MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF LAW
______________________________________________________________________________
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF A BACHELOR OF LAWS
HONOURS DEGREE.

RESEARCH TOPIC:

THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN ZIMBABWE’S LABOUR LAW: A LIABILITY OR A TRAP AT

WORST?

SUBMITTED BY

MELUSI MOYO

STUDENT NUMBER: R08559F

SUPERVISOR: DR. J. TSABORA

JUNE 2014

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval form …………………………………………………………………………………… i

Declaration ……………………………………………………………………………………… ii
Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………………. iii
Acknowledgment ……………………………………………………………………………….. iv

CHAPTER 1

1.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………....1

1.2. Background to Study…………………………………………………………………….......2
1.3. Statement of the Problem…………………………………………………………………....3
1.4. Research Aims and Objectives………………………………………………………………3
1.5. Literature Review……………………………………………………………........................4
1.6. Methodology………………………………………………………………………………...6
1.7. Summary of Chapters………………………………………………………………………..6

CHAPTER 2

2.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………… 8

2.2. Significance of the Right to Strike…………………………………………………………...8
2.3. The Common Law Position on the Right to Strike………………………………………….10
2.4. The Legislative Framework and the Right to Strike………………………………………...11
2.5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..17

CHAPTER 3

3.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….18
3.2. Situations where the Right to Strike is precluded……………………………………….......18
3.3. Requirements for a lawful strike action……………………………………………………..23
3.4. The purpose of the Labour Act the Right to Strike………………………………………….27
3.5. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………… 28

ii
CHAPTER 4

4.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………. 29

4.2. Right to Strike and Zimbabwe’s Socio-Economic Context…………………………………30
4.3. Remedies against unlawful strike action………………………………………………........ 31
4.4. The Right to Strike, the Constitution and the Constitutional Court…………………………33
4.5. Case Law and the right to strike…………………………………………………………….35
4.6. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………… 36

CHAPTER 5

5.1. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………… 37

5.2. Recommendations …………………………………………………………………….........37

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………….41

iii
APPROVAL FORM
The undersigned certify that they have read and recommend to the Midlands State University for
acceptance, research project titled THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN ZIMBABWE’S LABOUR LAW:
A LIABILITY OR A TRAP AT WORST? Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the Bachelor of Laws Honours Degree.

…………………………………………….
SUPERVISOR

………………………………………………..
PROGRAMME /SUBJECT COORDINATOR

………………………………………………….
DATE

i
 DECLARATION

I MELUSI MOYO, do hereby declare that this dissertation is a result of my own investigation
and research, save to the extent indicated in the acknowledgment, references and comments
included in the body of the research, and that to the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted
either wholly or in part thereof for any other degree at any other University.

.......................................... ………/ …………/ …………

SIGNATURE DATE

ii
 DEDICATIONS

To my beloved parents.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my profound gratitude to Dr J Tsabora for his guidance and support without
which the task of completing this manuscript would have remained a dream. I am also indebted to
my colleagues and fellow classmates for their moral support and encouragement throughout the
course of my research and preparation of this research project.

iv
CHAPTER 1

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Strike action, commonly referred to as “strike” occupies a central position in labour relations in
that it seeks to strengthen the bargaining power of employees than would otherwise be the case if
it were a matter of each employee facing the employer on their own. In other words, strike action
is concerned with the need to bring about equilibrium in industrial relations between two
competing interests; labour and capital1. Strike action refers to the collective and concerted
withdrawal of labour by workers in support of their interests2. Section 65 (3) of the Constitution
of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 20133 (hereinafter called ‘the constitution’) entrenches the right to
strike thereby making it justiciable. A strike is a form of collective job action as defined in section
2 of the Labour Act Chapter 28:014, hereinafter referred to as the “Act”.

An analysis of the above definition of strike action brings certain aspects of this right to the fore.
Firstly, for a strike to be regarded as such, there must be in existence an employment relationship
and one must be in a position to point out who the parties to that relationship are. Secondly, a strike
can only be resorted to by employees. In other words, it is one of the ways by which employees
can effectively stand their ground in demand of their rights, which rights must be related to the
employment relationship. One employee cannot embark on a strike. That there should be more
than one employee for a strike to suffice is so because of the inherent inequality in bargaining
power between the employer and the employee which inequality ordinarily results in the employer
prevailing over the employee concerned. Thus, the idea is to try and strengthen the bargaining
power of employees. In other words, the employer has the potential to exploit labour in the absence
of some balancing mechanism. Lastly, employees embarking on a strike must be acting with a

1
Munyaradzi Gwisai Labour and Employment Law in Zimbabwe: Relations of Work under the Neo Colonial
Capitalism (2007) 344.
2
Gwisai op cit note 1 at 1.
3
The new constitution which came into force on the 22nd of August 2013
4
Section 2 of the Act defines collective job action as an industrial action calculated to persuade or cause a party to
an employment relationship to accede to a demand related to employment.

1
common purpose: to disrupt production at work place thereby putting the employer out of business
and in the process, forcing the employer concerned to meaningfully engage with the employees 5.
In light of the foregoing, the dissertation endeavours to underscore the fact that despite the
aforesaid significance of the right to strike, it still remains of little, if any practical value to
employees. This is so because the exercise of the right in question is preceded by a number of
cumbersome procedures in respect of which the law requires absolute compliance, failing which
one’s conduct as an employee stands to be condemned as illegal, hence, punishable. Further, it will
be argued that it is a right that is given by one hand and taken by the other. The dissertation shall
focus on all employees except those in the public service and members of the disciplined forces of
the State.

1.2. BACKGROUND TO STUDY.

The right to strike is now constitutionally guaranteed under the Bill of Rights in section 65 (3) of
the Constitution of Zimbabwe. This means that the right is now justiciable and principles of
constitutional interpretation will be applied if any dispute arises with respect to this right. In
contrast, there was no right to strike under common law given that an employee had an absolute
duty to provide service. This was evident from the so called ‘no work principle’6. Thus, embarking
on a strike was not only a breach by an employee of his or her duty to provide service, but in fact,
a misconduct which entitled the employer to summarily dismiss the employee 7. With the coming
into force of the Labour Act8, the right to strike was entrenched in section 104. That however has
not meant any meaningful benefit to employees given that the right is exercised ‘subject to the
Act’9. The bone of contention lies in that in terms of the Act;
a) the right is limited to disputes of interests;
b) it does not apply to employees engaged in essential services of which the definition of
essential services is too wide to cover virtually all services;

5
Machingambi A Guide to Labour in Zimbabwe 1 ed (2007)
204
6
Machingambi op cit note 5 at 204.
7
Op cit note 5 at 2.
8
Op cit note 4 at 1.
9
Section 104 (1) of the Act, Op cit note 4 at 1

2
 c) other categories of employees are prohibited from embarking on a strike action10;
d) Various cumbersome procedures also have to be followed for the right to be lawfully
exercised11.
The situation is further compounded by the fact that the Act prescribes punishment including a
custodial sentence of up to five years for embarking on unlawful strike action12. This has a chilling
effect as employees cannot guarantee absolute compliance with the various cumbersome
procedures. In the end, they might end up deciding not to exercise the right for fear of being caught
on the wrong side of the law. As a result, one might argue that the change in law allowing for the
express provision of the right to strike has not assisted the employees much as the right is still
subject to excessive restrictions.

1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There is a prevailing uncertainty with regards to the nature and extent to which the right to strike
is justiciable. As a result, employees are of the view that they can embark on strike as and when
they so please. This however places them at the risk of being chastised for exercising a right which
is specifically provided for, but for the fact that it was not properly exercised. The assumption
therefore is that the right in question is very imprecise and of little practical value to employees.

1.4. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES.

a) To investigate the Constitutional and Legislative framework on the right to strike in

Zimbabwe.
b) To analyse the extent to which the right to strike is justiciable under Zimbabwe’s Labour
laws.
c) To explore possible ways of ensuring that the right to strike is justiciable and easily
available to employees.

10
Members of security services, section 65 (3) of the Constitution, op cit note 3 at 1
11
Section 104 of the Act, op cit note 4 at 1.
12
Section 109 (2) of the Act, op cit note 4 at 1.

3
1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW
Legal authorities are generally in agreement that the right to strike is essential to collective
bargaining13. This enables parties to an employment relationship to come up with a mutually
acceptable solution in case of a dispute. However, both Zimbabwean and South African authorities
simply analyse the right to strike as provided for in the relevant statutes in their jurisdictions. In
particular they analyse the various procedures that have to be complied with for a strike to pass
the requirement of legality14.

Machingambi15 for instance tries to justify some of the restrictions on the right to strike especially
in respect of employees engaged in essential service. However, the author did not comment for
instance, on the discretion that is given to the Minister of Labour to declare as essential in some
instances, services that are not ordinarily regarded as essential hence, encroaching on the
employees’ right to strike. In some cases, the authorities have noted that the law has remained
virtually the same as it was under common law16. Gwisai17 has also observed that the right to strike
is accompanied by various prohibitive and repressive rules intended to emasculate precisely those
aspects that make the right effective.

