CONFLICT OF LAWS-CASE DIGESTS ON JURISDICTION to validate the agency, even though there was no explicit previous promise on

her part to do so.

1 . N ATIONAL RENTAL VS. S ZU KHENT ET AL ., 37 5 U.S . 311 We deal here with a Federal Rule, applicable to federal courts in all 50 States.
But even if we were to assume that this uniform federal standard should give
(19 64 )
way to contrary local policies, there is no relevant concept of state law which
FACTS would invalidate the agency here at issue. In Michigan, where the respondents
Petitioner, a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, sued reside, the statute which validates service of process under the circumstances
respondents, residents of Michigan, in New York, claiming that respondents present in this case contains no provision requiring that the appointed agent
had defaulted in payments due under a farm equipment lease. The last expressly undertake to notify the principal of the service of process. Similarly,
paragraph of the contract provided that "the Lessee hereby designates New York law, which it was agreed should be applicable to the lease
Florence Weinberg as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any provisions, does not require any such express promise by the agent in order to
process within the State of New York." The respondents were not acquainted create a valid agency for receipt of process.
with Florence Weinberg, and she had not expressly undertaken to transmit
notice to them. The Marshal delivered two copies of the summons and It is argued, finally, that the agency sought to be created in this case was
complaint to Florence Weinberg. That same day she mailed the summons and invalid because Florence Weinberg may have had a conflict of interest. This
complaint to the respondents, together with a letter stating that the argument is based upon the fact that she was not personally known to the
documents had been served upon her as the respondents' agent. The respondents at the time of her appointment and upon a suggestion in the
petitioner itself also notified the respondents by certified mail of the service of record that she may be related to an officer of the petitioner corporation. But
process upon Florence Weinberg. The District Court quashed service of the such a contention ignores the narrowly limited nature of the agency here
summons and complaint, holding that, although Florence Weinberg had involved. Florence Weinberg was appointed the respondents' agent for the
promptly notified the respondents of the service of process and mailed copies single purpose of receiving service of process. An agent with authority so
of the summons and complaint to them, the lease agreement itself had not limited can in no meaningful sense be deemed to have had an interest
explicitly required her to do so, and there was therefore a "failure of the antagonistic to the respondents, since both the petitioner and the respondents
agency arrangement to achieve intrinsic and continuing reality." The Court of had an equal interest in assuring that, in the event of litigation, the latter be
Appeals affirmed. given that adequate and timely notice which is a prerequisite to a valid
judgment.
ISSUE
Whether the person upon whom the summons and complaint were served was Dissent:
"an agent authorized by appointment" to receive the same, so as to subject The record on the motion to quash shows that the Szukhents had never had
the respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court in New York any dealings with Mrs. Weinberg, their supposed agent. They had never met,
seen, or heard of her. She did not sign the lease, was not a party to it,
RULING received no compensation from the Szukhents, and undertook no obligation to
Yes. We need not and do not in this case reach the situation where no them. In fact, she was handpicked by the New York company to accept service
personal notice has been given to the defendant. Since the respondents did in of process in any suits that might thereafter be filed by the company. Only
fact receive complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending against them, after this suit was brought was it reluctantly revealed that Mrs. Weinberg was
no due process claim has been made. The question presented here is whether in truth the wife of one of the company's officers. I disagree with that holding,
a party to a private contract may appoint an agent to receive service of believing that:
process within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1), where
the agent is not personally known to the party, and where the agent has not (1) Whether Mrs. Weinberg was a valid agent upon whom service could validly
expressly undertaken to transmit notice to the party. be effected under Rule 4 (d) (1) should be determined under New York law
and that we should accept the holdings of the federal district judge and the
The purpose underlying the contractual provision here at issue seems clear. Court of Appeals sitting in New York that under that State's law the purported
The clause was inserted by the petitioner and agreed to by the respondents in appointment of Mrs. Weinberg was invalid and ineffective. No federal statute
order to assure that any litigation under the lease should be conducted in the has undertaken to regulate the sort of agency transaction here involved. It is
State of New York. to the law of New York - the State where this action was brought in federal
court, the place where the contract was deemed by the parties to have been
Florence Weinberg's prompt acceptance and transmittal to the respondents of made, and the State the law of which was specified as determining rights and
the summons and complaint pursuant to the authorization was itself sufficient liabilities under the contract - that we should turn to test the validity of the
appointment.

