Peter Batty - The House of Krupp - The Steel Dynasty That Armed The Nazis (2001) PDF
Peter Batty - The House of Krupp - The Steel Dynasty That Armed The Nazis (2001) PDF
PETER BATTY
This Cooper Square Press paperback edition of The House of Krupp (originaIly
published in the U.K. in 1966) is an unabridged republication of the edition first
published in 1967 in New York, here updated with a new afterword by the author. It is
reprinted by arrangement with Random House U.K., Ltd., and the author.
HD9523.9.K7 B3 2001
338.7'67'0943-dc21 2001053814
"'
8 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER
Contents
Introduction II
12. "We take great pride in the fact that our products
have come up to expectations" 177
Afterword 326
Bibliography 335
Index 337
List of Plates
BETWEEN PAGES 160 AND I6I
Alfried today
RENE BURRI (MAGNUM)
has any, can be laid at many doorsteps, its faults, alas, are
purely mine alone.
A final word of gratitude must go to my wife and to my
small children for being so tolerant in what has been a
difficult time for me. I trust and hope that my two young sons
and my young daughter will perhaps wonder in the years to
come what was all their father's fuss about guns and U-boats
and tanks and slave-labour. For myself, if another Krupp
cannon is never again fired in anger then it will have been
worth while.
Arndt
( -1624)
(1706-1757) T
Friedrich Jodokus m Helene Amalie
(Ascherteld)
Peter Friedrich
(1753 - 1795)
Frie~rich
(1787 11826)
Alt red
(1812 11887)
Friedrich Alt red ('Fri ti)
(1854-1902)
I
Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach m Bertha
QB70 - 1950) T QBB6-1957)
Al tried
(1907- )
I
Arndt
(1938- )
CHAPTER ONE
" ... for the manufacture of English Cast Steel and all
products made thereof"
The truth would seem to be that neither did, but that Alfred
eventually developed a way of making cast steel based on the
British process. So far as Friedrich is concerned, he had not
attempted to compete for Napoleon's £1,000 until he met
up with two retired army officers by the name of von
Kechel. These brothers claimed they possessed a secret
formula for making a steel every bit as good as the British
product. However, they did not tell Friedrich-and he
would appear not to have asked-the source of this formula.
It was in fact taken from a school textbook on chemistry!
Nor did the von Kechels tell Krupp that a previous venture
of theirs for making steel in another part of Germany had
recently gone bust.
Unknowing, yet undaunted, Friedrich entered into a
partnership with the von Kechels. He was to contribute the
capital for establishing the plant and keeping it running, in
return for their providing their "secret formula" ; the profits
were to be split two ways. And so on 20 November 1811,
when he was just twenty-four years old, having announced to
his friends that he "had no further interest in spices",
Friedrich founded the firm of Fried. Krupp of Essen to build
and to operate a factory "for the manufacture of English
Cast Steel and all products made thereof" -the firm which,
surviving many changes of fortune, is still the basis of
today's multi-million-pound Krupp industrial empire.
Spellbound by the vision of immense profits which he
felt sure would soon be his, Friedrich straightaway took on
fifty workers to help build his smelting shop and forge, and
immediately began buying immense quantities of coal and
iron. He proclaimed that he was prepared "to supply all
Europe with his steel" and he commissioned scores of price-
lists from the well-known Essen printing-house of Baedecker
-the selfsame family who later published the famous guide-
books.
But Friedrich and the von Kechels never produced any
steel-and after three years of fruitless experimenting, during
which he lost more than £5,000, Friedrich finally took his
family's advice in the autumn of 1814 and closed down the
works. His partners tried to milk him even further, before
the courts came to his rescue and decided the factory's
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
little cottage he had originally built near the factory for the
foreman. His wife told her friends that the air outside the city
walls would suit their health better and that Friedrich could
also "keep a closer eye on affairs at the works" -not that
much was happening at the works, for almost all their
customers had left them. But Friedrich's health was really
broken now. In fact he spent most of his time in bed. The
rest of the family did not bear these tribulations temperately
-and their noisy arguments became the talk of the town.
Friedrich had long since resigned his seat on the city council
and his name had already been struck off the list of taxpayers.
In 1825, the year after giving up the Flax Market house, he
had to suffer the final indignity of being removed from the
Register of Privileged Merchants: a sort of local Who's Who.
To date, his various enterprises had swallowed up more than
£30,000. His only daughter was working as a governess
while his eldest son was billeted on relatives because
Friedrich could no longer afford to feed him. On 8 October
1826, although just thirty-nine years old, Friedrich Krupp
succumbed to pectoral dropsy.
The year he died, coal from the Ruhr was borne for the
first time by rail and the Rhine saw its first passenger steam-
ship. His had been an era of great change. Essen was discard-
ing the final traces of mediaevalism, while all Germany was
at last beginning to throw off the lethargy into which she had
fallen during the long decline of the Holy Roman Empire.
The stage was being set for what would have seemed to him
incredible material progress and prosperity, for the final
forging of German political unity through Bismarck's "blood
and iron". If Friedrich had been born perhaps only a few
decades later, it is conceivable that he might have been
more fortunate. His failure mirrors the immense difficulties
under which the early German industrialists had to labour.
