P K Jain Surendra S Yadav Alok Dixit Derrivative Markets in India
P K Jain Surendra S Yadav Alok Dixit Derrivative Markets in India
in India
Trading, Pricing, and Risk Management
Derivative Markets
in India
Trading, Pricing, and Risk Management
Alok Dixit
Assistant Professor
Finance and Accounting Area
IIM Lucknow
Surendra S. Yadav
Professor of Finance
Department of Management Studies
IIT Delhi
P.K. Jain
Professor of Finance
Department of Management Studies
IIT Delhi
efficiency of the S&P CNX Nifty index options, the options which are traded
on the leading index of the National Stock Exchange (NSE).
The issue of market efficiency has been dealt with by using a comprehensive
research methodology. The methodology adopted consisted of a two-pronged
approach which built on the analysis of secondary as well as primary data
to ascertain the state of index options market in Indian. The secondary data
analysis has been carried out using select ‘model-free’ as well as ‘model-
based’ approaches. For the purpose, the study used the data for a period of six
years from June 04, 2001 (starting date for index options in India) to June 30,
2007. Moreover, a survey amongst the trading member organizations based
at National Capital Region (NCR) and Mumbai has also been conducted to
corroborate the findings from the secondary data analysis.
The ‘model-free’ approaches to assessing the options market efficiency
include the test of two popularly known conditions on options prices, namely,
(i) test of lower boundary conditions on the options prices and (ii) test of
put-call parity relationship. Likewise, the ‘model-based’ approaches have
dwelt upon, (i) test of rational expectations hypothesis on the term structure
of implied volatilities and (ii) examination of the informational efficiency of
implied volatilities vis-à-vis estimates from the select conditional volatility
models. In addition, the survey assessed the opinion of respondents on five
major dimensions relating to the state of options prices in Indian derivatives
market. These dimensions include: (i) level of usage of the options; (ii)
understanding of put-call parity relationship; (iii) awareness and use of
models for options valuation; (iv) correctness of options pricing, its impact,
and existence and exploitability of arbitrage opportunities; and (v) need of
regulations and educational initiatives for the betterment of the market.
Empirically, the findings of the ‘model-free’ approaches have been
corroborated with those of ‘model-based’ approaches. One of the notable
findings is that put options market is more inefficient compared to call options
market. Precisely, the put options have been overpriced in relation to call
options. The lopsided pattern (more inefficiency in the case of put options vis-
à-vis call options) of violations could be attributed to ‘short-selling constraint’
in Indian securities market during the period under reference. This is borne
out by the fact that the arbitrage strategy requires taking a short position in
the underlying asset to correct such anomalies, i.e., overpricing of put options.
And, it may be noted that the short-selling was not allowed in Indian market
during the period under reference.
However, it is generally argued that futures market can ideally be used in
case short-selling is banned in the market given that the futures are available
on the underlying asset. In view of this, the model free approaches were also
Preface ● ix
tested using S&P CNX Nifty futures prices. The major findings of the analysis
show that the futures market could identify only some of the mispricing
signals as the futures themselves were underpriced. The underpricing of
futures can be traced to the absence of short-selling facility in the market
as the correction of under-pricing of futures requires short-selling in place.
Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that the short-selling constraint
has emerged as one of the major reasons for the typical pattern of violations
in Indian options market.
Another notable finding of the research is that a majority of violations both
in the cases of call and put options could not be exploited on account of the
dearth of liquidity in such contracts. An adequate level of liquidity in options
as well as underling’s market is needed to execute the appropriate arbitrage
strategy successfully. The lack of liquidity causes a risk called immediacy-risk;
that is, inability of the arbitrageur to execute the strategy within the required
timeframe. Failing which, the observed arbitrage profits could turn into losses.
Besides, higher bid-ask spreads are observed for the contracts having low
liquidity and vice versa. And, therefore, the lower level of liquidity reduces
the observed profits as well.
In nutshell, the major findings presented in this book reveal that the Indian
investors are not exhibiting rational behaviour while valuing index options
during the period under reference. This is indicative of price inefficiency in
index options market in India. The revealed state of options pricing in the
derivatives market can be attributed to the short selling constraints, dearth
of liquidity and lack of proper understanding of the market amongst market
participants/investors.
In addition, a brief sketch of the recent initiatives taken by SEBI and their
possible impact on the market efficiency has been delineated in the book.
Besides, the need of further initiatives warranted to restore efficiency of the
options market in India has been given in the form of recommendations.
This book is expected to be useful for the academic community (especially
MBA/M.com students and the researchers who are working in the area of
Futures and Options), industry, the regulatory body (SEBI) and the major
exchanges of the country. The book can also be used for the class room teaching,
especially to explain the arbitrage mechanism in options market. In addition,
the book provides insight into the future research that can be attempted in
the domain of Futures and Options market. Besides, the regulators and stock
exchanges of the other countries which have recently introduced the Futures
and Options in their markets may find this book useful.
Acknowledgements
At the outset, we would like to thank the Almighty for His blessings to inspire
us to accomplish this academic endeavour. This work has been possible
because of the help, encouragement, cooperation and guidance of many people
and we convey our heartfelt thanks to all of them.
We are grateful to Prof. Surendra Prasad, Ex-Director, IIT Delhi, Prof.
R.K. Shevgaonkar, Director, IIT Delhi, and Prof. Devi Singh, Director, IIM
Lucknow for their kind cooperation and support. We are also thankful to all
the colleagues in Department of Management Studies, IIT Delhi, and in IIM
Lucknow for their good wishes for this endeavour.
In addition, we are deeply obliged to all the respondents of the survey, who
took out time from their busy schedules to provide data for this work.
Dr. Alok Dixit takes this opportunity to express his deepest gratitude to
respected guides (gurus) and co-authors, Prof. Surendra S. Yadav and Prof.
P.K. Jain, for their valuable guidance, inspiration, motivation, and untiring
efforts in completion of this project.
Last but not the least, we are thankful to our family members and loved
ones for their continuous encouragement and support.
A D
S S. Y
P.K. J
Contents
Preface vii
Acknowledgements xi
Abbreviations xv
Units of Measurement xvii
C 1 Financial Derivatives 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Types of Financial Derivatives 2
1.3 Use of Financial Derivatives 7
1.4 Factors Contributing to the Growth of Derivatives 7
1.5 Evolution of Derivatives Market in India 8
Glossary 179
References 183
Abbreviations
Financial Derivatives
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Financial markets play a vital role in capital creation in an economy. Precisely,
these markets are essential for raising capital through long-term sources of
finance, for example, equity shares and debentures/bonds. This is in view of
the fact that these markets not only facilitate in raising the fresh capital but
also ensure the trading of the investment vehicles. Trading in the investment
vehicles provides flexibility to the investors to liquidate their investments
virtually any time (to be on the safer side, any day) they want. However,
financial markets are largely subject to market risk. Market risk represents
summative effect of the economic forces (inflation, exchange rate, GDP
growth, etc.), which are unpredictable to a marked extent, and could cause
substantial alteration in the value of the assets traded in the open market. In
view of this, an investor (hedger) in the market looks for some instrument
that could provide him protections against such risk. At the same time, there
are participants (speculators) in the market who are willing to take this risk.
In a financial market, derivative instruments work as link between the two
entities; namely hedger (one who wants to transfer its risk) and speculator (the
other willing to take this risk). Besides, derivatives instruments are identified
with their contribution in terms of price discovery and increased liquidity
in the underlying’s market. In sum, derivative instruments are expected to
provide three major benefits in a financial market, viz. (i) transfer of risk
from one party to another party (hedging), (ii) better price discovery in the
underlying’s market and (iii) increase in liquidity of the underlying asset. In
turn, these benefits lead to better capital allocation in an economy.
Derivatives, also known as financial innovations, are defined as those
instruments that derive their value from the changes in the value of the
underlying asset; that is, in itself it does not have any value, unlike stock and
bonds. Rather, their value depends on typical characteristics/ behaviour of the
underlying asset. The underlying asset can be a financial asset (e.g. individual
2 ● Derivative Markets in India
shares, bonds and indices thereof), commodity (e.g. grains, metal, etc.) or
reference rate (e.g. interest rate, exchange rate, etc.). In their simplest form,
known as plain-vanilla instruments, derivatives include Forward Contracts,
Futures, Options and Swaps. Moreover, over the period of time, with the
increased complexity of financial markets, a variety of advanced derivative
instruments have been developed. Some of such instruments are Swaptions,
Barrier Options, Collaterlised Debt Obligations (CDOs), Collaterlised Bond
Obligations (CBOs), Credit Default Swaps (CDS), etc.
Financial derivatives, in particular, are those instruments that have financial
assets as the underlying. Naturally, these instruments become an obvious
choice for managing/tailoring financial risk of the assets being traded in the
market. Amongst financial derivatives, the instruments that are based on
indices (e.g. index futures and index options) serve as a natural choice to the
portfolio (fund) managers for tailoring the market exposure of funds based
on the risk appetite of their clients.
The exporter can make use of forward market by selling Euros 3-months
forward in the market. This can be achieved by entering into a 3-months forward
contract, and therefore, the exporter can avoid the foreign currency exposure
due to unfavourable movements in Euro by selling it at ` 55.50 per Euro. Now,
whatever happens to forex rates three months from now, he will receive a certain
amount, i.e., ` 55,50,000 (1,00,000 ¥ ` 55.50).
Example 1.3 In addition to data given in Example 1.2, further suppose that an
option contract on TATASTEEL, scheduled to expire one-month from now and
with the strike price of ` 610, is currently traded at ` 30 per contract. Say, the
contract size is 100 shares. Now suppose that the investor is willing to choose options
route to hedge against the unfavourable movements in the market. He needs to buy
6 ● Derivative Markets in India
10 put option contracts (Total no. of shares/No. of shares per contract, 1000/100),
and it will cost him ` 300 upfront.
At maturity (in the case of European options) or up to maturity (in the case
of American options), if the price of TATASTEEL shares goes down below `
610, the investor can exercise the option and can sell these shares at ` 610. For
example, the options that the investor purchased are European in nature and
at maturity TATASTEEL closes at ` 580. The investor will incur a loss of
` 30000 on his position in the spot market. At the same time, he will exercise the
option and sell the shares at ` 610. Therefore, he will be able to recover ` 30000
from his position in options market and his effective loss will be the premium
that he paid upfront, i.e., ` 300.
It is important to note that he would have done the same by using futures as
well (refer to Example 1.2). However, the advantage of option is that investor has
the flexibility not to sell his shares at ` 610 when market values TATASTEEL at
more than ` 610, say ` 640. In contrast, in the case of futures, he has to sell the
shares at ` 610 even if the market value of share turns out to be more than ` 610.
Example 1.4 Suppose a firm wants to raise some capital through debt market.
The firm finds that it can raise the desired amount based on floating interest
rate, i.e., MIBOR2 plus 100 basis points; however, it is interested in getting it
exchanged for a fixed interest rate loan for whatsoever reason (may be the firm
is new and does not want to take this risk). At the same time, there is another
firm that could raise the debt amount at the fixed rate of interest, say at 8% p.a.,
but was willing to exchange it for floating rate of interest. Both such firms can
explore the possibility of swapping their respective interest liability through the
2
MIBOR stands for Mumbai Inter Bank Offered Rate. This is a reference rate used for lending
and borrowing among banks.
Financial Derivatives ● 7
on June 11, 2000, with the launch of futures contracts on the leading index
of National Stock Exchange (NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The
derivatives were started in the Indian market in response to the report of L.C.
Gupta Committee. The committee conducted a survey amongst the market
participants to gauge the need of derivatives market in India and found that
there has been a well-awaited need of having a derivatives market for hedging
their financial risk. The derivatives segment in Indian securities market has
registered remarkable growth in its nearly 11 years of existence. The data on
the growth of derivatives segment are summarized in Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1.
It may be deciphered from the data (Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1) that the
derivatives market has experienced a whopping growth, evident from the
current volumes which amounts to many times of its initial trading volume
in the very first year of its existence.
Another notable observation from the data on the growth of derivatives
market is that the majority of trading in derivatives market has been seen in
the futures segment compared to that in the options market. The reason behind
this could be the ease of trading in futures market as options are comparatively
difficult to understand, and moreover, the market has got less experience of
the derivatives market, as it has been launched recently in Indian securities
market. Some facts on the development of derivatives market in India along
with its growth story has been summarized in following sub-section.
Total turnover of derivatives market in India, 2000–01 to 2008–09
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Equity options serve, amongst other functions, as an important tool for
managing risk for investors dealing with equity shares and/or portfolio
thereof. These are the derivative contracts that give their holders a right but
not an obligation to buy or sell the underlying asset (equity share or index
of such shares) at a predetermined price called strike/exercise price on or up
to a maturity date. The options market is expected to serve as a tool for risk
hedging, price discovery, enhancing liquidity in the market and, therefore,
facilitate better allocation of capital in an economy. The risk hedging function of
options is invariably claimed as the most important amongst all their functions.
This is in view of the fact that the availability of such financial innovations
in a market helps in transferring risk from one party to another (from buyer
of the options to the seller of the option), and therefore, it helps investors to
take risk which is tailored to best suited their risk appetite.
In addition, it is generally believed and has been demonstrated empirically
across the world that the options market leads the underlying’s market, i.e.
the information gets reflected first in the derivatives market, in general, and
options market, in particular, and then spills over to the underlying’s market. It
would be appropriate to note here that the flow of information is bidirectional;
however, the option market is expected to lead the underlying’s market in
an efficient market environment. This function of the options market can be
traced to the fact that it takes an investor considerably less to have the same
exposure through the options market compared to what it takes in the spot
market to have the same exposure in a financial asset. This is borne out by the
fact that options market entails lower transaction costs and provides leveraged
position to the investors. It is for this reason that the information is expected
to get reflected in the options market prior to the spot market.
Another function of the options market is to enhance liquidity of the
underlying’s market. However, such impacts are difficult to generalize and,
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 13
sectors of the economy. The securities are included in or excluded from the
Futures & Options (F&O) segment list based on the different criteria notified
by SEBI from time to time. Some of such criteria include, average daily market
capitalization and average daily traded value of the security for previous six
months, the market-wide position limit in the security, the quarter sigma
values, etc.
Options on individual stocks are used for speculating as well as hedging
purposes. However, the hedging provided by such options is limited
compared with that provided by index options, as these options can be used
to hedge exposure of underlying security or some other security having strong
correlation with the underlying. On the other hand, index options can be used
to hedge exposure of a variety of funds, since options are not available on
such tailored funds. At the same time, these funds are expected to have strong
association with the leading index/indices on which options are normally
floated in an economy.
In the case of index options, it is important to note that these are essentially
settled in cash. The cash settlement in the case of index options happens
because non-deliverable underlying asset (index), and therefore, physical
settlement becomes impossible. In Indian derivatives market, both types of
options, namely index and stock options, are settled in cash only.
Another important feature of Indian options market is that index as well
as stock options are European in nature, i.e. these can be exercised only at
maturity. It is important to note that options on individual stocks trading at
NSE were being offered as American options till October 2010. In October
2010, NSE decided to move to European style options with an expectation to
improve dearth of liquidity in options on individual stocks.
Further, with respect to maturity of options contracts, both types of options
(i.e. index and stock options) have three variants in terms of their maturity
time: Near the month (NTM)—options having less than or equal to 30 days to
maturity; Next the month (NXTM)—options which are having 31–60 days to
maturity and Far the month (FTM)—options which have more than 60 days
to maturity. In addition, March onwards, Long Dated Options (LDO) were
allowed to trade in Indian options market. However, such options could not
attract significant activity due to liquidity and pricing issues.
Underlying’s Pay-off
price at maturity Action Value (Value-call
(ST) premium)
2900 Abandon 0 –100
2950 Abandon 0 –100
3000 Exercise 50 –50
3050 Exercise 100 0
3100 Exercise 150 50
3150 Exercise 200 100
3200 Exercise 250 150
3250 Exercise 300 200
3300 Exercise 350 250
3350 Exercise 400 300
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 17
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
50
00
50
00
50
00
50
00
50
00
– 50
28
29
29
30
30
31
31
32
32
33
– 100
From the data, it can be easily inferred that the trader will be benefited only
if the market shows an advancing trend. Further, it should move up by at least
` 50 to break-even. He will start generating profit only if the market moves
beyond ` 3050. It is evident from the data that the trader will be benefited only
by large moves; for example, if market reaches at ` 3350 mark. In this scenario,
he will make a profit of ` 250. It becomes a possibility only if the market goes up
by ` 350, which is equivalent to nearly 40% {(350/3000) ¥ 12 } annualized
volatility. In this strategy, the maximum loss that a trader is going to incur is
the premium amount he paid initially; however, profit potential is theoretically
unlimited.
(b) Bullish and low volatility—Bullish call spread: A bullish call spread is
an appropriate trading strategy when a trader expects market to go up
but he expects volatility to be low. It combines two call options, which
are similar in all the aspects (maturity, underlying asset, etc.) except strike
prices. Since the trader thinks that market will go up, he takes a long
position in the call option; simultaneously, he takes a shot position in
the other call option (with higher strike price), as he expects that larger
moves are unlikely. Therefore, he can reduce his initial investment
by selling a call option with higher strike price. In sum, this strategy
involves a long position in a call option with the lower strike price and
simultaneously a short position in a call option with higher strike price.
Example 2.2 Suppose a trader expects that, one month from now the market
will be on the rising trend but large moves are unlikely. To exploit this scenario,
he goes long in a bullish call spread. For the purpose, he takes long position
in a call option having maturity of one month and strike price of ` 3000 (X1),
18 ● Derivative Markets in India
available at ` 60 (C1). At the same time, he takes a short position in another call
option with the same characteristics except the strike price, which he chooses at
` 3070 (X2), currently traded at ` 55 (C2).
Underlying’s Value
Pay-off {Total
price at maturity Bullish call spread
value – (C1 – C2)}
(ST) X1 (Long) X2 (Short) Total
2980 0 0 0 −5
2990 0 0 0 −5
3000 0 0 0 −5
3010 10 0 10 5
3020 20 0 20 15
3030 30 0 30 25
3040 40 0 40 35
3050 50 0 50 45
3060 60 0 60 55
3070 70 0 70 65
3080 80 10 70 65
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2980
2990
3000
3010
3020
3030
3040
3050
3060
3070
3080
3090
– 10
Underlying’s value of maturity (ST)
This strategy results in an initial cash outlay of ` 5, i.e. call premium paid
(on the option the trader is long) net of the premium received from the short
position (C1 – C2). Further, suppose the underlying share/index is currently
traded at ` 3000.
From the data it is evident that the trader will start generating profit only if
share price moves beyond ` 3005. Once the price reaches at ` 3005, the trader
will breakeven. Beyond this point, every increase will add to the profit of the
trader until the price reaches ` 3070. As the price advances beyond this point,
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 19
the call option you are short in will also be exercised against you and your profit
will stabilize at ` 65 (that is, ` 3070 – 3000 - 5). That is, this strategy will result
to a maximum profit of {X1 – X2 – (C1 – C2)}.
From the data it may be inferred that the trader will be benefited by adopting
this strategy if the market shows bullish trend and, at the same time, shows mild
moves. In case price moves beyond ` 3070, the trader is no longer benefited as
his profit stabilizes at rupee 65. Therefore, such a strategy is the most suitable
one when the market is expected to advance, at the same time large moves are
unlikely. In this systematically the maximum loss that he is going to incur is
the difference between call premiums, i.e. (C1 – C2). This strategy reduces the
maximum loss as well as the maximum profit compared with call option. In case
the market is expected to advance along with larger moves, a long position in call
option becomes more profitable strategy compared with a bullish call spread.
Underlying’s Pay-off
price at maturity Action Value (Value-put
(ST) premium)
2650 Exercise 300 250
2700 Exercise 250 200
2750 Exercise 200 150
2800 Exercise 150 100
2850 Exercise 100 50
2900 Exercise 50 0
2950 Abandon 0 −50
3000 Abandon 0 −50
3050 Abandon 0 −50
3100 Abandon 0 −50
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2650
2700
2750
2800
2850
2900
2950
3000
3050
3100
– 50
– 100
Underlying’s value at maturity (ST)
mark. In this situation, he will end up with a profit of ` 250. It is possible only
if the market goes down by ` 350, which is equivalent to nearly 40% annualized
volatility. In this strategy, the maximum loss that a trader is going to incur is
the premium amount he paid initially; however, profit potential can theoretically
reach up to the strike price.
(b) Bearish and low volatility—Bearish put spread: A Bearish Put spread
is an appropriate trading strategy when a trader expects market to
decline; however, larger moves are unlikely. A Bearish Put spread
combines two put options, which are similar in all the aspects (maturity,
underlying asset etc.) except strike prices. Since the trader speculates that
market will go down, he takes a long position in put option to benefit
from down movements; simultaneously, he takes a shot position in the
other put option (with lower strike price) as he thinks that larger moves
are unlikely. As a result, he reduces his initial investment by selling
a put option with lower strike price. In sum, this strategy involves
a long position in one put options with the higher strike price and
simultaneously a short position in a put option with lower strike price.
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 21
Example 2.4 Suppose a trader speculates that one month from now, the market
will be on the declining trend but the volatility will remain low. A bearish
put spread will be an appropriate strategy to get maximum benefit in case the
trader’s expectation turns correct. For the purpose, he takes long position in
a put option having maturity of one month and strike price of ` 3000 (X2),
available at ` 55 (P2). Simultaneously, he goes short in another put option with
the same characteristics but lower strike price, which he chooses at ` 2930 (X1),
currently traded at ` 50 (P1).
