure, and none of the retained tailings escaped retained tailings, which flow out of the breach as a viscous liquid
the impoundment. However, a year later the same dyke was and are capable of moving large distances before coming to rest.
breached catastrophically as a result of overtopping, releasing The 3 x 106m3 tailings escape at Bafokeng travelled 42km,
3x106m3 of tailings (as shown by Figure 3a) and causing 13 covering its path with slurry, before the remaining 2 x 106m3 was
deaths as a result (Jennings 1979, Blight 2000). stopped when the flow entered a water retaining dam. The flow

1
 The flow failure of a fly ash dump that occurred in 1961 in
Jupille, Belgium (Bishop 1973) (2, Table 1) is another archetype
of a flow failure in "dry" material. Figure 7a shows a plan of the
course of the flow which travelled down a dry valley for 0.5km.
At Jupille, it appears that the ash may have been fluidized by air
contained by its pores when the fly ash contracted during the
failure. It was reported that fly ash that entered houses,
overwhelmed in the flow, appeared to be "dry". Figure 7b shows
that as the ash flowed down a natural valley it "lined" the valley
with ash, the stream of fluid ash eventually flowing in a "canal"
of solid ash. Of course, this also happens to some extent with
flows of wet materials: the course of the flow is marked by
material stranded as the main flow passes. During the 42km long
flow at Bafokeng an estimated 1 x 106m3 of the 3 x 106m3 of
tailings that escaped was left marking the course of the flow.

Figure 2: Failure (or slump) of retaining dyke of Bafokeng 1.3 Flow failures of municipal solid waste
tailings dam (South Africa) that did not result in escape of
tailings (1973). Until recently, flow failures in dumps or landfills of municipal
solid waste have been unknown. This may be because significant

Figure 3a) Plan of Bafokeng tailings dam showing position of

breach, course of flow failure, and extent of pools prior to failure
(1974). b) Stages of failure of Bafokeng tailings dam.

at Merriespruit (a lesser quantity of 600 x 103m3) travelled 2km

before being halted and contained by an ornamental lake.

1.2 Flow failures of "dry" mine and industrial waste

Tailings are hydraulically deposited as slurries, into containments

designed to retain the consolidating solids and supernatant and
storm water. However, numbers of flow failures have also
occurred in mechanically placed "dry" mine waste deposits. The
prime example of a flow failure in a "dry" mine waste occurred
at the village of Aberfan, Wales (4, Table 1). Here, in 1966, a
dump or tip of coal waste failed, liquefied (largely as a result of
dumping waste over a spring) and flowed into the village of
Aberfan, killing 144 people of whom 116 were school children
(Anonymous 1967, Bishop, 1973). Figure 6 shows the course of
the 1966 flow slide. The figure also shows that the Aberfan tip
had failed and flowed twice previously, in 1944 and 1963, but
these earlier flows did not reach the village and did not serve as Figure 4: Plan of Merriespruit dam, South Africa, showing
sufficient warning to the owners of the tip, or regulatory officials, position of pool at time of failure, intended position of pool,
of the eventual 1966 disaster. breach in dyke, and path of tailings flood (1994).
2
Figure 5: Most likely development of flow failure at
Merriespruit, 1994.

Figure 7: Flow of fly ash at Jupille, Belgium.

surface, along the valley. The sewage that poured from the sewer
pipe was dammed by the slide debris and formed a lake of
sewage on the upstream side of the obstruction. Since this
occurrence, two and possibly three more flow failures of
municipal solid waste deposits have been reported (Hendron et al
1999 (17, Table 1), Brink et al 1999 (18, Table 1)).

1.4 Record of notable flow failures

Table 1 records 22 failures of "dry" mine waste deposits,

hydraulic fill tailings impoundments and municipal solid waste
landfills that occurred over the 72 years from 1928 to 2000. The
table gives an idea of how widespread these failures can be,
Figure 6: Flow failures of coal waste at Aberfan, Wales, 1944, geographically and in terms of the materials that have flowed, the
1963, 1966. volumes of material involved and the consequences. The death
statistics at the foot of the table (1400 deaths in 72 years) also
numbers of landfills have not, until recently, reached a large size show that flow slides are not particularly dangerous occurrences.
or because failures that did occur caused no deaths and therefore A single flying accident can cause 400 deaths, and we expect to
were not newsworthy and were not reported. However, in 1977 a have at least one or two of these per year, yet commercial air
flow failure took place in a landfill at Sarajevo (Gandolla et al travel is not considered dangerous, nor is travel by road, even
1979), and in 1993 a massive flow failure took place in the though the annual road death toll is hundreds of thousands.
Umraniye-Hekimbasi refuse dump in Istanbul, Turkey (Kocasoy, Not all flow failures of waste deposits make headlines, and
Curi 1995) (11, Table 1). Figure 8 shows sections through the regrettably as mentioned above, some failures may never reach
dump before and after the failure, as well as the course of the the news and are never recorded in the geotechnical literature.
debris flow. After reaching the bottom of the valley, the Figure 9 (Blight 2000) (12, Table 1) shows three flow failures
momentum of the flow carried it up the opposite slope, that occurred in a tailings impoundment at Saaiplaas, South
destroying a number of informal houses and killing 39 people. Africa, in three days. Because the failures caused no deaths or
The slide also fractured a main sewer pipeline that ran, on the

3
Figure 8: Failure of Umraniye-Hekimbasi municipal solid waste
dump, Istanbul, Turkey.

injuries and the flows were confined to mine property, this

incident was never reported by the news media, and never
comprehensively investigated. The Saaiplaas impoundment is
only a few km from the Merriespruit impoundment that failed a
year later. If the Saaiplaas failure had been publicized, it may
have served as a warning to the operators of other tailings dams
in the area to inspect their dams carefully for safety, and the
Merriespruit disaster might have been avoided. However, most of
us are confident that we are immune from disasters that befall
others, so it is more likely that the warning would have been
ignored, as in the case of Aberfan.

