The Unity of the World-order According

to Metaphysics Λ 10
CHRISTOPH HORN

In Lambda 10, Aristotle describes the universe as a unified and well-ordered

whole. As he strongly emphasizes, the order of the cosmos is that of an
organized totality. It should not be seen, we are told, as a mere contingent
type of match. As Aristotle admits, the world shows some arbitrariness, but
this is confined to its inferior parts: the higher an entity, the more its conduct
is determined by regularity. The cosmos thereby possesses, he says, “the good
and the best”, and this is traced back to the fact that all entities do not exist
independently from one another, but in a close interrelation. Moreover, we
learn how this interrelatedness has to be understood: namely in the sense that
everything is directed towards one center (πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἅπαντα συντέτακται:
1075a18–9). The order goes back, according to Aristotle, to a divine entity
which is at the center (or at the top) of the universe (of course not in a spatial
sense). This deity is compared with the general of an army, and a little later
it is equated to a king. Aristotle even ascribes to the entities in the universe
the “desire not to be governed badly” (οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς:
1076a3–4), before he concludes the chapter by quoting the Homeric phrase
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω (1076a4: “The rule of many is
not good; let there be one ruler”, following Iliad II 204) which reinforces the
idea of a divine world government.
Doubtlessly, the most natural way to deal with our text is to read it as a
strong sort of teleology connected with a theological account of the universe:
a divine design-argument. Nevertheless, not so many scholars are willing to
accept this sort of reading, and very understandably so. Given that Aristotle
is generally reluctant in conceding overarching forms of cosmic causality, one
fails to see how the universe can be regarded as an organized or structured
totality. Moreover, Aristotle does usually not seem to go for the version of
teleology that is presupposed in a divine design-argument. And finally, he
normally does not allow for a theology that attributes such a strong ordering
role to a God showing (quasi-)personal attributes, an idea that is rather typi-
cal for a creationist account of the cosmos.
In what follows, I would nevertheless like to defend this divine design-
reading, as I would like to call the teleological-theological interpretation. In

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270 Christoph Horn

order to do so, I will have to dispel three major obstacles. First, we need an
explanation of how Aristotle can justify the idea of an overarching causality
(I.). Then, I must turn to the question of how Aristotle’s account of cosmic
order and unity can be reconciled with his general idea of teleology (II.).
Finally, I will deal with the question of how his standard view of theology
(which seems quite deflationary) can be reconciled with what is said in Lamb-
da 10 (III.). The biggest challenge I will have to face is the ‘coordination
problem’.

I.

When reading the text closely, one cannot avoid the impression that Lamb-
da 10 should be interpreted in the sense of a divine design-reading. But how
can the demanding claims on the divine unity and teleological order of the
cosmos be reconstructed on an Aristotelian basis?
The philosophical problem addressed in Lambda 10 is formulated in its
very first sentence: In which sense does the nature of the universe (ἡ τοῦ ὅλου
φύσις) possess the good or the best? In this question, it is clearly presupposed
that the nature of the cosmos should rightly be described as having the good
or the best. Aristotle apparently considers the world as good, even in a sense
as the best possible. Similarly to the Leibnizian idea of le meilleur des mondes
possibles Aristotle seems to think that not every individual being is the best,
but only the world taken as a whole and its divine ruler.1 We are told that
the good (τὸ εὖ) lies both in the order and in the ordering general (ὁ
στρατηγός), but is more related to the general since it is he who brings about
order (and not the other way round). Aristotle sticks here to the principle
that the cause must possess to a higher degree what it gives than the caused.
But how can Aristotle describe the universe as the best?
Here are the relevant steps (1–7) taken in Lambda 10: (1) Aristotle offers
us three ways of understanding how the universe can possess “the good and
the best”: either (a) by something separate which exists per se (κεχωρισμένον
τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό,) or (b) by its order (ἢ τὴν τάξιν) or (c) by both
(1075a11–3). (2) He opts for (c) by pointing out that both ways of under-
standing the excellence of the cosmos can simultaneously be true; to illustrate
this, he compares the universe to an army (στράτευμα): an army too can be
good both by its order (τάξις) and by its general (στρατηγός), even if the

1 Of course, Aristotle neither expresses his thought in the terminology of modal logic, nor
does he support the idea of a divine pedagogy causing the moral improvement of those
who experience suffering.

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 271

second contributes much more to its goodness than the first (1075a14–5).
(3) The reason for the prevalence of the general (and analogously the divine
ruler) is that he caused the order of the army (and the order of the universe
respectively). But he (the divine ruler) did not arrange everything in an equal
way (οὐχ ὁμοίως) – even if (or precisely since) his order comprises also aquatic
and winged animals and plants (1075a16–7).2 (4) At any rate, it is not the
case that these entities existed unconnectedly or independently from one an-
other; the universe is jointly structured in relation to one single entity. The
difference in how the entities participate in the world-order is then explained
by a comparison with a household (ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ) where the freemen have
the least extent of latitude to act arbitrarily, but have to strictly follow the
order, while the slaves and the animals contribute less to the common good
(μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν) since they are acting mostly by chance (τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὅ τι
ἔτυχεν) (1075a18–22). (5) The principle (ἀρχή) that constitutes the difference
between the higher entities behaving regularly and the lower ones acting
arbitrarily is either the nature in general or their respective sort of nature
(φύσις). The lower ones are entities that are dissolved (τὸ διακριθῆναι) by
necessity; they are followed and replaced by succeeding beings which partici-
pate in the whole (1075a22–5). (6) In the text then follows the extended part
where Aristotle criticizes and rejects the theories of first principles as they
have been advanced by (some of) his predecessors, especially Empedocles,
Anaxagoras, Plato, and Speusippus (1075a25–1076a3; on this see below III).
(7) The chapter closes with the remark (already mentioned) that the entities
in the universe do not want to be governed badly, followed by the quotation
of Homer.
Two major points should be retained: First, Aristotle does not claim that
each entity in the universe, as an individual, is optimal (not even for what it
ideally can be), but only the order in general and the divine ruler. And second,
he apparently maintains that it is the divine ruler who caused the order.
At first glance, passages (1) and (2) seem to leave open whether or not
the divine ruler is the cause of the universal order. The alternative as formu-
lated here – that between the goodness coming from a separate entity and
the goodness coming from the order – seems to presuppose that the cosmic
excellence can either consist in the perfection of its highest entity or in the
perfection of its structure, without implying the idea that the structure is
caused by the divine ruler. But exactly this type of causality is explicitly main-
tained in (3): the excellence of the universe is both that of its ruler and that
of its structure precisely since it was he who caused it. In passages (3), (4)

2 The qualification ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως is clearly related to water animals (πλωτά), birds (πτηνά)
and plants (φυτά).