The year before Friedrich's death, Goethe wrote, "Wealth
and rapidity are what the world now admires and what
everyone now strives to attain .•• this is the century for
men with heads on their shoulders, for practical men of
quick perceptions, who, because they possess a certain
adroitness, feel their superiority to the multitude."
Friedrich's body was laid to rest in a little churchyard near
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 45
the centre of Essen. Not many years afterwards, when the
city began to outgrow its ancient walls, the cemetery was
built upon. Today no gravestone indicates the spot where he
lies. What is more no painted likeness of him has survived
the passage of time. Yet he has perhaps the most concrete
memorial of all the Krupps, for it is his name after all that
the firm bears today-Fried. Krupp of Essen.
CHAPTER THREE
there was no work for them to do. But Alfred himself never
slackened for one moment. He used to visit all the smithies
and forges for miles around Essen, seeking custom, but
he was ha\'ing to compete with steel from England which
still dominated the Prussian market. Even when the orders
came in they were small and far from regular in flow: a
few tools here, a few fleshing knives there, and only very
occasionally the more lucrative coin-dies for mints.
As prosperity began to pick up in Prussia, so Alfred's
business gradually improved. He started venturing farther
afield in search of work for his foundrymen, visiting the
valleys of the Main and the Neckar in south Germany-
trips which proved quite profitable. However, like his
father before him, as soon as any money began to come in
Alfred immediately plunged into schemes for rebuilding and
extending the works. The smelting-shop was fitted out with
a new forging-press-and he even installed a wooden power-
hammer. But the hammer was something of a white ele-
phant, because there was seldom enough water in the stream
to drive it. In the end it was to be another sort of drive and
power that would save Krupp, that would put him on the
path to eventual fortune-the drive and power of Prussia.
At the Peace Conference following Napoleon's defeat,
Prussia had been given most of the former Rhineland states
in the west as compensation for the loss of her Polish terri-
tories in the east. In making this territorial transfer, the
statesmen of the day did not of course consult the wishes of
the luckless people who happened to live in these lands-
it was merely a question of counting heads, or souls as the
diplomats called them then. Prussia in point of fact would
have much preferred to have kept her part of Poland, or at
least to have got a bigger slice of Saxony, and not to have
had anything to do with the Rhineland-indeed when she
was given it she suspected the whole mana:uvre as a piece of
skulduggery on the part of her former allies. What she
certainly did not realise at the time was that she was giving
up some relatively worthless agricultural land in the east and
obtaining in return what was to become the richest industrial
area in the world. Nor did her allies realise that by granting
Prussia the Rhineland they were really forcing her to
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 49
become a German State, a prospect she had hitherto been
reluctant to face up to. What is more, because the new
Prussian lands in the west were cut off from Prussia proper
in the east, they were in effect creating problems of defence
and pure administration for the Prussians which could only
be satisfactorily solved by annexing all the territories in
between-and once Prussia had done that she would be not
only the most powerful state in Germany but also well on
the way to becoming the most powerful state in Europe.
Three years after the 1815 peace, in an attempt to help
unite their scattered provinces, the Prussian Government
lifted all internal Customs barriers and at the same time
abolished most of the remaining petty restrictions on the
movement of trade. At first many of the other German states
retaliated by coming together in groups themselves to form
their own Customs unions. However, these never proved
very popular, and on l January 1834 they all joined up
with Prussia in a single Customs union which within two
years had been extended to cover most of Germany except
Tor Austria, Hanover, and a few of the tinier territories.
This Zollverein, as it was called, created what many German
businessmen had been longing for-a single economic unit
of twenty-five million people. In many ways it was the fore-
runner of today's European Common Market-and of
course Ruhr businessmen such as Alfred Krupp were well
placed to serve this new community.
Indeed, three months after the Zollverein's creation,
Alfred was setting out on a business trip that took him to all
the principal centres of Germany-a trip that was so
successful that by the end of 1834 he had trebled his output
and had increased his labour-force from eleven to thirty.
A year later he had doubled his production yet again and
was then employing nearly seventy people. At long last he
was able to purchase a steam-engine to power his forging-
hammers and in this way could turn his back once and for
all on the seasonal variations of drought, flood, and ice in his
mill-streams. As fate would have it he obtained his steam-
engine-a £750 twenty-horsepower one-from that self-
same Good Hope iron-foundry which his great-grandmother
had once possessed and which his father had nearly inherited
50 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
next-door to the old cottage where his father had died and
where his family had been residing ever since.
Alfred maintained the fiction to his dying day that he had
been born in this old cottage, when of course his birth-
place was Helene Amalie's much grander house in the Flax
Market. IIideed, in 1871 when the old cottage was almost
on the point of total collapse because of subsidence from
the mines beneath, Alfred had it entirely rebuilt and restored
although none of the original furniture or fittings had sur-
vived. It became a sort of shrine with him; a place to which
he would often return when depressed and one where
occasionally he would conduct his most important business.
He even decorated it with a steel plaque which read:
"Fifty years ago this dwelling, originally a workman's house,
was the refuge of my parents. May every one of our workmen
escape the load of care which the foundation of these Works
brought upon us. For twenty-five years doubt remained of
the success which has since then gradually, and ultimately
in such a marvellous degree, rewarded the privations, the
exertions, the confidence, and the perseverance of the past."
