CASE DIGEST

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On December 4, 1994, Norberto A. Vitangol contracted marriage with Alice G. Eduardo. Out of
their union, they were blessed with three children. Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their
household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man. The lawyer warned Alice of the
possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour. In retaliation to the threat
of criminal action against her, Alice filed a complaint for bigamy against Norberto who was previously
married to Gina M. Caerlan on July 17, 1987. The RTC of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy dated
September 1, 2010 and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum imprisonment. On appeal
dated July 18, 2012, the CA sustained decision of RTC but modified the penalty in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Norberto filed Motion for Reconsideration but CA denied. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the essential requites of marriage were present in the first marriage?
2. Whether or not Norberto is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

1. Yes. The SC emphasized that petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he contracted
marriage Alice. This is so because all the four requisites under Article 53 of the Civil Code are
present. These include: Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
authority of the person performing the marriage; and a marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional character. The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that
it has no record of the marriage license is unacceptable. Assuming that it is true, it does not
categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Moreover, petitioner admitted the
authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first
wife. The first marriage contract is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of
petitioner’s first marriage.

2. Yes. The SC contained that Norberto’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor
was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Within the
span of seven years, Norberto did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage. Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Under Article 349 of the Civil
Code, any married person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings shall
criminally liable of bigamy. Hence, SC denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed CAs
decision with modification.
 CASE DIGEST

HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION vs. LA SAVOIE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:
On April 2, 1990, La Savoie Development Corporation as a domestic corporation incorporated
commenced its operations. It is engaged in the business of real estate development, subdivision and
brokering. However in 1997, La Savoie found itself unable to pay its obligations to its creditors with the
onset of the Asian financial crisis. Thus, La Savoie filed a petition for the declaration of state of
suspension of payments with approval of proposed rehabilitation plan . The RTC issued the “Stay Order”
staying the enforcement of all claims against La Savoie. However, La Savoie's creditors like Planters
Development Bank, Philippine Veterans Bank, and Robinsons Savings Bank filed their oppositions. Home
Guaranty Corporation also filed an opposition even though it was not their creditor. Home Guaranty
Corporation noted that through the La Savoie Asset Pool Formation and Trust Agreement, La Savoie
obtained financing for some of its projects in Planters Development Bank who issued PI50 million dubbed
as the "La Savoie Development Certificates" (LSDC certificates) to be sold to investors which were
covered by a guaranty extended by Home Guaranty Corporation. The RTC denied La Savoies Petition for
Rehabilitation, thus filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals after. In the meantime, Home Guaranty
approved and processed the call on the guaranty for the redemption of the LSDC certificates and paid a
total of P128.5 million as redemption value to certificate holders. This absolutely conveyed and assigned
to Home Guaranty Corporation the ownership and possession of the entire assets of the La Savoie Asset
Pool. Thus, this underscores that the transfer made to it by Planters Development Bank was made after
the Stay Order had been lifted. On the other hand, La Savoie claimed that the supposed assignment and
conveyance to Home Guaranty Corporation was ineffectual considering that at the time of the guaranty
call, the Stay Order was admittedly in effect. CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision, reinstated the
Stay Order, gave due course to the Petition for Rehabilitation, and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings. Hence, this review for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Asset Pool should be excluded from the proceedings on La Savoie
Development Corporation's Petition for Rehabilitation?

HELD:
No. The execution of a Deed of Conveyance was a pactum commissorium which is forbidded by
law. Hence, the conveyance is void and ineffectual and does not serve to vest ownership in Home
Guaranty Corporation. Two key points are established in this case. First, the restoration of La Savoie's
status as a corporation under receivership brings into operation the rule against preference of creditors.
Second, La Savoie's continuing ownership entails the continuing competence of the court having
jurisdiction over the rehabilitation proceedings to rule on how the properties comprising the Asset Pool
shall be disposed, managed, or administered. The cumulative effect of these is that Home Guaranty
Corporation must submit itself, like how La Savoie's other creditors and La Savoie's Petition for
Rehabilitation shall be resolved. As a paying guarantor, Home Guaranty Corporation was subrogated into
the rights of La Savoie's creditors and now stands as the latter's own creditor. It remains so pending the
satisfaction of La Savoie's obligation and as the void conveyance made to it by Planters Development
Bank failed to terminate in the creditor-debtor relationship with La Savoie. Hence, SC denied petition and
RTC Makati is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the Petition for Rehabilitation.

