EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123048. August 8, 2000.]

YOLANDA FLORALDE, NIDA VELASCO and NORMELITA ALAMBRA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF

APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PAULINO W. RESMA, Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which reversed and
set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission 2 dismissing respondent Paulino W. Resma from
the service as Division Chief of Specialist Services Division (SSD) and Officer-In-Charge of Agricultural
Training Institute (ATI), Department of Agriculture.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On April 23, 1994, petitioners employees of the ATI charged respondent Paulino W. Resma with grave
misconduct in office (sexual harassment) in three separate complaints filed directly with the Civil Service
Commission.

On August 30, 1994, the Commission gave due course to the complaints and formally charged
respondent with grave misconduct requiring him to submit his answer with the affidavits of his witnesses,
and placed him under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days effective upon notice.

On September 9, 1994, respondent filed his answer to the complaints. He specifically denied all the
accusations against him and asked for the dismissal of the complaints.

On September 20, 1994, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation of the case.

At the hearing, petitioners affirmed the contents of their affidavits and gave the specific dates during
which the sexual harassment took place. Petitioners categorically narrated the various incidents of sexual
harassment, and they were subjected to extensive cross-examination. On the other hand, five witnesses
testified for the respondent including himself. In essence, they testified that the sexual harassment could
not have occurred.

On February 17, 1995, the Commission convinced that the complainants had proven the guilt of the
respondent with substantial evidence, issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. 3

On March 6, 1995, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the Commission erred
because the decision was not supported by evidence. 4chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On April 18, 1995, the Commission denied the motion for reconsideration. 5

On June 16, 1995, respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review. 6

After due hearing, on September 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision which
REVERSED and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.

Hence, this appeal. 7

The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission on the ground that the same were not supported by substantial evidence.
The sexual harassment charges against Resma were filed by three (3) rank and file employees of the
Agricultural Training Institute, where respondent Paulino Resma is OIC. Being rank and file employees,
they were all reporting to their superior, Paulino Resma. Their time records were signed by the latter.
Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of
sexual desire; it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over his women subordinates. The
power emanates from the fact that the superior can remove the subordinate from his workplace if the
latter would refuse his amorous advances.

This is the situation at bar. Yolanda Floralde, Nida Velasco and Normelita Alambra were all rank and file
employees reporting to respondent Paulino Resma, and their Daily Time Records (DTRs) were signed by
him.

Respondent Resma alleged that the Civil Service Commission erred in its resolutions since the petitioners
were unable to prove his guilt by the quantum of substantial evidence required in administrative
proceedings.

We do not agree. The evidence adduced before the Commission consists of the positive testimonies of
petitioners. On the other hand, respondent claimed that it was impossible for him to be at the office on the
days that the sexual harassment occurred. In other words, respondent presented an alibi.

Yolanda Floralde testified that it was around four in the afternoon at the anteroom of the directors office
that Paulino Resma approached her and ask her" Ano yan, pagkatapos ako ‘y pinalapit sa kanyang
kinaroroonan . . . nanatili akong nakatayo ngunit maya-maya ay bigla na lang siyang tumayo at dinakma
ang puwit ko ng papisilpisil." 8

Floralde testified that this was not the only incident that respondent sexually harassed her. Respondent
would oftentimes tell her that "nakakagigil ang batok mo," and "masuwerte ka type kita, yung iba may
gusto sa akin di ko type." 9 Respondent would also pinch her at her side close to her bust and when they
met at the corridors respondent would make a motion as though he would embrace her.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Nida Velasco on the other hand testified that in 1990 Paulino Resma first made his sexual advances
toward her. According to Velasco "habang binubuksan ko po ang pinto ng refrigerator sa Orosa Hall, bigla
po niya akong niyakap at hinawakan niya ang maselang parte ng aking dibdib at bigla po akong hinalikan
sa bibig. Binantaan po niya ako na kapag nagsumbong ako ay hindi niya irerenew ang aking appointment
dahil casual lang po ako." Nida further testified that respondent would often comment that "mamula-mula
na ang iyong pag-aari at fresh na fresh ka pa" and that she would answer back "lolo ka na eh, gago ka
pa." 10 At one time she was watching a volleyball game when she felt someone touch her buttocks, when
she looked back it was respondent Resma, and the latter said "nakakagigil ka." 11