Value
Underlying’s price Pay-off {Total
Bearish put spread
at maturity (ST) value-(P2 – P1)}
X1 (Short) X2 (Long) Total
2910 20 90 70 65
2920 10 80 70 65
2930 0 70 70 65
2940 0 60 60 55
2950 0 50 50 45
2960 0 40 40 35
2970 0 30 30 25
2980 0 20 20 15
2990 0 10 10 5
3000 0 0 0 −5
3010 0 0 0 −5
3020 0 0 0 −5
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2910
2920
2930
2940
2950
2960
2970
2980
2990
3000
3010
3020
– 10
Underlying’s value of maturity (ST)
22 ● Derivative Markets in India
This strategy entails an initial cash outlay of ` 5, i.e. put premium paid (on
the option having higher strike price) net of the premium received from the
short position (P2 – P1). Further, suppose the underlying share is currently
traded at ` 3000.
From the data, it is evident that the trader will start earning profit in case
the share price moves below ` 2995. Once the price hits ` 2995 mark, the trader
will breakeven. Beyond ` 2995 mark, every decrease will add to the profit of
the trader until the price reaches ` 2930. As the price declines beyond ` 2930,
the other put option (that you sold) will also be exercised against you and your
profit will stabilize at ` 65 (that is, ` 3000 – 2970 – 5). That is, in this strategy,
maximum profit will be {X2 – X1 – (P2 – P1)}.
From the example, it may be deciphered that this strategy will be appropriate
if the market is likely to decline and, at the same time, larger moves are unlikely.
In case price moves below ` 2930, the trader is no longer benefited as his profit
remains ` 65 beyond this point. Thus, such an strategy is the most suitable
one when the market is expected to decline; however, is likely to exhibit lower
volatility. In a bearish put spread, the maximum loss a trader is expected to
incur is the difference between put premiums, i.e. (P2 – P1). In sum, this strategy
reduces the maximum loss as well as the maximum profit compared with put
option.
In case the market is expected to experience larger moves along with the
bearish sentiment, a long position in put option will be more profitable compared
with a bearish put spread.
call will ensure maximum profit in case the market turns bullish and
experience larger moves; on the contrary, if market declines and exhibits
high volatility, a long position in put will maximize profit for the trader. It
is important to note that the trader will be able to maximize his profit only
if the market experiences large moves irrespective of their direction.
Example 2.5 Suppose a trader has no view on the direction of the market, i.e.
he fears that the market can go either way in a month’s time; however, he believes
that the volatility is going to be high. To generate profit in this scenario, he takes
a long position in a straddle. For the purpose, he goes long in a call as well as
a put option having strike price of ` 3000 and scheduled to expire one month
from now. The call and put options are currently available at ` 100 and 90,
respectively. Further, suppose the current market price of the underlying share
is ` 3000.
Value
Underlying’s price Pay-off {Total
Straddle Total
at maturity (ST) value − (C + P)}
XC XP value
2500 0 500 500 310
2600 0 400 400 210
2700 0 300 300 110
2800 0 200 200 10
2900 0 100 100 −90
3000 0 0 0 −190
3100 100 0 100 −90
3200 200 0 200 10
3300 300 0 300 110
3400 400 0 400 210
3500 500 0 500 310
400
300
200
100
0
– 100 2500 2600 2700 2800 2900 3000 3100 3200 3300 3400 3500
– 200
Underlying’s value at maturity (ST)
– 300
In the above case, it is evident that the trader will start earning profit if the
market moves up/ down by more than ` 190 from its current level. As long as
market rages with ` 2810–3190, he will incur losses. The trader will breakeven
24 ● Derivative Markets in India
in case the market reaches either of the following two points: ` 2810 and 3190.
The moment market crosses this range to either side, it will start generating
profit to the trader. Further, it is important to note that the trader will be able
to maximize his profit in case the market experiences high volatility. The higher
it move from its current level, higher will the profit that he earns. For example,
the market touches either ` 2500 or 3500 mark, which is possible in case market
exhibits more than 50% volatility, the trader will earn good amount of profit,
i.e. ` 210.
Since this strategy attempts to exploit both the possible directions, it naturally
will cost higher to the trader compared with directional strategies. In this
strategy, maximum loss that a trader can incur will be equal to ` 190 (C + P)
in case market remains at the same level at maturity. In case the market is likely
to experience moderate moves, it is not a suitable strategy. A suitable strategy
for mild moves/low volatility has been discussed next.
Example 2.6 Suppose a trader who has no idea where the market can move
a month from now is sure that large moves are unlikely. Based on his view, he
takes long position in butterfly spread strategy. For this purpose, he goes long in
two call options—scheduled to expire a month from now—having strike prices
of ` 2950 and 3050, respectively. The options are currently traded at ` 110 and
95, respectively. A the same time, he takes short position in two call option with
the same characteristics with the only difference that the strike price which he
chooses is at ` 3000. This option is currently traded at ` 100. Further, suppose
the underlying share is currently traded at ` 3000. This strategy will result in
an initial cash outlay that is considerably less compared with straddle; at the
same time, profit will also be limited, as it can go up to ` 45, whereas in the case
of straddle it can be substantially high.
From the data, it is evident that this strategy will generate profits as long as
the price remains within moderate limit (exhibits low volatility) irrespective of
direction it takes. It can be easily deciphered from the data that the trader will
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 25
Value
Underlying’s
Butterfly spread Total
price at maturity Total
X1 2*X2 X3 pay-off
(ST) value
(Long) (Short) (Long)
2930 0 0 0 0 −5
2940 0 0 0 0 −5
2950 0 0 0 0 −5
2960 10 0 0 10 5
2970 20 0 0 20 15
2980 30 0 0 30 25
2990 40 0 0 40 35
3000 50 0 0 50 45
3010 60 20 0 40 35
3020 70 40 0 30 25
3030 80 60 0 20 15
3040 90 80 0 10 5
3050 100 100 0 0 −5
3060 110 120 10 0 −5
3070 120 140 20 0 −5
50
40
30
20
10
0
– 10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
00
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
29
29
29
29
29
29
29
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
From the example, it is clear that the strategy generates maximum profit
when the price remains at the same level, i.e., ` 3000. Further it remains
profitable as long as price moves up or down by less than ` 45. In other word,
this strategy ensures profit in case the market exhibits low volatility irrespective
of its direction.
Example 2.7 Suppose a speculator fears that the market can move to either
direction and can experience large as well as small/moderate moves. Based on his
view on the market, he goes long in a box-spread strategy. For this purpose, he
goes long in a bullish call spread as well as in a bearish call spread. For bullish
call spread, consider the same data as discussed in Example 2.2. Further, assume
that a bearish put spread has been constructed with the same strike prices for the
same maturity dates. Assume that such put options with strike prices of ` 3000
and 3070 were traded at ` 58 and 68, respectively. This strategy results in an
initial cash outlay that equals to outlays of the bullish call spread and bearish
put spread added together, i.e. (C1 – C2) + (P2 – P1). It will be ` 15 {(60 − 55)
+ (68 − 58)} in the above mentioned case.
Values of the box-spread strategy for different possible prices/values of the
underlying asset at maturity has been summarized in the following Table. For
better understanding of the behaviour of values from the strategy, these have
been portrayed across various price levels in the figure.
Underlying’s Value
price at Bullish call spread Bearish put spread Box
maturity spread
X1 X2 Total X1 X2 Total
(ST)
Long (Short) (Short) Long
2970 0 0 0 30 100 70 70
2980 0 0 0 20 90 70 70
2990 0 0 0 10 80 70 70
3000 0 0 0 0 70 70 70
3010 10 0 10 0 60 60 70
3020 20 0 20 0 50 50 70
3030 30 0 30 0 40 40 70
3040 40 0 40 0 30 30 70
3050 50 0 50 0 20 20 70
3060 60 0 60 0 10 10 70
3070 70 0 70 0 0 0 70
3080 80 10 70 0 0 0 70
3090 90 20 70 0 0 0 70
3100 100 30 70 0 0 0 70
3110 110 40 70 0 0 0 70
Equity Options and Risk Management ● 27
From the data, it is clear that the combination of a bullish call spread and a
bearish call spread leads to the same value irrespective of the price underlying
asset takes. For this strategy, it is important to note that a trader should go
long in case the value of from the strategy (` 70 in the above-mentioned case)
is more that the initial cash outlay (` 15); otherwise, the trader should shorten
the box spread.
In all the profit strategies discussed, it is very important to note that it would
be safer to go with the European options (especially for combinational strategies),
as in the case of American options, the possibility of early exercise may distort
the expected profit pay-offs.
Table 2.1 Business Growth in Derivatives (F&O) Segment, April 2008 to March 2009 (in crores)
Total
Notional
Turnover of turnover of Share of index Share of index
Month turnover of
index futures derivatives futures options
index options
market
8-Apr 280100 133565 766431 37 17
8-May 267641 129067 797908 34 16
8-Jun 377939 308709 1084064 35 28
8-Jul 395380 357209 1160174 34 31
8-Aug 300449 312102 957445 31 33
8-Sep 380198 461623 1197872 32 39
8-Oct 324962 364510 941646 35 39
8-Nov 256950 292134 745356 34 39
8-Dec 269997 313615 829166 33 38
9-Jan 234141 309271 778118 30 40
9-Feb 205679 305599 712370 29 43
9-Mar 276677 444099 1039930 27 43
Source: www.nse-india.com
Figure 2.1 Relative volume of index options to index futures vis-a-vis total
volume of F & O segment during 2008-09: A paradigm shift
It would be appropriate to note here that the index derivatives (futures and
options) are primarily used for hedging the portfolios against the unfavourable
movement in the market, which may result in substantial reduction in the
value of the portfolio. Such financial innovations are predominantly used by
the fund managers, who are responsible for ensuring stable earnings to their
clients. The use of index derivatives as a hedging tool can be traced to the fact
that most of the funds are created using the concept of indexing. The concept
of indexing connotes benchmarking the portfolio to the best portfolio in the
market, which is the leading index of the economy. Therefore, the derivatives
on such indices are the natural choice for hedging risks that may reduce the
value of the portfolio.
30 ● Derivative Markets in India
In view of the change in the trading pattern of index futures and options
market, it would be appropriate to infer that the investors has shifted their
preferences to the index options for hedging their portfolios. Moreover, the
perceived change in the choice of hedging vehicle can be traced to the dramatic
change in the financial markets across the globe in terms of high volatility of
returns on account of devastative meltdown, which occurred as a result of
the sub-prime crisis. Therefore, it would be appropriate to say that the Indian
investors have shifted from index futures to index options in the wake of high
volatility in the market in view of the fact that the options provide far better
hedging mechanism compared with that of index futures. Major advantage
of hedging through options market (in addition to protection of the portfolio
from an unfavourable movement) is that it allows hedger to take the advantage
of a favourable movement as well.
3 C H A P T E R
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The options markets play a central role in an economy as they enhance better
allocation of capital in securities market by virtue of their functions to facilitate
risk hedging and price discovery. In today’s parlance, where the demand for
the structured finance (which requires excessive use of options contracts) is
booming in India, the role of such markets has acquired greater significance.
The ‘open interests’ in the options segment of Indian derivatives market has
even surpassed that of futures market for last few months since April, 2008.
This development has put the Indian derivatives market at equal footings with
the other international (developed) markets, where the options are preferred
to futures.
There could be two major reasons for such a development. First, increase in
the portfolio management services (PMS), which provide structured financial
products (using options market) to high profile investors. Secondly, an increase
in the variety of the products (in terms of maturity period) has taken place on
account of the introduction of long-dated options on 3rd March, 2008. These
options enable an investor to take a position up to 5 years.
Considering the increasing importance of the options market in India, it
is desired that the market should carry out its required functions in the best
possible way. For the purpose, it is imperative that the market should be
efficient. The reason is that well-functioning financial markets are vital to a
thriving economy, as these markets facilitate price discovery, risk hedging
and allocation of capital to its most productive uses. Inefficiency of a financial
market (e.g. options market in this study) indicates that it is not performing
the best possible job at above-mentioned important functions (Ackert and
Tian, 2000).
The present study attempts to assess the pricing efficiency of the index
options in India using both the spot prices of the underlying asset (i.e. the
daily closing value of the S&P CNX Nifty index) and the futures prices, which
32 ● Derivative Markets in India
are traded on the same underlying asset, the S&P CNX Nifty index. The use
of futures market has been proposed in view of the fact that (i) it helps, to a
marked extent, in ensuring the exploitability of arbitrage opportunities when
underlying asset is an index; (ii) the use of futures markets helps in doing
away with the short-selling constraint as a futures can easily be shorted and
(iii) it costs an investor less to exploit the arbitrage opportunities through
futures market because of the lower transaction costs attached to it and the
leverage they provide.
Notably, the use of futures prices on the same underlying asset instead of
spot prices essentially makes this approach a test of joint market efficiency, as
opined by Fung et al. (1997). At the same time, use of the futures prices facilitates
in assessing the degree of integration or pricing interrelationships between the
different derivative instruments being traded in the financial market (Lee and
Nayar, 1993). In other words, this approach helps in addressing the question
whether market participants consider important pricing interrelationships
while pricing the index options. The scope of the present study is confined to
the pricing interrelation between index options and index futures. In sum, the
use of futures market has been proposed in order to examine the role of futures
market in the absence of short-selling facility in the underlying’s cash market.
In other words, whether the futures market could work as an equally good
alternative to short-selling facility and, therefore, help in restoring equilibrium
in the options market even in the absence of short-selling facility.
The use of futures prices, however, puts one restriction on the otherwise
model-free approach, i.e. it assumes cost-of-carry model to hold. Therefore,
this approach cannot be designated as ‘model-free’ unlike the test of the
boundary condition using spot prices. However, the approach still remains
less restrictive compared with those based on certain pricing models, e.g.
Black and Scholes (1973), which assumes that the stock price and volatility
are governed by some stochastic processes.
In the chapter, the violations or mispricing signals observed from the test
procedures using spot values have been examined as per the specified levels
of liquidity and maturity of options. Also, the violations classified as per the
specified levels of maturity have further been sub-classified according to the
three specified levels of liquidity. The classification facilitates a meaningful
explanation to the exploitability of such violations and, therefore, is very crucial
in assessing the efficiency of the market. This has been done in view of the
fact that mere presence of violations does not indicate market inefficiency; it
is the unexploitability and persistence of such violations which pose serious
concerns/threats to the market efficiency.
Moreover, the learning behaviour of the investors in options markets has
also been examined. This has been done by analysing the number of violations
(from the test of LBCs using spot values) vis-à-vis the number of observations
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 33
analysed over the years under reference for both the call and put options. The
learning hypothesis, which requires that the number of violations should go
down over the years, has been proposed to gauge the developments related
to the efficiency of the market. The analysis of violations over the years under
reference is in line with Mittnik and Rieken (2000a), a study in the context of
German stock index options market.
The Section 3.2 of this chapter discusses lower boundary condition using
spot as well as futures prices on the same index that has been tested for options
contracts. The data have been discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents
analysis and results. The chapter ends with the concluding observations in
Section 3.5.
– r (T – t ) – d (T – t )
ept
= [{( Ke –e It ) – TTCt } – pt ] (3.6)
c p
In the above equations, e t and e t are the absolute amount of abnormal
profits (ex-post) or mispricing signals from call and put options, respectively,
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 35
a lower price, e.g. ` 6150, abandon the option to purchase the underlying asset
at ` 6200, and purchase it directly from the spot market.
From the above, it is clear that, in any case, maximum amount required to square
off the short position is ` 6,200. Since you received ` 6,217.26 from your initial
investment, you end up generating a profit of ` 17.26 (` 6,217.26 − 6,200).
And, on the whole contract (which includes 50 Nifty), you will end up with
the profit of ` 863.
Step 5: Pay off the borrowed sum along with the accrued interest for the period.
The amount payable is ` 6183.45 (` 6163.15 ¥ e(0.075 ¥ 16/365)).
From the above, it is clear that, in any case, you will realize ` 6,200 or more by
selling the underlying asset (squaring off your long position); whereas, amount
needed to pay off the borrowed sum is ` 6183.45. As a result, you will make
a profit of ` 16.55 (` 6,200 – ` 6183.45). And, on the whole contract (which
includes 50 Nifty),; you will book a profit to the tune of ` 827.50.
Note: In the case of index derivatives, it is important to note that final
settlement takes place in terms of cash, as physical settlement (delivery of
the underlying asset) is not possible. The cash settlement is entailed in view
of the nature of underlying asset, i.e. index, and the whole index cannot be
delivered. Therefore, the price differences are settled instead of delivery/receipt
of the underlying. For example, holder of a call option exercises his option
when value of the underlying index is ` 6,300; he will get a difference of ` 100
in case the strike price was ` 6,200. Similarly, in the case of put option with
the same characteristics, the holder will receive a sum of ` 50 on exercising
his option in case the value of underlying index turns out ` 6150.
due to the fact that the futures prices (in an efficient market) are expected to
have impounded the effect of dividends on the prices of the underlying asset.
3.2.2.1 Testable form of the lower boundary condition
using futures prices
The Eqs (3.7) and (3.8) have been rearranged in order to make them testable
to gauge the efficiency of the options market. The testable form, to gauge the
EMH using lower boundary condition, is given in the Eqs (3.9) and (3.10) for
call and put option, respectively.
– r (T – t )
e tc = [{( e ( Ft – K )) – TTCt* } – ct ] (3.9)
– r (T – t )
e tp = [{( e ( K – Ft )) – TTCt* } – pt ] (3.10)
c p
In the above equations, e t and e t denote the absolute amount of abnormal
profits (ex-post) or mispricing signals from call and put options, respectively,
if the violation of lower boundary condition occurs. A violation of the lower
boundary condition is recorded if e tc > 0 and e tp > 0 for call and put options,
respectively. Though the presence of such profits is indicative of market
inefficiency, it should not be treated as a conclusive remark on the efficiency
of the market.
It may be noted that all equations relating to test of LBCs using spot as well
as futures prices have been specified considering the transaction costs but
assuming zero or negligible bid-ask spread. In view of this, there is always
a chance that the arbitrage opportunities suggested by these equations may
disappear in the presence of the bid-ask spread, especially, for the options
traded relatively less frequently. Therefore, due consideration has been given
to the bid-ask spreads while interpreting the violations to draw inferences
regarding the market efficiency. The details on the transaction costs included in
the analysis have been summarized in the data section. On the contrary, given
the fact that the bid-ask spread for options is not included in the transaction
database provided by NSE and the difficulty to estimate such costs, it has
been excluded in the above equations. In operational terms, our study is in
line with that of Halpern and Turnbull (1985).
In this regard, commenting upon the exploitability of observed mispricing
signals, Trippi (1977) and Chiras and Manaster (1977) concluded that the
signals so observed were exploitable using a specified trading strategy to
ensure ex-ante exploitation of such profit opportunities. However, in the
present study, no strategy has been executed to ensure ex-ante exploitability
of abnormal profits suggested by mispricing signals, as the test procedure
applied is ex-post in nature.
at ` 6310. Examine the arbitrage opportunity, if any. Determine the profit which
can be generated by exploiting this opportunity.
Solution As mentioned in the discussion on LBC using futures prices, the
minimum price of a call option contract at any given point in time should be
ct ≥ max [{e–r(T – t) (Ft – K) – TTCt*}, 0]
Therefore, the minimum price for the above-mentioned call option should be
= Max [{e− (0.075 ¥ 16/365) ¥ (` 6310 − ` 6200)
– (0.0005 ¥ (6200 + 90 + 6310))}, 0] = ` 103.34*
Since the price quoted in market (` 90) is lower than that suggested by
the boundary condition, it indicates an arbitrage opportunity. In case such
an opportunity appears in the market, the following steps need to be taken to
ensure arbitrage gains.
Steps required now (on Spot):
Step 1: Buy the call option at the current market price as it is undervalued.
Step 2: Short (sell) the future contract at current market price.
Step 3: Borrow ` 96.30 (` 90Call premium + ` 6.30Transaction cost ) at risk-free rate
for the remaining time to maturity.
Steps required at maturity: At maturity, price of the underlying asset will
follow one of the following three scenarios: (i) less than the strike price of the
option contract, (ii) more than the strike price but less than or equal to future
price (Ft) and (iii) more than futures price (Ft).
Scenario 1: Less than the strike price of call option contract, i.e. price of the
underlying index turns out to be less than ` 6,200. For example, at maturity,
the index is traded at ` 6150.
Step 4: You will not exercise the call option as market price of the asset is less
than strike price (` 6200) of the contract.
Step 5: You will make a gain of ` 160 (` 6310 − ` 6150) on short position in
futures. Since you entered into a futures contract to sell the underlying asset
at ` 6310 on the maturity of the contract irrespective of price of the underlying
asset in spot market at maturity and as the current market price in the spot
market turns out to be ` 6150, you will make a gain as you will be able to sell
the asset at ` 6310.
Scenario 2: More than the strike price of call option contract but less than or
equal to the price of the futures contract. For example, at maturity, the index
is traded at ` 6250.
Step 4: You will exercise the call option, as the price of the asset is more than
the strike price (` 6200) of the contract. And, you will gain ` 50 on exercising
*
It may be noted that the margin needed to take a position in futures market and cost thereof
have been ignored in determining minimum price of the option contract in order to avoid further
complexity.