When he died his body lay in state there before being
taken to the cemetery for burial. Allied bombers destroyed
the cottage in 1943, but one of the first things Alfred's great-
grandson did on regaining control of Krupp's was to order
its rebuilding. When restored it formed the central attraction
of the firm's one hundred and fiftieth anniversary celebra-
tions in 1961 just as it had done at the centenary celebrations
fifty years before.
But to return to the early troubles of Alfred.
At the end of 1843 he again found himself short of funds.
This time he was rescued by a long-standing friend of the
family's, Fritz Solling, who loaned him £12,000 and as a
result became a sleeping partner in the firm. Besides being
a clever book-keeper with experience of selling overseas
Solling was also a determined critic of Alfred's business
methods, particularly of his expensive travelling and per-
petual building-criticisms which over the years led to a
state of almost continual friction between the two.
Because of the way in which the depression had hit many
of the country's newer industries, the Prussian Government
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 57
now raised the level of Customs dues in an attempt to help
protect them from further foreign competition. Naturally
such a move benefited Alfred enormously in his endeavours
to supplant British steel with his own native German
product. Within the year he had increased his labour-force
by another twenty-five and could now afford to spread
himself a little by taking on his cousin Adalbert Ascherfeld
as factory manager. Ascherfeld tyrannised the men who
worked for him and quickly became notorious as a stern
disciplinarian-passers-by used to taunt Krupp workers
hurrying to the factory gate in the early morning with cries
of "Run, run, or else old Ascherfeld will get you."
Alfred was a pioneer of industrial public relations and
during his whole life never missed an opportunity to publi-
cise his firm. He was also one of the first manufacturers,
especially in Germany, to make maximum use of that up-and-
coming sales device, the international industrial exhibition.
When, for instance, he won the gold medal for his exhibits
of cast steel at the Berlin Industrial Fair of 1844 he used the
occasion for an intensive publicity campaign for his factory.
While visiting England and France again in 1846 and
1847, Alfred managed not only to obtain an English patent
on the improved spoon-roller but also to meet James Roths-
child in Paris, though there is no record of the House of
Krupp having at that time done business with Europe's
most famous banking family.
But another of the periodic slumps that characterised the
nineteenth century brought him hurrying back to Essen.
This latest one seemed to hit Krupp's particularly hard-
their sales dropped from £12,000 to £6,ooo within the
year. For want of further credit, the works were in danger
of having to close down altogether. Fritz Solling, Alfred's
partner, was inclined to blame everything on Alfred's
mismanagement, particularly his having wasted the profits
of previous good years on excessive travelling and over-
ambitious building schemes. Alfred in his turn tried to pass
the blame off on to his two younger brothers, Hermann and
Fritz. Fritz had not been with the firm all that long, but had
already distinguished himself with his clever and resourceful
refinements of many of Alfred's products, especially the
58 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
WHEN PRUSSIA by her victory over France set the seal on her
hegemony in Germany, Alfred was entering his sixtieth
year. Although he was to live for another sixteen and was to
become the wealthiest man in all Europe, these were years of
personal decline for him-years of megalomania and acute
unhappiness.
He had in fact spent most of the war engaged on something
totally removed from the blood-letting of battle. In April
1870, just three months before the first shot was fired in
anger and while the succession of diplomatic crises was
putting almost everyone else off making such firm decisions
about the future, Alfred had laid the foundation-stone of his
dream-castle on the hill-the monstrous Villa Hiigel, that
great, graceless, 200-roomed "lumpen" and lugubrious pile
still standing today amid parkland near Essen. An arrogantly
sprawling place, with cathedral-like halls and steeple-high
staircases, it was just such a folly an Orson Welles might
have fashioned for a Citizen Kane. Here in suitable splen-
dour, successive Krupps have entertained kings and kaisers,
presidents and princes-and of course a fuhrer.
Hugel was the fourth house Alfred had designed and
constructed for himself. After moving out of the minuscule
four-room wooden cottage with its slanting roof and tiny
windows, in which his father had died and in which his
mother had brought up her four children, Alfred had built
next to it a grander, three-storeyed affair. But this had soon
become dwarfed as the factory spread and engulfed it.
Then in 1859, the year of Prussia's first big order for his
guns, he had put up, again within the Works, a much
more sumptuous and grandiose residence, styled The
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
most prosperous days the firm had ever known, but they had
also been the most squalid-but then the graph in the
fortunes of the House of Krupp during the next forty years
was to show a sharp and uncannily pronounced correlation
between moral meanness and material success, none more so
perhaps than in the period from Fritz's death up to the
beginning of the First World War.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Laon Salient near Crepy, where the German front line was
nearest the French capital. Designed purely for terror, in
fact to frighten the citizens of Paris into forcing their Govern-
ment to surrender, Long Max was an intrinsic part of
General Ludendorff's last desperate offensive.
