Seminar Paper MISSION COMMAND

by
LTC Abdel Aziz BIO DJIBRIL
Benin National Gendarmerie

Under the Direction of:

United States Army War College

The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army
War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the
Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional
accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation .
 Information

Title: MISSION COMMAND

Author: LTC Abdel Aziz BIO DJIBRIL

FI: Col Richard C. SHEFFE

Page Count: 8 Word Count: 2115

Through the varied and complex record of wars across the 20th century, the

character of war has significantly changed. These alterations drove change in doctrinal

approaches of most great armies, including the U.S. Army, to adapt to the new

situational environment. The complexity of this new environment led the U.S. Army,

confronted by a new type of war, to espouse and further implement the German concept

of mission command. This enduring approach, which has its roots in the 19th century,

is, according to the current U.S. doctrine, “ideally suited to the mosaic nature of COIN

operations.”1 Designed to fill the gap created by wars amongst the people, this doctrine

seems to shove the American culture, characterized by a total control of war, through

efficient planning and execution processes.2

As noted by Eitan Shamir more than two decades after the First Gulf War, the

three successive field manuals adopting mission command failed to bring about the

desired result, showing how hard it is to modify the culture of an organization. 3 As Alan

Wilkins warns in Developing Corporate Character, “when a worthy idea or practice is

adopted from another culture, it is important to avoid rush by applying quick fixes or

blind imitation and adapt the execution of that concept through trial and errors.” 4 Now

the U.S. Army through its own experience discovered it is time to reframe the concept

and find ways forward. Due to the necessity to overcome current threats, the U.S. Army

will adapt and implement mission command. Thus, by thoroughly identifying the

challenges that may hamper the development of that new concept and finding suitable

solutions to tackle them, Army leadership can successfully implement mission

command either in its original shape or in a modulated form to match the U.S. Army
culture. This paper provides a critical analysis of mission command and reveals its

importance. It sets the background of the concept, presents the challenges and makes

recommendations for successful implementation of mission command within the U.S.

Army.

Importance of mission command in the current strategic context

Mission command, as defined in the Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, is “The

exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable

disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive

leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” 5 Eitan Shamir noted in particular,

“Mission command denotes a decentralized command approach wherein superiors

dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans

independently and change it according to the emerging situation.” 6 The role of the

superiors will therefore be limited to design and control. After defining the objectives and

allocating the desired resources to the subordinates, the superiors will give free hand to

their subordinates to conceive and carry out the plan. In this concept, the superiors

focus more on the final results, the overall situation, and the enemy leaving aside

processes and procedures.

However, with the execution of the mission primarily based on the creativity and

the determination of the subordinates, the superiors keep an eye on the alignment of

ends, ways, and means. Both commanders and subordinates make decisions by

collectively aligning and coordinating across and within echelons to ensure the

coherence of the entire network.7 Failing to implement mission command can jeopardize

the success of one’s mission and even leads to defeat. A fine example of that is the

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defeat of the Confederate forces at Pea Ridge in March 1862. The defeat was due to

the inability of their commander, MG Earl Van Dorn to understand or apply the tenets of

mission command by ignoring both his subordinates’ advice and his own senses in

pressing an attack after the original goals became unattainable. 8

This concept is not actually new. It came from the Prussian then German military.

Its relevance today for the U.S. Army came from the kind of war American soldiers are

fighting in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq. The traditional way of fighting can barely

overcome these kind of insurgencies, causing tremendous damage to the U.S. Army.

Therefore, it was essential to find a better solution by either creating a new concept or

adapting an old one to meet the challenges of insurgencies. In this perspective, mission

command is the most promising option to fill in this gap. The new mode of fighting

centers on seizing and maintaining initiative, rather than the traditional attrition strategy.

The new doctrine can then adapt the needs and focus more on initiative, depth, agility,

and synchronization.9 So, by providing clear intent, commanders can rely on their

subordinates to be able, through creativity and full commitment, to take action to

accomplish their missions. Mission command is not only the balance of the art of

command with the science of control, but also the balance of leadership with

management.

