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Huayan Numismatics as Metaphysics: Explicating Fazang’s Coin-Counting

Metaphor

Article  in  Philosophy East and West · January 2017

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 Huayan Numismatics as Metaphysics: Explicating Fazang's
Coin-Counting Metaphor

Nicholaos Jones

Philosophy East and West, Volume 68, Number 4, October 2018, pp. 1155-1177
(Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2018.0101

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/717049

Access provided by University of Alabama @ Huntsville (19 Feb 2019 18:45 GMT)
HUAYAN NUMISMATICS AS METAPHYSICS: EXPLICATING
FAZANG’S COIN-COUNTING METAPHOR

Nicholaos Jones
Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Huntsville
[email protected]

I. Introductory Remarks

Fazang 法藏 (643–712) ranks among the preeminent Buddhists of medieval

China. History records him as a court politician during the reign of Empress
Wu Zetian 武則天 (625–705); he was an adept shaman and wonder-worker,
an accomplished engineer, and a prolific translator, as well as a popular
expositor of what we now refer to as Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism.1 While the
Golden Lion (Jinshizi zhang 金獅子章) contains Fazang’s most famous
pedagogical example, his most highly regarded work is the Treatise on the
Five Teachings (Huayan wujiao zhang 華嚴五教章).2 The Treatise presents
such well-known doctrines as the mutual identity (xiangji 相卽) and mutual
inclusion (xiangru 相入) of all dharmas, of li 理 and shi 事, of one (yi 一)
and many (yiqie 一切), and of wholes (zong 總) and their parts (bie 別).
Fazang’s Treatise also provides several provocative metaphors. Chapter
10 ends with the framed building, meant to illustrate the teaching of the
six characteristics (liu xiang 六相). Indra’s net (Yintuoluo wang 因陀羅網),
meant to illustrate the infinite diversity of reality and the mutual inclusion
of its inhabitants each within all others, appears on several occasions.3
Both of these metaphors are well studied.4 But there is also a third, less
famous and less remarked upon, metaphor known as counting ten coins
(shu shi qian 數十錢).5 This is meant to illustrate the mutual inclusion and
identity of one and many dharmas, chief (shou 首) and retinue (ban 伴),
primary (zhu 主) and secondary (ban 伴), hidden (yinmi 隱密) and manifest
(xianliao 顯了).
Antecedents of the coin-counting metaphor appear in the Avataṁsaka
Sūtra as well as in treatises by the second patriarch of Huayan, Zhiyan 智儼
(602–668). Both the Sūtra and Zhiyan speak of counting ten in the abstract.
It is only with texts by Ŭisang 義湘 (625–702), a Korean disciple of Zhiyan
and peer to Fazang, that the metaphor becomes more concrete by referring
to coins.6 Fazang, in turn, expands upon Ŭisang’s metaphor in the final
chapter of his Treatise.7
The present article explicates the coin-counting metaphor as it appears
in Fazang’s Treatise. The goal is to transform Fazang’s more-or-less inexact
and obscure mentions of the metaphor into something that is clearer and

Philosophy East & West Volume 68, Number 4 October 2018 1155–1177 1155
© 2018 by University of Hawai‘i Press
 more precise. The method for achieving this goal is threefold: first, by
presenting Fazang’s version of the metaphor as the culmination of a series of
written efforts to interpret a brief stanza in the Avataṁsaka Sūtra; second, by
providing textual evidence to support this interpretation; and third, by
contrasting the interpretation with its main alternatives. The immediate
purpose of explicating the metaphor in this way is to redress its relative
neglect in discussions of Huayan doctrine. The broader purpose, pursued
briefly in the conclusion, is to lay some groundwork for making insights
from Huayan metaphysics available and more accessible to a wider
audience of metaphysicians.
I begin with a historical review of how the coin-counting metaphor
develops from a stanza in the Avataṁsaka Sūtra to an illustration with
multiple and convoluted layers in Fazang’s Treatise. I frame the review as a
series of attempts to improve an originary example, with each successor
correcting a flaw in its predecessor.

II. History of the Metaphor before Fazang

Avataṁsaka Sutra
The Avataṁsaka (Flower Ornament) Sūtra presents the teaching that all
things, by virtue of lacking inherent or substantial nature (svabhāva), are
empty (śūnya).

Nirvana cannot be grasped, but when spoken of there are two kinds,
So it is of all things: When discriminated, they are different.
Just as based on something counted there exists a way of counting,
Their nature is nonexistent: Thus are phenomena perfectly known.
It’s like the method of counting (suan shu fa 算數法), adding one, up to infinity.
The numbers have no substantial nature: They are distinguished due to intellect.8

Because real distinctions among things reside in differences of svabhāva, this

teaching rejects ultimate distinctions among things. It entails, further, that
there is a sense in which ultimate reality escapes conceptual understanding.
Because concepts fundamentally mark differences, absence of distinctions
among things entails that concepts cannot grasp the ultimate reality of
things. Whence the verse concludes that if concepts grasp anything, they
grasp only what we ourselves impose upon reality.
Rather than situating our conceptual distinctions as attempts to track
independently real differences, this verse situates them as constituting those
differences. The verse refers to the metaphor of counting as a device for
explaining the meaning and possibility of such constitution. But the
metaphor is challenging. For example, when asked how many things are on
the hillside, I might answer “one copse” or “ten trees.”9 This illustrates that
counts are concept-dependent, but not how conceptualizing things as

1156 Philosophy East & West

copses rather than trees removes differences among things on the hillside.
Nor does counting the ten trees as ten trees or one copse involve theorizing
the trees as lacking substantial natures of their own.

Zhiyan’s Ten Mysterious Gates

Zhiyan’s Ten Mysterious Gates of the Unitary Vehicle of Huayan (Huayan
yicheng shixuan men 華嚴一乘十玄門) develops the counting metaphor to
elucidate the doctrine of interdependent origination.10 That doctrine has two
aspects: the mutual inclusion of one and many, and the mutual identity of
one and many. Both entail, following the teaching of emptiness, that things
lack substantial natures of their own.
Zhiyan’s presentation of the counting metaphor, unfortunately, is dense
and obscure. For example, he explains the mutual inclusion of one and
many as follows:

[I]f you count forward from one to ten you go up; if you count backward from
one to ten you go down. As for “one,” it exists dependently, so in one there is
ten, which is why “one” can be; without ten there can be no one, because it
has no inherent identity and is dependent. Because the implication of ten in
one is how one is established, so are two, three, four, and so forth all
established. If one remained in its own identity, ten could not be formed; and if
ten is not established, neither is one.11