Lloyd18blames the Labour Act itself, arguing that it ‘whittles away considerably the right to strike’.
This is so because the right is exercised subject to the Act, which Act prescribes various procedural
requirements that ought to be satisfied before the right can be lawfully exercised. Grogan19
highlighted the employer’s right to institute delictual claims against striking employees to recover
damages in some instances. Further, the author acknowledges the relative nature of the right to

13
Gwisai op cit note 1 at 1.
Machingambi op cit note 5 at 2. This author pointed out that there can be no guarantee that management would
meaningfully engage with employees’ representatives over working conditions in the absence of the right to strike,
at page 191.
John Grogan Workplace Law, 10 ed (2010) at page 367.
D du toit Guide Labour Relations Law “ A Comparative” 5 ed, at 291
14
Machingambi op cit note 5 at 2. The author referred to them as burdensome prestrike procedures: at page 198.
15
Supra footnote 4 at page 201.
16
Op cit note 5 at 2 the author likened the provisions of section 104 (4) of the Act (which relieves the employer of
the obligation to remunerate employees for the period on which they were on strike despite the fact that the
strike was legal) to the common law principle of ‘no work no pay’; at page 208
17
Gwisai op cit note 1 at 1
18
Patrick Lloyd Labour Legislation in Zimbabwe 2 ed (2006), Legal Resources Foundation; at page 126.
19
Op cit note 13 at 4.

4
strike, arguing that although it is constitutionally guaranteed, the right to strike may be limited in
the interests of some higher values and goals. Commenting on some of the difficulties faced by
employees who decide to exercise the right in question, the author observed that the obvious
disincentive to strikers is that they must do without their pay for the duration of the strike. Landis
and Grossett20 have also aligned themselves with the above observation, adding that should the
employer concerned remunerate the striking employees in kind, it can subsequently institute
proceedings to recover the monetary value of such remuneration.

Annali Basson, Marylyn Christopher & Christoph Garbers et al21 made reference to the various
options that may be resorted to by an employer who is faced by a lawful strike. The authors gave
as an example the fact that an employer can in some instances; persuade other employees to fill in
the gap left by the striking employees thereby undermining the right to strike. In light of the above
authors’ observations, it is quite evident that the right to strike is not as clear as it ought to be. This
project will therefore identify the various problems that hinder the effective exercise of the right
to strike and will suggest some recommendations aimed at addressing the problems concerned.

On the international plane, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
does provide for the right to strike in Article 8(1) (d). The right is conferred on condition that it is
exercised subject to the laws of a particular country. This therefore takes us back to the provisions
of the Act which, as mentioned earlier, also provides for the right concerned on condition that it is
exercised subject to its provisions. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions do
not specifically provide for the right to strike22. However the right is mentioned in passing for
instance in the Right to Organise Convention No. 98/89 as well as the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No. 87/194823. Thus it is up to the law makers in
various jurisdictions to make provision for the right concerned in a detailed manner.
To conclude on this section, note should be taken of the fact that Zimbabwe and South Africa
share the same Common law background, both being Roman Dutch jurisdictions. Thus, albeit in

20
Helga Landis & Lesley Grossett Employment and Labour Law: A Practical Guide for the Work Place 2 ed (2005)
at 366.
21
Annali Bassoon, Marylyn Christopher & Christoph Garbers et al Essential Labour, 5 ed (2009) at 326
22
Neville Rubin Code of International Labour Law: Law, Practice and Jurisprudence; Volume 1, Essentials of
International Labour Law (2005) at 203.
23
Machingambi op cit note 5 at 2

5
passing, reference will be made to the South African position with respect to some aspects
surrounding the exercise of the right to strike.

1.6. METHODOLOGY
The research methodology of this dissertation will be restricted to the desktop research. In the
circumstances, the following sources shall be used;
a) Leading textbooks, legislation, journals and scholarly articles
b) Case authorities, although to a lesser extent given that the right to strike in Zimbabwe is
largely governed by legislation
c) International Conventions
d) Internet sources

1.7. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS.

Chapter 1
This chapter gives an introduction and background to the study, statement of the problem, an
outline of the research aims and objectives, overview of the literature or current legal framework
on the subject, the research methodology as well as a synopsis of chapters.

Chapter 2
This chapter will give an account of the common law position as regards the right to strike. Further,
it will briefly look at the importance of the right to strike, evaluating whether the common law
position was mindful of such importance. Besides, the chapter will highlight the changes that were
effected with the advent of the Act24, and lately, the Constitution of Zimbabwe25.

Chapter 3
This chapter will analyse the various limitations to and the requirements for a lawful strike in
Zimbabwean labour law. Besides, the approach will also provide a platform for the analysis of the

24
Op cit note 4 at 1.
25
Op cit note 3 at 1.

6
current position on the right to strike in light of the purpose of the Act 26, whether it accords with
such purpose.

Chapter 4
This Chapter will analyse the right to strike in light of Zimbabwe’s Socio-economic context. The
endeavour will be to ascertain whether the provisions on the right to strike are compatible with
some government policies. In other words, the Chapter will analyse the right to strike from the
government perspective, that is, the light in which the right to strike is seen by the government.
More so, it will briefly discuss some of the measures employers can resort to in case of unlawful
strikes.

Chapter 5.
This Chapter will conclude the dissertation and advance some recommendations aimed at
addressing the problems that militate against the proper and effective exercise of the right to strike.

26
Op cit note 4 at 1

7
CHAPTER 2

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the significance of the right to strike. It further analyses the common law
position on the right to strike, highlighting the fact that the right in question was unknown under
this regime. Besides, it will discuss the legislative framework with respect to the right concerned,
starting with the position under the labour Act and thereafter the Constitutional position. In this
respect, regard shall be had to the manner in which the courts used to interpret the right to strike
before the advent of the 2013 Constitution, analysing whether such interpretation was in fact
compatible with the need to ensure the full realisation of this right. The author will further advocate
for the adoption of principles relating to Constitutional interpretation whenever courts are
presented with disputes concerning the exercise of the right. This is so because the right to strike
is now entrenched in the Constitution under the bill of rights.

2.2. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

The right to strike is intrinsically linked to collective bargaining which has been defined as a
voluntary process for reconciling the conflicting interests and aspirations of management and
labour through the joint regulation of terms and conditions of employment 27. It enables parties to
come up with a negotiated, mutually acceptable solution should any dispute arise. Gwisai 28, best
summarises the importance of collective bargaining, noting that it serves three main purposes
namely;
 Economic: in that it facilitates the regulation of workplace relations and the
institutionalisation of industrial conflicts. On the party of employers, it is a charter for
temporary reconciliation, which guarantees production planning, whilst for employees it
guarantees the creation of certain generalised standards, in particular, wages and
employment security;

27
Op cit note 1 at 1.
28
Op cit note 1 at 1.

8
  Social; in that it establishes and promotes workplace democracy thereby protecting workers
from employers’ arbitrary decision;
 Political; in that it brings a measure of democracy to industrial life, allowing workers to
effectively speak out on matters affecting them at work place. Thus, for collective
bargaining to be effective;
“there is need for relative equilibrium of power between the parties and the use of legitimate
economic weapons such as strikes by workers…., Without an effective right to strike, the power of
management to shut down the plant would not be met by a corresponding power on the side of
labour’’29

In the same breadth, Machingambi30 has also pointed out that there can be no guarantee that
management would meaningfully engage with employees’ representatives over working
conditions in the absence of the right to strike. According to Rubin31, the right to strike is an
indispensable means for workers and their organisations for the promotion and protection of their
economic and social interests. These interests not only have to do with obtaining better working
conditions, but also with seeking solutions to the economic and social policy questions, among
other issues. On his part, Freund32 has noted that there can never be an equilibrium in industrial
relations without the freedom to strike.

With the foregoing observations, the question then arises; does the Zimbabwe labour law recognise
the importance of the right to strike? This then opens the stage for consideration of the common
law position on the right to strike.

29
Op cit note 1 at 1.
See also Machingambi; op cit note 5 at 2
Grogan; op cit note 13 at 4
30
Op cit note 4 at 2.
31
Op cit note 22 at 5
See also, report by the Committee on Freedom of Association, one of the ad hoc Committees of the International
Labour Organization governing organ, the International Labour Conference: Report 214 on case No. 1081 (Peru)
32
Freund Khan’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983) at page 292, cited in Machingambi, op cit note 5 at 2 .
See also Caleb H Mucheche A Practical Guide to Labour Law in Zimbabwe 1 ed (2013) at page121. The author
acknowledged the importance of the right to strike, arguing that it is one of the most formidable and potent
weapons at the disposal of employees in the entire global village.

9
2.3. THE COMMON LAW AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

There is no legal basis for the right to strike under common law given that employees have a duty
to provide service to the employer33. This position was underscored in the case of Girjac Services
Pvt (ltd) v Mudzingwa34. In this case, the appellant employee had been arrested at the instance of
the employer on allegations of theft. He was subsequently acquitted, having been initially released
on bail, during which time he did not render his services to the employer. The employee later
sought to resume work with full pay from the date he had been arrested up to the date of his
acquittal. The High Court had ordered that the employee be reinstated with full back pay and
benefits. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that that the employee was not entitled to
absent himself from work because he had been arrested. He was not incapacitated from working
and should have tendered his services. He could not blame his absence on his employer for having
wrongfully caused his arrest, there having been reasonable suspicion that he had committed an
offence.

It logically follows therefore that embarking on a strike amounts not only to a breach by the
employee of the duty concerned, but also to a misconduct which entitles the employer to summarily
dismiss the employee without incurring any legal liability for such course of action35. This position
was evident from the so called no work no pay principle36, relied on by the Supreme Court in the
above case, which entitled the employer to withhold an employee’s salary should they fail to tender
their services. It is also sad to note that despite the fact that the court admitted that the employer’s
decision to cause the arrest of the employee concerned was wrong, it still thought it wise not to
blame the employer.