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272 Christoph Horn

and (5), however, Aristotle differentiates between the manifold ways in which
the world-order possesses the good. The underlying idea obviously is that
there exist degrees of regularity (or of contingency, to put it the other way
round), and the household example is meant to illustrate how different enti-
ties can have diverse ways of fulfilling their natures. Fulfilling their natures
immediately implies a regularity of their conduct. And the higher an entity
is, the more regular and less arbitrary is its behavior. Thus, a well-ordered
universe of different layers can emerge.
Within the Lambda, this doctrine does not come as a surprise. We al-
ready know that the universe is a layered or tiered one: in ch. 1, Aristotle
differentiates three types of substances, the terrestrial, the celestial and the
immaterial ones and characterizes them as being moved and perishable,
moved but imperishable, and unmoved and imperishable. This order of sub-
stances clearly forms some sort of ontological hierarchy, characterized by an
increasing dignity and regularity, and the divine level plays some causal role
(which is yet to be explained) for the rest of the cosmos. Furthermore, the
Prime Mover is repeatedly characterized as “principle and cause” (ἀρχὴ καὶ
αἰτία: already in ch. 4, 1070b34–5).3
Everything in the universe is included into the order which is directed
towards one single entity, the highest deity. But how can degrees of participa-
tion in this order be formulated? As David Charles concluded from other
Aristotelian writings, he distinguishes between at least four types of matter
and hence four types of change or motion (κίνησις).4 Following this idea, we
are faced with five different degrees of regularity. For Aristotle, there seem
to exist:

1. entities which are unchangeable (and hence imperishable), having no

matter and hence no κίνησις,
2. entities which are (otherwise) unchangeable, but in locomotion,
3. entities which are (otherwise) unchangeable, but in locomotion and in
qualitative change,
4. entities which are (otherwise) unchangeable, but in locomotion, in quali-
tative change, and in quantitative change,
5. entities which are changeable in a substantial sense, namely perishable.

If Charles’ reading is correct, then the universe is regularly structured, and

also in Lambda 2, the concept of regularity is combined with the idea that

3 There is an important remark in Metaphysics A 2 where Aristotle claims that God is for
all (traditional philosophers) one of the causes and principles (983a8 f.)
4 See Charles (Charles, D. 2000: Aristotle on Matter and Change: a study of Lambda 2, in
M. Frede/D. Charles: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford,
89–110) with regard to Lambda 2.

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 273

there is some inhomogeneity: Whereas layer 1 is the level taken up by the

unmoved mover(s), level 2 is that of the fixed stars, level 3 that of the planets,
and level 4 that of sun and moon. On level 5, living beings exist in the
sublunary world, namely humans, animals, and plants. We should certainly
add a level 6, that of inorganic things, namely the four elements (I will come
to that later). The motion of 1 is an ideal circular one, while the motions of
2, 3 and 4 are still regular, but less ideal. The motions of the entities in 5 are
even less ideal, except in the sense that perishable things are coming into
being and passing away on a regular basis. The motion of elements is that
of regularly going upwards or falling down. Even if it is not cogent, much
can be said in favour of such a reading of Lambda 2.
Now we are told in passage (5) that the principle (ἀρχή) which causes
these different ways of participating in the world-order (i.e. the different
degrees of regularity) is the nature (φύσις) of all entities. Aristotle adds this
remark which can be read in two different ways: If one follows D. Sedley
and the manuscripts, there exists one single nature which is the principle of
all entities in the universe.5 According to the reading of W. D. Ross and
Werner Jaeger, every item has its own nature.6 Following the first reading,
the universe too has a φύσις, and not only those entities to which Aristotle
ascribes a regular sort of conduct. Following the second one, every entity has
a φύσις of its own. This problem will be discussed in the next section (II.).
What we saw so far is that, according to Aristotle, the cosmic order is
a multi-layered phenomenon: on each level, the entities attain the perfection
that it is possible for them to reach. But is it possible to regard all of these
different states of perfection as brought about by a comprehensive causality
that is present in the universe? As is well known, Aristotle accepts neither
a creator nor a Demiurge of the heavenly bodies or the sublunary world.
The Prime Mover does not generate lower entities, nor does he actively
shape them. Both the heavenly bodies and the sublunary world exist eter-
nally. The stars, the planets, the sun and the moon are everlasting material
individuals, whereas entities in the sublunary world obtain a sort of quasi-
eternity by their intergenerational transfer of forms based on reproduction.
Even if the Prime Mover might be characterized, to some extent, in person-
alist terms, it shows no perception of or interest in the material world.
What the Prime Mover in fact does, is simply to give a first impulse which

5 Sedley: “For that is the kind of principle that nature is for each of them” (τοιαύτη γὰρ
ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν) (Sedley, D. 2000: Metaphysics Λ 10, in: M. Frede/D.
Charles (eds.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford, 327–
350).
6 Ross: “For the nature of each of them is such a principle” (Jaeger: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ
αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν).

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274 Christoph Horn

sets the heavens in motion, and even here strictly speaking only the outer-
most sphere of heaven is directly affected. Additionally, the assumption of
an overarching causality seems to be excluded on the basis of three textual
evidences.
The first is that Aristotle, in Metaphysics Lambda, famously defends the
idea that causality is individually relative. There is “no general man”, but it
is “Peleus who begot Achilleus and your father you” (5, 1071a22). For
Aristotle, it is the father who generates the son, not the Prime Mover (in
Creationist theories of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it is thus always diffi-
cult to separate the contributions to causality which are made by horizontal
cause from those advanced by vertically operating causes). Causal relations
have to be located within a single species: one might call that the ‘homoei-
detic’ concept of causation. A human being begets a human being (ἄνθρωπος
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ: 1070a8.27–8). The term ὁμοειδές – well known from
Metaphysics Zeta 7, 1032a24 – is in the Lambda explicitly used in ch. 5,
1071a17. It refutes the idea that universal causes may exist. So whereas
Aristotle praises Plato for individualizing natural kinds and for his accept-
ance of an independent Form for each of them, he blames him for the more
basic fact that Plato adopted a general type of causality instead of an indi-
vidual relative one. Some F is brought about, according to Aristotle, by an
entity which possesses F in a synonymous way, not, like a Platonic Form,
homonymously. Aristotle thinks that homoeidetic causality is sufficient to
explain how individuals are generated. In the same sense, the doctor applies
medical knowledge to the patient and the constructor his technical knowl-
edge to the house.7
The second aspect that seems to exclude an overarching causality is the
description of elements, causes, and principles in Lambda 4. Aristotle de-
clares that there are, in general, three elements (στοιχεῖα), and four causes
and principles (αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαί) (1070b25–6). The elements are form, priva-
tion, and matter (1070b18–9), and the same are also causes and principles,
plus the efficient cause. But their generality as elements, causes, and princi-
ples is only by analogy. It is not the case that the same entities, e.g. again
Platonic Forms, can be taken as general principles of everything. As Aristotle
emphasizes, it would be absurd (ἄτοπον) to assume that elements, causes and
principles are numerically identical, but only analogically; between the enti-
ties in the world, there is nothing common (οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν) except the
structure of substance and the categories (1070a35–b4).
The third difficulty for an overarching type of causality is due to the
description of how the Prime Mover sets the cosmos in motion. Aristotle

