Rohan - Moot
Rohan - Moot
MR. X PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF INDIA.....................................................................................RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...............................................................................................i
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................ii
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................01
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................02
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES...............................................................................................05
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.......................................................................................06
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...........................................................................................07
8. PRAYER............................................................................................................................14
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A. STATUTES REFERRED
B. BOOKS REFERRED
C. LIST OF CASES
1. Asif Hameed v State of J & K, AIR 1989 SC 1899.
2. Chiranjit Lal v Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
3. Clarance Pais v Union of India AIR 2001 SC 1151 @ 1152.
4. E P Royappa v State ofTamil Nadu 1974 AIR 555
5. Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 35
6. Janata Dal v H.S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892.
7. Kangshari v State of West Bengal (1960) 2 SCR 646.
8. Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873, 891
9. M.G. Badappanavar v State of Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC 666.
10. P. Ramachandra Rao v State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578.
11. S.P. Gupta v President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149
12. Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2920.
13. Shantabai v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1958 SC 532.
14. State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh,(2005) 10 SCC 437
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
D.RESEARCH DATABASE
www.manupatra.com
www.scconline.com
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 32 1 of the constitution of India for the
violation of fundamental rights enumerated in part III of the constitution. The respondent
maintains that no violation of rights has taken place. Therefore, this Hon’ble court need not
entertain its jurisdiction in this petition.
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may
by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND:
The Citizenship Amendment Bill, hereinafter referred to as ‘CAB’, came into force in 2016
by the amendment of the Citizenship Act, 1955. In the light of this bill, the Joint
Parliamentary Committee submitted its report on January 7, 2019. Finally the Citizenship
Amendment Bill was passed on 8th January, 2019 by the Lok Sabha which lapsed with its 16th
dissolution. Subsequently, on 9th December, 2019 the Bill was again introduced by the
Ministry of Home Affairs Amit Shah in the 17 th Lok Sabha session and was passed on 10 th
December, 2019. The Rajya Sabha gave its assent and passed the Bill on 11 th December,
2019, which came to known as the Citizenship Amendment Act, hereinafter referred to as
‘CAA.’
The legislative intent behind passing of CAA is to provide the status of Indian citizenship to
illegal immigrants, who entered India on or before the date 31 st December, 2014. This Act
basically focuses on migrants of six different religions namely, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists,
Jains, Parsis and Christians from three theocratic states namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and
Pakistan. According to the provisions of the Act, any individual shall be considered eligible
if he/she has resided in India during previous 12 months or for 11 of the previous 14 years.
For the specified class of illegal migrants, the number of years of residency has been relaxed
from 11 years to five years.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
o Such persons shall be deemed to be citizens of India from the date of their entry
into India, and
o All legal proceedings against them in respect of their illegal migration or
citizenship will be closed.
It also says people holding Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards - an immigration
status permitting a foreign citizen of Indian origin to live and work in India indefinitely -
can lose their status if they violate local laws for major and minor offences and violations.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
EXCEPTION
The Act adds that the provisions on citizenship for illegal migrants will not apply to the
tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Tripura, as included in the Sixth
Schedule of the Constitution.
These tribal areas include Karbi Anglong (in Assam), Garo Hills (in Meghalaya),
Chakma District (in Mizoram), and Tripura Tribal Areas District.
It will also not apply to the areas under the Inner Line Permit under the Bengal
Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873.
The Inner Line Permit regulates the visit of Indians to Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and
Nagaland.
The passing of the Act resulted in widespread protests with various individuals and
organizations claiming the act to be discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights
guaranteed under part III of the Indian Constitution.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
That the petitioner has no locus standi to file a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India as no fundamental rights of the petitioner have been violated.
The requirement of locus standi of a party to litigation is mandatory because the legal capacity
of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific
remedy sought for has to be ascetained at the very beginning of the consideration of a
challenge.2 Therefore, locus stadi is a paramount consideration for the initiation of a writ for
the violation of a fundamental right.
In the case of Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v. Union of India3, the Supreme Court has held that,
“It is well-settled that, the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 32 is an
important and integral part of the Indian Constitution but violation of a fundamental right is
the sine qua non for seeking enforcement of those rights by the Supreme Court. In order to
establish the violation of a fundamental right, the Court has to consider the direct and
inevitable consequences of the action which is sought to be remedied or the guarantee of
which is sought to be enforced.”
Consequently, unless the petitioner is able to show that his legal rights have been adversely
affected or that a breach of such rights is likely to be committed, they are not entitled to file a
2
Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, AIR 1993 SC 892.
3
Hindi Hitrashak Samiti v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 352.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
petition under Article 32.4 In the case of S.P. Gupta v. President of India 5, it has been held
that,
“The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a
person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally
protected interest by the impugned action of the state or a public authority or any other person
who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or
legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is
personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or
threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress.”
Therefore, Artice 32 cannot be invoked simply to adjudge the validity of any legislation or an
administrative action unless it adversely affects the fundamental rights of the petitioner. 6 It is
humbly argued that in the present case, the petitioner has not locus standi for the present
petition as no legal or constitutional rights of the petitioner have been affected by the
enactment of the impugned legislation.