Regard being had to the above, one would note that despite the aforesaid significance of the right
to strike, the common law position was not alive to that fact. The scales were in fact heavily tipped
in favour of the employer who, faced with a striking employee had two effective counter measures,
that is, in addition to withholding the employee’s salary, the employer could summarily terminate

33
Gwisai, op cit note 1 at 1
34
1999 (1) ZLR 243 (S).
35
Gwisai op cit note 1 at 1, Machingambi op cit note 5 at 2
36
Machingambi, op cit note 5 at 2

10
the employment relationship. This obviously was a disincentive which discouraged employees
from embarking on a strike action regardless of the propriety or otherwise of working conditions.
As a result of the above, the employer enjoys inherent superior power in the contract by virtue of
it being the owner and controller of the means of production37. The employment relationship was
in fact vertical due to the aforesaid superiority of the employer, hence there was no equality as
between the parties. Now the question is, is this common law position still relevant in Zimbabwe’s
labour law? That issue is dealt with below.

2.4. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

The legislative framework with regards to the right to strike differs from the common law position.
In fact, the statutory position brought in fundamental changes with respect to the right to strike. A
reading of section 104(1) of the Labour Act shows that all employees, workers committees and
trade unions have a right to resort to collective job action in order to resolve disputes of interests.
Despite a qualification with respect to the disputes in respect of which strike may be resorted to,
the most important issue to note is that the right is now expressly provided for, unlike under
common law. This becomes clearer especially if regard is had to the provisions of section 2 of the
Act which shows that collective job action includes “strikes”. The aforesaid section 104(1) of the
Act was brought into effect by section 37 of Amendment Act No. 17 of 2002. It follows therefore
that unlike under common law, exercising the right to strike no longer warrants disciplinary action
against employees, indeed, one cannot be punished for exercising their right. This of course, as
highlighted earlier is conditional upon the right being exercised strictly in accordance with the
manner prescribed in the Act.

It is also worth mentioning at this stage that although substantially different from the common law
position, the statutory position referred to herein retains some of the fundamental aspects of
common law, for instance the “no work no pay principle”38 This is evident from section 108(4) of
the Act which relieves the employer of the obligation to remunerate employees for services not
rendered albeit during a lawful strike. This essentially is a disguised form of punishment intended

37
Op cit note 1 at 1.
38
Op cit note 5 at 2

11
to discourage employees from embarking on strike. This is just but one of the major resentments
towards the manner the right to strike is treated in Zimbabwe’s labour law, as will be argued later
in this research.

With respect to the constitutional position, one would recall that the discarded Lancaster House
Constitution39 did not expressly provide for the right to strike. According to Machingambi40, the
right to strike used to be inferred from the then section 21(1) which provided for freedom of
assembly and association. The 2013 Constitution addressed this anomaly by expressly providing
for the right to strike in section 65 on labour rights, indeed under the Bill of rights. Section 65(3)
specifically guarantees the right to strike, hence making it justiciable. The section reads as follows;

“Except for members of the security service, every employee has the right to participate in
collective job action including the right to strike… but a law may restrict the exercise of this right
in order to maintain essential services”

Thus, any unwarranted interference with the right in question would warrant the intervention of
the Constitutional Court as the supreme constitutional adjudicator. This therefore represents a great
milestone in so far as the need to protect the right to strike in Zimbabwe is concerned.

It is worthy note that as with all other rights, the right to strike in section 65(3) of the Constitution
is not absolute. For instance, the same section stipulates that a law may restrict the exercise of the
right concerned in respect of essential services. This then calls for a detailed consideration of this
limitation given that, as indicated earlier, it is one of the highly arbitrary clauses which whittles
away considerably the right to strike. The main resentment against this limitation lies in that the
definition of essential services is too wide and encompasses almost everything. The right does not
also apply to members of the security services, an issue to be dealt with later in this research.

39
The one that was replaced by the COPAC (Constitutional Parliamentary Committee) Constitution which came
into force on the 22nd of August 2013.
40
Op cit note 5 at 2.

12
It is also important to note that since the right to strike is now provided for under the Bill of Rights,
principles relating to constitutional interpretation will be applied in case of disputes relating to the
exercise of this right. In particular, the preamble to the Constitution emphasises the issue of
commitment to upholding and defending fundamental human rights. Section 3 of the Constitution
contains the founding values upon which Zimbabwe is founded. Fundamental human rights is
singled out as one of those principles. Chapter 2 of the same Constitution also outlines what are
referred to as national objectives which are intended to guide State institutions and agencies of
government at every level. In particular, section 11 talks about the need to foster fundamental
human rights and freedoms. The obligation in this last respect being to protect fundamental rights
and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights and to promote their full realisation and fulfilment.
Thus, there is a thread of ‘fundamental human rights’ running throughout these provisions. It is
not difficult to appreciate how important the aforesaid Constitutional provisions are vis-a-vis the
right to strike. This is so because they are a constant reminder to Constitutional adjudicators on
the need to ensure the full realisation of human rights, of which strike action is one of them.

To further complement the aforesaid important constitutional provisions, our courts have had
occasion to develop important jurisprudence on Constitutional interpretation. In the landmark case
of Hewlett v Minister of Finance41, Fieldsend C.J (as he then was) noted that the principles
governing Constitutional interpretation were not different from those governing the interpretation
of any other legislation. He however proceeded to qualify his remarks in that respect by referring
with approval to the remarks of Lord Wilberforce in the Privy Council’s Decision in Minister of
Home Affairs (Bermuda) & Another v Fisher & Another42 wherein it was held that;

“…, a Constitution ought to be treated sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its
own, suitable to its character without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are
relevant to legislation of private law…”43

41
1981 ZLR 521
42
[1979] 3 ALL ER 21 (PC)
43
At page 581-582, Hewlett case, supra.

13
The same sentiments were echoed in the case of Smyth v Ushewokunze and Another wherein the
court observed that;

“…, in arriving at the proper meaning of a constitutional provision guaranteeing a right, the court
should endeavor to expand the reach of the right rather than attenuate its meaning and content.
What is to be accorded is a generous and purposive interpretation with an eye to the spirit as well
as the letter of the provision, one that takes full account of changing conditions, social norms and
values. The aim must be to move away from formalism and make human rights a practical reality
…”44

With the foregoing in mind, as the approach to Constitutional interpretation, one that will guide
the courts in interpreting the right to strike, it is important that a brief insight be given with respect
to the manner in which the right used to be interpreted in Zimbabwe. The case of Moyo & Others
v Cenral African Batteries (Pvt) Ltd45 is instructive in that respect, specifically on the requirement
for employees to embark on strike action as soon as the period specified in the notice expires. In
that case, the workers had served a notice to embark on a strike action in accordance with the then
relevant legal provisions. This was followed by a labour relations officer, issuing a determination.
The workers subsequently went on strike a few months later relying on the notice they had issued
earlier. The employer successfully challenged the legality of the strike action. It was held that the
original notice had been quite specific on the date which the strike would commence. The court
further noted that even if the grievance had been the same, as long as the original notice period
had expired, there was need to issue a fresh notice of the intended strike.

A clear analysis of the above case shows that there was ample evidence to show that the employer
had received knowledge of the intended strike action in the works council meeting. Further, the
strike action in question was actually based on the same grievances as those raised in the initial
notice. However, due to a rigid approach based on technicalities and unnecessary formalism,
employees concerned were dismissed for embarking on the strike action concerned. Such an

44
1997 (2) ZLR 544 (S)
45
2002(1) ZLR 615 (S)

14
approach was in fact at variance with the Supreme Court’s decision in an earlier case where it had
made it clear that it was undesirable to decide labour matters on technicalities46.

The case of Cole Chandler Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Twenty-Five Named Employees47 further
demonstrates how inconsistent the Supreme Court has been in its interpretation of the obligation
to give notice by employees. In that case, it was held that the test whether a fresh notice was
necessary was whether the collective job action was based on the same issues for which notice had
been given previously. If so, then there was no need for a fresh notice. According to Gwisai 48, this
is the approach adopted by the South African Courts on provisions similar to the Zimbabwe ones.
The point to note here is that this was in fact the courts’ approach as at that time bearing in mind
that the right to strike was not constitutionally protected at that point in time. Now that we have
the right under the Bill of Rights, it is hoped that courts will move away from that approach to a
purposive approach. The approach advocated for herein is one that takes account of the important
Constitutional provisions highlighted earlier relating to the need to ensure the full realisation of
fundamental rights, including the right to strike. Thus, to ensure this, courts will have to relax some
of the technicalities required for the lawful exercise of the right to strike. They must be prepared
to outlaw as unconstitutional any law, procedural rule or technical requirement which
unreasonably restricts the exercise of the right to strike49. Indeed, sentiments have been expressed
to the effect that legislation that arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of a fundamental
right lacks the attribute of reasonableness50.