7 Sexual reproduction is thus described as a sort of τέχνη in which a form is transferred.

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does not possess an equivalent to Plato’s Form of the Good, an entity which
is, according to Republic VI, both the ultimate formal, efficient and final
cause of all other beings. (On the contrary, he famously criticizes it in Nico-
machean Ethics I 2 (4).) The causality of the Prime Mover can only be de-
scribed in the sense of some chain reaction, regardless of whether one sees
final or efficient causality at work.8 His causality goes as follows: by exerting
an effect on the outermost celestial sphere, the Prime Mover indirectly causes
the movement of all other spheres and finally sets even all sublunary things
in motion. Thus, only the sphere of the fixed stars is immediately moved by
the impulse of the Prime Mover, and despite the fact that, according to Lamb-
da 8, the motion of one sphere influences the motion of the next one, the
role of the Prime Mover is not a prominent one. The Prime Mover gives the
first impulse, but this is only one of 56 impulses of the same kind. Each
sphere passes the impulse received by one of the movers or by other spheres
down to the next one. As we also know from ch. 8, Aristotle describes the
heavenly motion as the result of a cooperation of the Prime Mover and 55
additional movers. To be sure, the motion of the sphere of fixed stars caused
solely by the Prime Mover is, to a certain degree, an excellent one since it is
a constant and ideally circular motion. All other motions are more complex.
But this is due to the fact that all other motions are resultants from different
constitutive factors. We can clearly see that this model does not describe the
motion of the spheres in a subordinative way, but as an addition of partial
impulses. Even the expression ‘chain reaction’ which I just used is somewhat
exaggerated since the first movement does not cause the other first impulses.
On the contrary, the 56 impulses which we see at work here are independent
from one another, and they bring about 56 different motions. (It might be
that the 55 additional movers are striving for the Prime Mover or that he
exerts an influence on them, but Aristotle remains silent on this point.) The
‘chain reaction’ we are confronted with is rather that of the additive effect
caused by the fact that each sphere influences the subsequent spheres. We
might be tempted to conclude that the Prime Mover does not play a highly
privileged role in the scenario advanced by Aristotle. Moreover, he has only
a quite indirect effect on motion and change in the sublunary world.
Given these difficulties, how can there be a cosmic order as described in
Lambda 10? Can we identify any overarching form of causality? To be sure,
celestial motions have a strong impact on many changes happening on earth.
But they do not seem to play a causative role for all of them in general.
Whereas it is only locomotion which is the topic of change and alteration in
the celestial sphere, we are confronted, in the sublunary world, with four

8 On the controversy, see Alberto Ross in this volume.

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types of motion: locomotion, qualitative change, quantitative change and

substantial change (coming about and passing away). It seems implausible
to think that the Prime Mover could be the principle of all of these changes,
simply by moving the outermost sphere of the cosmos.
But apparently, there must be, for Aristotle, this type of overarching
causative force: the Prime Mover is described as the first and infinite source
of all actual being. We find three passages in the Lambda which are unambig-
uously pointing in this direction. The first is the final sentence of ch. 4: “Ad-
ditionally, there exists something of the first rank of all which moves every-
thing” (ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα: 1070b34–5). The
second is Aristotle’s claim, in ch.7, that “the heavens and the nature depend
of such a principle”, i.e. of the Prime Mover (ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται
ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις: 1072b13–4). And the third is the passage on the sun
and its ecliptic course in ch.5 (παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος:
1071a15–6) which contains the concession that there is at least a certain
cosmic causality in addition to homoeidetic causation according to the syn-
onymy principle.
At a closer look, homoeidetic causality is insufficient to explain the emer-
gence of individual beings. For it does not suffice to explain how the everlast-
ing process of causation in an imperishable universe is going on. The fact
that celestial bodies are in eternal movement as well as the fact that, in the
sublunary world, an eternal process of emerging and deceasing occurs, needs
some further explication. To give an account of this requires in addition the
assumption of an entity that is in eternal actuality. In the background of the
Lambda, there seems to be a consideration known from Physics VIII 10
(266a12–b24). There, Aristotle develops the following argument concerning
the infinitely extended motion of the universe: [1] Nothing that has a finite
size can cause an infinite motion. [2] In order to cause an infinite motion, it
takes an infinite δύναμις, but nothing of a finite size can possess such a infi-
nite δύναμις. [3] The assumptions [1] and [2] imply: The cause of an infinite
process cannot be something finite. [4] There is nothing of an infinitely ex-
tended size. [5] It follows from [3] and [4] that the cause of an infinitely
extended motion cannot be from something with a finitely or infinitely ex-
tended size. [6] Hence, the cause must be something with an infinite δύναμις,
but without extension. The Unmoved Mover here as well as in the Lambda
fills the gap which is left open by homoeidetic causality.
Following Plato’s simile of the sun from Republic VI, at least to some
extent, Aristotle describes the sun and the Prime Mover in Lambda 5 as
parallel in their function as overarching causes, the former of the sublunary
world, the latter of the entire cosmos. In the Corpus Aristotelicum, we find
additional evidence for the role of the sun as a general cause behind individu-
al causes. In the Meteorology, e.g., we are told that the characteristic cycle

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 277

of the sun causes generation and destruction by its regular approximations

and withdrawals (I 9, 346b20):
“The efficient and chief and first cause is the circle in which the sun
moves. For the sun as it approaches or recedes, obviously causes dissipa-
tion and condensation and so gives rise to generation and destruction.”
“ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινοῦσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν, ἐν
ᾧ φανερῶς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρίνουσα καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γίγνεσθαι
πλησίον ἢ πορρώτερον αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι.”
(ROTA)
What the text apparently means is that the seasons determine the life span
of plants and animals. Living beings emerge and perish within an order domi-
nated by the course of the sun. In the De Generatione Animalium IV 10,
Aristotle does also bring in the periodical motion of the moon as a cause of
the rise and fall of all living beings (777b16–22):
“We find, as we might expect, that in all animals the time of gestation
and development and the length of life aims at being measured by natu-
rally complete periods. By a natural period I mean, e.g. a day and night,
a month, a year, and the greater times measured by these, and also the
periods of the moon, that is to say, the full moon and her disappearance
and the halves of the times between these, for it is by these that the
moon’s orbit fits in with that of the sun [the month being a period com-
mon to both].”
“Εὐλόγως δὲ πάντων οἱ χρόνοι καὶ τῶν κυήσεων καὶ γενέσεων καὶ τῶν βίων
μετρεῖσθαι βούλονται κατὰ φύσιν περιόδοις. Λέγω δὲ περίοδον ἡμέραν καὶ
νύκτα καὶ μῆνα καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς χρόνους τοὺς μετρουμένους τούτοις,
ἔτι δὲ τὰς τῆς σελήνης περιόδους. εἰσὶ δὲ περίοδοι σελήνης πανσέληνός τε
καὶ φθίσις καὶ τῶν μεταζὺ χρόνων αἱ διχοτομίαι· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας συμβάλλει
πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον· ὁ γὰρ μεὶς κοινὴ περίοδός ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων.”
(ROTA)
There exists an argumentative structure that is quite parallel to Metaphysics
Lambda also in the De Generatione et Corruptione. Aristotle claims in this
work, on the one hand, that causation is homoeidetic and, on the other hand,
that the everlasting circle of being generated and passing away needs an
additional explication. Let us look first at some evidence for individual cau-
sation. In chapter I 5, we are told that causation is basically homogeneous
or homoeidetic (320b17–21):
“Therefore something comes-to-be in an unqualified sense out of another
thing, as we have also established elsewhere. And the cause of its coming-
to-be is either something in actuality which is homogeneous or homoei-