Zhiyan does not make explicit how his metaphor elucidates one including
ten. Presumably, because we count to one in counting to ten (from one), we
are to understand that one is in many.
To explain the mutual inclusion of one and many, Zhiyan also needs his
metaphor to elucidate many being in one. However, his discussion lacks a
commonsense interpretation. We do not count to ten in counting to one. So
mere counting seems to contradict the teaching. Interpretive counting, or
counting one as a one that is in ten, fits the teaching.12 However, this
presupposes the very idea the metaphor is designed to elucidate. It also
undermines the interpretation of one including ten, because in counting to
ten we do not begin counting at one-interpreted-as-being-in-ten.
Despite Zhiyan’s other mentions of the counting metaphor being equally
difficult to interpret, he clearly builds upon the metaphor from the
Avataṁsaka Sūtra. When introducing his metaphor, Zhiyan cites a similar
verse from a different translation of the sutra:
It is like the principle of counting ten, adding ones up to infinity—all are the
original number, but are differentiated by the intellect.13
Zhiyan also adds to the verse the feature of directionality. This is pivotal for
understanding how his metaphor elucidates the teaching of mutual inclusion.
The Avataṁsaka Sūtra mentions counting from one to infinity. It does
not specify in which direction the counting proceeds, presumably because

Nicholaos Jones 1157

 beginning the count at infinity and working toward one is impossible or at
least ill defined. By using the number ten to represent infinity, however,
Zhiyan effectively renormalizes the arithmetical situation. This allows him to
sensibly differentiate between counting from one to ten forward and
counting from one to ten backward. While we do not count to ten in
counting to one forward, we do count to ten in counting to one backward:
ten, nine, eight, and so on back to one.
Directional counting allows Zhiyan to elucidate the teaching of mutual
inclusion by illustrating one’s being in many with forward counting, and by
illustrating many’s being in one with backward counting. But a minor flaw
remains. In counting forward from one to ten, we cannot also count backward
from one to ten. So counting forward and counting backward are not merely
distinct; they are separable, and perhaps also jointly incompatible, by virtue of
excluding each other. This seems not to fit with the spirit of his teaching,
which treats one’s including many as inseparable from and coherent with
many’s including one. An insight from a text by one of his students, the Korean
monk Ŭisang, shows how to remove this apparent exclusivity.

Ŭisang’s Autocommentary on the Diagram of the Dharmadhātu

In the Diagram of the Dharmadhātu of the One Vehicle of Hwaŏm (Hwaŏm
ilsŭng pŏpkyedo), Ŭisang, one of Zhiyan’s star pupils, attempts to summar-
ize Zhiyan’s teaching. This work consists of a 210-character poem as well as
an extensive autocommentary, where Ŭisang extends Zhiyan’s metaphor of
counting to ten into a “theory of counting ten coins.”14 He retains the
directional feature of Zhiyan’s metaphor, and he makes explicit that he
chooses ten objects in order to “manifest infinity.” His text innovates by
adding physicality to Zhiyan’s metaphor, discussing counts of physical coins
rather than of abstract numbers.
Ŭisang does not say why he adapts Zhiyan’s metaphor by referring to
coins. When he mentions coins, he neither appeals to their specific
properties nor indicates how counting coins might differ from counting
numbers.15 But, while unremarked, coins familiar to Ŭisang differ subtly and
importantly from numbers by virtue of having distinct and inseparable
directions. Kaiyuan tongbao 開元通寶 coins, in particular, bear their four-
character name on the obverse and often another symbol on the reverse.16
These coins have a twofold directionality: when the obverse faces up, the
reverse faces down; when the obverse faces left, the reverse faces right. But
these directions are inseparable: there is neither obverse without reverse nor
reverse without obverse, and neither front nor back obstructs the other.
By embodying the method of counting to ten in physical coins, Ŭisang’s
text addresses the flaw of Zhiyan’s metaphor. For directions of marked coins,
unlike directions of counting, are distinct but inseparable. Yet there is no
obvious way to integrate this innovation with Zhiyan’s metaphor. There are
no necessary correlations between directions of marked coins and directions

1158 Philosophy East & West

of counting. For example, counting ten coins forward need not mean counting
the obverse sides of the coins; nor need it mean counting the reverse.
Moreover, replacing directions of counting with directions of marked coins
also seems to contradict the teaching of many being in one, because we do
not count the obverses of ten coins in counting the obverse for one coin.
Ŭisang provides no instruction in his autocommentary about how to
integrate the physicality of coins into Zhiyan’s counting metaphor. Nor is it
clear that he has this intention. He might discuss coins rather than numbers
for no deep reason at all; or he might mention it as an idea that Zhiyan and
his students had been entertaining. In any case, work by his colleague and
confidant, Fazang, provides a framework for integrating physical and
counting directionalities, thereby further improving upon the counting
metaphor as a tool for elucidating mutual inclusion and identity.

III. Fazang’s Counting-Ten-Coins Metaphor

Treatise on the Five Teachings

Following the Avataṁsaka Sūtra, Zhiyan, and Ŭisang, Fazang uses the
counting-ten-coins metaphor in his Treatise to explain the teaching of
dependent arising.17 The teaching has two aspects: that each dharma
includes and penetrates all other dharmas, and that each identifies and is
identified with all others.18 Because prior discussion of Zhiyan and Ŭisang’s
counting metaphor focuses on mutual inclusion, I do the same for Fazang.
The discussion for mutual identity is parallel.
Fazang distinguishes two aspects for the teaching of mutual inclusion,
namely mutual inclusion regarding common essence (tongti 同體) and
mutual inclusion regarding different essence (yiti 異體).19 Common essence
considers dharmas as part of a unified whole. The teaching of mutual
inclusion in this aspect concerns the inclusion of each part in its whole and
the whole in each of its parts. Different essence considers different dharmas
in relation to each other rather than in relation to a common whole. I focus
on the teaching of mutual inclusion in the aspect of different essence.20 The
discussion for common essence is similar.21

Power and Inclusion

For the teaching of mutual inclusion in the aspect of different essence, the
salient relations among dharmas are having power (youquanli 有全力) and
lacking power (quanwuli 全無力).22 When something “can form existence,”
Fazang says it has power.23 A light-bulb joke illuminates Fazang’s meaning:
Q: How many Zen Buddhists does it take to change a light bulb?