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BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
 the place of shipment from which collections are made. No salesman has
I agree with the district judge that this agency is invalid under the laws of New authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.
York. The highest state court that has passed on the question has held that,
because of New York statutes, the designation by a nonresident of New York of The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular and
an agent to receive service of process is ineffective; the court, in denying an systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellant’s salesmen, resulting
order for interpleader, held that only residents of New York can make such an in a continuous flow of appellant’s product into the state, was sufficient to
appointment, and even then only in compliance with the terms of the constitute doing business in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit
controlling statute.; in its courts. But it was also of opinion that there were sufficient additional
activities shown to bring the case within the rule frequently stated, that
(2) if, however, Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as calling upon us to formulate a solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign corporation plus some
new federal definition of agency for purposes of service of process, I think our additional activities are sufficient to render the corporation amenable to suit
formulation should exclude Mrs. Weinberg from the category of an "agent brought in the courts of the state to enforce an obligation arising out of its
authorized by appointment . . . to receive service of process." If Rule 4 (d) (1) activities there. The court found such additional activities in the salesmen’s
is to be read as requiring this Court to formulate new federal standards of display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmen’s
agency to be resolved in each case as a federal question, rather than as residence within the state, continued over a period of years, all resulting in
leaving the question to state law, I think the standards we formulate should substantial volume of merchandise regularly shipped by appellant to
clearly and unequivocally denounce as invalid any alleged service of process purchasers within the state.
on nonresidents based on purported agency contracts having no more
substance than that naming Mrs. Weinberg. State courts in general quite Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not sufficient to
properly refuse to uphold service of process on an agent who, though manifest its “presence” there and that in its absence the state courts were
otherwise competent, has interests antagonistic to those of the person he is without jurisdiction, that consequently it was a denial of due process for the
meant to represent. state to subject appellant to suit.... And appellant further argues that since it
was not present within the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to
taxation or other money exaction.
2 . INTERN ATI ONAL S HOE CO. VS . WASH INGT ON , 32 6 U. S. 310
ISSUES
(19 45 )
1. Does the Washington court have jurisdiction over International Shoe?
FACTS 2. Does International Shoe have “presence” in Washington?
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in
St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and RULING
other footwear. It maintains places of business in several states, other than Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
Washington, at which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his
merchandise is distributed interstate through several sales units or branches presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
located outside the State of Washington. rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of
Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. he should have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed 11 the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
to 13 salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located justice.”
in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities
were confined to that state; and they were compensated by commissions Since the corporate personality is a fiction although a fiction intended to be
based upon the amount of their sales. acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual, its
“presence” without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested
The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and only by activities carried on its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.
soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by To say that the corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process
appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant’s office in St. Louis requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in
for acceptance or rejection, and when accepted, the merchandise for filling the the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms
orders is shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers “present” or “presence” are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
within the state. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to

Page 2 of 11
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such FACTS
contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as to make it
reasonable, in the context of the federal system of government, to require the Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio, filed two in personam cases in an Ohio court.
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An “estimate Among those he sued is Benguest Consolidated (“Benguet”), a sociedad anima
of the inconveniences” which would result to the corporation from a trial away
organized in the Philippines where it owns and operates gold and silver mines.
from its “home” or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.
Perkins sued to collect an amount in dividends and damages she claimed to be
“Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the due her as a stockholder of Benguet.
activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent
to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been
given. Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of Benguet has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but
the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities limited, part of its general business. Its president, while engaged in doing such
in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
business in Ohio, has been served with summons in this proceeding. Benguet,
cause of action unconnected with the activities. To require the corporation in
for its part, sought to quash the summons served upon their president. The
such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction
where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too courts have sustained the motions to quash.
great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process. ISSUE

