RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Section 7, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte | afable

G.R. No. 74930
February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General
Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan.
Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is
that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

Issue:
Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their
constitutional right to information.

Held:
The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of
the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean"
loans from the GSIS. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and
its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of
the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern.

The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
on matters of public concern.
LEGASPI vs. CSC, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987 | almalbis

FACTS:

 Petitioner Legaspi invoked the right of the people to information on matters of

public concern in this special civil action for Mandamus.
 Civil Service had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City.
 These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.
 Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and
Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy to acquire the information, Legaspi prays for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of Mandamus to compel CSC to disclose
said information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Legaspi has the legal standing to sue

2. Whether the information sought by Legaspi is within the ambit of the

constitutional guarantee

HELD:

1. YES. The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the
sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
duty or act to be performed. In the case before Us, CSC takes issue on the
personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition
is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities
of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there is a vague reference to an
unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on
the subject But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has
firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. When a Mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
2. YES. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information
of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy . In the same way that free discussion enables members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. But the constitutional
guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law". The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security.

It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by
law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

A. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is
of public interest or public concern.

This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the
desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the
agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In determining
whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a
State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according
to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to
positions which are policy determining, primarily con7dential or highly technical,
by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]). Public office being a public
trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the
people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
B. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For
Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to con7rm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would
limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the
civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for
various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret
about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is,
therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to
the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
Baldoza v. Dimaano

A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976 | honrade

Topic – Right to Information

Facts

Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano,

of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of
the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court
to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order
conditions of the said municipality. Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of
authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with
their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.

Issue

Whether or not Judge Dimaano is guilty of abuse of authority

Held

No. The respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. As found by the
Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent under certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the
respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is predicated on the
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly,
in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, this Court held that mandamus would lie to compel
the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the
latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions,
and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court
stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner
in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may
exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
Topic:
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Section 7, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

MARTIN LANTACO, SR., ESTEBAN DEL BARRIO, ROSALITO ALAMAG and BORROMEO
VITALIANO , complainants, vs. CITY JUDGE FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent. |
liwag

FACTS:
This is a verified letter-complaint addressed to the President (and this was referred
by the Office of the President to the Supreme Court) by jeepney drivers and residents
of Pasay City against Judge Llamas for "Backsliding and Grave Abuse of Discretion."

- On Jan. 8, 1975, criminal cases for Estafa were filed against Ricardo Paredes, an
officer of the PASCAMASCON, an association of jeepney operators, for "non-
remittance of SSS contribution premiums."
- These cases were assigned to Judge Llamas.
- The defense moved to dismiss the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
- At 9:45am on July 31, 1975, Judge Llamas' clerk of court, upon his instruction,
read the dispositive portion thereof acquitting Paredes of all four (4) Estafa cases
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
- According to complainants, after the reading of the decision, a recess was made
by Judge Llamas and they requested for a copy of the decision. They were told by
Judge Llamas that there are no more copy so they asked a xerox copy/photocopy
instead but Judge Llamas told them that xerox copy is not permitted and just
instructed his employee (steno-typist) to type another copy for them. After going
back to the office several times, the complainants failed to get a copy of the
Decision. They were told that the folder of the case is at the house of Judge
Llamas because the Judge is making "CORRECTION." They wondered why a
correction is being made when the decision has already been rendered.
- The Supreme Court required Judge Llamas to comment on the complaint and also
sent a follow-up letter by registered mails and a tracer letter. The Bureau of Posts
certified that these follow-up letters were delivered to and received by the office
of Judge Llamas.
- Finally, the Supreme Court received Judge Llamas' comment. His brief comment
was that the criminal cases were validly and properly decided, validly
promulgated in the presence of the accused, fiscal and Ginete and all
complaining parties. The records of the decision show that the accused signed
the same and copies were furnished to the accused and prosecuting fiscal.
- Judge Llamas also submitted a copy of the decision.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Llamas committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give
the complainants a copy of his decision?
RULING:
Yes, Judge Llamas committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give the
complainants a copy of his decision.

SUPREME COURT; ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER LOWER COURTS;

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES; BACKSLIDING; DENIAL TO
PARTY LITIGANT OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS, ARBITRARY AND OPPRESSIVE;
CASE AT BAR. — The complainants were interested in securing a copy of the
decision as they were the complaining witnesses in these four criminal cases. The
request was made during office hours and was relayed personally to the respondent
judge. The decision in question was already promulgated. Copies were already
furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the defense. It was already part of the
public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. And if there was "no more
copy," the complainants were amenable to have a xerox copy of the original on file,
copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested
parties upon request, duly certified as true copy of the original on file. What
aggravates the situation, as seen from the sequence of events narrated by the
complainants which were never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is that
respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records and
gave the complainants the run-around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrary.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS MAY NOT BE PROHIBITED. — The Supreme Court

emphasized the importance of access to public records, predicated as it is on the
right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern in which the
public has a legitimate interest. While the public officers in custody or control of
public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which such records may
be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons such discretion does not
carry with it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination or
copying.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS NOW EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED IN THE NEW

CONSTITUTION. — The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people
are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly
granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV,
Section 6, New Constitution). The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of
general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: 'Maintaining the Now
of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its
dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the Now inevitably ceases.'

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS IS HEREBY DISMISSED AS CITY

JUDGE OF PASAY CITY WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL RETIREMENT PRIVILEGES AND
WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR-CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS, AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES.
Topic: Right to Information
Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
G. R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 | odulio

Facts:

 The instant petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to
disclose all facts on PEA’s on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay
Development (Amari) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay.
 The petition also seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
Amari involving such reclamation.
 On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. 
 On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture (JVA) Agreement with
Amari, a private corporation, to develop the freedom islands.
 Then President Ramos issued AO No. 365 to conduct a study on the legality of
the JVA in view of the Senate Committee Report.
 Petitioner Chavez as taxpayer filed the instant Petition for Mandamus and
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI.
 Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of
the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
 Petitioner further assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
 Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos
in properties of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:

(There are seven issues raised in this case but let us just focus on the fifth
issue which is the right to information)

Whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on

on-going negotiations before final agreement. – YES

Held:

 Petition granted. The constitutional right to information includes official

information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.

 PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. 
 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern in this manner:

"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions , as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis
supplied)

 The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public

interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus:

"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)

 These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in

policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights
and are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression.

 These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.

 PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public
all matters relating to the disposition of its property long before the
consummation of the contract because the government audit requires public
bidding.

 If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this
information at any time during the bidding process.

 Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals

being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and
any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition.

 Contrary to AMARI's contention, a consummated contract is not a requirement

for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
 exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated,
it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

 The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data
used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is
part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials.
The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third
category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned
by the government and used in formulating government policies.

 The right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, and
summaries relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.

 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must
copy the records, documents and papers at his expense.

 The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect

the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government
operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and
copying.

 The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as

privileged information under the separation of powers. The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts
have long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.

 There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by Chavez is

privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.

 We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official

information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
 Petition is granted. The Public Estates Authority and Amari are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN ASSOCIATION

Section 8, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ARTHUR TARNATE, petitioner, vs. CARMELO C. NORIEL as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations, LUCERIO FAJARDO, LUIS ISIP and AURELIO
INTERTAS, respondents. | ramil
[G.R. No. L-49272. September 15, 1980.]

TOPIC: RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS

Facts

Arthur Tarnate and Lucerio Fajardo are contenders in the election of union officers
who received 308 votes and 285 votes, respectively. Fajardo challenged the 40
ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers. OSG stressed that the
constitutional right to form associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor is
the right to self-organization.

Issue: Whether probationary employees has the right to form associations?

Ruling: Yes. The freedom of association is a constitutional right and is explicitly

ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or perlumbral.

However, the right of probationary employees is restricted as the right to join a labor
union for purposes of electing union officers.

The justification lies in the fact that management could by the simple device of
appointing probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the
choice of the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve best
its interests, not necessarily that of labor.
G.R. No. L-50874 October 23, 1981

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA UNION INDUSTRIES, INC., JOSE VALENZUELA,

and TOMAS SENA, petitioners, vs. DIRECTOR CARMELO NORIEL, BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, and UNION INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondents. | Riparip

FACTS:
 In 1978, petitioner Jose Valenzuela filed an application for a certificate of
registration of petitioner union composed of the rank and file employees
and workers of the respondent company.
 It was opposed by respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization.
 Later on, a certificate of registration of petitioner union was approved by
the Ministry of Labor, hence it was ready for issuance or release.
 It came as a surprise, therefore, when petitioner Valenzuela learned that
such issuance or release was withheld by respondent Director Noriel.
 Respondent Director then issued an order for a referendum.
 Petitioner union filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying among the
release of the certificate of registration.
 Respondent Director denied the motion.
 Private respondent Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization
would justify the order as it had a "certified collective bargaining
agreement" in existence.
 The petitioners contended that the solicitation of the signatures for
disqualification was attended by "deception, force, and intimidation."
 It asserted, however, that the issuance of a certificate of registration is
not an absolute right and is, therefore, not mandatory being subject to
regulatory police power of the State.
 Public respondents, in the answer filed by Solicitor General Mendoza, is
equally of the view that the issuance of a certification of registration is
"not an absolute right but one which is subject to the regulatory power of
the State.

ISSUE: Whether the Director Noriel is justified in issuing an order of referendum.

RULING:

NO. In the absence of any fatal defect to the application for registration, there is
no justification for withholding it from petitioner to enable it to exercise fully its
constitutional right to freedom of association. What is decisive is that the
members of petitioner Union did exercise their fundamental right to self-
organization and did win in a fair and honest election. Such a doctrine calls for
application. Moreover, considering the long period that had elapsed, it would not
suffice just to compel registration. It is even more essential that thereafter a
certification election be conducted. This approach dictated by equity no less
than by the authoritative doctrines has recommended itself to the Court.

The right to freedom of association is a preferred right and permits of no further

denial where as is so clearly shown, because of the intra-union rivalry, no
certification election had been held for some time. To permit further delay could,
under the circumstances, defeat two of the prime objectives of the protection to
labor mandate, namely the right to self-organization and the right to collective
bargaining by the union that would emerge triumphant in a certification election.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. L-32613-14. December 27, 1972.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner, vs. HON. SIMEON N. FERRER (in

his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I),
FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias  "Bob," and NILO S.
TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias  "Taba,"  respondents. | rollan

FACTS:

- On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-

Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac.
- On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation
and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
- Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
- Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion.
- On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute
on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him
the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE: Whether the Anti-Subversion Act is unconstitutional and is a bill of attainder. –

YES!