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278 Christoph Horn

detic as e.g. fire is the cause of fire or one human being the cause of
another human being, or by actuality, for what is hard does not come-
to-be by something hard.”
“γίγνεται μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς ἕτερον ἐζ ἑτέρου, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται,
καὶ ὑπό τινος δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος ἢ ὁμογενοῦς ἢ ὁμοειδοῦς (οἷον πῦρ ὑπὸ
πυρὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπου) ἢ ὑπ’ ἐντελεχείας [σκληρὸν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὸ
σκληροῦ γίνεται]·”
(ROTA)
Although the passage contains a textual problem,9 its fundamental intention
is pretty unambiguous: causation must be explained on the basis of homo-
geneous or homoeidetic factors: fire causes fire, and a man generates a man.
But this picture is not sufficient since it cannot account for growth and dimi-
nution. Growth and diminution must be understood in terms of the realiza-
tion of a potentiality. What we therefore need is something that explains the
eternal process of actualization. The solution is presented by Aristotle at the
end of the De Generatione et Corruptione II in chapter 10. In this text, he
starts from the insight that motion and becoming must be seen as everlasting.
But nevertheless, he continues, one must provide an explanation for the fact
that there is both coming-to-be and passing-away, hence two opposite mo-
tions. What can account for this is only the peculiar cycle of the sun that
comes closer and moves back; otherwise, it would be impossible to explain
the opposite effects of the same motion (336a31–b15):
“This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-
be and passing away, but the motion along the inclined circle: for this
motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality
of movements as well. For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always
to be continuous, there must be some body always being moved (in order
that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements
(in order that both changes, not one only, may result). Now the continui-
ty of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole: but the ap-
proaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclina-
tion. For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes
alternately remote and near; and since its distance is thus unequal, its
movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and
by its proximity, it – this very same body – destroys by retreating and
becoming remote: and if it generates by many successive approaches, it
also destroys by many successive retirements. For contrary effects de-

9 Cf. Rashed ad locum. (Rashed, M. 2005: Aristotle. De la generation et la corruption, Paris)

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 279

mand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-

away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time. Hence, too, the
times – i.e. the lives – of the several kinds of living things have a number
by which they are distinguished: for there is an Order controlling all
things, and every time (i.e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all
of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a small-
er and others by a greater one: for to some of them the period, which is
their measure, is a year, while to some it is longer and to others shorter.”
“διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἰτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ τὸν
λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο
κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχὴς γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μέν τι
κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὗται αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ’, ὅπως μὴ θάτερον
συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἰτία, τοῦ δὲ προσ-
ιέναι καὶ ἁπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις. συμβαίνει γὰρ ὁτὲ μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι ὁτὲ δ’
ἐγγύς, ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὄντος ἀνώμαλος ἔσται ἡ κίνησις, ὥστ’ εἰ τῷ
προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγὺς εἶναι γεννᾷ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι
φθείρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ πολλάκις προσελθεῖν γεννᾷ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις ἀπελθεῖν
φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναυτίων τἀναντία αἴτια, καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ
ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι οἱ βὶοι ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσι καὶ
τούτῳ διορίζονται. πάντων γὰρ ἐστι τάξις, καὶ πᾶς χρόνος καῖ βίος μετρεῖται
περιόδῳ, πλὴν οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἐλάττονι οἱ δὲ πλείονι· τοῖς μὲν
γὰρ ἐνιαυτός, τοῖς δὲ μείζων, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττων ἡ περίοδός ἐστι, τὸ μέτρον.”
(ROTA)
In order to explain the emergence and the death of living beings, one needs
to have an explicatory basis that is able to account for opposite effects: this
precisely is the sun and its ecliptic course. Note that Aristotle uses here al-
most the same words as in Lambda 5, 1071a15–6: διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ
αἰτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· (De gen. et corr.
II 10, 336a31–2). Aristotle, in the De Generatione et Corruptione II 10, does
not claim that there is a direct sort of overarching causality, but only an
indirect one: that of a permanent actualization. It can be characterized as a
co-efficient causality rather than as efficient causality. The Prime Mover’s
ἐνέργεια is in a parallel way the principle behind the causal efficacy of any
cause. The text continues (336b15–9):
“And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theo-
ries. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and
decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal
times. For the duration of the natural processes of passing-away and
coming-to-be are equal.”
“φαίνεται δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῶν λόγοις·
ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι προσιόντος μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίσις,

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καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἑκάτερον· ἴσος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως
τῆς κατὰ φύσιν.”
(ROTA)
In my view, there can be no doubt that Aristotle acknowledges some sort of
general causality: that exerted by the sun (and the moon) and similarly the
Prime Mover. They have an impact on all entities in the universe in that they
actualize the potential being and so bring about the cycles of life and death.
This is a first, important step in favour of a divine design-reading.

II.

