A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms,

Effects and Causes

Technical Paper 0003/sb

January 2018

Dr Stuart Burge

Abstract
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is ubiquitous throughout industry and commerce,
yet its deployment is often fraught with difficulty and its application ephemeral. It is argued in
this paper that root cause of these difficulties is an incomplete and inconsistent understanding
of failure.

This paper uses concepts and principles from Systems Thinking to provide a clear,
repeatable and reproducible approach to failure and its associated aspects that greatly
facilitate the deployment and application of FMEA in all its forms.

It also argues for the need to adopt an even earlier form of FMEA as a precursor to a Design
FMEA and Process FMEA. The intent of what is called Functional FMEA is to identify issues
before design commences such that they can be designed out ab initio.

Copyright and IPR Notice: Copyright and IPR exists and is held by BHW
and the Systems Engineering Company. This work must not be copied,
distributed or otherwise used without the express permission of BHW

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 1

1.0 Introduction

The use of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), in all its incarnations, is
ubiquitous throughout industry and commerce, yet its deployment is often
fraught with difficulty and its application ephemeral. What appears, prima
facie, to be a simple tool turns out to be used inconsistently with a
corresponding high degree of frustration and lack of confidence. Part of the
problem lies with the published works on this fundamentally simple tool.
Indeed, even the recognized writers in the field demonstrate a distinct degree
of inconsistency.

This paper uses concepts from Systems Thinking to provide a clear,

repeatable and reproducible approach to FMEA whether it is Design or
Process. It also argues for the need to adopt an even earlier form of FMEA as
a precursor to a Design FMEA and Process FMEA. The intent of what is
called Functional FMEA is to identify issues before design commences such
that they can be designed out ab initio.

The paper is split into 4 sections. The first provides an overview of the generic
“text book” FMEA process. The second describes some of the common
issues that are encountered with its application, while the third presents the
systems approach that focuses on the need for a clear understanding of
function. It is argued that a clear understanding of the function(s) of a design
or process provides a simple and elegant method of deriving the failure
modes and hence the causal chain that defines the failure mechanism.

The last section introduces the Functional FMEA as a tool that can be applied
at the requirements stage, before design has begun, in order to identify issues
early and design them out.

2.0 “Text Book” FMEA

2.1 History

The purpose of this section is to describe what is currently written about

FMEA in the published literature. It is not a literature review, but more a
condensation of what is written about the tool. There are numerous accounts
of FMEA that vary in depth and understanding. This section draws upon a
number of published works [1 to 7] to attempt to provide a common overview
of the tool, its purpose and process.

The history of FMEA is certainly not clear. What is certain is that the major
impetus for its use originates with the US Military. Indeed, the origins of FMEA
can be traced back to the US military standard MIL-P-1629 (1949) which
describes the process for conducting a “Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality
Analysis” (FMECA). It is indeed a misconception that FMEA and FMECA are
different. Originally, they were; FMEA did what its name suggests: it identified
and documented the failure modes and effects. The inclusion of numerical
assessments of severity of effect, probability of occurrence and ability to

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 2

detect are the “Criticality Analysis” (CA). Hence, conducting an FMEA and
following it with a CA gives an FMECA. FMECA has over the years become
known as FMEA particularly when, in the 1970’s and led by the Ford Motor
Company, the automotive industry began to use FMEA. Ford is also credited
with applying the same approach to processes (PFMEA) to consider potential
process induced failures prior to launching production.

What I am about to describe, as “textbook” FMEA, is a combination of various

sources [1 - 7] in an attempt to demonstrate the state of the art.

2.2 Contemporary Text Book FMEA

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a disciplined process, which

uses available experience and expertise to identify the level or criticality of
potential problems and thus lead to corrective actions that appropriately
reduce such levels. It is intended to be a pro-active tool used throughout the
life cycle of a product or process to prevent problems. For example, it can be
used during the design stage to identify failures and determine which are the
most critical in order that corrective action can be taken at an early stage. The
technique can also be used to assess the production of a design by identifying
potential production problems and again determining those that are critical.