A: Four—one to change it, one not to change it, one to both change and not
change it, one to neither change nor not change it.24

Nicholaos Jones 1159

 The setup for the joke is a question; the punchline is a declaration. Imagine
that the setup with punchline qualifies as a joke by virtue of being funny.
Consider the question in isolation. By virtue of being merely a question, it is
not funny. Nor, lacking a punchline as answer, is it a setup. Fazang would
say that the question, on its own, lacks power to form the joke. However,
when grouped with the proper declaration as answer, the question comes to
be a setup for a specific joke; and if grouped with a different declaration,
such as “I don’t know,” the question would come to be something else
altogether. Because the question on its own lacks power to form a joke,
Fazang would say that the punchline declaration has complete power to
form the joke. Similar reasoning applies when considering the declaration in
isolation: it lacks power to form the joke, and so the setup question has
complete power to form the joke.
The example of the setup and punchline should forestall some common
misunderstandings about power. Power in Fazang’s sense is not, as common
sense might lead one to suppose, a capacity to bring into existence
something from nothing. The punchline to the joke does not create its setup
ex nihilo. Nor is power a capacity to create existence by some sort of
reproduction or emanation. The punchline does not entail or generate the
joke’s setup. Instead, power is a capacity to bring into existence some
meaning or valuation not already otherwise present. The punchline brings
the meaning being a setup for a joke to the question; the setup, likewise,
brings the meaning being a punchline for a joke to the declaration and, we
are supposing, also makes the declaration funny.25
Fazang treats having complete power to form another as coextensive
with including that other within. He says, of an arbitrary dharma, we shall
(following Cook’s translation decision) label “A,”
with regard to power, because “A” has complete power, it can therefore include
the other. Because the other is [on that occasion] totally without power, it can
therefore be included in “A.”26

His idea seems to be that, in having complete power to form others, dharmas
simulate being causes of those others. Because Fazang presupposes that results
must resemble their causes in the way that mango trees must resemble mango
seeds, and because dharmas have complete power to produce others quite
different from themselves, the only way to ensure proper resemblance between
cause and result is for the dharmas with complete power to somehow include
within themselves the dharmas they form.
Fazang understands lacking power to form another and being included
in that other similarly.27 If some arbitrary dharma, “A,” is formed by another,
“A” is included in that other. Yet that which is included in another does not
form the existence of the other, because existing precedes the capacity to
include. So whatever is included in another lacks power to form that other.
Similar reasoning establishes the converse. Whatever lacks power to form

1160 Philosophy East & West

another does not include that other within it, lest it thereby have power to
form the other.

Fazang’s Innovation
When explicating the coin-counting metaphor, Fazang presumes a rather
sophisticated theoretical framework. He follows Ŭisang’s text in using a
count of ten, rather than a count of infinitely many, because ten “satisfies
the requirements for a perfect number for purposes of showing inexhaust-
ibility.”28 Then, in considering the relation of these ten to each other (under
the aspect of different essence), he makes several presuppositions. First, each
of the ten has and lacks power, albeit in different respects. Second, with
respect to having power, each one of the ten forms the remaining nine and
includes those nine within it. Third, with respect to lacking power, each one
of the ten is formed by and is included within the remaining nine. Fazang
also maintains that the dual respects of having and lacking power are
inseparable.29
Fazang uses this framework to integrate Zhiyan and Ŭisang’s innovations
for the Avataṁsaka Sūtra’s method of counting. He likens having power to
the forward-facing side of a coin, lacking power to the backward-facing
side. This incorporates the directionality of Zhiyan’s metaphor. His analogy
seems to be arbitrary. Fazang could have likened having power to the
backward-facing side instead, and this would have fit equally well with
Zhiyan’s remarks in the Ten Mysterious Gates.
Despite its arbitrariness, we can make Fazang’s metaphor more intuitive
by imagining one thing’s forming of another as a temporally extended
process. Specifically, imagine some “A” existing now, having been formed
by something that existed earlier, and itself forming something that will exist
later. If we follow “A” with respect to its having power, we move forward in
time. Similarly, if we follow “A” with respect to its lacking power, we move
backward in time. This result is similar to Fazang’s example, except for the
flaws of treating “A” as forming something other than that by which it is
formed and treating the formation relation as temporal rather than
synchronic.
The flaws are not severe, however. Fazang’s version of the coin-counting
metaphor requires only the idea of some one thing having two different
respects. In Zhiyan’s metaphor, the one thing is the counting process; the
respects are the forward and backward directions of counting. In Fazang’s,
the one thing is a dharma; the respects are having and lacking power.
Fazang likely mentions forward- and backward-facing directions to acknowl-
edge his intellectual debt to Zhiyan.
To incorporate the physicality of Ŭisang’s metaphor, Fazang introduces
a further innovation. Rather than consider one as forming, and being
formed by, the other nine sequentially, Fazang considers one as forming,
and being formed by, the other nine simultaneously. For example,

Nicholaos Jones 1161

 Fig. 1. The inseparability of having and lacking power. The left image represents the obverse of a
coin with the marking “1;” the right, the reverse of the same coin with grouped markings for the
remaining numbers. “0” stands for the number 10. The arrows, together with the slight rotation
effects, represent flipping the coin from one side to the other.

considered sequentially, one forms two, then three, and so on (in the
forward order); and one is formed by ten, then by nine, and so on (in the
backward order). However, as Fazang considers it, one forms two through
ten together and simultaneously; and those ten together and simultaneously
form one. This allows Fazang to liken the single one to one side of a
marked coin, the remaining collection of nine to the same coin’s other side
(see figure 1).
Using Ŭisang’s innovation in this way allows Fazang to explicate only
part of the coin-counting metaphor. By dividing ten into a single one and a
collective remaining nine, Fazang arrives at a coin that has, on its obverse
(say), a mark for one and, on its reverse, marks for two through ten. If we
imagine the obverse side facing forward, Fazang invites us to understand
one forming many by figuratively progressing through the coin from obverse
to reverse, and to understand the one being formed by the many by
figuratively regressing from reverse to obverse. Similarly, if we imagine
flipping the coin over, so that its reverse side now faces forward, Fazang
invites us to understand the many forming the one by figuratively progres-
sing through the coin from reverse to obverse, and to understand the many
being formed by the one by figuratively regressing from obverse to reverse.30
This explicates the Avataṁsaka teaching that one and many mutually
include each other. But the explication is incomplete.
The Avataṁsaka Sūtra teaches that each one of many mutually includes,
and is mutually included in, the remaining many. However, our explication
so far of Fazang’s metaphor does not show how an arbitrary element of the