Normelita Alhambra on her part testified that in 1990 at around 7:00 in the morning that after putting down
her bag, respondent Resma suddenly approached her and embraced her. She was able to escape from
his embrace. In other instances, Normelita testified that "tuwing maglalagay ako ng tubig sa baso sa loob
ng CR biglang sumusulpot si Mr. Resma at dinadakma ang puwit ko at sinasabing gustong-gusto niya
ang malalaking puwit." 12 Also at one time Normelita testified that "nakasuot ako ng long sleeve na red at
white maong pants galing ako sa CR ng bigla akong binangga ni Mr. Resma at dinakma ang aking dibdib.
13

Respondent’s defense is that the complaints were instigated by a certain Atty. Ola, who was his rival for
promotion. The defense alleged that the three complaining petitioners were all convinced by Atty. Ola to
file charges against respondent Resma so that he would be out of contention for promotion.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We are not convinced that all three women would prevaricate at the mere urging of Atty. Ola. Filing a
charge for sexual harassment is not a trivial matter. It entails having to go public with an incident that one
is trying to forget. It means opening oneself to public ridicule and scrutiny. We, therefore, can not believe
the version of the defense that the charges were all fabricated.

As to the issue of whether the resolution of the Civil Service Commission is supported by substantial
evidence, we find that, in fact, preponderant evidence supported its findings.

"In determining where the preponderance or the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies,
the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are testifying, the nature
of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The Court may also
consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest
number." 14 "By preponderance of evidence, is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side
is superior to that of the other." 15

"The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth." 16

Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.
"Well-settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be
respected, as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence might
not be overwhelming or preponderant. It is not the task of an appellate court to weigh once more the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency in respect of sufficiency of evidence." 17

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. In lieu
thereof, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dismissing
respondent Paulino W. Resma from office for grave misconduct. No costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124617. April 28, 2000

PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS

CHUA, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C.
CORTEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of
illegal dismissal.

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda
C. Cortez was a company nurse1 of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.

On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of
petitioner corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain
within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a
stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August
1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr.
Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her
time card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when in
fact she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read to
her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so that
while her case was pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty
(30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was
issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-
employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to
receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address
by registered mail.

Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00
and the punching-in of her time card by a co-employee.

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of
her termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of
duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.2cräläwvirtualibräry

On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its
president Francis Chua.3cräläwvirtualibräry
On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and
legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.4cräläwvirtualibräry

On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The NLRC
ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages
computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was
denied;6 hence, this petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.

The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled
to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained.

The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the
services of an employee,7 which grounds should be strictly construed since a persons employment
constitutes "property" under the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that there exists
a valid ground for termination of employment rests upon the employer.8 Likewise, in light of the
employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice, whatever
missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so
severe.9cräläwvirtualibräry

A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment for
"serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust." Specifically -

1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr. William
Chua, the Plant Manager.

2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent to CLMC for
Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was not recovered.

3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were at
work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per time card you were in at 8:02
A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.

4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an ATM card of
nine (9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees complained by the name of Tirso
Aquino about the status of his ATM Card and upon query from the bank it was found out that no
application and no deposit for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not
open the ATM Card and deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit
was made after a month later.10cräläwvirtualibräry

As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant
Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving
special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often refuse.
On many occasions, he would make sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms around her
shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special treatment and
sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his
flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if
she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from the service; and he
made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that her table which was
equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings was transferred
without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument
ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged with gross
disrespect.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for
transmittal was not lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal as
evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter.12cräläwvirtualibräry

With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her
time card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan,
and that was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing
that she was anyway only accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit of
the company with the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was apparently
tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so.13cräläwvirtualibräry

As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees,
private respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was
employed as a company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees.

The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee,
has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious;
(b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer.14 The act of private respondent in throwing a stapler
and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be considered, from a lay
man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a serious misconduct that
would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her duties
as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts complained of, under the
circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse. Her employment
identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no other.15 Also, the
memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending investigation of her case
was addressed to her as a nurse.16cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to
punch-in her time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise
does not constitute serious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she was
asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company, with the
consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during her five (5)-
year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the offense
was immediately known and corrected.

