THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-04-1547. April 15, 2005]

JOSEFINA C. RIBAYA, complainant, vs. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-

PARCIA, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Ligao City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint  filed by Josefina C. Ribaya praying that

[1]

disciplinary action be taken against Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Ligao City, Albay relative to Criminal Case No. 8617 (People of
the Philippines v. Sps. Vicente and Corazon Ribaya).
The complaint alleged that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Vega, in his
personal capacity, filed before the MTCC, Ligao City a criminal complaint
for estafa against the Spouses Ribaya on November 29, 2001. The spouses, after
receiving P12,000 from Vega, allegedly misappropriated the amount to the latters
prejudice. The preliminary investigation was then conducted by respondent judge.
Complainant, the daughter of the accused spouses, observed several irregularities
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant of arrest:
(1) no affidavit of any named witness was attached to the complaint; (2) one of the
witnesses, a certain Antal Rebancos, was a fictitious person; (3) respondent issued a
warrant of arrest  on the same day the complaint  was filed without a searching
[2] [3]

examination of any of the witnesses and (4) a bail bond of P10,000  for each accused
[4]

was also fixed on the same day.

Thereafter, the spouses filed the following pleadings: (a) Opposition to the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest and Motion for Leave to file Motion for Reconsideration of the
Prosecutors Resolution;  (b) Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and its Implementation
[5]

be Held in Abeyance;  (c) Supplemental to the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest;  and
[6] [7]

(d) Motion for Reconsideration. [8]

In an order dated January 17, 2002, respondent judge denied all of the foregoing
motions and opposition.
The spouses then filed a motion to quash and sought the nullification of subsequent
orders  on February 14, 2002. They alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction and
[9]

authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by an offended party

directly with the court. The authority to conduct a preliminary investigation was vested
solely on the Office of the City Prosecutor.
 While waiting for the resolution of their motion to quash, the spouses did not post
bail. They believed that there was no need for them to do so since any warrant issued
for their arrest would be void, having been irregularly issued.
On April 10, 2002, however, Corazon Ribaya was apprehended by two arresting
officers in the public market of Ligao City by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by
respondent judge.
Because of the irreparable damage, mental anguish and social humiliation suffered
by her mother Corazon, the complainant filed this administrative case against Judge
Parcia on May 16, 2002.
In her answer  dated August 5, 2002, respondent judge claimed that complainant,
[10]

a law student who prepared all the motions filed by her parents, was not a party in
Criminal Case No. 8617. The motions basically questioned respondents authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation.
Respondent explained that she conducted the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint against the spouses because the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Office of the City Prosecutor was too busy to do so.
To support her claim, respondent attached the affidavit  of Angeles S. Vasquez,
[11]

OIC of the City Prosecutors Office of the then newly-created Ligao City. Vasquez stated
that the City Prosecutors Office was still undergoing reorganization when the subject
criminal complaint was filed. It had neither enough manpower nor office space in the
Hall of Justice. The positions of City Prosecutor, Assistant Prosecutors, stenographers
and staff had not yet been filled. His workload as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and
OIC City Prosecutor was so heavy that time constraints did not permit him to conduct
preliminary investigations. Thus, it was the respondent judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation.
Regarding the motion to quash and nullification of subsequent orders,  respondent
[12]

judge merely stated that the proper remedy of the spouses was to file a petition for
annulment of the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a rejoinder  dated August 7, 2002, complainant noted that the affidavit of OIC
[13]

City Prosecutor Angeles S. Vasquez ironically supported, if not proved, her claim that
the respondent had in fact been conducting preliminary investigations. She also
reiterated that the constitutional rights of her parents were violated when respondent:
(a) issued a warrant of arrest without a preliminary examination of the complainants
witnesses and (b) issued the warrant of arrest on the same day the complaint was filed.
In a report  dated July 8, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
[14]

that respondent erred when she conducted the preliminary investigation of the subject
criminal complaint even after the Municipality of Ligao, Albay had been converted into a
city. The OCA recommended that: (1) the complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (2) the respondent be reprimanded, directed to concentrate
her time and effort on performing her judicial tasks and warned that a repetition of the
same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
 A motion for reconsideration  was filed by respondent on October 1, 2003. This
[15]

time, however, respondent claimed that what she conducted on November 29, 2001
was a preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the spouses. Respondent also claimed that the criminal
complaint was governed by Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the rule governing cases that did not require preliminary investigation.
Since the amount involved in the estafa case was P12,000, no preliminary
investigation was required. She explained that under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the penalty for estafa where the amount defrauded is over P6,000 but not
exceeding P12,000 is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, that is,
imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Considering
that Sec. 2, Rule 112, the section relied upon by complainant, required a preliminary
investigation for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2
months and 1 day, the criminal case against the spouses was not among those needing
preliminary investigation. In any event, respondent insisted that under Sec. 6(b), Rule
112, a preliminary investigation could be conducted either by the judge or the
prosecutor.
An opposition  to the motion for reconsideration was submitted by complainant on
[16]