1162 Philosophy East & West

many formed by one itself forms, and is formed by, the remaining eight
together with the original one. For example, we have not yet arrived at a
coin that has, on its obverse, a mark for two and, on its reverse, marks for
three through ten as well as for one. Moreover, our explication thus far
ignores the central component of the metaphor as it appears originally in the
Avataṁsaka Sūtra, namely the counting of numbers.
Fazang avoids these problems through combinatorial permutations. The
technique is more daunting in name than in practice. Give ten coins
the names COIN1, COIN2, up through COIN10, respectively. Let COIN1 be
the coin with “1” marked on its obverse and “2” through “10” marked on its
reverse. This coin elucidates the mutual inclusion of “1” with many others.
Similarly, let COIN2 be the coin with “2” marked on its obverse and “3”
through “10” as well as “1” marked on its reverse. This coin elucidates the
mutual inclusion of “2” with many others. And so on, with COIN10 marked
“10” on its obverse and “1” through “9” on its reverse, thereby elucidating the
mutual inclusion of “10” with many others. The student wishing to meditate
upon the Huayan teaching of interdependent origination may thereby
contemplate ten appropriately marked coins, considering the obverse and
reverse of each in turn, first progressing from obverse to reverse and then, by
flipping the coin, regressing from reverse to obverse (see figure 2).31
So interpreted, Fazang’s version of the coin-counting metaphor incorpo-
rates and integrates the feature of counting numbers from the Avataṁsaka
Sūtra, the feature of bidirectionality from Zhiyan, and the feature of
physicality from Ŭisang. The counting is the counting of ten differently
marked coins. The forward- and backward-facing directions are, by stipula-
tion, the relations of having and lacking power. The physicality is the
embodiment of these contrary relations into distinct yet inseparable sides of
individual coins. Finally, Fazang’s version integrates numerical, directional,
and physical features because the coins, each consisting of two inseparable
sides, may be flipped so that either side faces forward.
Fazang does not make these details of his metaphor explicit. Rather, like
Zhiyan and Ŭisang, he mentions key features in passing, presuming
familiarity with details among his readers. Fazang also uses language that
obscures his metaphor. For example, he speaks of one as forming ten.32 But
his metaphor involves one that forms nine others, making a total of ten
rather then eleven. Fazang follows Zhiyan, who writes,
In the aspect of different [essence], we say ten in one because it [one] looks to
the succeeding nine. In this aspect, if we say ten in one there is already nine in
the one, so we say ten in the one.33

One forms ten in the sense that, by virtue of forming nine, there come to be
ten. Similarly, ten do not form a separate one. Instead, nine taken together
form one further, making a total of ten. Ten forms one in the sense that nine
of the ten form the remaining one of ten.

Nicholaos Jones 1163

 Fig. 2. Combinatorial Permutations of Coin Faces. The left images represent coin obverses with
markings “2” through “0” (standing for the number 10), respectively. The right images represent the
coin reverse with grouped markings for the remaining numbers.

1164 Philosophy East & West

IV. Textual Confirmations

One might object that, whatever this interpretation’s scholarly credentials, it

makes Fazang’s metaphor too convoluted for its intended soteriological
purpose, namely making manifest to Fazang’s patrons the thoroughgoing
and awe-inspiring harmony of reality.34 However, I prefer to allow that the
complexity of metaphysical explication often exceeds the simplicity of
religious practice. For example, the communion sacrament for Roman
Catholics involves receiving into oneself the flesh and blood of Jesus Christ
by ingesting ritually transformed bread and wine. The ritual is meant to
invoke awe and gratitude, even though explicating the ritual’s metaphysics
—perhaps in Aristotelian terms of form and matter—is quite convoluted.
We do not know how Fazang translated the coin-counting metaphor into
practice. It might have been an intellectual contemplation, the basis for
serially meditating upon coins strung together, or reserved only for those
caught by the inertia of scholarly tradition. Whatever its purpose, I prefer to
judge interpretive (philosophical) explications by more limited standards:
How charitable are they with respect to the internal coherence of ideas?
How well do they fit with relevant texts? How well do they cohere with
texts from philosophical predecessors?
Accordingly, I highlight two remarks Fazang makes about mutual
inclusion as evidence of interpretive appropriateness. First, when discussing
“the mystery of the simultaneous formation of the hidden and revealed,”
Fazang revisits the coin-counting metaphor:
For instance, the ten coins in the first coin, above, are said to be manifested,
while the second coin, from the point of view of the ten coins within the one
coin, is said to be hidden. Why is this? Because if you see these [ten coins in
the one], you do not see the others [such as the second, third, etc., coins],
because there is no connection between them. Even if there is no connection
between them, however, because when one is formed the others are formed,
both are said to be formed.35

Fazang here introduces, in addition to the perspective of one in many and

many in one, a third perspective of one of those many in the one. This
follows a similar remark of Zhiyan’s about mutual identity, that “insofar as
one is ten, one is revealed, while two, three, four, up to ten, are
concealed.”36
Because pronouns obfuscate, I prefer to make Fazang’s remark more
concrete. Consider, again, “1” that includes within it “2” through “10.” Call
the collection of “2” through “10” the many-in-“1.” Fazang is saying that, from
the point of view of the many-in-“1,” “2” is hidden. This is because the many-
in-“1” is a unified group rather than a collection of discrete entities; only by
peeking into the composition of the group, so to speak, do we find “2” in
residence. This confirms interpreting Fazang’s “ten” as a grouping of nine.

Nicholaos Jones 1165

 The second piece of textual confirmation occurs in a discussion about
mutual inclusion in the aspect of common essence. After arguing that one
whole includes its tenfold parts, Fazang says,
Since this is the case for the first coin, each of the remaining two, three, four,
five, etc. are the same.37

After arguing that one whole is included in its many parts, he makes a
similar remark: “Each of the other nine, eight, seven . . . one is like this.”38
Because Fazang’s argument parallels his discussion of mutual inclusion in
the aspect of different essence, he likely understands his remarks about
mutual inclusion in the aspect of different essence to extend to other coins
in the same way. This is just what the preceding interpretation of his
metaphor does: it shows mutual inclusion of “1” in the remaining nine, and
then treats “2” through “10” similarly.
Both of these textual confirmations depend upon a tacit interpretive
assumption, namely that Fazang’s use of “coin” (qian 錢) and his various
numerical references (to first, second, and so on) are ambiguous. For
example, in the text quoted for first confirmation, I interpret Fazang’s “first
coin” (一錢) as the “1” that stands alone on one side of COIN1 rather than
as COIN1 itself. But in the quoted text for the second confirmation, I
interpret him as referring to COIN1, COIN2, and so on. Cook’s translation
either ignores or reproduces such ambiguity, with the result that Cook offers
a different interpretation of Fazang’s metaphor. I provide, in the next section,
some reason to prefer my interpretation over Cook’s.