It must also be highlighted that the Constitution simply lays down the right to strike in skeletal
form. It does not for instance prescribe the manner in which the right should be exercised. It
follows therefore that the Labour Act51 section 10452 is the one that gives effect to section 65 (3)

46
Dalny Mine v Banda 1999 (1) ZLR 220 (S).
47
SC-161-98.
48
Op cit note 1 at 1
49
Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9 supra has argued that no test case has so far been taken to the Constitutional
Court of Zimbabwe challenging the procedural humps to strike. He however expressed hope that if that is done, it
is likely that the Court will declare such bridles to the right to strike to be unconstitutional.
50
In Re Munhumeso & Others 1995 (1) SA 551 at 562.
51
Op cit note 4 at 1
52
Section 104 of the Labour Act which provides for the right to strike.

15
of the Constitution53. The problem that we have is that the current Constitution was preceded by
the Labour Act which as indicated earlier has various flaws in so far as it unduly restricts the
exercise of the right to strike. What therefore needs to be done is to realign the Provisions of the
Labour Act with the Constitutional provisions to ensure that the limitations in the Labour Act with
respect to the right to strike may not be challenged as ultra vires the Constitution. In fact,
limitations to all the rights in the bill of rights will only be tolerated to the extent that they do not
contravene the limitation clause in the Constitution.54

It follows from the above that the approach should be one of balancing the interests of employees
and those of employers, labour on the one hand and capital on the other hand. Thus, inasmuch as
Courts should endeavour to expand the meaning of the provision on the right to strike, care must
be taken in order to ensure that the exercise of the right will not cripple the economy. Indeed, if
employees were to embark on strike action without having to comply with some of the
requirements prescribed by legislation, the effects would be highly adverse to the economic good
of the State at large. This is so because, production in industries will be halted, shortage of basic
commodities will arise and ultimately, the standard of living for the general populace will decrease.
This could be the reason why the right is totally excluded in essential services, although as
indicated earlier, this provision ought to be revised in order to satisfy the requirements of
reasonable limitation. If fact, without unhampered provision of these services, life will be difficult
to cope up with.

It is also imperative to highlight the fact that in South Africa, the Constitution also provides for
the right to strike55. However, the extent to which the right is protected still remains questionable
as is the case in Zimbabwe. This is so because when faced with a strike action, the employer in
South Africa is not prohibited from employing replacements56. Further, the employer is at liberty
to dismiss the striking employee57. The only obligation on the employer is to prove that although
the strike action is protected, its effects justify reducing staff for operational requirements and that

53
Section 65(3) provides for the right to strike.
54
Section 86 of the Constitution. Limitations should be fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic
society based of openness, justice, human dignity, and equality, among other factors.
55
Grogan op cit note 13 at 4 . See also section 23 of the South African Constitution.
56
Grogan op cit note 13 at 4
57
Grogan op cit note 13 at 4

16
the dismissal is for that reason.58 It is submitted that this clearly amounts to providing an employer
with a ready escape route. This therefore undermines the effective exercise of the right to strike
despite it being constitutionally protected.

2.5. CONCLUSION
Having established this essential background on the right to strike, the task now is to ascertain
whether or not with the developments alluded to above, the right to strike is better protected,
realisable and of practical benefit to employees. In other words, is it now better protected and
realisable than ever before? What follows in the next Chapter is an analysis of the various
conditions imposed by legislation for a lawful exercise of the right to strike.

58
Grogan op cit note 13 at 4

17
CHAPTER 3

3.1. INTRODUCTION.
In Chapter Two, the significance of the right to strike has been discussed. It has been highlighted
that the common law position does not recognise the right to strike, hence, it has since been
modified by the legislative framework. It has also been indicated that the trend in Zimbabwe has
been to narrowly interpret the right to strike given that the right was not constitutionally protected
until recently. The author has further advocated for a wider, purposive interpretation of the right
to strike, the endeavour being to ensure its full realisation and making sure that its enjoyment is
not hampered by unnecessary formalism and technicalities. Against that background, this chapter
is going to discuss the various situations where the right to strike is precluded. It will further give
a critical analysis of the various requirements for a lawful strike, noting that these invariably stand
as obstacles to an effective exercise of the right to strike. The chapter will conclude with an analysis
of whether the right to strike accords with the purpose of the Act59.

3.2. SITUATIONS WHERE THE RIGHT TO EMBARK ON STRIKE IS PRECLUDED

Given that strikes hit the bosses where it hurts the most – the source of profits60, embarking on
strike action is prohibited in some cases. The first restriction on the right to strike appears in section
104 of the Act which specifies the nature of disputes in respect of which strikes can be resorted to.
The right to strike, which falls under the phrase ‘collective job action’ as defined in section 2 of
the Act can only be resorted to for the purpose of resolving disputes of interests.61 Section 2 of the
Labour Act defines a dispute of interest as a dispute other than a dispute of right. The same section
defines a dispute of right as

“any dispute involving legal rights and obligations, including any dispute occasioned by an actual
or alleged unfair labour practice, a breach or alleged breach of this Act or of any regulations

59
Section 2(A) provides that the purpose of the Act is to advance social justice and democracy at the work place by
giving effect to the fundamental rights of employees provided for under Part 11 of the Act, among other issues.
60
Op cit note 1 at 1
61
Section 104(1) of the Act. See also section 104 (3) (a)(ii) of the Act.

18
made under this Act, or a breach or alleged breach of any of the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement or contract of employment”

In other words, before embarking on a strike action, employees ought to make a distinction
between the issues regarding the application of existing rights and those relating to the creation of
new rights. In essence, disputes of rights as is evident from section 2 of the Act are those arising
from the application of existing law, collective bargaining agreement or an existing contract of
employment. On the other hand, disputes of interests are those that arise from failure of collective
bargaining, to say, when parties negotiations for the conclusion, renewal, revision or extension of
collective agreement end in deadlock.62 From the foregoing it can be noted for instance, that it
would be unlawful for employees to resort to strike action in order to compel an employer to pay
their salaries as agreed in terms of a contract of employment, or as required in terms of section 663
of the Labour Act should the employer withhold the employees’ salaries. The issue has to be
addressed through other channels, which however do not fall within the ambits of this research
project.

It is submitted that the above constitutes a technical distinction which requires due care and
consideration, otherwise the employees could risk being accused of embarking on illegal strike.
Commenting on this restriction, which also appears in the South African Labour Relations Act64,
Grogan65 has indicated that this is the most extensive limitation on the right to strike created by
the South African Labour Relations Act. It is therefore submitted that this distinction is not
necessary given that it unduly restricts the effective exercise of the right to strike. Employees
should in fact be left to decide on their own what means should be resorted to and to resolve what
disputes depending on the effectiveness or otherwise of the means concerned. It should be noted
however that some authorities are content with this restriction, their argument being that it is in
accordance with (ILO) Conventions embedding the right to strike66.

62
Op cit note 5 at 2
63
An employer has an obligation to pay an employee a wage not lower than that prescribed by law or by any
agreement made under the Labour Act.
64
Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995.
65
Op cit note 13 at 4. See also Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9. The author regarded this restriction as the “most
remarkable substantive limitation on the right to strike’’ .
66
Mucheche, op cit note 32 at 9

19
Strikes are also prohibited with respect to what are referred to as essential services. 67 Section 102
of the Act defines an essential service as any service the interruption of which endangers
immediately the life, personal safety or health of the whole or any part of the public; and that is
declared by notice in the Gazette made by the Minister, after consultation with the appropriate
advisory council, if any, appointed in terms of section nineteen, to be an essential service. The
Minister through the Labour (Declaration of Essential Services) Regulations68 has since declared
essential services for purposes of section 104 of the Act. The definition of essential services
includes railway engineers, electricians, transport and communication employees, veterinary
services and pharmacies69. This definition goes far beyond anything envisaged by ILO
Conventions.70 Indeed, this definition is too wide and encompassing such that it covers virtually
everything71. In other words, essential service concept is one that is defined in unacceptable
sweeping terms such that it unduly restricts the exercise of the right to strike.

The other complaint to note with respect to essential services relates to powers given to the
Minister in terms of section 3 of Statutory Instrument No.37 of 2003 referred to above. The section
concerned empowers the Minister to declare, in some instances, any non-essential service to be an
essential service72. This catch all provision strongly interferes with the right to strike given that the
Minister’s powers are too wide and highly discretionary. In terms of this section, the Minister may
exercise his powers where for instance, a strike in a sector, service, industry or enterprise persists
to the point that the lives, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population is
endangered. To note however is the fact that such powers would be exercised regardless of the
legality of the decision by employees to embark on strike in the first place. In other words,
employees cannot be heard to say that the strike is legal by virtue of it being in compliance with
the relevant provisions of the Act. This clearly shows how arbitrary the aforesaid provision is.
Indeed, employers, knowing that the Minister might exercise his powers would be reluctant to

67
Section 103(3) (a) (1) of the Act.
68
Statutory Instrument No. 137 of 2003.
69
Section 2 of Statutory Instruments No. 137 of 2003.
70
2007 annual survey of violations of trade union rights, ITUC CSI 1913, available at www,ituc.csi.org
71
See also Mucheche op cit note 32 at 9. The author castigated the sweeping definition of essential services,
noting that the essential services concept can be abused to outlaw strikes by simply designating a sector as
essential.
72
Mucheche op cit note 32 at 9. The author has advocated for the establishment of an independent committee to
determine what constitutes essential services rather than just leaving it to the Minister to decide; at page 128.

20
meaningfully engage with employees, thus ensuring that they continue to wallop in poverty. It is
for this reason, among others, that one cannot be faulted should they conclude that the right to
strike is one that is given by one hand and taken by the other.

