EN BANC  

August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE

ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL
BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE
VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her father,
JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, 
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY
OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and
NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the

curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila,
and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain,
and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance
as ultra viresfor being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as
well as the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a

nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were

respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-
02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng
Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew
Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of
2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon
City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31,
2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong

Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that aims to
forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the
youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that
the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or
detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly
determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment,
and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment
of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions

indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed
curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class,
they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and
breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at
night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are

unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that
bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly
Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended,
given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition
of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall
be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose

curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise
of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if
a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs,
installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children
and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can
impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and
education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew,
and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their
children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety
of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the
Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual
controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for 

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept
of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of
settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and

prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under
the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x
the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to
set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved

Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile
that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the]
'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule
65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its
power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for
petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by
the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of
their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to
travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also
claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of
the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to
any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail

the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next
question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this
Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be

made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and
the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court
is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance
and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being
of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the
Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving

the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of
the first two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in

the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's
exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this
requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the

requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual
justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties'
legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the
minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance
goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations,
petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below -
conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce
impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise
ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being
implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement.
The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination

of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of
appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners]
must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of
sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement
of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question
involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by
the official act- as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of
his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)

constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within
their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas
(Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to
travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances;
and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after
school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the
Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper
subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct
injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the
Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they
have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or
guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should
be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr.
Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the
alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the
Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands
as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was
supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no
legal personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the
capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e.,
the minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on
the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the
alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing

requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number
of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed,
when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise
its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in
spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile

curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court
asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to
rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to
determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching
significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this
case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of
parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners'
contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were
already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities
apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of
the child, they submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law
enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is

improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any
of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to
provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required
so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is
premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this
particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which

may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive
due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty"
involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to
provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the
vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness
doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is
no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to

guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew
offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to
the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy
that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily,
the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration
in a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this
perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous
provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of the
government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits
and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated
that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,

judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague
standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual
impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in

any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of
detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances
cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient

standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the
Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement
agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended,
provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be

determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances

because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances
inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew
ordinances are children at riskand, therefore, covered by its
provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is
one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read
and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove
that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority
age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement
authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless
to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the
appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for
vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their 

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because

they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go
home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that
the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State,
the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred

to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral
character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental
duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of
the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For
indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring
by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of

authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme
Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation
has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear
their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The
qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the
State in the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's
deference to parental control over their children was explained by the US
Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies

limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors. But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not
[a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed

that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public
welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public
safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate
state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control
the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents

in the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore,
not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role
as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it

is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position,  vis-a-
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As
was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
parents in the moral development of their children, 70 and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In
Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid
parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State
interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability
and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm
by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental
decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply

only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be
later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental
authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are
effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during
curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances
affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in
public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew
hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all
plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force
parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their
minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up
his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively
influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation
provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the
US court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x
that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their
children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal
behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no
less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons
which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for

violating the parents' right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances

based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a
fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling
State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of
minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the
government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth

doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of
their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct.
In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism
Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application
of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing
to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a

facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that
are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to
the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an

exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely
"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. 82 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the
overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)]
cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined

that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated
how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial
challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the
realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth

analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On
the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed
regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88

under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right
embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of
every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens
to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where
they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and

exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression,
assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel
with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v.
Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,

assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement must
necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First

Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is
equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed
this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the

First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship
is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting
hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people
cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community,
opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the
First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify

restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the
freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of

juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the
interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor
becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As
to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our
legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA
9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA
9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as
amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly

authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils,
to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may

prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by
local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon
the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances

(as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through
their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis
- as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right
to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes
that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise
of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults. 109 They are
always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s
and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates
and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as
in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111the right to execute
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With
respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a
clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other
than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has
broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of
adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being
of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise
of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the

differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first,
the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the

parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court

acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are
the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places,
and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the
diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that
legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's
police power, whether against the parent's claim to control of the child or
one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them
not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors'
exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable
grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to

determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test
applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny
test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational
basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the
applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors
enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego
(Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews

implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict
scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights
are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the
analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors
and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a
lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the
context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables
courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest
justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in

regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a]
lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on
minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x

x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of

the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the
State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with
the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under
the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect
class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive meansto
protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally

declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's welfare and
the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parenspatriaeconstitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained
in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling
interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling
interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate

objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during
the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As
denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in
imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their

proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead]
them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the
risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,

unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs
who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there
is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth
spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of
society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious
activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information
gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance
subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the
present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in
relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would

materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and
crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources,
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public
opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice,
national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis
of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will
make for a safer community. The same streets may have a more
volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use
narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who
succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in
their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to
these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on
the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce
through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with
criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective
of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of

Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles,
either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact

curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare
clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments
have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate
legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances
are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the
cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny
test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing
legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling
interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then
they must be so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to

regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in
any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in
the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on
their other constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional

impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment
of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It
observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone

Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It
would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch
services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents,
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives
of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not
even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they
frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.

xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note
52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven
exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by
a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this

Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed
requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of
the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family
members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as
buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency
purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of
their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a)
minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended
a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d)
those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running
errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal
age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities,
and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day,
the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All
Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly
restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances
protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night
from school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas
Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account
for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise
of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly
trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more
protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it
still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it
hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities
in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also
contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development,
yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from
attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to
freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to

engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free
expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in

these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to
prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew
hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to
protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming
prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are
merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest;
hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken

down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the
scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure
protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they
cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability
clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It
provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances

shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

 (b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or
when such minors are out and unable to go home early
due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency

situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road
accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment

activity, or going to or returning home from the same place of
employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel

accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending

an official school, religious, recreational, educational,
social, community or other similar private activity
sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar
private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by
the community) that supervises the activity or when the
minor is going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening
or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the
Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by
these items given that the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the
curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In
relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these activities
are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City
Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that
hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and
loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her

minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the
night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly
considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure
with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only
complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but
primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on

these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by
law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was
observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of
fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The
State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of
themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full
rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling
interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court
finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or
restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police
power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in
similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the
parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was
raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA
9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or

guardian under Section 8 thereof,154does not impose any penalty on the
minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his
or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be
unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed
therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various
sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of
violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the

sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or
person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen
(18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and

Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in
case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT

OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10)
days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose
on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and
admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties
on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or

not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local

governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not
limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking
and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against
public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and
trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall
be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be
brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to
be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention
programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also
be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law."
The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that

curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not
considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what
they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors,
without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-
A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in

the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful
authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine,
penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed
against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all
the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal
consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt
appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid

form of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City
in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the
welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors
an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their
delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance
with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the
opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote
their integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise

consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way
of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel
or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines
admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild
rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an
expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and

admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and
are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for
the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his
future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and

fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor.
Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that
does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine
Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he
belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the
error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring
individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject
the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval
from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate
that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute

penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and

unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children
for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing
the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and
irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as
they do not constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has
sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City
Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means
to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to
achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as
constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal
provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict
with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares

Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila,
and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No.
SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City
is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate opinion

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Or "Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan," rollo, p. 4.

1 Id. at 3-36.

2 Entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE

JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER TI-IE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
approved on April 28, 2006.

3 Rollo, p. 6.

4 Id. at 37-40.

5 Id. at 41-43. Entitled "Ordinansa na Nag-aamyenda sa Jiang Bahagi

ng Tuntunin 1, 2 at Tuntunin 4 ng Pambayang Ordinansa Big. 99-02,
Ki/ala Bilang Ordinansang Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na
Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila."

6 Id. at 44-47.

7 Id. at 48-60
8 See id. at 5-6.

9 Namely, herein petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim and John Arvin
Navarro Buenaagua, and Ronel Baccutan, Mark Leo Delos Reyes, and
Clarissa Joyce Villegas, minor, for herself and as represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr, as leaders and members of the SPARK,
respectively. Id. at 4-5.