2 STRAIN-SOFTENING OR LIQUEFACTION OF MINE

AND MUNICIPAL WASTES

2.1 The mechanics of strain-softening or liquefaction

When a particulate material, be it a soil, tailings, dry mine waste
or municipal solid waste, is subjected to shear stresses, it will
tend to change volume and hence void ratio. Dense materials will
tend to dilate, loose materials will tend to contract and materials Figure 9: Plan of Saaiplaas dam, (South Africa) showing
of intermediate, or near critical state density will have little locations of failures A, B, & C.
tendency to change volume. The consequences of this behaviour
when a saturated material is sheared undrained, are illustrated by
Figure 10 (after Castro 1969). The important features of Figure of the same order, and occurred at approximately the same
10, which shows results for consolidated undrained strain- (small) axial strain.
controlled shear, are: .2 After the initial peak, the loose specimen lost strength (or
strain-softened) as the strain increased, whereas the dense
.1 The initial peak shear strength achieved by all specimens was specimen continued to gain strength (strain-hardened) with

4
 Deviator
Stress
Deviator (kPa)
Stress
(kPa)

Pore
Pressure
u
Pore (kPa)
Pressure
u
(kPa)

Figure 10: The effect of initial relative density (Dr) on the shape
of the stress-strain curves of consolidated undrained tests on
saturated sand. (Castro, 1969)

increasing strain. The strength of the intermediate specimen

remained more or less constant.
.3 In the loose specimen, the pore pressure rapidly rose with
increasing strain, to reach a constant maximum. In the dense
specimen, after rising to a peak, the pore pressure reduced
continuously and the shear strength increased.
Figure 11 : a) Stress-strain curves for stress-controlled
The loss of shear strength of the loose specimen from 180kPa anisotropically consolidated undrained tests on saturated loose
to 20kPa after a strain of 3 to 5% constitutes strain-softening sand ( s 31c = 400kPa)
which in an extreme state can be called liquefaction. Because the b) Corresponding stress paths (Castro, 1969).
shear stress was applied monotonically, this is termed static
strain-softening or liquefaction.
Figure 11 a shows the results of three load-controlled tests,
also by Castro (1969), on specimens of loose saturated sand.
These show very similar behaviour to the strain-controlled test of
Figure 10. These tests, though, also show that if a loose material
fails under stress-controlled conditions, which is usually the case
in a slope failure, the failure can occur very rapidly, in fact,
almost instantaneously as the shear stress is applied. Figure 11b
shows the stress paths for the tests of Figure 11a, illustrating that
the ultimate effective stress state reached in these tests lies on the
Kf or failure line for strain-controlled tests.
The behaviour of a loose saturated sand silt under dynamically
applied shear stress is illustrated by Figure 12 (Blight 1990).
Figure 12: Stress path for dynamic shear test on loose saturated
Each application of the shear stress of 300kPa caused an
natural sandy silt.
increment of pore pressure that reduced the mean effective stress,
until application 13 moved the stress path onto the Kf or failure
line. On stress application 14 it was not possible to reach the
weather, varying thickness of layers of deposition, demands for
shear stress of 300kPa. If the test had been continued past stress
increased deposition rates at times of increased production to
application 14, the ultimate condition would have been reached,
meet market demands, etc., the degree of densification inevitably
with the stress path on the Kf-line, a constant mean effective varies both with time and position on the tailings dam (both in
stress, and a very low shear strength. elevation and plan). For example, for a year before the three
failures on the Saaiplaas No. 5A dam (Figure 9) took place, the
rate of rise of the dam had been increased from its long-term
2.2 Strain-softening or liquefaction of tailings
average of 1.8m/y to 2.6m/y and shortly before the failures
occurred, the rate of rise had been further increased to 2.8m/y.
Tailings are usually deposited as slurries and settle out as the Each increase in rate of rise would have reduced the time
tailings are beached in the impoundment at a high water content.
between tailings deposition cycles. Thus the density of
They therefore settle on the beach with a loose particle structure.
successive layers of tailings may be, and usually is highly
If the tailings beach is allowed to dry out between successive
variable. The effects of this variable density on the measured
deposition cycles, which is usually the case, the slurry layer shear strength of tailings are illustrated by Figures 14 and 15
shrinks and densifies as it dries, as shown in Figure 13. However, (Blight 1997, Fourie et al 2001). Figure 14a shows stress paths
because of seasonal and other variations in the

5
 Figure 15a shows the results of a piezo-cone penetrometer test
conducted on the Merriespruit impoundment after the failure
illustrated by Figures 4 and 5. The cone penetration resistance
fluctuated over a range of up to 2MPa as the cone penetrated
successive layers of tailings. The pore pressure, in sympathy,
showed low or even negative values as dense, dilative layers
were penetrated, and high values as loose contractive layers were
encountered. Figure 15b summarizes the results of 16 piezo-cone
penetrometer tests at Merriespruit, made at various distances
from the toe of the dam. Each cone penetration profile has been
characterized by its maximum and minimum slopes in terms of
penetration resistance per unit depth (in kPa/m). There was a
considerable difference between these two slopes, and both the
slopes and the difference between maxima and minima decreased
with distance from the toe. However, there was no sudden
change in penetration characteristics between tailings forming the
outer slope of the impounding dyke and those contained in the
interior of the impoundment. In other words, this was not a case
of a consolidated outer embankment retaining a partly
consolidated semi-fluid core. Certain layers of tailings forming
Figure 13: Densification of tailings slurry by drying shrinkage the beach of the dam must have suffered static strain-softening or
liquefaction for the flow failure to have occurred.