It should be noted however that although unpleasant in several respects, the provision on essential
services is indeed critical. As highlighted in Chapter 2, it is impractical to advocate for a situation
whereby employees would embark on strike action without having to comply with some of the
prescribed requirements and with no limitations as to who can resort to strike action. Indeed, if left
at the discretion of employees, strike actions have the potential to cripple the economy. What needs
to be done therefore is to precisely define services that can properly be regarded as essential. More
so, although giving the Minister some latitude in the exercise of his discretion in deciding what
constitutes essential services, there must be a mechanism to ensure that the Minister’s powers are
exercised judiciously, in a manner that does not prejudice the employees’ right to strike. 73

Strikes are also banned in situations where a dispute has been referred to arbitration either
voluntarily or compulsorily.74 The case of Chisvo and others v Aurex (Pvt) (Ltd) and Another75 is
quite instructive to this effect. The case involved a number of workers including the chairman of
the workers committee who had gone on strike in defiance of the labour relations officer’s directive
referring the matter to compulsory arbitration. The company then obtained a show cause order
requiring the employees concerned to show cause why the strike should not be terminated and that
pending its determination, the strike be declared unlawful. The employees concerned were
subsequently dismissed, which dismissal was upheld on appeal with the court noting that they
should have abided by the labour relations officer’s decision as well as comply with the show
cause order. According to Mucheche76, once a dispute is referred to compulsory arbitration, the
door for the right to strike is firmly shut.

73
See also Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9. The author pointed out that the definition of essential service should not
be too broad to create a blanket ban on the right to strike for certain category of employees who ordinarily cannot
be construed as essential service employees, at page 123.
74
Section 104(3) (a) (iii) of the Act.
75
1999(2) ZLR 334 (S)
76
Mucheche op cit note 32 at 9

21
In addition to the above restriction, it is also unlawful for unregistered trade unions and other
employers’ organisations to engage in collective job action, including strikes or to recommend
one77. This of course cannot be heavily queried given that there is always that need to prove one’s
standing whenever there is dissatisfaction with respect to decisions affecting one’s rights by any
authority. In any case, there is need to ensure accountability in the event that something wrong
happens in the course of a strike action. Thus, with unregistered trade unions, there is nothing in
that case to prevent them from denying responsibility if something amiss happens.

Another situation where the right to strike is absolutely prohibited include those where there is in
existence a registered trade union which represents the interests of employees and that trade union
has not approved or authorised such kind of collective job action78. It appears this restriction is
meant to ensure that the right to strike is exercised in an orderly manner, than would otherwise be
the case if employees were to do it on their own. Provision should however be made to cater for
situations where the employees’ representatives unreasonably refuse to approve the employees’
decision to embark on strike action. In most cases, the representatives are not the ones directly
affected by whatever grievances employees might have against their employers. It is therefore
submitted that the ultimate decision on whether to or not to embark on strike action should in fact
lie with the employees.

Lastly it is prohibited to embark on strike where there is in existence a union agreement which
provides for or governs the matter in dispute, and such agreement has not been complied with or
remedies specified therein have not been exhausted as to the matter in dispute79. Whilst this
prohibition could be hailed in so far as it seeks to protect the sanctity of the parties’ agreement
with respect to what they would have agreed, it is the failure to qualify that position which is being
queried herein. Indeed, exhaustion of local remedies concept should not be strictly adhered to save
in situations where such exhaustion would yield an effective remedy. There is no point in pursuing
any such specified remedies where indications are that no positive result will be achieved.

77
Section 104(3) (c) of the Act.
78
Section 104(3) (b) of the Labour Act, supra.
79
Section 104(3) (d) of the Labour Act, supra.

22
It should also be noted that embarking on strike in defiance of these provisions is a punishable
offence in respect of which one can be sent to prison for up to five years 80. This then goes a long
way to show that the right to strike in Zimbabwean labour law is very restricted. With the above
observations, the next step forward is to look into those situations where the right to strike is not
prohibited and ascertain the requirements for its lawful exercise. It will also be shown in what
respects these requirements render the right to strike nugatory.

3.3. REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAWFUL STRIKE ACTION

“Although forced to recognize the right to strike, the ruling class have since tried their best to limit
the actual extent of the right through various methods, direct and indirect …, the right to strike is
accompanied by various prohibitive and repressive rules intended to emasculate precisely those
aspects that make this right truly effective”81

The above observation bests summarises the legal position with regards the right to strike in
Zimbabwe’s labour laws, which position the author of this dissertation aligns himself with. Below
is the justification.

A party intending to embark on strike is obliged to give fourteen days 82 written notice stating the
grounds for resorting to strike to a party against whom the action is to be taken, the appropriate
employment council and the appropriate trade union, among others.83 This requirement is set in
peremptory terms, that is, use of the word ‘shall’, meaning that it is mandatory to comply with it,
otherwise any attempt to resort to a strike action without compliance thereof would be illegal,
hence punishable84. To further compound the situation, the law requires that the strike be carried

80
Section 109 (1) of the Act.
81
Gwisai, op cit note 1 at 1.
82
Mucheche, op cit note 32 at 9. The author argued that the fourteen days written notice to go on strike is too
excessive and will only serve to deflect and deflate the right to strike and thus undermining that right and this runs
counter to the ILO requirements on the right to strike.
83
Section 104 (2) (a) of the Act.
84
Section 109 of the Act.
See also the case of Moyo and others v Central African Batteries Pvt Ltd 2002(1) ZLR 615 (S). In this case, a notice
which was not reduced to writing was held to be defective.

23
out immediately after the expiration of the fourteen days’ notice, otherwise, undue delays after the
expiration of the period concerned would render the notice invalid.85 In other words, employees
would, in that case, be obliged to issue a fresh notice. It is submitted that these are just but
unnecessary technical requirements calculated to confuse the employees and discourage them from
exercising their right. This is so because in most cases, the employer would have been apprised of
the employees’ grievances such that to require a notice in the manner prescribed does not really
serve any purpose. In any case, the requirement to issue a fresh notice should not apply especially
where the strike action is based on the same grievances as those outlined in an earlier notice.

The law also requires that before embarking on strike, there must be a thirty – days attempt to
conciliate the dispute in question, failing which a certificate of no settlement should be issued
relating to that dispute.86 It is however sad to note that despite imposing such a requirement, the
Labour Act does not define conciliation, neither does it prescribe guidelines to be followed in the
conciliation procedure. Besides, the absence of an independent panel of conciliators87 coupled with
uncertainty with regards the competency and scope of powers of such conciliators further
complicates the whole process88. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how employees could have faith
in such an incomplete process. All these government imposed delays prevent employees from ever
declaring legal strikes89. In the premises, it would not be exaggerating to say that indeed, “the right
to strike in Zimbabwe’s labour law is restricted, it is a liability or a trap at the worst. This is so
because in as much as the right is there and may be exercised, doing that is not as easy as it ought
to be.

In terms of section 104 (3) (e) of the Act, no strike may be resorted to in the absence of an
agreement by a majority of the employees voting by secret ballot. Section 8 of statutory instrument

85
Moyo and others v Central African Batteries Pvt Ltd 2002(1) ZLR 615 (S)
8686
Section 104 (2) (b) of the Act.
87
Legal advice, Trade Unions, Strikes and the Law; available at www.mywage.org/Zimbabwe.
See also Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9. The author expressed dissatisfaction on the use of Labour Officers in
conciliation proceedings given that these are employed by the State and as such, they might employ tactics
designed to frustrate the right to strike.
88
Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9 .page 127 has also noted that the fourteen days conciliation period coupled with
fourteen days’ notice period in the event that conciliation fails has the effect of compromising the momentum for
a strike. Indeed, it effectively dilutes it.
89
Legal advice, Trade Unions, Strikes and the Law; available at www.mywage.org/Zimbabwe

24
Number 217 of 2003 specifies the requirements for conducting a secret ballot, for instance, the
fact that it must be conducted before the expiration of the fourteen days’ notice referred to earlier.
According to Gwisai90 the requirements are vague and badly drafted meaning that they must be
read robustly, the guiding principle being whether a substantially free ballot has been conducted.
He further noted that:

“The balloting requirement is modelled on colonial legislation and is meant to individualise

workers and give bosses, the media, the state and such other ideological instruments of the
employer class, full opportunity to intimidate the workers from going on strike…”91

It is also difficult to understand the logic behind this secret ballot requirement given that it assumes
that minority employees enjoy no right to strike. Indeed, it is highly unjust to prohibit a strike
simply because the majority of the employees are against it92. The minority should in fact enjoy
the same right as the majority and should be allowed to embark on strike as long they believe it is
necessary in the circumstances93.