HELD:

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex
post facto law shall be enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for
a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining
legislatures to rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the
judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to
suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that
the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as
a bill of attainder. 

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act Was condemned by the court a

quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the
Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its
existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.' "By
means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge,"
and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if
the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and
voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly
created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."

This statute specifies the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing
body of any labor organization.

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally

unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still
has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that
the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they
joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force,
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and
domination of a foreign power.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities,
this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting
partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or
employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to
the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly,
a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at
least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid
even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan. 17

In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace

Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of
union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by
this Court. 19

Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to

easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this
ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion
against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding
office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment
of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding
that they had engaged in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a
member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor
union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
Na-doble lang sa digest – pili na lang kayo if digest ni Mikh or ni Hezel 

Topic: Right to form and join association

Case No. 8: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. SIMEON N. FERRER (in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of FERRER (in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO
alias “Bob”, and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba” | solana

Facts:

 A criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was led
against the respondent Feliciano Co.

 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a

prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
information.

 Based on the information, the accused became an officer and/or ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), an outlawed and illegal organization
aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines through illegal means for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
government under the control and domination of an alien power.

 Another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the
respondent Nilo Tayag and 5 others with subversion as officers and/or ranking
leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in
Republic Act No. 1700.

 On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted

meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches
instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

 The accused pursued the subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City
by recruiting members for the New People's Army

Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversive Act is a violation against the right of people to
form and join associations

Held: No, the Anti-Subversive Act is not a violation against the right of people to form
and join associations

The Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,

violence or other illegal means.

Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by

the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the
preservation of democratic institutions in this country.

The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of

the state to seld-preservation.

The existence of substantive evil justifies the limitation to the exercise of freedom of
expression and association in this matter. The court stresses that whatever interest
in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in
the CPP are weak considering national security and preservation of democracy.

As was held in a case, where the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-
preservation and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as in the situation
described in the legislative findings stated in the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best be met
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedoms is not to be set aside merely
because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have chosen other
methods.

For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom to hire or freedom to speak, is

itself an effort at compromise between the claims of the social order and individual
freedom, and when the legislative compromise in either case is brought to the
judicial test the court stands one step removed from the conflict and its resolution
through law."
Topic: Right to form and join associations

Case No. 9 People vs Ferrer

[G.R. Nos. L-32613-4. April 30, 1974.] | solana

Resolution to ng Case No. 8

Facts:
 The respondents Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag separately seek a reconsideration of
our decision in this case dated December 27, 1972.

 Tayag contended that membership alone in the Communist Party of the

Philippines or in any other subversive organization cannot, consistently with the
Constitution, be made the basis of criminal prosecution under the Anti-Subversion
Act.

 He argues that such membership must be coupled with direct participation by the
defendant in the illegal activities of the organization.

 Tayag seeks the inclusion in the guidelines in the decision a requirement that in
prosecutions under the Act, the State must prove that the defendant joined or
remained a member of the CPP or of the subversive organization, knowing its
subversive character.

Issue: Whether the motion for reconsideration of Tayag is meritorious

Held: No, motion for reconsideration of Tayag is not meritorious.

The Act is a conspiracy statute. The gist is the agreement itself rather than action
taken pursuant to it.

Obviously, to require proof of direct participation of the defendant in the substantive

offenses constituting the object of the conspiracy, in addition to proof of agreement,
would render ineffectual the conspiracy device in penal law.

The law is primarily concerned with conduct and will not intervene as long as the
actor withdraws from what he has planned to do. But where the actor acts in concert
with others, the likelihood of a change of heart or of a misreading of his intention is
minuscule.

Moreover, a requirement that the prosecution must prove direct participation by the
defendant in the objectives of the conspiracy would run counter to another
established principle in the law — that where conspiracy is proved, the act of one is
deemed to be the act of all.

Indeed, as we noted in our decision, the requirement that membership in the CPP or
in any other subversive organization be shown by overt acts was intended no more
than to preclude the possibility that conviction may he obtained solely on the basis
of incriminating evidence rather than positive acts of the defendant.

Thus, where one is shown to have taken an oath of membership or signed affiliation
papers in a subversive organization, knowing its illegal purposes, the requirement of
the law is satisfied. It is then that the defendant's participation in the illegal
activities of the organization would constitute proof of his specific intent.

Indeed, the rationale of the Anti-Subversion Act, like that of the Smith Act involved in
Yates, is that the existence of the conspiracy by itself creates the danger to national
security.
RIGHT TO STRIKE
__
Topic: Right to Strike
Solis, A.

ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA BANK EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA AT
KAWANI NG MWSS (AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES LABOR ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (AGW); SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); PVTA
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND OFFICE
WORKERS (AGW), petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and
EMPLOYMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB); METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS
and SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS); GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS); SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION (PVTA); PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE (PNC); POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), respondents.

G.R. No. L-60403. August 3, 1983.

Facts:

o Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while

the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the
employees of several offices, schools, or government owned or controlled
corporations such a PNB, MWSS, SSS, GSIS, PVTA, PNC and PUP.
o They questioned the validity of Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 as it included other types of
employers not exempted by the decree.
o They argue that regulations adopted under legislative authority must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions.

Issue: WON Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree
No. 851is invalid.

Held: No. It is valid.

The court ruled that the President had in mind only workers in private employment
when he issued the decree. There was no intention to cover persons working in the
government service.

(This is the meat of the matter)

The court also noted that the petitioners are taking collective action through a labor
federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased
compensation for its members. This resort to concerted activity with the ever
present threat of a strike can not be allowed.

The terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. In government employment, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.

Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil

service. The salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced by the civil service are
fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from appropriations or savings
under the law, and not from concerted activity.

The right to strike given to unions in private industry does not apply to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interests of all people in the public
service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom
they employ.

The government agencies in the performance of their duties have a right to demand
undivided allegiance from their workers and must always maintain a pronounced
esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It would be highly
incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders
from union leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above
solidarity with the Government. This would be inimical to the public interest.

Public employees by joining labor the unions may be compelled to support objectives
which are political in nature and thus jeopardize the fundamental principle that
governmental machinery must be impartial and non-political in the sense of party
politics.

The dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that
workers in government-owned and controlled corporations or in state colleges and
universities may not enjoy freedom of association. But they may not join
associations which impose the obligation to engage in concerted activities in order
to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from
that provided by law and regulation.
SSS v. CA
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989 | sorongon
FACTS:
 Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after
the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation
of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night
differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the
children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.
 SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages alleging that
the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS;
that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. 
 SSS argues that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws
and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the
right to strike.

ISSUE:
 Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?

HELD & RATIO:

 NO. Under the 1987 Constitution the Civil Service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
 Employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule
III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are
governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof.
 X. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN

Section 9, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.

Section 2, Rule 67, 1997 Rules of Court. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with authorized government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at
any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.

If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and

the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court.

After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer
to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and
promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties. (2a)

2. “Public Use”

 PUBLIC USE

SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO | taclas

FACTS:

 The National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of

parcels of land covering approximately 25 hectares, including the lots of
petitioners Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing.
 Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the
properties. The NHA deposited the payment with the PNB, representing the
“total market value” of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to P.D No.
1224 which defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just compensation.”
 Having deposited with the PNB, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a
writ of possession.
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been
deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law.
However, it was denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of
respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D No. 1224.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: (1) That “socialized housing” as defined in P.D No.
1224, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not “public use” since it will
benefit only “a handful of people, bereft of public character.” (2) Petitioners further
contend that P.D No. 1224, would allow the taking of “any private land’ regardless of
the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners
claim that “there are vast areas of lands which are owned by a few landowners only.
It is surprising why NHA would include their two small lots . . .” (3) That P.D No.
1224, as amended, would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust
and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In addition, they
assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to
determine what would be "just compensation".

ISSUE:

 Whether “socialized housing” defined in P.D No. 124, as amended, constitutes

“public use” for purposes of expropriation

RULING:

 1. YES. “Socialized housing” is defined as, “the construction of dwelling units

for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the
construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities”
 Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded
concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution.
 The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: The State shall
promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, Sec. 9]
 The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic
service to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities
to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall
respect the rights of small property owners. (Art. XIII, Sec. 9)
 In the light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that “socialized housing”
falls within the confines of “public use.” Provisions on economic opportunities
inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the
project.
 In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcel of
land meets the requisites of “public use”. The lands in question are being
 expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project
to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
 2. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to
designate the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing
purposes and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing
of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed
to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the
NHA’s choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner may
not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other
property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose.
The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered
by and has to yield to the demands of the common good.
 3. The provisions on just compensation found in P.D No. 1224 was declared
unconstitutional for being encroachments on prerogatives.
 This Court holds that “socialized housing” defined in P.D No. 124, as amended
by P.D Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes ‘public use” for purposes of
expropriation. However, as previously held by this Court, the provisions of
such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in the instant
case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and
hearing are violative of due process.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN | TAKING

REPUBLIC vs. VDA. DE CASTELLVI

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 | rubie tolentino

FACTS:
The Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the lease
contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the
succeeding year) under the terms and conditions therein stated.

Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. AFP refused to vacate the leased
premises after the termination of the contract which led Castellvi to write to the AFP
Chief of Staff about the discontinuance of the contract as they had decided to
subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be
vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned.

Chief of Staff Arellano stated that in view of the permanent installations and
other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established,
it would be difficult to comply and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President.

Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the CFI Pampanga to eject the
Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings.
The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959 and on
November 21, 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case.

ISSUE: Whether the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the year
1947 by virtue of the
lease agreement? – NO.

RULING:
We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that the two essential elements in
the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain were not present when
the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. The lower court
did not commit an error when it held that the "taking" of the property under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

In American Jurisprudence, the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) is as

follows:

Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering
upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant
 or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 

A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for

purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in
the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the
AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.

Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or
permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable
from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and
considered transitory.

It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land
permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract.

Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case,
because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.

Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the
property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by
the air force of the AFP.

Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant
case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for
public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and xxx the Republic was bound to pay, and
had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in

order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate
(or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land
to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same when the
lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the property for the
purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when the Government
started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the
property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the
fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the meantime
increased during the period of the lease. This would be sanctioning what obviously is
a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the
property of its true and fair market value at the time when the expropriation
proceedings were actually instituted in court. 
XI. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

Section 10, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.