CASE DIGEST

RENANTE B. REMOTICADO vs. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADINING CO. & ALIGNAY

FACTS:
On December 6 2010, Renante Remoticado was absent without an official leave. His services
then were engaged by Typical Construction Trading owned by Rommel M. Malignay. He remained absent
until December 20, 2010 when, upon showing up, he informed Nielo that he was resigning. Prodded by
Nielo for his reason, Remoticado noted that they were personal reasons considering that he got
sick. Nielo advised Remoticado to return the following day as he still had to report to Typical
Construction's main office, and as his final pay had yet to be computed. Remoticado returned the
following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He protested, saying that he was entitled to
separation pay computed at two months for his services for two years. In response, Nielo explained that
Remoticado could not be entitled to separation pay considering that he voluntarily resigned. On January
10, 2011, Remoticado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal due to a debt at the canteen. The LA Dela
Cruz dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. He explained that Remoticado's employment could not
have been illegally terminated as he voluntarily resigned. He appealed to NLRC and CA but still denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Renante B. Remoticado was illegally terminated in the manner, on the date, and
for the reason he averred in his complaint?

HELD?
No. The SC did not find merit in the petition. While it is true that in illegal termination cases, the
burden is upon the employer to prove that termination was for a just cause. However, logic dictates that
the complaining employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of termination by the
employer. Petitioner here insists on his version of events, that on December 23, 2010, he was told to
stop reporting for work on account of his indebtedness at the canteen. The CA underscored that
petitioner only made a general statement that he was illegally dismissed. He did not state how he was
terminated or mentioned who prevented him from reporting for work. It is not disputed that the
establishment identified as Bax Canteen, to which petitioner owed P2,115.00, is not owned by or
connected with any of Typical Construction's owners, directors, or officers. It appears that Bax Canteen
was merely in the proximity of the site of Typical Construction's Jedic Project. Therefore, it is sheer
improbable that Typical Construction would take Remoticado’s indebtedness as an infraction, and as a
ground for terminating his employment.
Moreover, the waiver and quitclaim bearing Remoticado’s signature and thumbmarks was dated
December 21, 2010, predating petitioner's alleged illegal termination by two days. If indeed petitioner
was told to stop reporting for work on December 23, 2010, it does not make sense for Typical
Construction to have petitioner execute a waiver and quitclaim two full days ahead of the termination of
his employment. It would have been a ludicrous move for an employer that is purportedly out to outwit
someone into unemployment. Remoticado’s claim that his employer’s order for him to stop reporting was
hardly believable. He does absolutely nothing more than entreat the doctrine on an employer's burden to
prove just cases for terminating employment. With an utter dearth of proof in Remoticado’s favor, the
consistent findings of the Court of Appeals, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Labor
Arbiter were sustained. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari was denied.

CASE DIGEST

MACARIO S. PADILLA vs. AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC. AND/OR CATALINA SOLIS
G.R. No. 210080, November 22, 2017

FACTS:
On September 1, 1986, Macario Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc.
as a security guard. He was first assigned at an outlet of Trebel Piano along Ortigas Avenue Extension,
Pasig City. Padilla allegedly rendered continuous service until June 15, 2009, when he was relieved from
his post at City Advertising Ventures Corporation and was advised to wait for his re-assignment order. On
July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from Airborne directing him to report for assignment and
deployment. He called Airborne's office but was told that he had no assignment yet. On September 9,
2009, he received another letter from Airborne asking him to report to its office. He sent his reply letter
on September 22, 2009 and personally reported to the office to inquire on the status of his deployment.
He was told that Airborne was having a hard time finding an assignment for him since he was already
over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised by Airborne's personnel to resign, but he refused. In
December 2009, when he reported to the office to collect his 13th month pay, he was again persuaded to
hand in his resignation letter. Still not having been deployed or re-assigned, on February 23, 2010, Padilla
filed his Complaint for illegal dismissal, impleading Airborne and its president Catalina Solis. The LA
dismissed Padilla’s Complaint. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s Decision. The CA also sustained the rulings of
the NLRC and LA. Thus, this review for certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the age of Padilla was a valid ground for denying employment as a security
guard?
2. Whether or not Catalina Solis liable for the illegal termination of Padilla's employment?