2.3 Strain-softening or liquefaction of "dry" mine wastes

Bishop (1973) drew attention to the phenomenon of the

"bulking" of unsaturated sands and gravels when deposited
without compaction, a phenomenon long known in concrete
technology with relation to volume batching of aggregate. In
general terms, if a given mass of dry cohesionless sand or gravel
is deposited loosely, it will assume a certain volume and void
ratio. If water is gradually added, the volume of the mass (and
Figure 14a: Stress paths for consolidated-undrained triaxial shear hence its void ratio) will increase up to an optimum water content
of undisturbed tailings specimens. after which the volume will decrease again. When the material is
saturated, it will have approximately the same volume and void
ratio as when it is dry. Bulking is well illustrated by the results
shown in Figure 16a for mixtures of the coarse gravel and sand-
fractions of diamond mining waste. The two sets of curves were
prepared with different compactive efforts, and hence initial void
ratios, but regardless of initial void ratio, showed much the same
maximum increase in void ratio as bulking proceeded. At water
contents approaching saturation, the void ratios were much the
same as the initial values. Note that the sand content of the
material had little effect on the bulking, but the addition of sand
did affect initial void ratios for the same compactive effort. For
these materials, specimens prepared at void ratios of 1.0 or above
were contractive in consolidated undrained triaxial shear. Below
a void ratio of 1.0, the materials were neutral to dilative.
Figure 16b shows bulking results presented by Bishop (1973)
Figure 14b: Effective stress changes in undisturbed specimens for waste from the Aberfan tip, which show the percent decrease
during unconsolidated undrained triaxial compression. in volume on saturation. Figure 17 shows results for triaxial
shear tests on bulked colliery waste (Dawson et al 1998) which
was set up at a void ratio of 0.51, consolidated isotropically to
for four consolidated undrained triaxial shear tests on 38mm 0.40 under an effective stress of 200kPa and sheared undrained
diameter x 76mm high samples taken from a single Shelby tube (although it is not clear at what stage the specimen was
sample from the Merriespruit tailings dam (see Figures 4 and 5). saturated). The strain-softening behaviour was very similar to
The two tests at consolidation stresses of 50 and 100kPa showed that shown in Figures 10 and 11.
contractive behaviour, the one at 200kPa showed critical state "Dry" mine wastes are usually deposited in a bulked condition
behaviour, while that at 400kPa was weakly dilative. Figure 14b without compaction. Subsequent saturation by heavy or
summarizes changes in effective stress from the start of shearing continuous rain or some other source of water can cause a
to the ultimate state for 16 consolidated undrained shear tests on tendency for a sudden decrease in void ratio with its consequent
Shelby tube specimens from Merriespruit having various void strain-softening loss of shear strength.
ratios. The specimens were tested under their original in situ Fortunately, there is a current trend in South Africa for mines
effective overburden stress. While nine of the specimens dilated to compact their dry wastes. In the case of colliery wastes, this is
during shear, seven showed contractant or almost neutral done to reduce the air permeability of the waste and thus prevent
behaviour. In other words certain of the layers in the tailings spontaneous combustion, sustained by the entry of oxygen.
could have strain-softened or liquefied and flowed during the
large scale failure, carrying other denser layers with them.

6
Figure 15a: Typical cone penetration test in Merriespruit tailings
impoundment.

Figure 15b: Variation of shear strength with distance from toe of

Figure 16b: Bulking effects in coal waste from Aberfan.
outer wall for Merriespruit tailings impoundment.

Figure16a: Bulking curves for diamond tailings

7
Figure 17: Typical isotropically consolidated undrained test for Figure 18: Results of consolidated undrained triaxial shear test on
coal mine waste (rock sandy gravel). reconstituted specimens of MSW measuring 300mm dia. by
600mm high (Caicedo, etal, 2002).
Some gold mines in South Africa sluice their coarse wastes with
waste mine water as a means of disposing of waste water. The contraction ceasing. Similar results were obtained in drained
sluicing causes the rock to compact, reducing its tendency to triaxial tests on reconstituted MSW specimens from the Bulbul
contract, but may unfortunately increase acid seepage from the landfill in Durban, South Africa (18, Table 1).
base of the dumps, leading to undesirable surface and ground Hence at present there appears to be no clear evidence from
water pollution. laboratory tests that MSW can be strain-softening. However,
there is no doubt from the three (possibly four) flow failures in
MSW landfills recorded (11, 17, 18 and possibly 22, Table 1)
2.4 Strain-softening or liquefaction of municipal solid waste that MSW can strain-soften, resulting in flow failure.
Largely because the phenomenon of flow failures in municipal
waste landfills has only recently become an obvious problem,
relatively little is known of the strain-softening behaviour of 3 DESCRIPTIONS OF TYPICAL FLOW FAILURES IN
municipal solid waste (MSW). MSW is particularly difficult to TAILINGS IMPOUNDMENTS, "DRY" MINE WASTE
characterise because of its heterogeneity and fibrous texture DUMPS AND MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS
which makes it almost impossible to sample in an undisturbed
condition. Also, the properties of MSW change with age and the 3.1 Tailings impoundments
progress of decomposition. Although there were some published
data on strength parameters (e.g. Singh and Murphy 1990) it is 3.1.1 Failure caused by seismic action
only recently that data have been published on volume and pore
pressure changes during shear (Vilar and Carvalho 2002, Caicedo Common features of failures in tailings dams caused by seismic
et al 2002). In particular, Caicedo et al performed consolidated action are (Troncoso, in Blight et al 2000):
undrained triaxial tests on saturated 300mm diameter by 600mm
high reconstituted specimens from the Dona Juana landfill in .1 the presence of a large pond in the impoundment that has
Bogota (17, Table 1), obtaining the results shown in Figure 18. encroached on the outer impoundment dyke;
(The density of the specimens is not given.) The pore pressure .2 an outer dyke formed of loose, poorly compacted or
behaviour is what would be expected of a high void ratio uncompacted tailings sand that is contractive when subjected
material, increasing continuously with strain. But the shear to shear stress;
strength also increased continuously, the net effect being for the .3 poor separation of the sand used to build the impoundment
MSW to behave as if dilatant. These tests were terminated at an dyke from the silts stored within the impoundment, with
axial strain of 13%. However, drained triaxial tests by Vilar and weak lenses of silt included in the dyke; and
Carvalho (2002) on MSW from a landfill in Sao Paulo, Brazil .4 dykes usually built (at least partially) by upstream deposition.
were taken to an axi al strain of 40% without the shear strength
reaching a maximum, or the volume