KABILING vs. NHA

[G.R. No/ 57424, 18 December 1987]

by Z Torres

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808 on the grounds that 1) it
deprives them of their property without due process of law and without just
compensation and of their right to equal protection of the law; and 2) it violates the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Petitioners further alleged that their properties are not proper subject of
expropriation by the government.

In their amended petition, petitioners invoke as an additional ground the alleged non-
publication of P.D. No. 1808.

Respondents stated that contrary to petitioner’s allegation in the Amended Petition,

P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette.

The Court dismissed the Amended Petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808 can be
sustained.

Held:

No. It cannot be sustained because the decree is a valid exercise by the State of its
police power.

The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the
Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development
plans for this depressed community, provides the justification of the exercise of the
police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.” It is a power inherent in the
State, plenary, “suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights and did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.”

The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by

and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. For the same reason, petitioners cannot
complain that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law.

Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being expropriated without just
compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1808 provides for just compensation to lot
owners who have fully paid their obligations to the City of Manila under their
respective contracts before the issuance of the decree.

Ortigas & Co. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co.

G.R. No. L-24670
December 14, 1979 | AFABLE

Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision
at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter
transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a
deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to
be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer
Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from
Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started
construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could
also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but
Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the
zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was
made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: 
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial
and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer
Certificate of Titles.

Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that
implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in its favour”, “to
give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social
welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General
Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27
was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace
and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a
conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise
which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments. Decision
dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. L-56450. July 25, 1983.]

RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA, in his capacity as ExO-cio Provincial

Sheriff of Iloilo , petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding
Judge, Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT
and ESTEBAN C. TAJANLANGIT, respondents. | almalbis

FACTS:

 On August 28, 1979, Ganzon extrajudicially foreclosed a real estate mortgage

executed by private respondents in his favor. The mortgage was to secure the
payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note in favor of Ganzon. The
mortgage covered a parcel of residential land located in Iloilo City.
 Thereafter, petitioner Lira, as sheriff, served personal notice of the
foreclosure on private respondents and cause its publication.
 A day before the scheduled public auction, private respondents filed a civil
action to declare the extrajudicial foreclosure null and void. They asked for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioners from proceeding with the
foreclosure and auction sale. The trial court granted the petition.
 The private respondents filed an amended complaint stating among others
that the promissory note was part of the purchase price of the lot and
incorporated in the deed of absolute sale is a proviso to the effect that Gazon
guaranteed to have the occupants of the lot to vacate the premises, but the
guaranty was violated by Ganzon since the occupants of the sait lot up to the
present are still within the premises of the lot.
 In their answer, petitioners admitted the veracity of the deed of absolutesale
but denied that the real estate mortgage covering the lot subject of the
extrajudicial foreclosure was executed by the Tajanlangits in favor of Ganzon
to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price. They maintained that
the real estate mortgage was an entirely different transaction.
 After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private
respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of
Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to which the petitioners
interposed an Opposition.
 In an order, the Court granted the motion of private respondents' motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court's orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause
guaranteed by the constitution.
HELD:

YES. The questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause

guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond
to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and
conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting
the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.

XII. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

Section 11, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution. Free access to the courts and
quasijudicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty.

XIII. RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Section 12, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as
well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
1. “Custodial Investigation”

People v. Ayson, Ramos

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 | honrade

Topic: Custodial Investigation

Facts:

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he
was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, PAL management
conducted an investigation. On the day before the investigation, , Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten note stating that he was willing to settle the irregularities
charged against him.

At the investigation, Ramos responded to the questions of PAL branch manager Cruz.
His answers were taken down in writing.

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging
him with the crime of estafa.

At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J.
Ramos taken during the investigation” marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
"handwritten admission given prior to the investigation”, marked as Exhibit K. The
judge declared said exhibits inadmissible since the accused was not reminded of
this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that he was not
actually assisted by a counsel during the investigation conducted by PAL and when
he made his written admission.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
excluded abovementioned exhibits from evidence.

Held

YES. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in
any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in
ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It
is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
the first day of the administrative investigation, and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors
the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to
Ramos.
Topic:
Miranda Doctrine -
RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Section 12, Article 3, The 1987 Constitution:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

⁃ Rights are available only during custodial investigation. The rights guaranteed
in Sec. 12, Art. Ill, exist only in “custodial investigation” or “in custody interrogation
of accused persons.”
⁃ custodial investigation = any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. The rule begins to operate at once as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is
then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ, alias

RODOLFO DOMINGO or " OMPONG," accused-appellant. | Liwag

FACTS:
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico Laroya and his
children, 12-year old Karen Laroya and 10-year old John Lester Laroya, were
discovered in their residence by their horrified neighbors. They were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded
in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore external
signs of sexual assault. None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome
murders. On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant (Ompong).
They interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was
arrested. The investigation commenced at around 9 A.M. at the police headquarters
in Cainta, Rizal at the time when appellant was still without counsel.

Appellant, who was afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and with an
impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo) and who only reached the fourth grade of
elementary schooling, was charged with multiple murder.

Appellant's defense was that he was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights
prior to and while undergoing custodial investigation. Appellant testified that
although he was conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although
he can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated his extrajudicial confession and insisted
that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice, much less met said Atty.
Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, his supposed counsel. Record shows that his
answers to the questions appearing in his extrajudicial confession are in fluent,
flawless and expressive Tagalog. Appellant further claimed that he was tortured by
the police authorities into signing the same. While he admits having been at the
residence of the victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied
having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same night when he
proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio.

The trial court rendered judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a

counsel assisting him from the very start of the custodial interrogation?

RULING: Yes, an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a

counsel assisting him from the very start of the custodial interrogation.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION. — In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of
Article III of the Constitution requires that "any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Corollary
thereto, paragraph 3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in
violation of the same shall be inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. An
accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section
12 upon being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the
police authorities.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, CONSTRUED. — As explained by this Court in People

vs. Marra, custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at
once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question which tend
to elicit incriminating statements.

MEANINGFUL COMMUNICATION OF THE RIGHTS BETWEEN INVESTIGATING

OFFICER AND ACCUSED, REQUIRED. — Not only does the fundamental law impose,
as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to
the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful
communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice. The
defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language
or dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, INADMISSIBLE. — A confession made in
an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the
rights to which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible,
perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural and substantive
safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now
further implemented and ramified by statutory law. Again, about the only matter that
bears out the presence of such counsel at the stage of custodial interrogation are
the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of the
confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted
the interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to him having explained
to the appellant his rights under the Constitution. Necessarily, even while there is
evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, appellant's conviction must be set aside
for his extrajudicial confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence against him.

RULE APPLIES TO ADMISSION. — The insistence of the Office of the Solicitor

General that appellant's confession could nonetheless be treated as an "admission"
which could therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of Rights
treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in the same light.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; COUNSEL MUST

ASSIST ACCUSED FROM THE VERY START OF INVESTIGATION. — Jurisprudence
along these lines have all been too consistent — an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start
thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, could not be any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must
perforce be informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he
lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he
shall be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, the cautionary right to
counsel would merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an impecunious
person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would mean
simply that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to
obtain legal services, and nothing more.

RIGHT VIOLATED WHERE COUNSEL WAS MERELY PICKED OUT AND PROVIDED BY
LAW ENFORCERS THEMSELVES. — Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any
indication as to how appellant was able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza
Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present when appellant
executed his confession and who was not even subpoenaed to testify thereon. This
significant circumstance lends credence to the latter's denial that he ever met in
person, much less executed the confession in the presence of, said counsel. What
emerges from a perusal of the record is that this counsel was merely picked out and
provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus putting into serious doubt her
independence and competence in assisting appellant during the investigation as to
affect its admissibility.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or
"Ompong," is hereby ACQUITTED.
Topic: Custodial Investigation
Alejandro B. Dela Torre vs. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 102786, August 14, 1998 | odulio

Facts:

 Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO was assigned to

inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific
Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) located in Novaliches, Quezon
City.
 Manalo discovered that the said electric meters were missing and reported
the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City.
 Manalo and Olegario, also of Meralco, gave statements to the Northern Police
District regarding the loss of the electric meters
 Manalo and Olegario suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have
damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal
the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters. They
expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved.
 Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the
scene of the crime and conducted an investigation.
 A certain Danilo Garcia informed Enopia that he (Garcia) had seen at about
10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck,
with the number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric meters.
 Enopia then asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom turned
out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck
number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it.
 The crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They
were included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de
la Torre as the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from
the CAPASSCO premises, but he did not recognize the three (3) other
crewmembers.
 The RTC rendered judgment finding Dela Torre guilty for Qualified Theft.
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, de la Torre contends that first, his
constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation
conducted in the case;
 Second, that the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally offered;
 Third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in arriving at its
judgment;
 And fourth, that the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue:

Whether the constitutional rights of the accused were violated during the
custodial investigation as provided under Art. III, §12 (1) of the Constitution – NO.
Held:

 Art. III, §12 (1) of the Constitution provides that "any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of his right to remain silent
and to have the assistance of counsel during the investigation conducted on
July 4, 1989 at the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO
service truck number 522 were presented in a police line-up.

 He further invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same §12 that "any
confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
 In Gamboa v. Cruz,  this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that,
while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel." 
 However, this applies only from the moment the investigating officer begins to
ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any
information from the accused. A police line-up is not considered part of any
custodial inquest because it is conducted before that stage is reached.
 In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other
crewmembers of MERALCO truck number 522, was merely included in a line-
up of eight (8) persons from which he was picked out by Garcia as the leader
of the group which had removed the electric meters from the CAPASSCO
premises.
 Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner dela Torre.
Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to
witnesses of the complainant. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's
allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial interrogation were
violated.

 Note: Although the constitutional rights of the accused were not violated, the
Supreme Court still acquits petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.

 On second issue, the trial court committed no error in considering the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that
such testimonies had not been offered before they were given.

 On third issue, on hearsay evidence, there were documents presented in court

which are material to the guilt of the accused, but the persons who exhibited
these documents were not presented in court. According to the Supreme
Court, these documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who
 made them should have been presented in court so that they could be cross-
examined by the defense. Otherwise, whatever matter they contain is hearsay
and, consequently, without probative value.