To instill mission command, it is important to institutionalize and operationalize it

into every single aspect of military domain (doctrine, education, training etc…). U.S.

military at all levels, must learn creative, critical, and system thinking, as well as

adaptability, independence, and rapid decision-making to prepare themselves to be

autonomous.10 This implies a change in military culture which to be successful must

3
follow three crucial steps. First, create a shared understanding and purpose. Second,

provide a clear intent of the commander. Last, but not least, exercise disciplined

initiative, as well as, use of mission orders and accept prudent risk. 11 These steps, albeit

simple to present, will face several challenges in their implementation that can

jeopardize the whole process of the new doctrine.

Challenges of the establishment of Mission Command in the U.S. Army

Establishing mission command, a German concept into the U.S. Army will

definitely challenge the U.S. military culture. That is why it appears reasonable to

identify these challenges and then, minimize the effects of their impact on the

implementation of the concept. In the Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous

(VUCA) environment where the U.S. Army is operating, the first major challenge that

appears is trust. A mutual trust among commanders, subordinates, and partners is

necessary in the process of mission command. The mutual trust must derive from a

shared confidence that may help commanders, subordinates, and partners to build

cohesive teams.12 In these teams, the subordinates will strive to understand implicitly

commanders’ intent, and, in return, the commanders have to rely on their subordinates

to fulfill the missions. It is in this context that mutual trust takes on its full meaning. Trust

is the backbone of mission command and the prerequisite for success.

The second challenge concerns the type of training and education that will best

fit the mission command concept. In the U.S. Army curriculum, according to Eitan

Shamir, evidence indicates that current personnel, education, and training deficiencies

continue to hinder the practice of mission command. While the Germans encourage

inventive solutions, Americans officers even today, utilize checklists and scripted

4
scenarios.13 He argues that education and training centers do not still teach officers to

think holistically, or to make decisions and pursue them in the face of an adversary. 14 in

the same vein, Vandergriff states: “Rather than encourage free thought, the focus in the

programs is on the confined use of template processes, pre-determined phases,

matrixes, laundry lists, and pages of commander’s guidance.” 15 In these conditions, for

the mission command to be successful, it is urgent to adapt the education system to the

current needs.

The third challenge is related to the ability to adapt the military culture to the new

concept or vice versa. In fact, the difficulties the U.S. Army faces in the implementation

of mission command in the first three attempts are due to an existing legacy of

managerial approach to command, which often clashes with the tenets of an imported

approach. The managerial approach focuses on a centralization and standardization

with detailed planning, which gives the impression of efficiency and certainty. 16

Recommendations

With regard to the above-mentioned challenges, the U.S. Army leadership needs

to focus its effort on the education and training of the personnel at all levels. By

adapting the education and the training, as well as raising the awareness of its

personnel, the U.S. Army can substantially improve the environment, and facilitate the

implementation of mission command.

Although it seems to be a psychological issue, trust is a matter of education and

people can learned it. Therefore, it is important to instill trust within U.S. military

personnel, through education about army values related to mission command. Army

must reinforce honesty, sense of supreme sacrifice, loyalty, and commitment. All

5
commanders must scrupulously follow army leadership principles in order to establish

confidence in their command through a positive command climate. As learned behavior

to develop through education, trust in mission command should not be blind; education

must offer officers the ability to recognize the capability of their subordinates to

implement mission command.17 This skill will enable the commanders to leave initiative

to their subordinates to proceed and report later on. Taking initiative in combat is a

heavy responsibility for non-seasoned officers. Therefore, they need an adequate

training to ensure mission success. In 1944, when MG McClain assigned a mission to

his subordinates, he did not tell them how to seize the Mayenne Bridge because he

trusted them and provided them a clear intent.