On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to
private respondent dated 20 October 199417 and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, the
money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees concerned,
although belatedly. We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that -

The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support a
conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show
that opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show
that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for
petitioners employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain
requirements before an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms,
identification cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was
caused by Rosalindas neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied).18cräläwvirtualibräry
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire
absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.19 The negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but
also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly
prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may
fairly be made to rest.20 All these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting in the
case at bar.

On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled
to recover such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by malice
or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her services. In
disbelieving the explanation proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table was the
response of a spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter -

Complainants assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she
threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to her
which started from her early days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable.
For indeed, if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during that period?
Why did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for the Plant Manager to
react. This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all.21cräläwvirtualibräry

Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4)
years to expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more
prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua
were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she
would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely protecting her
womanhood, her person and her rights.

We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within
which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary
depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the
employee.

Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's
sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the
agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third
memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much
longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one
employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily "monster" roaming the streets
that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all
tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could outwit her employer's
ploys she would continue on herb and consider them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in
her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the
prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced
reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in
his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up
anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to terminate her.

In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral
damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of.22 Exemplary damages, on the other
hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for the public
good"23 if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner."24cräläwvirtualibräry

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager
showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he
would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an
imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for
advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent
should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered,
petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to
lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions
committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that
she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently
inimical to her employers interest.25 Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was pending
investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE , the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the
dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners
Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed
from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the
strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service until finality of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private
respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008

ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY
V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of
RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National labor Relations
Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.

x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008

The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee’s

spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.1

Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution of
the CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14,
2001 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals’ Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office
of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of, thus:

xxxx

4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot,
gumaganda ka yata?"

5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat
sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga
pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga
napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa
ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.

6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na
kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon
daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang
ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni
Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:

Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.

At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang
ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba
ako.

Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?

Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.

Chairman: Nasaan na siya?

Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.

Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?

Lourdes: Nainip po.

Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo,

hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.

Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.

Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.

Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.

Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.

Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko

tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-
saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
 Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just the
two of us.

Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?

Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I don’t give them a damn. Hindi
ako mamatay sa kanila.

Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na si
Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento
ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP
3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako baka
magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi
niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit
hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera
noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.

7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na
hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.

Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?

Lourdes: Sir, wala po.

Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?

Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.

Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?

Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.

Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.

Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.

Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.

8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa
kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza
Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko
na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si
Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang
dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.

9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina,
sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:

Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.

Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya

 Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).

10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang
kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang
talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo.
Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako
ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na
pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:

Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?

Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya
ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya
ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito
ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:

Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!

Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat
ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.4

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately
transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of
1998,5 constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic
Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the
Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the
offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which
it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.

The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation
to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day, in accordance with AO 250.

On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of
which read:

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of the Committee as
to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by clear and
convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the recommendation that respondent be meted
only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the circumstances
of the case.

What aggravates respondent’s situation is the undeniable circumstance that he took advantage of
his position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the
 NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set an
example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it that
his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and to
provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other with respect,
courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor of
Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).

What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs.
Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense
of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713),
respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good morals
(Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public
trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Given these established standards, I see respondent’s acts not just [as] a failure to give due
courtesy and respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all times
uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public sense of morality." Otherwise stated, respondent –
to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC – had shown an
attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the service.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor
Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct
and is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt of this Order.

SO ORDER[ED].

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He
then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was
dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a
Motion for

Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its
June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.

The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on
record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:

The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited
testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x
x

Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her
witnesses to invent their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his empty
conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a
hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People v.
Noroña, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a
story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose herself to
the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public
ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayala’s acts violated
RA 6713:

Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations
Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such
an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him. He must comport himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of his everyday life
should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts complained of were
committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the objectionable nature of his
wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the solitude of his chambers,
Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and immoral
conduct warrants his removal from office.14

Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.

SO ORDERED.15

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the
December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the
penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the
CA, a Special Division of Five was constituted.17 In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its
earlier Decision:

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the
challenged decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review18 before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003
Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court
granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any
act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18, 2002 Resolution. The
CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, (sic)

is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.