 On the fourth issue, which led to the acquittal of dela Torre, the evidence for
the prosecution at the trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The trial court convicted petitioner solely on the
uncorroborated testimony of Danilo Garcia.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . JUANITO BALOLOY, accused-
appellant. | ramil

[G.R. No. 140740. April 12, 2002.]

TOPIC: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Facts

Juanito Baloloy was charged the crime of rape. Baloloy voluntarily told to Barangay
Captain Ceniza the circumstances on how he raped the victim then threw the body to
the ravine. Baloloy was turned over to the policeman. Then, when presented before
Judge Dicon, Baloloy spontaneously narrated how he committed the crime.

Issue:

Whether accused constitutional rights during custodial investigation was violated?

Ruling

No

It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a
suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What
the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights underSection 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

In this case Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped Genelyn and
thereafter threw the body into the ravine.

This narration was a spontaneous answer , freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started.

In this case, the narration before the Barangay Captain prior to custodial
investigation was admissible in evidence but not the admissions made before Judge
Dicon, inasmuch as the questioning by the judge was done after the suspect had
been arrested and such questioning already constituted custodial investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y
PASCUAL, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999.] | RIPARIP
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135562. November 22, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee,vs.BENITO

BRAVO,  accused-appellant. | rollan

FACTS:

- On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of a child was found in a vacant lot
along the road leading to Patul, Rosario Santiago City. 1 Her body was found
between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her
panty stuffed in her mouth.
- The body was identified to be that of a nine year old girl named Juanita
Antolin, a resident of Rosario, Santiago City and known in her neighborhood as
Len-len. Her body was found about 700 meters from her house putrid and in
rigor mortis. 3 The scalp on the left side of her head was detached exposing a
fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed
fresh laceration at 2:30 o'clock and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock
and easily accepts two fingers. The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage. 
- On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide 5 was filed against
herein accused-appellant
- Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader from Rosario, Santiago City
neighbor and cousin of the victim testified that she was with the deceased the
night before she disappeared.
- She stated that while they stood on the roadside watching "Home Along Da
Riles" from an open window of a neighbor's house the appellant approached
them and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he will
buy her Coke and balut.
- Len-Len asked her to go with them but she did not want to because she was
watching television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following
morning Len-Len's mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was
missing.
- In court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as the person last seen with
Len-len before she was found dead.
- The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television, Gracia
Monahan, corroborated Evelyn's testimony that on the evening of January 12,
1994 she saw the appellant talking to Len-len while the two girls were
watching television from her open window and that when she looked again
towards the end of the program to the direction where the girls were situated,
only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan testified that she is familiar
with the appellant and the two children because they are neighbors. 
- The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department,
Alexander Mico, testified that on January 15, 1994 his office received a report
that a dead body was found in a vacant lot. The body was later identified as
Juanita Antolin. Mico stated that he interviewed San Mateo who pointed to the
appellant as the man last seen with the deceased. Mico found the appellant at
his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon
seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl in
 Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to come with him for questioning. The
appellant agreed. Mico further narrated in court that at the police station the
appellant admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but
he was so drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her. 9 
- On cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his right against self-
incrimination before the appellant made the said admission because according
to Mico he was only informally interviewing the accused when he made the
admission and that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the
assigned investigator.
RTC: Found the appellant guilty beyong reasonable doubt of rape with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether the accused should be acquitted for not informing him his
constitutional rights. –YES!

HELD:

We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory

protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and
the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It states:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. prLL

(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.

(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section

17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from
the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation
in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime although not yet in custody. 17 The exclusionary rule sprang
from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for
coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the
crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from
confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the
accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. 18 Law
enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person
under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right. 19 Courts are not allowed to
distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when
applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person while
in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the
competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible. 20 It has been held, however, that an admission made to news
reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. 21
 
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written extra-
judicial confession; the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during
an "informal talk" at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape
and killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that the appellant
admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the
probable time of the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder
but that he was too drunk to remember what subsequently happened. The arresting
policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged admission is incriminating
because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime
was probably committed.

Topic: Police line-up

Case No. 23: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUIRICO DAGPIN y ESMADE | solana

Facts:
 The appellant was charged with murder when shot with the use of a home-made
shotgun Nilo Caermare.

 At about 1:00 a.m., March 20, 1996, Randy, in the company of his Uncle Nilo, his
sisters Rena and Rona, and Mario Aliman, were on their way home from the party.

 Momentarily, a man who wore a dark shirt with a baseball cap on his head came
from Randy’s left side and inserted himself between Nilo and Randy.

 The man was armed with a long shotgun. Suddenly, the man raised his gun, and,
with the muzzle only about a foot away from Nilo’s back, pulled the trigger. Nilo
fell to the ground.
 The assailant pressed a flashlight on Randy’s chin, then the latter saw the face of
the malefactor and recognized him as the appellant, although he did not know the
latter’s name at the time.

 Randy’s sisters Rena and Rona also saw the appellant with 3 other men.

 Randy, Rona and Rena went to the police station and saw the appellant, whom
they pointed to the police as the person who shot their uncle . It was only then
that they learned the name of their uncle’s assassin, Quirico Dagpin. They
executed sworn statements of their respective accounts of the killing.

 The appellant denied killing Nilo. He stated that on the night of incident he was at
the house of Pedro Elcamel who came by and told the appellant that his daughter
was going to graduate the following day, and that he was giving a party for her at
his house. Pedro asked him to come along and butcher pigs for the occasion. The
appellant alleged that he slept at Pedro’s house that evening.

 Police Inspector Pepe Nortal testified that per the police blotter entry at 1:00 a.m.
of March 20, 1996, the victim’s assailant was still unidentified. A team of police
investigators and the Assistant City Health Officer proceeded to the crime scene
to investigate the killing.

 After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder.

 The appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime
charged on the basis mainly of his having been identified by Randy, Rona and
Rena at the police station on March 27, 1996. He was not assisted by counsel
when the three pointed to him as the culprit in the police station. Hence,
according to the appellant, such identification is inadmissible in evidence.

 For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that Randy, Rona and Rena,
saw and recognized the appellant as the person who shot the victim at the situs
criminis. It also maintains that the appellant was not deprived of his
constitutional rights when he was identified by the prosecution witnesses at the
police station without counsel, because he was not then under custodial
investigation. It avers that the penalty meted by the trial court on the appellant is
correct

Issue: Whether the Dagpin was denied of his right under the Constitution when he
was not assisted by counsel at the time the prosecution witnesses identified him as
the culprit

Held: No, Dagpin was not denied of his right under the Constitution when he was not
assisted by counsel at the time the prosecution witnesses identified him as the
culprit.
The evidence on record shows that even before the killing of Nilo on March 26, 1996,
Randy and Rona had already seen the appellant, although they did not know his
name. This can be gleaned from the testimony of Randy.

Rona’s testimony on this matter positively identified the appellant who killed her
uncle Nilo.

Randy and Rona recognized their uncle’s assassin; they were certain it was the
appellant. Randy testified how he recognized the appellant when the latter got a
flashlight, pressing it at his chin, forcing him to stand, then he went away. Randy
testified that the man who returned with the flashlight and with the gun was the
same man who shot his uncle.

Rona testified that she herself recognized the appellant.

No less than the appellant’s witness, Barangay Captain Rene Jauculan, testified that
when he talked with Rona and Randy after the shooting, they confirmed to him that
they knew the suspects, but were afraid to divulge their identities before they were
arrested.

We have ruled that illumination produced by a kerosene lamp or a ashlight is

sufficient to allow identification of persons.

The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the testimonies of Randy and
Rona. The well-settled rule is that findings of a trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge has a clear advantage over the
appellate magistrate in appreciating testimonial evidence.

The appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by
counsel because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where
he was identified by the prosecution’s witnesses in a police line-up .

Indeed, the appellant even denied that there was no police line-up and that he was
merely with the police officers when the prosecution’s witnesses arrived in the
police station.
Topic: Police Line-up
Solis, A.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL

G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16, 2002

Facts:
o On the night of December 27, 1996, a robbery was committed in a boarding
house by a man with his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification
and carried a knife about four inches long.
o Inside a bedroom were 3 friends Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma.
Teresa Gellaver.
o After getting their money, the man blindfolded the three and had carnal
knowledge of Michelle Darunday. The victim was not able to see the offenders
face save for his “chinito” eyes and felt the keloids on his back.
o Two children saw the man enter and exit the boarding house and their
description of the suspect fitted that of Anthony Escordial, a worker at a café
called Coffee Break Corner.
o Michelle was taken to the town of Pontavedra to identify her assailant.
o The accused Escordial was found at the basketball court of Pontevedra and
was "invited" to go to the police station for questioning without a warrant of
arrest.
o At the police station he was asked to take off his t-shirt. No keloids were
found but according to SPO3 Tancinco, Michelle confirmed that accused was
the man who had attacked her. She later on testified that she immediately
recognized Escordial as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra
police station.
o Escordial was also identified as the assailant in a police line-up by four
witnesses on various dates after his arrest. All done without the benefit of a
counsel.
o RTC found Escorial GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape.
o On appeal Escordial raised the issues of lack of warrant of arrest and counsel
as violations of his constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of
the evidence against him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witness.

Issue: WON Escordial's constitutional rights were violated due to the 1) lack of
warrant and 2) wihout assistance of a counsel.

Held: Yes, however he waived objection to the legality of his arrest when he pleaded
not guilty during his arraignment. Any defect in his arrest must be deemed cured
when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.

As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up

considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of
attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when
these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.

An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a

showup, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a
group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the
accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled
that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a
show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible
as evidence against him.

However, defense failed to object immediately when the witnesses were presented
by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of
them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must
be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of their
testimonies.

Furthermore, the inadmissibility of out-of-court identifications does not render the in-
court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the
poisonous tree." This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial
court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the
illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as
evidence against him.

SC found both the out-of-court and in-court identification of Michelle Darunday to be

insufficient to establish accused-appellant as the person who robbed and raped her
and her companions on the night of December 27.

Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she immediately recognized
accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra police
station. A show-up has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for
"being pointedly suggestive , generating confidence where there was none, activating
visual imagination, and, all told, subverting the reliability of an eyewitness.

Michelle knew that she was going to identify a suspect when she went to
Pontevedra. Upon seeing accused-appellant escorted by Tancinco and his colleagues
in the Bacolod police, she knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to
identify. When accused-appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as
to what was expected of her. Further aggravating the situation were the reply of the
policeman to accused-appellant's protestations of innocence that he was being held
for rape and Michelle's aunt's obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelle's immediate
conclusion, therefore, that accused-appellant was her attacker was understandable.
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent
suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility concerning the identity
of accused-appellant. The possibility that her identification of accused-appellant was
merely planted in her mind both by the circumstances surrounding the show-up and
her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this Court.