Indeed, the complexity of mission command demands a modulation of the

curricula of training and education at all levels of command. As mentioned in Mission

Command White Paper, “Training for mission command is about building teams, both

within the unit by the commander and externally to the unit by the commander with

supported, supporting, and higher echelons of command.” 18 Members of the teams must

be able to communicate efficiently in order to implicitly understand the commander’s

intent. From basic officer training to the War College, instructors must place students in

situations where they utilize their creativity, adaptability, critical thinking, system

thinking, and independent decision-making to find solutions to any kind of situation. The

curriculum must compel students to leverage their cognitive capability to think out of the

box and avoid relying on templates to solve problems. The battle of Tarin Kowt in

Afghanistan in 2001 is a stunning instance of mission command where a well-trained

and mentally agile group of Special Forces soldiers achieved a major victory. 19 This

6
example shows the importance of training and education in combat. Moreover, taking

into consideration the intrinsic principle of mission command, which is to cede initiative

to basic units, it may be appropriate to review the training process of well-educated

Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) with great experience to become officers. This will

combine experience, knowledge, and lead to brilliant officers capable of taking initiative.

In that perspective, US army must increase the number of NCOs expected to become

officers.

Lastly, the most difficult issue to deal with during the implementation of mission

command as a foreign concept is culture. Officers, as well as, NCOs, and soldiers must

understand now that they need to be more flexible and not resist to the introduction of

mission command as a new concept in order to enable it to take root in the U.S. Army.

On a final note, if the U.S. Army discovers during implementation that mission command

is not suitable for U.S. Army culture, it is important to modulate the concept to align with

U.S. Army culture.

As small units conduct decentralized operations across wide areas in rapidly

changing environments, U.S. Army operations become very complex, involving

continuous interactions between coalition forces, enemy organizations, and civilians, as

well as, influence from other factors, such as time, terrain, and local political dynamics. 20

In this atmosphere, it becomes very complicated to stick to employing a centralized

command approach to defeat the current enemy of the U.S. Army. Developing an

adequate concept to counter these new threats is challenging, demanding an

adjustment in U.S. Army training concepts and culture.

7
 In order to successfully carry out mission command, is it best to modulate the

concept of mission command to match U.S. Army culture or is it best to modulate the

culture to meet the demand of mission command? Army leadership made efforts, such

as the establishment of the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE), which

develops, integrates and synchronizes leader development, army profession, and

mission command requirements and solutions to prepare leaders and units to

successfully exercise mission command during the execution of unified land

operations.21 However, Army leadership must put the stress on all levels of command in

order to unlock the junior commanders’ potential for creativity, critical, and system

thinking. Unless U.S. Army made these challenges central to its basic character and

address them holistically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will struggle to reach

his vision for effective implementation of mission command.

Endnotes

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 1
US Army Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington DC 15 December 2006), 1-26.
2
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance 1939-1945 (London:
Arms & Armour 1983), 127.
3
Eitan Shamir, The Long And Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach To Command
And The Adoption Of Mission Command (Auftragstaktik), 666.
4
Alan L. Wilkins, Developing Corporate Character: How to successfully change an Organization
Without Destroying It (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 19.
5
Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 Mission Command, 17 May 2017, 1
http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp6_0.pdf (accessed October 08, 2017).
6
Eitan Shamir, The Long and Winding Road, 645.
7
Anthony C. King, Mission Command 2.0: From An Individualist To A Collectivist Model, 8.
8
Donald P. Wright, Sixteen Cases Of Mission Command, 1
http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/SixteenCasesOfMissionCommand.pdf
(accessed October 14, 2017)
9
Field Manual 100-5 Operations 1982, 2-1.
10
Mission Command White Paper, 3 April 2012, 6.
11
ADP 6-0 Mission Command, 2.
12
Ibid.
13
Eitan Shamir, The Long and Winding Road, 666.
14
Ibid.
15
Donald E. Vandergriff, the Path To Victory, 139
16
ADP 6-0, 2.
17
Mission Command White Paper, 6.
18
Ibid, 7.
19
Donald P. Wright, Sixteen Cases Of Mission Command, 172
20
https://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/Mission%20Command/ (accessed October 10, 2017)
21
http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe (accessed October 11, 2017)