It is highly persuasive to ascribe to Aristotle some sort of encompassing,

overarching causality in the universe, even if it is not like that of Plato’s
Forms. Now the question arises how close or far he is, in Lambda 10, from
the Platonic model of teleology as advanced in the Phaedo and the Timaeus.
On a closer look, it is no exaggeration to say that Aristotle follows in princi-
ple the model spelled out in these two dialogues, despite his famous criticism,
especially in the De Caelo, of the Platonic world-soul and the idea of self-
motion.10 Aristotle reformulates the concept of a natural teleology without
making use of these problematic elements; he shares, however, the core idea
that reason (νοῦς) is the cause of everything in nature and that it produces
everything according to the best possibility available. In the Phaedo, this
approach to explain natural causality is famously described when Socrates
tells us the story of his misunderstanding of Anaxagoras whom he believed
to have defended the thesis that νοῦς “ordered everything and is the cause of
everything” (νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος: 97b9–10). Aristotle
twice gives a very similar criticism of the misleading position of Anaxago-
ras.11 He fully accepts the Platonic position expressed by Socrates that reason
brings everything into an optimal order and locates all things to their best
(τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτι-
στα ἔχῃ: 97c4–5). Thus, the universe is optimal in the double sense of the
ordering νοῦς and the order of the structured multitude.
For Aristotle as well as for Plato, this implies two directions of teleologi-
cal explanations within their philosophy of nature: If we know of certain

10 This critique is discussed in some detail by Johansen, T. 2009: From Plato’s Timaeus to
Aristotle’s De Caelo: The Case of the Missing World Soul, in: C. Wildberg/A. C. Bowen
(eds.): New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Caelo, Brill, 9–28.
11 Anaxagoras’ theory of νοῦς is rejected both in Met. I 3, 984b8–22 and in I 4, 985a18–22.

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empirical facts, we can come to a sufficient explanation by interpreting them

as the best possible solution to a given problem; and if we do not know the
details of a given situation, we can identify them by using the criterion of
how something would be optimally arranged.
The first strategy is the predominant one found within the Corpus Aris-
totelicum. It is not restricted to biological cases (even if these provide the
best and most persuasive examples). On Aristotle’s view of nature, we have
to differentiate between (a) heavenly spheres and celestial bodies, (b) human
beings, (c) animals, (d) plants, and (e) elements. Aristotle adopts the second
strategy especially in the context of his astronomy, e.g. in the De caelo II 12.
He says that the great distance between us and the celestial bodies makes it
difficult to identify something precise about them; if we consider them, he
tells us, not as mere bodies, but as ensouled and living beings, then we have
the chance to grasp the perfection of their movements (292a14–22):
“On these questions it is well that we should seek to increase our under-
standing, though we have but little to go upon, and are placed at so
great a distance from the facts in question. Nevertheless there are certain
principles on which if we base our consideration we shall not find this
difficulty by any means insoluble. We may object that we have been
thinking of the stars as mere bodies, and as units with a serial order
indeed but entirely inanimate; but should rather conceive them as enjoy-
ing life and action. On this view the facts cease to appear surprising.”
“περὶ δὴ τούτων ζητεῖν μὲν καλῶς ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον σύνεσιν, καίπερ
μικρὰς ἔχοντας ἀφορμὰς καὶ τοσαύτην ἀπόστασιν ἀπέχοντας τῶν περὶ αὐτὰ
συμβαινόντων· ὅμως δ’ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων θεωροῦσιν οὑδὲν ἄλογον ἂν δόξειεν
εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον. ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων αὐτῶν μόνον, καὶ
μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα· δεῖ δ’ ὡς μετ-
εχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς· οὕτω γὰρ οὐθὲν δόξει παράλογον
εἶναι τὸ συμβαῖνον.”
(ROTA)
As soon as one attributes life and action to the stars, our understanding of
them is considerably improved. This passage provides a striking example for
the teleological explanation in the second sense.
Aristotle famously claims that nature does nothing in vain (De Cael. I 4,
271a33, Pol. I 2, 1253a9). This formula basically amounts to the thesis that
natural things must be described as purposive or goal-directed. The order of
the world is in its best state, Aristotle claims in several passages (e.g. De gen.
et corr. II 10, 336b27–8). All natural entities serve a certain function, and
they are equipped to do so to the best possible extent. Also in this respect,

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Aristotle follows Plato, namely his ‘function theory’ as we find it in Repub-

lic I, 352d–354b. Each entity is characterized as fulfilling a certain function
either solely or optimally (better than all the others). The precise way in
which Aristotle spells out this idea is that many things in the universe ‘have
a nature’, meaning by this nature (φύσις) an internal principle of goal-direct-
edness (especially in Phys. II 1). In Lambda 10, 1075a23 we find the fact
that each entity which has such a φύσις possesses it as its principle.
A minimalist reading of this version of teleology might maintain that
Aristotle confines his considerations to this small point, namely the question
of how natural entities can be interpreted as being in their best states. It need
not be the case, one might say according to this reading, that serving a func-
tion does eo ipso imply acting for an external goal or in the interest of a
beneficiary. It would thus be a mistaken sort of question to ask ‘What is the
good for the sake of which the universe and its entities are in an optimal
condition?’ or ‘Who benefits from the fact that all things are acting for the
best?’ The first problem would find a sufficient answer only in some provi-
dential history; but this is completely absent in Aristotle since the universe
exists eternally, without beginning and end, and can thus have no goal in
time. But on the second question, there exists some controversy among the
interpreters since D. Sedley (1991 and 2000) advanced an anthropocentric
interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology.
According to Sedley’s interpretation, human beings are the ultimate end
for which the universe is teleologically arranged. This approach possesses the
advantage of not pluralizing the beneficiaries for the sake of whom nature
operates. As Sedley points out, this does not imply that man is the highest
being in the universe; but as e.g. Politics I 8 (1256b10–22) claims, man is
the beneficiary of the food chain: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and
animals exist for the sake of human beings. With regard to Physics II 8,
Sedley argues that the regularity of winter rain provides an indication of its
teleological character; regular winter rain makes the crops grow and hence
serves the nutrition of men. Sedley adds the argument that human art or
craft, according to Aristotle, both imitates nature and perfects it. The link
between the two, he contends, lies in the purposiveness of both of them. In
order to make this plausible, Sedley assumes that the nature under considera-
tion is not a specific one (e.g. that of water falling down from the sky or that
of an animal nourishing human beings), but universal nature (“the nature of
the entire eco-system, so to speak”, 2000: 192). I will come back to this in
a moment.
There are two passages (but only these two) which can be adduced in
favour of Sedley’s interpretation. Besides Politics I 8 on the food chain there
is Physics II 8. There, Aristotle discusses the relevance of final causality with
regard to the popular example of ‘Zeus lets the rain fall’ (ὕει ὁ Ζεὺς). Could