The giant gun had been mounted in great secrecy, special
rail tracks having had to be laid for the purpose. Squadrons
of aircraft flew constantly overhead and simultaneous salvoes
from other batteries in the area accompanied each round so
as to make it all the more difficult for the British and French
gunners to pinpoint its exact position. Long Max's crew of
sixty was bossed by a full admiral, for it had been developed
in fact from the fifteen-inch Krupp naval gun that in April
1915 had successfully shelled Dunkirk from twenty-three
and a half miles away. By lengthening the barrel and
tapering the point of the shell, Krupp's gun designers had
managed to extend its range to sixty miles. But then the
German Army's retreat from the Somme in 1917 had taken
them all by surprise and had necessitated them having to
add an extra fifteen miles to Long Max's range. This they
did not accomplish until January 1918. Even so, the building
of the gun emplacement and the laying of the special rail-
tracks had been started as early as September 19 I 7, though
the monster weapon itself was not finally in place before the
beginning of March 19 l 8.
Long Max's first shell fell in the middle of Paris near the
Quai de Seine just after dawn on 23 March, and the bom-
bardment continued at roughly fifteen-minute intervals
throughout that opening day, with the Kaiser even popping
down in his special train at lunchtime to watch one of the
firings. Before the Allies' counter-offensive forced Ludendorff
to order its withdrawal on 9 August 1918-just twenty-four
hours after the German Army's self-confessed "Black Day"-
Long Max had worn out seven barrels with firing 452 shells
into the heart of Paris from three different locations. One
location was barely fifty-six miles from Notre Dame itsel£
More than 1,ooo French civilians lost their lives as a result
of Long Max while the numbers wounded ran into several
thousands. One shot falling on a Paris church during a Good
Friday service killed eighty-eight worshippers, most of them
134 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
women and children. The monster gun was in fact the first
in a long line of German secret weapons, but it came too
late to change the course of the Kaiser's War and served only
to make Germany, and hence Krupp, more hated than
ever.
For Gustav and his men the Paris bombardment was
the pinnacle of their weapc:-n inventiveness so far. It showed
Krupp's meticulous precii.ion and wellnigh incredible
handling of materials, yet it was really only a development
of existing ballistic techniques and by no means such an
imaginatively new departure as, say, the tank was. Indeed
as regards the tank, although during the Second World
War the Essen firm became identified with the terrible
destructive power of a particularly heavily armed one, it
was only after the British had introduced them during the
battle for Cambrai in November 1917 that Krupp's began
making any at all. They had still not supplied a single tank
to the German High Command even by the end of the
war.
In all the recriminations after 1918 one of the issues that
was raised most was whether or not Krupp's had actually
anticipated the declaration of war. This question came about
through the strange affair of the resignation during the spring
of 1915 of one of Gustav's directors, Wilhelm Mtihlon, and
his subsequent flight to neutral Switzerland where he
promptly accused Krupp's of having started to prepare for
hostilities at least six months b~fore mobilisation and follow-
ing secret advice from Berlin. Mtihlon had been with the
firm for four years and had been in charge of the department
dealing with foreign contracts. Like Gustav he was a former
Prussian Foreign Service official. His charges against the
head of the House of Krupp ranged from Gustav having
begun to enlarge his works in the spring of 1914 just at the
moment when the heat had been taken out, albeit tempor-
arily, of the international crisis, to his having also from then
onwards started to lay in extensive stocks of raw materials,
in many cases from sources within the territories of Ger-
many's subsequent enemies, such as nickel from French New
Caledonia. Gustav did not really deny these charges until
1932, by which time of course the normal democratic
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 135
processes for checking such statements had ceased to operate
in Germany.
Extreme left-wing critics and passionate pacifists have
always liked to believe that an international conspiracy
exists among armament manufacturers to hold the rest of
the world to ransom, that patriotism as we know it has no
meaning among weapon-makers, that the profit motive has
its most disgusting expression in the selling of guns and
munitions. This is the origin of the phrase "merchants of
death". Such conspiracies have never been adequately
proved or disproved. There were, however, claims, partially
substantiated, that throughout the early part of the First
World War Krupp's had continued to obtain vital raw
materials from enemy sources by way of neutral countries
such as Norway and Sweden. Similarly it has been said that
some Krupp products continued reaching Allied customers
through those same neutral powers during the first twelve
months of the war-indeed Krupp officials did later admit
that a few contracts signed before hostilities actually began
were honoured in this way.
Yet the most bizarre claim of all, and one that has never
been satisfactorily cleared up, was that many of the British
shells fired against German troops in the First World War
bore the patent mark KPz 96/04 denoting that they con-
tained a fuse made under licence from Krupp's by British
armament manufacturers such as Vickers! a licence which
usually earned the Essen firm about 1s. 3d. per fuse and
against which they allegedly made a financial claim after the
war that, so the story goes, was eventually settled substanti-
ally in their favour. Furthermore, some of the armour-plating
of the British warships was also said to have been made under
licence from Krupp's, so that when after the stalemate naval
Battle of Jutland in 1916 the Kaiser sent Gustav a telegram
telling him it was "a day of triumph for the Krupp works''
because of the excellent showing of the Krupp naval guns and
the Krupp armour-plating in the German fleet, Admiral
Jellicoe too might well have felt inclined, as some cynics have
already pointed out, to congratulate Krupp for their efforts
in helping protect the British sailors!