8
 When an earthquake of sufficient magnitude occurs, a failure
develops as follows: It should be noted that after a failure, the flow of liquefied
tailings from the impoundment will continue until a surface
.1 the shear strains and the corresponding shear stresses imposed profile compatible with the reduced strength of the tailings has
by the earthquake cause the weaker, fine, possibly partly developed. Once this stable surface has formed, loss of tailings
consolidated tailings in the basin of the impoundment to from the impoundment will cease. In the case of El Cobre
strain-soften. If the shear strength falls to a low enough (Antiguo) the average stable slope was about 3.5°, under static
value, conditions because the quaking had stopped. Any aftershocks
.2 liquefied tailings and ponded water will move in waves, could have resulted in further flattening of the profile, and further
alternately drawing down and overtopping the upstream loss of tailings.
slope and crest of the confining dyke;
.3 the upstream slope of the dyke may slide into the 3.1.2 Flow failure resulting from static liquefaction
impoundment, and the dyke may crack;
.4 when the wave of water and liquid tailings returns, it may For a flow failure to occur as a result of a static liquefaction, the
overtop the failed section of the dyke, eroding it and forming outer dyke of the tailings impoundment must be breached either
a breach, while water and liquid tailings may flow into and by shear (e.g. Figure 2) possibly followed by overtopping, or by
through cracks in the dyke, eroding and enlarging them; piping erosion followed by overtopping (e.g. Figure 3b), or by
.5 the downstream slope of the dyke may fail in shear, as a result overtopping followed by erosion and shear failure (e.g. Figure 5).
of strain-softening accompanied by erosion; The formation of a breach in the outer dyke acts as a trigger for
.6 as the breach in the dyke rapidly enlarges, the contents of the strain-softening or liquefaction of the impounded tailings by
impoundment flow out of the breach starting the tailings imposing sudden shear strains in the tailings adjacent to the
flood, which is sustained by retrogressive liquefaction of the breach by the removal of lateral support. If certain layers
tailings within the impoundment (as illustrated by Figure 5); sandwiched in the mass of tailings are susceptible to liquefaction,
.7 the failure process and flow of tailings cease once the shear they lose strength and cause the adjacent, possibly dilative layers
strains imposed by the earthquake diminish and a stable (see Figure 15a) to disintegrate as well, with the result that a
surface profile is developed by the breached dyke and the substantial part of the total tailings mass moves towards and out
tailings flood that has escaped from the impoundment. This of the breach. This process continues until the stable surface
profile must be sustainable by the reduced shear strength of profile, compatible with the reduced strength of the tailings that
the strain-softened tailings. was mentioned above, has developed. Note also, that the basin
that forms the source of the flow must not only be stable on the
The El Cobre (Antiguo) failure (3(1), Table 1) is a good line of the breach (the exit direction of the escaping tailings), but
example of a failure caused by an earthquake (Dobry, Alvares also transversely, i.e. the basin sides must everywhere develop a
1967). Figure 19 shows cross-sections through the side-hill stable slope before the tailings flow can cease.
impoundment before and after failure. The impoundment was The Merriespruit failure (13, Table 1 and Figure 4) is a good
commissioned in 1930, but after the Nuevo (new dam) (3(2), example of a flow failure that resulted from static liquefaction.
Table 1) was constructed in 1963, the Antiguo (old) dam was On 22 February 1994 a rainstorm deposited 25mm of water on to
used only periodically as a standby. The dyke had been built by the Merriespruit gold tailings ring-dyke impoundment in the Free
upstream hydraulic filling, and the downstream slope of the dyke State province of South Africa. A large quantity of water had
was 35m high at the time of the failure. The epicentre of the 7.5 been stored in the impoundment, reducing the free-board to an
Richter magnitude La Ligua earthquake that resulted in the unknown, but small value. Shortly thereafter, as runoff from
failure was 70km from the dam with a focal point at a depth of rainfall on the impoundment surface concentrated in the pool, the
61km. dyke was overtopped and breached. A flow failure ensued that

Figure 19: Pre-and post- failure profiles of EI Cobre old dam

During the quake a cloud of dust arose from the dried surface involved 600 000m3 of tailings and cut a swathe of destruction
of the only periodically used impoundment. The flow failure through the village of Merriespruit downhill of the tailings dam.
continued for 20 minutes after the quake had ended, as 1.9 x Seventeen people were killed and scores of houses were
106m3 of a total storage of 4.25 x 106m3 of tailings flowed down demolished and swept away by the flood. Eventually, the flow
a dry valley for a distance of 12km. A town in the path of the stopped about 2km from the breach when the tailings entered an
flow was annihilated with 300 deaths occurring. ornamental lake, constructed in a natural wetland.
As shown by Figure 19, the dam was constructed on sloping After the afternoon rainstorm, clear water (presumably from
ground with a slope angle of 3° and the average slope of the post- the dam) ran through the streets of the village from about 7 p.m.
failure profile through the breach was only 3.5°. The flow was to 9 p.m. when failure occurred. The failure was accompanied by
reported to have covered its 12km course in a few minutes. This a series of bangs. It was dark, but there was light from the moon.
is too imprecise to allow the speed of the flow to be estimated, Unfortunately, eye-witness accounts as to how the failure took
but it must have been about 20kmh-1 (see Section 4). place do not give a consistent picture. The wall appears to have
disintegrated into a series of large slabs that crashed down,

9
Figure 20: Sections through failure at Merriespruit showing post-
failure equilibrium surface.

causing the noise and being followed by a wave of mud (see

Figure 5).
Figure 20 shows sections of the post-failure equilibrium
surface for the failure basin of the Merriespruit tailings
impoundment. Section E'E' is the pre-failure section normal to
the wall and EE is a section through the breach. Section FF
runsat right angles to EE, and GG runs at 45° to EE. The
intersections of FF and GG with EE are marked in Figure 20. The
slope of the tongue of escaped tailings was 2°, which is very
similar to the slope of large portions of FF and GG. In other
words, the post-failure surface had flattened to a general slope of
2°-3°, with some portions around the perimeter of the failure scar
being as steep as 10°-20°. Presumably, these areas had formed
late in the failure process, had been subjected to lesser shear
strains because they were not so high, and were therefore stable
at steeper surface slopes. 1 2 3
Because of the disturbance caused by the failure, it is very
difficult to know from what depth in the impoundment the
material that composes the post-failure surface originated. The
Figure 21: Vane shear strength profiles measured in an operating
surface is also too soft to be accessible after a failure until a
drying crust has formed. Hence it is not possible to sample a gold tailings impoundment
post-failure surface straight after the failure to help identify its
depth of origin. It seems likely, however, that the tailings that and 7 at Aberfan, 7 being the tip that failed and flowed in 1966.
move out of the breach will consist of the upper, more recently The colliery waste was tipped loosely by a mechanical tipper and
deposited layers, and that the post-failure surface will consist of the slopes of the tip were at the angle of repose of the waste of
deeper layers exposed as the slope of the failure basin is flattened about 37°. Under the toe of tip 7 was a spring, fed by water in the
by the outward flow of the tailings. underlying sandstone under artesian pressure between the
For example, Figure 21 shows profiles of vane shear strength uppermost coal seam and the surface layer of alluvial boulder
measured in an operating gold tailings impoundment. In the clay, which acted as aquicludes. The height of the tip when the
event of the outer dyke being breached, it is obvious from their failure occurred was about 67m from toe to crest.
relatively low strength that the top 10m of tailings would tend to The failure was probably initiated by a series of shallow slips
flow off more readily than the deeper layers. Figure 21 also triggered by the artesian pressure of the spring and exacerbated
demonstrates the loss of in situ strength of the tailings when by contraction of the loose, bulked waste as it became saturated
disturbed, with a sensitivity ratio or strength reduction factor by upward seepage from the spring. At 07.30 on the morning of
(undisturbed/remoulded strength) of about 2.7. the failure, the tipping gang found that the crest of tip 7 had
moved downwards by 3m over a distance of 10 to 12m from the
edge. By 08.30 this displacement had increased to 6m. At 09.10
3.2 Flow failures of "dry" mine waste dumps
the toe of the tip started moving down the 12½° hillside and
Perhaps the best example of a flow slide involving dry mine within a few minutes the rapid flow down the hillside had
waste was the final of the series of three failures that occurred at commenced. The flow travelled 1600m before reaching the
Aberfan (4, Table 1). Figure 22 shows a section through tips 5 school which it destroyed, and came to a halt 350m further
downhill. Referring to Figure 6, at Aberfan road, the depth of the