10 Id. at 4.

11 See id. at 16.

12 Entitled "AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
ACT OF 2006' AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on
October 3, 2013.

13 See rollo, pp. 20-21.

14 See id.

15 See id. at 21-22.

16 Id. at 23.

17 Id. at 23-25.

18 Id. at 25.

19 Sec. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth

violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is fifteen (15) years of age and below, the
sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and
ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person
exercising parental authority.

(b) If offender is Fifteen (15) years and under Eighteen (18) years
of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. for the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. for the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition,

and a warning about the legal impositions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and
 3. for the THIRD OFFENSE AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court: PROVIDED, That the complaint shall
be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor. (See id. at 45.)

20 Section 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted

by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but
not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-
smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited
to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to
any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the
custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a
"child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as
counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the
parents, attendance in parenting education seminars.

21 See rollo,pp.18-19.

22 Id. at 26-28.

23 See id. at 243-248.

24 Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 525 (2014).

25 Id.

26 Id.

27 Id. at 528.

28 Id. at 531; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

29 See G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, December 6, 2016.

30 See id.
31 See Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097,
226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294, November 8, 2016.

32 Arroyo v. Department of Justice, 695 Phil. 302, 334 (2012);

emphasis and underscoring supplied.

33 Id. at 335; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

34 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Phil. 416, 518-519 (2013).

35 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC

Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29.

36 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 519; emphasis and

underscoring supplied.

37 See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC

Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 29; emphasis
and underscoring supplied.

38 Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 123-124 (2014);

emphasis and underscoring supplied.

39 See TRO dated July 26, 2016 issued by Clerk of Court Felipa B.
Anama; rollo, pp. 67-70.

40 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 and 212444, January 12,

2016, 779 SCRA 241, 327-328; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

41 Id. at 328.

42 Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 34, at 527; emphasis and

underscoring supplied.

43 Rollo, p. 5.

44 Clarissa was seventeen (17) years old (see Certificate of Live Birth;
id. at 63) at the time the petition was filed on July 22, 2016 (see id. at
3).

45 Association of Flood Victims v. Commission on Elections

(COMELEC), G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 100, 106.

46 Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 40, at 335-336; emphasis and

underscoring supplied.
47 See rollo, pp. 19-21.

48 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, 646 Phil. 452, 488 (2010); emphases and underscoring
supplied.

49 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566; 94 S. Ct. 1242; 39 L. Ed. 2d 605

(1974) U.S. LEXIS 113.

50 Dissenting Opinion of Retired Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga

in Spouses. Romualdez v. COMELEC,576 Phil. 357, 432 (2008).

51 401 F. Supp. 1242 (1975) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477.

52 Id., citation omitted.

53 Section 16 of RA 10630 provides:

Section. 16. Repealing Clause. -All laws, decrees, ordinances and

rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
modified or repealed accordingly.

54 Section 11 of RA 10630 provides:

Section. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances

enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as
well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or
safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public
scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children.
x xx The child shall also be recorded as a 'child at risk'
and not as a 'child in conflict with the law.' x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

55 Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006." It shall cover the different
stages involving children at risk and children in conflict with the law
from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.

56 People v. Chong Hong, 65 Phil. 625, 628 (1938); emphasis and

underscoring supplied.

57 See rollo, pp. 26-28.

58 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; 92 S. Ct. 1526; 32 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1972) U.S. LEXIS 144; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

59 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622; 99 S. Ct. 3035; 61 L. Ed. 2d 797

(1979) U.S. LEXIS 17.

60 Id.

61 390 U.S. 629; 88 S. Ct. 1274; 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968) U.S. LEXIS
1880; 1 Media L. Rep. 1424; 44 Ohio Op. 2d 339.

62 Id; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

63 See Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 192 and 195.

64 Bellotti v. Baird, supra note 59.

65 See id.

66 Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; emphasis

supplied.

67 Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

68 150-A Phil. 241 (1972).

69 Id. at 248, citing Mormon Church v. US, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).

70 See Spouses lmbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 38, at 195-196.

71 Bellotti, supra note 59, citing See Hafen, Children's Liberation and

the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning
Children to Their "Rights," 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 605 and Ginsberg v.
New York, supra note 61; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

72 See Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (1998) U.S.

App. LEXIS 26597.