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it be that the rainfall has to be explained by mere necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης), not
since it is better (ὅτι βέλτιον) that it rains? Aristotle adds in favour of a
naturalistic view that nobody would assume that the rain which spoils some-
one’s crop situated on the threshing-floor has fallen purposively in order to
spoil the crop. It is merely a coincident. Isn’t it possible to explain the growth
of teeth etc. as an effect of blind necessity? Aristotle rejects this sort of anti-
teleological naturalism by the following argument (Phys. II 8, 198b34–a8):
“Yet it is impossible that this should be the true view. For teeth and all
other natural things either invariably or for the most part come about
in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is
this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency
of rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in summer
but only if we have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either
the result of coincidence or for the sake of something, and these cannot
be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be
for the sake of something; and that such things are all due to nature
even the champions of the theory which is before us would agree. There-
fore action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by
nature.”
“ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ
αἰεὶ οὕτω γίγνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου
οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ’ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ
χειμῶνος, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ’ ἂν χειμῶνος. εἰ
οὖν ἢ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτ’ εἶναι,
μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ’ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν
φύσει γ’ ἑστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ἔστιν
ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.”
(ROTA)
If something happens regularly, it must be arranged by nature, and hence it
must be for a purpose. This is the case for rainfall in winter, not in summer.
Rainfall in summer is characterized as accidental and contingent, whereas
that in winter is purposive. If rainfall is purposive only during the winter
season, not everything in the world is arranged in a teleological sense; many
facts can also be traced back to matter which is seen by Aristotle as the
principle of accidental features and contingency (e.g. in Met. E 2, 1027a8–
14). But even if not all facts in the world require a teleological explanation,
a considerable number of them do.12

12 There are highly diverging lines of interpretation of Aristotelian teleology, e.g. in Owens,
J. 1968: The Teleology of Nature, in: Monist, 52, 159–173; reprinted J. R. Catan (ed.),
Aristotle: The Collected Papers of J. Owens, Albany 1981, 136–147; Nussbaum, M. 1978:

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Nevertheless, Aristotle’s teleology cannot be meant in an anthropocentric

sense: Human beings are not that important to him, and the multitude of
arrangements in his universe are certainly not entirely purposive for the life
of human beings. Furthermore Sedley himself mentions the problem that an
animal’s striving for self-fulfillment and its tendency for self-transcendence
by reproduction (thus gaining some sort of immortality) are not easy to rec-
oncile with being part of a comprehensive purpose. In Aristotle’s teleology,
there exists no principle that generally determines lower entities to be at the
service of higher ones; if there in fact are such constellations of unilateral or
mutual benefit, this is contingent (see on this Scharle 2008a and 2008b).
Hence the ‘business’ of teleology is rather to improve any given entity or
species, not to improve the living conditions of one species alone.
In my view, the decisive passage in Physics II 8 has a quite different focus:
it mirrors not an anthropocentric, but a perfectionist account of teleology.
According to a perfectionist reading, one can defend a teleological theory
without assuming a beneficiary of the cosmic arrangement. A perfectionist
teleology is simply based on observations about ideal arrangements, that e.g.
the front teeth of many animals are sharp whereas their molars are broad
(as we read it in Phys. II 8). This fact is a non-coincidental feature of their
natural endowment. Since we notice that animals are in all cases (or at least
mostly) endowed with an appropriate set of teeth, we can conclude that, in
such a case, this is due to their respective natures, which equip living crea-
tures with all sorts of instruments necessary or useful for their survival (as
already spelled out in the myth of Plato’s Protagoras). Hence, according to
the perfectionist model of teleology, the teleological character of nature lies
in its tendency to distribute advantages to all beings; nature tends to enable
them to have a constant and successful existence. Even if the individuals of
a given species may lead a suboptimal life due to their concrete defective
equipment (or the insufficient realization of their endowment) and are killed
or destroyed, the species themselves remain constantly the same, on the basis

Aristotle on Teleological Explanation, in: M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De motu animalium,

Princeton 59–99; Balme, D., 1987, “Teleology and Necessity,” in A. Gotthelf and J. G.
Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle Biology, Cambridge, 275–286; Sauvé Meyer,
S. 1992: Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction, in: Philosophical Review, 101, 791–825; re-
printed in T. Irwin (ed.), Classical Philosophy. Collected Papers, New York–London, 1995,
81–116; Furley, D. J. 1999: What Kind of Cause is Aristotle’ Final Cause? In: M. Frede/
G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought, Oxford, 59–79 and Johnson, M.R. 2005:
Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford. I am mainly following the reading advanced by Scharle, M.
2008a: Elemental Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics II 8, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philoso-
phy, 34, 147–184 and 2008b: The Role of Material and Efficient Causes in Aristotle’s
Natural Teleology, in: Apeiron 41, 27–46 and Leunissen, M. 2010: Explanation and Teleo-
logy in Aristotle’s Science of Nature, Cambridge.

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of sexual reproduction and the self-protection conferred on them by being

optimally adapted to their habitats.
What sort of features then are supposed, in Lambda 10, to make the
universe good and even the best? According to our text, I think we have
three possible candidates: The first is the regularity which is found in the
universe: namely both the regular behaviour of its higher parts which are
similar to the free persons in the household, and the weaker regularity of the
lower parts which consists in a regular process of coming-into-being and
passing away. The second is its hierarchical order, especially the fact that the
sublunary world is governed by the motions of the celestial bodies in a simi-
lar way as slaves and animals are ruled by free persons. And the third is the
fact that it shows a structure of coordination and of interrelatedness. It is
this third aspect which is, so far, completely unclear.
If we can take it for granted that the Aristotelian universe is teleological
in the perfectionist, not in the anthropological sense, we must still give an
explanation of precisely how Aristotle’s comparison of the cosmos with an
army works. And Lambda 10 is not isolated; the idea of a something which
has brought „the universe into this order“ (εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν: Phys.
II 4, 196a24–35), can also be found elsewhere. What seems to be lacking so
far in our reading is an explanation of the order in the universe, the coordina-
tion problem, as one might call it. If, in an apartment, every detail is in
an optimal condition, this does not yet imply that everything is optimally
coordinated. Here, Sedley’s interpretation comes back with a second impor-
tant aspect: The idea of a universal nature, as it is introduced at the beginning
of Lambda 10 in 1075a11 and then reappears in 1075a22–3. I already men-
tioned the fact that the second text can be read in two different ways: either
in the sense of one single nature of the entire universe (Sedley’s interpretation)
or in the sense of one nature working in each of the natural entities separate-
ly. As I. Bodnár (2005) has shown, both readings are grammatically possible,
but a certain linguistic advantage lies on the side of the second view.13 But on
the other hand, the Aristotelian version of teleology, then, would be unable
to account for the coordination problem since, even if, to take again the
apartment example, all items and processes are working regularly at the will
of the resident, there can be a serious lack of coordination.
Bodnár instead proposes to return to the traditional reading according
to which all entities of the universe strive for the Prime Mover by the regular-
ity of their motions and the everlastingness of their reproduction. As Bodnár

13 As Bodnár (Bodnár, I. 2005: Teleology across natures, in: Rhizai 2, 9–29), 20 points out,
it would seem somewhat strange that, on Sedley’s reading, nature has the good instead of
being good.

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admits, there would remain a certain gap then in Aristotle’s teleology which
can be filled by a Platonic theory as well as by a Stoic one, but not on
an Aristotelian account. This, however, would be a very weak reading of
Lambda 10. It does not really do justice to Aristotle’s examples of the army
and the household. For the decisive advantage of the organizational structure
of an army (and a household) does not simply lie in the fact that each mem-
ber of them behaves on a regular basis. Additionally, we should find an
explanation for their coordination.