SC found that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable
doubt required in criminal cases. Escordial was acquitted.
Guidelines and Procedures; RA 7438

Republic Act No. 7438

April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –

Detained or Under Custodial

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall
inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person
arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and
adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by
the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or
detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no
effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under

custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as
chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be
null and void and of no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical
doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family or by his counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international
nongovernmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The
person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent
or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece,
and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting"
officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or
those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot
pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee:
Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are
available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance
with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand
pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but
not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone
acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a
competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford
the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or
any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with
him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of
four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1©

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.

Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby
repealed. Other laws, presidential decrees, executive orders or rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed
or modified accordingly.

Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in any daily newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines.

Approved: April 27, 1992

PEOPLE v. MAHINAY
G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999 | SORONGON

FACTS:
 Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip.
 The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor. She used to
pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya  birds together with other children. While they were playing,
Mahinay was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard
was a septic tank.
 One day, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic
tank.
 The policemen retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira
Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another
room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Mahinay. Also
found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as Mahinay's belongings.
 Mahinay was finally arrested. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police
Station. With the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, Mahinay executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed
the victim. Also, when Mahinay came face to face with the victim's mother
and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the
victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators.
 Now, Mahinay argues that his extra judicial confession was executed in
violation of his constitutional right to counsel.

ISSUE:
 Was the constitutional right to counsel of Mahinay during the custodial
investigation violated?

HELD & RATIO:

 NO. Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed
of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of
the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the
commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given
with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely
and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities
of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even informed the Inquest
Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement that he was forced,
coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound
with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public
Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes
he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was
present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is
 expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner
of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused.
 There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the
statement. There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to
sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers.

 There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were

obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have
been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of
the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given.

 A person under custodial investigation should be informed through the

following conditions:

1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
by said person;

2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;

3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the

presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;

6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his
immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his
waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that
he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or
any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;

11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation
of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES; RA 7438 | taclas

MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA 384 US 436

(SORRY, HINDI KO MAHANAP FULL TEXT KAYA ITO NA LANG)

FACTS:

 The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona  addressed four different

cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of these cases, the
defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of
these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights
at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning
elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were
admitted at trial.
 Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to
a police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was
then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a
signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were
presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and
was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
 Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in
connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three days
prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was
then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery
and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct
for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the
presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At
trial, the oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury.
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals.
 Westover v. United States:  Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas
City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police
station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on
a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest
and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the
interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of interrogation by the
FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one
of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in
California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted
of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each
count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
 California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch
robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant,
 Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the
robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s
wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a
cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on nine different
occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had
robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police
released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no
evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements
were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder
and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding
that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel.

ISSUE:

 Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to

custodial police interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial;
and –NO.
 Whether “procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to
incriminate himself” are necessary. –YES.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the prosecution could not
introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a criminal trial because the
police had failed to first inform Miranda of his right to an attorney and against
self-incrimination. The police duty to give these warnings is compelled by the
Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which gives a criminal suspect the right to
refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth Amendment which
guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney.
 The defendant's right to an attorney is an equally fundamental right, because
the presence of an attorney in interrogations, according to Chief Justice
Warren, enables "the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to
tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in
the interrogations process."
 Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the Court ruled, "dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," "no statement obtained
from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”
 Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread ignorance of the law,
the Court devised statements that the police are required to tell a defendant
who is being detained and interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda Rights"
begin with "the right to remain silent," and continue with the statement that
"anything said can and will be used against [the defendant] in a court of law."
The police are further compelled to inform the suspect of his or her right to an
attorney and allow for (or, if necessary, provide for) a defendant's attorney
who can accompany him during interrogations. Because none of these rights
was afforded to Ernesto Miranda and his "confession" was thus
unconstitutionally admitted at trial, his conviction was reversed. Miranda was
later retried and convicted without the admission of his confession.
3. Duties of Police and Arresting Officer

DUTIES OF POLICE AND ARRESTING OFFICER

PEOPLE vs. VELARMA

G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986 | rubie tolentino

FACTS:

Not long before November 6,1981, the Manila Drug Enforcement Unit, Western Police
District received complaints from concerned citizens regarding the rampant use of
prohibited drugs in the Commodore Pension House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila
and illegal sale by one alias 'Nel'.

The Unit placed the Commodore Pension House and its surroundings under
surveillance for about a week followed by an entrapment with the confidential
informant acting as the buyer of marijuana.

At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6, 1981, the police team carried out out the
entrapment plan. The informant was given two (2) P5.00 bills, with one of the police
officer’s initial thereon. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and
gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00. Thereupon, the appellant delivered to
informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette.

Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed appellant. Pat. Gomez frisked
appellant and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00
bills and from the left pocket of her pants marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a
piece of newspaper.

Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional
rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket,
but refused to reduce her confession to writing.

To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who
testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed police
informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she was under
custodial investigation.

The trial court convicted the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused? - YES

RULING:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it
would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must
also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that
the person has been "informed" of his rights.

Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence
and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice
it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is
unlettered.

According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she
was under custodial investigation. What specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he
did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which the appellant was advised of
her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly
significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate and cannot be expected
to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon
merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.

As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under

investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the
prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with
his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession
made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence.

All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the appellant is
hereby acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. DUHAN

[G.R. No. L-65189, 28 May 1986]

by Z Torres

Facts:

The accused are found guilty of violating Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A.
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended), and appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Appellants contend that the evidence on record does not justify the Trial Court’s
findings, but on the contrary, demonstrates the existence of a quite different version
of the facts, for which reason they are entitled to an acquittal at least on reasonable
doubt, invoking the doctrine that “an accused should be convicted on the strength of
the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.”

The Solicitor General agrees with the appellants, basing on the “Manifestation and
Motion In Lieu of Appellee’s Brief” filed by the Solicitor General’s Office, which
showed the material occurrences.

Duhan was investigated and made to admit possession of marijuana, even if it was
not true, according to his mother.

He was then made to sign Booking and Information Sheets, which read: “Accused,
after being informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel,
readily admitted his guilt but refused to give any written statement.”

Issue:

Whether or not appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

No. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore they should be acquitted.

Even if the appellants made the verbal confessions imputed to them as alleged in the
Booking and Information Sheets, the same would not be acceptable as evidence
against them because the constitutional preconditions for their admission had not
been complied with. The mere assertion by a police officer that after an accused
was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, he readily
admitted his guilt, does not make the supposed confession admissible against the
purported confessant.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation ‘to be informed’ of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. He is not only duty-
bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also
explain their effects in practical terms.

In other words, the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a

correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Otherwise, there is a denial of right, as it cannot truly be said that the
person has been ‘informed of his rights’. Since the right to be informed implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation required will vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
under investigation.
People vs. Ramos
G.R. No. L-59318 | afable
May 16, 1983

Facts:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and
P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol they had observed MALCON OLEVERE acting
suspiciously . The police officers, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his
possession dried marijuana leaves. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared
that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one Rogelio Ramos.

The following day, a police team proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio
Ramos and arrested him. During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere
executed a written sworn statement implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio
Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. The accused, verbally admitted the
commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold to Malcon
Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00. At the trial, the prosecution presented three
witnesses but not Malcon Olevere.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to
meet the witness against him face to face and to cross-examination e him has been
violated.

Held:
Yes. For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving
the adverse party the right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the
fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort
of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse
party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that,
generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.

For the same reason, that Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness and
insofar as they impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged, the
adduced evidence are nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as
competent evidence as to the veracity of the contents therein.

A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others,
either because he was told or having read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned. Since Malcon Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies
offered by the witnesses for the prosecution are regarded as hearsay, insofar as they
impute to the appellant the commission of the offense charged. WHEREFORE,
accused acquitted.
4. Counsel of Choice, Extra-Judicial Confession

Section 3, RA No. 7438. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except
those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;

(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;

(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality of city cannot
pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee:
Provided, That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are
available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance
with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. L-60025 September 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGINIA MATOS-VIDUYA y

GALPA, accused-appellant.| almalbis

FACTS:

 This is a case of parricide allegedly committed by Virginia Viduya against her

husband, Atty. Jose Viduya.
 The prosecution presented 3 witnesses, Mrs. Domingo (lessee), Melanio
Cambel (family driver) and Florentino Bagallon (investigator). Bagallon
testified that the accused Mrs. Viduya executed three "salaysays" saying that
it was a thief who stabbed her husband and identified him on her 2nd
"salaysay" as one of their former employee.
 After executing 3 salaysays, Mrs. Viduya executed her extrajudicial
confession wherein she categorically admitted that she killed her husband,
but she merely acted in self-defense.
 Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
 The defense contends that Mrs. Viduya was misled and deceived by Officer
Bagallon into signing her extrajudicial confession since he told her she will
not be detained if she signs the document.
 The lower court ruled finding the extrajudicial confession of Mrs. Viduya
admissible in evidence. Thus, she was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Mrs. Viduya is inadmissible in

evidence, the same having been signed without assistance of counsel

HELD:

Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that: Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

In this case, it is undisputed that the extrajudicial confession was executed without
the presence of counsel.

The trial judge held the extrajudicial confession as admissible because the fiscal is
present and there is no prohibition for the fiscal to act as counsel.

Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and is fully
applicable to this case. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or Prosecutor cannot be a
lawyer for the accused at the same time.
In his testimony, the fiscal stated that his main functions are to prosecute and
render duties as inquest fiscal. He cannot pretend to act as defense counsel.

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of
defense counsel even during custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance
would render illusory the protection given to the accused during custodial
investigation. What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the
presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake
his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Moreover, the answer of the accused ("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na
kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she did not fully understand her
in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights.

The extrajudicial confession having no probative value on the grounds that it was
executed without the presence of counsel and there having been no intelligent
waiver of the right to remain silent, this Court no longer deems it necessary to
inquire into the alleged deceit employed by Pfc. Bagallon in extracting the above-
mentioned confession from the accused.
People v Jerez

G.R. No. 114385 January 29, 1998 | honrade

Topic – Counsel of Choice, Extrajudicial Confession

Facts

Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola, were
charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide.