The method is widely used, particularly in the automotive and aerospace

industries. In consequence there are several variations on the basic theme
with most large organizations producing their own standard method. The
differences between these variations are more often than not limited to style
and presentation. The underpinning approach can be summarised as the 7
steps given in table 1

Step Activity
1 Identify Item and Determine Boundary
2 Determine function
3 Determine for each function /component/ process step:
• potential failure modes
• effects of potential failure modes
• causes of potential failure modes
• current controls
4 Tabulate and assign ratings to:
• seriousness of occurrence
• probability of occurrence
• detectability of occurrence
5 Determine Criticality Index or Risk Priority Number
6 Determine corrective actions where appropriate
7 Assess Corrective Action

Table 1: The basic steps in performing a “text book” FMEA

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 3

To assist in the process of conducting an FMEA a form is used, which when
completed, left to right, will take the user through the 8 steps given above. An
example of a generic FMEA form is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: A Generic FMEA form

The following provides a summary of the 7 steps that constitute the “textbook”
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.

STEP 1: IDENTIFY ITEM & DETERMINE BOUNDARY

When FMEA is applied, it is necessary to ensure that the “item” under

consideration is clearly defined. The “item” can be a component, a sub-
assembly, assembly, sub-system or system, process-step, sub-process or
process. If the item is complex, then it is necessary to adopt a top down
decomposition of the item to break it up into manageable 'sub-items' as
appropriate. Whatever is selected as the “item” its boundary must be clearly
defined. The interfaces between the “item” and the larger entity, to which it
belongs, must also be considered, since these are frequently the areas that
cause most problems. FMEA can also be used to consider the interfaces in
isolation.

STEP 2: DETERMINE FUNCTION

The second step is for each item to determine its function or functions. These
should be written as statements as to what the item does.

STEP 3: DETERMINE FOR EACH FUNCTION

For each function identified in step 2 the following should be generated;

• potential failure modes

• effects of the potential failure modes

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 4

 • cause(s) of the potential failure modes
• current controls

The preparation of these lists is performed by drawing on the experience and

expertise of an engineer or team of personnel who have a knowledge of the
item under consideration. Without doubt the preferred approach is to use a
team comprising of members from different disciplines.

STEP 4: TABULATE & RATE

In step 4 the information generated so far is entered on an FMEA worksheet,

of which there are several variations. Using this information, together with the
experience and expertise of the team, a rating between 1 and 10 is assigned
to the following;

O Probability of Occurrence (of failure mode due to cause(s))

S Seriousness of Occurrence (of failure mode due to cause(s))

D Probability of Detection (of failure mode due to cause(s))

The scales used can be summarised as;

Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
S Not severe Extremely severe
O Very unlikely to occur Very likely to occur
D Certain to detect Cannot detect

The reason why the probability of detection scale appears to be the wrong
way around, is that it is concerned with the ability to detect the failure before
the user does.

Even with the above scale it can be difficult to assign ratings. For example,
what is the difference between a 3 or 4. In most cases such differences are
not important provided the team or individual is consistent when forming an
FMEA. The important point to note is that FMEA is a relative and subjective
analysis. Indeed, if two teams perform an FMEA on the same item, the ratings
given are likely to be different. However, the ranking of the failure modes by
the criticality indices is likely to be the same. That is, both teams will identify
the same critical failure modes and causes. Care must therefore be exercised
when comparing two FMEAs. Some companies have attempted to overcome
the subjectivity of FMEA by defining the criteria for each rating.

STEP 5: DETERMINE Risk Priority Number

Following the assignment of ratings to S, O and D the RISK PRIORITY

NUMBER (RPN) is calculated for each case using

RPN = SxOxD

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 5

The larger this number, the more serious or more critical the failure mode. An
important point to note is that criticality of a failure is not just dependent on its
likelihood of occurrence. Indeed, emphasis is placed on how the user is
“affected” if the failure, however remote, were to occur.

Once all the criticality indices have been calculated, a summary of the most
critical is extracted in order to highlight those areas where priority action must
be directed. It is also recognised practice to highlight any failures that contain
a 10 for Severity, Occurrence or Detection irrespective of the other ratings

STEP 6: CORRECTIVE ACTION

Having identified the critical failure modes, appropriate remedial action it is

considered. This should result in a series of corrective actions, which are
stated clearly on the FMEA form and “actioned” to be carried out. An
important feature of the FMEA, because it does not just concentrate on
probability of occurrence, is that the ratings can give direction as to the
appropriate corrective action.