It was also in 1916 that Gustav in association with other
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
coal, and rail trucks as and when they pleased. They had
even commandeered the Villa Htigel as a billet for some of
their generals. The new German State seemed to be crumb-
ling. A separate "Republic of the Rhine" had been pro-
claimed in Aachen with French support. Bavaria too was
in open rebellion against Berlin. The Communists had
failed with one attempted coup in Hamburg, though they
had almost succeeded in Saxony and Thuringia. On 8 Nov-
ember 1923 an obscure Austrian demagogue tried to take
over the city of Munich, but within twenty-four hours was
forced to flee. His name was Adolf Hitler and he was about
ten years too soon.
Fearing bankruptcy, most of Gustav's directors had
pleaded with him to close down all the factories-or at
least to shut down the Essen foundries so as to concentrate
on the newer, more efficient Rheinhausen steel plant. But
Gustav would have none of this. He had set out to model
himself on the old "Cannon King" and was wont to reply
to all such talk of contraction with the remark, "But Alfred
would never have dreamt of doing such a thing". Gustav
felt it to be his sacred duty to preserve the Krupp empire
come what may. Besides, he now had another burning
passion-to save the House of Krupp for Germany's sake.
Just as Hitler's spell behind bars at Landsberg made him
more resolute and intransigent, so undoubtedly the time
Gustav spent in Dtisseldorf jail, together with the tremend-
ous reception accorded him throughout Germany on his
release, hardened the man.
It would appear then that it was Gustav's experiences in
that fateful year of 1923 which finally encouraged him in the
belief that the House of Krupp uniquely held the means and
the power to bring Germany out of the "confusion and the
darkness" in which she now found herself and to restore her
to "a position of glory". It was a belief that was to have fatal
results for rrtuch of Europe's youth then flowering.
CHAPTER NINE
upon the Dutch Government of the day to stop it. This they
refused to do, arguing that they did not interfere with
"private business"-but it is firmly believed that many
influential Dutchmen at this time were involved financially
with Krupp's.
Gustav's old team of naval designers were transferred en
bloc from the Germania shipyards at Kiel to Rotterdam to
work on secret projects for the German Navy. The projects
included submarine and torpedo components. In 1922 a
dummy Dutch company called the Ingenieurskantoor voor
Scheepsbouw was established by Krupp's, according to
documents captured in Essen in 1945, "for the preservation
and further implementation of German U-boat experiences".
Two submarines developed in Holland by Krupp's were
sold to the Turks in 1925. Others were built in Spain and
Finland according to Krupp specifications. Indeed, despite
the Allies having confiscated most of his former holdings in
Spain, Gustav was soon back there in force. This time he did
not stop at just buying iron-ore deposits at Bilbao as before,
but extended his interests to engineering at Barcelona and
shipping at Cadiz. It was at a Cadiz shipyard that most of
the preparatory work was carried out on the new, improved
U-boats that were ready to be mass-produced at Kiel after
1936. One such U-boat was in fact built at Cadiz for the
German Navy as early as 1929.
Krupp's also had secret agreements with the Japanese for
making U-boats. In 1920, with the full approval of the
German Admiralty, Gustav entered into partnership with
a shipbuilding company near Nagasaki to exchange tech-
nical information concerning submarine manufacture.
Eventually Krupp's chief submarine-designer, Dr. Techel,
went out to Japan to supervise the construction of U-boats
at the Kawasaki shipyards.
In April 1922, Germany and Russia surprised the world by
apparently reconciling their wartime differences in a treaty
of friendship, the so-called "Treaty of Rapallo". But in
addition to all the diplomatic bargaining there had also
been highly secret top-level military talks in which the head
of the German National Defence Force, General Seeckt, and
the German Chancellor, Dr. Wirth, had taken part-
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 149
talks which led to a secret military pact being signed between
the Red Army and the new German Army on 29July 1922.
Although given the bogus title of "Provisional Trade Agree-
ment", its real intention was to involve German armament
firms such as Krupp's in the redevelopment of Russia's
weapon-making industries. The German Government laid
aside virtually unlimited funds to the German generals for
this task and even created a cover organisation for their
operations called "The Society for the Encouragement of
Commercial Enterprises". Its true purpose included Russian
manufacture of new Junker bombers, the training of
German airmen on Soviet soil, as well as the joint develop-
ment of a poison gas and a wide range of artillery ammuni-
tion. The Steppes became a proving ground for Krupp guns
and Krupp tanks. Significantly it was also in 1922 that
Gustav got his agricultural concession in the Ukraine.
But not all of Krupp's illicit work on weapon development
took place outside Germany. Much of it, as Gustav boasted
in his 1942 article, went on right under the very noses of the
Allied inspectors in Essen. Although these inspectors had
one success in May 1920 when they caught Gustav still
producing three-inch field-guns ostensibly for the Reichs-
wehr, Germany's National Defence Force, this was their
only victory. After that the Essen firm became more subtle.
France's occupation of the Ruhr disturbed these clandes-
tine activities, though it also supplied an extra stimulus and
an additional excuse. For one thing, the Allied disarmament
controls lapsed during the occupation, because the French were
considered persona non grata elsewhere in Germany as a result
of their military action in the Ruhr, while the British and the
Americans were so embarrassed by the whole affair that
they even withdrew their inspectors for a time from Essen.