Police Major Roberto Rosales testified that upon appellant's arrest, the latter was
apprised of his constitutional rights. In the presence of Atty. August Schneider, an
investigation conducted by the police ensued and statements therein were reduced
to writing, signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie
Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not appellant understood the
consequences of his confession.

Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice.

Issue

Whether or not the extra-judicial statement was valid

Held

Yes. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
available as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Excerpts of the extra-judicial
confession shows that when Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider,
supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of
appellant during investigation, the latter answered in the affirmative.

The Court, therefore, finds that appellant's constitutional right to counsel was not
breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.
Topic:
Counsel of Choice, Extra-Judicial Confession

Section 3, RA No. 7438. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except
those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance
with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, CABILES alias " NONOY", accused-

appellant. | Liwag

FACTS:
At around 1:15 a.m. of November 5, 1989, a man, later identified as Cabiles, barged
into the house of Marites Atienza and while pointing a knife, took from her cash
amounting to P1,000, a Seiko watch worth P1,500, a lady's wristwatch with the
trademark "Chanel" worth P850, a bracelet worth P500, and a ring worth P500, and
by reason or on occasion of said robbery, with the use of a deadly weapon, and lewd
designs, had carnal knowledge of Luzviminda Aquino, maid of Marites, and then
attacked, assaulted and stabbed with the same weapon on Arnel Cericos, the
neighbor who came to the rescue of the women, thereby inflicting upon him serious
physical injuries.

On November 8, at around 1:00 pm, Cabiles was arrested. According to the latter, he
was lying on a bench at the Marivic Compound when three men in civilian clothes
arrived. He did not know the reason for his arrest. He, however, admitted that a
"Chanel" lady's watch was recovered from him at the time of the arrest but insisted
that he owns the watch, the same having been pledged to him by his cousin
Elizabeth Abantao when he was still at Wright, Samar, and which was later sold to
him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen contents was recovered from him by
his captors. He said he only saw the contents of the bag when he was under
detention at the Kalookan City Jail. As regards his sworn statement containing a
confession to the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by the policemen
at the station to execute the same. He did not read it and was just forced to sign it.
He was not assisted by counsel during that time [Confession in the sworn
statement].

On November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Marites saw accused-
appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted his guilt and
pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to
commit the crime [Verbal admissions]. Marites further recalled that she saw
accused-appellant at Mabingnay's house on November 5, 1989, before the crime took
place.
ISSUE: Whether the confession in the sworn statement and verbal admissions are
admissible as evidence against the accused?

RULING:
Confession in the sworn statement – NOT ADMISSIBLE as evidence

Verbal admissions – Yes, ADMISSIBLE as evidence

Confession in the sworn statement – NOT ADMISSIBLE as evidence:

EVIDENCE; CONFESSION; REQUISITES FOR ADMISSIBILITY
— In People vs. Deniega, we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed for
admissibility of a confession, to wit (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in
writing.

ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION EXECUTED WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,

INADMISSIBLE. — Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the
sworn statement containing his confession. Although this assertion is
uncorroborated, accused-appellant's free will and volition in signing his confession
will not cure the defect that it was made without assistance of counsel. An
admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is
inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cascalla). Even if the confession of an accused
speaks the truth, if it was made without assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given (People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in
the presence of counsel is admissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy).

Verbal admissions – Yes, ADMISSIBLE as evidence:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ON CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION DO NOT APPLY TO SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS; STATEMENTS
MADE, ADMISSIBLE. — In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before
Marites Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in point is People vs.
Andan where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private
meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is
admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as
a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did
not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
orally admitted having committed the crime — as in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence
on record, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Topic: Counsel of Choice, Extrajudicial confession

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Jimmy Obrero y Corla, accused-
appellant.
G. R. No. 122142, May 17, 2002 | ODULIO

Facts:

 Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose

business was selling chickens to customers.
 Accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera
 Later, the accused-appellant together with a certain Ronnie Liwanag, were
accused of robbing the house of Emma Cabrera and killing her two maids.
 Pat. Ines then conducted an investigation. He was told by the accused-
appellant’s sister Merly, that her brother had gone to La Union and that the
latter confessed to her that he had done something wrong in Manila.
 Aside from the two sworn statements executed by Pat. Ines, he also testified
that accused-appellant gave a confession in writing marked as Exh. O, with
the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he
admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta.
 Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit marked as Exh. P stating the
circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest. He said accused-appellant
refused to sign the booking and information sheet.
 Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as
Exhibit O.  In said exhibit, the accused-appellant narrated the incidents that
surrounded the killings.
 The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in
the presence of Atty. De los Reyes.
 The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide
 Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which
forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He
claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his confession,
was not the counsel of his own choice.
 And that was the same reason why he refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. He also said he signed the extrajudicial confession five
times as a sign or an indication that it was involuntarily executed by him.

Issue:

Whether the extrajudicial confession made by the accused-appellant is valid. –

YES AND NO (see discussions below)

Held:

At first, the answer is yes because there was no sign that the confession was
made involuntary.
 Later, the answer is no because he was not given the Miranda rights
effectively and was not assisted by a counsel of his choice, and as a result, his
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

Art. III, §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him.

There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this

constitutional provision:

(1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12, and

(2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the
subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12.

 Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and

threat. Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of
force and violence on him. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a
physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign
the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it.

 What accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the
same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof.

 He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the
Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again as proof that after being
given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he
signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part
of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his
confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the third page in
which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O).

 There is no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact
that it was signed by accused-appellant five times.
  Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the
fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet.
For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it
for five times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the
said sheet as well.

 The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant
execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the
booking and information sheet.

 Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary , and, in the absence of

conclusive evidence showing the declarant's consent in executing the same
has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

 Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the
crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated
that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta),
that he committed the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag,
and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had
stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are
consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the
two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon.

 It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind
on which violence and torture have been applied. 

 When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they
could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts
narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession
is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the
statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the
declarant.

 There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is

corroborated by evidence aliunde  which dovetails with the essential facts
contained in such confession. 

(Turning point: what makes the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible? Is the

fact that he was not given the Miranda warnings effectively.)

 But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact

that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under
the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United
States from which Art. III, §12(1) was derived, is presumed to be
psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and
 surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police
interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel.

 Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect
in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings:

(1) He must be informed of his right to remain silent;

(2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him;
and

(3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him. 

 In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes
to establish that the requisites were fully satisfied when accused-appellant
executed his extrajudicial confession. There was even a waiver signed by the
accused-appellant.

 But, there was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to
accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted
to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the
police to appoint one for him.

 This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been
found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful
information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been
scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was
specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth
grade of the elementary school.

 Moreover, Art. III, §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was
assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the
reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted
accused-appellant.

 For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession

is inadmissible in evidence.

 Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant

cannot stand. 

 And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there

is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-
appellant which, as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that
accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally
 proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of
proof which rested on the prosecution. 

 Accused acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . RENE JANUARIO
y ROLDAN, EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, ELISEO SARITA @ TOTO,
EDUARDO SARINOS and SANTIAGO CID, accused, RENE JANUARIO Y
ROLDAN and EFREN CANAPE y BAYOT, accused-appellants. | ramil

G.R. No. 98252. February 7, 1997

TOPIC: COUNSEL OF CHOICE, EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION

FACTS:
 Santiago Cid approach Vicente Pons if he wanted to buy jeepney.
 Pons sold the jeepney to Myrna Temporas.
 When Pons failed to execute a deed of sale Mryna filed an estafa before the
NBI.
 NBI found out that the jeepney sold by Pons were carnapped by accused.
 Only Juanario, Efren and Cid were arrested.
 During the custodial investigation, Rene they were assisted by Atty. Carlos
Saunar who was “just around.”
 During trial, Atty Saunar testified that when he took the statements of the
accused, he was still in private practice and that he was in the NBI head
office for a client when an NBI agent approached him and they need his
assistance as the accused were about to execute their sworn statements.

.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of the accused are admissible in evidence for
having been extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel?

RULING
Yes.

The Constitution values freedom and voluntariness that, interalia, it unequivocally

guarantees a person undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense not
only the services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) competent but also
(b) independent and (c) preferably of his own choice as well.

In this case it was that there was a violation of this provision where the counsel who
assisted the accused in the custodial investigation conducted by the NBI was an
applicant for employment with the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO COUNSEL. - The 1987 Constitution was crafted

and ordained at a historic time when our nation was reeling from ghastly memories
of atrocities, excesses and outright violations of our people's rights to life, liberty
and property. Hence, our bill of rights was worded to emphasize the sanctity of
human liberty and specifically to protect persons undergoing custodial investigation
from ignorant, overzealous and/or incompetent peace officers. The Constitution so
dearly values freedom and voluntariness that, inter alia, it unequivocally guarantees
a person undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense not only the
services of counsel, but a lawyer who is not merely (a) "competent" but also (b)
"independent" and (c) "preferably of his own choice" as well. In the case before us,
the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their own
extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the
presence and with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI.
Such counsel cannot in any wise be considered "independent" because he cannot be
expected to work against the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a
few months later he in fact was admitted into its work force. For this violation of
their constitutional right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After
the exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence
remains in the Court's records to overturn another constitutional right: the right to be
presumed innocent of any crime until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

- Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is,

however, not a guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken
in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision requires that a... person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Elucidating on this particular
constitutional requirement, this Court has taught:
- "It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms
absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the
fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the
voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely... stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions
guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices
given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.
- Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far
as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the
lawyer were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should
be competent and independent,... i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely
be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an... accused's
right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel 'contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.'
- Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) 'should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper... petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
 independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and... law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic."
- Saunar was not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation
counsel.
- Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective
communication that results in an... understanding of what is conveyed.[52]
Appellant Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on
paper, fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the
aforequoted testimony of NBI Agent Toribio.
- Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI
agents should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional
rights.
- The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of appellants' constitutional
rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of
the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12
of the same article which mandates... that an admission of facts related to a
crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel otherwise it would be
inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.
6) PETER PAUL ABALLE Y MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE BERNARDO V. SALUDARES,
respondents. [G.R. No. 64086. March 15, 1990.] | RIPARIP
7) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMIL SAMOLDE Y
TAMBUNTING and ARMANDO ANDRES, accused, RAMIL SAMOLDE Y TAMBUNTING,
accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 128551. July 31, 2000.] } ROLLAN
Topic: Counsel of choice, Extra-judicial confession

Case No. 37: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOISES MARCOS Y DELA ROSA
LA ROSA | solana

Facts:
 Appellant MOISES MARCOS, together with Danilo Castro, Jun alias "John Doe" and
"Peter Doe," were charged with the crime of kidnapping.