40 ● Derivative Markets in India
the call option, as you have the right to purchase the asset at ` 6200, which is
currently traded at ` 6250.
Step 5: Similarly, you will make a gain of ` 60 on the short position in
futures.
In sum, you will make a total gain of ` 110 from your portfolio (long in call and
short in futures). Further, it may be noted that this portfolio will generate ` 110,
in case price of the underlying asset ranges between ` 6200 and ` 6310.
Scenario 3: More than the price of the futures contract. For example, at
maturity, the index is traded at ` 6400.
Step 4: You will exercise the call option as the price of the asset is more than
the strike price (` 6200) of the contract. And, you will gain ` 200 on exercising
the call option.
Step 5: However, you will lose ` 90 on the short position in futures.
In sum, you will make a total gain of ` 110 from your portfolio (long in call
and short in futures). It is important to note that this portfolio will generate a
profit of ` 110, in case price of the underlying asset turns out to be more than
` 6310.
Finally, from all the three possible scenarios for the price of the underlying asset,
it is evident that an arbitrageur will always earn ` 110 or more.
Step 6: You need to pay off the borrowed sum along with the accrued interest,
i.e. ` 96.62 (` 96.30 ¥ e (0.075 ¥ 16/365)).
From the above, it is clear that although, in any case, you earn ` 110 or more,
you require ` 96.62 to pay off your borrowings. In other words, you make a
minimum profit of ` 13.38 (` 110 − ` 96.62). And, on the whole contract (which
includes 50 Nifty); you will end up with the profit of ` 669.
In sum, you will make a total gain of ` 140 from your portfolio.
Finally, from all the three possible scenarios for the price of the underlying asset,
it is evident that an arbitrageur will always earn ` 90 or more.
Step 6: You need to pay back the borrowed sum (along with the accrued interest),
i.e. ` 76.45 (` 76.20 ¥ e (0.075 ¥ 16/365)).
From the above, it is clear that, in any case, you will earn ` 90 or more; whereas,
you require ` 76.45 to pay off your borrowings. In other words, you will make a
minimum profit of ` 13.55 (` 90 – ` 76.45). And, on the whole contract (which
includes 50 Nifty), you will end up with a profit of ` 677.50.
Note: While assessing options market using futures market, it is assumed
that futures market is efficient. That is, it will converge to spot price at the
maturity of the contract.
r = ln (1 + r*) (3.11)
Where, r is the proxy for continuously compounded annual risk-free rate
of return and r* is the average annual yield on 91-days T-bill of the maturity
corresponding to the maturity date of the options contact.
The data for all the four mentioned categories have been collected from
June 4, 2001 (starting date for index options in Indian securities market), to
June 30, 2007. The first, second and third data sets have been collected from
the website of NSE, and the fourth category of data set has been collected
from website of RBI.
be reasonable to consider the opportunity cost for the brokerage house, and
a logical estimate could be the cost incurred by the institutional investors, i.e.
0.03% in the case of F&O segment, as pointed out by Vipul (2008). Moreover,
with respect to the transaction costs pertaining to spot market transactions for
the trading member organizations, an estimate of 0.15% (excluding STT) of
the traded value has been arrived at, based on the interaction with different
trading member organizations based at Delhi and as suggested by Vipul
(2008). Based on these estimates, the violations have been calculated using
the transaction costs applicable to the trading member organization, given
their least cost structure.
Besides, the STT charge of 0.01% (on the sell side of the transactions in
F&O segment) has also been included in the transaction costs. Likewise, the
STT charge of 0.125% has been considered for the spot market transaction,
notably, for both legs of the transaction. Since the STT was introduced in
October, 2004, it has been considered as part of the transaction costs for the
arbitrage opportunities that occurred after 1st October, 2004. In sum, for the
analysis purpose, the major constituents of the transaction costs have been the
brokerage and the service tax on it before October, 2004; and it additionally
includes STT October 1, 2004, onwards. The definition of the transaction costs
have been confined to the brokerage and STT (wherever applicable) as these
constitute, in general, more than 90% of the transaction costs (excluding bid-
ask spread). Though the analysis has been conducted ignoring the bid-ask
spread and opportunity cost of the margin deposits, these have been given
due consideration while ensuring the exploitability of mispricing signal. This
has been done in view of the fact that bid-ask spread, in particular, plays a
very important role in assessing the options market efficiency, as opined by
Baesel et al. (1983) and Phillips and Smith (1980).
the case of moderately traded options, the third quartile seems to offers
relatively attractive profits (more than ` 462 and 533 for call and put options,
respectively), and in the presence of bid-ask spread are quite likely to be
exploited. In sum, nearly 3% (25% of 12.76%) of the violations for the call
options seems to be exploitable by trading member organizations. Likewise,
a relatively lower proportion of violations, i.e. less than 2% (25% of 7.50%),
can be designated as exploitable in the case of put options.
In another significant observation, the frequency of violations across
different levels of maturity signifies a decreasing trend with an increase in
time to maturity when the first two levels (0–7 and 8–30 day to maturity)
are clubbed together. The results are reported in Table 3.3. In addition, a
majority of the mispricing signals are confined to the options having 0–7
and 8–30 days to maturity—approximately 83% in call options and 91% in
put options. However, for the next two levels, i.e. 31–60 and 61–90 days to
maturity, the combined percentage is merely 17% and 9% for call and put
options, respectively. The concentration of the violations in the 0–30 days to
maturity category and, especially, in 0–7 days to maturity is similar to that
reported by Bhattacharya (1983), a study in the context of US market where
42% of the total violations had one week or less to maturity.
The concentration of violations in 0–7 days to maturity category (especially
in the case of put options) can be attributed to the fact that most of the
arbitrageurs, in general, try to unwind their arbitrage positions when the
options are nearing maturity. On account of this, the liquidity in such options
is expected to be very thin, as there are only a few or no buyers. This, in turn,
causes the transaction costs, especially the bid-ask spread, to be considerably
high. Therefore, the lack of liquidity and less time to maturity might be cited
as the major reasons for the observed mispricing signal remaining unexploited.
This is eloquently borne out by the fact that the majority of violations in this
category (viz. 87% in the case of call options and 91% in the case of put options)
belong to the thinly traded options category and, therefore, may safely be
designated as unexploitable.
Moreover, if we look at the violations in this category, which had high
traded volume, offer very low profit opportunities as the third quartile start
with profits as low as ` 147 in the case of call options; however, the figure is
relatively attractive, ` 423, in the case of put options but with the very low
frequency. Likewise, the third quartile of such violation having moderately
traded volume offers possibly exploitable opportunities in the light of bid-
ask spread.
The behavior of violations pertaining to the 8–30 days to maturity category
is quite similar to that of 0–7 days to maturity category, as the violations
belonging to the highly liquid category are nearly 3% in the case of call
options and less than 1% in the cases of put options (of the total violations
Table 3.3 Maturity-wise Descriptive Statistics for Violations of the Put-call Parity Condition for Under-priced
and Over-priced Put options in Indian Securities Market, June 2001–07
Call options Put options
Number of Magnitude of violations (`) Number of Magnitude of violations (`)
Days to Liquidity
maturity violations violations
(Percentage) Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3 (Percentage) Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3
Thinly 617 359
1569 3173 169 437 1326 1222 2542 144 374 1217
traded (87.39) (91.35)
Moderately 66 29
232 277 50 118 321 1491 3847 56 236 562
0–7 traded (9.35) (7.38)
Days Highly 23 5
136 165 50 89 147 341 185 249 281 423
traded (3.26) (1.27)
706 393
Overall 1397 3002 139 369 1143 1231 2640 135 372 1164
(24.41) (55.59)
Thinly 1448 234
990 2117 137 390 815 1632 3579 154 453 1394
traded (86.14) (93.60)
Moderately 177 14
345 348 96 259 462 710 1530 122 256 368
8–30 traded (10.53) (5.60)
Days Highly 56 2
262 259 95 208 336 343 361 87 343 598
traded (3.33) (0.80)
1681 250
Overall 898 1982 131 356 731 1570 3488 151 425 1335
(58.13) (35.36)
Thinly 415 55
1119 2962 193 443 888 1175 2611 151 350 1285
traded (89.83) (94.83)
Moderately 35 3
524 736 138 300 656 421 412 194 317 596
31–60 traded (7.57) (5.17)
Days Highly 12
559 421 257 518 749 Zero NA NA NA NA NA
traded (2.60)
462 58
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options
Overall 1059 2821 189 440 853 1136 2548 146 349 1265
(15.98) (8.20)
●
49
50
●
Table 3.4 Summary of the One-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov Statistics to Assess the Normality
Options Call options Put options
Number of observations 2892 707
Mean 1057.85 1351.98
Normal parameters (a), (b)
Std. deviation 2426.71 2965.31
Absolute 0.33 0.32
Most extreme differences Positive 0.30 0.28
Negative −0.33 −0.32
Kolmogorov–Smirnov Z 17.83 8.62
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
(a) Test distribution is normal; (b) Calculated from data.
Since the results depict severe departure from the normality (revealed by
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov, KS, statistics), ANOVA cannot be applied, as it
requires data to follow the normal distribution. Therefore, the differences
have been analysed using a non-parametric statistics that does not require
the data to follow any specified distribution. The test statistics applied in the
present study is Kruskal–Wallis (H-statistics) test, which is a non-parametric
substitute for the one-way ANOVA. In addition, Dunn’s multiple comparison
test has been used for post hoc analysis of all possible pairs in the analysis. The
results of H-statistics and Dunn’s test for the differences across the specified
levels of liquidity are summarized in Tables 3.5 (a) and (b), respectively.
Table 3.5(a) Kruskal–Wallis (H-statistics) Test for the Differences in Means (Magnitude) of
Violations across the Specified Levels of Liquidity for Call and Put Options,
June 2001–07
Call options Put options
Test statistics
Liquidity Rank Rank Test statistics (a), (b)
(a), (b)
Mean Chi- Mean Chi-
N df Sig. N df Sig.
rank square rank square
Thinly
2523 1502.72 654 359.20
traded
Moderately
278 1096.80 91.568 2 0.000 46 288.07 5.688 2 0.058
traded
Highly
91 956.24 7 301.14
traded
(a) Kruskal–Wallis Test (b) Grouping variable—liquidity.
The significance value given in Table 3.5 (a) clearly indicate that the
difference among the specified levels of liquidity is significant at even 1% level
of significance for call options; however, the difference could not be supported
statistically in the case of put options at 5% level of significance.
As a result of significant results of H-statistics in case of call options, the post
hoc diagnosis, i.e. Dunn’s multiple comparison test, has been carried out to find
the pair-wise differences. Notably, the post hoc analysis has not been applied in
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 53
case of put options as the differences amongst the specified levels of liquidity
were not found to be significant at the first stage itself, i.e. the Kruskal–Wallis
test. The results of the post hoc analysis in the case of call options summarized
in Table 3.5 (b) signify that average magnitude of violations for the thinly
traded options is significantly different from that for the moderately traded,
as well as highly traded options. However, average magnitude of moderately
traded options is not significantly different from that of highly traded options
at 5% level of significance.
Table 3.5(b) Dunn’s Test for the Multiple Comparisons amongst the Specified Levels of
Liquidity for the Call Options, June 2001–07
Call Options
Dunn’s multiple
Difference in Significant Summary
comparison test
rank sum (P < 0.05)
Thinly traded
vs. 405.9 – Yes
Moderately traded
Thinly traded
vs. 546.5 – Yes
Highly traded
Moderately traded vs.
140.6 Not significant No
Highly traded
In this respect, the results (summarized in Table 3.6 and Fig. 3.1) indicate
that the percentage of violations in call options has shown a decreasing trend in
the first year (from 12% to nearly 8%). However, it remained almost persistent
for next four years as the percentage of violations kept on hovering around 8%
and showed a declining trend in the last year, as the percentage of violations
reduced to nearly 4% of the total observations analysed for the year. That is,
the violations pertaining to the call options have shown an improvement in the
first year of trading; however, no significant improvement could be recorded
during the next four years of the trading. Notwithstanding the persistence in
the percentage of violations, the last year under reference, i.e. 2006–07, has
shown considerable improvement in the state of market efficiency.
Table 3.6 Year-wise Frequencies of the Violations of LBC for Call and
Put Options, June 2001–07
Call options Put options
Year No. of No. of No. of No. of
Percentage Percentage
observations violations observations violations
(%) (%)
analysed observed analysed observed
2001-02 3496 422 12.07 2557 114 4.46
2002-03 3898 301 7.72 3376 151 4.47
2003-04 7173 455 6.34 6189 228 3.68
2004-05 7010 629 8.97 6702 61 0.91
2005-06 9323 735 7.88 7931 92 1.16
2006-07 9398 350 3.72 8416 61 0.72
Total 40298 2892 7.18 35171 707 2.01
14.00%
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
In contrast, the percentage of violations over the years has shown a clearly
declining trend in the case of put options except for the first two years
of trading, where the percentage of violations remained nearly at the same
level (as is evident in Table 3.6 and Fig. 3.2). The third year of trading
showed a modest learning effect amongst the investors, as the percentage of
violations registered a decline of less than 1%. However, it may be noted that
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 55
5.00%
4.50%
4.00%
3.50%
3.00%
2.50%
2.00%
1.50%
1.00%
0.50%
0.00%
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
2001–02
1
Highly traded 67 NA NA NA NA Zero NA NA NA NA NA
(0.24)
422 114
Overall 381 466 108 264 497 424 690 62 144 394
[14.5.0] [16.12]
264 143
Thinly traded 337 469 81 213 442 351 475 62 212 396
(87.71) (94.70)
32 7
Moderately traded 145 125 61 78 224 131 115 32 105 244
(10.63) (4.64)
2002–03
5 1
Highly traded 225 123 163 243 335 87 NA NA NA NA
(1.66) (0.66)
301 151
Overall 314 445 73 1.92 419 33.9 466 61 211 372
[10.41] [21.36]
422 201
Thinly traded 928 1978 130 333 822 1410 2053 218 562 1467
(92.75) (88.16)
27 24
Moderately traded 188 252 52 102 191 466 823 103 278 452
(5.93) (10.53)
2003–04
6 3
Highly traded 60 42 35 40 104 334 252 192 249 433
(1.32) (1.32)
455 228
Overall 874 1916 121 309 768 1294 1970 1970 514 1273
[15.73] [32.25]
Call options Put options
Years Liquidity Number of Magnitude of violations (INR) Number of Magnitude of violations (INR)
violations Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3 violatious Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3
505 60
Thinly traded 974 1515 149 374 1054 1013 1294 162 441 1302
(80.29) (98.36)
76
Moderately traded 381 263 161 378 542 Zero NA NA NA NA NA
(12.08)
2004–05
48 1
Highly traded 266 327 74 140 328 598 NA NA NA NA
(7.63) (1.64)
629 61
Overall 848 1387 137 344 839 1006 1284 166 443 1301
[ 21.75] [8.63]
637 86
Thinly traded 1436 2551 230 565 1324 3827 6314 535 1327 3541
(86.67) (93.48)
82 5
Moderately traded 473 599 105 323 629 243 325 85 87 217
(11.16) (5.43)
2005–06
16 1
Highly traded 259 242 95 148 398 423 NA NA NA NA
(2.18) (1.09)
735 92
Overall 1303 2408 202 532 1190 3595 6166 402 1271 3457
[25.41] 113.01]
308 53
Thinly traded 2912 5173 421 925 2761 2404 3102 445 1373 2769
(88,00) (86.89)
27 7
Moderately traded 449 431 180 317 545 5847 6535 1139 2171 10089
(7.71) (11.48)
2006–07
15 1
Highly traded 404 280 227 337 612 281 NA NA NA NA
(4.29) (1.64)
350 61
Overall 2615 4920 323 770 2221 2764 3733 490 1404 3047
[12.10] 18.631
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options
2. In the table, S.D., Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote standard deviation, first quartile, second quartile (i.e., median) and third quartile, respectively.
57
58 ● Derivative Markets in India
Table 3.2) that can be designated as exploitable; all the remaining violations
might have remained unexploited due to the lack of liquidity. Our finding
that the LBC for call options is violated more frequently compared with put
options is similar with one documented by Puttonen (1993), a study done in
the Finnish index options market.
In this respect, explaining the higher frequency of violations in case of
call options, Mittnik and Rieken (2000a) opined that selling the asset short,
particularly when the asset is an index, becomes very difficult. Notably, the
strategy needed to exploit the arbitrage on account of the violations of LBC
in case of call options requires shorting of the underlying asset unlike that in
case of put options, which requires a long position in the underlying asset. In
view of this, the comparatively higher frequency of violations in the case of
call options can be reasonably attributed to the short-selling constraint in the
Indian securities market for the period under reference.
Table 3.8 Violations of the LBC Using Spot Values and Futures
Prices, June 2001–07: A Comparison
Using spot values Using futures prices
Particulars Call Put Call Put
options options options options
Total number of observation analysed 40,298 35,171 40,298 35,171
Total number of violations observed 7019 1544 3593 1815
before transaction costs (17.42) (4.39) (8.49) (5.16)
Total number of violations observed 2892 707 2838 1492
after transaction costs (7.18) (2.01) (7.04) (4.24)
Figures in parentheses denote percentages.
Moreover, it may be noted that use of futures market has shown a negligible
improvement in the call options market as the number of violations has slightly
decreased from 2892 to 2838; however, the put options market has registered
a counterintuitive increase in the number of violation from 707 to 1492. The
reason behind the decrease (increase) in the number of violation for the call
(put) options could be the underpricing of futures contracts. Moreover, another
reason for the increase in the number of violations in the case of put options
could be the comparatively lower transaction costs in F&O segment. However,
there should have been an increase in the case of call options as well to assign
lower transaction costs as a major reason. Notably, there has been a negligible
decline in the case of call options, and therefore, the lower transaction costs
cannot be assigned as the sole reason behind this development.
The picture becomes clearer when we identify the violations without
considering any transaction cost for both the strategies, i.e. using the spot
market and futures market for identifying the violations of LBCs (as reported
in Table 3.8). The results demonstrate that the use of futures market has caused
a decrease (increase) in the frequency of violations pertaining to call (put)
options compared with those using spot market. In view of this, it would be
reasonable to conclude that the above-mentioned development in the state
of options market efficiency can be designated to the underpricing of futures
market. This may further be traced to the fact that as far as the correction
of underpricing of the futures market is concerned, the short-selling of the
stock basket is needed to exploit such arbitrage opportunities and to restore
equilibrium in the futures market. In short, the underpricing of the futures
can, therefore, be attributed to the fact that short-selling have been banned
during the period under reference in Indian securities market.
In sum, it may be concluded that the futures market has failed to provide an
equally good substitute for shorting the assets in the absence of short-selling
facility in the Indian securities market during the period under reference.
Thus, the futures market could not succeed in restoring equilibrium in the
options market.
Testing Lower Boundary Conditions for the S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 61
market has shown an increase in the number of violations for such an arbitrage
strategy. Such a development can be traced to the fact that the futures
themselves remained underpriced in the absence of short-selling facility in the
market and, therefore, registered a negligible decrease in the case of call options
and an increase for the put options market. In sum, it may be reasonable to
infer that the futures market failed to restore equilibrium in options market
in the absence of short-selling facility in Indian securities market for the time
period under reference.
Therefore, in short, it is reasonable to conclude that majority of violations
in call options could not be exploited on account of the existing market-
microstructure in India during the period under reference (i.e. short-selling
constraint that caused underpricing in futures to persist). Besides, the dearth
of liquidity in the options market appears to be another major constraint to
arbitrageurs, in case of call as well as put options market, in view of the fact
that a vast majority of violations occurred in the thinly traded category.
END NOTES
1. Nonsynchonous trading refers to the phenomenon of different timings
of closing transactions in the two markets (the options market and the
underlying’s cash market in this case).
2. In the study, the liquid options quotations have been defined as those
quotations that have at least one contract traded. Though the definition
of liquid contracts is not useful in ensuring exploitability of arbitrage
opportunities on account of the high bid-ask spread for such options, this
has been done to gauge the total number of violations in Indian options
market. Moreover, while ensuring the exploitability of the arbitrage
opportunities, due consideration has been given to the liquidity.
4 C H A P T E R
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Efficiency of the options markets is of great importance to the academicians
as well as practitioners. Well-functioning financial markets are vital to a
thriving economy, as these markets facilitate price discovery, risk hedging and
allocation of capital to its most productive usage. Inefficiency of a financial
market (e.g. options market) indicates that it is not performing the best possible
job at above-mentioned important functions (Ackert and Tian, 2000). Therefore,
it is imperative to test the state of options market efficiency, especially when
the market is in its nascent stage of development.
In view of this, this chapter attempts to investigate the market efficiency
of the Indian index options market by testing the Put–Call Parity (PCP)
relationship on daily closing observations of call and put options. The PCP
relationship in line with the lower Boundary conditions (LBCs) is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the efficiency of the options market. However,
it is a more rigorous condition on options market efficiency compared with the
LBCs approach, as it requires the relationship between call and put options to
hold. The efficiency of the market, in this respect, connotes pricing efficiency.
The PCP for the option prices (as specified in the literature) has been used
extensively as a tool to gauge the efficiency of options market across the globe.
The violation of PCP implies that the call (put) options are not priced correctly
in relation to the corresponding put (call) options and, therefore, indicates
the arbitrage opportunities in the market that are expected to be absent in an
efficient market.
Moreover, the futures market on the same underlying asset (S&P CNX Nifty
Index) has also been used to test the PCP relationship, i.e. Put-Call-Futures
Parity (PCFP). This has been done in view of the fact that (i) the futures
market is a better alternative in exploiting the arbitrage opportunities when
underlying asset is an index; (ii) it is generally argued that the futures market
helps in doing away with the short-selling constraint as a futures can easily be
64 ● Derivative Markets in India
shorted; and (iii) it costs an investor less to exploit the arbitrage opportunities
through futures market because of the lower transaction costs associated with
it and the leverage it provides. In sum, the futures market becomes a more
convenient and profitable route in the case of index options to exploit the
arbitrage opportunities.
Notably, the use of futures prices on the same underlying asset instead of
spot prices essentially makes this approach a test of joint market efficiency,
as opined by Fung et al. (1997). At the same time, use of the futures prices
facilitates in assessing the degree of pricing interrelationships between the
different derivative instruments/markets traded in the financial market
(Lee and Nayar, 1993). In other words, this approach helps in addressing
the question whether market participants consider important pricing
interrelationships while pricing the index options. The scope of the present
study has been confined to the pricing interrelationship between index options
and index futures.
In sum, the very purpose of using futures market has been to examine its
role in the absence of short-selling facility in underlying’s market. In other
words, whether the futures market could work as an equally good alternative
to short-selling facility and, therefore, help in restoring equilibrium in the
options market even in the absence of short-selling facility.
The use of futures market imposes one restriction on the otherwise model-
free approach as it assumes ‘cost-of-carry’ model to hold. Therefore, it would
not be appropriate to call this approach as a ‘model-free’ approach unlike the
test procedure which uses spot values. However, the approach still remains
less restrictive compared with those based on certain pricing models, e.g.
Black and Scholes (1973), which assumes that the stock price and volatility
are governed by some stochastic processes.
The method applied to test the efficiency of the options market is in line
with other studies conducted in different markets for the same purpose. The
test procedure has taken care of the dividends expected from the underlying
asset during the life of the options. Moreover, the transaction costs (excluding
bid-ask spread) have been incorporated while identifying the violations of PCP
relationship. Though the analysis has been conducted ignoring the bid-ask
spread, the results have been interpreted cautiously. This has been considered
in view of the fact that the bid-ask spread plays a very important role in
assessing the options market efficiency as it results in significant transactions
costs (Baesel et al.,1983; Phillips and Smith, 1980).
The violations or mispricing signals observed from the test procedures have
further been classified as per the specified levels of ‘liquidity’ and ‘time to
maturity’ in order to draw some meaningful results from such violations. The
classification so made facilitates a logical explanation to the exploitability of
such violation, which is very crucial in assessing the efficiency of the market.
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 65
This has been done in view of the fact that mere presence of violations does
not indicate market inefficiency; it is the exploitability and persistence of such
violations that pose serious threat to the market efficiency.
Besides, the learning behaviour of the investors in options markets has also
been examined. This has been done by analysing the number of violations
vis-à-vis the number of observations analysed across the subsequent years,
for both the call and put options. The learning hypothesis warrants that the
number of violations should go down over the years. This has been proposed
with intent to gauge the desired improvements in the understanding of the
options market amongst market participants.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four main sections. The Section 4.2
of this chapter discusses PCP relationship using spot as well as futures prices
on the same index. The data has been summarized in Section 4.3. Section 4.4
presents analysis and empirical results. The chapter ends with the concluding
observations in Section 4.5.
the globe. The model-free approach of this efficiency test, i.e. no dependence
on any particular options pricing model (which makes certain assumptions
about the movement of the underlying asset and volatility during the life of
the options, e.g. Black–Scholes model), makes it of particular importance to
assess the efficiency of options markets. Some of the studies that have used
this test to assess the efficiency of different options markets are Stoll (1969),
Merton (1973), Gould and Galai (1974), Klemkosky and Resnick (1979), Goh
and Allen (1984), Evine and Rudd (1985), Bodurtha and Courtdon (1986), Gray
(1989), Taylor (1990), Frankfurter and Leung (1991), Wilson and Fung (1991),
Finucane (1991), Brown and Easton (1992), Nisbet (1992), Marchand et al. (1994),
Sternberg (1994), Easton (1994), Kamara and Miller Jr. (1995), Wagner et al.
(1996), Berg et al. (1996), Broughton et al. (1998), Mittnik and Rieken (2000b),
Cavallo and Mammola (2000) , Li (2006), Zhang and Lai (2006).
Likewise, a few studies have used put-call-futures relationship (which is
the test of PCP relationship using futures prices on the same underlying asset
instead of spot market values) to examine the options market efficiency and
the degree of pricing interrelationship between the two markets. The leading
study in this respect, Lee and Nayar (1993), for the very first time proposed
this relationship and tested it in the context SPX options and S&P 500 futures
traded on Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME) of USA. Other studies that used this framework to assess
options market efficiency include Fung and Fung (1997), Fung and Mok (2001),
Draper and Fung (2002), Vipul (2008), etc.
is not expected to pay any dividends during the life of the option. However,
the assumption of payout protection is violated quite frequently as almost
all the financial assets pay dividends. Equation (4.1) needs to be modified by
incorporating the effect of dividends. Empirically, the treatment of dividends
in the test varies based on the assumption made about the payment of
dividends. In this respect, Klemkosky and Resnick (1979), for the very first
time, incorporated effect of absolute amount of dividends to modify the parity
relationship.
A number of studies in literature have used discrete amount of dividends
to gauge the effect of dividends on the parity relationship. However, in the
present chapter, since the underlying asset is a stock index (S&P CNX Nifty
index), which is based on 50 stocks, the dividend yield has been used to
incorporate the effect of dividends on the parity relationship following Fung
and Fung (1997) and Li (2006). This has been done in view of the fact that
incorporation of discrete dividends becomes difficult when the underlying
asset is a stock index. Also, a stock index can be treated as a financial asset
that generates a continuous stream of dividends (Guo and Su, 2006). The PCP
relationship for the S&P CNX Nifty index options, assuming that the index
is paying continuously compounded annual dividend yield (d), is given in
the Eq. (4.2).
Ct = [Pt + (– e– d (T – t) It – e– r (T – t) K) ± TTCt] (4.2)
The testable form of the Eq. (4.2), which constitutes the basis of the present
study in assessing the efficiency of the options market in India, is given in the
next sub-section.
In the above equations, e tOverpriced and e tUnderpriced are the absolute amount
of abnormal profits (ex-post) or mispricing signals, if the violation of PCP
takes place. A violation of PCP is recorded if e tOverpriced > 0 or e tUnderpriced > 0.
Though the presence of such profits is merely indicative of market inefficiency,
it should not be treated as a conclusive remark on the efficiency of the market,
as their exploitability needs to be examined to draw correct inferences about
the market efficiency.
68 ● Derivative Markets in India
1
It is important to note that the transaction costs related to spot market as well as dividend yield
have been ignored in determining the relative price of the put option in order to avoid further
complexity.
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 69
TTCt is the Total transaction costs (i.e. transaction costs relating to trading in
options and futures contracts) at time t. Besides, all other variables are the
same as in Eq. (4.1).
With respect to the treatment of dividends, it may be noted that the futures
prices (in an efficient market) are expected to have impounded the effect of
dividends expected to be distributed during the life of the contract. And, it is
for this reason that the dividends expected from the underlying asset during
the life of the option have not been included as the underlying asset used in
the test is futures prices/values of the index instead of the spot values.
In the above equations, e tOverpriced and e tUnderpriced are the absolute amount
of abnormal profits (ex-post) or mispricing signals, if the violation of PCP takes
place. A violation of PCP is recorded if e tOverpriced > 0 or e tUnderpriced > 0.
It may be noted that all equations relating to test of PCP using spot as well
as futures prices have been specified considering the transaction costs, but
assuming zero or negligible bid-ask spread. In view of this, there is always
a chance that the arbitrage opportunities suggested by these equations may
disappear in the presence of the bid-ask spread, especially for the options
traded relatively less frequently. Therefore, due consideration has been given
to the bid-ask spreads while interpreting the violations to draw inferences
regarding the market efficiency. The details on the transaction costs included in
the analysis have been summarized in the data section. On the contrary, given
the fact that the bid-ask spread for options is not included in the transaction
database provided by NSE and the difficulty to estimate such costs, it has
been excluded in the above equations. In operational terms, our study is in
line with that of Halpern and Turnbull (1985).
In sum, you will incur a loss of ` 130 (` 180 − ` 50), in case price turns out
to be less than the strike price of options contract.
Scenario 2: More than the strike price of call option contract but less than
or equal to futures price. For example, at maturity, the index is traded at
` 6250.
Step 4: The call option will be exercised against you as the price is more than
strike price (` 6200) of the contract. As a result, you will incur a loss of ` 50. On
the other hand, you will not exercise put option given the market conditions.
Step 5: Similarly, you will incur a loss of ` 80 on the long position in futures.
In sum, you will incur a loss of ` 130 from you position in options and
futures markets.
Scenario 3: More than the price of futures contract (the price at which
we purchased the futures). For example, at maturity, the index is traded at
` 6400.
Step 4: The call option will be exercised against you as the price more than strike
price (` 6200) of the contract, and you will incur a loss of ` 200. On the other
hand, you will not exercise put option given the market conditions.
Step 5: However, you will gain ` 70 on the long position in futures.
In sum, you will incur a loss of ` 130.
Thus, from all the three possible scenarios for the price of underlying asset,
it is evident that you will end up with the loss of ` 130.
Step 6: Liquidate your investment, and you will have ` 141.44 (` 140.54 ¥ e
(0.075 ¥ 31/365)
).
From the above, it is clear that, in any case, you incur a loss of ` 130; at the
same time, you will receive ` 141.44 from your initial investment. In other words,
you make a profit of ` 11.44 (` 141.44 − ` 130). Thus, on the whole contract
(which includes 50 Nifty), you will end up with the profit of ` 572.
On the other hand, the put option will not be exercised against you given the
market conditions.
Step 5: Similarly, you will make a profit of ` 80 on the short position in
futures.
In sum, you will make a profit of ` 130 from you position in options and
futures markets.
Scenario 3: More than the price of futures contract. For example, at maturity,
the index is traded at ` 6400.
Step 4: You will exercise the call option as the price of the asset is more than
the strike price (` 6200) of the contract. You will make a profit of ` 200. However,
the put option will not be exercised against you given market conditions.
Step 5: However, you will incur a loss of ` 70 on the short position in
futures.
In sum, you will gain ` 130.
Thus, from all the three possible scenarios for the price of underlying asset,
it is evident that you will make ` 130 or more.
Step 6: Pay back your borrowed sum (along with interest) of ` 101.16
(` 100.52 ¥ e (0.075 ¥ 31/365)).
From the above, it is clear that, in any case, you earn ` 130 and you need to
pay ` 101.16. In other words, you make a profit of ` 28.84 (` 130 − ` 101.16).
And, on the whole contract (which includes 50 Nifty), you will end up with
the profit of ` 1442.
4.3 DATA
each other on the basis of three criteria—‘deal date’, ‘date of expiration’ and
‘strike price’. Therefore, the total number of quotes of call options (40,298) has
been matched with those of put options (35,172) based on the above-mentioned
three criteria, for all the 6 years under reference. The matching so carried out
resulted into 28,839 pairs of call and put options having identical ‘deal date’,
‘expiration date’ and ‘strike price’. Moreover, since the study also attempts
to test the PCFP, these pairs have further been matched to the data relating
to index futures based on the ‘deal date’ and ‘expiration date’. The matching
so carried out resulted into the same number of triplets (i.e. 28,839), as each
pair of options could find a futures contract having the same ‘deal date’ and
‘expiration date’.
liquidity risk. In this respect, Ofek et al. (2004) aptly opined that the lack of
liquidity imposes another significant cost to arbitrageurs in terms of the bid-ask
spread, as it is higher for illiquid contracts and could turn out to be a major
constraint to arbitrageurs.
Likewise, the overpriced puts tread the same path as far as the frequency
of thinly traded violations is concerned, however, with the lower percentage
(68% of total violations in terms of overpriced puts) compared with that in
case of underpriced puts. Naturally, the percentage of violations belonging
to the relatively exploitable category, namely moderately and highly traded
category, is considerably higher for the overpriced put options compared
with that observed in the case of underpriced put options. That is, 32% of
the overpriced puts pertain to the ‘moderately and highly traded’ category
compared with 16% in the case of underpriced put options.
Table 4.1 Violations of the PCP Relationship and Liquidity Levels, June 2001–07
Underpriced Overpriced
Total
Particulars put options put options
(Percentage)
(Percentage) (Percentage)
Total number of observation analysed 28,839 28,839 28,839
Total number of violations observed 6413 21309 27,722
before transaction costs (22.24) (73.89) (96.13)
Total number of violations observed 2,224 13,035 15,259
after transaction costs (7.71) (45.20) (52.91)
Violations relating to the three specified levels of liquidity
1873 8881 10754
(a) Thinly traded options
(84) (68) (71)
304 2187 2491
(b) Moderately traded options
(14) (17) (16)
47 1967 2014
(c) Highly traded options
(2) (15) (13)
Total 2,224 13,035 15,259
put options are more likely to be exploited compared with underpriced put
options on account of higher magnitude of profits they offer.
Thought, it may be noted that the higher standard deviations both in the
cases of overpriced and underpriced put options (for both the categories) defy
the credibility of the mean as a correct statistical measure as these indicate
the presence of outliers in the data. Therefore, it would be reasonable to use
positional measures (i.e. median, percentiles, etc.) instead of the arithmetical
measures (i.e. mean). In view of this, the quartiles have been calculated for
the magnitude of profit and are reported in Table 4.2.
The results summarized in Table 4.2 clearly indicate that the violations
belonging to highly and moderately traded category in the underpriced put
options amount to just 351 (304 + 47) observations. In operational terms, such
violations in underpriced puts category can be designated as exploitable
since the bid-ask spread is expected to be relatively lower on account of the
higher trading in such violations. Moreover, the information contained in the
quartiles suggests that nearly one-fourth of the highly traded underpriced
puts (as indicated by the third quartile) can be designated as exploitable as
the third quartile offers a profit magnitude of more than ` 361. However, the
proportion of exploitable violations in moderately traded underpriced puts
category goes further down since the third quartile offers a starting profit of
less than ` 300. Further, in order to have a better idea about the percentage
of exploitable violations in this category, the 80th, 85th and 90th percentiles
have been calculated. The results suggest that nearly 20% of violations in
‘moderately traded underpriced put’ category can be reasonably designated
as exploitable because the 80th percentile reported a starting profit of ` 346
per contract.
In sum, it would be reasonable to conclude that a total number of 72 cases
(12 cases from the highly traded category and 60 from the moderately traded
underpriced puts) out of the total number of (2,224) violations identified in
terms of underpriced futures can be designated as exploitable. In other words,
the exploitable number of underpriced put options amounts to just 0.25% of
total pairs analysed. The rest of the violations in underpriced puts belong
to thinly traded category and amount to 84% of the total violations in this
category. Such violations can be termed as unexploitable on account of low
liquidity, which causes the bid-ask spread to be significantly higher.
Given the meagre percentage of exploitable violation in uderpriced puts
category, it would be reasonable to conclude that the put options are not
underpriced or call options are not relatively overpriced. This finding defies the
popular belief that call options, in general, are costlier than the put options.
In contrast, a significantly noticeable number of violations have been
observed in terms of overpriced put options. It is well manifested in the fact
that a total number of 4,154 (2,187 + 1,967) violations belonging to highly and
80
●
Table 4.2 Liquidity-wise Descriptive Statistics for Violations of the PCP Condition for Underpriced and Overpriced Put Options in Indian
Derivative Markets in India
Table 4.3 Maturity-wise Descriptive Statistics for Violations of the PCP Condition for Underpriced and Overpriced Put Options in Indian
Securities Market, June 2001–07
Underpriced put options Overpriced put options
Days to
Liquidity Number of Magnitude of violations Number of Magnitude of violations
maturity
violations Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3 violations Mean S.D. Q1 Q2 Q3
Thinly traded 561 585 926 93 263 657 879 646 1386 106 283 666
Derivative Markets in India
‘0–7’ Moderately traded 94 285 515 60 116 353 147 357 504 83 208 379
Days Highly traded 24 245 254 41 171 355 107 462 620 109 244 414
Overall 679 532 872 84 231 604 1133 591 1253 104 265 590
Thinly traded 925 556 985 88 230 604 4689 602 847 166 376 722
‘8–30’ Moderately traded 190 171 171 41 97 250 1229 453 511 139 309 598
Days Highly traded 23 233 207 60 167 373 1351 571 488 212 466 792
Overall 1138 485 903 71 195 503 7269 571 745 167 379 720
Thinly traded 366 867 867 82 211 503 2734 964 1031 304 735 1330
‘31–60’ Moderately traded 20 396 396 11 60 207 716 916 719 334 789 1340
Days Highly traded Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 437 989 673 474 931 1418
Overall 386 484 851 68 199 497 3887 958 946 323 770 1345
Thinly traded 21 1413 2007 411 872 1766 579 1695 1445 759 1489 2255
‘61–90’ Moderately traded Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 95 1712 994 861 1702 2422
Days Highly traded Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 72 1841 945 1178 1811 2560
Overall 21 1413 2007 411 872 1766 746 1711 1353 782 1544 2348
In the table, S.D., Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote standard deviation, first quartile, second quartile (i.e. median) and third quartile, respectively.
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 83
the 0–60 days to maturity category, i.e. the first three levels of maturity, viz.
0–7, 8–30 and 31–60 days to maturity. As already revealed in the analysis of
violations in relation to different levels of liquidity, the number of exploitable
violations in terms of the underpricing of puts seems to be negligible across
all the categories of maturity. It is empirically evident from the fact that the
magnitudes of the violations pertaining to highly and moderately liquid
categories are very low. The very first category in the 0–7 days to maturity have
a total number of 118 violations including cases of both moderately and highly
traded categories. Moreover, only the third quartiles of such violations offer a
starting amount of magnitudes (viz. ` 353 and ` 355, respectively) that can be
designated as worth exploiting in the presence of bid-ask spread. Therefore, it
may reasonably be deciphered that only one-fourth of such violations (nearly
30 cases) are exploitable.
Similarly, for category 8–30 days to maturity of underpriced put options
have a total number of 213 violations aggregately in moderately and highly
liquid categories. However, if we look at the exploitability of such violations,
the number must certainly go down as only the third quartile of highly traded
category offers a potentially exploitable starting profit of ` 373. Besides, the
third quartile in case of moderately traded category offers a lower profit
margin, which per-se, suggests that even less than one-fourth of such violations
may be exploitable. Therefore, to have precise idea about the number of
exploitable cases in this category, 80th, 85th and 90th percentile were calculated.
The 80th percentile for such options suggested a starting profit of ` 317, which
indicates that 20% of the cases in this category can be designated as exploitable.
In sum, a total number of 44 cases of violations in 8–30 days to maturity can
be designated as exploitable, which is again a meagre number.
Moreover, the last two categories of maturity for the underpriced put
options revealed negligible to zero exploitable cases as there are no cases in
the highly liquid category for both the maturity levels. Besides, the moderately
traded category have negligible cases in the case of violations having 31–60
days to maturity and no cases for the last category.
In sum, it may be inferred from the above discussion that the number of
exploitable violations remained negligible for the first two levels of maturity.
Moreover, such violations remained virtually absent for the last two categories.
A vast majority of such cases across all the levels of maturity remained
unexploited in view of their profit magnitudes and the immediacy risk.
In sharp contrast to the underpriced put options, the overpriced put
options seem to offer noticeable number of exploitable violations across all the
categories of maturity. Moreover, such violations predominately appeared in
the second and third level of maturity, i.e. 8–30 and 31–60 days to maturity.
It is empirically corroborated from the fact that the magnitude of profits in
case of overpriced put options are substantially higher compared with those
84 ● Derivative Markets in India
in the case of underpriced puts across all the categories. In the 0–7 days to
maturity category, one-fourth of the total cases in moderately and highly
traded category (nearly 60 cases); based on the magnitudes of profit they offer
can be referred to as exploitable. The finding is revealing as long as the number
of exploitable violations in the next two maturity levels are concerned. This is
evident from the fact that half of the violations in moderately as well as highly
traded category for the maturity level 8–30 days to maturity (which amount to
more than 1250 cases) could be designated as exploitable based on the profit
magnitude they offer. Moreover, nearly an equal number of violations for the
next maturity level, i.e. 31–60 days to maturity can be designated as exploitable,
as all such violations belonging to moderately and highly traded category
offered attractive profit potentials. Besides, unlike the underpriced put options,
the overpriced put options experienced the existence of a significant number
of violations in the 61–90 days to maturity category as well.
In sum, it may be concluded that the overpriced put options had a noticeable
number of exploitable violations across all the four categories of time to
maturity unlike the underpriced puts, where negligible number of violations
were recorded across all the four levels. The violations predominantly occurred
in 8–30 and 31–60 days to maturity categories.
The results of the post-hoc analysis in the case of call options summarized
in Table 4.5(b) signify that average magnitude of violations for the thinly
traded options is significantly different from that for the moderately traded
but not significaltly different from the highly traded category in the case of
underpriced put options. Besides, there has been no significant difference
between the magnitudes of moderately and highly traded category as well.
In contrast, all the pairs were found to have significantly different magnitude
of profits except for the one pair, i.e. Thinly vs. Highly traded pair in the case
of overpriced put options.
In operational terms, the results imply that the average magnitude of
violations for exploitable options contracts is significantly different from those
for options contracts that can be designated as unexploitable. Moreover, it may
be noted that in both underpriced and overpriced put options, the magnitude
of highly traded options is not significantly different from those of thinly
traded options, but the latter could not be designated as exploitable in light
of the higher bid-ask spread and immediacy risk.
The finding, per-se, indicates that the profit potential of exploitable
opportunities has been quite high, especially for overpriced put options, as
the profit for highly traded options has been found to be higher than that for
thinly traded category; however, the increase was not statistically significant
at 5% level of significance. Moreover, the profit of highly traded category for
overpriced put options has been considerably higher than that of moderately
traded category. It, therefore, indicates that the exploitable opportunities in
case of overpriced put options offered quite high amount of profit.
86
●
Table 4.5 (a) Kruskal–Wallis (H-statistics) Test for the Differences among the Violations across the Specified Levels of Liquidity for Underpriced and
Overpriced Put Options, June 2001–07
Underpriced put options Overpriced put options
Liquidity Rank Test statistics (a), (b) Rank Test statistics (a), (b)
N Mean rank Chi-square df Sig. N Mean rank Chi-square df Sig.
Thinly liquid 1873 1164.98 8881 6562.72
Derivative Markets in India
Moderately liquid 304 815.46 80.86 2 0.000 2187 6135.00 30.873 2 0.000
Highly liquid 47 942.35 1967 6741.90
(a) Kruskal Wallis Test; (b) Grouping Variable—Liquidity
Table 4.5 (b) Dunn’s Test for the Multiple Comparisons amongst the Specified Levels of Liquidity for Overpriced as well as Underpriced Put Options,
June 2001–07
Call options Call options
Dunn’s multiple
comparison test Difference in Significant Difference in Significant
Summary Summary
rank sum (P < 0.05) rank sum (P < 0.05)
Thinly traded
vs. 349.5 – Yes 427.7 – Yes
Moderately traded
Thinly traded
vs. 222.6 Ns No −179.2 Ns No
Highly traded
Moderately traded vs.
−126.9 Ns No −606.9 – Yes
Highly traded
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 87
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
In addition, the magnitude of the violations across the years has been
examined with intent to ensure exploitability of violations over the years.
The results have been summarized in Table 4.7. It is satisfying to note that
the frequency of exploitable violations in the case of underpriced put options
remained negligible across all the years except the year 2003–04. Moreover, the
year 2003–04 accounts for more than two-fifth of the total violations occurred in
underpriced put category. For the rest of five years, the frequency of exploitable
violations remained negligible in view of the magnitude of profit they offered
for the exploitable category, i.e. the moderately and thinly traded category.
88
●
Derivative Markets in India
Table 4.6 Year-wise Frequencies of the Violations of PCP Relationship, June 2001–07
Total violations Put options underpriced Put options overpriced
Total number of
Year No. of Percentage of No. of Percentage of No. of Percentage of
pairs analysed
violations violations (%) violations violations (%) violations violations (%)
2001–02 2226 1347 60.51 303 13.61 1044 46.90
2002–03 2922 1509 51.64 480 16.43 1029 35.22
2003–04 5296 3020 57.02 964 18.20 2056 38.82
2004–05 5390 2414 44.79 127 2.36 2287 42.43
2005–06 6368 3690 57.95 222 3.49 3468 54.46
2006–07 6637 3279 49.40 128 1.93 3151 47.48
Total 28839 15259 52.91 2224 7.71 13035 45.20
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 89
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07
Thinly traded 394 188 218 54 106 250 797 254 237 88 193 m
Moderately traded 82 98 107 41 61 97 219 186 160 51 147 292
2002–03
Highly traded 4 316 179 226 405 405 13 207 167 54 109 294
Overall 480 174 206 48 95 241 1029 239 223 58 188 343
Thinly traded 744 529 737 111 300 652 1569 604 677 168 387 817
Moderately traded 187 246 379 58 153 336 363 415 410 130 273 528
2003–04
Highly traded 33 219 238 35 102 346 124 480 363 171 371 792
Overall 964 464 681 76 250 560 2056 563 627 163 370 776
Thinly traded 125 604 824 110 334 754 1599 587 631 196 406 721
Moderately traded 1 80 Nil Nil Nil Nil 361 453 405 153 348 616
2004–05
Highly traded 1 830 Nil Nil Nil Nil 327 531 423 208 422 696
Overall 127 602 819 109 334 761 2287 558 576 196 401 706
Thinly traded 206 1315 1662 295 728 1766 2310 1042 1257 298 739 1375
Moderately traded 9 551 517 129 353 853 556 833 809 271 577 1120
2005–06
Highly traded 7 222 120 161 220 246 602 659 690 172 447 870
Overall 222 1250 1622 269 687 1651 3468 942 1124 262 649 1296
Thinly traded 121 1383 1678 338 820 1735 1635 1313 1494 417 970 1733
Moderately traded 5 518 477 297 431 431 615 942 797 278 770 1394
2006–07
Highly traded 2 193 206 47 193 338 901 836 653 344 724 1159
Overall 128 1330 1685 45 142 268 3151 1104 1205 374 840 1496
In the table, S.D., Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote standard deviation, first quartile, second quartile (i.e. median) and third quartile, respectively.
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 91
in Table 4.6, Figs 4.1 and 4.2). In short, a vast majority of exploitable violations
appeared in the case of overpriced put options and, therefore, failed to show
the warranted improvement in the market efficiency unlike the underpriced
put options, which were found consistent with the learning hypothesis.
(ii) in case of options having index as the underlying asset, it becomes very
difficult to short-sell/purchase of the index as all the basket of shares
which constitute the index need to be sold/purchased in the proportion
in which these have been included in the index and
(iii) relatively less transactions costs associated with trading in futures
market compared with the spot market. The results on the violations
of put-call-futures condition are reported in Table 4.8.
The results reported in Table 4.8 reveal that the number of violations of
PCFP remained quite high, predominantly, in terms of overpricing of put
options, as a vast majority of violations belong to this category. Notably, unlike
identifying violations of PCP, short-selling constraint, prima-facie, could not be
a correct explanation to the higher frequency of violations in call options since
to exploit the arbitrage opportunities using futures market, the arbitrageur
does not have to short the stock basket, rather he needs to sell the futures that
is easily possible.
Moreover, another notable finding is that the violations of the parity
condition remained nearly at the same level as revealed by the analysis using
the spot market (Table 4.8). It is borne out by the fact that such violations
have shown a negligible decline from 13,035 to 13,016. Notwithstanding the
trend in overpriced put options, a substantial increase has been recorded in
violations labelled as underpriced put options. The violations in terms of the
under pricing of put has been as high as four times of those in the case of
parity analysis using spot market values. As such, violations have increase
from 2224 to a whopping 9612.
An intuitive explanation to such a development could be traced to the fact
that the transaction costs for the trading in the futures market are substantially
lower compared with those for spot market transactions. It seems to be a
plausible reasoning for the observed increase in the number of underpriced
put options. However, there should have been a corroborating development
(increase) in the overpricing of puts as well to make this explanation tenable.
Empirically, this is not the case as the violations in terms of the overpricing
of put options have shown a negligible decline and, therefore, discards this
explanation to above-mentioned development in the frequency of violations.
Moreover, the frequency of violations without considering the transaction
costs (both in the case of PCP and PCFP, Table 4.8) offers strong corroborating
evidences to the above-mentioned finding, i.e. the transaction costs cannot be
offered a major reason for the observed decline (increase) in the number of
overpriced (underpriced) puts options.
Notably, another more plausible explanation in terms of the ‘underpricing
of futures contracts’ can be offered for the observed change in the trend of
violation while using futures market instead of the spot market. It is for this
reason that there has been an increase (decrease) in the number of underpriced
Table 4.8 Violations of the PCP Relationship Using Spot Values and Futures Prices, June 2001–07: A Comparative Analysis
Using spot values Using futures prices
t
Æ
Æ
(4.8)
The equation demonstrates that the underpricing of futures is liable to cause
an increase in the theoretical price of the put options, given the market price
of the call option. And, therefore, the put options that have been found to be
correctly priced or overpriced in the test of PCP using spot prices are likely
to be converted into the underpriced or correctly priced put options given the
magnitude of increase in the theoretical price of the put option. The process of
conversion of correctly priced and overpriced put options into the underpriced/
correctly priced ones has been well documented in the number of violations
without considering the transaction costs, as reported in Table 4.8. The results
show that there has been an increase in the number of underpriced puts from
6,413 to 12,176 on account of the use of futures market. Similarly, there has
been a decrease in the number of overpriced puts from 21,309 to 16,600 on
account of the use of futures market instead of the spot market. In sum, the
use of futures market, essentially on account of the underpricing of futures
contracts, has registered an increase in the underpriced puts by 5,763 and,
at the same time, a decrease in the overpriced put options by 4,709. In other
words, the underpricing of futures contracts has converted 4,709 overpriced
put options into the underpriced put options. Likewise, a total number of 1054
put options contracts, which were found to be correctly priced (in the test of
PCP using spot price), have been designated as underpriced on account of
the underpricing of futures contracts. In sum, the decrease (increase) in the
number of overpriced (underpriced) can appropriately be designated to the
underpricing of futures contracts in the Indian derivatives market, for the
period under reference.
The observed underpricing of futures contracts may be traced to the short-
selling constraint in the Indian securities market during the period under
reference. The non-availability of the short-selling facility can be designated
as the primary reason for the underpricing of the futures contracts because
of fact that the arbitrage strategy needed to correct such pricing anomalies
required short-selling of the underlying asset. In short, the underpricing of
the futures can, therefore, be attributed to the fact that short-selling has been
banned during the period under reference in Indian securities market.
Thus, it may be concluded that the futures market has failed to provide a
good substitute for shorting the assets in the absence of short-selling facility
in the Indian securities market during the period under reference. Therefore,
the futures market could not succeed in restoring equilibrium in the options
market.
In view of this, it is reasonable to conclude that the indirect impact of the
short-selling constraints on the efficiency of the options market on account of
A Test of Put–Call Parity Relationship on S&P CNX Nifty Index Options Market ● 95
the interrelationship of the index options and index futures market has been
one of the major reasons amongst others (e.g. liquidity) for the existence of
mispricing signals in the Indian options market. In short, the impact of short-
selling constraints cannot be ignored even if the violations are identified
using futures contracts, as the efficiency of futures market does impact the
efficiency of options market, which in turn, can be ensured when short-selling
is allowed.
market. This is eloquently borne out by the fact that the number of violations
in terms of relative overpricing of put options remained nearly same even
when the futures market has been used to identify the violations. Moreover,
the no. of violations in terms of underpricing of put options have shown a
whooping increase when identified using futures market. The development
so observed can be traced to the fact that the futures themselves remained
underpriced in the absence of short-selling facility in the market and, therefore,
registered a negligible decrease in overpriced put options and an increase
for the underpriced put options. In short, it may be appropriate to conclude
that in the absence of short-selling facility in Indian securities market for the
time period under reference, the futures themselves traded away from the
equilibrium prices. It is for this reason that the futures market failed to restore
equilibrium in options market.
In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that majority of violations identified
using PCP relationship could not be exploited on account of the existing market
microstructure in India during the period under reference (i.e. short-selling
constraint that caused underpricing in futures to persist). Moreover, the futures
market failed to restore efficiency in options market due to its own inefficiency
in terms of underpricing for the period under reference because of the lack of
short-selling facility during the same period. Besides, the dearth of liquidity
in the options market appears to be another major constraint to arbitrageurs
because a vast majority of violations occurred in the thinly traded category.
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 97
5 Testing the Expectations
Hypothesis on the Term
C H A P T E R
Structure of Volatilities
Implied by S&P CNX Nifty
Index Options
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Term structure of implied volatilities connotes the relationship of implied
volatility with time. The pattern of implied volatility across time to expiration
is known as the term structure of implied volatility, and the pattern across
strike prices is referred to as the volatility smile (Dupire, 1994; Derman and
Kani, 1994 and Rubinstein, 1994). Term structures are helpful in pricing the
options for which the volatility of the underlying asset can be assumed to be
a deterministic function of time. It has been well documented in the available
literature that different restrictions have been imposed on the term structure
of implied volatility, considering the nature of underlying asset’s volatility.
In this chapter, a restriction on the term structure of implied volatility,
assuming rational expectations to hold, will be tested in line with the study
done by Stein (1989), Diz and Finucane (1993), Heynen et al.(1994), Campa and
Chang (1995) and Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998). The restriction is arrived at
assuming mean-reversion in implied volatility. The mean-reversion in implied
volatility connotes that, in long run, it will return to its long-term average,
which is assumed to be constant. Before testing the restriction on the term
structure, the mean-reversion property of the implied volatility has been
validated. In short, this chapter addresses two empirical questions, viz. (a)
whether the implied volatilities, in the case of short-dated as well as long-dated
options, are mean reverting and (b) whether the volatilities implied by the
long-dated options are consistent with the future volatilities estimated based
on the volatilities implied by corresponding short-dated options, as warranted
by rational expectations to hold. This has been operationalized by measuring
the empirical elasticity coefficients, which reveal observed or empirical causal
relationship between the volatilities implied by short-dated and long-dated
options, and comparing it with the theoretical elasticity coefficient derived
from the theoretical restriction on the implied volatility.
98 ● Derivative Markets in India
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. In ADF test, the basic DF test equation
is augmented by adding lagged values of the dependent variable DYt . The
ADF test, in our case, will be based on the estimation of Eq. (5.4).
m
DYt = b1 + b 2 t + lYt – 1 + a i ∑ DY
i=1
t–i + et (5.4)
where et is a pure white noise error term, DYt – 1 = (Yt – 1 − Yt – 2), and so on. The
number of lagged variables to be added is determined empirically such that
the error term becomes serially uncorrelated. In ADF test, we still test if l = 0
against the alternate hypothesis, i.e. l < 0.
2 T1 ( rT2 – 1)
[s AV (t , T ) – s 2 ] = T1
2
[s AV (t , T1 ) – s 2 ] (5.8)
T2 ( r – 1)
Where s 2AV (t, T1) and s 2AV (t, T2) are the average expected volatility with
short (T1 days) and long (T2 days) maturities respectively, and r is the first
order (daily) autocorrelation coefficient of volatility.
Assuming a constant difference between the maturities (T2 − T1 = DT) of
average expected volatilities, Eq. (5.8) can be expressed in an empirically
testable form (Diz and Finucane, 1993). It is given in Eq. ( 5.9).
2
[s AV 2
(t , T2 ) – s 2 ] = b (T1 , r ) [s AV (t , T1 ) – s 2 ] (5.9)
T1 ( rT2 – 1)
where, b (T1, r) = (5.10)
T2 ( rT1 – 1)
The relationship of the average expected volatilities given in the Eqs (5.9)
and (5.10) can be extended to the implied volatilities estimated from the option
price quotations of at-the-money options including near-the-money3 (NTM)
options. This can be done because the average expected volatility generally
turns out to be approximately equal to the volatility implied by inverting
the Black–Scholes (BS) model for at-the-money options and NTM options
as shown by Hull and White (1987) and Feinstein (1989). Following this, the
relationship of average expected volatilities with differing maturities can be
extended for implied volatilities as well. This relationship has been tested by
Stein (1989), Diz and Finucane (1993), Heynen et al. (1994), Campa and Chang
(1995), Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998) and Poteshman (2001).
Besides, Mixon (2007) has tested the expectations hypothesis on the term
structure of implied volatility of index options for five indices using over-
the-counter options data using Heston’s model. In another study, Das and
Sundaram (1999) made an effort to explain observed shapes of the term
structure of implied volatilities by examining two different volatility models
(jump-diffusion and stochastic volatility).
In case of implied volatilities, the above relationship is arrived at by
2 2
substituting s AV (t , T1 ) and s AV (t , T2 ) by IVtn (the volatility of the underlying
asset implied by short-dated options) and IVtd (the volatility of the underlying
asset implied by long-dated options), respectively. The option price quotations,
for which implied volatilities have been studied as a relationship, are similar
in all respects except the maturity time.
In order to test the restriction empirically, Eq. (5.8) has been examined
by regressing IVtd on the corresponding IVtn (with the same specifications
in terms of strike price, spot price, deal date, etc.) instead of regressing
( IVtd – s –2 ) on ( IVtn – s –2 ) .Equation (5.8) can be estimated in the way
mentioned above because of the ‘free from shift of origin’ property of traditional
102 ● Derivative Markets in India
5.3.1 Data
The data considered for the analysis can be broadly classified into three
categories: data related to option contracts; data related to the underlying
asset, i.e. the main index of National Stock Exchange (NSE), formally known
as S&P CNX NIFTY index, and data on risk-free rate of return. The data on
the options consist of daily closing prices of options, strike prices, deal dates,
maturity dates and number of contracts of call and put options. The second
data set, i.e. regarding the underlying asset, includes daily closing value of
S&P CNX NIFTY index and dividend yield on the index. The third data set
consists of monthly average yield on 91-days Treasury-bills. The data for all
the three mentioned categories have been collected from June 04, 2001, (starting
date for index options in Indian securities market) to June 30, 2007.
In order to minimize the bias associated with nonsynchonous trading9, only
liquid option quotations10, i.e. contracts which are having at least 100 contract
traded, are being considered for the analysis. In addition to this, another
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 103
filter has also been used. That is, only near-the-money (NTM) contracts have
been selected. In this context, NTM contracts are those contracts that satisfy
a specified range of moneyness (0.90 £ (St/X) £ 1.10) for all the three levels of
time to expiration or maturity, namely (a) time to expiration £ 30 days, (b)
time to expiration 31–60 days and (c) time to expiration 61–90 days.
Besides, another problem related to the presence of multiple contracts
(having same deal date, maturity time and strike price) on a single date. This
required objective selection criteria to zero down such multiple contracts to a
single contract. To address this problem, a short-listing criterion was developed
to select the option quotation that was nearest to the money11 amongst all such
multiple contracts available for a particular date.
To test the REH, two data sets have been prepared across all the level of
moneyness, namely out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-money option
quotations. Each data set for given level of moneyness consists of a pair of
implied volatility (estimated from the option quotations with short-dated and
medium/long-dated maturities12, respectively, which were same in all other
respects, viz. deal date, strike price, etc.). The pair for the first data set (for
a given level of moneyness) consists of (a) implied volatility estimated from
option quotations with time to expiration £ 30 days and (b) implied volatility
estimated from option quotations with time to expiration 31–60 days. Likewise,
another pair of the second data set (for the given level of moneyness) includes
(a) implied volatility estimated from option quotations with time to expiration
£ 30 days and (b) implied volatility estimated from option quotations with time
to expiration 61–90 days. While creating the pairs for the analysis, problem of
non-simultaneity of data have been addressed by selecting only matching data
points. Matching has been done on the basis of date and strike prices.
In addition to this, several short-listing criteria were used to exclude
uninformative option price quotations. These short-listing criteria are:
(i) Options quotations with moneyness outside the range {0.90 £ (St/X)
£ 1.10} in case of a call option and {0.90 £ (X/St) £ 1.10} in case of put
options have been excluded from the analysis. This filtering has been
done because most of the trading volume is concentrated in the options
belonging to the specified range only.
(ii) Secondly, the option quotations which remained untraded (for
which number of contacts traded was zero) have been excluded from
the analysis because these quotations do not contain any relevant
information about the market.
(iii) Thirdly, we have excluded those option quotations for which the lower
boundary condition for option prices has been violated. The violation
of the lower boundary condition occurs when (St − e–r(T – t) X) in case of
call options and (e–r(T – t) X − St) in case of put options, are greater than
the price of call and put options, respectively.
104 ● Derivative Markets in India
where,
ln(S0 ¥ e –d T / X ) + (r f + s 2 / 2)T
d1 = ; d2 = d1 – σT1/2,
s T
c and p are price of the call and the put option, respectively, T is the maturity
period, s is the volatility of the underlying asset, S0 is the spot price of the
underlying asset, X is the Strike price of the option contract, d is the constant
continuous dividend yield, rf is the risk-free rate of return and N(x) is the
Normal cumulative probability distribution.
As the BS model has been used to estimate the implied volatilities, it might
give rise to a problem of systematic bias in the estimates of implied volatility
because of its inherent assumptions. It assumes volatility to be constant over
time. On the contrary, time varying behaviour of volatility is well documented
in literature. In addition, the ARCH models (used in analysis) are based on
the empirical premise of time varying volatility. Therefore, the use of BS
model might result into systematic bias in the estimates of implied volatilities.
Fortunately, the problem of systematic bias in the estimates of implied volatility
is less likely to occur as the data on option price quotations that have been
used essentially pertain to the NTM options. Following Claessen and Mittnik
(2002), NTM options have been defined as the options that are up to 10%
in-out-of-the-money. Also, Hull and White (1987) demonstrated empirically
that BS model performs equally well in case of at-the-money options, as the
prices of such option quotations are almost linear in volatilities across all the
maturities.
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 105
In this respect, Feinstein (1989) and Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998) made
a similar observation that the implied volatility estimated from BS model
can be used as an unbiased approximation of the expected average volatility
for at-the-money options. Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998) further carried out
the analysis by extending it to the NTM options. In addition, Day and Lewis
(1988 and 1992) also concluded, considering both Black–Scholes (1973) and
Hull and White (1987) model, that the specification error can be minimized
by focusing on at-the-money options because Hull–White and BS models are
linear in average volatility for such options. In view of the above, the present
study has used NTM options in order to minimize the noise in estimating
implied volatilities using BS model.
Besides, efforts have been made to reduce the bias due to non-synchronous
trading, which is likely to distort the quality of implied volatility estimates
derived from the options prices. For the purpose, following Day and Lewis
(1992), all the contracts having at least 100 contracts traded per day have been
chosen for the analysis. The bias due to non-synchronous trading emerges
from the fact that closing prices for the thinly traded contracts are more likely
to represent the transactions that occur before the close of the trading (Day
and Lewis, 1988).
On the selection of appropriate model to estimate the implied volatility,
Stein (1989) mentioned that the use of incorrect model to estimate the implied
volatilities might result into a systematic bias in the estimates. As the model
discussed above has been used to estimate the implied volatilities, it might
give rise to a problem of systematic bias in the estimates of implied volatility
because of its inherent assumptions. The BS model assumes volatility to be a
strictly deterministic function of time. On the contrary, to establish a theoretical
relationship between near-the-month (short-dated) and far-the-month (long-
dated) options, the volatility is assumed to be a stochastic variable. Thus, use
of the BS model might result in systematic bias in the estimates of implied
volatilities and might lessen the authenticity of the results derived from such
estimates of implied volatility.
Fortunately, the problem of systematic bias in the estimates of implied
volatility due the use of the BS model might not occur in our case since the
data on option price quotations that have been used essentially pertain to the
NTM options. Hull and White (1987) in their study have shown empirically
that BS model performs equally well since the prices of such option quotations
are almost linear in volatilities across all the maturities.
Commenting upon this, Feinstein (1989) and Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998)
made a similar observation that the implied volatility, estimated from BS
model, can be used as an unbiased approximation of the expected average
volatility for at-the-money options. Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998) further
carried out the analysis by extending it to the NTM options. This study is
similar to their work since NTM options (with the same definition) have been
the focus of analysis in this chapter. Day and Lewis (1988, 1992) also concluded,
106 ● Derivative Markets in India
considering both Black–Scholes (1973) and Hull and White (1987) model, that
the specification error can be minimized by focusing on at-the-money options
because Hull–White and BS models are linear in average volatility for such
options.
Besides, efforts have been made to reduce the bias due to non-synchronous
trading. The bias due to non-synchronous trading or non-simultaneity has been
offered as a potential explanation of apparent mispricing of option contracts
by Easton (1994). The bias due to non-synchronous trading emerges from
the fact that closing prices for the thinly traded contracts are more likely to
represent the transactions that occur before the close of the trading (Day and
Lewis, 1988).
In the study, the NTM option price quotations refer to those for which the
moneyness indicators, namely (Spot price/Strike price) for the call options
and (Strike price/Spot price) for the put options, ranges from 0.90 to 1.10. The
explanation for the action taken above is quite explicit from the nature of the
data on option price itself, which is presented graphically in Figs 5.1 and 5.2
for call options and put options, respectively.
Figure 5.1 Moneyness and liquidity for Figure 5.2 Moneyness and liquidity for
call option put option
As evidenced by Day and Lewis (1988 and 1992), at NYSE, trading volume
tends to be concentrated in the options that are NTM. It is also apparent
from Figs 5.1 and 5.2 for the Indian options market that 92% and 88% of the
total traded volume pertains essentially to the near-the-month call and put
option price quotations, respectively. Since only near-the-month option price
quotations are being considered for the study, it automatically ensures that
the bias due to non-synchronous trading is minimized. This happens because
any lack of synchronization between the closing index level and closing option
price is less likely to occur.
Following Xu and Taylor (1995), the implied volatilities have been calculated
separately for both call and put options. Besides, following Stein (1989) and
Diz and Finucane (1993), the average implied volatilities (taking an average
of implied volatilities of the underlying estimated from call and put options)
have also been calculated. The reason behind the analysis of average implied
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 107
volatility has been the possibility of stale index levels that might induce
potential biases in the estimation of implied volatility when done separately
for call and put options (Diz and Finucane, 1993).
In short, the study focuses on the estimation procedure that assigns greatest
weight on the option price quotations that are affected least by specification
error or bias. This happens because the trading tends to concentrate in NTM
options. This approach is similar to Stein (1989), Harvey and Whaley (1991),
Day and Lewis (1988 and 1992), Takezaba and Shiraishi (1998), Diz and
Finucane (1993) and Campa and Chang (1995).
from call Jarque–Bera 375377.4 189217.9 40203.4 278533.3 211290.4 654.7604 1029120 125916.1 27279.06
options Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1222 1005 464 1061 668 266 1208 926 460
Mean 0.0694 0.0678 0.0713 0.0641 0.0586 0.0645 0.0823 0.0675 0.0573
Implied Std. Dev. 0.0841 0.0567 0.0297 0.0675 0.0416 0.0262 0.3996 0.0687 0.0290
volatility Skewness 8.74 7.55 1.26 6.87 3.00 1.79 32.92 9.72 0.65
estimated Kurtosis 117.60 117.49 7.34 80.68 18.10 14.28 1132.11 162.37 5.65
from put Jarque–Bera 735736.70 505128.50 357.86 298411.90 5918.93 484.63 66253583.00 697089.40 42.47
options Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1314 909 341 1151 538 83 1243 649 117
Mean 0.0585 0.0490 0.0529 0.0515 0.0452 0.0542 0.0581 0.0524 0.0499
Std. Dev. 0.0772 0.0313 0.0174 0.0561 0.0239 0.0178 0.0751 0.0284 0.0208
Average Skewness 6.25 2.69 -0.59 6.79 1.66 1.61 6.78 1.58 1.66
implied Kurtosis 56.93 15.64 3.39 81.53 8.24 9.65 66.70 7.03 9.01
volatility* Jarque–Bera 75335.45 2888.26 3.85 133664.10 506.28 138.95 106940.20 610.95 228.00
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 590 367 60 505 315 61 605 558 116
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 109
0.075
0.07 Mean IV_Call
0.065 options
0.07
0.065 Mean IV_Call
options
0.06
0.055 Mean IV_Put
options
0.05
Mean IV_Average
0.045
basis
0.04
> = 30 Days 31–60 Days 61–90 Days
0.09
Mean IV_Call
0.08 options
0.07
Mean IV_Put
options
0.06
Mean IV_Average
0.05 basis
0.04
>=30 Days 31–60 Days 61–90 Days
In addition to correlograms, ADF test has been applied for all the three levels
of maturity and the moneyness separately for call options, put options and on
their average. The results of ADF test are reported in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 for
call options, put options and on their average basis, respectively. In order to
make error term a pure white noise, the number of lags of dependent variable
to be added in the equation of ADF test has been decided on the basis of Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and/ or Schwarz information criterion (SIC).
The results of the ADF test clearly demonstrate that the implied volatilities
do not contain a unit root. The null hypotheses that the series of implied
volatilities are having a unit root have been tested at 5% as well as 1% level
of significance. In the tables, the significance levels provided in parentheses
(p-values) along with the empirical value of tau statistic connote that almost
all the implied volatilities for call options, put options and on their average are
significant at even 1% level of significance except a few, which are significant
only at 5%. The rejection of the null hypotheses that the implied volatilities
are having a unit root makes the series of implied volatilities stationary, i.e.
the implied volatilities, in fact, are mean reverting in nature.
The stationarity so observed validates mean-reversion in implied volatilities
and indicates that the investors price options considering mean-reversion
property of the volatility. However, the mean reversion in itself does not
ensure that the expectations regarding the evolution of volatilities are being
formed in the way as warranted by REH. In view of this, the empirical test
of the restriction has been carried out too, and the results are summarized in
the next section.
Out-of-money
3 Far-the-month2 call option − 2.8676 − 3.4444 Mean reverting Non-mean reverting
(0.0338)
− 5.9855
4 Near-the-month call option − 2.8641 − 3.4363 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 8.2594
5 Far-the-month1 call option − 2.8657 − 3.4399 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 3.2777
At-the-money
6 Far-the-month2 call option − 2.8724 − 3.4553 Mean reverting Non-mean reverting
(0.0169)
Near-the-money options
7 Near-the-month call option − 2.8637 − 3.4356 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 30.4295
8 Far-the-month1 call option − 2.8644 − 3.4372 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 21.4476
In-the-money
9 Far-the-month2 call option − 2.8676 − 3.4443 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
12
Note: The figures in parentheses show ‘level of significance’ / ‘p value’.
1
Options having 31–60 days to maturity.
2
Options having 61–90 days to maturity.
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by...........
●
111
Table 5.3 Testing Mean-Reversion (Stationarity) in the Implied Volatilities of Put Options 1 2 112
Augmented Dickey Fuller t/t-test
●
S.
Description of options Empirical value Critical value of t Inferences
no.
of t at a = 5% at a = 1% at a = 5% at a = 1%
− 6.1981
1 Near-the-month put option − 2.8638 − 3.4358 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 3.9069
2 Far-the-month1 put option − 2.867 − 3.4423 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0021)
− 6.4729
Out-of-money
3 Far-the-month2 put option − 2.8972 − 3.5123 Mean reverting Mean reverting
Derivative Markets in India
(0.0000)
− 35.4276
4 Near-the-month put option − 2.8636 − 3.4354 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 24.4757
5 Far-the-month1 put option − 2.8658 − 3.4402 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 5.6345
At-the-money
6 Far-the-month2 put option − 2.8658 − 3.4876 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
Near-the-money options
7 Near-the-month put option − 2.8635 − 3.4351 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
− 4.5421
8 Far-the-month1 put option − 2.8645 − 3.4373 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0002)
− 2.8796
In-the-money
9 Far-the-month2 put option − 2.8699 − 3.4496 Mean reverting Non-mean reverting
(0.0488)
1
Options having 31–60 days to maturity.
2
Options having 61–90 days to maturity.
Table 5.4 Testing Mean-Reversion (Stationarity) of the Average Implied Volatilities*
Augmented Dickey Fuller t/t-test
S.
Description of options Empirical value Critical value of t Inferences
no.
of t at a = 5% at a = 1% at a = 5% at a = 1%
−8.6483
1 Near-the-month option −2.8662 −3.4412 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
−18.3613
2 Far-the-month1 option −2.8692 −3.4480 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
−3.7731
Out-of-money
3 Far-the-month2 option −2.9117 −3.5461 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0053)
−4.7362
4 Near-the-month option −2.8671 −3.4432 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0001)
−16.2688
5 Far-the-month1 option −2.8705 −3.4510 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
−8.7377
At-the-money
6 Far-the-month2 option −2.9109 −3.5441 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
Near-the-money options
7 Near-the-month option −2.8661 −3.4410 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
−24.9652
8 Far-the-month1 option −2.8665 −3.4419 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
−11.9199
In-the-money
9 Far-the-month2 option −2.8867 −3.4881 Mean reverting Mean reverting
(0.0000)
*
Average implied volatility = (Implied volatility of call option + Implied volatility of put option)/2 1 2
1
Options having 31–60 days to maturity.
2
Options having 61–90 days to maturity.
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by...........
●
113
114 ● Derivative Markets in India
This has been done because the calculation of theoretical elasticity coefficients
requires that the difference of maturities has to be constant (Diz and Finucane,
1993). The classification of implied volatilities so arrived at as per levels of
moneyness, maturities and constant maturity differences is presented in Tables
5.5a, 5.5b, 5.6a, 5.6b, 5.7a and 5.7b, respectively.
While estimating the empirical elasticity coefficients, the traditional
regression equation (including an intercept term) has been estimated in such a
way that the intercept term does not come out to be significantly (statistically)
different from zero, or in other words, the intercept term is zero, and the
residual or error term becomes a white noise. To do the same, the methodology
that has been adopted is ARIMA (n, 1, 0)13, i.e. a traditional regression equation,
which includes n lags of dependent variable as independent variables as well
as first order differencing in order to get a zero intercept term.
The precondition to estimate the ARIMA model is that the series under
consideration should be stationary. Since the prerequisite of stationarity of
implied volatilities have already been ensured in the Section 5.4.1, the next
issue in the estimation of ARIMA model is to decide upon the number of
lags to be included in the model. To respond to the issue, ACF and PACF
for the implied volatilities have been plotted to have an initial idea about the
probable lag structure of the model. Besides, AIC and SIC have been used to
select the best model with a zero intercept term and a white noise error term.
In addition to this, the calculation of coefficient of determination has been done
separately for the regression pairs of average basis implied volatility. This has
been done to draw a comparison with the similar study done by Stein (1989).
The coefficient of determination has been calculated as15:
Residual sum of squares
R2 = 1 –
Total sum of squares
After estimating the ARIMA (n, 1, 0), we have also examined the error
term to ensure that the model has fitted the data well, and the error term is a
white noise. In order to ensure that the error term is a white noise, it has been
examined whether (a) the error term is serially uncorrelated up to the one forth
of its lag length and (b) its mean is zero. To test the serial independence in
error term, the correlograms and a statistics put forth by Ljung and Box (1978)
have been used. To test the mean value of the error term, t-test was used to
see whether it is statistically different from zero. The estimates of empirical
elasticity coefficients so arrived are given in Tables 5.5b, 5.6b and 5.7b.
Next to the estimation of the empirical elasticity coefficients, calculation
of the theoretical coefficients of elasticity was done. The calculation of the
theoretical elasticity coefficients has been done on the basis of the formula given
in the Eq. (5.10). From the formula, it is clear that all the variables required
for the calculation of the theoretical coefficients of the volatilities are known
except one variable—the autocorrelation coefficient of the volatilities.
Table 5.5 (a) Calculation of the Theoretical Elasticity Coefficient of the Implied Volatilities of Call Options
Constant maturity Average maturity of Average maturity of First order auto Theoretical elasticity
Options difference3 short-dated options (T1) long-dated options (T2) correlation coefficient coefficient
(in days) (in days) (in days) (r) (b)
CALL OTM 28 14.61 42.61 0.766 0.350
(30–60) 35 10.15 45.16 0.663 0.228
CALL OTM 56 16.78 72.78 0.601 0.231
(30–90) 63 13.11 76.16 0.55 0.172
CALL ATM 28 14.65 42.65 0.716 0.346
(30–60) 35 16.33 45.35 0.291 0.360
CALL ATM 56 18.06 74.06 0.531 0.244
(30–90) 63 12.5 75.64 0.251 0.165
CALL ITM 28 14.31 42.32 0.618 0.338
(30–60) 35 11.3 46.32 0.024 0.244
CALL ITM 56 17 73 0.529 0.233
(30–90) 63 11.86 74.92 0.093 0.158
3
Constant maturity difference signifies the difference between maturities of ‘near-the-month’ and ‘far-the-month’ options. Such differences have been calculated
for each pair, i.e., between ‘8–30 days to maturity and 31–60 days to maturity’, and between ‘8–30 days to maturity and 61–90 days to maturity’. Moreover,
within each pair, the data has been arranged in two sub-groups for further analysis.
Table 5.5 (b) Theoretical and Empirical Elasticity Coefficients of the Implied Volatilities of Call Options
Values of elasticity coefficient of mean-reversion (b) under REH
Constant maturity difference*
Options Empirical values from Conclusion
(in days) Theoretical values
detrended series
CALL OTM 28 0.350 No causality NA
(30–60) 35 0.228 0.183 Underreaction*
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by...........
●
Table 5.6 (a) Calculation of the Theoretical Elasticity Coefficient of the Implied Volatilities of Put Options
Constant maturity Average maturity of Average maturity of First order auto Theoretical elasticity
Options difference* short-dated options (T1) long-dated options (T2) correlation coefficient coefficient
(in days) (in days) (in days) (r) (b)
PUT OTM 28 13.01 41.01 0.774 0.329
(30–60) 35 9.99 45.02 0.285 0.222
PUT OTM 56 18.16 74.16 0.697 0.245
(30–90) 63 13.49 76.6 0.39 0.176
PUT ATM 28 12.85 40.84 0.683 0.317
(30–60) 35 9.15 44.17 0.631 0.210
PUT ATM 56 18.72 74.72 0.415 0.251
(30–90) 63 11.57 74.57 0.565 0.155
PUT ITM 28 12.63 40.62 0.547 0.311
(30–60) 35 9.52 44.53 0.699 0.221
Constant maturity Average maturity of Average maturity of First order auto Theoretical elasticity
Options difference* short-dated options (T1) long-dated options (T2) correlation coefficient coefficient
(in days) (in days) (in days) (r) (b)
PUT ITM
63 14.25 75.89 0.365 0.188
(30–90)
Table 5.6 (b) Theoretical and Empirical Elasticity Coefficients of the Implied Volatilities of Put Options
Values of elasticity coefficient of mean-reversion (b) under REH
Constant maturity difference
Options Empirical values from Conclusion
(in days) Theoretical values
detrended series
PUT OTM 28 0.329 0.433 Overreaction
(30–60) 35 0.222 0.186 Underreaction
PUT OTM 56 0.245 1.221 Overreaction
(30–90) 63 0.176 0.238 Overreaction
PUT ATM 28 0.317 0.497 Overreaction
(30–60) 35 0.210 0.289 Overreaction
PUT ATM 56 0.251 0.565 Overreaction
(30–90) 63 0.155 0.559 Overreaction
PUT ITM 28 0.311 0.412 Overreaction
(30–60) 35 0.221 0.230 Overreaction
PUT ITM
63 0.188 0.275 Overreaction
(30–90)
Table 5.7 (a) Calculation of the Theoretical Elasticity Coefficient of the Average Implied Volatilities
Constant maturity Average maturity of Average maturity of First order auto Theoretical elasticity
Options difference* short-dated options (T1) long-dated options (T2) correlation coefficient coefficient
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by...........
Table 5.7 (b) Theoretical and Empirical Elasticity Coefficients of Average Implied Volatilities
Constant maturity Values of elasticity coefficient of mean-reversion (b) under REH
Options difference* Empirical values from R2 (%) Conclusion
(in days) Theoretical values
detrended series
OTM 28 0.324 0.801 88.67 Overreaction
(30–60) 35 0.210 0.388 85.29 Overreaction
OTM
56 0.200 0.252 72.60 Overreaction
(30–90)
ATM 28 0.293 0.667 85.51 Overreaction
(30–60) 35 0.194 0.450 66.92 Overreaction
ATM
56 0.255 0.528 73.68 Overreaction
(30–90)
ITM 28 0.322 0.296 79.59 Underreaction
(30–60) 35 0.236 0.372 63.72 Overreaction
ITM
63 0.230 0.462 72.00 Overreaction
(30–90)
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 119
END NOTES
1. Mean-reversion level connotes that level of long-run average volatility to
which the instantaneous volatility is expected to return in a long period
of time.
Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities Implied by........... ● 121
2. This refers to the current level of volatility at any specified point of time.
3. In the study, near-the-money (NTM) options stand for those option
contracts that lie within the specified range (0.90 ≤ (S0/X) ≤ 1.10) of
moneyness.
4. A regression equation which includes an intercept term and regression
coefficients along with the corresponding independent variables to
explain the variations in the dependent variable.
5. A regression equation which does not include an intercept term or a
traditional regression equation where the intercept terms comes out to
be zero/statistically insignificant.
6. An acceptable percentage of error while rejecting the null hypothesis
that is expected to occur purely due to chance. The most preferable
levels of significance are 5% and 1%.
7. Empirical elasticity coefficient denotes the degree of causal relationship
between the short-dated and long-dated volatility that is observed
empirically by regressing long-dated volatility on the corresponding
short-dated volatility.
8. An error term is said to be a white noise when it is normally distributed
and remains serially uncorrelated up to a significant lag length.
9. In this context, non-synchronous trading refers to the phenomenon of
different closing timings of the two markets, i.e. the options market and
the underlying’s market.
10. In the study, the liquid options stand for those option contracts, which,
at least, have one contract traded.
11. Nearest-to-the-money options imply those option quotations which,
within the specified range of moneyness, are most close to one (at-the-
money option) or, in other words, the option quotation for which the
difference between their strike price and spot price is the least amongst
all given on a particular date and level of maturity. For example, if on
July 15, 2007, when the spot price stands at ` 4257.5; there are three
contracts with the strike prices ` 4250, 4255 and 4265, respectively
(assuming that all the contracts are having same maturity). The contract
with the strike price ` 4255 will be said to be nearest-to-the-money.
12. In the study short-dated maturity refers to the period of less than equal
to the time period of 30 days, a time period between 31days to 60 days
belongs to the medium-dated option contracts, and Long-dated option
contracts cover the time period of greater than 60 days and less than or
equal to 90 days.
13. ARIMA (n, 1, 0) stands for Autoregressive Integrated Moving average
model with n autoregressive terms in the model as independent
variables, with first order level of differencing.
122 ● Derivative Markets in India
14. In the formula, residual sum of squares is given in the SPSS generated
solution for ARIMA models in the table called residuals diagnostics
and total sum of squares has been calculated by measuring variation in
the long-dated implied volatility (dependent variable) around its mean
value.
*Average implied volatility = (Implied volatility of call option + Implied volatility
of put option)/2
6 C H A P T E R
Informational Efficiency of
Implied Volatilities of S&P
CNX Nifty Index Options
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The implied volatilities (IVs) of options contracts represent the market’s ex-ante
forecast of the average volatility of the underlying asset over the remaining
life of the option contract (Merton, 1973; Hull and White, 1987). The IVs have
been of equal interest to academics as well as practitioners because of the
information they contain about the near future of the market and their usage
for valuation of options, risk hedging, portfolio selection, etc. These aspects
facilitate in assessing the informational efficiency of the options market in that
whether the options market is performing satisfactorily on its well-identified
function, viz. risk hedging, price discovery in the underlying’s market and
allocation of capital, as pointed out by Ackert and Tian (2001).
The informational efficiency of IVs has been tested by a number of studies
across the globe. For this purpose, it is hypothesized that the IVs impound
all the information contained in the historical returns. Therefore, in an
informational efficient options market, the forecasts based on IVs should
outperform the forecasts based on the historical returns. In view of this,
majority of the studies have compared IVs as a future estimate of volatility with
forecasts based on select conditional volatility models, namely Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) and Exponential
GARCH or EGARCH models.
In literature, some of the studies have supported the hypothesis that IVs
are informational efficient, i.e. these can be used as a predictor of future
volatility, whereas some of the studies have rejected this hypothesis. In this
respect, Day and Lewis (1992), a pioneering study on informational efficiency
of IVs of Standard & Poor’s 100 index options market of USA, found that the
IVs could not impound all the information available in the past returns and,
therefore, concluded that the IVs were not better forecasts of futures volatility
compared with those based on select conditional volatility models, namely,
GARCH(1, 1) and EGARCH(1, 1). The inability of implied volatility to forecast
124 ● Derivative Markets in India
Figure 6.1 Volatility clustering in daily returns of S&P CNX Nifty index, June 1997–2006
For clustering, data consisting of NSE Nifty index values has been
analysed for the period of 10 years from June 2, 1997 to June 30, 2006.
Figure 6.1 shows the daily returns of S&P CNX Nifty index and the
typical pattern of clustering. The returns are expressed in percentage
terms and are continuously compounded [ln(It/It – 1); where It and
It – 1 represent the value of index at day t and the previous day, t – 1,
respectively]. The figure clearly indicates that there are different phases
of high as well as low volatility. In the present study, this tendency in
index returns has been confirmed by using Ljung-Box statistics.
2. Fat-tailed distribution of asset returns: The fat-tailed distribution
property of asset returns is also known as leptokurtic (highly peaked)
distribution of returns. This represents the tendency of returns to cluster
126 ● Derivative Markets in India
excessively near the mean value (i.e. more peaked around the mean)
and higher probability of returns at tails of the distribution compared
with expected returns in case of a mesokurtic (normal) distribution. In
earlier studies, it is documented in Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965).
Nattenberg (1994) concludes that stock returns exhibit non-normal
skewness and kurtosis. These findings were also supported by the work
of Corrado and Su (1997), Clark (1973) and Blattberg and Gonedes (1974).
In this respect, Ghysels et al. (1996) contend that volatility clustering
and fat tails of asset returns are intimately related. The distributional
assumption of returns/innovations becomes important as it needs to be
specified for the estimation of variance equation in conditional volatility
models, e.g. GARCH and EGARCH.
3. Mean reversion: Mean reversion in volatilities indicates the tendency of
volatility to return to its normal level (i.e. the long-run level of volatility)
in long-run. It signifies that irrespective of the magnitude and sign of
fluctuations, the series reverts to its mean. Such a series in time-series
statistics is refereed to as a covariance stationary series, i.e. a series
which has a constant mean, variance and autocovariance (at different
lags), regardless of the point of time at which the measurement is made.
Though the property of mean reversion is accepted by most of the
practitioners, they may differ in the magnitude of the normal volatility
level and changes in it over a period of time (Engle and Patton, 2001).
The mean reversion in IVs has been examined empirically by Dixit et
al. (2007), a study on Indian options market.
4. Leverage effect: It is designated as the main reason for the asymmetrical
contribution of innovations (having different sign) to the volatility
of returns of a financial time series. In financial markets, it has been
observed that a negative shock contributes more to the volatility of
returns compared with a positive shock. That is, the volatility is high
when the market falls and is found to be relatively lower in times
of upward trends. This is explained by leverage effect. The financial
leverage or debt-equity ratio of the company increases as the value of
equity shares goes down in the market. This causes increase in the risk
the investor’s perceive as the futures streams of the cash flows from
the company become more uncertain. Therefore, a down movement
in the stock prices is expected to cause more volatility compared with
appositive movement. This effect was first noted by Black (1976) and
later supported by Christie (1982), Schwert (1989), Nelson (1991), Glosten
et al. (1993) and Engle and Ng (1993). They observe that the changes in
stock prices tend to be negatively correlated with the changes in stock
return volatility, and changes in stock return volatility are too large in
response to the changes in returns direction.
Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 127
These typical characteristics of the financial time series data have helped
financial econometricians to engineer more sophisticated models for
measurement and forecasting of volatility and led to the conditional volatility
models for more precise measurement and estimation of volatility.
q p
s 2t = w+ ∑
i =1
a i e t2– i + ∑b s
j =1
j
2
t–j (6.3)
6.3.1 Data
The data considered for the analysis can consist of (i) data related to S&P CNX
Nifty index options contracts, (ii) data related to the underlying asset, i.e. the
S&P CNX Nifty index, and (iii) data on the risk-free rate of return. The data
on the options consist of daily closing prices of options, strike prices, deal
dates, maturity dates and number of contracts of call as well as put options. In
order to minimize the bias associated with nonsynchonous trading, only liquid
option quotations (i.e. contracts which are having at least 100 contracts traded)
have been considered for the analysis. The second data set is regarding the
underlying asset. It includes daily closing prices of S&P CNX Nifty index. The
third data set consists of monthly average yield on 91-days Treasury-bills with
maturity date most close to the expiry of the options contracts.
The details pertaining to data collection and conversion of discrete yields
into continuous one have been provided in Chapter 3.
130 ● Derivative Markets in India
chosen for the analysis. The bias due to non-synchronous trading emerges
from the fact that closing prices for the thinly traded contracts are more likely
to represent transactions that occur before the close of the trading (Day and
Lewis, 1988). For further details refer to Chapter 5.
specification for the financial time serieshaving fat-tails. In order to arrive at the
correct specification for the innovations, the assumption of normal distribution
has been tested empirically, and the results are summarized in Table 6.1.
Skewness and kurtosis of the returns data provide initial evidences that
the distribution of returns departs from normality, as the observed values
of skewness and kustosis are different from the desired values of 0 and 3,
respectively, required for a normal distribution. The departure from normality
further gets corroborated by the Jarque and Bera test (summarized in Table
6.1), as it indicates severe departure from the normality. In addition, the
kurtosis of 7.7817 is indicative of leptokurtic distribution of returns, i.e. high
peakedness of the data and a relatively higher likelihood of observations on
the tails (fat-tails) compared with a normal (mesokurtic) distribution. The
high peakedness and fat-tails for the returns data are clearly depicted in
Fig. 6.2, which compares the empirical distribution of returns with the normal
distribution for such data set.
returns data series) and ARCH test have been found to be highly significant
at the all specified lags, viz. 4, 8, 12, 16 and 32. The high significance levels
for Q statistics at all specified lags for returns and absolute returns series
indicate the presence of serial correlation in the data. The high significance
of Q statistics for the squared returns, prima-facie, suggests the presence of
conditional heteroscedaticity. The presence of ARCH effect in the data further
gets validated by the high significance levels for Engle’s ARCH-LM test.
In short, the financial time series under consideration demonstrates the
typical characteristics which suggest an ARCH model with GED innovations,
an obvious choice for forecasting the volatility of NSE CNX Nifty index
returns.
Table 6.2 In-The-Sample Test of Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of Call as well as Put Options vis-à-vis Volatility Estimates
Using GARCH(1,1) Model, June 04, 2001, to June 30, 2006 (Unconstrained Model: s 2t = w + ae 2t –1 + bs 2t –1 + dIV2t –1 )
Options Coefficients GED Log Likelihood
Model
type w a b d parameter likelihood Ratio (LR) test
Derivative Markets in India
indicate that the IVs do have some relevant information. This is borne out by
the fact that the introduction of IVs as an exogenous variable in the GARCH
variance equation resulted in an increase in the value of log likelihood functions
(LLF), and the increase was found to be statistically significant.
Notably, the IVs of call options seem to be less inefficient compared with
those of put options, as the latter failed to capture ARCH as well as GARCH
effect present in the GARCH forecasts compared with the former which failed
to include only the GARCH effect. This finding further gets corroborated by
the fact that the coefficient of IVs in GARCH-IV models for call options turns
out to be higher compared with that in the case of put options, i.e. 0.4354 and
0.1107 for call and put options, respectively.
Besides, the incremental information of IVs in the case of put options seem
to be relatively less since its introduction as an exogenous variable in the
GARCH variance equation has increased the LLF just by 5.02 compared with
an increase of 21.86 in the case of call options. Also, the increase in LLF has
been found to be significant at 5% level of significance compared with the call
options, where it is significant even at 1% level of significance. In sum, ‘in-
the-sample’ analysis using GARCH model reveals that the IVs of call options
have been informationally superior to those of put options.
negative and statistically significant in the unconstrained model for both call
and put options. These findings, prima-facie, lead to the conclusion that the IVs
are informational inefficient. In sum, it would be reasonable to conclude that
the IVs have failed to incorporate all the typical characteristics of the returns
series under consideration, for in-the-sample analysis.
However, the informational inefficiency of IVs does not necessarily mean
that these do not include any information contained in EGARCH forecasts.
It is evident from the fact that the persistence of volatility for call options has
reduced from 0.8410 to 0.6649 on account of inclusion of implied volatility as
an exogenous variable in the variance equation. A reduction in persistence of
volatility was also observed in the case of put options, as it has reduced from
0.8785 to 0.7841. Besides, the statistical significance of the coefficient associated
with IVs denotes that these do have incremental information. The finding
that the IVs, in spite of their informational inefficiency, contain some useful
information has further been corroborated by the significant values of the LR
tests. Notably, the coefficients of IVs are statistically significant; however, the
magnitude is very low compared with those in the case of GARCH model. This
could be attributed to the inability of IVs to capture the leverage effect.
Moreover, as far as comparative efficiency of IVs of call and put options
is concerned, the results are in line with the GARCH-IV model. The poor
performance of IVs of put options is indicated by comparatively lower
magnitude of coefficient of IVs of put options in EGARCH-IV variance
equation. Also, the increase in LLF on account of introduction of implied
volatility as an exogenous variable is 5.80 for put options compared with an
increase of 15.18 for call options. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude
that put options market is more inefficient compared with call options market
in India.
+
+
=
(1,1) Model, June 04, 2001 to June 30, 2006 [Unconstrained Model: ln (s t2 ) = w b ln(s t2–1) a +g + d ln(IVt2– 1) ]
st – 1 st – 1
S. Estimation et – 1 e t –1
s 2t = w + ae 2t–1 + bs 2t–1 ln(s t2 ) = w + a +g
2
+ b ln(s t –1 )
no. date s t –1 s t –1
w a b w a g b
1 30-Jun-06 0.000013* 0.1559* 0.7746* −1.0473* 0.2706* −0.1369* 0.9054*
2 7-Jul-06 0.000012* 0.1530* 0.7780* −1.0333* 0.2707* −0.1340* 0.9071*
3 14-Jul-06 0.000012* 0.1546* 0.7771* −1.0274* 0.2739* −0.1318* 0.9080*
4 21-Jul-06 0.000012* 0.1546* 0.7820* −0.9915* 0.2736* −0.1316* 0.9119*
5 28-Jul-06 0.000012* 0.1548* 0.7811* −0.9911* 0.2707* −0.1330* 0.9117*
6 4-Aug-06 0.000013* 0.1588* 0.7714* −1.0294* 0.2668* −0.1515* 0.9070*
7 11-Aug-06 0.000012* 0.1575* 0.7741* −1.0279* 0.2707* −0.1384* 0.9076*
8 18-Aug-06 0.000013* 0.1581* 0.7719* −1.0359* 0.2685* −0.1419* 0.9065*
9 25-Aug-06 0.000013* 0.1658* 0.7636* −1.0435* 0.2688* −0.1471* 0.9054*
10 1-Sep-06 0.000013* 0.1608* 0.7690* −1.0515* 0.2695* −0.1436* 0.9049*
11 8-Sep-06 0.000013* 0.1594* 0.7719* −1.0777* 0.2642* −0.1556* 0.9013*
12 15-Sep-06 0.000014* 0.1583* 0.7639* −1.1392* 0.2619* −0.1537* 0.8940*
13 22-Sep-06 0.000013* 0.1528* 0.7740* −1.1256* 0.2600* −0.1506* 0.8955*
14 30-Sep-06 0.000012* 0.1429* 0.7896* −1.0417* 0.2543* −0.1381* 0.9048*
15 6-Oct-06 0.000013* 0.1472* 0.7743* −1.0719* 0.2543* −0.1345* 0.9015*
16 13-Oct-06 0.000012* 0.1414* 0.7880* −1.0649* 0.2557* −0.1319* 0.9024*
17 20-Oct-06 0.000012* 0.1400* 0.7912* −1.0582* 0.2545* −0.1337* 0.9031*
18 27-Oct-06 0.000012* 0.1401* 0.7912* −1.0532* 0.2550* −0.1325* 0.9037*
19 3-Nov-06 0.000012* 0.1418* 0.7896* −1.0518* 0.2573* −0.1312* 0.9041*
20 10-Nov-06 0.000012* 0.1442* 0.7872* −1.0635* 0.2601* −0.1348* 0.9031*
Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 141
Coefficients
S. Estimation et – 1 e t –1
s 2t = w + ae 2t–1 + bs 2t–1 ln(s t2 ) = w + a +g
2
+ b ln(s t –1 )
no. date s t –1 s t –1
w a b w a g b
21 17-Nov-06 0.000011* 0.1434* 0.7920* −1.0254* 0.2611* −0.1308* 0.9076*
22 24-Nov-06 0.000011* 0.1469* 0.7860* −1.0857* 0.2683* −0.1320* 0.9014*
23 1-Dec-06 0.000011* 0.1436* 0.7919* −1.0252* 0.2605* −0.1286* 0.9076*
24 8-Dec-06 0.000011* 0.1424* 0.7938* −1.0453* 0.2569* −0.1388* 0.9051*
25 15-Dec-06 0.000012* 0.1506* 0.7818* −1.1328* 0.2631* −0.1515* 0.8956*
26 22-Dec-06 0.000012* 0.1506* 0.7822* −1.1150* 0.2627* −0.1502* 0.8975*
27 29-Dec-06 0.000012* 0.1540* 0.7752* −1.1371* 0.2647* −0.1512* 0.8952*
28 5-Jan-07 0.000012* 0.1538* 0.7760* −1.1685* 0.2716* −0.1486* 0.8924*
29 12-Jan-07 0.000012* 0.1572* 0.7724* −1.1588* 0.2689* −0.1540* 0.8932*
30 19-Jan-07 0.000012* 0.1565* 0.7716* −1.1881* 0.2703* −0.1537* 0.8901*
31 26-Jan-07 0.000012* 0.1570* 0.7707* −1.1824* 0.2699* −0.1546* 0.8907*
32 2-Feb-07 0.000012* 0.1564* 0.7715* −1.1669* 0.2680* −0.1541* 0.8923*
33 9-Feb-07 0.000012* 0.1565* 0.7719* −1.1570* 0.2660* −0.1575* 0.8932*
34 16-Feb-07 0.000013* 0.1555* 0.7714* −1.1941* 0.2640* −0.1638* 0.8887*
35 23-Feb-07 0.000012* 0.1542* 0.7780* −1.1653* 0.2638* −0.1622* 0.8920*
36 2-Mar-07 0.000012* 0.1650* 0.7668* −1.1869* 0.2727* −0.1634* 0.8902*
37 9-Mar-07 0.000012* 0.1658* 0.7694* −1.1409* 0.2688* −0.1640* 0.8950*
38 16-Mar-07 0.000011* 0.1594* 0.7782* −1.1406* 0.2719* −0.1575* 0.8955*
39 23-Mar-07 0.000011* 0.1603* 0.7777* −1.0829* 0.2643* −0.1608* 0.9013*
40 30-Mar-07 0.000011* 0.1597* 0.7770* −1.0881* 0.2634* −0.1612* 0.9006*
41 6-Apr-07 0.000010* 0.1522* 0.7930* −1.0185* 0.2576* −0.1551* 0.9078*
42 13-Apr-07 0.000010* 0.1533* 0.7914* −1.0269* 0.2583* −0.1581* 0.9069*
43 20-Apr-07 0.000011* 0.1583* 0.7848* −1.0724* 0.2680* −0.1563* 0.9027*
44 27-Apr-07 0.000010* 0.1529* 0.7914* −1.0153* 0.2553* −0.1579* 0.9078*
45 4-May-07 0.000010* 0.1519* 0.7931* −1.0151* 0.2564* −0.1546* 0.9080*
46 11-May-07 0.000011* 0.1585* 0.7838* −1.0505* 0.2661* −0.1518* 0.9050*
47 18-May-07 0.000011* 0.1584* 0.7844* −1.0490* 0.2647* −0.1539* 0.9051*
48 25-May-07 0.000011* 0.1590* 0.7834* −1.0473* 0.2638* −0.1551* 0.9051*
49 1-Jun-07 0.000011* 0.1577* 0.7853* −1.0385* 0.2620* −0.1567* 0.9059*
50 8-Jun-07 0.000010* 0.1497* 0.7949* −1.0125* 0.2584* −0.1514* 0.9086*
51 15-Jun-07 0.000010* 0.1494* 0.7929* −1.0514* 0.2623* −0.1456* 0.9046*
52 22-Jun-07 0.000010* 0.1484* 0.7956* −1.0289* 0.2614* −0.1429* 0.9071*
53 29-Jun-07 0.000010* 0.1500* 0.7946* −1.0267* 0.2637* −0.1436* 0.9076*
* represents that the associated coefficient is significant at 1% level of significance.
Note: (1) To estimate the coefficient of the ARCH variance equation, the conditional mean equation
which has been found adequate is r1 = c + f1 rt – 1 + f4 rt – 4 + et, where et ~ GED (0. ht).
142 ● Derivative Markets in India
∑h
W
hF , t = F,t + i (6.8)
n i =1
W
where, h F , t is the average ex-ante forecast of conditional variance for the
D
week at time t; h F , t + 1 is the daily ex-ante forecast of conditional variance for
the ith day of the week at time t estimated from GARCH(1,1) or EGARCH(1,1)
model and n represents the number of trading days in that week. All such
forecasts of volatility have been annualized multiplying by 252 (number of
trading days in the year).
Likewise, the IVs of the options with shortest maturity (ranging between
‘8–30 days to maturity’) have been used as an ex-ante forecast of volatility
(V1t). The options having shortest maturity have been chosen in order to
minimize the noise caused by maturity mismatch, as these forecasts are to be
used as one-week ahead ex-ante forecast of volatility. Notably, the IVs (as an
ex-ante forecast for the next week) have been calculated at the close of trading
on the Friday, which, at the same time, marks the end of the rolling samples
for the estimation of ARCH models. From the options data, a series of 49
implied volatility forecasts of one-week-ahead volatility could be examined for
call as well as put option unlike the total number of 53 forecasts from ARCH
models, as four contracts were lost in filtering the data on specified moneyness
and liquidity criteria. This approach is similar to that adopted by Day and
Lewis (1992) and most of the other studies carried out later on (e.g. Claessen
and Mittinik, 2002).
Having estimated the ex-ante one-week ahead forecasts of volatility from
select ARCH and implied volatility models, the ex-post calculation of realized
volatility for the forecasted weeks has been carried out. Also, like ARCH
models, a total number of 53 one-week ahead realized volatilities were calculated
ex-post. The realized volatilities so calculated have been used as a benchmark
for assessing the forecasting ability of different volatility models under
consideration. The realized volatility for one week represents the average of
daily volatilities for all the trading days of the week. The formula used for
calculation of the realized volatility is given in Eq. (6.9).
n
1
VRt =
n ∑r +
i=1
2
t i (6.9)
Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 143
where, VRt is the realized average variance for the week at time ‘t’, r2t + i is the
squared return for the ith day calculated ex-post and n represents the number
of trading days in the week. The volatility so arrived has been annualized
multiplying by 252 (i.e. number of trading days in a year).
Further, mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE) and mean squared
error (MSE), the most commonly used criteria for assessing the forecasting
ability of different models, have been used to examine the forecasts from the
four models (i.e. ‘GARCH’, ‘EGARCH’, ‘Implied volatility of call options’
and ‘Implied volatility of put options’) vis-à-vis the realized volatility for
the week. The ME, MAE and MSE are given in Eqs (6.10), (6.11) and (6.12),
respectively.
n
1
ME =
n ∑
t =1
VtF – VtR (6.10)
n
1
MAE =
n ∑V
t =1
t
F
– VtR (6.11)
n
1 2
MSE =
n ∑
t =1
VtF – VtR (6.12)
where, VFt is one-week ahead ex-ante forecast from one of the select volatility
W
models under consideration, specifically, h F , t in the case of ARCH models and
VtI in the case of implied volatility models; n denotes the number of forecasts
made using each method, i.e. 53 in the case of ARCH models and 49 in the
case of implied volatility models; and VRt is the ex-post estimation of one-week
ahead realized volatility.
The results pertaining to the ex-ante forecasting performance of all the
volatility models under consideration are summarized in Table 6.5. The
findings clearly indicate that forecasts from the EGARCH model are the best
amongst all other competing models used to forecast the ex-ante volatility.
Also, the forecast from the GARCH model have shown better results compared
with those based on IVs of call as well as put options as indicated by MAE
and MSE. To sum up, the measures of forecast efficiency in terms of overall
MAE and MSE indicate that IVs have failed to generate considerably good
forecasts compared with those from the ARCH models both in the cases of
call and put options.
Notwithstanding the overall MAE and MSE, the overall ME designates IVs
from the call options as the best ex-ante forecast of future volatility because
it turns out to be the least. However, the conceptual superiority of the other
two measures, namely MAE and MSE, lessens the importance and reliability
of this finding, as the ME is sensitive to the sign of deviation. That is, positive
and negative deviations are neutralized in calculation of ME.
144 ● Derivative Markets in India
The forecasts based on IVs seem to have failed in impounding the ARCH
as well as leverage effect, which probably be assigned as a major reason for
relatively high forecast error compared with ARCH model. This finding, prima-
facie, rejects the hypothesis that the IVs have subsumed all the information
contained in ARCH forecasts, which are based on historical returns data. And,
therefore, the IVs can be designated as informational inefficient as these do
not seem to have impounded relevant information about the future forecasts
compared with ARCH models.
Since the above-mentioned findings are based on the overall measures of
forecast performance, there is always a possibility that such measures might
present a distorted picture on account of the presence of a few outliers in
the data. Therefore, it would be useful to further analyse the data for more
reliable results using different percentiles to test the consistency in forecasting
efficiency of different models under consideration. The percentiles are reported
in Table 6.5.
The results in terms of percentiles corroborate the above finding that
forecasts from the EGARCH model are the best as the first three quartiles (25th,
50th and 75th percentiles) turn out to be the least for this model compared with
all the other three competing models. That is, in 75% cases, the forecasts from
the EGARCH models have outperformed the forecasts from the other models
and, therefore, reflects the consistency of EGARCH ex-ante forecasts.
Moreover, if we look at all the percentiles calculated, the forecasts from the
EGARCH model have outperformed the forecasts from the implied volatility
in a total number of 85% cases, i.e. first 75% cases plus 10% cases from 85th
to 95th percentiles. In other words, the forecasts from the IVs of call options
(the next best model) have outperformed the EGARCH forecast only in 15%
of the total cases analysed. Likewise, the forecasts from the GARCH model
have outperformed the forecasts from the IVs of call options in a total number
of 65% of the cases analysed, i.e. first 50% cases plus 15% cases from 85th to
100th percentiles. Thus, the forecasts from implied volatility of call options
have outperformed the GARCH forecasts in 35%s of cases analysed.
In contrast, the forecasts from ARCH models have outperformed the
forecasts from the IVs of put options in a total number of 90% cases. That is,
the forecasts based on IVs of put options could outperform the forecasts from
the ARCH models only in 10% of the cases.
In view of the above findings, it would be appropriate to conclude that IVs
do not have much information about the futures volatility. These findings
corroborate the earlier finding (based on the overall ME, MAE and MSE) that
the IVs are informational inefficient. However, one of the plausible arguments
in favour of implied volatility could be the maturity mismatch. That is, IVs of
the options having 8–30 days to maturity have been used to forecast one-week
ahead volatility. Therefore, it would be appropriate to analyse the options that
Table 6.5 Comparative Forecasting Performance of Implied Volatility Models for Call as well as Put Options Having 8–30 Days to Maturity
vis-à-vis Select Conditional Volatility Models in Forecasting One-Week-Ahead Volatility, July 2006 to June 2006
Forecasting models
Performance
GARCH(1,1) EGARCH(1,1) Implied variance call options Implied variance put options
measurement
ME MAE MSE ME MAE MSE ME MAE MSE ME MAE MSE
Overall
0.00380 0.03083 0.00188 –0.00256 0.02700 0.00172 0.00156 0.03208 0.00199 0.03646 0.04953 0.00320
Percentiles
25 0.00229 0.01065 0.00012 –0.00311 0.00859 0.00007 –0.00750 0.01501 0.00023 0.02104 0.03332 0.00111
50 0.01530 0.02024 0.00041 0.00964 0.01658 0.00027 0.01567 0.02469 0.00061 0.04053 0.04508 0.00203
75 0.02484 0.03977 0.00159 0.01875 0.02851 0.00082 0.03054 0.03541 0.00126 0.05925 0.06447 0.00416
80 0.02667 0.04830 0.00234 0.02131 0.03654 0.00135 0.03339 0.03635 0.00132 0.06465 0.06679 0.00446
85 0.03492 0.06916 0.00480 0.02505 0.04998 0.00250 0.03482 0.03860 0.00149 0.07036 0.08225 0.00677
90 0.03981 0.07563 0.00573 0.02890 0.07250 0.00525 0.03606 0.08018 0.00643 0.08242 0.09462 0.00895
95 0.05658 0.10436 0.01096 0.03752 0.11309 0.01281 0.03860 0.12754 0.01644 0.10205 0.10204 0.01041
100 0.07065 0.13849 0.01918 0.05057 0.14231 0.02025 0.04214 0.14248 0.02030 0.12827 0.12827 0.01645
Note: In the table, ME, MAE and MSE denote mean error, mean absolute error and mean squared error, respectively.
Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of S&P CNX Nifty Index Options
●
145
146 ● Derivative Markets in India
are close to the one-week forecast horizon (in terms of maturity) to assess the
true informational efficiency of IVs in forecasting the future volatility. For the
purpose, the IVs of the options having 8 days to maturity have been used to
compare the ex-ante one-week ahead forecasting ability of different volatility
models under consideration. The results in this regard are summarized in
Table 6.6.
The results clearly indicate that the forecasts from the IVs of call options
turn out to the best, as the overall ME, MAE and MSE are the least amongst all
the competing models. However, the percentiles corroborate that the forecasts
from the EGARCH model still remain the best forecasts, as the MAE and MSE
for the first three quartiles (for 75% of the cases) are the least among all the
models. That is, the percentage of forecasts from EGARCH that outperformed
the implied volatility forecasts from the call options has reduced from 85% to
75% and can be attributed to the correction of maturity mismatch.
At the same time, the forecasts from the IVs have shown considerable
improvement vis-à-vis GARCH forecasts when corrected for maturity
mismatch. The forecasts from the IVs of call options have outperformed all
the forecasts from the GARCH model; the percentage of GARCH forecasts
outperforming the forecasts based on the IVs of call options has reduced from
65% to 0. In view of these findings, it would be appropriate to infer that the
informational inefficiency in the IVs of call options can, to a marked extent,
be attributed to the maturity mismatch.
In sum, it can be concluded that the forecasts from the IVs of the call
options impound all the information contained in the GARCH forecast. In
other words, the IVs of call options do contain relevant information about
the future volatility; however, these failed to capture the leverage effect as
the forecasts from the EGARCH models still outperformed implied volatility
in 75% of the cases.
Unlike the IVs of call options, those of put options have shown no
improvement in their forecasting ability. It is evident from the fact that the
forecasts of put options from the ARCH models have outperformed the
forecasts based on IVs in 95% of the cases. This finding corroborates the earlier
finding that the IVs of put options are clearly informational inefficient and do
not contain much relevant information for forecasting the future volatility.
Similarly, the respective coefficients turn out to be 0.1654 and 0.0890 for the
EGARCH variance equation. These findings denote that the IVs of call options
are more informational efficient compared with those of put options.
Further, the forecasts based on IVs of put options have been outperformed
by the forecast of all the other models under consideration (Tables 6.5 and
6.6). Notably, the forecasts based on IVs of put options have consistently
been outperformed by those based on the IVs of call options, as manifested
in ME, MAE and MSE on aggregate as well as disaggregate basis (in terms of
percentiles). Moreover, the MEs in the case of forecasts from the IVs of put
options have consistently been higher (nearly more than double) compared
with those in the case of call options. This finding (along with the MAE and
MSE), per-se, reveals that the IVs of put options are consistently overstating the
forecasts of future volatility compared with those of call options and signifies
that the IVs of put options are overpriced. The relative overpricing of IVs of put
options can be attributed to the overpricing of the put options, as the call and
put options used for out-of-the-sample analysis have the same characteristics,
viz. trading date, maturity date and strike price. The overpricing of put
options in relation to the corresponding call options is, apparently, indicative
of violation of the put–call parity relationship.
Therefore, the poor performance of IVs of put options vis-à-vis those
of call options, as revealed by in-the-sample as well as out-of the-sample
analysis, can be attributed to the overpricing of put options. Also, it would
be appropriate to conclude that the IVs of put options are more informational
inefficient compared with those of call options. However, such anomalies in
an efficient market should be corrected by arbitrage mechanism, provided the
market microstructure facilitates the arbitrage processes required to correct
such anomalies.
Given the state of market microstructure of Indian securities market
during the period under reference, the relative overpricing of put options can
possibly be attributed to the short-selling constraint. This has been assigned as
one of the major reasons in view of the fact that to exploit such an arbitrage
opportunity, the three courses of action, namely (i) sell the overpriced put,
(ii) buy a corresponding call with the same contract specifications and (iii) sell
the underlying asset(s) short, are required to be taken. In short, relatively lower
informational efficiency of the IVs of put options could be traced to the existing
market microstructure in India during the period under reference.
The major finding of the study that the IVs do not incorporate all the
information available in the historical returns, which signifies the informational
inefficiency of IVs vis-à-vis the volatility estimates from select ARCH models,
is in line with Day and Lewis (1992), Canina and Figlewski (1993), Lamoureux
and Lastrapes (1993) and Pong et al. (2004) for the forecast horizon of one
Informational Efficiency of Implied Volatilities of S&P CNX Nifty Index Options ● 149
day and one-week. However, at the same time, the results of the study are
opposite to some studies that found IVs to be informational efficient. These
include Latane and Rendleman (1976), Chiras and Manaster (1978), Gemmill
(1986), Shastri and Tandon (1986), Scott and Tucker (1989), Xu and Taylor
(1995), Fleming, J. (1998) and Claessen and Mittnik (2002).
END NOTES
1. The non-negativity constraints on the coefficients of an ARCH variance
equation rule out the possibility of negative coefficients, as the values
of the coefficients are restricted to zero or a positive value (may or may
not be specified explicitly). This, in turn, does away with the possibility
of a negative variance estimate.
2. Generalized Error Distribution (GED) is a theoretical distribution, which
is suitable for the data which have fat-tails and high peakedness.
3. It represents a model where no constraint has been imposed on the
value of coefficients in the model.
4. It represents a model where one or more coefficients have been
constrained to some value, e.g. zero.
7 C H A P T E R
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This survey attempts to gauge viewpoint of trading member organizations/
brokers on the state of pricing of options contracts in Indian derivatives
market and reforms in terms of regulation and educational initiatives for the
betterment of the market. For the purpose, a questionnaire has been prepared
to seek responses/perception of trading member organizations on the issue. The
survey was conducted amongst the branch managers and research analysts of
brokerage firms based at Delhi and Mumbai. The survey is expected to provide
a useful insight primarily for two reasons: (i) the brokerage firms play a central
role in capital creation in an economy as they facilitate trading of financial
securities/assets (including derivatives securities), and (ii) derivatives markets
is new in India as it took off in June 2000 only, and therefore, the understanding
of the market amongst such intermediaries needs to be assessed.
In the survey, the viewpoint of the respondents has been captured on five
major aspects. These are: (i) level of participation and usage of the options market,
(ii) awareness and use of models for options valuation, (iii) understanding
of put–call parity relationship, (iv) correctness of options pricing, its impact
and existence and exploitability of arbitrage opportunities and (v) need of
regulations and educational initiatives for the betterment of the market.
The rest of the chapter has been organized in four sections. The Section 7.2
enumerates survey methodology. Profile of respondents has been summarized
in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 contains analysis and empirical evidences. The
chapter ends with concluding observations in Section 7.5.
and phone calls. As a result, in the time span of approximately 5 months from
March 2008 to August 2008, a total number of 64 responses were received. The
responses include 31 responses from Delhi and 33 from Mumbai. Out of all the
31 responses from Delhi, 19 were collected through personal visits and rest of
the responses were received though postal mail (9) and email (3). Similarly,
all the 33 responses from Mumbai were received through postal mail (26) and
email (7). This amounts to 12.38% of the total population of trading members
active in derivatives segments.
Though the response rate is less than one-fifth (18.29%, i.e. 64 out of 350), it
should not be considered as low/poor response in view of the busy schedule
of executives of trading member organizations. Another reason for such a
response rate is that business organizations normally consider information
related to financial matters very sensitive and confidential. However, the
response level should be borne in mind while interpreting the results/findings
of the survey.
51% of total respondents had average daily turnover (notional value) between
` 25 and 100 crore, one-fourth of the respondents had daily trading volume of
more than ` 100 crore, and nearly one-fourth (24%) of the respondents belongs
to the category having a daily turnover of less than ` 25 crore.
It would be reasonable to infer from the above findings that the respondents
of the survey have accorded relatively less weightage to options; their major
interest seems to be in futures contracts. The finding for marked preference
to the futures is in conformity with an earlier survey in the Indian derivatives
market by Srivastava et al. (2008).
It was also of interest to ascertain the purpose of taking a position in options
market. The results have been presented in Fig. 7.4. An overwhelming majority
(95%) of the respondents have been using this market primarily for hedging, in
conjunction with other objectives, e.g. speculation and arbitrage. Speculation
(75% of respondents), along with other purposes, has been the second most
preferred objective; however, arbitrage emerged as the least preferred objective
for entering the market. The findings of survey, to a marked extent, are in line
with the report of the L.C. Gupta Committee (1998) on derivatives market. The
Committee reported that majority of the respondents (70%) aspired to have a
derivatives market to get a proper hedging mechanism for the equity portfolios.
Figure 7.5 Awareness of options valuation models amongst respondents of the survey
Table 7.1 One-Sample ‘T’ Test for The Statistical Validation of Agreement/Disagreement of Respondents on the Some Aspects Relating to Valuation
of Options
Test value = 03
95% confidence interval of
Statement Number X s Mean
t df Sig. the difference
difference
Lower Upper
Valuation of options is more
64 4.19 0.687 13.83 63 0.000 1.188 1.02 1.36
difficult than that of futures
Volatility is most difficult to be
64 3.69 0.990 5.56 63 0.000 0.688 0.44 0.93
estimated
Implied volatility can be used to
64 3.89 0.620 11.49 63 0.000 0.891 0.74 1.05
value the options
Survey Analysis and Findings
●
159
160 ● Derivative Markets in India
Figure 7.6 contains the factors considered by those respondents who have
been using BS and BT models in valuing options. The results depicted in the
figure are revealing, as the respondents who are using BS and BT models in
pricings options have not considered all the factors reckoned by these models in
valuing options. These models, in general, include six variables, namelystrike
price, spot price, time to maturity, volatility of underlying asset, interest rate
and dividend yield/absolute amount of dividends, to arrive at the correct
price for the options.
The vast majority of respondents (80%) have considered the first four factors
in valuing index or stock options; it is surprising to note that the last two
factors, namely interest rate and dividend yield, have not been used widely
in valuing the options. Amongst the four most considered factors, volatility
of underlying asset has been indicated as the most important factor, as all
the respondents considered it in valuing the options. As far as interest rate
is concerned, only 52% and 61% of the respondents have used it in valuing
index and stock options, respectively; the figure is much lower at 23% and 35%,
respectively, pertaining to the use of dividend yields for valuation purpose.
The finding that interest rate is one of the two least considered factors for
valuing options amongst respondent is in line with Srivastava et al. (2008). It
may be noted that the consideration of dividend yield in valuation would not
affect the correct prices much; however, the valuation using these models is
not possible without considering the interest rate, as it is a necessary input
required to determine options price.
In sum, it would be reasonable to conclude that the ‘true’ percentage of the
respondents who are actually using the ‘correct’ valuation models is lower
than that noted earlier (52%). The actual percentage represents the respondents
who reckoned interest rate also (along with other variables) as an important
factor for valuing options. Based on such a correct measure, nearly one-fourth
162 ● Derivative Markets in India
of the respondents are actually using valuation models (BS and BT) for valuing
index options. Likewise, a marginally higher percentage of respondents have
been found to be actually using valuation models for pricing options.
As far as the method used for estimating volatility is concerned, half of
the respondents have been found to be using standard deviation method
(Fig. 7.7). In contrast, only 16% of the respondents have been using moving
average models; surprisingly, the remaining one-third (34%) of the respondents
were not using any model to estimate the volatility.
Figure 7.7 Percentage of respondents using specific model for estimating volatility
Since the first direct question has revealed that nearly one-third (34%)
of the participants are not aware of the PCP relationship and the next two
questions have shown contradictory results on the PCP relationship, it would
be reasonable to conclude that a significant proportion of the total respondents
lack correct understanding of the concept.
This issue has further been examined by using cross tabulation of responses
to all the three questions on PCP relationship. The results are summarized
in Table 7.4. It is pertinent to note that nearly one-third (32%) of the
164
●
Table 7.3 One-Sample t-test for the Responses on the PCP Relationship
Test value = 03
95% confidence interval of
Statement Number s
Derivative Markets in India
Count 3 15 2 14 8 42
Total
●
represents those respondents who responded to the question/statement no. 1 and 3 but did not respond to question/statement no. 2.
166 ● Derivative Markets in India
The results depicted in Figs 7.9 and 7.10 clearly demonstrate that nearly
two-fifth (39%) of the respondents have felt that the options in Indian securities
market are incorrectly priced, whereas more than one-third (34%) of the
respondents have believed that these are correctly priced. The remaining
one-fourth (27%) of the respondents showed their inability to judge the state
of options pricing in the market.
On the direction of mispricing of options contracts, only 9% of the
respondents opined that options in Indian securities market are underpriced
when asked for the direction of mispricing. At the same time, a major segment,
i.e. 34% of the respondents, could not say anything on the issue. Majority of
the respondents, who represents 57% of the participants, were of the opinion
that options are not underpriced, i.e. these could either be correctly priced
or overpriced. In order to deduce the percentage of respondents who have
believed that options are overpriced, the responses on these two dimensions
of options pricing (namely viewpoint on the state of pricing and direction of
mispricing, if any) have been cross tabulated. The results are demonstrated
in Table 7.5 and Fig. 7.11.
Table 7.5 Correctness of Options Pricing in Indian Market: Trading Members’ Perspective
Category of respondents Percentage
Incorrectly priced and overpriced 24
Incorrectly priced and underpriced 9
Incorrectly priced and no opinion on under/overpricing 11
No opinion on correctness and under/overpricing 22
Correctly priced 34
Total 100
Fig. 7.12) indicate that more than 80% of the respondents had actually tried
for the arbitrage in the options market. However, amongst these respondents,
more than one-fourth (27%) of the respondents have attempted to gain
from arbitrage quite frequently, majority of respondents (i.e. 65%) have not
attempted frequently, and a meager 8% of such respondents rarely tried such
strategies.
The majority of the respondents (64%) who felt that the arbitrage
opportunities had been difficult to exploit or not exploitable at all were of the
opinion that dearth of liquidity in the options market was the major reason
for their inability to exploiting such opportunities. Higher bid–ask spread
had been cited as the second major reason for this. Notably, higher bid-ask
spreads essentially can be traced to the dearth of liquidity. In operational terms,
172 ● Derivative Markets in India
the investors who feel this as the reason for inability to exploiting arbitrage
indirectly signal liquidity as the main reason.
In sum, therefore, it would be appropriate to conclude that a vast majority
(79%) of such respondents perceived dearth of liquidity as the major reason
for inability to exploiting arbitrage opportunities. This apart, nearly one-tenth
(9%) of such respondents felt that cost associated with such opportunities had
been higher than the profit margins expected from such opportunities.
It is surprising to note that none of the respondents mentioned any of the
market frictions, e.g. short-selling constraint in the market, as a reason for
their inability to exploiting from arbitrage opportunities. The finding suggests
that respondents are either using futures market to overcome the short-selling
constraint or they are not using the arbitrage strategies which require use of
short-sell. However, the latter seems to be the more probable reason as in the
absence of short-selling mechanism, the futures market cannot be expected to
be correctly priced and, therefore, would not be able to identify the arbitrage
in all the cases even if the options market is inefficient. In sum, it would
be reasonable to conclude that the respondents do not seem to be aware of
arbitrage opportunities that require short-selling mechanism in place.
On the educational initiatives for the investors, the respondents were asked
on three aspects—(i) the need of educating investors more on the derivatives,
(ii) opinion on creating a separate body for the purpose and (iii) the acceptable
ownership pattern for the proposed educational body. The results regarding
the first two aspects have been summarized in Table 7.9 and the responses to
the third aspect have been depicted in Fig. 7.16.
In an overwhelming response to the need of more educational initiatives,
a vast majority (94%) of the respondents felt that enhanced educational
initiatives for investors’ education need to be put in place. As a solution to the
warranted increase in educational initiatives, more than four-fifth (84%) of the
respondents agreed that a separate non-profit organization should be created
to carry out this task. The agreement on these two proposals so observed has
been supported statistically as well (Table 7.9). With respect to the ownership
of the proposed educational organization, a major segment of the respondents
has given first priority to the Public Private Partnership (PPP).
Table 7.9 One-Sample t-Test for the Statistical Validation of Agreement/Disagreement of Respondents on the Enhanced Educational Initiatives
Test value = 03
95% confidence interval of
Statement Number X s Mean
T df Sig. the difference
difference
Lower Upper
Need of more education on
64 4.55 0.75 16.40 63 0.000 1.547 1.36 1.74
derivatives
Need of a separate body for
64 3.89 0.86 8.31 63 0.000 0.891 0.68 1.10
educating investors on derivatives
Survey Analysis and Findings
●
175
176 ● Derivative Markets in India
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