STEP 7: ASSESS CORRECTIVE ACTION

The last step is common sense. The purpose of FMEA is not only to identify
potential problems but also to provide corrective action. Step 7 is therefore a
repeat of the FMEA to ensure that the corrective actions do actually reduce
the criticality index.

3.0 Failings of Textbook FMEA

Despite its apparent simplicity the application of FMEA in commerce and

industry is often fraught with difficulty. Indeed, many organizations take
several years to successfully deploy and embed FMEA. The argument put
forward in this paper is that FMEA is difficult to implement because of a lack
of understanding of failure.

The word “failure” is so frequently used in everyday conversations that we all

feel we have an inherent, and complete understanding of its meaning.
Furthermore, we are also familiar with the concept of cause and effect; every
failure must have some root cause. It can be argued that this recognition of
cause and effect is not a bad thing, but it is often perceived in simple linear
terms. We naturally assume that an effect has a single cause. It is one “thing”
that has caused the end event. People like to find a single item of blame.
Reality suggests, however, that multiple and complex cause and effect chains
are the norm. This over familiarity with “failure” and linear “cause and effect”
results in a lack of rigour and discipline because we all believe we know what
we are doing.

The other major contributing factor to the failings of FMEA is failure itself.
Nobody plans to fail, but failures do occur. In fact, they occur on a daily basis
with a consequential impact on cost, time and also reputation. It therefore

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 6

follows when failures do occur we address them with a sense of urgency, we
wish to impress upon those affected by the failure that we are doing
everything in our power to put it right. We divert resources to fix the failure, we
put our senior people “on the job” because are keen to be seen to be “doing
something”. The ubiquitous nature of FMEA is a reflection of the ubiquitous
nature of failure and the need to do something now!

Even the less astute of organizations will soon realise that “fixing failures” is
wasteful and recognise the need to attempt to prevent failure and begin a
quest for the “holy grail”. That search is often short and sweet because FMEA
appears through the mist as a knight in shining armour. It is appealing on
many levels. It is a simple tool and most people with their inherent
understand of failure and cause and effect feel they can quickly grasp the
process and intent. It has numbers and therefore has a “scientific” quantitative
feel but is not mathematical. Other potentially useful tools such as Reliability
Block Diagrams, Design of Experiments, Sensitivity Analysis, Monte Carlo
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis etc. are overlooked because the maths involved
appears too hard! There is also plenty of literature on FMEA. Many people
have trod this path leading to the over documentation and an “over-
availability” of literature on FMEA, particularly on the Internet!

This glut of FMEA literature should be useful. It is not. Everybody has their
take on FMEA that stems from their understanding of failure. In consequence
FMEA is reported in an inconsistent and incomplete fashion. To all intents and
purposes, FMEA is a simple tool and therefore most people feel they are able
to understand its application. Moreover, they can complete the FMEA form
and it “looks good” – it “looks right”. Unfortunately, the fact you can put
something in a column of an FMEA form does not mean it is correct. To
illustrate this, below is an example obtained from the Internet on 7 January
2014. It was obtained using a Safari browser and used the search word
“Failure Mode”. One of the items in the top 10 was entitled “The difference
between root cause and failure mode” – potentially an interesting online
debate – but it included the following example cited as helping in the debate:

EQUIPMENT: e.g. furnace tube boiler

FAILURE: (what happened) e.g. Catastrophic failure of the welded

joint between the furnace tube and tube plate.

FAILURE MODE: (by definition is what the equipment or component

failed from) e.g. Corrosion fatigue.

ROOT CAUSE/S: (by definition, what caused the failure mode to

occur AND what can be changed to prevent re-occurrence.
Remember there can be more than one!!)
e.g. Poor feed water
treatment accelerated corrosion; Rapid firing, particularly from cold,
increased thermal stress on the boiler; Over pressurization and
temperature cycles.
Box 1: An Internet example to help explain cause and failure mode (incorrectly)

At first glance this looks like a reasonable example – but it is wrong! Aspects
are correct. The author got the “Equipment” aspect right, but the rest is not

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 7

correct. However, it is plausible. What has been written appears to make
sense, especially to a person who is not a “furnace tube boiler” expert.
It is important to perhaps reflect at this point. If you were that novice
attempting to find out about how to prevent failures and you began an Internet
search you would soon discover FMEA. Shortly after you will come across
example like that above which will taint your understanding for life. It’s akin to
searching for “how to add” and finding a document that says 1+1 = 3. Even
the Standards Bodies that most organization looks towards for trustworthy
guidance do not present a consistent or complete view. For example, table 2
below shows several of the common “trusted” sources of information on
FMEA and their definitions of what are the key concepts in FMEA.