There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit Constitution of the United States precludes Ohio from subjecting a foreign
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts in this action in personam
activities.
RULING
We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the
state upon an agent whose activities establish appellant’s presence there was
not sufficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those No. Ohio is free to decline or take jurisdiction over the corporation. To begin
activities as to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the with, Benguet is a foreign corporation according to Ohio law. The Federal
notice. It is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state Constitution does not compel Ohio to open its courts to such a case, even
that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable though Ohio permits a complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in
assurance that the notice will be actual. Nor can we say that the mailing of the its courts against a properly served nonresident natural person to enforce a
notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not
cause of action which does not arise out of anything done within the State.
reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit.

Appellant having rendered itself amendable to suit upon obligations arising out As a matter of federal due process, the business done by the corporation in
of the activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the Ohio was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to
present suit in personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the entertain the cause of action against it, though the cause of action arose from
privilege of employing appellant’s salesmen within the state. For Washington activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.
has made one of those activities, which taken together establish appellant’s
“presence” there for purposes of suit, the taxable event by which the sate
4 . M CGEE VS. INTERN ATI ONAL LIFE IN S. CO.3 55 U. S. 22 0
brings appellant within the reach of its taxing power. The stat thus has
constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to a suit to recover (DE CE MBER 16 , 19 57 )
it. The activities which establish its “presence” subject it alike to taxation by
the state and to suit to recover the tax. FACTS

Lulu McGee, was the mother of Lowell Franklin who purchased a life insurance
3 . PER KINS VS. BEN GUET CONS OLI DATED MININ G CO 34 2 policy from Arizona-based Empire Mutual Insurance Company that named
U.S. 43 7, 7 2 S. CT. 4 13 9 6 (1 95 2) McGee as the beneficiary. In 1948, International Life Insurance Co.

Page 3 of 11
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
("International"), a Texas corporation, agreed to assume Empire's insurance 5 . PHI LSE C. IN VEST MENT V. C OURT OF APPE ALS, 2 74 S CRA
obligations. 1 02 (19 97 )

FACTS
 Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum
International mailed a reinsurance certificate to the Franklin in California, of $2.5M secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
offering to insure him according to the terms of the Empire policy. Franklin  In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook
accepted the offer and paid premiums from California until his death in 1950. the obligation to pay by virtue of a Warranty Deed with a Vendor’s
When Franklin's mother tried to collect on the policy, the insurance company Lien. Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings (“Athona”)
refused to pay, claiming Franklin had committed suicide. McGee brought suit in a parcel of land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M
California, and sought to enforce it in Texas. The Texas Court, however, loan to Athona to partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot.
 Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M
refused to enforce the judgment by the California Court for the collection of
to complete the payment for the lot. After all these transactions,
the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Ducat was released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan.
 Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note.
 1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the
$.3M.
Note that International had conducted no other business in California except  The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending,
for this one policy. Philsec filed a complaint to recover a sum of money with damages in
a Makati RTC against Ducat.
ISSUE  Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis
of litispendentia and forum non conveniens.
 The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc.
Can California exercise jurisdiction over a International, whose contacts with
because the action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied
that state are limited to a single act or contract? by the fact that the said defendant was a non-resident.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUES
RULING 1. Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in
Philippine courts? (i.e. Can the foreign judgment constitute res
Yes. A state may exercise jurisdiction over a party whose contacts with that judicata?)
state consist of only a single act, provided that that act is what gave rise to 2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens?
the claim for which jurisdiction is being sought, and was deliberately directed
toward the state. RULING
1. It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE EFFECT
The court relied on the fact that the suit was based on "substantial connection" OF RES JUDICATA WITHOUT GIVING THE ADVERSE PARTY AN
with California, particularly the facts that the contract was delivered to OPPORTUNITY TO IMPEACH IT ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39,
McGee's son while he was a resident of California, International continued to §50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: “WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT
maintain a financial relationship with McGee's son by collecting his premium OF NOTICE TO THE PARTY, COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR CLEAR MISTAKE
payments, and that the policy holder was a resident of the state when he died. OF LAW OR FACT.”