G.R. No. 155831

Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She
raises this issue:

The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative
to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential appointee. The President
was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to dismiss the
respondent from the service.21

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who
has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OP’s decision was arrived at
after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely
with the President.22

As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the
disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an
erring presidential appointee.

G.R. No. 155840

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:

I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN

PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En
Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE
APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.

II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS

AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM.

III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE DEFINITION
OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY APPLYING
DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.23

Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes
sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a)
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-
employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the
employee.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from
petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts
imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo’s perception of malice in his
alleged acts – a "product of her own imagination"25 – that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum
prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is
considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that
intent is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a
sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual harassment
is committed with the perpetrator’s deliberate intent to commit the offense.26

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the
definition of the forms of sexual harassment:

Rule IV

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the
following forms:

a) Overt sexual advances;

b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;

c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or
the like for the same purpose;

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.27

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute
sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the
employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual
harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment.29

G.R. No. 158700

The Republic raises this issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent Rayala as
Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.30

The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute
unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are
generally annoying or offensive to the victim.31

It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP.
Rayala’s dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC
Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due
process clause.

The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not
prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though
Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by
dismissal from the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala’s position is invested with public trust and his
acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which
states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good
behavior.33 Since Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed
from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.

All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:

(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?

(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?

Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840
before this Court.

We do not agree.

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in
one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
special civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.35

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the
parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief
prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.36

Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22,
2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it
was directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.

When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review with
this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that
there was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840.
With respect to Domingo’s petition, the same had already been dismissed on February 19, 2003.
Domingo’s petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG only on
July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.37

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out that
it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed
a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more favorable
ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties adversely
affected by this ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for
reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When the
Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That Rayala and
Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this right. Thus, when this
Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."

We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.

It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the
findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP
to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable
penalty.

That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the
common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA.
It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The
principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40

Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review
the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are now
conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the
acts imputed to him.

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition
for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his
case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.42

We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or

training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
 limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training

Environment. – It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or
training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual
harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of
sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved
by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives,
prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the
administrative sanctions therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful
acts of sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among
others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training
institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment.

The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees
to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also
conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory
rank, and from the rank and file employees.

In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at least
one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or
coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy
of this Act for the information of all concerned.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the
Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would
still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck
and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school
expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones
– all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made
as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.45 That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is
clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and
requested transfer to another unit.

Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is different
from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto
Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly kissed
her, embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice Josefina
G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that "the complainant failed to show by
convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `beso-
beso’ fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill
motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and
special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of
the exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:

In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant
should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and
not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades.
The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design.
The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion,
without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma.
Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form
of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day
and even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's birthday or their
birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's department, further
attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck
on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive occasions, female
employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of
Judge Acosta's well wishers.

In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's acts
of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in
nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent
acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In fact, she did not
even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone
in all those incidents.47

This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.

To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court
interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during
festive or special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding
and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when no other members of his
staff were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s acts, as already
adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported
the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.

Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the
NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy
coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its
coverage because he is a presidential appointee.

We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence.
The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for
violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the
participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the
investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and
recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee
in the orderly conduct of the investigation.

Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.

We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the
crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of
office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As
we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not
proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to
conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses
– all employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for
coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.

Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee
on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OP’s decision finding him
guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of
RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the
verdict is a "sham and total nullity."

We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:

[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards.
Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared,
personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.

On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense
is not controlling, thus:

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or
the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.50

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral
conduct.51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first
offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she
reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that
Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered
discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above,
the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for
disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.
Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal
from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it
still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance57 and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is
suspension for one (1) year.

Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is
not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge
Arceo,59 this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:

The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He
took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one
who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.

In yet another case, this Court declared:

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up
to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when
such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for
his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to
protect its employees from oversexed superiors.60

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct
themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy
demands that he should set a good example.61

Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts
Domingo’s character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered,
albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in
the disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that
he has been found wanting.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831,
155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 165121 : February 14, 2008]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. PETER E. NIERRAS, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the partially amended
Decision1 dated July 27, 2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64122, which
reduced to six months without pay the penalty of dismissal imposed on Nierras by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).