The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that union approval, of a registered trade union is
required in order for the strike to proceed94. It is because of all these difficulties that
Machingambi95, has referred to the foregoing requirements as “burdensome prestrike procedures”.
Others have also noted that these excessively complicated mechanisms for organising a lawful
strike means that many unions give up trying to organise a legal strike and instead resort to illegal
stoppages or stay aways.96 This then brings the aspect of liability for engaging in these unlawful
activities. This is so because once they embark on unlawful strikes, employees cannot claim the
protection accorded to those engaged in a lawful strike, one which fully complies with all the
requirements discussed above. They cannot for instance claim the protection provided for in terms

90
Op cit note 1 at 1.
91
Gwisai; op cit note 1 at 1.
92
Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9. The author attacks this requirement on the basis that it is ultra vires section 65
(3) of the Constitution which confers the right to individual employees not a group or a majority of them.
93
Mucheche has also noted that since the Constitution confers rights on individuals, it is now possible to have a
one man strike action unlike under the previous position, supra at page 127: op cit note 32 at 9.
94
Section 104(3)(b) of the Act.
95
Supra, at page
96
2007 annual survey of violations of trade union rights, ITUC CSI 1913, available at www,ituc.csi.org

25
of section 108 (2) of the Act which makes it clear that it shall constitute neither a delict nor a
breach of contract to engage in a lawful strike. Instead, the employer can subject them to
disciplinary action and possibly dismiss them or simply replace them with scab labour 97, thus
diluting the effect of any such purported strike. Additionally, those taking part in an illegal strikes
face harsh prison sentences of up to five years98.

It is submitted that the above concerns have a chilling and discouraging effect given that employees
cannot guarantee full compliance with the aforesaid requirements. Thus, instead of taking the risk,
employees would rather pretend they are satisfied with whatever working conditions the employer
might impose. This then goes a long way to show how difficult it is for workers to effectively
exercise their right to strike.

To further demonstrate how difficult it is for workers to embark on strike action, attention may be
drawn to the provisions of section 108 (4) of the Act, which absolves the employer from the
obligation to remunerate employees who would have embarked on a lawful strike for the period
for which they were on strike. This to some extent shows that although statute law has tried to
modify common law in many respects, it still retains some of its precepts, in this case, “no work
no pay principle”99. In the event that the employer remunerates the employees concerned in kind,
the law entitles it to institute civil action in order to recover the monetary value of anything the
employee might have benefited from the employer during their lawful strike. In other words, the
moment one embarks on strike, they automatically parte with their salary or other benefits to which
they may be entitled to in terms of the contract. This therefore becomes a liability for exercising
one’s right. Indeed, the employee is meant to believe they can exercise their right, when to do so
brings enormous adverse consequences.

More so, a consideration of all the hurdles presented above with respect to the exercise of the right
to strike shows that indeed, the right to strike is a liability or a trap at worst. In particular, it is
submitted that the requirements for a lawful strike as presented above are couched in a manner

97
Section 108 (5) of the Act.
98
Section 109 (1) of the Act.
99
Machingambi; op cit note 5 at 2.

26
designed to make sure that any attempt to organise a lawful strike will in most cases, end up
degenerating into an unlawful strike. This then will result in criminal liability for the employees
concerned. The harsh sentences imposed for such unlawful strikes are in themselves highly
discouraging100. Employees should not go on strike action with the idea of pitfalls that will befall
them if they fail to do it legally. With the foregoing analysis, the question which then arises is
whether the provisions on the right to strike accord with the purpose of the Labour Act101.

3.4. THE PURPOSE OF THE LABOUR ACT VIS-À-VIS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE.

Section 2A of the Labour Act provides as its ultimate objective, the promotion of social justice
and democracy in the workplace102. It aims to do this by, among other things,
 Providing a legal framework within which employees and employers can bargain
collectively for the improvement of conditions of employment103;
 Securing the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and unfair labour
practices104.
It goes on to stipulate that the Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures the
attainment of its purpose referred to in subsection 1105.

With respect to the first issue highlighted above, it is submitted although the Act advocates for a
legislative environment that provides a conducive environment for effective collective bargaining
as between employees and employers, the situation on the ground shows otherwise. This is so
because as indicated in chapter 2, it is not feasible to imagine collective bargaining in its truest
sense in the absence of economic weapons for employees, such as an effective right to strike.106 In
other words, the right to strike is an ultimate weapon in persuading the other party to bargain107. It
is against this background that one can note that with the right to strike in its current form, it is
unlikely that the Labour Act will succeed in its purpose.

100
Op cit note 79 at 22, section 109 (1) of the Labour Act, supra
101
Opo cit note 4 at 1
102
Section 2A (1) of the Labour Act
103
Section 2A (1) (c) of the Labour Act
104
Section 2A (1) (f) of the Labour Act
105
Section 2A (2) OF the Labour AcT.
106
Gwisai; op cit note 1 at 1.
107
Lovemore Madhuku The Right to Strike in Southern Africa’s International Labour Review (1997) Vol. 136

27
It is also a fact that strike action is a form of dispute resolution mechanism108. As indicated above,
the Labour Act also aims to attain its purpose by securing the just, effective and expeditious
resolution of disputes and unfair labour practices109. An examination of the various prestrike
procedures discussed above shows that this is highly misleading. It is submitted that the sum effect
of the various technical and cumbersome prestrike procedures is to hinder rather than promote
dispute resolution by way of strike action. Mucheche110 shares virtually the same sentiments as
those discussed above. The author has noted that within the Zimbabwean context;

“The right to strike exists on paper but its practical realization is a moot point particularly given
the artificial ‘Berlin wall’ that exists between private sector and public sector employees and
essential and non-essential employees as well as a myriad of restrictions of the exercise of the
right to strike itself”111

3.5. CONCLUSION

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it can be noted that the current restrictions, and
requirements for a lawful exercise of the right to strike have the effect of rendering the right to
strike a brutum fulmen. In as much as it may be necessary to regulate the exercise of the right to
strike, the regulation should not amount to wrestling away the right from employees, as the current
provisions do. It has also been highlighted that the current legislative provisions on the right to
strike are at variance with the purpose of the Labour Act as prescribed in section 2A (1).

108
Section 104 (1) of the Labour Act.
109
Supra, footnote 91.
110
Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9
111
At page 121; op cit note 32 at 9

28
CHAPTER 4

4.1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter 3, arguments have been presented to the effect that even though the right to strike is
fully recognized by the Zimbabwean legislative framework, exercising the right is not as easy as
it ought to be. In particular, the research unpacked the various situations where the right to strike
is totally unavailable, for instance, in relation to members of the security service, employees
engaged in essential services, disputes of rights, among other situations. The dissertation
proceeded to give a categorical outline of the various requirements for a lawful strike, highlighting
the fact that the law requires absolute compliance with those requirements. In other words, there
is no such thing as ‘substantial compliance’ with the requirements when it comes to the right to
strike in Zimbabwe. Employees cannot be heard to say that they should not be held criminally
liable if they fail to fully comply with the said requirements on the basis that they would have tried
to do so, though not to the extent required by the law.

Against the above background, Chapter 4 will briefly analyse the right to strike in light of the
Zimbabwe’s socio-economic set up. It will be argued that the provisions on the exercise of the
right to strike are pro-government, the idea being to try and promote government policies. In
particular, the provisions on essential services and those that prohibit strikes in respect of members
of the security services are intended to safeguard the social and economic well-being of the State.
Regard shall also be had to employers’ recourse in case of an unlawful Strikes given that attempts
to organize lawful strikes will normally be met with very little success. More so, an attempt shall
be made to ascertain whether employees can pin their hopes on the fact that the right is now
constitutionally protected in the Bill of Rights. It will be highlighted, with reference to some cases,
that although the Constitutional Court is indeed a judicial institution, it may, in some cases, as it
has done before, disregard individuals’ right for the good of the country’s socio-economic well-
being.

29
 4.2. RIGHT TO STRIKE AND ZIMBABWE’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

It has been argued that the use of economic power (strike action) should be the last resort because
of its adverse effects on the economy112. Thus, before embarking on strike action, parties are
enjoined to pursue other avenues available to them with a view to amicably resolve whatever
disputes they might have. It is because of its perceived threats to the economic and social interests
of the State that the right to strike in Zimbabwe is preceded by the various procedural requirements
discussed in Chapter 3. This is particularly true in respect of essential services. Precluding the right
to strike in respect of employees engaged in essential services in intended to safeguard the socio-
economic pillars of the State. Essential services employees include those engaged in the supply
and distribution of water, those engaged in health services as well as transport and communication
services, among others113. One would agree that indeed, the supply of water for instance need not
be interrupted for the maintenance of proper sanitation. Any interruption in the provision of such
services might lead to the outbreak of diseases like cholera, hence adversely affecting the social
fabric of the State. The same can also be said in respect of employees engaged in health services.

It should also be noted that the prohibition of strikes in relation to employees engaged in essential
services is not an issue that is peculiar to the Zimbabwean jurisdiction alone. In fact, the concept
is recognised in many jurisdictions and is also sanctioned by ILO Conventions114. Essential
services are defined as services whose interruption would endanger the life personal safety or
health of the whole or part of the population115. Thus, the definition of Essential services in
Zimbabwean legislation is modelled along this definition. It is however pro-government in so far
as it gives the Minister some powers to declare as essential, in some cases services that are not
ordinarily regarded as essential. The idea here is to try and ensure that industrial production is not
affected, among other issues. In other words, Zimbabwean labour laws clearly show that the
government is much concerned about uninterrupted industrial productivity and pays little regard
to employees’ rights.

112
Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution – Is SADC meeting the challenge? Issues Paper No. 30,
available at www.Ilo.org.
113
Section 2 of Statutory Instrument No. 137 of 2003, Labour (Declaration of Essential Services) Notice.
114
Supra, footnote 111.
115
ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, Report of the Committee of experts on the application of
Conventions and Recommendations, Report 111 (Part 4b), available at www. Ilo.org.