General Seeckt took advantage of the crisis, together with the
subsequent hardening of Gentian attitudes towards France,
to begin recruitment for his illegal army, the so-called Black
Army. At one time nearly half a million strong, its members
were armed from the secret caches of weapons which had
already been set up all over Germany and which were
stocked principally with the guns and ammunition that
Krupp's among others should have handed over to the
150 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
Above: Alfried Krupp as a child with his mother, Bertha. Below left:
Fritz Krupp, 1854-1902; and right: Gustav von Bohlen, 1870-1950
Alfried Krupp being sentenced for war crimes at Nuremberg, 1948
Alfried's release from Landsberg Prison, 3rd February 1951: he was met
by his brother Berthold, who brought him a bouquet of tulips
out against his father and his new-found Nazi friends would
have required physical courage, and physical courage was
something in which the Krupps had hitherto been found
lacking. Some people, however, have argued, and indeed
continue to argue, that it was a bit much to expect Alfried,
not a very strong-willed creature, to have become a martyr.
Even so, there were of course many Germans who while
not opposing Hitler openly did not at the same time support
him enthusiastically. Alfried was not one of those Germans.
In fact there is every indication that like Gustav he went out
of his way to show his approval of the Nazi cause-and
indeed to this day he has never renounced Nazism.
In November 1937 he attended for the first time one of
the annual rallies of the Nazi party at Nuremberg. His
younger brother Claus went with him. What they both
made of this initial encounter with the histrionic side of
Nazism, with its massed marching and counter-marching,
its torchlight processions and vainglorious speeches, its
chauvinistic songs and its Roman-style standard-bearers
and swastika banners, we shall never know, for neither of
them were men of poetic expression or even of moderate
penmanship. What we do know, however, is that shortly
afterwards their father wrote to Martin Bormann in Berlin
expressing regret that he had been unable to go to the rally
himself, but saying that "our two sons both returned from
Nuremburg deeply moved. I am very pleased that they have
gained these tremendous and lasting impressions. My own
experience at Nuremberg was that only there could one
fully understand the purpose and the power of the movement,
and I am therefore doubly pleased with the foundation that
has thus been assured for our sons."
A year later Alfried joined the Nazi Party and was given
the number 6989627. At the same time he also became a
member of the National Socialist Flying Corps, eventually
reaching the rank of full colonel. He had of course met
Hitler many times during the Ftihrer's frequent visits to
Essen, and had become friendly too with some of the other
Nazi leaders, particularly Goering. In October 1938, just
a few days after Hitler's triumph at Munich over the
British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, Alfried was
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 1 75
presented to the Fuhrer again, this time as a full director
of the firm, the director in charge of mining and armaments.
Alfried was now as totally tied to Nazism and to all its
terrible exploits as the most gun-happy Gestapo-man or
the most craven concentration-camp chief. His involvement
in their guilt was from this day on merely a matter of degree.
He had begun to tread that path which was to lead him to
the defendants' dock at Nuremberg ten years later.
When war finally came, Alfried was considered far too
essential to Hitler and his generals for him to be allowed to
go off to fight for his fatherland. Instead he had to remain
where he was, at the helm of Krupp's. However, his younger
brothers were thought fitting cannon fodder, and, as we have
seen, of the four of them two were killed: Claus in an air
crash just after the beginning of the war, and Eckbert in
Italy just before the end of the war, while Harald ended up
in a Russian prisoner-of-war camp where he remained for
eleven years before being released in 1955. On receiving the
news of Claus' death, Gustav resisted all the attempts of his
colleagues and his friends to comfort him, merely remarking,
"But my son had the honour to die for his Fuhrer." Iron-
ically, one of his nephews, Kurt von Wilmowsky, who had
had the misfortune to have been in England when war was
declared, was later drowned when the unarmed British ship
carrying him to an internment-camp in Canada was sunk
by a Krupp-built U-boat. ·
At his trial for war crimes in 1948 Alfried's counsel made
much of the fact that he did not formally become head of the
House of Krupp until 1943. But there is little doubt that
from the very first day of hostilities, if not even earlier,
Alfried occupied a far more active role in Krupp affairs
than his ailing father. What emerges clearly from the
Nuremberg documents is that by 1939 Gustav was already
merely a figurehead in the firm-for one thing he was by
then approaching seventy years of age while Alfried was
just thirty-two. Furthermore, as many who knew him at
that time have since attested, Gustav's faculties had already
begun to go. Goebbels, for instance, described him in his
diary as being "gaga". Three directors handled the day-to-
day running of Krupp's, and Alfried was one of them-the
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
"We take great pride in the fact that our products have
come up to expectations"
certain that the Essen firm got the biggest slice possible in
the pickings of machine-tool factories in France, shipbuilding
facilities in Holland, metal works in Belgium, nickel mines in
Greece, and chromium deposits in Yugoslavia. Even the
great Philips electrical complex at Eindhoven in Holland
fell into Krupp's grip.
Nor was it always simply a matter of plundering the out-
put on the spot-in many cases Krupp technicians dis-
mantled whatever machines they could lay hands on for
transshipping to Krupp sites elsewhere. For example, in
1943 the Russians' modern electro-steel mill at Mariupol was
broken down to be re-erected as part of Krupp's new
Berthawerke near Breslau in eastern Germany. Towards
the end of the war Krupp's despoliation of the occupied
countries became quite wilful. In France for instance most
of the Austin factory at Liancourt, the Almag plant at
Mulhouse, and the Alsthow works at Belfort, were man-
handled bodily back to Essen.