 While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
The court also gave weight to California's interest in protecting its residents as
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the
consumers of insurance policies, and validated the long arm statute which judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on
gave the California courts their power of jurisdiction over out of state grounds allowed under the law.
companies by declaring that California had a "manifest interest in providing  IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE A SEPARATE
effective means of redress for its residents. ACTION OR PROCEEDING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
JUDGMENT.

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BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
  WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO Oklahoma. The Robinsons claimed that the injuries which they suffered in a
CHALLENGE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT, IN ORDER FOR THE COURT TO car accident in Oklahoma were caused by the defective design and placement
PROPERLY DETERMINE ITS EFFICACY. of their automobile’s gas tank and fuel system. Seaway Volkswagen and
 This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to ACTIONS IN
Worldwide Volkswagen both incorporated and doing business in New York,
PERSONAM, as distinguished from actions in rem, a FOREIGN
JUDGMENT MERELY CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE asserted that Oklahoma’s exercise of jurisdiction over them would violate the
JUSTNESS OF THE CLAIM OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the due process clause. Seaway
PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. and Worldwide Volkswagen sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court
 In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the of Oklahoma to prevent the trial judge from exercising in personam jurisdiction
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for over them. The writ was denied on the ground that personal jurisdiction was
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private authorized by Oklahoma’s “long-arm” statute allowing an Oklahoma court’s
respondents.
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a tortfeasor who causes injury in
 The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial
court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the Oklahoma by an act or omission outside Oklahoma “if he regularly does or
pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this rendered” in Oklahoma.
case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute
res judicata.

2. Yes.
ISSUE
 First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does
not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is W/N Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the controversy? NONE
more properly considered a matter of defense.
 Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain RULING
from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
“vital facts are established, to determine whether special As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise
circumstances” require the court’s desistance. personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only as long as there exist
 In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state. The concept
JURISDICTION SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BY of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
DISMISS.
 IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
CORPORATION AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND THAT IT WAS THE States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LATTER’S DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
OF THE TRANSACTION UNDER LITIGATION.
 The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case. “reasonableness” or “fairness.” We have said that the defendant’s contacts
with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit “does not
6 . WORLD- WI DE VOL KS WAGEN CORP . VS . WOODS ON 444 U. S. offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
2 86 (19 80 )
Thus, the Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make
FACTS binding a judgement in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”. Even if the defendant
Spouses Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of New York, who had purchased a would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before
car from Seaway Volkswagen, a retailer in New York, brought a suit against the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
the retailer and its wholesale distributor, in the District Court for Creek county, applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is the most

Page 5 of 11
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state has personal jurisdiction over any party
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of whose actions intentionally reach another party in the state and are the basis
its power to render a valid judgement. for the cause of action.

Apply these principles to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a Facts. Petitioners South is a reporter, and Petitioner Calder is president and an
total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate editor, of Petitioner National Enquirer. South wrote an article that accused
to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity Respondent of a drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her
whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for
They avail themselves of none of the privileges either through salespersons or publication. Respondent brought a suit for libel, and South and Calder
through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the challenged California’s personal jurisdiction since neither had any physical
record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma contacts with California, particularly as it pertained to this article. South did
customers or residents or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to rely on sources from California, and Respondent’s life and career were
serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on centered in California. The district court cited Petitioner’s rights under the First
one, isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the Amendment to the United States Constitution as trumpeting Due Process
fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New Clause concerns. The appellate court reversed because First Amendment
York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through arguments are irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis.
Oklahoma.
Issue. The issue is whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and
Calder through their targeting of Respondent with this article.