V. Interpretive Comparisons

Cook’s Interpretation
Francis Cook’s work from the 1970s seems to be the only recent and
published English-language discussion of the coin-counting metaphor that
spans more than a few paragraphs.39 This is not entirely surprising. Fazang’s
presentation is obscure and convoluted. Cook, by virtue of having translated
Fazang’s Treatise into English, would have spent more time than most in
contemplating the metaphor. I aim to show that my interpretation of
Fazang’s metaphor improves upon Cook’s.
Cook discusses Fazang’s metaphor in the context of the different essence
of mutual identity. But his remarks apply equally well to the context of the
different essence of mutual inclusion, because Fazang’s discussions of
identity and inclusion are parallel. Accordingly, when Cook writes of mutual
identity, I understand him as also remarking upon mutual inclusion.
Cook tends to focus on the numerical feature of Fazang’s metaphor,
applying the teaching of mutual identity to ten interrelated elements. For
example, in explaining the formation of the second of ten coins by the first,
Cook says,

1166 Philosophy East & West

 coin two is not a self-existent entity in its context of the ten (whole). It is coin
two as a result of coin one, and looked at from the standpoint of coin one,
coin one is the cause and coin two is the result, i.e., it is a conditioned coin
two. . . . Looked at from the standpoint of the first coin, which is an entity with
a distinct appearance and individual nature, coin two, which becomes what it
is purely due to the presence and conditioning function of the first coin, is
empty. Consequently, coin one exists . . . and coin two is empty. . . . 40

Cook’s interpretation is fundamentally correct. Parallel remarks for the case

of mutual inclusion would replace exists with has complete power and is
empty with lacks power. In saying that Cook focuses on numericity, I mean
that the ten interrelated elements being coins is irrelevant for his discussion.
So far as Cook’s remarks go, the ten elements might equally well be Kaaba
souvenirs or rosary beads. All that matters, for Cook’s explication, is that
each has “a distinct appearance and individual nature,” and that each
element be “a real, concrete individual which bears causal power and exerts
it” on others.41
Cook elsewhere acknowledges that Fazang’s metaphor has non-numer-
ical features. He comments, in particular, upon the metaphor’s directional
feature (from Zhiyan). Cook interprets the forward and backward directions
as a device to emphasize the absence of priority among mutually inclusive
or identical elements:
The commentaries are unclear as to why there is both an ascending order and
descending order. [I]t would appear that the ascending order emphasizes the
ability of each coin to absorb the qualities of the other coins into itself. Thus,
when one dharma appears, the others which follow it are already absorbed into
the first, so that, again in terms of the coins, number one must exist before there
can be number two. But this would tend to overemphasize the dependence of
coins two through nine on coin one, and so forth. The descending order
attempts to rectify this by showing that while coin one is a cause for coin ten,
let us say, coin ten is simultaneously a cause for coin one.42

Here I diverge from Cook. I interpret Fazang as using the device of the two-
sided coin, rather than the device of bidirectionality, to emphasize the
absence of priority among mutually inclusive elements.
As I interpret Fazang’s metaphor, the directional feature is a side effect
of the physical feature. Elements symbolized on the forward-facing side of a
coin are to be understood as having, say, complete power while elements
symbolized on the backward-facing side are to be understood as lacking
power. Further, the elements understood as having complete power lack
priority over the elements understood as lacking power. This all agrees with
Cook. We diverge regarding the reason for the absence of priority. When
the coin is flipped, elements once on the forward-facing side come to be on
the backward-facing side, and elements once on the backward-facing side
come to be on the forward-facing side. Neither obverse nor reverse has an

Nicholaos Jones 1167

 originary claim to be forward-facing. I interpret Fazang’s metaphor as
illustrating the lack of priority among mutually inclusive elements with this
lack of priority among coin sides. Cook, by contrast, ignores the sidedness
of coins.
My interpretation improves upon Cook’s in two ways. First, it shows how
Fazang’s metaphor integrates Ŭisang’s innovation of physicality and how the
two-sidedness of coins fits with Zhiyan’s innovation of directionality. Cook’s
interpretation does not, because it works equally well with cubes and spheres.
Second, my interpretation shows how Fazang’s metaphor explicates the
inseparability of having and lacking power. Because the sides of a coin are
inseparable, the coin always can flip onto its opposite side. So the coin’s
forward-facing potential is inseparable from its backward-facing potential.
Because these facing directions represent having and lacking power, respec-
tively, having and lacking power are likewise inseparable. Cook’s interpreta-
tion does not capture this pedagogical feature of Fazang’s metaphor, instead
reproducing the flaw in Zhiyan’s version: because ascending and descending
orders, or forward- and backward-facing directions, are separable, they cannot
elucidate the inseparability of having and lacking power.
Cook’s interpretation of Fazang’s coin-counting metaphor integrates the
metaphor’s numerical and directional features. However, it does not show
how Fazang’s metaphor explicates the inseparability of having and lacking
power. Nor does it integrate the physical feature of Fazang’s metaphor,
namely the fact that the elements are two-sided coins rather than, say, six-
sided cubes or one-sided spheres. I submit that my interpretation of Fazang’s
metaphor improves upon Cook’s by integrating the metaphor’s numerical,
directional, and physical features in a way that shows, as a corollary, how
the metaphor explicates the inseparability of having and lacking power.

Deguchi and Sano’s Interpretation

Fazang’s metaphor is fortunate to have interpreters more contemporary than
Cook. Yasuo Deguchi and Katsuhiko Sano use techniques from modal logic
to creatively translate Fazang’s informal metaphor into contemporary formal
language. The result is a provocative interpretation of the coin-counting
metaphor that is clearer and more precise than Fazang’s original. It also
differs in some interesting ways from the interpretation I offer. Chief among
these is that Deguchi and Sano interpret many being in one as each one of
many individually being in a single one, whereas I interpret many being in
one as the unified group of many being in a single one. I aim to show that,
despite other benefits of their interpretation, this difference prevents Deguchi
and Sano from explaining how Fazang’s metaphor elucidates the mystery of
the simultaneous formation of the hidden and revealed.
Deguchi and Sano’s interpretation invokes substantial machinery from
formal modal logic. I refer the reader to their manuscript for details.43 I
provide only a semi-formal and partial summary.