The dramatis personae in this case are complainant Olga C. Oña, a secretary of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), and respondent Peter E. Nierras, the Acting General Manager of the
Metro Carigara Water District, Leyte.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On July 17, 1994, Oña left for Leyte upon orders from her Department Manager, Hector Dayrit, to assist
in the formation of the San Isidro Water District. Upon arrival in Tacloban City, Oña was endorsed by the
LWUA management adviser to Nierras.

On July 18, 1994, Oña and Nierras proceeded to San Isidro, Leyte, where she held a briefing for the
local officials. After the official briefing, Oña asked Nierras where the municipal mayor would
accommodate her. Nierras replied that he would accommodate her in his farm in Calubian. They then
took a motorcycle to Calubian where, according to Oña, Nierras already made passes at her.

In Calubian, they first deposited their personal belongings in the house of Nierras' cousin where he said
they would stay for the night. Thereafter, they proceeded to Nierras' farm. Upon their arrival, Nierras
asked a tenant to purchase liquor and invited the other tenants to a drinking spree. Around 10:30 p.m.,
Oña, already tired and sleepy, reminded Nierras that they should go back to his cousin's house to retire
for the night. However, instead of going back, Nierras gave her a sleeping mat, a blanket and a pillow and
was told to rest. She then left and chose a corner in the balcony of the house in the farm to sleep.

Around midnight, Oña was awakened when Nierras lay down beside her and crept underneath her
blanket. To her surprise, she saw that Nierras was half-naked with his pants already unzipped. She tried
to run away but Nierras pulled her and ordered her to go back to sleep. It was only when she screamed
"Ayoko, Ayoko, Ayoko!" that Nierras stopped grabbing and pulling her.

For his part, Nierras denied the charge and averred that when they were about to go back to the house of
Nierras' cousin, Oña insisted that it would just be better if they slept at the farm. Nierras then managed
to borrow one blanket, one pillow and one mat. Thereafter, they lay down on the same mat and started
conversing. During their conversation, Oña said that she badly needed P5,000 at the moment. Oña
asked Nierras if he could lend her the money. Shocked by what Oña said, Nierras just laughed and
expressed his amazement through a sarcastic smile. Thereafter, Oña never talked anymore to Nierras.

After about an hour, Nierras said he saw that a part of the blanket was not being used by Oña. Because
of the weather and the swarm of mosquitoes, Nierras asked if he could use a part of the blanket. Oña
kept mum so he managed to use the unused part of the blanket to cover part of himself to lessen
mosquito bites. When Oña felt that Nierras was using a part of the blanket, she immediately stood up,
bringing with her the pillow. She never came back to the place where she slept.

On August 11, 1994, Oña filed an incident report2 addressed to the Administrator of the LWUA, charging
Nierras with sexual harassment. She also implicated her immediate supervisors, Hector Dayrit and
Francisco Bula, Jr., in the charge for possible collusion and conspiracy for failure to act on her complaint
despite being informed of what Nierras did to her.

On October 28, 1994, Oña filed with the CSC an affidavit3 for sexual harassment, grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming a public officer. After a prior investigation, the CSC formally charged Nierras with
grave misconduct after finding a prima facie case against him. But finding no evidence of collusion with
him, the CSC dismissed the complaint against Dayrit and Bula.

On September 29, 2000, the CSC found Nierras guilty of Grave Misconduct.4 The dispositive portion of
the decision states:

WHEREFORE, Peter E. Nierras is hereby found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and is meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties.

Let a copy of this Resolution as well as other relevant documents be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever criminal action it may take under the premises.5

Nierras moved for reconsideration; however, the same was denied. Hence, he appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

On March 5, 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision6 affirming the resolutions issued by the
CSC finding Nierras guilty of grave misconduct through sexual harassment and upheld the penalty of
dismissal imposed upon him.