10
Figure 22: Section through tips 5 and 7 at Aberfan was burning in several places and streams of noisome leachate
issued from the toe of the dump and ran down the slope into the
waste was 9m. The speed of the flow was estimated to have been valley bottom. In 1992 the "technical advisor" to the Mayor of
15 to 30kmh-1. Istanbul decided that the waste should be covered, and later that
year the site operator complied by covering the sub-horizontal
3.3 Flow failures in municipal solid waste top platform with 3 to 5m of demolition wastes and soil. This
additional disturbing force was the straw that broke the camel's
The flow failure at Istanbul (11, Table 1) will be taken as the back.
archetypical example of this type of flow failure (Kocasoy and The failure took place in April 1993. Heralded by a loud bang,
Curi 1995). It is remarkable not only for the destruction it which was later ascribed (probably wrongly) to a methane
wrought, but also for the lack of common sense of the authorities explosion, 1.2 x 106m3 of waste rapidly moved down the valley
that established and operated the landfill. Figure 8 shows that the and was carried a short way up the opposite slope, where the
landfill must have been sited where it was, purely for reasons of houses were situated that the slide demolished.
expediency. Given some flexibility in siting, no engineer in his Whereas the failure at Istanbul took place as a result of a
right mind would have sited a waste deposit on a 27° slope. The complete lack of engineering or technical input or understanding,
waste was dumped near the edge of the slope, sorted through by the failure of the Dona Juana landfill in Bogota, Columbia (17
informal reclaimers (i.e. scavengers), and then pushed over the Table 1) appears to have occurred as a result of a combination of
edge by dozer where it came to rest at an angle of repose of 45°. poor design understanding and poor appreciation of operating
There was no attempt to compact the waste and no attempt to principles (Hendron et al, 1999, Caicedo et al, 2002.)
cover it either. As a result, the waste absorbed all the rain that fell .
on it, as well as the runoff from the dumping platform. The waste

Figure 23: Progression of failure of Dona Juana landfill (Hendron, etal, 1999).

11
The zone of the landfill that failed (see Figure 23) was lined with 4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GROUND AND POST-
a 1mm PVC geomembrane resting on either compacted clay or in FAILURE SURFACE SLOPES AND TAILINGS-GROUND
situ soils. A sand drainage layer and a protective soil layer were INTERFACIAL SHEAR STRENGTH
above the liner. A horizontal soil cover layer was provided on top
of each 2.5m lift of compacted waste, while the lifts of waste Figure 24a shows the basis for a simple sliding block analysis to
between cover layers were interconnected with rock-filled drains calculate the relationship between the post-failure slope, ß, of a
to allow leachate to percolate downwards to the drain above the tongue of escaped tailings, dry mine waste or municipal solid
liner. There was also a passive gas venting system consisting of waste, the slope, i, of the ground surface and the interfacial shear
vertical perforated pipes on a 50m grid. A leachate recirculation strength, t, between the ground surface and the fugitive waste.
system was installed consisting of horizontal perforated pipes Alternatively, the analysis can be used to calculate the shear
placed on top of each waste lift before placing the cover layer. strength of the surface of the failure basin within a breached or
The object of this piping was to inject leachate, collected from failed impoundment, dump or landfill, or the acceleration of a
the base of the landfill, back into the waste, so as to operate the flow of material once it exits the boundary of the waste deposit
landfill as a biological waste reactor, thus purifying the leachate (Blight et al 1981, Blight 1997).
before releasing it into the nearby river. For the potentially sliding block illustrated in Figure 24a,
The investigation of the failure concluded that it had been Downstream forces - upstream forces = mass of block x
triggered by high liquid pore pressures caused by the re-injection acceleration
of leachate. The zone that failed was the only zone where
leachate recirculation had been applied. The design stability i.e. (P1 - P2)cosi + Wsini - tL/cosi = W.a/g (1)
analysis had assumed that no pore pressures would occur in the
waste. The inset on Figure 23 shows how the calculated factor of The symbols are defined in Figure 24a and
safety for the failed section must have declined as the waste a = acceleration of the block, g = gravimetric acceleration.
thickness increased during the initial 22 months prior to the start From equation (1)
of leachate injection (Caicedo et al 2002). The additional pore
pressures caused by re-injection caused the already low factor of a = [(P1 - P2)cosi + Wsini - tL/cosi]g/W (1a)
safety to fall to 1.0 and the failure followed.
The failure investigation reached the obvious conclusion that If the block of material comes to rest, a = 0 and
when designing a landfill where leachate is to be re-circulated,
t = [(P 1 - P2)cosi + Wsini]cosi/L (1b)
pore pressures must be properly evaluated and their effect must
be considered in the stability analysis If the block is accelerating, its increase in velocity after time ?t
will be

?v = a?t (2)

In equation (1)

W = [2h - L(tanß - tani)? L/2 (3)

and

h =H1 + L(tanß - tani)

(4)

where ? ( is the bulk unit weight of the material in the block.)