73 See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (1993) U.S. App. LEXIS 29974.

74 See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; and City of

Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363; 1989 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 254; 83
A.LR. 4th 1035.

75 Supra note 72.
76 Id.

77 Id.

78 See rollo, pp. 23-25.

79 See id. at 21-23.

80 Supra note 48.

81 Id. at 490; emphasis in the original omitted, citation omitted.

82 Id. at 490-491.

83 First Amendment (US Constitution). Congress shall make no law

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

84 539 U.S. 113; 123 S. Ct. 2191; 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003) U.S. LEXIS
4782; 71 U.S.L.W. 4441; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5136; 16 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S347.

85 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism

Council, supra note 48, at 491.

86 Supra note 38.

87 See Associate Justice Marvic M.V. F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion; id.

at 583-584; emphases and underscoring supplied.

88 See In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benigno S.

Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 158-A Phil. 1 (1974); Kwong v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 240 Phil. 219 (1987).

89 In Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 497-498 (1989), the Court

ruled that the right to travel under our Constitution refer to right to
move within the country, or to another country, but not the right to
return to one's country. The latter right, however, is provided under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a
signatory.

90 UP Law Center Constitutional Revision Project 61 (1970). See Kent

v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116; 78 S. Ct. 1113; 2 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1958) U.S.
LEXIS 814. See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660
705-706 (1919), where the Court stated that the right of locomotion is
one of the chief elements of the guaranty of liberty.

91 See Duran v. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 410, 431-432 (1945).

92 See Salvador H Laurel. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional

Convention. As Faithfully Reproduced from the Personal Record of Jose
P. Laurel, Vol. III, 652 (1966). See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, supra note 90, at 705.

93 See City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179 (1992) Iowa Sup.
LEXIS 91.

94 Id.

95 See Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-Office of the

Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) v. Heusdens, 678 Phil. 328, 399 (2011)
and Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 523 Phil.
713, 752 (2006). See also Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 89, at 504.
In Silverio v. CA (273 Phil. 128, 133 [1991 ]), the Court held that "the
[State is] not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations [on
this right]," and in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (supra note 90,
at 716), it was held that "citizens [do] not possess an absolute freedom
of locomotion."

96 The State under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

pertains to executive officers or administrative authorities
(see Santiago v. Vasquez, G .R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217
SCRA 633, 651 ).

97 Silverio v. CA, supra note 95, at 133.

98 See Section 2 of RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR

STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES
FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as
"SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT" (July 27, 1992).

99 See Section 2 of RA 9775, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND

PENALIZING THE CRIME OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known
as the "ANTI-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2009," approved on
November 17, 2009.
100 See Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL TIES
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the
"ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004"
(March 27, 2004).

101 See Section 2 of RA 9851, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND

PENALIZING CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, ORGANIZING
JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL COURTS, AND FOR RELATED
PURPOSES" otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE ACT ON CRIMES
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE, AND
OTHER CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY," approved on December 11, 2009.

102 See Section 2 of RA 9344.

103 See Sections 3 (a) and (b) of RA 10364, entitled "AN ACT

EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT No. 9208, ENTITLED 'AN ACT TO INSTITUTE
POLICIES TO ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN
AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED
PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "EXPANDED ANTI-
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT OF 2012," approved on February 6,
2013.

104 See Section 32 (b) of RA 9211, entitled "AN ACT REGULATING THE

PACKAGING, USE, SALE, DISTRIBUTION AND ADVERTISEMENTS OF
TOBACCO PRODUCTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known
as ''TOBACCO REGULATION ACT OF 2003"(September 2, 2003).

105 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 8980, entitled "AN ACT

PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM
FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as
"ECCD ACT" (May 22, 2001 ).

106 See Sections 2 and 3 of RA 9288, entitled "AN ACT

PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM
FOR ENSURING NEWBORN SCREENING," otherwise known as the
"NEWBORN SCREENING ACT OF 2004" (May 10, 2004).

107 See Articles 1, 3, and 8 of PD 603, entitled "THE CHILD AND

YOUTH WELFARE CODE," approved on December 10, 1974.
108 See Bellotti, supra note 59. See also Assessing the Scope of
Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984), stating that minors enjoy a myriad of
constitutional rights shared with adults. Indeed, the Bill of Rights under
the Constitution is not for adults alone; hence, the State should not
afford less protection to minors' right simply because they fall below
the age of majority.