Standard text definitions of failure and associated aspects

Aspect Reference Text Definition
BS4778-3.1:1991 The termination of the ability of an
item to perform a required
IEC 60050(191):1990, International function
Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) –
Chapter 191: Dependability and
quality of service

IEC 60812, 2006 Analysis

Failure
techniques for system reliability –
Procedure for failure mode and
effects analysis (FMEA)
SAE J1739 JAN2009 None given
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis None given
Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press
2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3

BS4778-3.1:1991 et al None given

A design function is a description
SAE J1739 JAN2009 of the design intent for a system,
subsystem, or component
Function
None given
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press
2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3

BS4778-3.1:1991 et al Manner in which an item fails

SAE J1739 JAN2009 the manner in which the item fails
to meet its intended function.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis A design failure is the manner in
Failure Mode Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press which a system, subsystem or
2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3 part fails to meet its intended
purpose or function. A process
failure is the manner in which a
system, subsystem or part fails to
meet its intended purpose
Aspect Reference Text Definition

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 8

 BS4778-3.1:1991 et al Consequence of a failure mode in
terms of the operation, function or
status of the item
SAE J1739 JAN2009 None given
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis A description of the impact of a
Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press failure mode on the operation,
Effect
2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3 function, or status of the part,
assembly, subsystem, system,
product, customer, manufacturing
operations, manufacturing
operators, manufacturing tooling
and equipment, or government
regulation.

BS4778-3.1:1991 et al The physical, chemical or other

process that results in failure.
SAE J1739 JAN2009 None given
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (1) the process that results in
Failure Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press failure. These processes can
Mechanism 2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3 include chemical, electrical,
physical, thermal and
informational. (2) the process of
degradation, or chain of events
leading to and resulting in a
particular failure mode.

BS4778-3.1:1991 et al None given

SAE J1739 JAN2009 None given
Cause
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis The how or why that leads to the
Stamatis D.H. ASQ Quality Press failure mode.
2003 ISBN 0-87389-598-3

Table 2: Trusted sources of FMEA understanding

I wish to argue that it is the lack of a clear, logical, consistent and complete
definition of failure and its associated aspects, combined with our individual
belief that we “understand” failure that has led to a number of common issues
when applying FMEA in practice. These common issues include:

• Over proceduralisation – turning FMEA into a cottage industry.

Documents describing procedures and process that over-specify and
dilute the important concepts and principles that are fundamental to the
performing “good” FMEAs.
• Poorly defined boundaries for the analysis leading towards an
overambitious problem space (turning a simple study into solving
“world hunger”)
• Functions poorly if not incorrectly defined or even not considered
resulting in incorrectly defined failure modes, effects and causes
• Effects not related to what the user experiences
• Failure modes recorded as failure mechanisms, effects or even causes
• Failure mechanism ignored or overlooked

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 9

 • Causes are often not the underlying cause but a high-level event or
symptom
• Excessive and detailed scales inferring a precision of outcome beyond
the inherent capability of FMEA

4.0 A Systems View of Failure

It is clear from table 2 that even the trusted sources of reference provide
incomplete and inconsistent understanding of failure. Any FMEA novice using
these reference sources in order to gain understanding will be left with an
incomplete picture. Therefore, FMEA becomes open to interpretation and the
inclusion of an individual’s personal view of a failure. It is analogous to
attempt to run a court of law with incomplete and inconsistent written laws!