HELD:
1. No. The court ruled that it is unreasonable to deny employees their means of earning a living
exclusively on the basis of age when there is no other indication that they are incapable of
performing their functions. Age, per se, cannot be a valid ground for denying employment to
a security guard. What is crucial in determining capacity for continuing employment is an
assessment of an employee's state of health, not his or her biological age. Hence, it is unjust
to discriminate against workers who are within an age range that is typical of physical
productivity.
2. No. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. As a rule, corporate directors and officers are not liable for the illegal
termination of a corporation's employees. It is only when they acted in bad faith or with
malice that they become solidarily liable with the corporation. Other than Solis' designation as
Airborne's president, this Court finds no indication that she acted out of bad faith or with
 malice specifically aimed at petitioner as, regards the termination of his employment. Thus,
this Court finds that she did not incur any personal liability.
In line with the forgoing, the petition for review on certiorari was granted. The assailed
decision of Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The Airborne Security Service, Inc.
was ordered to pay petitioner Macario S. Padilla full back wages, separation pay and
Attorney’s fees. The case then was remanded to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed
computation of the amounts due.

CASE DIGEST

DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. AND NARCISO T. DELA MERCED vs. ROSALIO A. LERON
G.R. No. 204288, November 8, 2017

FACTS:

In 1980, Rosalio A. Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc., a domestic
corporation engaged in manufacturing handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export. Narciso T.
Dela Merced was company’s president. Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis and his services were
contracted through job orders. He worked from Monday to Saturday. However, there were times when he
was required to work on Sundays. Leron received his wages at the end of every week but he never
received standard benefits such as 13th month pay, service incentive leave, rest day pay, holiday pay,
and overtime pay. Sometime in June 2006, Leron was dismissed by Demex's foreman, Marcelo Viray, and
its manager, Nora Francisco. Prior to Leron’s dismissal from service, he was given a memorandum stating
that the dining chair he had previously weaved for export to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex
expressed that it would no longer avail of his services. On June 28, 2006, Leron did not report for work
anymore. He filed the next day a complaint against Demex for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of
Quezon City. Meanwhile, Demex construed Leron’s failure to report to work as an AWOL. Despite having
received two notices from Demex, Leron did not report to his post. On July 12, 2006, he received a third
notice informing him of its decision to terminate his services on the ground of abandonment. The LA
dismissed the complaint holding that Leron’s termination was valid. The NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. On
appeal, CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC thus reversed its decision. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Leron was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of abandonment of
work?

HELD:

No. Demex failed to establish the elements constituting abandonment. The determination of
whether or not an employee is guilty of abandonment is a factual matter. It involves a review on the
probative value of the evidence presented by each party and the correctness of the lower courts'
assessments. The CA’s finding that respondent did not abandon his work would generally be binding
upon the parties and this Court. However, an exception should be made in this case considering that
there is a variance in the findings of the CA and NLRC. Abandonment of work has been construed as a
clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning back.  To
justify the dismissal of an employee on this ground, two elements must concur. These are, (1) the failure
to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and, (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship. Demex evidence does not clearly establish a case of abandonment.
Demex failed to prove the second element of abandonment, which is regarded by this Court as the more
decisive factor. Intent to sever the employer-employee relationship can be proven through the overt acts
of an employee. Demex point that Leron’s absences, non-compliance with the return-to-work notices, and
his alleged act of crumpling the first return-to-work notice are indicators of abandonment.  These acts still
fail to convincingly show Leron’s clear and unequivocal intention to sever his employment. Hence, the
petition for certiorari was denied, and CAs Resolution was affirmed.

CASE DIGEST

BELO MEDICAL GROUP, INC. vs. JOSE L. SANTOS & VICTORIA G. BELO
G.R. No. 185894, August 30, 2017

FACTS:

On May 5, 2008, Belo Medical Group received a request from Santos for the inspection of
corporate records. Santos concern over the corporate operations arose from the alleged death of a
patient in one of its clinics. Santos claimed that he was a registered shareholder and a co-owner of Belo's
shares, as these were acquired while they cohabited as husband and wife. Santos sought advice on his
probable removal as director of the corporation considering that he was not notified of meetings where
he could have been removed. Belo objected to this request and wrote Belo Medical Group to repudiate
Santos co-ownership of her shares and his interest in the corporation, claiming that the 25 shares in his
name were merely in trust for her as she paid for these shares. Belo prayed that the case be tried as a
civil case and not as an intra-corporate controversy, arguing that intra-corporate controversies did not
include special civil actions for interpleader and declaratory relief, and clarified that the issue of
ownership of the shares of stock must first be resolved before the issue on inspection could even be
considered ripe for determination. Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss. Though a motion to dismiss is a
prohibited pleading under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the
trial court ruled motions to dismiss are allowed in interpleader cases. On appeal to CA, it was dismissed
as well. Thus, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the present case is intra-corporate?