If the surface of the flow (i.e. of the block) is parallel to the

ground surface, ß = i and P1 = P2 , h =H1.
If the pore water pressure in the block is taken as hydrostatic
with free water at the surface of the slide,

(P1 - P2) = (K?1 + ?w)[h2 - (H1)2]/2 (5)

where ?1 is the effective unit weight, ?w is the unit weight of

water and K is the active lateral pressure coefficient, KA.
In Table 2, equation (1b) has been applied to the surfaces of
some failure basins of tailings impoundments (Blight 1997). All
of these failures have been listed in Table 1, except the Arcturus
failure that occurred in a gold tailings dam in Zimbabwe in 1978
(Shakesby and Whitlow, 1991).
It is important to note that in all of these cases, the interfacial
shear strength required for stability was relatively small when
compared (for example) with the values shown in Figure 21. This
supports the view that very thin layers of low strength may
govern the overall strength of a sliding mass.
It should also be noted that if a liquefied waste flow debouches
onto wet ground, e.g. when failure follows a heavy rainfall, the
interfacial shear strength will be reduced by the water already at
the waste-to-ground surface interface, and the flow will be more
mobile than if the ground surface had been dry. For example, in
Figure 24: Analysis of equilibrium of flowing waste Table 2, the calculated interfacial shear strength at Saaiplaas for

12
Table 1: 22 flow failures of mine waste tips (or dumps), tailings dams and municipal solid waste landfills that have resulted in deaths,
major environmental damage, or major damage to structures and infrastructure
(Note: Entries have been selected, list is not comprehensive)

Year & Volume of

Location Waste Cause of Failure Consequences
Number Flow
1928 Barahona, Chile copper tailings 8.2 Richter 3 x 106m3 fine tailings environmental
(1) earthquake devastation
1961 Jupille, fly ash removal of toe 100-150 x 103m3 fly 11 deaths, houses
(2) Belgium support of dump ash destroyed
1965 El Cobre (2 copper tailings 7.5 Richter 1) 1.9 x 106m3 300 deaths, village
(3) impoundments) earthquake 2) 0.5 x 106m3 buried in tailings
fine tailings
1966 Aberfan, UK coal waste dumping of waste 108 x103m3 waste 144 deaths, 116
(4) over spring children, extensive
damage to property
1970 Mufulira copper tailings collapse of tailings 89 miners killed
dam into workings underground
(5) Zambia
1972 Buffalo Creek, coal waste overtopping of waste 500 x 103m3 water + 118 deaths, 4 000
(6) USA impoundment waste homeless, US$50
million damage
1974 Bafokeng, platinum tailings overtopping of 3 x 106m3 fine tailings 13 deaths, extensive
(7) South Africa tailings dam damage to mine
installation and
environment
1978 Mochikoshi, gold tailings 7.0 Mercalli 80 x 103m3 fine environmental
(8) Japan earthquake tailings devastation
1985 Stava, Italy fluorite tailings shear failure of 190 x 103m3 fine 268 deaths, extensive
retaining dyke tailings damage to property
(9) and environment
1985 Quintette coal waste pore pressure 2.5 x 106m3 environmental
(10) MaËmot, BC, resulting from damage - river valley
Canada collapse settlement filled with waste for
2.5km
1993 Istanbul, municipal solid shear instability of 1.2 x 106m3 39 deaths, 11 houses
(11) Turkey waste uncompacted waste destroyed, main
(Umraniye- sewer fractured,
Hekimbasi) sewer flow dammed
by slide debris
1993 Saaiplaas, gold tailings high phreatic surface 140 x 103m3 (slides 1 minimal
(12) South Africa (3 in ring dyke & 2) environmental
failures in 3 140 x 103m3 (slide 3) damage. Not
days) reported by news
media
1994 Merriespruit, gold tailings overtopping of 600 x 103m3 fine 17 deaths, extensive
(13) South Africa tailings dam tailings damage to housing
and environment
1995 Omai, Guyana gold tailings piping erosion of 4.2 x 106m3 slurry 80km of river
(14) retaining dyke devastated
1995 Surigao del gold dyke failure 50 x 103m3 12 deaths, coastal
(15) Norte, pollution
Philippines
1996 Sgurigrad, lead, zinc, copper overtopping of 220 x103m3 107 deaths,
(16) Bulgaria retaining dyke environmental
devastation

13
 Year & Volume of
Location Waste Cause of Failure Consequences
Number Flow
1997 Bogota, municipal solid pore pressure caused 800 x103m3 river dammed by
(17) Colombia waste by recirculation of debris
leachate
1997 Durban, South municipal solid pore pressure caused 160 x 103m3 slide contained
(18) Africa waste by co-disposal of within boundary of
liquid wastes site
1998 Los Frailes, lead, zinc, copper foundation failure of 4 x 106m3 slurry environmental
(19) Spain tailings dam devastation
1999 Surigao del gold Tailings slurry 700 x 103m3 17 houses destroyed,
Norte, escaping from burst agricultural land
(20) Phillippines pipe devastated

2000 Inez, Kentucky, coal wastes tailings dam failure 950 x103m3 120km of rivers
(21) USA from collapse of devastated by slurry
underground
workings
2000 Manila, municipal solidshear failure not known minimum of 218
(22) Philippines waste following heavy deaths
typhoon rains
At least 1 400 deaths in 72 years (a maximum of perhaps 20 per year) compared with thousands of millions killed by war, disease,
famine, traffic accidents, etc. in the same period.
Table 1 was drawn from a number of sources, most of which appear in the reference list. For post 1991 failures, the list given by
Fahey et al (2002) has been useful.