Nierras filed a Motion for Reconsideration7 dated March 30, 2004, asking the Court of Appeals to reverse
its decision and reduce the penalty of dismissal. On July 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the
partially amended decision reducing the penalty of dismissal to suspension of six months without pay on
the basis of the Resolution dated July 8, 2004 of this Court in Veloso v. Caminade.8 The dispositive
portion of the said decision states:

WHEREFORE, our Decision promulgated on March 5, 2004 is hereby PARTIALLY AMENDED by

reducing the penalty of dismissal imposed on the petitioner by the Civil Service Commission to SIX (6)
MONTHS of SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the instant petition, wherein petitioner poses a single issue for our resolution:

WHICH IS THE APPLICABLE RULING IN THE FACTS OF THIS CASE: VELOSO V. CAMINADE, 434
SCRA 1 (2004) OR SIMBAJON V. ESTEBAN, 312 SCRA 192 (1999), DAWA V. ASA, 292 SCRA 701
(1998) AND ANALOGOUS DECISIONS.10

Simply put, the question raised could be restated as follows: Did the acts of respondent constitute grave
misconduct that warrant his dismissal from the service?cralawred

Petitioner prays that we sustain the original decision of the Court of Appeals penalizing Nierras with
dismissal, and not merely a six-month suspension without salary for immoral conduct.
For his part, respondent Nierras contends that the penalty to be meted to him should be equivalent to or
even less than what has been meted by this Court on Judge Caminade in the case of Veloso v.
Caminade, because in the said case more complaints of sexual harassments were filed against the judge
and the standard of morality expected of a judge is more exacting than that expected of an ordinary
officer of the government.

Misconduct refers to intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to,
or be connected with, the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. Grave
misconduct is distinguished from simple misconduct in that the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest in grave misconduct.11

Otherwise stated, the misconduct is grave if it involves the additional element of corruption.12 Corruption
as an element of grave misconduct consists of the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
to duty and the rights of others.13

In this case, we find that the element of corruption is absent. Nierras did not use his position as Acting
General Manager of the Metro Carigara Water District in the act of sexually harassing Oña. In fact, it is
established that Nierras and Oña are not employed or connected with the same agency or
instrumentality of the government. While this fact would not negate the possibility that sexual harassment
could be committed by one against the other, the same would not warrant the dismissal of the offender
because he did not use his position to procure sexual favors from Oña.

Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1994,14 sexual harassment does not necessarily or
automatically constitute "grave misconduct." Besides, under paragraph 2 of Section 1 thereof, sexual
harassment constitutes a ground for disciplinary action under the offense of "Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, or Simple Misconduct."

Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case of Veloso v. Caminade in imposing
the proper penalty on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in
the instant case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the complainants
were the subordinates of the offender. Also, in the Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual
harassment by a judge from whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there
was only one incident of sexual harassment. If a six-month suspension can be meted to a judge from
whom the expected standard of morality is more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be
meted to Nierras. Moreover, in the Caminade case, the offender actually forcefully kissed and grabbed
the complainants. However, in this case, Oña was able to flee from the arms of Nierras even before he
could cause more harm to her. Under the circumstances of the present case, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that suspension of the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay is sufficient penalty.

Clearly, there is no doubt that the act of Nierras constituted misconduct. However, it would be
inappropriate to impose on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Section 16, Rule XIV of the
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides that in the determination of penalties to
be imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be considered.15 Considering the fact that
this is the first time that Nierras is being administratively charged, it would be too harsh to impose on him
the penalty of dismissal outright. Worth noting, in the case of Civil Service Commission v.
Belagan,16 although the Court found that the act of the offending public official constituted grave
misconduct, still it did not impose the penalty of dismissal on him, considering the fact that it was his first
offense.17

The law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant. It should be sanctioned. Public service is a public
trust and whoever breaks that trust is subject to penalty. The issue, however, concerns the appropriate
penalty. Dismissal with forfeiture of benefits, in our view, should not be imposed for all infractions
involving misconduct, particularly when it is a first offense as in the instant case.18 To conclude, given the
circumstances of this case and of the precedents cited, we are in agreement that suspension of
respondent for six (6) months without pay is sufficient penalty.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 27, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994

DELFIN G. VILLARAMA, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., respondents.

Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioner.

Armando V. Ampil for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when inflicted by
those with moral ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for separation from
service.

First, the facts. On November 16, 1987, petitioner DELFIN VILLARAMA was employed by private
respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its Materials Manager. His starting salary was P6,500.00 per
month, later increased to P8,500.00.