30
Recently, the government has been advocating for a situation whereby employees’ remuneration
determined on the basis of productivity116. A call has been made for amendments to the Labour
Act to ensure alignment of wage adjustments to labour productivity117. This clearly confirms the
fact that strike actions are viewed by the government as counterproductive. This possibly could be
the reason why the right to strike is provided for subject to the various prohibitive and restrictive
requirements discussed in Chapter 3. In other words, if left at the discretion of employees, the right
to strike has the potential to prejudice the economy.

More so, the prohibition of strike actions in respect of members of the security forces is pro-
government given that it seeks to safeguard the security of the state albeit at the expense of the
members concerned. Again this exclusion of the police, armed forces and department of
correctional services from the exercise of the right to strike is common in many jurisdictions and
also permissible under ILO Conventions118. Unfair as it may be to the employees concerned, this
prohibition is arguably justified to some extent. This is so because the defence and security of the
State as well as the observance of laws are matters of public interest. Thus if these employees were
to be allowed to embark on strike actions, the effects would be highly adverse to the state at large.

4.3. REMEDIES AGAINST UNLAWFUL STRIKE ACTIONS

Section 106 of the Labour Act empowers the Minister119, whenever a party threatens or engages
in an unlawful collective job action to issue what is referred to as a show cause order calling upon
the responsible person to show cause why a disposal order should not be issued in relation
thereto.120 The order may be issued by the Minister on his own initiative or upon an application
being made by any person affected or likely to be affected by the unlawful collective action. The
order will specify, among other things a date, time and place on which parties would appear before

116
www.the independent.co.zw, labour law relaxation antiworker, 01/03/2014.
117
0p cit note 116 at 31
118
Supra, footnote 111.
119
The Minister may not delegate the powers to issue such an order to any other person. See the case of Cargo
Carriers (Pvt) Ltd v Zambezi & ors 1996(1) ZLR 613. Minister means the Minister of Public Service, Labour and
Social Welfare or any other Minister to whom the President may assign the administration of the Act: section 2 of
the Labour Act, supra.
120
Section 106 (1) of the Act

31
the Labour Court and show cause why a disposal order should not be issued in relation to the
matter concerned. The Minister also has powers to grant interim relief pending the issuance of a
disposal order, meaning that even if employees attempt an unlawful strike, they can easily be
countered. In other words all avenues to force the employer to bargain in good faith are effectively
shut.

On the date specified by the Minister in the show cause order, the Labour Court has powers to
issue a disposal order disposing of a show cause order issued by the Minister121. Parties will be
afforded an opportunity to make representations and thereafter the court may direct that the
unlawful collective job action, in this case, strike action be terminated, postponed or suspended,
among other things122. Clearly, the impetus to force the employer to bargain will be automatically
diluted at this time123.

Note should also be taken of the fact that section 109 (6) permits a party to claim punitive damages
arising from loss as a result of unlawful collective action, strikes included. Liability attaches in
respect of death, loss of or damage to property or other economic loss including perishing of goods
caused by employees’ absence from work, among other issues124. The only defence would be to
show that such person did not realise or lacked subjective intention to participate in the unlawful
collective job action.125 Criminal sanctions are also provided for in terms of section 109 of the
Labour Act. Under this, one can be imprisoned for up to five years for taking part in an unlawful
strike action126. The convicting Court is also empowered to make an order directing the convict to
compensate any person who might have suffered personal injury or loss in respect of any right or
interest in property of any description. After analysing the above grave consequences of engaging
in unlawful strikes, Gwisai127 came to the conclusion that;

121
Section 107 of the Act.
122
Section 107 )2) (a) of the Act
123
The Court may also authorize the institution of disciplinary action against certain categories of unlawful strikers,
see Wingate Farm v Wingate Farm Employees LC/H/144/2004. It may also order that the unlawful strikers should
not be remunerated for the period for which they were on unlawful strike, see the case of Border Timbers (Pvt) Ltd
v Employees LC/MC/O7/04.
124
Gwisai; Op cit note 1 at 1. See 372.
125
Gwisai; Op cit note 1 at 1. See page 372.
126
Section 109 (2) of the Act.
127
Op cit note 1 at 1

32
“The law on strikes in Zimbabwe remains draconian and heavily loaded against the working class
in a manner inconsistent with the principles of collective bargaining and pluralism underlying the
Labour Act and Declaration of Rights128”

It is on the basis of the above considerations that one can conclude that indeed the right to strike
in Zimbabwe is too restricted, and is regarded by the government as a liability. For careless striking
workers, it is in fact a trap as evidenced by the foregoing considerations.

4.4. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT.

In chapter 2, it has been indicated that entrenchment of the right to strike in the Constitution means
that the right to strike is now justiciable129. In other words, any unwarranted interference or
violation with this right may be challenged in the Constitutional Court which can then
authoritatively adjudicate on such matters. Interference with a constitutionally guaranteed right
might be by way of legislation which unjustifiably interferes or impedes the exercise of the right
concerned. In that case, the provision concerned will be ultra vires the Constitution, hence, void to
the extent of such inconsistency.130 In the context of the right to strike, arguments presented in
Chapter 3 have shown the Labour Act is the one that prescribes requirements for a lawful exercise
of the right to strike. It has further been argued that the said requirements are couched in a manner
designed to stifle the environment so that employees will not resort to the right to strike. The
question now is whether the Constitutional Court can be absolutely relied on to protect the
employees’ right to strike. A look at some precedents will show that although the Constitutional
Court is ordinarily expected to protect rights of individuals against violations, in some instances,
it has disregarded such rights in the interests of some other values, such as State policies.

128
Gwisai; Op cit note 1 at 1. See page 374.
129
See Mucheche; op cit note 32 at 9
130
Section 2 of the Constitution which talks about the supremacy of the Constitution. It makes it clear that any law,
custom conduct or practice inconsistent with it shall to the extent inconsistency be void.

33
The case of Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority131 is authority for the above position.
The court was called upon to decide whether or not compulsory monetary contributions to the
NSSA scheme could be regarded as in violation of the provision on the protection of property, then
section 16 of the discarded Constitution. The court decided that such compulsory contributions
were not in any way unconstitutional as long they had been imposed by the legislature or other
competent authority. It was the court’s finding that the contributions concerned were meant to
benefit the public through the provision of a public service. Further, it was noted that national
authorities were better placed than the courts to decide what was in the public interest. It should
be recalled that in this case, the right to property was specifically guaranteed by the Constitution
and the Applicant was also entitled to that right. However, due to the importance attached to State
interests, the right was disregarded.

Another case in point is Minister of Lands and Others v Commercial Farmers Union132. In this
case, land belonging to white commercial farmers was being compulsorily and unlawfully
acquired. Farms were being invaded in a haphazard manner. The white commercial farmers
challenged the invasions on the basis that they constituted a violation of their right to property as
well as a violation of their right to protection of the law, which rights were guaranteed by the
discarded Constitution under the bill of rights. In fact, the Court had ruled in an earlier case
involving the same parties that the manner in which the whole case was being carried out was a
complete defiance of the rule of law concept. Instead of ordering that such invasions be stopped,
and that the illegal occupiers be evicted, the court gave the government two options, either legalise
the unlawful occupations or to evict the unlawful invaders. The government chose the former, with
the result that the law was enacted to legalise and legitimise past illegal events133. The law was in
fact following the events instead of it being the other way round. The court decided that it could
not stop a legitimate government policy on the basis of the illegality that had occurred. The land
reform programme, in the Court’s view, was a necessary evil given that it was legitimately
intended to redress past colonial imbalances in terms of land ownership and bring about social
transformation.

131
1995(2) ZLR 1 (S).
132
2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S)
133
The Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act.

34
 4.5. CASE LAW AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

As can be noted from the above cases, property rights of individuals were disregarded not because
there was no law which adequately protected such rights. Rather, the Court took the stance that in
as much as the individuals concerned had valid claims, their rights were in fact outweighed by
some higher values whose pursuance was in the public interest at large. In other words, the Court
was prepared to disregard individuals’ rights in favour of social interests. The same can also be
said in relation to the right to strike. It is unlikely for instance that employees will be able to
persuade the court to strike as unconstitutional, provisions relating to essential services. This is so
because in as much as they unduly restrict the exercise of the right to strike, indications are that
such services, as pointed out earlier are necessary for the proper functioning of the State. The Court
will therefore weigh the harm likely to be caused by the State if it allows essential services
employees or members of the security services to embark on strike action against the prejudice
likely to be suffered by the employees concerned if they do not embark on strike action. In most
cases, especially in light of the cases above, the Court will find in favour of the State.

The same can also be said of the various prestrike procedures discussed in Chapter 2. Admittedly,
these restrict the exercise of the right to strike. However if they are to be relaxed, strikes will be
resorted to frequently thereby hampering production in industries. Thus, in the same manner the
court was prepared to uphold the Rural Land occupiers (Protection from eviction) Act in the CFU
case discussed, despite the fact that it was in fact a violation of individuals’ property rights, it may
also uphold the various provisions of the Labour Act which seemingly hinder the exercise of the
right to strike. The justification, as was noted in the cases above, will be, pursuance of what is in
the public interests. The above cases therefore are authority for the position that it might be too
early for employees to raise hopes on the basis that the right to strike is now constitutionally
protected. The situation on the ground shows that although the Constitutional Court is there as a
judicial institution, it also enforces and gives effect to government policies, which policies might
be at cross purposes with rights of individuals, such as employees.