Table 2: Summary of observed post-failure surface slopes and of the stagnation height against the building to the kinetic energy
corresponding ground/tailings interfacial shear strengths for of adjacent unimpeded flow) (Blight, Robinson, Diering 1981) to
flow failures in tailings impoundments have been 10ms -1 or 36kmh-1, even though the ground surface
was almost level. Hence the lower accelerations shown on Figure
24 appear to be realistic.
Tailings dam Post - Ground At rest
A similar approach to estimating flow velocity can be applied
failure slope interfacial
surface i shear in cases where a downhill flow crosses a valley and stagnates at a
slope ß strength, t given elevation on the opposite slope, as in the Istanbul MSW
(kPa) flow. Here, the flow reached stagnation at an elevation of 15m
above the bottom of the valley. Assuming the bulk density ( of
the liquefied waste to have been 1 000kgm-2, an approximate
Bafokeng (Figure 2) 4° 1.5° 5.2
energy balance per m3 of waste would be:
Bafokeng (Figure 3) 2° 1.3° 1.6
Arcturus 3° 1.5° 2.6
Saaiplaas (Figure 9) ½ ? v2 = ?g?h or v = (2g?h)½ (6)
(After rain) 3° 1° 2.3
(No rain) 2.3° -0.5° 3.4 where v is the velocity of flow at the bottom of the valley and ?h
(No rain) 3° -0.5° 3.6 is the stagnation height above the bottom of the valley. For the
Merriespruit (Figure 4) Istanbul case, ?h = 15m and the (minimum) v = 17ms -1, or
(Flow slide) 2° 1.5° 1.0 60kmh-1. This ignores energy consumed in overcoming shear at
(Failure basin) 2° 0 1.8 the interface of the hillside and the flowing waste. Applying the
same reasoning to the flow at Aberfan, if the stagnation height is
the failure that occurred after rain was 65% of that corresponding taken as 9m, the minimum speed of the flow would have been
to flows over a dry ground surface. At Merriespruit, the fugitive 13ms -1 or 48kmh-1, whereas the speed was estimated to have
tailings flow over wet ground had an interfacial shear strength of been 15 to 30kmh-1.
55% of that of the final surface of the failure basin. Figures 24b The basis of the sliding block analysis (above) can also be used
and c show some data on the shear strength required for stability to design protection measures such as deflection dykes and safety
(zero acceleration) on various ground slopes (b) and also the platforms to protect installations from the effects of waste flows
acceleration that will occur if these shear strengths are not met (e.g. Blight, Robinson, Diering 1981, Miao et al 2001).
(c). The data correspond to a simple case in which the surface of Obstructions such as these can give very effective protection. For
the flowing waste is parallel to the ground surface, but via example, in the Aberfan slide, of the 118 x 103 m3 that
equation (2) give some idea of the speed with which a flow slide participated in the slide, only 42 x 103m3 crossed the rail
can move. For example, if the acceleration from rest is only embankment between the village and the waste tip. If the rail
0.1ms -2 and this is maintained for 1 minute, the flow will embankment had been designed as a safety barrier and been
accelerate to 6ms -1 or 20kmh-1 in this period. The consequences constructed higher, it could have stopped or deflected the flow,
of higher rates of acceleration are frightening. In the flow failure saving the village from devastation.
at Bafokeng, the flow velocity a short distance after leaving the
breach in the impoundment was estimated from stagnation flow
heights on damaged buildings (by equating the potential energy

14
5 PREVENTING FLOW SLIDES IN THE FUTURE - SITING, Examples of "waste land" that is still often used for waste
DESIGN, OPERATION, REVIEW AND AMENDMENT disposal, but should never be so used are:

Waste deposits are among the most difficult of geotechnical ? steep hillsides or the crests of hills above steep hillsides,
structures to design, manage and operate: ? water-logged swampy areas, or areas crossed by streams,
? areas below the 500 year flood level,
? Most tailings impoundments, mine waste dumps or landfills, ? undermined areas, and
have an operational life of 30 years or more. ? areas crossed by usually dry valleys that could convey raging
? During their operational life, they are continually under torrents in exceptionally wet weather.
construction, and will experience several complete turnovers
of design, supervisory and operating staff. Side-hill dumps are often opted for because the top of a ridge
? Most of them have to be designed and commissioned before may be easily accessible, and dumping can proceed by building
the material they are intended to store has been produced. out a horizontal platform using edge-tipping with gravity to
? In most cases the characteristics of the waste will change with transport the waste down the hill, over the "wasteland". This was
time, as the geology of the ore body varies and metallurgical the reason for the choice of the Istanbul site and several others
processes are changed. like it, as well as the Quintette Marmot site.
? Many of them will eventually be constructed to heights, or will The Durban Bulbul landfill (18, Table 1) was sited in a steep-
extend laterally to extents not envisaged when they were sided valley. This caused seepage from the hillside to be directed
planned. towards the waste body in addition to providing a steep base for
? In mining operations, waste disposal is at the tail end of the the landfill to rest on.
process, and is a source of cost, not revenue. Waste disposal Siting of waste deposits in swampy areas has been the root
is therefore low on the list of priorities, both in terms of cause of many failures (e.g. Blight 1997). In 1970 a tailings dam
capital and running expenditure, and in terms of the quality collapsed into underground workings in Zambia, trapping and
of operating staff assigned to waste disposal. killing 89 miners in the workings, and this was also the cause of
? At the end of the operating life, the waste deposit is still there, the failure at Inez, Kentucky (21, Table 1) in 2000. The
and has to be closed, rehabilitated, maintained and Bafokeng tailings dam was sited with one of its outer dykes on
monitored for periods often thought of in terms of decades the bank of a dry valley, and it was the presence of this valley,
or centuries, but in reality, in perpetuity. There is no walk- carrying water after rain, that caused the 42km long flow of the
away solution to closure. For example, in Johannesburg, escaped tailings.
tailings dams and mine waste dumps operated by companies
that ceased to exist before the end of the 19th century, are
still causing pollution and nuisance at the start of the 21st. 5.2 Design

Many considerations are obvious from the above points, others Because of the long-term nature of waste deposition operations,
not so obvious, as will be seen below. However, the prime causes and because the characteristics of the waste will inevitably
of disasters involving waste deposits are the financial greed of change during the deposit's operating life, pre-construction
the owners, the mental and physical sloth of the operators, and in designs are really site preparation designs, based on available
the case of landfills, vote-seeking by local politicians (which in knowledge of the waste characteristics. Design for stability must
most forms of democracy translates into personal financial be reviewed and, if necessary, revised once the installation is
greed). operating, waste has been deposited and its in situ properties
In reviewing the failures at Bafokeng, Saaiplaas and have been measured. It is also quite likely that the envisaged
Merriespruit, the first author (Blight 2000) pointed out that these method of deposition will prove unsuccessful or unsuitable and
failures were not the result of unknown geotechnical factors, or will have to be changed. For example spigot deposition of
design faults (although it must be noted that in all three cases site unthickened tailings from a ring delivery main may be replaced
investigation and design studies had been perfunctory). All three by paddock deposition or thickened tailings, or placing of dry
were the result of poor operation, lack of proper management and waste by mechanical stacker may be replaced by spreading from
cost saving pressures applied by the mines involved to the bottom-dump trucks.
contractor operating the tailings impoundments. (The fact that the However, to avoid failure of a (suitably sited) waste deposit,
same contractor was involved in all three failures, points up and in particular, failure resulting in a destructive flow, the
Winston Churchill's observation that all we learn from history is design should provide for:
that we do not learn from history.)
? holding an absolute minimum of water on the deposit, and the
facility for rapid drainage of rainfall and run-on water
5.1 Siting during and after the design storm;
? compacting or densifying the waste to above the critical
Many waste deposits whether of hydraulic fill tailings, "dry" density, so that it is not contractive under the application of
mine waste or municipal solid waste are sited in positions that shear stresses;
invite the occurrence of disasters. Examples are the Jupille, ? outer slopes that are flatter than those calculated for an
Aberfan and Quintette Marmot waste dumps (2, 4 and 10, Table acceptable factor of safety against shear failure (it must be
1), the El Cobre, Mochikoshi, Stava and Merriespruit tailings remembered that the outer slopes will need to be
impoundments (3, 8, 9 and 13, Table 1), all of which were sited rehabilitated, and that for vegetation to be stable, and
on hillsides or hill crests above villages, the Bafokeng (7, Table surface erosion minimal, the maximum outer slope should
1) tailings impoundment, sited 200m from an unprotected mine not exceed 15°);
shaft and the Istanbul MSW dump (11, Table 1) sited on the crest ? the installation of an instrument system (piezometers,
of a very steep slope. These are obviously unacceptable sites for inclinometers, etc.) that will enable pore pressure conditions
structures of this type. In all likelihood, most of these sites were as well as movements in the waste to be monitored
chosen for reasons of cost saving, or to use land that was continuously during operation and after closure.
regarded as waste land, unsuitable for any other use.