It is argued, however that because an automobile is mobile by its very design Held. The United States Supreme Court held that California had personal
and purpose it was “foreseeable” that the Robinsons’ Audi would cause injury jurisdiction over Petitioners. The first step in the analysis is to determine the
in Oklahoma. Yet “foreseeability” alone has never been a sufficient benchmark focal point of the harm suffered, and that was in California. The Court then
for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. determined that Petitioners’ actions intentionally aimed at a California
resident, and the injuries suffered would be in that state.

Discussion. Petitioners argued that, because they were merely employees of

Other version
7. CALDER VS . JON ES, 465 U.S . 7 83 (MARC H 20 , 19 84 )
Calder v. Jones
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Shirley Jones, brought a libel suit in a
465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct.1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)
California state court against Petitioners, Calder et al. Petitioners South and
Calder are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal
Plaintiff/Respondent: Shirley Jones
jurisdiction over them.
Defendant/Petitioner: Calder

Rule of Law: A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions
intentionally reaches another party in the state and is the basis for the cause
of action.
Page 6 of 11
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Facts: Hampshire consist of monthly sales of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its
nationally published magazine.
-Defendant South is a reporter, and defendant Calder is president and an
editor, of National Enquirer.

-South wrote an article that accused P of a drinking problem that was so ISSUE
severe that it affected her acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited
it to its final form for publication. Whether or not New Hampshire has jurisdiction

-P brought a suit for libel in CA. South and Calder challenged California’s
personal jurisdiction since neither had any physical contacts with California,
particularly as it pertained to this article. RULING

-D’s are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal YES. Hustler Magazine’s regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is
jurisdiction over them. sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the
contents of the magazine. The fact that Keeton has very limited contacts in
-South did rely on sources from California, and P’s life and career were New Hampshire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to
centered in California. have “minimum contacts” with the forum State before that State is permitted
to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.
-The district court cited D’s rights under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution as trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns.

-The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are Here, where Hustler Magazine has continuously and deliberately exploited the
irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine, and since Hustler
Issue: Whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder Magazine can be charged with knowledge of the “single publication rule”, it
through their targeting of Respondent with this article? must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. There is no
unfairness in calling Hustler Magazine to answer for the contents of its national
Holding: California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and
distributed.
Reason: The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the
harm suffered, and that was in California. The Court then determined that
Petitioners’ actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries
suffered would be in that state 9 . AS AH I METAL IN DUSTR Y CO VS. SUPE RIOR COURT, 4 80 ,
U .S 1 02 (FE BR UAR Y 24 , 19 87 )
8 . KEET ON VS . HU STLER M AGAZI NE, IN C. ET AL, 46 5 U.S . 770
FACTS
(MARC H 20 , 19 84 )  Asahi Metal Industry Co. was an international corporation based
in Japan, which manufactured a valve used in the manufacture
FACTS of motorcycle wheels.
 These valves were bought by Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co.,
Keeton (NY) brought a libel suit against Hustler Magazine (Ohio) in New a Taiwanese distributor.
 One of these valves was alleged to have failed, causing an
Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. Keeton’s
accident in the State of California.
only connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of a magazine
that she assists in producing. Hustler Magazine’s contacts with New

Page 7 of 11
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
  As a result of the accident the driver of the motorcycle sustained
serious injuries and his wife, who was riding on the  Because an assertion of jurisdiction would disturb the "traditional
motorcycle as a passenger, was killed. notions of fair play and substantial justice," the decision of the
 The accident victim sued Cheng Shin in a California state court, California Supreme Court was reversed and the judgment of California
and Cheng Shin in turn filed a third-party complaint Court of Appeal (California's intermediate appellate court) was
(impleader) seeking indemnification from Asahi. effectively reinstated.
 Asahi contested California's personal jurisdiction over Asahi,
but the California courts found jurisdiction based on Asahi's
alleged awareness of the international distribution of its products.
 Specifically, Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's summons.
 The California Superior Court and the California Supreme Court 1 0. BEN SU AN RESTAURANT CORP ORAT ION VS. RIC HAR D B.
both denied the motion, leading Asahi to appeal to the United
KIN G, DOCKET NO. 96-9 344 , (SEPT EMBE R 10 , 19 97 )
States Supreme Court.