In view of such devotion to the Nazi cause, it came as no
shock to anyone when in March 1943 Alfried was awarded
the Nazi Cross for Meritorious War Service. He had already
that same year been made a War Economy Leader by Hitler
who had charged him with the main responsibility for
mobilising the full resources of the nation's armament
industry. To accept this post, which he had done "eagerly
and readily", Alfried had had to submit a so-called "declara-
tion of political attitude". He had been required in fact to
swear that he stood by "the National-Socialist conception of
the State, without any reserve".
His father, as we have pointed out, had already had his
share of Hitler honours. Yet another one had come his way
in May 1940, when with the German Wehrmacht triumph-
ant on all fronts, thanks to Krupp guns, Krupp tanks, and
Krupp U-boats, the Fuhrer recognised his indebtedness
to the House of Krupp by designating it "a model enterprise
of National Socialism"-and Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy,
had hurried down to Essen in person to give Gustav his
Golden Banner of Industry. According to the official Krupp
report of the occasion, Hess delivered a "stirring address"
which was "characterised by a most timely political note-
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 179
settling final accounts with the Jewish-plutocratic-demo-
cratic world". In accepting the diploma, Alfried's father had
said that he considered it "a tribute to a social-political
attitude which, while having its roots in an age-old tradition,
has developed organically so as to fit into the new times in
National-Socialist Germany". It could have been Hitler
himself speaking!
Just as in the First World War, when they had produced
the notorious Big Bertha and the incredible Long Max, so
now in the second Krupp's had an equally fantastic and
terrifying gun up their sleeves, nicknamed "Fat Gustav".
The biggest gun ever made, it could pierce armour-plating
five feet thick and concrete eleven feet thick from a distance
of twenty-five miles. Each shell weighed seven tons and
measured thirty-two inches across, while the crater it caused
could be as much as I oo feet deep and I oo feet wide.
Intended for the siege of Leningrad, the I ,500-ton gun did
not arrive there in time, but it was used with devastating
effect at Sevastopol in June I 942.
Work on the giant weapon had begun as far back as
I 935, when a member of the German Army Ordnance
Office had telephoned Krupp's to ask what weight and
speed of projectile would be required to demolish the massive
defences of the Maginot Line which the French were then in
the process of completing. As a result of this initial enquiry,
three teams of Krupp ballistic experts were set the task of
compiling preliminary blueprints for siege-guns of 700, 800,
and I ,ooo mm. calibre respectively. According to the N urem-
berg testimony of Dr. Erich Mueller, Krupp's chief gun
designer at that time, nothing more was heard from the
authorities about the project until Hitler's visit to the works
in March 1936. Fresh from his triumph over the reoccupa-
tion of the Rhineland, Adolf evidently brought up the
question of the giant gun's feasibility during conversations
with Gustav, Alfried and Mueller. He was told by them that
the difficulties would probably lie in fashioning the large
forgings and the extra-heavy castings necessary for such a solid
piece of ordnance, but that nevertheless it was theoretically
possible. Hitler, however, still did not commission the scheme.
Even so, without waiting for a definite commitment from
180 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
room in rather the same way as a dozen years later the Suez
Canal was to appear to Lady Eden to be running through
her drawing-room! Visiting the Ruhr for the first time
during the autumn of 1964 was like stepping back twenty
years into my schooldays.
dressed man as seen with Hitler and the other Nazi leaders
in the photographs Airey Neave had found by the score in his
searches at the Villa Hugel during August 1945. Occasion-
ally Alfried even turned up in the courtroom sporting a few
days' growth of beard on his chin and cheeks-a thing he
never would have done before. His face had become drawn and
haggard; he was beginning to look more and more like old
Alfred. His expression was serious-at times even almost
vacant. He appeared much older than his forty years.
The Krupp directors, including Alfried, were charged
under the same four main headings as the major war
criminals had been: that is, with having committed crimes
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and
with having participated in a common plan or conspiracy to
commit crimes against peace and humanity. In the words
of the American indictment:
These crimes included planning, preparing, initiating
and waging wars of aggression and invasions of other
countries, as a result of which incalculable destruction
was wrought throughout the world, millions of people
were killed, and many millions more suffered and are still
suffering; deportation to slave labour of members of the
civilian population of the invaded countries and the
enslavement, mistreatment, torture, and murder of
millions of persons, including German nationals as well
as foreign nationals; plunder and spoliation of public
and private property in the invaded countries pursuant
to deliberate plans and policies intended not only to
strengthen Germany in launching its invasions and wag-
ing its aggressive wars and to secure the permanent
domination by Germany of the continent of Europe,
but also to expand the private empire of the defendants.
Case Number Ten is unique. If Gustav had stood trial
alongside Goering and the others the recitation of his mis-
deeds would have merely been an addition to an already
vast and mounting catalogue of corporate villainy. For
another thing, the delay of two years had enabled the
British and American investigators to delve more deeply.
But more especially, the singling out of Alfried and his eleven
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
Krupp confreres for a separate trial meant that for the first
time the century-old machinations of that industrial colossus,
the House of Krupp, could be publicly revealed and legally
condemned. Because, as the prosecution's indictment made
clear and the chief American counsel's opening speech
made obvious, it was not the dozen defendants in the dock
who were being tried in that dark-panelled courtroom, but
the history and the heritage of the House of Krupp-that is
what makes Case Number Ten perhaps the most historic, apart
from the most histrionic, trial in the whole Nuremberg series.