It follows that the professional application of FMEA demands a set of

complete definitions that enable a clear, complete and consistent
understanding of failure. That view can be obtained by taking a systems view
of failure. Central to this view is the recognition that all systems seek to
achieve a purpose and it is the inability of a system to achieve its purpose
which is the logical route to defining failure. The fact that everything can be
treated as a system infers that this view of failure will also be consistent at any
level within a system and across systems. In other words, this systems view
provides a universal approach to defining failure. Interestingly, although the
British Standard’s definitions about the aspects of failure are incomplete, their
definition of failure enshrines the systems view perfectly:

FAILURE: The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required

function. [BS4778-3.1:1991]

However, for completeness it is important to define the term “function”. Once

again, a systems view helps since function is used to capture purpose:

FUNCTION: what the item does, its purpose. [Burge, 2009]

The use of function rather than purpose is useful since it encourages

conciseness. Indeed, the best way to define a function [Burge 2009] is as a verb
noun phrase – an action on an object. This definition of failure through
functionality is incredibly powerful since it provides a consistent way of defining
the Failure Mode:

FAILURE MODE: the manner in which the item fails to meet its intended
function. [SAE J1739 JAN2009]

Failure modes are used in preference to failures, since any given failure may have
several failure modes. Failure modes are written as “anti-functions” and perhaps
more important are that there are only 5 basic types:

• No Function
• Over Function
• Under Function

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 10

 • Intermittent Function
• Unintended Function

It is important to reflect at this point on the universality and consistency

offered by these simple systems definition of failure. Given a system or sub-
system, and eventually down to individual components we can always
determine their function(s) as simple verb noun descriptions and through
these verb noun functional descriptions we can define the failure modes
consistently. To illustrate this point, consider a familiar example – a television.
The purpose or function of a television is

to convert radio frequency (RF) signals into light and sound.

In terms of determining the failure modes what is critical from the function give
above is the verb to “convert”. This verb, together with the 5 usual suspects
given above, are used to determine the failure modes as:

Failure Mode End Effect

No Convert No sound or picture
Over Convert Ghosting
Cracking in sound
Under Convert Fuzzy picture
Pixelated Picture
Low sound volumes
Tinny sound
Booming Sound
Intermittent Convert Picture freezing
Intermittent picture
No sound
Skewed sound
Unintended Convert Channel Bleed

Table 3: Failure Modes Table for the function to convert radio frequency signals into
light and sound

To construct the failure mode, the verb of the function has been taken to the
back and the 5 usual suspects of No, Over, Under, Intermittent and
Unintended used to start the definition. In practice it may be necessary to
interpret the resultant phrase taking into account the context. For example, it
may be necessary to discuss and agree what is meant by under convert of the
RF signal? However, the beauty of the systems view of failure is the ability to
apply it consistently though the use of function.

In the above table the second column contains the end effect:

END EFFECT: The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the

operation, function, or status of the highest indenture level. This is
expressed as what the CUSTOMER/USER might experience as a
result of the failure mode. [MIL Std 1629A]

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 11

It is clear from table 3 that a particular failure mode can have several end
effects. In this particular instance, this is partially due to a television having
two prime functions: the conversion of RF signals to light and the conversion
of RF signals to sound.

Table 3 also shows what is called the “End” effect – what the user of the
system will actually experience. Dependent upon the “item” under
investigation there are other possible effects. In some systems it may be
necessary to think of the effect scenario through the levels of a system. This
leads to a number of additional effects at different levels:

LOCAL EFFECT: The consequence(s) a failure mode has on the

operation, function, or status of the specific item being analysed. [MIL
Std 1629A]

NEXT HIGHER-LEVEL EFFECT: The consequence(s) a failure mode

has on the operation, functions, or status of the items in the next higher
indenture level above the indenture level under consideration. [MIL Std
1629A]

There are however, other aspects to failure that are important. Firstly, there is
always something that causes the failure mode to occur.

CAUSE: the underlying event that leads to a failure mode.

However, there is one final aspect of failure that is often overlooked and
ignored. This is the failure mechanism that is the “road between the cause and
effect”:

FAILURE MECHANISM: The physical, chemical or other process that

results in failure. [BS4778-3.1:1991]

The “Failure Mechanism” is interesting because most FMEA forms do not have
a column for it and in consequence people often confuse failure mode1 and
failure mechanism. It is not uncommon to find “fatigue” or “corrosion” given as a
Failure Mode. It is also possible to find these words appearing in the causes
column! Both are incorrect, “fatigue” and “corrosion” are Failure Mechanisms –
they are the chemical or physical process that results in failure. Something will
cause the item to fatigue or corrode – it is this that should be recorded in the
Cause column. The Failure Mode will be how an item fails to meet its intended
function as a consequence of fatigue or corrosion. It is perhaps easy now to see
why it was possible to declare the example given in box 1 as incorrect.