III.

Does the imitation of the Prime Mover, practiced by each entity in the uni-
verse, suffice as an answer to the coordination problem, as Bodnár claims?
This seems implausible since in Lambda 10, as we saw, Aristotle emphasizes
the interrelatedness of all things in the universe. A world consisting of isolat-
ed beings individually (or collectively within a species) striving for the Prime
Mover would not bring about the crucial feature of cooperation. An addi-
tional objection arises from the observation that, in the second half of Lamb-
da 10, Speusippus is attacked precisely for his departmentalization of reality,
resulting from his claim that mathematical numbers are principles. In the
more detailed refutation of Speusippus’ standpoint in Metaphysics N 2–3 it
becomes clear that Aristotle criticizes him for having disconnected the reality
into different layers of being – namely numbers, spatial magnitude, soul,
sensible things – which are supposed to exist independently from one anoth-
er. In the same vein, Aristotle’s criticism of his other adversaries – Plato,
Empedocles, and Anaxagoras – regards their mistaken dualism; we can infer
from this that Aristotle’s own position must be meant to imply some sort of
cosmic monism. The coherence contained in Aristotle’s worldview must be a
much more unified one. But in what sense can this be meant?
In order to deal with the cooperation problem, we should first remind
ourselves of some fundamental facts about Aristotle’s theology. It is crucial
to see what kind of imitation his philosophical theology permits and what
kind it excludes. As is widely (if not generally) accepted, we find in Aristotle
no creationism, no doctrine of individual immortality for humans, no salva-
tion or redemption; furthermore, the God does not take care for the sublu-
nary world because he is immutable and self-directed (Lambda 9, 1074b15–
35). Divine providence, if it exists, is at least not a decisive phenomenon of
universal history since contingency, according to Aristotle, is real in the sub-
lunary world and cannot be overcome. In his discussion of good fortune as
brought about by the God in E. E. VIII, Aristotle does not completely disre-
gard it, but gives us also no clear affirmation of its existence. The Aristotelian

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God, however, possesses certain personal features such as thinking and lead-
ing the most pleasurable life (Met. Lamba 7, 1072b14–30). According to
Aristotle, there can be friendship between God and human beings despite the
strong asymmetry between these friends (E. E. VII 3, 1238b18–30 and VII
12, 1245b14–9). Furthermore, we learn that God loves most the philosopher,
apparently because of his intellectual activity (E. N. X 8, 1179a22–32; on
this see Broadie 2003; cf. E. E. VII 14, 1247a27–1248b6). Here, we find the
idea of a human imitation of God. It is plausible to say that Aristotle shares
the Platonic advice that humans should ‘become like God’ and so participate
in immortality (ἀθανατίζειν: Sedley 1999).
Doubtlessly, the traditional reading is correct: Aristotle’s dominant way
of characterizing the relationship between God and the world is that of di-
vine perfection and the universe imitating it. To imitate the Prime Mover can
be realized (a) by perfect circular motion, as in the case of the fixed stars
(Phys. VIII 9, 265a28–b9; Met. XII 7, 1072b1–2), (b) by sexual reproduc-
tion, as in the case of animals and plants (De an. II 4, 415a25–b7), (c) by
contemplation, as in the case of human beings (E. N. X 7, 1177b26–1178a8,
X 8, 1178b7–32, E. E. I 7, 1217a26–9; E. E. VIII 3, 1249b15–614), (d) by
things happening on a regular basis (as in the case of winterrain), and (e) by
an uninterrupted activity, as in the case of the elements; Aristotle declares in
Metaphysics Theta 8, 1050b28–30:
“Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change,
e.g. earth and fire. For these also are ever active; for they have their
movement of themselves and in themselves.”
“μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ. καὶ γὰρ
ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ· καθ’ αὑτὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.”
(ROTA)
The Aristotelian God is the final good of universal strive and desire; the
Prime Mover is to be understood as „a kind of metaphysical magnet“, as
Charles Kahn has put it (1985, 184). Aristotle speaks of strive, love, desire,
and imitation. In addition to the language of appetitive behavior, we can also
identify the language of efficient causality. God is explicitly described as ac-
tive or operative (ποιητικός: Lambda 6, 1071b12–13).
Given these basic facts about Aristotelian theology, what might be an
adequate answer to the coordination problem? Coordination can receive its
value either from the fact that coordinated entities are producing an (external
or internal) good or from the perfection of the structure under consideration.
As far as I see, one can hence distinguish between four possible solutions,

14 See also E. E. 1245b14–9 and Pol. VII 13, 1331b25

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288 Christoph Horn

namely the assumption of (I) a common external good, (II) a common good
of mutual benefit, (III) a common internal good, and (IV) a common good
of an overarching perfection.
(I) What Aristotle clearly expresses, in Lambda 10, is that there exists a
common good to which the different, but coordinated entities in the universe
contribute in various ways, as the members of an army or a household do.
This seems to favour a reading according to which the universe strives for
some external good, while the entities within the cosmos contribute to it
following a certain division of labour. Can this be the correct reading? Cer-
tainly not. The Prime Mover has no end or goal for the sake of which he
could act at all, given that he is mere ἐνέργεια without potentiality and that
he already leads a perfect, eternal and happy life. In the same vein, the idea
that the universe is an instrument for an external end is obviously absurd;
there is nothing outside the universe.
(II) The common good of the universe might be seen in some sort of
benefit resulting from the interaction between the different entities in the
world, as in the case of an eco-system or habitat, constituted by the elements,
plants, animals, and humans living in it. But Aristotle develops no clear idea
of interaction and complex living conditions. So when he says e.g. that men
possess such valuable tools as hands because they are the most intelligent
creatures and can hence make the best use of this item (De part. an. IV 10,
687a8–18), all he wants to express is that hands are exactly suited to the
purposes of their human owners. He does not mean that hands are a divine
gift to men, let alone that the God arranged this with regard to the possession
of other endowments of other biological species. When Aristotle discusses
the advantage of the fact that the front teeth of many species are sharp
whereas their molars are broad in order to optimally fit the different pur-
poses for which the teeth are needed in Physics II 8, he does not bring in the
idea of a divine coordination. It is an idea found in Plato’s Protagoras, Phae-
do and Timaeus to describe the characteristics of a species in the sense of a
divine distribution. For Aristotle, it would indeed be strange to interpret
the natural endowment of animals as God’s will, since then, one could not
understand why God privileged a certain species up to this or that degree,
but no more and no less.
(III) Can the common good be an internal one? The benefit which is
brought about by the members of a household if they are acting jointly can
be e.g. wealth, i.e. something which is of use for the members themselves.
Likewise, we could assume that the universe is good and valuable since it is
made for the benefit or, say, for the happiness of its inhabitants. This, how-
ever, would not be a κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, except in the sense of some collective
advantage in which all items of the universe partake distributively. But bene-
fit or happiness are irreducibly individual. So the assumption that Aristotle

