Lords Bingham, Steyn, Hope, Millett and Rodger: (2009) EWCA Civ 116
Lords Bingham, Steyn, Hope, Millett and Rodger: (2009) EWCA Civ 116
House of Lords:
Lords Bingham, Steyn, Hope, Millett and Rodger
o This case concerned fairness of a term in a standard form regulated credit agreement that on
default interest was chargeable after judgment as well as before.
o The House of Lords emphasised that Regulation 6 should be interpreted restrictively,
o There is a difference between “ancillary” and “core” terms:
o terms “ancillary” to the “core” of the bargain should still be subject to assessment for
fairness.
o If Reg.3(2) was to be so widely construed that such a term fell within the ambit of a core term
it would defeat the purpose of Council Directive 93/13.
o Consequently, the term had to satisfy the fairness requirements contained in Reg.4 of the
Regulations;
o BUT, having regard to the context of the agreement, the term did not cause a significant
imbalance in the parties' respective rights and obligations and therefore was not unfair for the
purposes of Reg.4.
o In assessing the fairness of a term under Reg.4, the court was required to consider whether the
supplier had dealt openly and fairly. In cases like the instant case concerning the provision of
credit, a borrower would accept that a lender would not lend if it might not be able to recover
all its principal and interest.
o First Direct's standard agreement set out the nature of the borrower's obligations clearly and
unambiguously.
Reflections
o A more literal approach to the interpretation of the Regulations than is perhaps desirable.
o The trial judge and Court of Appeal both emphasised that the purpose of the Directive, and
thus the Regulations, was to ensure adequate consumer protection.
o A pertinent principle, not expressly articulated by any of the judges but latent in the judgments
of the lower courts, is that of “unfair surprise”in relation to such terms
Reflections…
o This approach has the advantage of absolving the courts from difficult questions regarding
what is merely “ancillary”, but greatly expands the scope of Regulation 6, thereby reducing the
amount of protection given to consumers.
o The Supreme Court was content to allow a less restrictive interpretation of Regulation 6 since
it identified the purpose of the Regulations not to be consumer protection but rather consumer
choice.
o Very literal interpretation
o OFT has now stated that it will not pursue its investigation further: (OFT 1154, Personal
Current Accounts - Unarranged Overdraft Charges: Decision on an investigation under the
UTCCRs and next steps (December 2009)
o Now favours legislative intervention
o Lord Walker noted that it is open to the legislature to afford greater rights to consumers, and
that other European countries, notably Germany, have chosen to do this.
In conclusion
o The law regarding unfair terms in English law generally is something of a mess and can be
difficult for consumers to understand
o The co-existence of the Regulations and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 is unnecessarily
complicated.
o A helpful first step would be to adopt the Law Commission's Report, Unfair Terms in
Contracts (Law Com. No. 292 (2005).
So what?
o UCTA is better for claimant is clause is one which will always be treated as invalid
o UCTA is as good as UTCCR is the clause is subject to reasonableness test under UCTA or
unfairness test under UTCCR
o More certainty about what is unfair under UCTA?
PART II – Misrepresentation
Mere representations and mere puff
The Contract
Express terms
Implied terms
Regulation of misrepresentations
o Contract
o Tort
o Restitution
Key concepts
o Generally no positive duty to disclose information in pre-contractual negotiations
o Negotiators can disclose as little or as much information as they wish and can act without good
faith
o BUT if a party states an inaccurate fact in pre contractual negotiations they may be liable for
misrepresentation
Exceptions
o Contracts involving utmost good faith e.g., insurance
o Fiduciary relationships
What is a misrepresentation?
o An unambiguous false statement
o Made in pre-contractual negotiations
o Which does not become a term but
o Induces the other party to enter into the contract
a) Statement?
o It must be a statement of fact not opinion
o Sales talk and opinions must be distinguished from other statements made in the course of
negotiations
o The other party may have a different opinion
o They do not have to agree
o They can make their own assessment
b. Statement?
o Is misrepresentation confined to words?
o A nod or putting of a false label on a product may constitute a misrepresentation
o But mere silence is generally not enough: ‘…the passive acquiescence of the seller in the self-
deception of the buyer will not entitle the latter to avoid the contract’.
o Approach reflected in the maxim Caveat emptor
o The buyer is expected to ask about all pertinent aspects of the transaction and it is not for the
seller to say things that will put them off
c. Statement?
o What happens if a party makes a statement which is only a half truth?
o What is left unsaid may amount to a representation
o In Dimmock v Hallett (1866) seller of land told potential buyer that the land was let but not
that the tenants were about to leave. This had an impact on income.
o Held to be a misrepresentation
The statement must induce
o The statement must be one of the reasons the party trying to set the contract aside entered into
the contract
o Does not have to be sole reason
o Must show actual and reasonable influence: Pan Atlantic [1994] 3 All ER 961