109 See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531; 338 U.S. App.

D.C. 11 (1999) U.S. App. LEXIS 13635; Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, supra note 72, citing Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; 106 S. Ct. 3159; 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) U.S.
LEXIS 139; 54 U.S.L.W. 5054; Bellotti, supra note 59; Ginsberg v. New
York, supra note 61; and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 804; 64 S.
Ct. 784; 88 L. Ed. 1090 (1944) U.S. LEXIS 942.

110 See Vernonia School District 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646; 115 S. Ct.
2386; 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995) U.S. LEXIS 4275; 63 U.S.L.W. 4653; 95
Cal. Daily Op. Service 4846; 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S229.

111 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V, Section 1.

112 Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 1327.

113 Labor Code of the Philippines, as renumbered, Articles 137 and

138.

114 See Section 8 (a) of RA 7610 and Section 5 (t) of RA 8239, entitled

"PHILIPPINE PASSPORT ACT OF 1996," approved on November 22,
1996.

115 Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra note 72, citing Prince v.

Massachusetts, supra note 109.

116 Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville; id.

117 Supra note 59.

118 Bellotti, id.; to wit: "The unique role in our society of the family x x
x requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and
flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have
recognized three [(3)) reasons justifying the conclusion that
the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults: 111 the peculiar vulnerability of children; 121
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and 131 the importance of the parental role in child
rearing." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

119 Id.

120 Supra note 109.

121 Id., citations omitted.

122 See Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP (ESP), 487

Phil. 531 (2004); White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil.
444 (2009); Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 77
(2010), citing Joaquin Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines: A Commentary 139-140 (2009). See also Concurring
Opinion of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in Garcia v.
Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 124-127 (2013); and Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of
Justice, 727 Phil. 28, 97- 98 (2014).

123 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. ESP (id. at 693-696,

citations omitted), it was opined that, "in the landmark case of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. l; 93 S. Ct.
1278; 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 [1973] U.S. LEXIS 91), the U.S. Supreme Court in
identifying a 'suspect class' as a class saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,
articulated that suspect classifications were not limited to
classifications based on race, alienage or national origin but could also
be applied to other criteria such as religion. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled that suspect classifications deserving of Strict Scrutiny
include those based on race or national origin, [alienage], and religion
while classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, financial need,
conscientious objection and age have been held not to constitute
suspect classifications." See also Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers
& Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 and 189305, August
16, 2016. See further White Light Corporation v. City of Manila (id. at
463), where it was held that "[s[trict scrutiny is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race[,]
as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection. The [US] Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights
such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel."

124 See Dissenting Opinion of Retired Chief Justice Artermio V.

Panganiban in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, id. at
648.
125 See id.

126 See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, id.

127 In the US, courts have made several, albeit conflicting, rulings in
determining the applicable level of scrutiny in cases involving minors'
constitutional rights, specifically on the right to travel (see Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, supra note 51; Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065 [1981] U.S. App. LEXIS 16939; 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
[Callaghan] 879; McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381
[1984] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16647; Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125
[1989] U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5707; Qutb v. Strauss, supra note 73; Hutchins
v. District of Columbia, supra note 109; Nunez v. City of San Diego,114
F.3d 935 [1997] U.S. App. LEXIS 13409; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4317,
97 Daily Journal DAR 7221; Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, supra
note 72; Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 [2003] U.S. App.
LEXIS 25851; and Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 [2004] U.S.
App. LEXIS 910). These conflicting rulings spring from the uncertainty
on whether the right to interstate travel under US laws is a
fundamental right (see US v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281; 41 S. Ct. 133; 65
L. Ed. 270 [1920] U.S. LEXIS 1159; and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618; 89 S. Ct. 1322; 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 [1969] U.S. LEXIS 3190). In
contrast, the right to travel is clearly a fundamental right
under Philippine law; thus, the strict scrutiny test is
undeniably the applicable level of scrutiny.