1168 Philosophy East & West

 Their interpretive framework involves three central elements: a set of
worlds, each denoted by a positive integer; a set of “independent numbers,”
each having the same value at all worlds, where that value is also denoted
by a positive integer; and a set of “Kegon numbers,” each associated with
an independent number, each with a different value at every world but all
having the same value within any particular world (where that value is
denoted by the number of the world). For example, in a set of ten worlds
with ten of each number kind, the first independent number at world One
has a value of one, the second a value of two, and so on; but all of the
Kegon numbers at world One have values of one, even the second one
associated with the second independent number.
Deguchi and Sano interpret Fazang’s notions of having and lacking
power by stipulating that a Kegon number has power at a world just if its
value at that world matches the value of its associated independent number.
So, for instance, the first Kegon number at world One has power, but the
second lacks power. Deguchi and Sano further interpret Fazang’s notion of
inclusion by stipulating that, within a world, one Kegon number includes
another just if the former has power at the world and the other lacks power.
When Fazang says that “‘one’ is not an independent ‘one,’”44 Deguchi
and Sano interpret him as referring to the first Kegon number rather than the
first independent number. When Fazang says that one includes ten, or has
power to form ten, they interpret him as meaning that the value of the first
Kegon number determines the value of all remaining Kegon numbers at
world One. Similarly, when Fazang says that ten includes the one, they
interpret him as meaning that, for every Kegon number other than the first,
its value is the value of the first Kegon number at some world. For example,
for Deguchi and Sano, two includes one because at world Two the value of
the first Kegon number is two.
Deguchi and Sano’s interpretation abandons the directional and physical
features of Fazang’s coin-counting metaphor. There are forward- or back-
ward-facing directions among Kegon numbers, namely successor and
predecessor relations within worlds. But these relations are irrelevant to
explicating why Kegon numbers are mutually inclusive. Moreover, Kegon
numbers are abstract intentional objects, identical at any given world with
some subset of integers. They are neither coins nor two-sided objects of
some other sort. This is the first of three major differences between Deguchi
and Sano’s interpretation of Fazang’s metaphor and the one I provide.
Despite omitting certain features of Fazang’s metaphor, Deguchi and
Sano’s interpretation has the virtue of providing a relative consistency proof
for the central metaphysical claims Fazang intends to elucidate, and doing
so without requiring non-well-founded parthood relations.45 Kegon numbers
are well-defined, as are Deguchi and Sano’s notions of power and inclusion.
Insofar as their system for so-called Kegon arithmetic is self-consistent,
Fazang’s understanding of the doctrine of mutual inclusion in the aspect of

Nicholaos Jones 1169

 different essence is as well.46 For both have the same formal structure. My
interpretation, by contrast, provides no assurance of consistency. This is the
second of three major differences.
The third, and perhaps the most important, major difference between
Deguchi and Sano’s interpretation and mine concerns the “one includes
many” aspect of Fazang’s metaphor. Deguchi and Sano interpret many being
in one as each one of many individually being in a single one. For example,
the second and third Kegon numbers are separately in the first Kegon
number at world One. Inclusion, for Deguchi and Sano, is a relation among
individual Kegon numbers. By contrast, I interpret many being in one as a
unified group of many being in a single one. For example, “2” and “3” are
in “1,” because they together are elements of the many-in-“1.” Inclusion, as
I interpret it, is a relation among an individual and a unified group thereof.
This difference prevents Deguchi and Sano’s interpretation from explain-
ing how Fazang’s metaphor elucidates the mystery of the simultaneous
formation of the hidden and revealed. Fazang says, of this mystery, that “if
you see [ten in the one], you do not see the others [such as the second,
third, etc.].”47 Seeing ten in the one, as Deguchi and Sano interpret Fazang’s
metaphor, means going to some world and seeing that some Kegon number
has the same value as its associated independent number while the others
do not. In seeing that many Kegon numbers include one Kegon number, we
separately see each of the other Kegon numbers including the first at
different worlds. This is because, for Deguchi and Sano, many being in one
means each one of many individually being in a single one. So understood,
none of the many are hidden in the one, contrary to Fazang’s under-
standing.

VI. Concluding Remarks

I conclude by returning to the counting metaphor in the Avataṁsaka Sūtra.

The preceding interpretation of Fazang’s coin-counting metaphor indicates
how he understood (one aspect of) the teaching that all things are empty:
they include each other, each simultaneously having power to form the
others and be formed by those others. The interpretation also indicates how
Fazang understood the idea that conceptual distinctions constitute differ-
ences among things.
I interpret Fazang’s metaphor as concerned with differences among
things with respect to their power rather than with respect to their
individuation from others. If we imagine the numerals on the coins in
Fazang’s metaphors as elements of reality, each coin provides complemen-
tary models about the source of reality. For example, COIN1 offers one
model whereby “1” forms reality, by virtue of its having power to form “2”
through “10”; and it offers a complementary model whereby “1” is formed
by the rest of reality. COIN2, similarly, offers one model whereby “2” forms

1170 Philosophy East & West

reality, and a complementary model whereby “2” is formed by the rest
of reality. These model-pairs are distinct, because COIN1 does not
model reality as being formed by “2” alone, and because COIN2 does not
model reality as being formed by “1” alone.
Fazang’s metaphor does not privilege any coin as the correct pair of
models. Instead, it equalizes all model-pairs, so that each is correct from its
own perspective. It follows that which model we select as “correct” is a
matter of free conceptual choice: in selecting to work with one model, we
engage reality as having a particular single source (“1,” “2,” . . . ) and a
complementary group source. This is the sense Fazang’s metaphor gives to
the idea that our conceptual distinctions constitute differences among things.
If we carve the world into “1” and the others (as with COIN1), “1” differs
from the others in being the single source. But if we carve the world into
“2” and others (as with COIN2), “2” differs from the others as being the
single source while “1” forms reality only as a group member.
So understood, Fazang’s metaphor informs contemporary discussions
about fundamentality. Recent analytic metaphysicians conceptualize one of
their central tasks as discerning between fundamental and derivative
elements of reality.48 Some advocate one element as fundamental; others, at
least two as fundamental; still others, none as fundamental.49 Yet, exhaustive
as these options seem, Fazang’s coin-counting metaphor makes salient a
fourth alternative.
Fazang’s metaphor models reality’s fundamental structure in a way that
cuts across monist, pluralist, and nihilist positions on fundamentality. The
aspect of counting backward from ten to one supports pluralism. For, by
virtue of modeling the many as having power to form the one, it treats many
as fundamental. The aspect of counting forward, by contrast, supports
monism. For, by virtue of modeling the one as having power to form the
many, it treats one as fundamental. The aspect of multiple coins, however,
again supports pluralism. Since which one has power to form the many
varies across different coins, many ones are fundamental. Moreover,
complements for each of the preceding considerations support nihilism. For
in counting forward, the many are not fundamental; and in counting
backward, the one is not fundamental. Since this is so across all coins, none
is fundamental.
This reasoning establishes a contemporary catus. kot. i.50 It is not the case
that one element, rather than many, is fundamental. Nor are many, rather
than one, fundamental. Nor are both one and many fundamental. Nor are
neither. I conjecture that Fazang resolves this catus. kot. i by rejecting the
presupposition that fundamentality is absolute. I conjecture, further, that he
endorses fundamentality as relativistic, akin to Einstein’s rejecting rest from
motion as absolute in favor of rest being relative. This allows Fazang to say,
for instance, that one is fundamental relative to the forward-counting aspect
of COIN1 and yet derivative relative to the backward-counting aspect of the

Nicholaos Jones 1171

 same coin. Supporting arguments require going beyond Fazang’s coin-
counting metaphor.51 But his metaphor, by virtue of deepening contempor-
ary inquiry into the notion of metaphysical fundamentality, suffices to
motivate doing so.