ISSUE Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, the plaintiff, owned the Blue Note jazz club
Does Asahi have minimum contacts with California such that the in New York’s Greenwich Village, and owned a federal trademark registration
exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions for the mark “THE BLUE NOTE.” The defendant, Richard King, operated “The
of fair play and substantive justice”? Blue Note,” a small club in the college town of Columbia, Missouri, and had
used that mark on a local basis since 1980 — several years prior to use of
RULING
 NO “Blue Note” by the now-famous New York club. Although the New York jazz
 The Supreme Court applied a five-factor test in determining whether club had obtained a federal registration for the Blue Note mark in 1985, the
"traditional notions of fair play" would permit the assertion of in Missouri club could continue to use the name within its local area based on the
personam jurisdiction over a foreign (meaning out-of-state) Missouri club's prior use of the name.
defendant:
In April 1996, the Missouri club began operation of a website
1. What is the burden on the defendant?
(http//www.throughport.com/cyberspot) that offered general information
2. What are the interests of the forum state in the litigation?
3. What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that about King’s club, including a calendar of events and ticketing information.
state? Tickets could not be ordered via the Internet; instead, one could order tickets
4. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency? for an advertised event by telephone and then pick-up the tickets in person at
5. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy a box office in Columbia, Missouri. The Missouri club’s website also included a
interests? hyperlink to the website for Greenwich Village’s Blue Note club, while also
offering a disclaimer that "The Blue Note’s Cyberspot should not be confused
 The Court finds that fair play would be violated because:
with one of the world’s finest jazz clubs, the Blue Note, located in the heart of
o The burden on the defendant is “severe” because the
New York’s Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the Big Apple give
corporation would have to travel from Japan to California and
defend itself under the laws of a foreign country. them a visit.”
o The plaintiff is not a California resident, and thus California’s
interests in the case are “diminished”. California can enforce The New York jazz club viewed the Missouri club's website on the Internet as
its interest in having safe products in its state indirectly by an expansion of use of the Blue Note name outside of the local area, and
applying pressure to direct suppliers of goods to California, raised this objection with King. In response, King removed the second
who in turn will apply commercial pressure to their suppliers. sentence of the disclaimer and the hyperlink from his website.
o Cheng Shin has not shown that California is a more
convenient forum than Japan or Taiwan in which to pursue
its claim.
o Jurisdiction is not necessarily in the best interests of the
The operator of the New York jazz club sued the operator of the Missouri jazz
other countries involved.
o Jurisdiction is not warranted by any international policy club for trademark infringement in New York.
considerations, if they even exist.
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BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Trial Court Proceedings Edit  He subscribed to CompuServe, and he also placed items of "shareware" on
the CompuServe system for others to use and purchase.
Looking to New York’s long-arm statute, the court inquired whether King’s  When he became a shareware "provider," Patterson entered into a
operation of a website on a server in Missouri represented the commission of a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") with CompuServe.
 The SRA incorporates by reference two other documents: the
tort in New York. Although a New York user could access the Missouri Club’s
CompuServe Service Agreement ("Service Agreement") and the
website to obtain event ticket information, a purchase of tickets required Rules of Operation, both of which are published on the CompuServe
calling the Missouri club via its website-advertised telephone number and Information Service.
picking up the tickets at the Columbia, Missouri box office.  Both the SRA and the Service Agreement expressly provide that
they are entered into in Ohio, and the Service Agreement further
The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information on provides that it is to "be governed by and construed in accordance
the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, with" Ohio law.
promoting, selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New  The SRA asks a new shareware "provider" like Patterson to type "AGREE"
at various points in the document, "[i]n recognition of your online
York." Consequently, the district court concluded that any tortious action of
agreement to all the above terms and conditions." Thus, Patterson's
trademark infringement would arise in Missouri rather than in New York. assent to the SRA was first manifested at his own computer in Texas, then
transmitted to the CompuServe computer system in Ohio.
In examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over King would satisfy due  From 1991 through 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted 32
process, the court asserted that “creating a site, like placing a product into the master software files to CompuServe.
stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide — or even worldwide — but,  These files were stored in CompuServe's system in Ohio, and they
without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.” were displayed in different services for CompuServe subscribers, who
could "download" them into their own computers and, if they chose to do
The court distinguished the CompuServe v. Patterson case based on the
so, pay for them. Patterson's software product was, apparently, a program
observation that the facts in CompuServe v. Patterson,[1] were vastly designed to help people navigate their way around the larger Internet
different from the present action. Unlike the software developer in network.
CompuServe, King did not direct any contact to or have any contact with New  CompuServe began to market a similar product, however, with markings
York, nor did he intend to avail himself of the benefits of New York. and names that Patterson took to be too similar to his own. Thus, in
December of 1993, Patterson notified CompuServe (appropriately via "E-
Thus, the court held that King's operation of the website was not sufficient to mail" message) that the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator," and
satisfy the requirements of New York’ long-arm statute, and that the exercise "FlashPoint Windows Navigator" were common law trademarks which he
and his company owned. Patterson stated that CompuServe's marketing
of personal jurisdiction would violate the precepts of constitutional due
of its product infringed these trademarks, and otherwise constituted
process. Significantly, the court found that the owner of the Missouri club was deceptive trade practices. CompuServe changed the name of its program,
only trying to attract local patrons by the club's operation of its website, and but Patterson continued to complain.
dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction
 After Patterson demanded at least $100,000 to settle his potential claims,
CompuServe filed this declaratory judgment action in the federal district
court for the Southern District of Ohio, relying on the court's diversity
subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson responded pro se with a
1 1. COMPUSERVE IN C. VS . RICH AR D PATTER SON , NO. 95 - consolidated motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of
3 452 , (JULY 2 2, 1 99 6) personal jurisdiction. Patterson also submitted a supporting affidavit, in
FACTS which he denied jurisdictional facts, including his having ever visited Ohio.
 CompuServe is a computer information serviceheadquartered in
Columbus, Ohio. ISSUE
 It contracts withindividual subscribers, such as the defendant, to Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with
provide, inter alia, accessto computing and information services via Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient,
the Internet. under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court's exercise of
 Defendant, Richard Patterson, is a resident of Houston, Texas who personal jurisdiction over him?
claims never to have visited Ohio.
RULING