See also In Re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83; 394 N.E.2d 368 [1978]
Ohio Misc. LEXIS 94; citing earlier cases involving curfew
ordinances on minors; People in the Interest of JM, 768 P.2d 219
[1989] Colo. LEXIS 10; 13 BTR 93; City of Panora v.
Simmons, supra note 74; and City of Maquoketa v. Russell, supra
note 93.

128 See In Re Mosier, id. citing People v. Chambers, 32 Ill. App. 3d 444;

335 N.E.2d 612 (1975) Ill. App. LEXIS 2993.

129 Nunez v. City of San Diego, supra note 127.

130 Id.

131 Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 122, at 98. See

also Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 282
(2009).

132 Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, id. See also Dissenting Opinion of

Ret. Chief Justice Panganiban and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. BSP, supra note
122, at 644 and 688-689, respectively.

133 See The Diocese of Bacolodv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January

21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1, 97-98, citing 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Secs.
12 and 13 and Soriano v. Laguardia, 605 Phil. 43, 106 (2009).

134 Id.

135 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., supra note 131, at 298.

136 Rollo, pp. 48-49.

137 Supra note 72.

138 Id.

139 In its Comment dated August 18, 2016 (see rollo, pp. 270-313),
the local government of Quezon City attached statistical data on
"Children in Conflict with Law" (CICL) incidents from the various
barangays of its six (6) districts for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015
(see id. at 330-333). The information is summarized as follows:

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2013 2677

2014 5106

2015 4778

In 2014 and 2015, most of the reported CICL incidents were

related to Theft, Curfew violations, and Physical Injury. The local
government claimed that the decline of CICL incidents in 2015
was due to the enforcement of the curfew ordinance (id. at 298).

Also, together with its Comment dated August 16, 2016 (id. at
85-111), the local government of Manila submitted data reports
of the Manila Police District (MPD) on CICL incidents, in Manila
from 2014, 2015, and half of the year 2016 (id. at 116-197), as
follows:

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2014 74*
 2015 30

January to July 2016 75**

 It includes a minor who violated RA 4136 or the "Land

Transportation and Traffic Code" (June 20, 1964) and RA
10586 or the "Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of
2013," approved on May 27, 2013.
 It includes the number of minors who violated curfew
hours.

A number from these reports involve incidents of Robbery (43),

Theft (43), Physical Injuries (12), Rape (9), and Frustrated
Homicide (6).

The local government of Manila likewise attached the

Department of Social Welfare and Development's (DSWD) report
on CICL for the years 2015 and half of the year 2016, summed as
follows (id. at 198-I 99):

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2015 845

January to July 2016 524

Further, it attached DSWD's report on minors who were at risk of

running in conflict with law and CICL as a result of the local
government of Manila's Campaign on Zero Street Dwellers in the
City of Manila for the year 2016 (id. at 200-202):

Reached out Cases 2,194

**Reached out Cases 480

with Offenses (CICL)

**For the period January to August 2016 only.

140 See id. at 296-298.

141 See In Re Mosier, supra note 127.

142 See People in Interest of J.M, supra note 127.

143 Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile
Curfews and the Constitution, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1163 (March 1984).

144 Note that the court in this US case used "no compelling interest"
as the ground to declare the ordinance unconstitutional. The reasons
set forth in its discussion, however, relates to the failure of the
ordinance to be narrowly drawn as to infringe on constitutional rights
(see supra note 127).

145 See Qutb v. Strauss (supra note 73), wherein a US court ruled that

the assailed .curfew ordinance employed the least restrictive means of
accomplishing its objectives as it contained various defenses or
exceptions that narrowly tailored the ordinance and allowed
the local government to meet its goals while respecting the
rights of minors. In effect, the ordinance placed only minimal burden
on the minors' constitutional rights. It held:

Furthermore, we are convinced that this curfew ordinance also

employs the least restrictive means of accomplishing its goals.
The ordinance contains various "defenses" that allow affected
minors to remain in public areas during curfew hours. x x x To be
sure, the defenses are the most important consideration in
determining whether this ordinance is narrowly tailored.

xxxx

x x x It is true, of course, that the curfew ordinance would restrict

some late-night activities of juveniles; if indeed it did not, then
there would be no purpose in enacting it. But when balanced
with the compelling interest sought to be addressed-
protecting juveniles and preventing juvenile crime--the
impositions are minor. x x x. Thus, after carefully examining
the juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by the city of Dallas, we
conclude that it is narrowly tailored to address the city's
compelling interest and any burden this ordinance places
upon minors' constitutional rights will be
minimal. (Emphases supplied)