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 289

might mean an internal good also seems implausible. Given additionally that
Aristotle ascribes happiness to a very small number of people – he is even
reluctant to attribute the capability to become happy – it is unlikely that the
world can have happiness as its internal end, especially if we can exclude the
anthropocentric reading of Lambda 10.
(IV) There is one final option for understanding the idea of a common
good of the universe, generated by the cooperation of all entities within it.
The best way to make sense of this is, to my mind, to point out that the
cosmos, as seen from an imaginary external standpoint, shows some sort of
perfection. This perfection might be spelled out in terms of a principle of
plenitude, i.e. in the sense that the universe contains all valuable entities
which are ontologically possible; but Aristotle does not clearly subscribe to
such a principle. Its perfection is rather due to the fact that it is ruled and
thus coherently organized. And this is exactly what Aristotle expresses in
Lambda 10, especially by the concluding quotation of Homer. There can be
no doubt that Aristotle conceives of the ‘ruler’ of the universe in terms of an
organizer. In Politics I 5 we learn that the very fact that something is orga-
nized implies the idea that there is a ruler of the system (1254a28–33):
“For in all things which form a composite whole and which are made
up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the
ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in
living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of
the universe; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle,
as in a musical mode.”
“ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἕν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν
εἴτε ἐκ διῃρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ
τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ
μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἁρμονίας.”
Aristotle emphasizes the naturalness and ubiquity of order and traces it back
to the order of the universe. Order presupposes a ruling principle. In Lamb-
da 10, the figure that is explained through comparison to an army general
and a king is the Prime Mover. But then, the God must be in a sense the
active organizer and designer of the universe. Are we entitled to consider
Aristotle’s Prime Mover as such a figure? Of course, Aristotle does not ac-
cept, by contrast with Plato, the idea of a universal δημιουργός. But the com-
parison of the Prime Mover to an army general clearly implies that the gener-
al is not due to the order; rather, the order is due to the general (οὐ γὰρ οὗτος
διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν: 1075a15). This inference is support-
ed by the remark at the end of ch. 10 that the beings do not want to be ruled
in a bad way. Even if the Prime Mover is not conceived of as an intentionally
and deliberatively planning subject, he can bring about a coordinative effect

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290 Christoph Horn

among the beings in the universe. The Prime Mover is in pure actuality and,
as we saw, he is the source of actuality of all things which pass from potenti-
ality to actuality. The idea of actualization is sufficient for bringing about a
coherent order of the universe, as we learn from the De generatione et cor-
ruptione II 10 (336b25–34):
“Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, always be con-
tinuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated. And this conti-
nuity arises with a good sense. For in all things, as we affirm, nature
always strives after the better. Now being […] is better than not-being;
but not all things can possess being, since they are too far removed from
the principle. The God therefore adopted the remaining alternative and
fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninter-
rupted; for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to exis-
tence because that coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually is
the closest approximation to eternal being.”
“ἀεὶ δ’, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, συνεχὴς ἔσται ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά (καὶ οὐδέποτε
ὑπολείψει δι’ ἣν εἴπομεν αἰτίαν), τοῦτο δ’ εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐν
ἅπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὀρέγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἢ
τὸ μὴ εἶναι (τὸ δ’ εἶναι ποσαχῶς λέγομεν, ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται), τοῦτο δ’ ἐν
ἅπασιν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λει-
πομένῳ τρόπῳ συνεπλήρωσε τὸ ὅλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν·
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα συνείροιτο τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας
τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν.”
(ROTA)
The divine contribution to the perfection of the universe is precisely its per-
manent and everlasting actualization. Given what we said in section I, the
God is the principle behind the causality exerted by the different beings.
At this point, we should return to Sedley’s second proposal: that of a
unified nature of the universe. I think that he is right on this, and we can
now see why. Nature can be described by Aristotle as the ordering effect of
the divine rule. When in the De Caelo Aristotle uses the formula ‘Nature
does nothing in vain’, he does so by saying: Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην
ποιοῦσιν (De Cael. I 4, 271a33). The parallelism between God and Nature
need not be epexegetic, having the meaning ‘God, i.e. Nature’. But would
also be implausible that the phrase is meant simply in the sense of ‘Paul and
Susan do nothing in vain’, presupposing that these two persons act independ-
ently from one another. We should read it in the sense that all instantiations
of order that we find in the universe can ultimately be traced back to the
divine constitution of the universe. Order and ‘the best’ can be realized, as
we know it from Lambda 10, in layers or degrees, as Aristotle spells out in
the De Caelo II 12 (292b13–19):

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 The Unity of the World-order According to Metaphysics Λ 10 291

“Thus, taking health as an end, there will be one thing that always pos-
sesses health, others that attain it, one by reducing flesh, another by
running and thus reducing flesh, another by taking steps to enable him-
self to run, thus further increasing the number of movements, while an-
other cannot attain health itself, but only running or reduction of flesh,
so that one or other of these is for such a being the end. For while it is
clearly best for any being to attain the real end, yet, if that cannot be,
the nearer it is to the best the better will be its state.”
“οἷον εἰ ὑγίεια τέλος, τὸ μὲν δὴ ἀεὶ ὑγιαίνει, τὸ δ’ ἰσχνανθέν, τὸ δὲ δραμὸν
καὶ ἰσχνανθέν, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρᾶξαν τοῦ δραμεῖν ἕνεκα, ὥστε πλείους αἱ
κινήσεις· ἕτερον δ’ ἀδυνατεῖ πρὸς τὸ ὑγιᾶναι ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δραμεῖν
μόνον ἢ ἰσχνανθῆναι, καὶ τούτων θάτερον τέλος αὐτοῖς. Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ
ἐκείνου τυχεῖν ἄριστον πᾶσι τοῦ τέλους· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ὅσῳ ἂν
ἐγγύτερον ᾖ τοῦ ἀρίστου.”
(ROTA)
This text gives us an impression of how Aristotle conceives of a multi-layered
universe which is teleologically organized and is oriented towards one single
center. There are various degrees of proximity to the center, as the example
of health illustrates.
I think that the solution to the cooperation problem should be formulat-
ed as follows: The universe is a gradually ordered totality and thus it is good;
to its goodness in being ordered, the inferior things contribute only a little.
It is good by its perfection, not by the goods or advantages it brings about
externally or internally. This reading is attractive since it explains why regu-
lar behaviour is seen as beneficial for everything; it is simply the idea of a
perfect order which makes the universe valuable. This line of thought is de-
veloped in favour of a perfectionist reading in the sense of a divine design-
argument. The common good which is under consideration is that of perfec-
tion, spelled out as regularity, hierarchy, and everlastingness.

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