G.R. No.

179962               June 11, 2014

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Department of Justice against
the petitioner. The BIR alleged that the petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor doing
business and/or exercising his profession for taxable years 2001 to 2003

the BIR alleged that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable years 2001 to 2003 and,
consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due the government

the petitioner admitted that he has been operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in
Quezon City, Makati, Dagupan and San Fernando. However, he countered that he did not file his income
tax returns in these places because his business establishments were registered only in 2003 at the
earliest; thus, these business establishments were not yet in existence at the time of his alleged failure
to file his income tax return.

, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against petitioner for non-filing of income
tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as
to his true income for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly
an Information was filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with violation of Section 255 of Republic
Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997).

The petitioner filed the present petition after the CTA denied his motion for reconsideration

The petitioner claims in his petition that the prosecution’s amendment is a substantial
amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense.18 Thus, he was not
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Adopting the observation of a dissenting CTA justice, he claims that to change the allegation on
the locations of his business from San Fernando, Pampanga and Dagupan City to Muntinlupa
and Mandaluyong cities would cause surprise to him on the form of defense he would have to
assume.

The petitioner adds that the change in the date of the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002
would also alter his defense considering that the difference in taxable years would mean
requiring a different set of defense evidence. The same is true with the new allegation of
"Mendez Medical Group" since it deprived him of the right, during the preliminary investigation,
to present evidence against the alleged operation and or existence of this entity.19 In sum, the
amendments sought change the subject of the offense and thus substantial.

Issue: Whether the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are
substantial in nature and must perforce be denied?
Ruling: No. There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment. According
to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Under Section
14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless of the nature
of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his plea, subject
to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.

Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution
from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the
rights of the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the
arraignment of the accused of the charge against him. The theory in law is that since the accused
officially begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the
information read to him during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the
basis of the same information.

Application:

Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one;
or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.

In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to (i) the alleged change
in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase
"doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or
addition of the branches of petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income
earned." The Court cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial
right of the petitioner as accused.

Conclusion: Therefore, the amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are not
substantial in nature and must perforce be denied.
G.R. No. 185527               July 18, 2012

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
Respondents
Facts:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits for allegedly defrauding Highdone Company
Ltd. which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as
machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB
Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in
Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources and
Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth
and in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and
foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION.
the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health.

Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,9 prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari10 before the RTC but the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.

the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen
Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal
cases.

Issue:

I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO
A PUBLIC TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA

Ruling: The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is

Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.13 This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public
trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility
through his manner and deportment while testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however, as
the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a
witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Application:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the
provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor
and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking
the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order
allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than
the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

Conclusion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19,
2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed the
deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.
 [G.R. No. 240053.
October 9, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO

and JULIUS L. LACANILAO, respondents.

Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio (Cristina), and Julius L. Lacanilao (Julius) were friends and
neighbors in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility,
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.

However, to Mary Jane's dismay, she was informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia
that the job intended for her was no longer available. After spending a few days in Malaysia,
Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday.

Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she
was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her
luggage. She was accordingly charged with drug trafficking.

In October 2010, the District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, convicted Mary Jane of
drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad.Eventually, the eight companions of
Mary Jane were executed by firing squad. Presently, Mary Jane is detained at the Wirogunan
Penitentiary in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the Anti- Human Trafficking Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking in
person. Cristina and Julius were likewise charged in two separate Informations with the crime of
illegal recruitment and estafa.
The President of Indonesia, granted her an indefinite reprieve. The State filed a "Motion for
Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories." It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of
deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court
because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to
her imprisonment.
Cristina and Julius immediately filed their "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to Proposed Questions for Deposition of Mary
Jane Veloso." 9 However, the trial court denied their Omnibus Motion in its November 3,
2016 Resolution. 10
Undeterred, Cristina and Julius filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Urgent Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction 11 before the Court of Appeals
averring that the trial court judge gravely abused her discretion in the issuance of the assailed
Resolutions. ATICc
the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule
119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. the State failed to establish compelling reason to depart
from such rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies
in civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her
conditional examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the case is
pending.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary
Jane's testimony as a prosecution witness proper

Ruling: Yes. The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane
that were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written
interrogatories under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall
be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes.
Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries.
— In a foreign state or country, depositions may be taken (a) on notice before a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or
officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) the
person referred to in section 14 hereof.
Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice
and of interrogatories. — A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a
notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and
the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may
serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories
upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within three (3) days after
being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
Application: A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant
of reprieve by the Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim,
is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and
Julius. This has been recognized by no less than the Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko
Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in
the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines.

The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process.

Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to
due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the
parties have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair
process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an
accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in
criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence in
support of a charge.

Conclusion: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December
13, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and officials in Indonesia pursuant to
the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.