HELD:
Yes. A conflict between two stockholders of a corporation does not automatically render their
dispute as intra-corporate. The nature of the controversy must also be examined. The Court held that to
determine whether an intra-corporate dispute exists and whether this case requires the application of the
rules of procedure, this Court evaluated the relationship of the parties. The types of intra-corporate
relationships include: a. between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; b. between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers; c.
between the corporation, partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise, permit or
license to operate is concerned; and d. among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. For
as long as any of these intra-corporate relationships exist between the parties, the controversy would be
characterized as intra-corporate. This is known as the relationship test.
Applying the relationship test, this Court notes that both Belo and Santos are named
shareholders in Belo Medical Group’s Articles of Incorporation and General Information Sheet for 2007.
The conflict is clearly intra-corporate as it involves two shareholders although the ownership of stocks of
one stockholder is questioned. Belo Medical Group argues that the case should not have been
characterized as intra-corporate because it is not between two shareholders as only Santos or Belo can
be the rightful stockholder of the 25 shares of stock. This may be true. But this finding can only be made
after trial where ownership of the shares of stock is decided. Applying the nature of the controversy test,
this is still an intra-corporate dispute. In the interpleader case, Belo Medical Group sought his
disqualification from inspecting the corporate books based on bad faith. Therefore, the controversy shifts
from a mere question of ownership over movable property to the exercise of a registered stockholder’s
proprietary right to inspect corporate books. The Review for Certiorari was partially granted and
remanded to the commercial court of origin for further proceedings.

CASE DIGEST

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO SAGANA Y DE GUZMAN

FACTS:
On July 21, 2010, Ernesto Sagana Y De Guzman willfully, unlawfully and criminally, sell and
deliver to a customer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride contained in one heat-sealed plastic sachet,
weighing more or less 0.12 gram in exchange for P500.00, without authority do so. This is contrary to
Article II, Section 5, R.A. 9165. On the same date, Sagana have in his possession, custody and control
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) contained in five heat-sealed plastic sachets, weighing more or
less 0.59 gram, without authority to possess the same. This is contrary to Article II, Section 11, R.A.
9165. Upon arraignment of these two criminal charges, Sagana pleaded not guilty. A police officer
allegedly demanded P50,000.00 in exchange for not filing a case against Sagana, an amount open for
bargain. However, when Sagana told them that they did not have that amount, he was detained and was
taken to the prosecutor's office for inquest the following week. The Regional Trial Court ruled Sagana
guilty of the charges. On appeal, Sagana asserted that the police officers failed to comply with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules. He argued that the trial court allegedly erred in
finding him guilty of the charges. On February 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling. It held that failure to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 did not render Sagana's
arrest illegal or the evidence confiscated inadmissible. Strict compliance with the law can be dispensed
with provided that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved by the law
enforcers. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to comply Section 21 of R.A. 9165 did not render Sagana's arrest illegal or
the evidence confiscated inadmissible?

HELD:
Yes. Sagana’s arrest was illegal and the evidences confiscated were inadmissible. The
prosecution cannot simply rely on the saving clause provided for under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. While non-conformity with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A.
9165 is not essentially prejudicial to its claim, the lapses committed by the police officers must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable  grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of
the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. In this case, the prosecution failed to offer
any justifiable reason why the police officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21. It also failed to
prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were maintained despite the failure
to conform to the directives of the law. The miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs heightens the
importance of a more stringent conformity with Section 21, which the police officers in this case
miserably failed to do so. The significant lapses committed, as well as their failure to explain their non-
compliance with the directives of the law, cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. With these
circumstances, the Court acquitted Sagana as his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
the decision of the CA was reversed and set aside.

CASE DIGEST

GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC. vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION

FACTS:
In 1995, Gotesco obtained from Solidbank ₱300 million loan through its President, Mr. Jose Go.
This loan was covered by three promissory notes. This loan was covered by three promissory notes. To
secure the loan, Gotesco was required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture naming Solidbank-Trust
Division as Trustee. The indenture obligated Gotesco to mortgage several parcels of land in favor of
Solidbank. One of which was a property located in San Fernando, Pampanga. Gotesco also agreed to at
all times maintain the Sound Value of the Collateral. When the loan was about to mature, Gotesco found
it difficult to meet its obligation due to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. So Gotesco sent a letter to
Solidbank proposing to restructure the loan obligation, extending the payment period to 7 years with a 2-
year grace period. But Solidbank informed Gotesco that there was a substantial reduction in the
appraised value of its mortgaged properties and required Gotesco to replace or add to the mortgaged
properties. Solidbank sent a demand letter to Gotesco as the loan became due but Gotesco failed to pay
the outstanding obligation. Thus, Solidbank filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the lot in
Pampanga. A Notice of Sale was published for public auction on August 31, 2000. Solidbank won as the
highest bidder. Gotesco filed a complaint RTC for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings, against
Solidbank, assailing the validity of the foreclosure proceeding claiming that it was premature and without
legal basis and that the jurisdictional requirements prescribed under Act No. 3135 were not complied
with. Solidbank further claimed that it complied with the publication and posting requirements. Solidbank
then filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The RTC dismissed the and the
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the foreclosure was premature?
2. Whether or not the requirements under Section 3 of Act No. 3135 were complied?