35
 4.6. CONCLUSION

It is apparent from the above discussion that although we have had a lot of progress with regards
to efforts aimed at ensuring the effective exercise of the right to strike, especially given that the
right is now constitutionally protected, it still remains to be seen whether the right will be fully
realised. This is so because there are some other interests which may be preferred at the expense
of this right. In fact, the Constitutional Court has done that before and as such there is nothing to
suggest that it will not do the same with respect to the right to strike.

36
CHAPTER 5

5.1. CONLCUSION.

At the beginning of the research project, a proposition was made to the effect that the right to strike
in Zimbabwe’s labour laws amounts to a liability or a trap at the worst. An outline as to how the
propriety or otherwise of that notion would be explored was given. In Chapter 2, the project
proceeded to explore the legal regimes governing the right to strike action in Zimbabwe, viz, the
Common law and the legislative framework. Common law was depicted as a failure in so far as it
does not provide for the right to strike. It has been highlighted, that the unsatisfactory common
law position was subsequently modified by the legislative framework through the Labour Act
which ushered in the express provision of the right to strike action. Chapter 3 of the dissertation
then proceeded to outline the requirements for a lawful exercise of the right to strike as prescribed
in the Labour Act. It was highlighted that the limitations and restrictions that came with the
legislative framework render the right to strike nugatory, indeed, justifying the proposition earlier
highlighted. In Chapter 4 an analysis of the right to strike in light of Zimbabwe’s socio economic
context was given. It was highlighted that strike actions are viewed by the government as
counterproductive, indeed, liabilities on the part of the government.

Cumulatively, the foregoing issues, it is submitted, strongly underpin and justify the research topic.
Simply put, it is submitted that the right to strike action does exist, but only on paper. To put it
bluntly, it is a fallacy. It is in light of such resentments that the author proposes some
recommendations set forth hereunder to try and address the said anomalies in the law relating to
strike actions in Zimbabwe.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS.

a) The Constitution and the Constitutional Court

37
As rightly pointed out in Chapter 2 and 3, the right to strike is now constitutionally guaranteed.
This means that its interpretation and application is now a matter within the province of the
Constitutional Court as the supreme Constitutional adjudicator. In this respect, it is recommended
that the Constitutional Court should adopt a wide, purposive interpretation of the right to strike,
one that makes this right a reality and best promotes the purpose which the right is meant to serve
that is, effective collective bargaining, among other things. It should be prepared to strike off as
unconstitutional, any law or conduct which unreasonably restricts the effective exercise of the right
to strike. This means that the Court should be prepared to relax and or disregard all technical
requirements that hamper an effective exercise of the right concerned. These include, among other
issues;

- The requirement to give 14 days’ written notice before embarking on strike action. The
form of the notice, that is, the fact that it should be a written notice, should not be
overemphasised. All that should be considered is objective proof that adequate notice has
been brought to the attention of the other party.
- The fact that employees should embark on strike action as soon as the fourteen day period
expires. As regards this, the Court should adopt the stance that as long as the employer has
been adequately notified, in writing or otherwise, employees should be allowed to proceed
with a strike action. It should not be an issue that they did not do so as soon as the fourteen
days’ period expires. This should be the case especially in those cases where the dispute is
based on grievances that would have been articulated in an earlier notice.
- Prohibition of strike action where the purpose is to resolve disputes of rights. As regards
this, it is recommended that employees should not be dictated to as to what remedy can be
used to resolve what type of disputes. In fact, they should be left at liberty to utilise a
remedy which best addresses their concerns. In other words, the effectiveness or otherwise
of the remedy should be the overriding consideration.

b) Alignment of the Labour Act provisions with the Constitution.

Some provisions of the Labour Act, for instance, section 104 (3) (e) which prohibits strike
actions where the majority of employees have not agreed by way of a secret ballot to
embark on a strike action have become irrelevant. It should be noted that the current

38
 Constitution came into force recently when the Labour Act was already operational. The
Constitution now accords the right to strike to individual employees. The aforesaid Labour
Act requirement has therefore been overtaken by events, hence irrelevant and should be
repealed. In other words, unlike before the advent of the new Constitution, a single
employee can now embark on strike action given that the right as contained in the bill of
rights attaches not to a group of employees but to individuals.

c) Requirement that conciliation should be resorted to first before embarking on strike

action.

In chapter 3, it has been shown that despite imposing this requirement, the Labour Act does
not prescribe the formalities or procedures to be adopted in the conciliation process. The
author of this dissertation recommends that the clear procedures and formalities should be
put in place so that there are no delays in the conciliation process. More so, it has been
highlighted that currently, we do not have an independent panel of conciliators whom
employees can trust to effectively resolve their disputes. Thus, a panel of independent
conciliators who are not subject to the control of the government must be established. For
instance, employers and employees representatives in different sectors should be allowed
to nominate individuals who will act as conciliators as and when disputes arise.

d) Essential services
It has been demonstrated that the Minister of labour has very wide discretionary powers in
the determination of what constitutes essential services. The definition of essential services
itself has been shown to be too wide such that it covers virtually all services. To address,
this issue and as a way of ensuring that the Minister does not abuse his powers, it is
recommended that an independent Committee on essential services, as advocated for by
Mucheche134, be set up. This will then have the task of redefining essential services.

e) Penalties for embarking on unlawful strikes

134
Op cit note 32 at 9.

39
These have been shown to have a chilling and discouraging effect due to their severity.
Indeed, five years imprisonment for embarking on an unlawful strike action is unduly
harsh. Legal authorities are silent on what possibly could be the appropriate penalty, if need
be, in cases of unlawful strikes. It is therefore recommended that the penalties in question
should be done away with so that employees do not organise or embark on strike actions
with the wary of consequences that will befall them if they fail to do it legally. In fact, it is
highly undesirable to create an offence from what is purely a private contractual
arrangement between parties to an employment relationship. The matter should in fact be
addressed by civil remedies if and only if a party suffers prejudice as a result of what are
allegedly referred to as unlawful strikes.

The foregoing suggestions may, if properly considered, go a long way in ensuring that the
right to strike exists and is practicable. Without a new constitutional interpretation
approach that is suggested in this work, the right remains nothing more than a paper
weapon, a fallacy or a trap for workers in Zimbabwe.

40
BIBLIOGRAPHY

TEXTBOOKS

1. Annali Bassoon, Marylyn Christopher & Christoph Garbers et al Essential Labour,

5 ed (2009)
2. Caleb H Mucheche A Practical Guide to Labour Law in Zimbabwe 1 ed (2013)
3. D du toit et al Labour Relations Law “ A Comparative Guide” 5 ed (2009)
4. Freund Khan’s Labour and the Law 3 ed (1983)
5. Helga Landis & Lesley Grossett Employment and Labour Law: A Practical Guide for
the Work Place 2 ed (2005)
6. Innocent Machingambi A Guide to Labour in Zimbabwe 1 ed (2007)
7. John Grogan Workplace Law, 10 ed (2010)
8. Munyaradzi Gwisai Labour and Employment Law in Zimbabwe: Relations of Work under
the Neo Colonial Capitalism (2007)
9. Neville Rubin Code of International Labour Law: Law, Practice and Jurisprudence;
Volume 1, Essentials of International Labour Law (2005)
10. Patrick Lloyd Labour Legislation in Zimbabwe 2 ed (2006)

CASE LIST
1. Cargo Carriers (Pvt) Ltd v Zambezi & ors 1996(1) ZLR 613.
2. Cole Chandler Agencies (Pvt) Ltd v Twenty-five Named Employees SC-161-98.
3. Chisvo & Others v Aurex (Pvt) ltd & Another 1999 (2) ZLR 334 (S)
4. Dalny Mine v Banda 1999 (2) ZLR 220 (S)
5. Girjac Services Pvt (ltd) v Mudzingwa 1999 (1) ZLR 243 (S)
6. Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1981 ZLR 521
7. In Re Munhumeso & Others 1995 (1) SA 551

41
 8. Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) & Another v Fisher & Another [1979] ALL ER 21
(PC)
9. Minister of Lands & Others v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S)
10. Moyo & Others v Central African Batteries (Pvt) Ltd 2002 (1) ZLR 615 (S)
11. Nyambirai v National Social Securirty Authority 1995 (2) ZLR (S)
12. Smyth v Ushewokunze 1997 (2) ZLR 544 (S)
13. Wingate Farm v Wingate Farm Employees LC/H/144/2004
14. Border Timbers (Pvt) Ltd v Employees LC/MC/O7/04.

LAW REVIEWS
Lovemore Madhuku The Right to Strike in Southern Africa’s International Labour Law Review
(1997) Vol. 136

STATUTES
1. Constitution of Zimbabwe
2. Labour Act Chapter 28:01.
3. Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
1. Labour (Declaration of Essential Services) Notice: Statutory Instrument No. 137 of 2003

INTERNET SOURCES
1. 2007 annual survey of violations of trade union rights, ITUC CSI 1913, available at
www,ituc.csi.org
2. www.the independent.co.zw, labour law relaxation antiworker, 01/03/2014.
3. ILO, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, Report of the Committee of
experts on the application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 111 (Part 4b),
available at www. Ilo.org
4. Collective Bargaining and Labour Dispute Resolution – Is SADC meeting the challenge?
Issues Paper No. 30, available at www.Ilo.org

42
5. Legal advice, Trade Unions, Strikes and the Law; available at
www.mywage.org/Zimbabwe
6. Report 214 on case No. 1081 (Peru) available at www.ilo.org

43