 With conspiracy, the abovenamed accused kidnap Benedict Gonzales @ "Cocoy",

for the purpose of extorting ransom from Benito Gonzales father of Benedict.

 Benedict Gonzales, a 9-year old pupil of the St. Martin de Porres Catholic School in
Paombong, Bulacan, while on his way home from school, was approached by three
(3) men on board an owner-type jeep. On the pretext that the boy's father, Benito
Gonzales met an accident, the men asked Benedict to go with them to the
hospital.

 The unsuspecting Benedict went with the three (3) men who brought him to an
isolated hut in Caloocan City. At said hut, Benedict was detained for two nights
and one day, guarded during the day by two of the men.

 Accused Moises Marcos y de la Rosa, who is the first cousin of Benito, cooperated
in the execution of the offense by previous simultaneous acts, that is, by pointing
to Benedict Gonzales @ "Cocoy" to his co-accused and writing a ransom note
demanding the amount of P200,000.00 from the father of the victim, Benito
Gonzales but were able to get only the amount of P20,000.00 as ransom.

 Benedict's brother found a note at the gate of their residence wherein the
kidnappers are asking for P200,00.00 ransom.

 Moises volunteered to talk with the kidnappers to reduce the ransom money to
P20,000.00 and proposed the raise the amount through a loan from a friend.
Benito, fearful for the life of his son and having no ready cash at the time, readily
agreed to appellant's proposal.

 Eventually, father and son were reunited on February 22, 1979 in Nueva Ecija and
Benito reported the incident to NBI. Noting some suspicious circumstances in
appellant's story, the NBI conducted further investigation.

 In his sworn statement dated July 10, 1979 voluntarily given before NBI Agent
Esteban Libit, appellant admitted that he, together with Danilo Castro, "Jun" and
alias "Peter Doe," planned and executed the kidnapping of Benedict .

Appellant’s version of the story:

 He wrote the ransom letter because he was instructed by Danilo Castro to write
said letter and after Danilo Castro and his companions have taken the boy (Benito
 Gonzales) he was instructed to write the ransom letter. He was forced or
intimidated to write the ransom note because if he will not do so, they (Danilo
Castro and companions) will get his children who are studying in Manila.

 Appellant's co-accused, Danilo Castro, Jun alias "John Doe" and "Peter Doe"
escaped arrest and for this reason only appellant Moises Marcos was arraigned
and tried.

 The trial court rendered judgment finding Moises Marcos, Guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping.

 Appellant maintains that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence

against him because the same was obtained from him without the assistance of a
counsel. He avers that although he waived his right to counsel, this waiver is
without legal effect as such was made without the assistance of a lawyer, a
requisite which should have been complied with.

Issue: Whether appellant’s extra judicial confession is inadmissible as evidence

against him because the same was obtained from him without the assistance of a
counsel

Held: No, appellant’s extra judicial confession is not inadmissible as evidence.

The Court in this regard, finds that appellant's protestations do not warrant reversal
of the appealed judgment. When appellant gave his sworn statement before the NBI
agent Esteban Libit on July 10, 1979 he was not then under police custody . He was
merely invited for questioning so he can shed light on the kidnapping of Benedict. He
was even allowed to go home, after the investigation.

Appellant who is a retired First Lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary and who
had studied up to third year in mechanical engineering, admitted having voluntarily
given his sworn statement to the NBI.

It is significant to consider that appellant Moises Marcos was duly informed of his
right to remain silent. He was warned that any statement he make may be used;
against him and that he is entitled to be assisted by a lawyer of his choice .

From the case records, appellant was informed that it is his right to give or not give
any statement or to answer or not to answer the questions to be propounded to him
in this investigation. In other words, he has a perfect right to remain silent. He was
also informed that whatever he may say may be used as evidence against him in any
criminal or civil proceedings. He was informed that he is also entitled to be assisted
by a lawyer of his own choice and should he not be able to engage the services of a
lawyer, the government will appoint one for him.

In the sworn statement of appellant Moises Marcos, dated July 10, 1979, marked as
Exhibit E, his waiver of his right to counsel is clearly expressed.
Testifying before the trial court, appellant expressly acknowledged that he
voluntarily signed his sworn statement, which was marked as Exhibit "E."

Considering all the foregoing circumstances, the Court is of the view that appellant's
admissions, voluntarily made and confirmed by him in open court during his trial,
render worthless the challenge now interposed by him to the admissibility of
appellant's sworn statement, Exhibit E.

Appellant Moises Marcos was an active participant and was even the one who had
inspired the commission of the kidnapping of the son of his first cousin.
5. Waiver of Rights

Topic: Waiver of Rights

Solis,A.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LETICIA CAPITIN y VARGAS

G.R. No. L-49118. August 30, 1988

Facts:
o On December 10, 1975, Leticia Capitin, a 22-year old housemaid was charged
with parricide for the death of her baby by suffocation .
o That same day, Leticia was investigated at the Western Police District
headquarters, where she signed an extrajudicial confession without
assistance of counsel.
o Taking into account her behavior and her record of mental imbalance as
reported by her counsel de officio, the trial court ordered her psychiatric
examination.
o Dr. Florante Reyles of the National Mental Hospital reported that Leticia was
suffering from schizophrenia. Consequently, she was ordered committed to
the National Mental Hospital for treatment.
o Two years later the court was informed that Leticia had sufficiently improved
to stand trial. Trial then proceeded (even as she remained confined at the
National Mental Hospital for continued treatment) and she was ultimately
found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
o The decision relied much on the extrajudicial confession made by Leticia.

Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession by Leticia valid and admissible as evidence.

Held: No.

The confession was completely inadmissible because it was taken without

observance of the safeguards provided by the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
suspect facing custodial investigation.

Leticia was asked whether or not she was waiving her right to assistance of counsel.
The answer thereto was unacceptable and could not have been possibly composed
by the accused-appellant in her state of mind at the time and given her limited
knowledge of Tagalog. Although she had lived all her life in Camarines Sur and had
come to Manila only six months earlier, in June of that year, there was a remarkably
fluent exchange between the investigator and Leticia.

It is not believable that the organized and ready answer, with all its legal overtones
to boot, could have come from this 22-year old housemaid, who, on top of her
deficiencies in the language (and the law), was presumably not thinking clearly then
(even assuming she was sane) because she had just killed her child and was under
strong emotional stress.
Under the Galit doctrine as now embodied (and even strengthened) in Article III,
Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, the written waiver of the right to counsel
must be made with the assistance and in the presence of counsel. This was not done
in the case at bar, as the statement itself plainly discloses.

It is required that the waiver be made intelligently, after proper notification of his
rights to the suspect, with full understanding by him of the effects of such waiver.
Assuming such valid waiver, we have also insisted that the confession itself be
understandable to the person signing it, both as to its language and its contents, and
must not have been simply prepared beforehand, details and all for the suspect's
signature.

If we have outlawed confessions written in advance by the police for persons of

limited intelligence or educational attainment, we see no reason why a confession
signed by a person whose sanity is dubious, as in the present case, should receive
any less disapprobation. Leticia's intelligence was not only limited but impaired.

RTC's decision was REVERSED and the accused-appellant was ACQUITTED by

reason of insanity.
PEOPLE v. HIZON
G.R. No. 71273, July 29, 1988 | Sorongon

FACTS:
 Armando Lipata, together with Apolonio Hizon and a John Doe alias Boy
Bungal, was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Only accused-
appellant Lipata was tried as his co-accused were then at large.
 The prosecution presented only four witnesses, to wit, the medical examiner
who autopsied the corpse, the victim's widow, the police investigator of the
case, and Ciriaco Cruzado. None of them testified on the actual killing.
 The only possible basis for the conviction, therefore, was Lipata's
extrajudicial confession, which, however, he disowned at the trial. He said the
confession had already been prepared when he was asked to sign it and that
he did so for fear of being "salvaged."
 The defense argued that the said confession was inadmissible because it was
violative of the Bill of Rights, particularly of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973
Constitution, providing as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible evidence.

Moreover, as embodied in Article III, Section 12(l) of the Constitution of 1987,

thus:
“Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.”

 The trial court disagreed and in its view, made Lipata's confession voluntary.
The judge also said that the narration "reflects spontaneity and coherence"
and the response in every question is fully informative, sometimes beyond the
requirements of the questions. He was found guilty as charged and imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
 Was there a proper waiver of the right to counsel of herein accused?

HELD & RATIO:

 NO. A reading of the alleged confession clearly shows that Lipata was not
fully and properly informed of his rights, particularly of his right to the
assistance of counsel.  There is nothing in the written confession showing
that a lawyer assisted Lipata when he made the answer waiving his right to
the assistance of counsel. There is no record elsewhere of any such
 assistance when the waiver was made. What appears in the sworn statement
only is that, having made the waiver, Lipata was immediately subjected to the
questioning that resulted in the detailed narration of how Gandillo was robbed
and killed.
 The suspect must be informed that he has a right to the assistance of counsel
and assured that if he cannot afford to retain counsel of his own he will be
provided with one for free. While he may choose to waive the right, such
waiver must be a knowing and intelligent one and in any case must be made
only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver made without observance of
these requirements is null and void.
6. Presumptions

PEOPLE VS. JARA | Taclas

FACTS:

 Petitioner Jara herein was charged of robbery with parricide and murder,
while the other two, namely Reymundo Vergar b a and Roberto Bernadas, with
robbery with homicide.
 Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa,
together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense.
The other accused, Vergara and Bernadas retracted their respective extra-
judicial confessions admitting their participation in the crimes charged and
identifying their mastermind as the accused Jara during proceedings before
the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confessions and the subsequent re-enactment of the crime on the ground that
their participations in these occasions were not free and voluntary and were
without the benefit of counsel.
 The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confession of the accused
Bernadas and Vergara established the guilt of the accused-beyond moral
certainty.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Vergara and Bernadas

were admissible.
RULING:

 NO. Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Constitution provides:

“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

 Before the extrajudicial confession of appellant Bernadas was reduced to

writing, Pfc. Henry E. Pulga, in the presence of four other police officers, made
the following "Pasubali" followed by the answer, "Opo":

PASUBALI: Ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at dahil dito ay

ipinababatid namin sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na sa ilalim ng ating
Bagong Saligang Batas ay ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang
manananggol o abogado ayon sa sarili mong pili mayroon ka ring karapatan na
hindi maaaring piliting sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa iyo sa alinmang
Hukuman sa Pilipinas. Nauunawaan mo ba ang lahat ng mga ipinaliwanag
namin sa iyo ngayon?
 SAGOT: Opo.