October 25, 2003.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
[17]

Among the officers authorized by Sec. 2, Rule 112  of the Revised Rules on
[18]

Criminal Procedure to conduct preliminary investigation are the city prosecutors and
judges of the MTC and MCTC. Although judges of inferior courts are authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation of all crimes within their jurisdiction, the task is
essentially an executive function. As far back as Collector of Customs v. Villaluz,  we
[19]

already held that:

[w]hile we sustain the power of the x x x courts to conduct preliminary examination,

pursuant to Our Constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts, as
a matter of policy, we enjoin x x x judge[s] x x x to concentrate on hearing and
deciding before their courts. x x x [Judges] should not encumber themselves with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints, which they should
refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the
assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and
investigation.

The old rules provided that:

Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts shall have authority to conduct
preliminary investigations of crimes alleged to have been committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions which are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. [20]

City judges then were clearly authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and
examination. But even then, we also held that the provisions of Rule 112 granting city
judges the authority to conduct preliminary investigation did not apply to judges of cities
the charters of which authorized the city fiscal only to conduct preliminary investigation
of criminal complaints. [21]

This ruling was, in fact, integrated into the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Sec. 1, Rule 110, criminal actions in chartered cities are instituted by filing the
complaint only with the City Prosecutor. The rule implies that the task of conducting
preliminary investigation in these cities is now lodged with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. Consequently, inferior court judges of cities whose charters authorize only
the fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation are no longer allowed to perform this
function.
The Municipality of Ligao was converted into a city by RA 9008 which took effect on
February 21, 2001. This law, also known as the charter of the City of Ligao, provides in
Sec. 50 that:
(a) There shall be established in the city a prosecution service to be headed by a city
prosecutor and such number of assistant prosecutors as may be necessary, who
shall be organizationally part of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and under the
supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice and whose qualifications,
manner of appointment, rank, salary and benefits shall be governed by existing
laws covering prosecution in the DOJ;
(b) The City Prosecutor shall handle the criminal prosecution in the MTC in the
city as well as in the RTC for criminal cases originating in the territory of the
city, and shall render to or for the city such services as are required by law,
ordinance or regulation of the DOJ;
(c)The Secretary of Justice shall always assure the adequacy and quality of the
prosecution service in the city and for this purpose, shall in the absence or lack or
insufficiency in number of city assistant prosecutors as provided hereinabove,
designate from among the assistant provincial prosecutors, a sufficient number to
perform and discharge the functions of the city prosecution service as provided
hereinabove. (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the subject criminal complaint. The officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations in the then newly-created City of Ligao was its City
Prosecutor. At that time, the duty devolved upon OIC City Prosecutor Angeles S.
Vasquez, despite the administrative difficulties he was encountering. As a matter of fact,
OIC Vasquez knew fully well that the task was his when he stated in his affidavit:

x x x as OIC of the City Prosecution Office, the undersigned prosecutes all heinous
cases emanating from the City of Ligao as well as those crimes or offenses cognizable
by the MTCC. This workload is aside from xxx regular assignment as an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor.  (Emphasis supplied)
[22]