HELD:

1. No. The SC ruled that the foreclosure was not premature for the following defaults: first
when it failed to pay the loan according to the terms of the promissory note; second, when it
failed to provide the additional collateral demanded by Solidbank; and third Gotesco never
refuted that it defaulted in its payment of the loan. Gotesco had admitted to proposing the
 loan restructuring because of its inability to meet the loan payments. Moreover, restructuring
agreement was not perfected between parties. Without an absolute acceptance, there is no
concurrence of minds.
2. Yes. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of Sale be: physically posted in
three public places and be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is situated. As to Gotesco’s
claim that the posting requirement was defective as the notice of sale was posted less than
the required 20 days. Further, such issue is superficial since even though the notice of sale
was posted for only 16 days, the object of a Notice of Sale in an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold
Thus, Mistakes or omissions that do not impede this objective will not invalidate the Notice
of Sale. The SC held that the argument is without merit as documentary evidence will
generally prevail over testimonial evidence. Hence, the review on certiorari was denied and
the CA decision was affirmed.
CASE DIGEST

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. ROYAL FERRY SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:
On August 28, 2005, Royal Ferry filed a verified Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. It alleged that in 2000, it suffered serious business losses that led to
heavy debts. Efforts to revive the company's finances failed, and almost all assets were either foreclosed
or sold to satisfy the liabilities incurred. Royal Ferry ceased its operations on February 28, 2002. On
December 19, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an order, granting the petition declaring
the Royal Ferry Services insolvent. The said order was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three consecutive weeks furnishing copies to all creditors of the company in the schedule of creditors. On
December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum filed before the RTC of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim and
a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the respondent Royal Ferry Services In.c owes them the amount of P
2,769,387.67 and the Petition for Insolvency was filed erroneously filed in a wrong venue. The petitioners
argued that in Insolvency Law, a petition for Insolvency should be filed before he Court with territorial
jurisdiction over the company's residence. In its Article of Incorporation, respondent's principal business
address is situated in Makati City would it be the Petition for Insolvency should be filed before the Court
of Makati. The Motion was denied by the Court on January 30, 2006 for lack of merit. Thereafter,
Pilipinas Shell moved for a reconsideration on February 24, 2006. On June 15, 2006, Regional Trial Court
reconsidered the denial of Pilipinas Shell Motion to Dismiss and reconsider its order dated January 30,
2006. The Petition for Voluntary Insolvency was ordered dismissed. On appeal, CA ruled reinstating the
Insolvency proceedings setting aside the Trial Court order dated June 15, 2006. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency was filed in a proper venue where the
company's residence is situated?

HELD:
Yes. The first insolvency law, R.A. 1956, was entitled "An Act Providing for the Suspension of
Payments, the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, the Protection of Creditors, and the Punishment of Fraudulent
Debtors (Insolvency Law)". With the enactment of R.A. No. 10142, otherwise known as the Financial
Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA), the Insolvency Law was expressly repealed on July 18,
2010. However, because the relevant proceedings in this case took place before the enactment of the
FRIA, the case needs to be resolved under the provisions of the Insolvency Law. Insolvency proceedings
are defined as the statutory procedures by which a debtor obtains financial relief and undergoes judicially
supervised reorganization or liquidation of its assets for the benefit of its creditors. The respondent Royal
Ferry Services is a resident of Manila in its actual operations of its business when the Petition for
Insolvency was filed. It was not opposed as stated in the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent that
its principal business address is situated in Makati is no longer accurate and existing. Facts has been
proven that the actual use and venue of the respondent's business operations is in Manila when the Court
Sheriff implemented the order of the Court dated December 19, 2005. Hence, the SC ruled affirmed
decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency filed by the respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The Petition for certiorari filed by Pilipinas Shell was ordered
Denied.

CASE DIGEST

RIZALITO Y. DAVID vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL & MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES
G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

FACTS: