SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208243. June 5, 2017.]

EDWIN GRANADA REYES , petitioner, vs . THE OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and PAUL JOCSON ARCHES ,
respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN , J : p

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, led
by petitioner Edwin Granada Reyes (Reyes), together with Rita Potestas Domingo
(Domingo) and Solomon Anore de Castilla (de Castilla). 2 This Petition assails the
O ce of the Ombudsman's March 20, 2013 Resolution 3 in Case No. OMB-M-C-11-
0005-A and the June 26, 2013 Memorandum 4 denying their motion for
reconsideration. The assailed March 20, 2013 Resolution found probable cause to
indict petitioner Reyes, Domingo, de Castilla, and Gil C. Andres (Andres) for violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and directed that an information against them
be filed before the Sandiganbayan. 5
On November 21, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bansalan, Davao del Sur
passed Municipal Ordinance No. 357, prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling, and
blowing up ('pagpabuto') of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly
called ' recrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan
Public Market." 6 On December 14, 2009, then Bansalan Mayor Reyes approved a
permit allowing vendors to sell recrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from
December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010. 7
On December 27, 2009, a re befell the Bansalan Public Market. It caused
extensive damage and destroyed re hydrants of the Bansalan Water District.
Subsequently, private respondent Paul Jocson Arches (Arches) led a complaint dated
December 20, 2010 against Reyes before the O ce of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Ombudsman-Mindanao). Arches questioned the approval and issuance of a mayor's
permit agreeing to sell recrackers, in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. He
claimed that this permit caused the fire the previous year. 8
By order of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, Chief of Police de Castilla, Fire Marshall
And r es , 9 and Permits and Licensing O cer Designate Domingo were made
respondents in the case, considering that they recommended the approval of the
mayor's permit's. 1 0
The respondents a quo led their respective counter-a davits. Reyes alleged
that Andres led two (2) different counter-a davits, and Reyes was not furnished a
copy of the second counter-affidavit (Andres' affidavit). 1 1
After concluding the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Resolution 1 2 dated March 20, 2013 and found that probable cause existed to
charge Reyes and his co-respondents a quo with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman held that Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 public o cers during the questioned acts. 1 3 Both the government and private stall
owners suffered undue injury due to the re at the Bansalan Public Market. 1 4 While the
mayor's permit was not the proximate cause of the re, it nonetheless, "gave
unwarranted bene t and advantage to the re cracker vendors . . . [to sell] recrackers
in the public market despite existing prohibition." 1 5 The issuance of the mayor's permit
was "patently tainted with bad faith and partiality or, at the very least, gross inexcusable
negligence." 1 6 The Ombudsman appreciated the evidence presented and found that
Reyes and his co-respondents a quo were aware of Municipal Ordinance No. 357. 1 7
Despite this, Reyes approved and issued a mayor's permit stating, "Permit is hereby
granted to sell recrackers on December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at Public Market,
Bansalan, Davao del Sur." 1 8 The assailed Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, this O ce nds probable cause to indict respondents
Edwin G. Reyes, Solomon A. De Castilla, Gil C. Andres, and Rita P. Domingo for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). Let an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 be led against the respondents before the
Sandiganbayan.
The other charges against the respondents are dismissed. 1 9
Thus, an Information 2 0 was led against Reyes, together with his co-
respondents a quo Domingo, de Castilla, and Andres for violating Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. It read:
On December 14, 2009, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, EDWIN GRANADA REYES,
RITA POTESTAS DOMINGO, SOLOMON ANORE DE CASTILLA, GIL CURAMENG
ANDRES, public o cers being then the Mayor, Permits and Licensing O cer
Designate, Chief of Police, and Fire Marshall, respectively, of the Municipality of
Bansalan, while in the discharge of their o cial functions, conspiring and
confederating with one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at
the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted bene t to a group of recracker
vendors by approving and issuing them a mayor's permit "to sell recrackers on
December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010 at Public Market, Bansalan, Davao del
Sur" despite fully knowing the existence of a municipal ordinance expressly
prohibiting the storing, displaying, selling and blowing-up of recrackers at the
Bansalan Public Market and the non-issuance of the requisite Fire Safety
Inspection Certi cate (FSIC) to the recracker vendors, thereby giving the said
recracker vendors the unwarranted bene t and advantage of holding the
business of selling firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 1
The Ombudsman denied a motion for reconsideration of its March 20, 2013
Resolution. 2 2
Thus, petitioner led this petition, arguing that public respondent Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion considering there was no legal basis to support the
finding of probable cause against petitioner. 2 3
Petitioner argues that there was no probable cause, insisting that there was not
enough basis for the nding of bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable
negligence in this case. 2 4 There was no unwarranted advantage or preference given to
the recracker vendors because the mayor's permit was granted based on a long-
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 standing practice to allow them to sell their wares during the Christmas season. 2 5 All
recracker vendors received similar treatment and were allowed to sell their wares,
provided they submitted the requirements. 2 6 Acts done in a public o cial's
performance of o cial duty are presumed to have been done in good faith, and
mistakes committed are not actionable unless malice or gross negligence amounting
to bad faith is shown. 2 7
Petitioner insists that public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion when it relied solely on Andres' a davit, which was not furnished to
petitioner, to indict him. 2 8 Petitioner did not know of Andres' a davit, which contained
accusations against petitioner, until he received the assailed Resolution. 2 9 Thus,
petitioner's right to due process was violated. Petitioner imputes bad faith in the ling
of the complaint against him. 3 0
In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner claims that he and his
family will suffer nancial, emotional, and psychological hardship. The issuance of
injunctive relief is necessary because the Sandiganbayan has already set the
arraignment date of petitioner. 3 1
In his Comment, 3 2 private respondent Arches argues that there was probable
cause, 3 3 that none of the grounds for enjoining a criminal prosecution exists, 3 4 and
that the assailed Resolution was not based solely on Andres' affidavit. 3 5
The O ce of the Ombudsman argues in its Comment 3 6 that petitioner failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. There were
su cient bases to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019. The ndings of the Ombudsman were based on the evidence presented. 3 7 In the
absence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court has consistently refrained from
interfering with the Ombudsman's exercise of its mandate. 3 8 The Ombudsman
opposes petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief, as no invasion of any clear or legal right
has been established by the petitioner. 3 9
In his Reply, 4 0 petitioner Reyes argues that conspiracy could not be present,
considering that the respondents did not even agree with one another, as shown by
Andres' a davit. 4 1 Further, it was not shown that petitioner intentionally disregarded
the Fire Safety Inspection Certi cate requirement as mandated by law. Without this,
only administrative liability would attach. The Ombudsman also did not show that the
vendors enjoyed any undue bene t or that the government suffered any undue
disadvantage. 4 2 Lastly, there was no showing of manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable neglect without which petitioner cannot be held criminally liable.
43

Petitioner avers that during the preliminary investigation, he was not clearly
informed of the nature of the charge against him, in violation of his constitutional right
to due process. 4 4 The ndings of the Ombudsman were confusing, 4 5 and petitioner
was not provided a copy of co-respondent a quo Andres' a davit, upon which the
Ombudsman relied in its finding of probable cause against petitioner. 4 6
Petitioner insists that this Court can interfere with the ndings of the
investigatory powers of the Ombudsman in this case, considering that "this is a case of
persecution, [not] prosecution." 4 7 Private respondent Arches was compelled by
vengeance in filing the complaint. 4 8
The sole issue for resolution of this Court is whether the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in determining that probable cause against petitioner exists.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

 We dismiss the Petition.
I
This Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman's ndings of
probable cause. In Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman: 4 9
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the O ce of the
Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman
wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public o cials and
government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman[.]"
An independent constitutional body, the O ce of the Ombudsman is
"beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver
of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine
whether there is probable cause to warrant the ling of a criminal case against
an accused. This function is executive in nature.
The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter.
It requires probing into the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
[or she] was prosecuted."
The O ce of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It
is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the
evidence on hand needed to make a nding of probable cause. As this Court is
not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.
Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with
the O ce of the Ombudsman's nding of probable cause. Republic v.
Ombudsman Desierto explains:
[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the O ce of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints led before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the scals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to le an information
in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 5 0
(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Despite this well-established principle, petitioner would have this Court interfere
with the Ombudsman's assessment on the basis of grave abuse of discretion.
However, disagreement with the Ombudsman's ndings is not enough to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. It is settled:
An act of a court or tribunal may constitute grave abuse of discretion
when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner because of passion or personal hostility. 5 1 (Emphasis in
the original, citations omitted)

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

 Thus, for this Petition to prosper, petitioner would have to show this Court that
the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty under the law. Petitioner has failed to do this. "A
preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause." 5 2 Further,
probable cause is:
[T]he existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being
based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute
certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, as the investigating o cer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause
implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify a conviction. 5 3 (Citations omitted)
Here, the Ombudsman properly performed its duty to determine probable cause
as to whether petitioner and his co-respondents a quo violated Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Section 3 (e) provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public o cers . — In addition to acts or
omissions of public o cers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public o cer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his o cial administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to o cers and employees of o ces or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Based on opinion, reasonable belief, and the evidence on record, the Ombudsman
found that the elements of the crime punishable under Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 existed. 5 4 Petitioner and his co-respondents a quo did not deny that they were
public o cers when the alleged acts were committed. 5 5 There was "unwarranted
bene t and advantage [given] to the recracker vendors." 5 6 The issuance of the
mayor's permit was "tainted with bad faith" or gross inexcusable negligence. 5 7
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman failed to show the undue bene t given to
the vendors, 5 8 but the Resolution sufficiently explained:
Nevertheless, respondents' approval and issuance of the subject mayor's
permit gave unwarranted bene t and advantage to the [ recracker] vendors.
"Unwarranted" means lacking adequate or o cial support; unjusti ed,
unauthorized; or without justi cation or adequate reasons; while "advantage" is
de ned as "a more favorable or improved position or condition; bene t or gain
of any kind." The approval and issuance of the mayor's permit was clearly
without basis as it was, in fact, in violation of a municipal ordinance and the
Fire Code of the Philippines. It gave a group of vendors the bene t and
advantage of holding the business of selling recrackers in the public market
despite existing prohibition. 5 9 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner's claim that the Ombudsman did not explain the evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable neglect 6 0 also cannot be countenanced. The Ombudsman likewise
sufficiently explained the finding of bad faith:
. . . Respondents' action was patently tainted with bad faith and partiality
or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence. "Bad faith" refers to a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; "partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which excites a disposition
to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are; while
"gross negligence" is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care
with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are
concerned.
Based on their respective counter-a davits, respondents were well aware
of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 which expressly prohibits "the storing,
displaying, selling and blowing up ("pagbubuto") of those pyrotechnics products
allowed by law, commonly called as " recrackers" or "pabuto" within the
premises of buildings 1 and 2 of Bansalan Public Market." In clear violation of
this ordinance, respondents approved and issued a mayor's permit stating[,]
"Permit is hereby granted to sell recrackers on December 21, 2009 to January
1, 2010 at Public Market, Bansalan, Davao del Sur." Furthermore, as respondent
Andres narrated in his counter-a davit, the recracker vendors were not issued
a Fire Safety Inspection Certi cate (FSIC) because they did not comply with re
safety requirements. The issuance of a FSIC by the Bureau of Fire [Protection] is
a prerequisite to the grant of permits by local governments. According to Andres,
he expressly informed respondent Reyes of the lack of the safety requirements
and objected to the issuance of the mayor's permit because of the re risk
involved in such sale of recrackers. Nevertheless, despite the absence of the
required FSIC, respondents Domingo, Castilla, and Andres himself
recommended for approval the application for the subject mayor's permit.
Respondent mayor, for his part, cannot claim that he merely relied on the other
respondents' recommendation for approval since he knew of an existing
ordinance prohibiting such sale of firecrackers and was apprised of the fact that
the firecracker vendors were not given a FSIC. 6 1 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner may insist on his innocence and the absence of bad faith, but the
presence or absence of bad faith is a matter of evidence, best threshed out during trial.
In any case, petitioner has failed to show how the Ombudsman's determinations
constituted grave abuse of discretion.
II
Petitioner avers that his right to due process was violated. Petitioner points out
that the initial complaint against him and his co-respondents a quo did not mention
giving unwarranted bene t to the recracker vendors. Yet, he was charged with
violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for giving unwarranted bene t to the
recracker vendors. Petitioner states that this charge was based on co-respondent a
quo Andres' a davit, which he was not given. Because he had no opportunity to
respond to Andres' a davit, he asserts that he was deprived of due process. 6 2 This
argument is untenable.
Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and is conducted only to establish
whether probable cause exists. Consequently, it is not subject to the same due process
requirements that must be present during trial. In Webb v. De Leon: 6 3
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support
a nding of probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely
abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clari catory
questions. The decision to call witnesses for clari catory questions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone.
If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need
not hold a clari catory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can
demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ
Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish
probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary. 6 4
A person's rights during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided
by procedural law. 6 5 Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in
the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) ...
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted
by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at
his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to
specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these
shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his
expense.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting a davits and documents, the respondent shall
submit his counter-a davit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-a davits shall be
subscribed and sworn to and certi ed as provided in paragraph (a) of this
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to le a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-
affidavit.
Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right
to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, 6 6 but he does not have a
similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-respondents.
This issue is not novel. This Court has held that during preliminary investigation,
the Ombudsman is not required to furnish a respondent with the counter-a davits of
his co-respondents. In Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman: 6 7
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to
furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-
a davits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process.
Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that
it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary
investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada's claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the O ce of the Ombudsman require is
for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting a davits and documents at the time the order to submit
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 the counter-a davit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from
Section 4 (b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the O ce of the Ombudsman
when it states, "[a]fter such a davits [of the complainant and his witnesses]
have been secured, the investigating o cer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the a davits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-
a davits . . . ." At this point, there is still no counter-a davit submitted by any
respondent. Clearly, what Section 4 (b) refers to are a davits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the a davits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-a davits of the co-respondents are not
part of the supporting a davits of the complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada's Request.
Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the O ce of
the Ombudsman provides that a respondent "shall have access to the
evidence on record," this provision should be construed in relation to Section
4 (a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
First, Section 4 (a) states that "the investigating o cer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute a davits to substantiate the
complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant,
and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4 (b) states that "the investigating o cer shall issue an
order attaching thereto a copy of the a davits and all other supporting
documents, directing the respondent" to submit his counter-a davit. The
a davits referred to in Section 4 (b) are the a davits mentioned in Section 4
(a). Clearly, the a davits to be furnished to the respondent are the a davits of
the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately
succeeding Section 4 (c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have
"access to the evidence on record" does not stand alone, but should be read in
relation to the provisions of Section 4 (a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the
investigating o cer to furnish the respondent with the "a davits and other
supporting documents" submitted by "the complainant or supporting
witnesses." Thus, a respondent's "access to evidence on record" in Section 4
(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure refers to the a davits and
supporting documents of "the complainant or supporting witnesses" in
Section 4 (a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "[t]he respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to
copy them at his expense." A respondent's right to examine refers only to "the
evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or under Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement
whatsoever that the a davits executed by the co-respondents should be
furnished to a respondent. 6 8 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Thus, petitioner's non-receipt of Andres' a davit did not violate his procedural
rights during preliminary investigation.
Moreover, petitioner was fully accorded due process in the preliminary
investigation proceedings.
In Resurreccion v. People: 6 9
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com
 We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. For as long
as the parties are given the opportunity to present their cause of defense, their
interest in due course as in this case, it cannot be said that there was denial of
due process.
Here, petitioner was able to le a counter-a davit to explain his side and to
respond to the complaint filed against him. He was not denied due process.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The O ce of the
Ombudsman's March 20, 2013 Resolution in Case No. OMB-M-C-11-0005-A and its
June 26, 2013 Memorandum: Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration 7 0 in
relation to Criminal Case No. SB-13-CRM-0596 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Mendoza * and Martires, ** JJ., are on official leave.
Footnotes
* On official leave.

** On official leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 3-28.
2 . Pursuant to Rita Potestas Domingo and Solomon Anore de Castilla's motion to withdraw
from being parties to the Petition (rollo, pp. 226-231), this Court dropped them as
petitioners in a Resolution dated September 16, 2013 (rollo, p. 249-A).

3. Rollo, pp. 29-40. The Resolution was penned by Assistant Special Prosecutor III Anna Isabel
G. Aurellano and approved by the Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

4. Id. at 120-130. The Memorandum: Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, docketed as
Criminal Case No. SB-13-CRM-0596, was penned by Assistant Special Prosecutor II
Joseph F. Capistrano, with recommending approval of Acting Director Lalaine D. Benitez
and approved by The Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
5. Id. at 39.
6. Id. at 262-263, Comment to the Petition for Certiorari.
7. Id. at 262.

8. Id. at 29-30.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 29-30.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 29-40.

13. Id. at 34.

14. Id.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

 15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 39.

20. Id. at 66-68.
21. Id. at 66-67.
22. Id. at 130.
23. Id. at 11.

24. Id. at 13.

25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 20.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 23.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 262-273, Comment to the Petition for Certiorari.

33. Id. at 264.

34. Id.
35. Id. at 265.
36. Id. at 477-495.
37. Id. at 484.

38. Id. at 487.

39. Id. at 490.
40. Id. at 499-527, Reply to the Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with Prayer for
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
41. Id. at 508.
42. Id. at 509.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 512.

45. Id. at 512-513.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com

 46. Id. at 514.
47. Id. at 520.
48. Id.
49. G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2016/december2016/206310-11.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].
50. Id. at 16-17.
51. Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, 503 Phil. 93, 100 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
52. Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, 751 Phil. 821, 863 (2015) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

5 3 . Chan y Lim v. Secretary of Justice , 572 Phil. 118, 132 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division].
54. Rollo, pp. 34-37.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id. at 36.

58. Id. at 509.

59. Id. at 35.

60. Id. at 510.

61. Id. at 36-37.

62. Id. at 22.

63. 317 Phil. 758 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

64. Id. at 789.

6 5 . Dichaves v. O ce of the Ombudsman , G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2016/december2016/206310-11.pdf> 18 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

66. RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 3.

67. 751 Phil. 821 (2015) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

68. Id. at 855-861.

69. 738 Phil. 704, 720 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

70. Rollo, p. 120.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2017 cdasiaonline.com