Regarding the propriety of conducting a preliminary investigation, respondent

correctly observed (although quite belatedly) that it was not needed in the estafa case.
The maximum penalty for the crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months) did not meet the minimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months and
1 day) required to make a preliminary investigation part of the spouses right to due
process. Nevertheless, we noticed the contradiction between her answer and her
motion for reconsideration as to what she actually conducted on November 29, 2001. In
her answer, she justified her authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. In her
motion for reconsideration  of the OCAs September 3, 2003 resolution, however, she
[23]

declared that she conducted a preliminary examination to justify the issuance of a

warrant of arrest.
The reason for respondents shift in defense was apparent. Her explanation in the
later motion not only justified all her acts but was also calculated to absolve her from
any administrative liability. Yet, if the narration in her motion for reconsideration was
what actually transpired, we do not understand why she failed to cite this in her answer.
Since that was her first opportunity to present her side, it would have provided this Court
with enough basis to clear her immediately. Her failure to do so could only mean that,
contrary to her later claim, what she conducted that day was indeed a preliminary
investigation. Her subsequent motion for reconsideration based on a claim of
preliminary examination was, to us, a mere attempt to cover her tracks.
But why did she even have to cover her tracks? There appeared to be something
more behind the preliminary investigation she conducted in the estafa case. Several
questions bother us.
First, as a then newly-appointed judge of a newly-converted court, she was
expected to have apprised herself of the scope and limits of her authority and
jurisdiction. Her sudden ignorance of basic procedure makes us wonder about the real
story behind her volunteering to conduct the preliminary investigation. The complainant
there, Pedro Vega, was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. Are we to believe that in a
small place like Ligao City, Albay, respondent Judge Parcia and Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Vega did not know or were not acquainted with each other at all?
Second, we are skeptical of OIC Vasquezs heavy workload which allegedly left him
no time to attend to the duty entrusted to him by law. Had it taken him a long time to
resolve the complaint, it would have been perfectly understandable. But entrusting its
investigation to one he should have known had no authority to conduct it was an entirely
different matter altogether.
Third, why did respondent judge voluntarily offer to assist OIC Vasquez
notwithstanding her lack of authority to do so? And why was OIC Vasquez so eager to
accept her offer?
There appear just too many intriguing uncertainties surrounding the filing of the
estafa case. We therefore direct our attention to respondent judges failure to erase our
doubts over how she administers justice in her jurisdiction. The Canons of Judicial
Ethics reminds every judge:

12. Kinship or influence of parties and counsel. X x x not [to] suffer [her] conduct to
create the impression that any person can unduly influence [her] or enjoy her favor, or
that [s]he is affected by the rank, position, or influence of any party.

Respondent judge must be reminded that she should do honor to her position not
only by rendering just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in a manner free
from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality, and as to her integrity. A
spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be
intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance
of fairness and impartiality. [24]

Considering all this, respondent judge committed simple misconduct in office.

Misconduct in office has a well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct that affects the
judges performance of her duties and not just her character as a private individual. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
[25]

Nevertheless, we find nothing irregular in respondents issuance of a warrant of

arrest on the same day the complaint was filed. As long as the constitutional mandate
was complied with, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon a finding of probable
cause personally by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the warrant of arrest was valid. After
all, the purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest was to place the respondents under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Respondent judge
examined the complainant Pedro Vega on the day the complaint was filed and she was
satisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant of arrest she issued against the
spouses Ribaya was, therefore, justified and no violation of their constitutional rights
occurred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is hereby found guilty of
simple misconduct and a fine of P11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed to
devote her time and effort exclusively to discharging her judicial functions. She is
furthermore warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe
penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

[1]
  Rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2]
  Id., p.7.
[3]
  Id., p.3.
[4]
  See note 2.
[5]
  Id., pp. 12-14.
[6]
  Id., pp. 83-86.
[7]
  Id., pp. 87-89.
[8]
  Id., pp. 25-29.
[9]
 MTCC orders dated January 17, 2002 and February 5, 2002 (Denial of Motion for
Reconsideration); Id., pp.30-31.
[10]
 Id.,  pp. 34-36
[11]
 Id., pp. 40-41.
[12]
 See note 9.
[13]
 Id.,  pp. 42-44.
[14]
 Id.,  pp. 63-65.
[15]
 Id.,  pp. 68-73.
[16]
 Id.,  pp. 101-103.
[17]
 Sec. 1, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[18]
 Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.  The following may conduct preliminary
investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law. x x x.
[19]
 No. L-34038, 18 June 1976, 71 SCRA 356.
[20]
 Sec. 37, BP Blg. 129.
[21]
 Espiritu v. De la Rosa, 78 Phil. 827 (1947); Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859 (1948); Montelibano,
et al. v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228 (1955); People v. Hechanova, 153 Phil. 399 (1973).
[22]
 See note 11.
[23]
 See note 14.
[24]
 Naldoza v. Lavilles, 254 SCRA 286 (1996).
[25]
 Ong v. Rosales, 325 SCRA 689 (2000).