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BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Yes. Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific in nature,
depending on the nature of the contacts in a given case. In the instant case, Cause of action arising from Patterson's activities in Ohio Requirement: The
because CompuServe bases its action on Patterson's act of sending his cause of action in the instant case concerns allegations of trademark or trade
computer software to Ohio for sale on its service, CompuServe seeks to name infringement and unfair competition. Patterson's contacts with Ohio are
establish such specific personal jurisdiction over Patterson. certainly related to the operative facts of that controversy. He used that
The crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether, given the facts of the system to advertise his software and sell it. The proceeds of those sales flowed
case, the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to him through Ohio. It is uncontroverted that Patterson placed, marketed,
that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional and sold his software only on Ohio-based CompuServe. Thus, any common law
notions of fair play and substantial justice." This court has employed three trademark or trade name which Patterson might have in his product would
criteria to make this determination: First, the defendant must purposefully arguably have been created in Ohio, and any violation of those alleged
avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a trademarks or trade names by CompuServe would have occurred, at least in
consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from part, in Ohio.
the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough The reasonableness requirement: A court must consider several factors in this
connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the context, including "the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum
defendant reasonable. state, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states
in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies." It may be
"Purposeful availment" requirement: The question of whether a defendant has burdensome for Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew when he
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement with CompuServe that he
is "the sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction." The "purposeful availment" was making a connection with Ohio, and presumably he hoped that connection
requirement is satisfied when the defendant's contacts with the forum state would work to his benefit. Further, Ohio has a strong interest in resolving a
"proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a dispute involving an Ohio company, which will involve the Ohio law on
´substantial connection' with the forum State," and when the defendant's common law trademarks and trade names. CompuServe alleges that more
conduct and connection with the forum are such that he "should reasonably than $10 million could be at stake in this case, and it also contends that this
anticipate being haled into court there." This requirement does not, however, case will have a profound impact on its relationships with other "shareware"
mean that a defendant must be physically present in the forum state. providers like Patterson, who also directed their activities toward Ohio-based
CompuServe
There is no question that Patterson himself took actions that created a
connection with Ohio in the instant case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and 1 2. RU SH VS. SAUC HUK , 44 4 US 32 0 (1 98 0)
then he entered into the Shareware Registration Agreement when he loaded
his software onto the CompuServe system for others to use and, perhaps, FACTS
purchase. Once Patterson had done those two things, he was on notice that he  While a resident of Indiana, Savchuk was injured in an accident in Indiana
had made contracts, to be governed by Ohio law, with an Ohio-based while riding as a passenger in a car driven by Rush, also an Indiana
company. Then, he repeatedly sent his computer software, via electronic links, resident.
to the CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised that software on the  After moving to Minnesota, Savchuk commenced this action against Rush
CompuServe system. Moreover, he initiated the events that led to the filing of in a Minnesota state court, alleging negligence and seeking damages.
this suit by making demands of CompuServe via electronic and regular mail  As Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that would support in personam
messages. jurisdiction, Savchuk attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by
garnishing the contractual obligation of State Farm Mutual Automobile
The real question is whether these connections with Ohio are "substantial" Insurance Co. (“State Farm”) to defend and indemnify Rush in connection
enough that Patterson should reasonably have anticipated being haled into an with such a suit.
Ohio court. Patterson entered into a written contract with CompuServe which  State Farm, which does business in Minnesota, had insured the car, owned
provided for the application of Ohio law, and he then purposefully perpetuated by Rush's father, under a liability insurance policy issued in Indiana.
the relationship with CompuServe via repeated communications with its  Rush was personally served in Indiana, and after State Farm's response to
system in Ohio. Patterson was a third-party provider of software who used the garnishment summons asserted that it owed the Rush nothing,
CompuServe, which is located in Columbus, to market his wares in Ohio and Savchuk moved the trial court for permission to file a supplemental
elsewhere. This was a relationship intended to be ongoing in nature; it was not complaint making the garnishee, State Farm, a party to the action.
a "one-shot affair." Patterson sent software to CompuServe repeatedly for  Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
some three years, and the record indicates that he intended to continue jurisdiction over the defendant.
marketing his software on CompuServe.