146 Rollo, pp. 44.

Sec. 2. During curfew hours, no children and youths below

eighteen (18) years of age shall be allowed in the streets,
commercial establishments, recreation centers, malls or any
other area outside the immediate vicinity of their residence,
EXCEPT:
 (a) those accompanied by their parents, family members of
legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication
facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) students
of night schools and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required to stay in the streets or outside
their residence after10:00 P.M.; and

(d) those working at night: PROVIDED, That children falling

under categories c) and d) shall secure a certification from
their Punong Barangay exempting them from the coverage
of this Ordinance, or present documentation/identification
proving their qualification under such category.

147 Id. at 38.

Tuntunin 3. Mga Eksemsyon

a.1Mga mag-aaral na may klase sa gabi;

a2 Mga kabataang naghahanapbuhay sa gabi;

a.3 Mga kabataang dumalo sa gawainlpagtitipon ng

paaralan o simbahan na may pakikipag-ugnayan Sa
Tanggapan ng Sangguniang Barangay.

Ang lahat ng kabataan sa sakop ng Bayan ng Navotas,

Kalakhang Maynila na nag-aaral o naghahanapbuhay na ang
oras ng pagpasok o pag-uwi ay sakop ng "curfew" ay kailangang
kumuha ng katibayan (certification) mula sa
paaralan/tanggapan/pagawaan na pinapasukan ng may
pagpapatunay ng Punong Barangay na sumasakop sa mga
kinauukulan, upang ito ay magamit sa oras ng "curfew" sa
kanilang pag-uwi o pagpasok.

b. Eskemsyong [sic] lnsidental:

b. l Mga kabataang may mga gawain sa ilalim ng

superbisyon o pamamahala ng kanilang mga
magulang/tagapag-alaga o mga indibiduwal na nasa
hustong gulang (18 taon at pataas) na may awtoridad sa
kanila.

b.2 Mga kabataang napasama sa mga aksidente,

kalamidad at mga tulad nito.
 k. Eksemsyong tuwing may okasyon:

k.l Bisperas at Araw ng Pasko;

k.2 Bisperas at Araw ng Bagong Taon;

k.3 Bisperas at Araw ng Pistang Barangay;

k.4 Araw ng Santo!Araw ng mga Kaluluwa;

k.5 Huwebes Santo;

k.6 Biyernes Santo;

k.7 Sabado de Gloria; at k.

k.8 Pasko ng Pagkabuhay.

148 The Curfew Ordinances exempt minors from the curfews when

they are engaged in night school, night work, or emergency situations
(see id. at 38, 44, and 53-54).

149 Supra note 127.

150 See Tuntunin 4 of the Navotas Ordinance (rollo, p. 42); and Section

12 of the Manila Ordinance (rollo, p. 46).

151 The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as

repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity
of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it
could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent.x x x.

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a

statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other,
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the
parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with
one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried
 out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void,
in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall
with them. (Tatad v. The Secretary of the Department of
Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 371 [I 997], citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1986 Ed., pp. 28-29.)

152 Rollo, pp. 53-54.

153 Malta v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 139-140 (2007).

154 Rollo, p. 57-59.

155 See amended Navotas Ordinance; id. at 41-42.

Tuntunin 1. PAMPATAKARANG KAPARUSAHAN AT MULTA.

a) Unang Paglabag - ang mahuhuli ay dadalhin sa

Tanggapan ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad
(MSWDO). Ipapatawag ang magulang o tagapag-alaga sa
kabataang lumabag at pagkuha ng tala hinggil sa
pagkatao nito (Pangalan, Edad, Tirahan, Pangalan ng
Magulang o Tagapag-alaga), at pagpapaalala, kasunod ang
pagbabalik sa kalinga ng magulang o tagapagalaga ng
batang nahuli.

b) Pangalawang Paglabag -Ang batang lumabag ay

[dadalhin] sa MSWDO, pagmumultahin ang
magulang/tagapag-alaga ng halagang ₱300.00 piso, dahil
sa kapabayaan o apat (4) na oras na gawaing sibiko-
sosval o pangkomunidad ng magulang/tagapag-
alaga at ang batang nalluli.

k) Ikatlong Paglabag - pagmumulta ng magulang/tagapag-

alaga ng halagang ₱300.00 piso dahil sa kapabayaan at
apat (4) na oras ng gawaing sibiko-sosval o
pangkomunidad  ng magulang/tagapag-alaga  at ang
batang naliuli.

d) Para sa pang-apat at paulit-ulit na lalabag ay papatawan

ng kaparusahang doble sa itinakda ng Tuntuning l .k ng
ordinansang ito.