That the doctrine of separation of powers prevents the Judiciary from entertaining a
petition against the policy decisions of the Legislature.
Although the doctrine of Separation of Powers has not been recognized under the constitution
in its absolute rigidity, but the Constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of
various organs of the state. The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary have to function within
their respective spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions
assigned to another.7 Therefore, under the principles enshrined under the Constitution, the
judiciary should not interfere with legislation unless there has been a violation of a
fundamental right or there is a possibility that the operation of a legislation may violate a
fundamental right.
In the case of State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh 8, the Supreme Court had held that “where
the words are clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or to take upon itself
4
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
5
S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149
6
Shantabai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1958 SC 532.
7
Asif Hameed v. State of J & K, AIR 1989 SC 1899.
8
State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh,(2005) 10 SCC 437.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judge should not
proclaim that they are playing the role of lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial
valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication
from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased.”
Moreover, in the case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India 9,
it has been held that the mere possibility that a legislation may enable the abuse of power shall
not be a ground for denying the power conferred by the legislation to an authority. The Courts
shall exercise restraint in interfering with a legislation and do so only to remove obvious
lacunae and fill the gaps in the legislation. 10 However, they cannot entrench upon the feild of
legislation. That is the sole pergative of the Legislature.
Consequently, as no fundamental rights of the pertitioners have been violated due to the
application of the impugned legislations, the petitioner has not locus standi for filing the
present petition. Therefore, as the jurisdiction conferred to the Supreme Court under Article
32 is contigent upon the infringement of a fundamental right, the present petition is not
maintainable before the Hon’ble Court.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
That the impugned legislatiion is not violative of Article 14 of the Consitution of India.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the provisions of the impugned Act are
not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the classfications made by the legislation are
not arbitrary and have an inteligible differentia with the object sought to be achieved by the
Act.
Equality is a basic feature of the Consitution and any treatment of equals unequally or
unequals as equals will be a violation of the basic structure of the Constitution of India.11
Article 14 enshrines two concepts: equality before law and equal protection of laws. The first
principle states that every person shall receive equal treatment under the laws of the nation,
and no person shall be discriminated against by the law or obtain concessions by operation of
law. Secondly, the principle of equal protection of laws states that equal treatment shall only
be encouraged under equal circumstances. Meaning thereby, that the state can legitimately
discriminate amoung people who are under different circumstances.
The operation of Article 14 is mainly governed by two overarching doctrines of interpretation
that have been used by the judiciary for determining the operation of the statute. The Doctrine
of Reasonable Classification states that if there is a reasonable classification by a legislation
which is based on an intelligible differentia, and that this differentia has a nexus with the
objective that is sought to be achieved by the legislation. 12 Secondly, in the case of E.P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu13, the Supreme Court propounded the Doctrine of Non-
Arbitrariness which states that the fact that a legislation makes a reasonable classification
based on intelligible differentia is irrelevant if the action resulting from the operation of the
legislation is arbitrary. The arbitrariness of the legislation shall make it irrevocably violative
of Article 14.
It is further submitted that Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable
classification of persons, objects and transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of
achieving specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should fulfill the following two
11
M.G. Badappanavar v State of Karnataka (2001) 2 SCC 666.
12
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,
13
E P Royappa v State ofTamil Nadu 1974 AIR 555.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
The object sought to be achieved by the Act is providing citizenship in India to the person
who have suffered injustice in the abovementined nations due to the fact that their roots were
in India. In the case of Clarance Pais v Union of India16 the Supreme Court of the view that
“Historical reasons may justify differential treatment of separate geographical regions
14
Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 873, 891.
15
Kangshari v State of West Bengal (1960) 2 SCR 646.
16
Clarance Pais v Union of India AIR 2001 SC 1151 @ 1152.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
provided, it bears a reason and just relation to the matter in respect if which differential
treatment is accorded.”
Therefore, it is humbly contended that the classification of persons under the impugned Act is
not arbitraty is nature as the Act affords a mechanism for obtaining citizenship on historical
and geographical grounds. Historically, because before the partition of India, the
abovementioned states were a part of the Indian sub-continent, were for all intents and
purposes, one nations. However, after the partition of India, such states evolved into
theocratic Islamic nations with Islam as their state religion. This has given such states an
excuse to persecute the minorities residing within them, especially those minorites with their
roots in India. The object of the present legislation is to provide asylum to such persecuted
minorities in India and this is done by providing citizenship to such persons. Therefore, it is
humbly contended that the impugned Act makes a reasonable classification based on a
rational nexus.
Furthermore, with regard to constitutionality, the presumption is always in favor of a statute
in i.e. that the legislature is competent in carrying its functions, and is cognizant of all of the
constitutional doctrines and principles involved in the operation of a statute.
17
Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2920.
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
PRAYER
Wherefore in the lights of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the Counsel for the Respondent most humbly prays before this Forum to adjudge and
declare that:
And to pass any order that the Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the best interests of justice and
equity.
Sd/-
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