Typically, Failure Mechanisms comprise physical degradation of the item and its
components due to local operational conditions in combination with aspects
such as design features, materials and surface treatments.

1 In the case of “failure mode” BS 4778 actually doesn’t help! BS 4778 defines a failure mode as: “The effect by which a
failure is observed”. The lack of reference to the “function” presents an inconsistency within the BSI approach.

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 12

Different engineering disciplines will attract typical Failure Mechanisms. For
example, in mechanical design, Failure Mechanisms can involve for example:
Corrosion
Embrittlement
Fatigue
Fretting
Wear
Work hardening
Electronic design
Dielectric breakdown
Electromigration
Induced current

Systems Thinking requires us not only to think about the components in a

system but the relationships and interconnections between the components.
This follows for the system view of failure and figure 1 shows how the various
aspects of failure defined above relate to provide a clear, complete and
consistent understanding of failure.

Figure 1: A Systems Model of Failure

Starting with the “upper-loop” of figure 1, the model states that an item has a
function 2 and it is that function that defines the failure mode (through the usual
suspects). Moreover, the item will fail to deliver its function via the failure mode
and will result in an effect. The “lower-loop” of figure 1 states that a failure mode
will have a cause that initiates a failure mechanism that generates the failure
mode. To illustrate this, consider the simple situation of a pair of scissors.

2 Because an item ranges from a system down to an individual component is it possible that an individual item could
have many functions.

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 13

Figure 2: Failure of a Pair of Scissors

Imagine however, attempting an FMEA without the systems understanding

given above. The outcome could be (and actually has been) recorded as
follows:

Item Failure Mode Effect Cause

Pivot Sloppy Poor cut Wear

It is often argued that it “doesn’t matter if things are in the wrong column – it's
the process that is more important”. It is easy to have some sympathy with
this view; the fact a group of engineers are talking about potential failures is a
good thing. The fact they do not understand is equally disappointing and
frankly unprofessional.

The systems view of failure given in figure 1 has major advantageous

corollary: it unifies the various flavours of FMEA providing a consistent
approach in all circumstances. There are two “classic” forms of FMEA, The
Design FMEA and the Process FMEA. The Design FMEA is concerned with
identifying potential Failure Modes, Effects and Causes of a design. The
Process FMEA is concerned with identifying potential Failure Modes, Effects
and Causes of a design. These two forms of FMEA are logical. The first, the
Design FMEA (DFMEA) recognises that failures in use can be attributed to
“poor” design. A DFMEA is therefore concerned with identifying and
prioritising design–related potential failure modes and thereby determining
suitable mitigating action. The Process FMEA (PFMEA) recognises that even
an excellent design can still fail in use as a consequence of errors during
manufacture. This description of DFMEA and PFMEA, of course, relates to
product-based items, but the principles can be carried over to service-based
items. This latter point is important since it implies a tacit recognition that
product, process and service are all just different types of system. In other
words, the concepts and principles inherent in a FMEA apply universally.
Indeed, figure 1 can be easily modified to represent both DFMEA – see figure
3 and PFMEA – see figure 4.

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 14

Figure 3: The Systems Model of Failure Modified for Product-Based Systems (Design
FMEA)

Notice, in figure 3, the only element that has changed is “ITEM” has been
replaced by “SYSTEM, SUB-SYSTEM, PART”. The remainder of the model is
unchanged.

Figure 4: The Systems Model of Failure Modified for Process-Based Systems (Process
FMEA)

Again, note that the only element that has changed is “ITEM” has been
replaced by “PROCESS STEP”. The remainder of the model is unchanged.
This is a consequence of the universal nature of the system definition of
failure that will allow for a simple correct and consistent approach to
identifying and documenting failure attributes. This consistent and complete
view of failure also leads to development of a universal approach to Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis and a precursor to DFMEA and PFMEA, the
Functional Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 15

A Universal FMEA Approach

The Universal or Systems Approach to FMEA is based on the systems view of

failure summarised in figure 1 and on current practice as described in Table 1.

The process for performing a universal FMEA is given in table 4.