Notes

I thank Friedrich Grohmann and James Benn for helpful comments on prior
drafts, and in particular for generous guidance regarding some of the original
Chinese texts. I also thank two anonymous referees for constructive
comments.

1 – See Fang Litian 方立天, Fazang 法藏 (Taibei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi,

1991); Jinhua Chen, Philosopher, Practitioner, Politician: The Many
Lives of Fazang (643–712) (Boston: Brill, 2007). For Fazang’s connec-
tions to Wu Zetian, also see “Fazang” in Norman H. Rothschild,
“Rhetoric, Ritual, and Support Constituencies in the Political Authority
of Wu Zhao, Woman Emperor of China” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown
University, 2003).
2 – Francis H. Cook, “Fa-tsang’s Treatise on the Five Doctrines: An
Annotated Translation” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
1970), p. 107. I rely upon Cook’s translation to emphasize that, except
for one interpretive assumption I make explicit at the end of section 4,
my departures from Cook’s interpretation do not depend upon
competing translation choices or close readings. For those who prefer
to judge this for themselves, I footnote the Chinese text of substantive
claims from Fazang’s Treatise (Taishō Tripit. aka T45n1866), as digitized
by the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA) and
available at <tripitaka.cbeta.org/T45n1866>.
3 – Cook, “Fa-tsang’s Treatise,” pp. 509–512.
4 – See Francis Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977); Ming-
Wood Liu, “The Teaching of Fa-Tsang: An Examination of Buddhist
Metaphysics” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles,
1979); Fang Litian 方立天, Huayan Jinshizi zhang jiaoshi 華嚴金師子章
校釋 (Emendation and annotation of the Huayan Golden Lion chapter)
(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983); Tao Jiang, “The Problem of Whole-
Part and the Horizon of the Enlightened in Huayan Buddhism,” Journal
of Chinese Philosophy 28, no. 4 (2001): 457–475; Nicholaos Jones,
“Fazang’s Total Power Mereology: An Interpretive Analytic Reconstruc-
tion,” Asian Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2009): 199–211; Nicholaos John
Jones, “Mereological Heuristics for Huayan Buddhism,” Philosophy
East and West 60, no. 3 (2010): 355–368; Nicholaos Jones, “Nyāya-

1172 Philosophy East & West

 Vaiśesika Inherence, Buddhist Reduction, and Huayan Total Power,”
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37, no. 2 (2010): 215–230; Graham
Priest, “The Net of Indra,” in The Moon Points Back, ed. Koji Tanaka,
Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015), pp. 113–127.
5 – Cook characterizes the ten coins as a “comparison” (“Fa-tsang’s
Treatise,” p. 471). Fazang uses the term yu 喻, which I prefer to translate
as “metaphor” (see T45n1866 p0503a29). This engenders no substantive
disagreement with Cook, because all metaphors are comparisons. It also
follows common practice in scholarly literature. Some might prefer
translating Fazang’s term as model. Here, too, I find no substantive
disagreement. I understand Fazang as intending the ten coins to model
reality, and metaphors are respectable vehicles for modeling (see Daniela
M. Bailer-Jones, “Scientific Models as Metaphors,” in Metaphor and
Analogy in the Sciences, edited by Fernand Hallyn, [Dordrecht: Springer,
2009], pp. 181–198). I prefer metaphor rather than model to connote
that dissimilarities between Fazang’s coins and the reality he is modeling
do not undermine the aptness of his comparison.
6 – For context surrounding Ŭisang’s creation of the coins metaphor, and
his broader influence on Fazang and the Huayan tradition, see Guo Lei
(Ray Guo) 郭磊, 義相的華嚴思想與中國佛教 (Master Ŭisang’s Huayan
philosophy and Chinese Buddhism), Journal of Huayen Buddhism 4
(2012): 115–127; Yang Guoping 杨国平, 义湘与海东华严 (Yixiang
[Ŭisang] and Huayan Scripture), Jiang Huai Tribune 5 (2002); Seok
Gil-am , , —數十錢法 (The mean-
ing and structure of mutual-identity and mutual-entering in Huayan
Buddhism—Centered on the developments of the metaphor of counting
ten coins), Pulgyohak yon’gu 10 (2005): 5–28; Seok Gil-am
, (義湘) (行路) (Study on Ŭisang’s path of
life and his ideological change), Pulgyo hakpo 佛敎學報 59 (2011):
85–107. On Fazang’s indebtedness to Ŭisang, see Antonino Forte, A
Jewel In Indra’s Net: A Letter from Fazang in China to Uisang in Korea
(Kyoto: Italian School of East Asian Studies, 2000).
7 – See Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, pp. 471–493.
8 – Thomas Cleary, The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the
Avatamsaka Sutra (Boston: Shambala, 1993), p. 448; translating from
T10n279 p0101b13–18.
9 – See Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1884/1953), p. 59.
10 – See Thomas Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable: An Introduction to
Hua-yen Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1983),