 This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial

confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal
form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with
the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in
their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of
the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up
of a right is missing.

 Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person

entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver.
Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence
to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the
taking of that confession.

 It is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the
confessions in these cases should testify that the statements were voluntarily
given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. The evils of
incommunicado interrogations without adequate safeguards to insure
voluntariness could still result in the conviction of innocent persons. More
important, what the Constitution commands must be obeyed even at the risk
of letting even hardened criminals mix once more with the law-abiding world.

 As to the re-enactment, the extra-judicial-confessions served as a script for

what was to follow. Pictures re-enacting a crime which are based on an
inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible.

PRESUMPTIONS

PEOPLE vs. ABANO

G.R. No. L-57184-85 November 14, 1986 | rubie tolentino

FACTS:

The crime was committed in February 1980 involving former spouses Eugenia Abano
and Agripino Abano were already separated for three years.  
Eugenia stayed in the conjugal home while Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another
woman at the Abanos' hut some 400 meters away from the conjugal home. Behind
Eugenia's house was another hut occupied by Rodolfo Abano, a son of Eugenia and
Agripino, and his family.

At around 7:00 PM of February 7, 1980, Rodolfo's wife, Concordia, saw Eugenia dining
with Eliseo Cabana and Teofilo Cabana at the former's house.

At around 11:30 o'clock that night, Concordia was awakened by Eliseo pulling her
hair, with him was Teofilo. Eliseo then ordered her to accompany him to her father-
in-law, Agripino. Along the way, Eliseo and Teofilo instructed her to tell Agripino that
his son Rodolfo [Concordia's husband] was suffering from a stomach ache and that
he should be brought to a doctor. Out of fear, Concordia complied because the two
were carrying bolos.

Delia Cumad, the 15-year-old daughter of Bienvenida, who was then sleeping in one
of the two rooms of Agripino's hut was likewise awakened by Concordia's voice.
When Agripino was already downstairs, Delia heard an impact the sound of which
resembled that of the hacking of a banana trunk. 4 Then she heard Agripino calling
out, "Day, help Day, I am hacked." Delia tried to prevent her mother Bienvenida from
going down the hut but the latter persisted. An hour later, Delia asked for help from
their neighbors.

Rodolfo Abano was awakened by his mother Eugenia at around midnight. She asked
him to transport Eliseo and Teofilo Cabana to Matab-ang, Toledo City in his
motorized tricycle. As he was ferrying them to Matab-ang, Rodolfo noticed that they
were carrying a piece of sack that was rolled over a two-feet-long object. From
Matab-ang, Rodolfo went back to Cantuod. There he met Bernie Verdeflor who told
him that his father and his common-law wife were dead.

A complaint for parricide with murder and double murder against Eugenia and "Eliseo
Doe and Pablo Doe" before the municipal circuit court of Balamban-Asturias. The
municipal circuit judge issued a warrant for the arrest of Eugenia, Concordia, Eliseo
and "Pablo." 

The municipal circuit judge set the preliminary investigation of the case on February
9, 1980. On that date, all the accused appeared in court but they were not assisted
by counsel. Eugenia and Concordia manifested that they wanted the investigation
postponed to February 28. Notwithstanding, the investigating judge assigned one
Atty. Sarmiento as counsel for Concordia who was thereafter investigated. 22

The investigating judge issued an order discharging Concordia as an accused for

humanitarian considerations.  Thereafter, the assistant provincial fiscal filed the
two informations quoted and mentioned earlier. At their arraignment, the three
accused pleaded not guilty.
They interposed alibi as their defense. Later on, Eugenio executed a sworn
statement professing innocence of the crimes charged against her and stating that
she made self-incriminating statements because of her confused mind and her pity
for Concordia whom she wanted released from jail because she was breastfeeding a
child and her other children were all crying inside the jail. 58

LOWER COURT:
- On January 27, 1981, the lower court rendered the decision stating that the
"web of circumstantial evidence" produced "beyond all doubt, complete proof
of the guilt" of Eugenia Abano as principal by inducement and Eliseo and
Teofilo Cabana as principals by direct and actual participation. 
- It considered as "evidence of high caliber and of great persuasive value"
Eugenia's confession which, it believed, "was not extracted from her under
custodial interrogation by police authorities."
ISSUE:
Whether the "web of circumstantial evidence" is sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused? YES.

RULING:

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the accused's extrajudicial

confession, we find the "web of circumstantial evidence" which the trial court found
sufficient for conviction, to have remained unimpaired.

Under Section 5 of Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. These requirements
have been satisfied in the case at bar.

The events narrated by Concordia, Delia and Rodolfo constitute an unbroken

chain of natural and rational circumstances, which corroborate each other and point
beyond reasonable doubt to the complicity of the accused in the crimes.

On the other hand, among the persons implicated, it was Eugenia Abano who
had the motive to order the killing of her husband and his paramour. Her initial
protestation that she harbored no ill-feelings toward her husband and his common-
law wife was totally negated by her very own testimony that Agripino used to box
and maltreat her every time she objected to his cohabitation with Bienvenida and the
suspicion she expressed that it was Bienvenida who induced her husband to
maltreat her so that she would die and they would be free to live together.

The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. The
wound in her heart, occasioned by the separation, never had a chance to heal, but
was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and cruel behavior of her husband
maintaining a love nest so near the abandoned wife. Palaban ang Ponente!!! Four hundred
meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community
where the next-door neighbor may be housed at an even greater distance. It is
indeed in cases like this, that the bounden duty of the court to apply the law
becomes a painful task and the maxim "dura lex, sed lex" makes its full impact felt.
In view of the exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the Court
recommends executive clemency for accused-appellant Eugenia Abano.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Cebu-Bohol Circuit Criminal Court is hereby

affirmed. For lack of necessary votes, the two death penalties imposed on each of
the accused are hereby commuted to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs TOLENTINO

[G.R. No. L-50103, 24 November 1986]

By Z Torres

Facts:

Hamid Duma, Leonardo Tolentino and Romeo Palermo were accused of the crime of
robbery with homicide.

Both Duma and Tolentino implicated accused Romeo Palermo as their companion in
the commission of the crime. Palermo, however, denied participation.

During the preliminary investigation before the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan, both
appellant Duma and accused Tolentino confessed participation in the commission of
the crime, Palermo, however, refused to confess and denied having participated in
in.

Appellant contends he was assaulted to be compelled to falsely admit and make

untruthful statements to incriminate himself and his two other co-accused.

The Trial Court convicted appellant.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him.

Held:

Yes. The in-custody confession is not admissible in evidence and the remaining
circumstantial evidence does not fulfill the degree of moral certainty required to
sustain the judgment of conviction.

It appears that in giving credence to the confession, the trial court applied the rule in
People vs. Castro, where it was stated that the burden of proof to show the
involuntariness of a confession rests on the accused. The trial court concluded that
since herein appellant failed "to adequately meet or put up convincingly this burden
of proof," the presumption of voluntariness stands and the fact that the same was
obtained from him while under arrest does not affect its admissibility. However, the
Castro ruling, which is premised on the presumption of regularity of official acts, is
no longer controlling in so far as it concerns the application of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution.
People vs. Trinidad
G.R. No. L-38930 | AFABLE
June 28, 1988

Facts:
Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Dominador Barwel apprehended the accused. On the way to
Umingan, Pangasinan, Romeo Condaya was verbally interrogated inside the jeep.
Here, Condaya admitted the shooting as Isabelo Trinidad promised to pay him the
amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and pointed where the gun used in the
killing was hidden.

After their apprehension, Condaya, Trinidad, Palding, and Mitrado were made to
execute sworn statements which, however, they refused to affirm before the
Municipal Judge of Umingan, Pangasinan.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession admissible.

Held:
No. Since there is no proof that when they made their confessions they were
informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and that they knowingly and
intelligently waived these rights, such confessions are inadmissible in evidence.

It is not only the oral confessions made to the apprehending officers, Sgt. Casio and
Cpl. Barwel, that are tainted but also the written confessions made and signed a few
days after their arrest. Thus, the testimonies of the police officers on the matters
allegedly confessed to them by accused-appellants and the written extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
Testimony of Arresting Officer on the Alleged Oral Confession of the Accused

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY DY, accused-appellant. |

almalbis

FACTS:

 At around midnight of May 7 1984, a swiss tourist with a gunshot wound on

the neck died in Boracay.
 The following day, a police report was entered. Acting on the report, Chief of
Police Tambong prepared a Complaint charging the accused Benny Dy, owner
of Benny's Bar, with the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearms.
 Testifying for the prosecution was fisherman Tumaob who saw the accused
shoot the victim on the neck.
 Additional prosecution evidence is that early morning after the incident, the
Accused confessed orally to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the radio
station on the Island, and voluntarily surrendered the gun he had used in
shooting the victim.
 The defense version professes the innocence of the Accused, denies his
presence inside the bar during the shooting and attributes the offense to an
unrecognized person. All defense witnesses testified that the culprit was
someone else other than the Accused.
 The accused stoutly denied having made any oral confession alleging that he
went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in
the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla
picked up the gun from the bar at his request. He argued that even if he did
make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence.
 After trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
 Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused had orally admitted his authorship of the crime
and that it is admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES.

The case history and the documentary evidence attest strongly to Appellant's oral
confession and voluntary surrender.

It may be that Chief of Police Tambong who made such entry, died before the start of
the trial and was not in a position to Identify the same before the Court. His
successor, however, was presented as a prosecution witness and Identified said
entry. The revolver was identified by Pat. Padilla as the firearm surrendered by the
accused.
Accused's assertion that the gun was merely found by a boy helper deserves no
credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself
under police custody in the morning after the incident.

The sworn Complaint signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Accused's oral
confession. Said officer could not have prepared the Complaint with such
promptitude sans investigation at "0700H" the morning after the incident were it not
for Appellant's outright admission.

Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the accused to Pat.
Padilla is competent evidence against him. The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence against
him. It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is that,
any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a
case it must be given in substance. What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla
was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary
manner. With the indubitable official and documentary evidence on record, the
identity of the Accused as the victim's assailant is indisputable.