Phil. Association of Service Exporters Inc Vs Drilon G.R. NO. 81958 JUNE 30, 1988 Sarmiento, J. Facts
Phil. Association of Service Exporters Inc Vs Drilon G.R. NO. 81958 JUNE 30, 1988 Sarmiento, J. Facts
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the
Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it
is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior
consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police
power is valid under the Constitution?
HELD:
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor
force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation.
In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is
no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have
been afflicted with an identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar
as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne
by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department
Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this
Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended
to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the
Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the
authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the
ban shall be lifted.
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on
overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that
such a total ban has not been contemplated.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements
of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but
it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we
have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and
Employment with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of
the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has
convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.