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BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
ISSUE
May Minnesota courts obtain jurisdiction over both Rush and
State Farm by virtue of a quasi in rem jurisdiction?

RULING
 No.
 A STATE MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY EXERCISE QUASI IN REM
JURISDICTION OVER A DEFENDANT WHO HAS NO FORUM
CONTACTS BY ATTACHING THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF AN
INSURER LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE TO DEFEND
AND INDEMNIFY HIM IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUIT.
 A State may exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if
the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
 In determining whether a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."
 Here, the only affiliating circumstance offered to show a
relationship among Rush, Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that
Rush's insurance company does business in the State.
 However, the fictional presence in Minnesota of State Farm's policy
obligation to defend and indemnify Rush -- derived from combining
the legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes,
wherever the debtor is found with the legal fiction that a corporation is
"present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business -- cannot
be deemed to give the State the power to determine Rush's
liability for the out-of-state accident.
 The mere presence of property in a State does not establish a
sufficient relationship between the owner of the property and the
State to support the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated
cause of action, and it cannot be said that the defendant engaged
in any purposeful activity related to the forum that would make
the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable merely because
his insurer does business there. Nor does the policy provide significant
contacts between the litigation and the forum, for the policy obligations
pertain only to the conduct, not the substance, of the litigation.

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