Nicholaos Jones 1173

 pp. 126–131. There is some doubt whether this is posthumously
attributed to Zhiyan after Ŭisang’s work. See Chon Haeju 全海住,
: (A study on the analogy of the ten
coins in Huayan doctrinal learning: Centered on the theories of Zhiyan
and Ŭisang), in Myŏngsŏng sŭnim kohui kinyŏm Pulgyohak nonmunjip
明星 古稀紀念佛敎學論文集 (Festschrift in commemoration of the
seventieth birthday of the Venerable Myŏngsŏng) (Chongdo: Unmun
Sungga Taehak, 2000), pp. 924–945.
11 – Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable, p. 127.
12 – Perhaps: one-in-ten, two-in-ten, three-in-ten, . . . , nine-in-ten, ten. Or
perhaps: one one-in-ten, two ones-in-ten, three ones-in-ten, . . . , nine
ones-in-ten, ten ones-in-ten.
13 – Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable, p. 127. In my concluding section,
I return to the concern about how the counting metaphor illustrates the
conceptual constitution of differences.
14 – Steve Odin, Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism: A Critical
Study of Cumulative Penetration vs. Interpenetration (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1982), p. 206.
15 – Ibid., pp. 206–209.
16 – Paul Einzig, Primitive Money in Its Ethnological, Historical, and
Economic Aspects (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1951), pp. 254–-
257; Lien-sheng Yang, Money and Credit in China: A Short History
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 23–25.
17 – I explicate Fazang’s metaphor from a philosophical perspective, aiming
to make explicit how Fazang’s theoretical framework informs the
metaphor’s content. Doing so ignores contextual factors that might
explain the genesis of his ideas, or why he chose one framework rather
than another. An account of how the religious and political tumult of
Fazang’s era informed his thinking is worth developing.
18 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 472 (就異體中有二門。 一相即。 二相
入。 [p0503b06–07]).
19 – Ibid., pp. 471–472 (p0503b02–03). I follow Cook’s choice to translate
tongti 同體 and yiti 異體 as common essence and different essence,
respectively. There are better choices. Hans-Rudolf Kantor uses sustain-
ing force of identity and sustaining force of difference (“Concepts of
Reality in Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism,” in Chinese Metaphysics and
its Problems, edited by Chenyang Li and Franklin Perkins [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015], p. 146). Even this does not capture
同體 as connoting sameness in the sense of one togetherness,
associated with the Sanskrit ekatva, or 異體 as connoting difference in

1174 Philosophy East & West

 the sense of diversity among others, associated with the Sanskrit
anyatva.
20 – We ought not explicate either aspect of mutual inclusion by reference
to some mind more fundamental than dharmas, upon which dharmas
depend. Fazang’s discussion occurs in the third part of his Treatise’s
tenth chapter, which is restricted to dependent arising in its causal
aspect—that is, to dharmas considered as capable of existing on their
own and with power of their own to form others. Were dharmas
considered as arising from a more fundamental mind, they would lack
such capacities.
21 – Seok argues that Fazang systematizes and transcends Ŭisang’s version
of the coin-counting metaphor by developing it for the aspect of
common essence (Seok Gil-am, ;).
22 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, pp. 474–475.
23 – Ibid., p. 448 ((俱故能成有是有力也。 [p0502a10]).
24 – Borrowed from Nicholaos Jones, “Buddhist Reductionism and Empti-
ness in Huayan Perspective,” in The Moon Points Back, ed. Koji
Tanaka, Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 135–136; inspired by Brook
Ziporyn, Being and Ambiguity: Philosophical Experiments with Tiantai
Buddhism (Chicago: Open Court, 2004), p. 97.
25 – For other illustrations of Fazang’s notion of power, see Liu, “The
Teaching of Fa-Tsang,” pp. 398–399; Ming-Wood Liu, “The Harmo-
nious Universe of Fa-tsang and Leibniz: A Comparative Study,”
Philosophy East and West 32, no. 1 (1982): 61–76.
26 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 474 (二明力用中自有全力故所以能攝他。
他全無力故。 所以能入自。[p0503b16–18]). Perhaps a better transla-
tion (my own) is: “The second perspective [on yiti] is power’s
functioning. Self having power as cause thereby allows it to take in the
others. The others completely lacking power as cause thereby allows
them to enter into self.”
27 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 475 (他有力自無力(反上可知。
[p0503b18]).
28 – Ibid., p. 471 (所以說十者。 欲應圓數顯無盡故。[p0503b01–02]).
29 – Ibid., p. 475 (如是本末二門中。[p0503c02; also see p0504a27–28]).
30 – See ibid., p. 476 (於中先明相入。 初向上數十門。 一者一是本數。 何
以故。 緣成故。 乃至十者一中十。 何以故。 若無一即十不成故。 一
即全有力故攝於十也。 仍十非一矣。 餘九門亦如是。 一一皆有十。
準例可知。 向下數亦十門。 一者十即攝一。 何以故。 緣成故。 謂若

Nicholaos Jones 1175

 無十即一不成故。 即一全無力歸於十也。 仍一非十矣。 餘例然。
[p0503b24–c02]).
31 – I thank an anonymous reviewer for noting that kaiyuan tongbao coins
were often strung together through holes in their center, allowing for
group unification unavailable with modern coins.
32 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 476 (乃至十者一中十。 [p0503b25]).
33 – Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable, p. 130.
34 – I thank an anonymous referee for this concern.
35 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 516 (如上第一錢中十錢名為顯了。 第二錢
望第一錢中十即為祕密。 何以故。 見此不見彼故。 不相知故。 雖不
相知見。 然則成此彼成故。 俱名成也。 [p0506c05–08]).
36 – Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable, p. 137.
37 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 488 (復與二作一故。 即為二一。 乃至與
十作一故。 即為十一。 [p0504b11–13]).
38 – Ibid., p. 489 (餘下九八七乃至於一皆各如是。 準例思之。
[p0504b20–21]).
39 – For example, Liu gives the metaphor one paragraph (“The Harmonious
Universe of Fa-tsang and Leibniz,” p. 66). Guo Cheen mentions the
metaphor only in passing (Guo Cheen, Translating Totality in Parts:
Chengguan’s Commentaries and Subcommentaries to the Avatamsaka
Sutra [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2014], p. 71).
40 – Cook, Hua-yen Buddhism, pp. 64–65.
41 – Francis Cook, “Causation in the Chinese Hua-Yen Tradition,” Journal
of Chinese Philosophy 6 (1979): 374.
42 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 477.
43 – Yasuo Deguchi and Katsuhiko Sano, “Kegon Arithmetic: A Modal
Interpretation of Fa-Tsang’s Metaphor of Ten Coins” (forthcoming).
44 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 478.
45 – See Priest, “The Net of Indra.”
46 – Contra Dale S. Wright, “The Significance of Paradoxical Language in
Hua-yen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 32, no. 3 (1982):
325–338.
47 – Cook, Fa-tsang’s Treatise, p. 516 (如上第一錢中十錢名為顯了。 第二錢
望第一錢中十即為祕密。 何以故。 見此不見彼故。 [p0506c05–07]).
48 – See Theodore Sider, Writing the Book of the World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), p. vii.

1176 Philosophy East & West

 49 – See Jonathan Schaffer, “The Internal Relatedness of All Things,” Mind
119, no. 474 (2010): 344.
50 – See Jan Westerhoff, “Nāgājuna’s Catus. kot. i,” Journal of Indian Philoso-
phy 34, no. 4 (2006): 367–395.
51 – For some progress, see Nicholaos Jones, “Metaphysics of Identity in
Fazang’s Huayan Wujiao Zhang: The Inexhaustible Freedom of
Dependent Origination,” in Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist
Philosophy, edited by Sandra A. Wawrytko and Youru Wang, (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2018).

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