15
5.3 Operation engineered structures that have been suitably sited on prepared
sites, designed for stability and constructed under careful and
It must be recognized that waste deposits are complex structures continuing supervision and design review. Whereas a decade or
that need careful and intelligent operation. Every waste deposit so ago, regulations relating to these structures were minimal and
should have its own operating manual that is regularly updated as those regulations that existed were often laxly applied, attitudes
conditions change and operating experience is gained. The now appear to have improved. Mining companies appear to be
operating manual should include both "do's" and don't's" and adopting more responsible attitudes to both public safety and
must have sections covering recognition of the development or environmental issues, and in most parts of the world, regulations
existence of dangerous and emergency situations, emergency are more comprehensive and better enforced.
procedures, public warning systems, etc. However, even the best Accidents will, however, still happen if the mining and
operating manual is completely useless if it stays unread on the geotechnical engineering professions do not continually remain
bookshelf of the waste disposal manager. Because staff change vigilant, and alive to the development of dangerous situations or
continually, and because people forget, regular refresher courses practices.
on operating procedures should be given to the operating staff, Finally, we quote a statement made by the first author in 1979,
and summaries of the emergency procedures must be posted which is as applicable 24 years later as when it was written
prominently at the workplace where they can be read or (Blight 1979):
consulted.
"The design, construction and control of deposits of waste falls
within the area of responsibility and the field of competence of
5.4 Review the professional civil and mining engineer and is therefore
subject to the moral standards and ethics accepted by members
Reviewing and measurements of at least the following should be of the engineering profession. Professional engineers have a
made six-monthly: moral obligation not only to their employers and clients, but
also to the country, the public at large and to the future
? Properties of wastes disposed (grading, shear strength, generations who will inherit their works. ...
consolidation parameters of the waste for mine wastes and Dirt, muck, mess, pollution and desolation are not
composition for municipal solid waste). inseparable from mining activities. With modern technology
? Properties of wastes as placed (slurry density, beach slopes and and modern knowledge of geotechnology, plant biology,
gradings down the beach, in situ shear strength and dry surface and groundwater hydrology, soil chemistry and other
density for tailings, in situ densities and water contents for applied sciences, the worst aspects of waste disposal can be
dry mine wastes, in situ densities for MSW). mitigated and some adverse effects can be entirely eliminated.
? Dimensions of deposit (slope angles, heights and rates of rise). However, if the ideal situation is to be approached, our
? Effluents from deposits (quantities and rates of flow for return attitudes must change. Mining and industrial corporations, the
water from tailings dams, rates of flow of leachate from professions and government agencies must unite and
landfills, seepage from all waste deposits, erosion from collaborate to bring the disposal of waste within an acceptable
slopes). framework of control.
? Weekly maximum pool levels and minimum freeboards. It will be noted that government agencies have been
? Weekly return water reservoir or leachate pond levels. mentioned last in the above sentence. It is firmly believed that
? Measurements from instruments (pore pressure, settlement, the initiative in formulating clear and practical guidelines for
movement of slopes). waste disposal should be taken by industry, who must pay for
? Meteorological data, rainfall, evaporation, wind speed and the cost of environmental protection measures, and the
direction. professions, who must plan, design, institute and control those
? Seismic data (whether natural or seismically induced.) measures. ...
? A detailed site inspection by an independent engineer or panel It is well to concede at this point that any mining or
of engineers. industrial activity will inevitably cause some environmental
damage. The overall benefit to the country must be offset
The design should then be reviewed by the engineer or against this damage. It must also be recognized that whatever
engineering panel in the light of the current design for the waste control measures are instituted, due regard must be paid to
deposit, including reviews of: local conditions and current circumstances. The costs of the
waste disposal operation in relation to the revenue-producing
? the water balance for the deposit; operation that must pay for it, the practicability of the
? the stability of the slopes in terms of geometry, height, rate of environmental protection measures proposed, and the short and
rise, in situ shear strength and results of instrument long-term consequences of these measures, both for the safety
measurements; of the public and for their quality of life, must all receive
? minimum free boards and maximum return water reservoir careful and due consideration."
levels.

Any deficiencies in the performance of the deposit or its

operation must then be corrected immediately, and the REFERENCES
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amendments must be made to the design and to the operating Anonymous 1967. Report of the tribunal appointed to enquire
manual, for immediate implementation. into the disaster at Aberfan. HMSO, London, UK.
Bishop, A.W. 1973. The stability of tips and spoil heaps.
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Blight, G.E. 1979. Editorial: The disposal of mining and
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Blight, G.E. 1990. The effect of dynamic loading on underground
Tailings impoundments, dry mine waste dumps and landfills are fill in South African gold mines. De Mello Tribute Volume,
different from natural slopes in that they all are, or should be Editoria E. Blucher, Sao Paulo, Brazil: 37-44.

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Brink, D., Day, P.W. du Preez, L. (1999). Failure and Geol. & Water Sci., 18, 2: 143-153.
remediation of Bulbul Drive landfill: Kwazulu-Natal, South Singh, S., Murphy, B.J. 1990. Evaluation of the stability of
Africa. Proc. Sardinia '99, Cagliari, Italy: 555-562. sanitary landfills. In: Geotechnics of Waste Fills - Theory and
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