Process for performing a universal FMEA

Step Activity
1 Identify Item (System, sub-system, part, process step) and
determine boundary
2 Determine function of the item
3 Determine for each function:
• potential failure modes
• effects of potential failure modes
• failure mechanisms of potential failure modes
• causes of potential failure modes
• current employed prevention or detection methods
4 Tabulate and assign ratings to:
• seriousness of occurrence
• probability of occurrence
• detectability of occurrence
5 Calculate Risk Priority Number
6 Determine corrective actions where appropriate
7 Assess Corrective Action

Table 4: The basic steps in performing a Universal FMEA

The difference between the activities in table 1 (textbook FMEA) and table 4
(Universal FMEA) are small. This is both convenient and deliberate. The
differences are concerned with recognising that products and processes can
be treated as systems. The parts, assemblies etc. of a product are equivalent
to the process steps in a process. Most important, however, is the recognition
that these parts, assemblies, process steps etc. all perform a function. It is the
identification of the function that provides the segue into the failure analysis
since from figure 1 all the other attributes necessary to completely define
failure follow. It also leads to a modification of the generic FMEA form to
include Failure Mechanism. This is shown in Figure 5. It is still perfectly sound
practice to use the generic FMEA form with the system view of failure, but
there is nowhere to capture the failure mechanism and therefore that
information, unless recorded elsewhere, is lost.

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 16

Figure 5: Generic FMEA

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 17

The systems view of failure also points towards a third type of FMEA that has
huge potential. This is the Functional FMEA whereby a FMEA analysis can be
performed before design is undertaken! This allows the opportunity to design
out potential failure modes ab initio. If the design of a product or service
adopts a Systems Engineering approach, then effort will be expended to
understand the customer’s requirements in terms of necessary functionality to
address the problem defined by their requirements. System Design is
therefore concerned with finding the best means of implementing the
functionality. At a later date these selected means will be subject to a DFMEA
that will involve deducing their functionality in order to determine the failure
modes etc. Clearly the deduced functionality should match that extracted from
the customer’s requirements. In other words, we have the functionality of
system before we design it and can apply FMEA before the design. This
provides an opportunity to discover failure modes, effects and causes during
the requirements discovery phase of a system design. It is then an issue of
designing the system to meet its requirements but at the same time avoid the
potential failure modes identified. The cost implications are quite profound.
Figure 6 shows the classic “cost to fix” vs. development phase, annotated with
where the various FMEAs can be first applied.

Figure 6: Application of FMEAs during the Development Cycle

It is typically reported [for example INCOSE] that the cost to fix increase by a
factor of 10 with each development phase. What is therefore clear from figure
6 is that performing FFMEAs provides the opportunity to address potential
failure modes at minimum cost and result in more robust failure free products
and services.

5.0 Conclusions

This paper has argued that Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), while
ubiquitous throughout industry and commerce, struggles to be effectively
deployed and its application ephemeral. It is further argued that the main

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 18

contributing factors are the over-exposure of FMEA in combination with a
visceral understanding of failure.

This paper has used concepts from Systems Thinking to provide a clear and
consistent understanding of failure that in turn permits a repeatable and
reproducible approach to FMEA whether it is Design or Process.

This system approach to FMEA also points the way to the need to adopt an
even earlier form of FMEA as a precursor to a Design FMEA and Process
FMEA. The intent of what is called Functional FMEA is to identify issues
before design commences such that they can be designed out ab initio.

6.0 References
[1] BS4778-3.1:1991 Quality vocabulary. Availability, reliability and maintainability terms
Guide to concepts and related definitions

[2] IEC 60050(191):1990, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) – Chapter 191:

Dependability and quality of service

[3] IEC 60812, 2006 Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for failure
mode and effects analysis (FMEA)

[4] Stamatis D.H. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, ASQ Quality Press 2003 ISBN 0-
87389-598-3

[5] United States Department of Defense (24 November 1980). MIL-STD-1629A -

Procedures for performing a failure mode effect and criticality analysis. Department of
Defense (USA). MIL-STD-1629A.

[6] AIAG (2008). Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 4th Edition.
Automotive Industry Action Group. ISBN 9781605341361.

[7] SAE (2008). Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA)
and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Manufacturing and Assembly
Processes (Process FMEA) and Effects Analysis for Machinery (Machinery FMEA).
SAE International.

[8] Burge S E Holistic Requirements Model, Burge Hughes Walsh,

www.burgehugheswalsh.co.uk, 2012

A Systems Approach to Failure Modes, Mechanisms, Effects and Causes 19