1.1. Sa pagkakataong walang multang [maibibigay] ang

magulang/tagapag-alaga ng kabataang [nahuli], ang Tanggapan
ng Kagalingang Panlipunan at Pagpapaunlad (MSDWO)
 ay magpapataw ng gawaing sibiko-social o
pangkomunidad sa magulang at ang batang
nahuli katumbas ng nasabing multa tulad ng mga sumusunod:

a. Apat (4) na oras na paglilinis ng kanal o lansangan na

itinakda ng nasabing tanggapan.

b. Apat (4) na oras na pagtatanim ng puno sa lugar na

itatakda ng nasabing tanggapan.

c. Apat (4) na oras na gawaing pagpapaganda ng

komunidad bilang suporta sa programang "Clean and
Green" ng Pamahalaang Bayan. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

156 Rollo, p. 45.

157 Penalties (as punishment) are imposed either: (1) to "satisfy the

community's retaliatory sense of indignation that is provoked by
injustice" (Black's Law Dictionary, 81 h Ed., p. 1270) - or for retribution
following the classical or juristic school of thought underlying the
criminal law system (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal
Code, 2012 Ed., p. 9); (2) to "change the character of the offender"
(Black's Law Dictionary, Eight Ed., p. 1270) - or for reformation
pursuant to the positivist or realistic school of thought (Boado, Notes
and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed., pp. 9-10); (3) to
"prevent the repetition of wrongdoing by disabling the offender"
(Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1270) - following the utilitarian
theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, 2012 Ed.,
p. 11); or (4) for both retribution and reformation pursuant to the
eclectic theory (Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code,
2012 Ed., p. 11).

158 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1168.

159 Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 688.

160 Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1269.

161 Section 4 (f) of RA 9344 reads:

Section 4. Definition of Terms- x x x.

xxxx
 (f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs
provided in a community setting developed for purposes of
intervention and diversion, as well as rehabilitation of the child in
conflict with the law, for reintegration into his/her family and/or
community.

162 Section 54 of RA 9344 reads:

Section 54. Objectives of Community-Based Programs. - The

objectives of communitybased programs are as follows:

(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of

livelihood of the child in conflict with the law in case he/she
is studying, working or attending vocational learning
institutions;

(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law

from his/her parents/guardians to maintain the support
system fostered by their relationship and to create greater
awareness of their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;

(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the

child in conflict with the law and encourage community
support and involvement; and

(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in

conflict with the law by preventing jail detention.

163 <http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/admonition > (last
accessed on March 14, 2017).

164 8th Ed., p. 52.

165 3rd Ed., p. 36.

166 See Section 52 (g), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative

Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) (promulgated on November 18,
2011), which states that: "[a] warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty." See also In the Matter of the Contempt Orders
Against Lt. Gen. Calimlim, 584 Phil. 377, 384 (2008), citing Tobias v.
Veloso, 188 Phil. 267, 274-275 (1980); Re: Anonymous Complaint
Against Ms. Bayani for Dishonesty, 656 Phil. 222, 228 (2011);
and Dalmacio Joaquin v. Dela Cruz, 690 Phil. 400, 409 (2012), to name
a few.
 See also Section 58 (i), Rule IV of Memorandum Circular No. 19,
Series of 1999 or the "Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service" (RURACCS) (September 27, 1999). The
RRACCS (Section 46 (f), Rule 10) and its predecessor RURACCS
(Section 52 (c), Rule IV), however, consider reprimand (or
censure) as a penalty imposed for light offenses.

167 <http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/reprimand >(last
accessed on March 14, 2017).

168 8th Ed., p. 1329.

169 3rd Ed., p. 818.

170 See Section 52 (f) Rule IO of the RRACCS: "[t]he penalty of

reprimand x x x." See also Tobias v. Veloso, supra note 166, at 275.