On July 15, 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-
typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work. Her
letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads:

MR. LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO

President
Golden Donuts, Inc.

Dear Sir:

I would like to tender my resignation from my post as Clerk Typist of Materials

Department effective immediately.

It is really my regret to leave this company which has given me all the opportunity I long
desired. My five (5) months stay in the company have been very gratifying professionally
and financially and I would not entertain the idea of resigning except for the most
shocking experience I have had in my whole life.

Last Friday, July 7, 1989, Mr. Delfin Villarama and Mr. Jess de Jesus invited all the girls
of Materials Department for a dinner when in (sic) the last minute the other three (3) girls
decided not to join the groupp anymore. I do (sic) not have second thought(s) in
accepting their invitation for they are my colle(a)gues and I had nothing in mind that
 would in any manner prompt me to refuse to what appeared to me as a simple and
cordial invitation. We went to a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our dinner.
Mr. Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and Mr. Jess de Jesus were drinking while we were eating
and (they) even offered me a few drinks and when we were finished, they decided to
bring me home. While on my way, I found out that Mr. Villarama was not driving the way
to my house. I was wondering why we were taking the wrong way until I found out that we
were entering a motel. I was really shock(ed). I did not expect that a somewhat reputable
person like Mr. Villarama could do such a thing to any of his subordinates. I should have
left the company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who might be
similarly situated. I hope that you would find time to investigate the veracity of my
allegations and make each (sic) responsible for is own deed. (emphasis ours)

Thank you very much and more power.

Very respectfully yours,

DIVINA GONZAGA

The letter prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call petitioner to a meeting
on August 4, 1989. Petitioner was then required to explain the letter against him. It appears that petitioner
agreed to tender his resignation. Private respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private
respondent approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay from August 5-28, 1989. It also
issued an inter-office memorandum, dated August 4, 1989, advising "all concerned" that petitioner was no
longer connected with the company effective August 5, 1989. 1 Two (2) days later, or on August 7, 1989,
Mr. Prieto sent a letter to petitioner confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially separated
from the private respondent. The letter reads:

Dear Mr. Villarama:

This is to officially confirm our discussion last Friday, August 4, 1989, regarding your
employment with us. As per our agreement, you will be officially separated from the
company effective August 23, 1989.

May I, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your resignation letter on or
before the close of business hours of August 22, 1989.

Please see the Personnel & Industrial Relations Office for your clearance.

Very truly yours,

(SGD). LEOPOLDO H.
PRIETO, JR.
President

In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter dated August 16, 1989, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the management's decision to terminate him, viz.:

DEAR SIR:

MAY I REQUEST FOR A RECONSIDERATION ON THE DECISION HANDED DURING

OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1989, TERMINATING MY SERVICES WITH THE
COMPANY EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1989.
 THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE MATERIALS DEPARTMENT, WHICH I
HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE PAST 21 MONTHS, TO THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE COMPANY FAR OUTWEIGHS THE ERROR THAT I HAD COMMITTED. AN
ERROR THAT MUST NOT BE A BASIS FOR SUCH A DRASTIC DECISION.

AS I AM STILL OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE UNTIL THE 29th, OF THIS MONTH, MAY I

EXPECT THAT I WILL RESUME MY REGULAR DUTY ON THE 29th?

ANTICIPATING YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

(SGD.) DELFIN G.
VILLARAMA

For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on August 23,
1989. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case 2 against private respondent.

In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V. Nambi held that due process was not
observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private respondent
GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate petitiner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA to his former
position, without loss of seniority rights, and pay his backwages at the rate of P8,500.00 per month from
August 1989, until actual reinstatement; (2) pay petitioner the amount of P24,866.66, representing his
unused vacation leave and proportionate 13th month pay; (3) pay petitioner P100,000.00, as moral
damages, and P20,000.00, as exemplary damages; and (3) pay the attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent of the entire monetary award.

Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992, public
respondent reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and
a new one entered declaring the cause of dismissal of complainant as valid; however, for
the procedural lapses, respondent (Golden Donuts, Inc.) is hereby ordered to indemnify
complainant (petitioner) in the form of separation pay equivalent to two month's (sic) pay
(for his two years of service, as appears (sic) in the records), or the amount of
P17,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition where the following arguments are raised:

THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER IS NOT

SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

THE MERE ADMISSION OF THE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS ENTITLES

PETITIONER TO REINSTATEMENT.

IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HIS SALARIES FROM RECEIPT BY

PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER ON 4
FEBRUARY 1991 TO (sic) AT LEAST THE PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION ON (sic) 16 JULY 1992.
 IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ALSO ENTITLED TO HIS UNUSED VACATION
LEAVE AND PROPORTIONATE 13TH MONTH PAY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF
P24,866.66, ADJUDGED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.

THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES BY

THE LABOR ARBITER IS JUSTIFIED.

We affirm with modification the impugned Resolution.

At the outset, we note that the Petition was not accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed July
16, 1992 NLRC Resolution, 3 in violation of Revised Circular No. 1-88. Neither was there any certification
under oath that "petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency,
and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency," as required under Circular
No. 28-91. It is settled that non-compliance with the provisions of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular
No. 28-91, would result in the outright dismissal of the petition. 4

In addition, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the special civil action for certiorari is available
in cases where the concerned "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions had acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Antonio v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 5 we held that the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision, and the resolution thereof, which is not only expected to be but
would actually have provided adequate and more speedy remedy than a petition for certiorari. The
rationale for this requirement is to enable the court or agency concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. 6 In this case, the assailed July 16, 1992 Resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission was received by petitioner's counsel on July 23,
1992. 7 Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead, he commenced this special civil action
for certiorari. Be that as it may, we allowed the petition to enable us to rule on the significant issues raised
before us, viz.: (1) whether or not petitioner's right to procedural due process was violated, and (2)
whether or not he was dismissed for a valid or just cause.

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice
to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his counsel if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set
by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall
be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. . . . (emphasis supplied)

This procedure protects not only rank-and-file employees but also managerial employees. Both have the
right to security of tenure as provided for in Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the case at
bench, petitioner decided to seek reconsideration of the termination of his service thru his August 16,
1989 letter. While admitting his error, he felt that its gravity did not justify his dismissal. Considering this
stance, and in conformity with the aforequoted Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, petitioner should have
been formally charged and given an opportunity to refute the charges. Under the facts in field, we hold
that petitioner was denied procedural due process.

We now come to the more important issue of whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.

Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed. We
hold otherwise. The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he
voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence preparatory to this
separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto dated August 7, 1989. A few
days after, petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated on the ground that the
seriousness of his offense would not warrant his separation from service. So he alleged in his letter to Mr.
Prieto dated August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner admitted his "error" vis-a-vis Miss
Gonzaga. As a manager, petitioner should know the evidentiary value of his admissions. Needless to
stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his separation.

Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can be
proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. As further observed by the Solicitor
General:

. . . assuming arguendo that De Jesus and Gonzaga were sweethearts and that petitioner
merely acceded to the request of the former to drop them in the motel, petitioner acted in
collusion with the immoral designs of De Jesus and did not give due regard to Gonzaga's
feeling on the matter and acted in chauvinistic disdain of her honor, thereby justifying
public respondent's finding of sexual harassment. Thus, petitioner not only failed to act
accordingly as a good father of the family because he was not able to maintain his moral
ascendancy and authority over the group in the matter of morality and discipline of his
subordinates, but he actively facilitated the commission of immoral conduct of his
subordinates by driving his car into the motel.

(Comment, April 29, 1993, p. 9)

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live
up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when
such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable ground for his
dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect
its employees from over sexed superiors.

To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial
employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence. 8

We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding
separation pay of P17,000.00 as indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award of
separation pay is proper in the cases enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, 9 and in
cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no longer feasible. But
this is not to state that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal notice and conduct the
necessary investigation before dismissing an employee. 10 Thus, in Wenphil vs. NLRC 11 and Pacific Mills,
Inc. vs. Alonzo, 12 this Court awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non-observance of due process.

Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or malice on the
part of private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner. 13
Petitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as
held by the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected by his
separation from the service.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that the award of separation pay is DELETED. Private respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 for non-observance of due process, and the equivalent amount of
his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.