Most German writers on the subject, particularly the
official Krupp historians and biographers, have not realised
-or have refosed to realise-what the American prosecu-
tion team, backed by their British researchers and in-
vestigators, were trying to do beneath the solitary Stars and
Stripes banner and amid all the microphones and the ear-
pieces of the simultaneous translators during those winter,
spring and early summer days of 1947 and 1948. It was a
murderous machine and a mean method of making profits
out of other people's miseries that was being judged, not a
group of morally weak and cowardly concupiscent minor
creatures. That Alfried should be free today and one of the
richest men alive, that the House of Krupp should have once
more attained a position of prominence and power not just
in Germany but in the world, might seem to suggest that
Colonel Taylor and his team failed at Nuremberg during
those fateful eight months of bickering and bombast. But
that is far from so. The stigma of "convicted war criminal"
has been fastened for ever on a scion of the Krupp family,
and those massive misdeeds in a century of blood and booty
have once and for all been nailed to the name of Krupp.
That is what Case Number Ten was all about.
Colonel Taylor's opening speech was so lengthy that at times
he had to stand down while other members of his team read
it for him. He lumped Krupp's with the other German
militarists as "the indestructible common denominator of
Germany's murderous and obstinately repeated lunges at
the world's throat". Of all the names that had appeared in
the Nuremberg indictments none, he argued, had been
known for so long as that of Krupp. Nazism, he suggested,
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP 215
sentence was one of two years ten months meted out to Hans
Kupke who had been in charge of some of the foreign
workers' camps at Essen.
The additional sentence for Alfried of property confisca-
tion came as a shock to many people. Although Stalin had
proposed it at Yalta for all convicted war criminals, and the
Soviet representative on the International Military Tribunal
had brought it up again during the preparatory talks at
Nuremberg before the major trials opened there in Novem-
ber 1945, the Americans in particular had always appeared
adamantly opposed to the notion-indeed Robert Jackson,
Colonel Taylor's predecessor as Chief Prosecuting Counsel
for War Crimes, had described it as "somewhat obsolete as a
punishment ... like drawing and quartering".
On the other hand it would also seem that at least one of
Alfried's judges might have wanted his punishments to have
been even harsher, since in a dissenting minority judgement
Judge Wilkins of Seattle declared:
"The American"
been closed in the Ruhr since 1958, when the crisis really
began-and the numbers employed there in actual coal-
production have shrunk from nearly half a million in 1957
to under 300,000 by the end of 1965. As the use of oil in-
creases, and as the new natural-gas field just 100 miles away
in Holland is more and more opened up, so coal's share of
the fuel market can expect to diminish yet further. Though
still relatively abundant, most of the Ruhr's coal lies deep
down in narrow veins not easily adaptable to automatic
mining techniques.
By contrast to coal, steel is still in great demand-1964
was in fact a record year for output in the Ruhr. But times
are becoming tougher and tougher for steel producers, such
as for instance Krupp's Rheinhausen subsidiary. Competition
from the other Common Market countries, as well as from
Japan, has intensified in recent years: between 1961 and
1965, for example, the share of imported steel in West
Germany's total steel consumption rose from 14 to 22
per cent. To shave costs, most manufacturers are automating
heavily-which means of course fewer jobs. They also argue
that they could reduce prices still further by using the
cheaper American coal instead of the more expensive local
product; that in this way the removal of the Federal Govern-
ment's high duty on coal imports could save them something
like £30 million a year. But as the steel companies are
practically the only major customers still faithful to Ruhr
coal this would aggravate that industry's difficulties as fast
as it solved their own. In addition, many steel producers,
including Krupp's Rheinhausen subsidiary, have their own
coal-fields-all of which makes the problem of what to do
about the Old Ruhr a particularly complicated one.
Even so, the 5,000,000 people who live and work in
that oval-shaped, fifty-miles-long by twenty-miles-wide
industrial belt, stretching from Dortmund in the east to
Duisburg in the west, enjoy today one of the highest standards
of living anywhere in Europe: higher certainly than South
Wales, Clydeside, or the north-east coast of England,
and at least as high as London or the Midlands. Shop-
windows fairly bulge in the Ruhr-while the atmosphere
in most town centres is on the whole more cosmopolitan,
274 THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
period (though this was less than the 16 per cent achieved in
the previous year). Much more importantly, in November
1964 Alfried had bought what The Economist described as
"the jewel" of the tottering Hugo Stinnes Jr. chain of
industrial companies. This was the great Atlas-Werke of
Bremen, manufacturer of ships and diesel-engines, of elec-
tronic equipment and engineering goods, quite a sizeable
proportion of it on defence contracts to the West German
Government. Nor did it appear as though this particular
take-over was the limit of Alfried's ambitions on that score.
Indeed, when giving his usual yearly address to the senior
employees of the firm, Alfried in April 1965 had gone out of
his way to reiterate his strong belief in the need for big
corporations: "the right kind of concentration is of vital
importance to the German economy ... only soundly based
large companies can be of help to the many specialised
medium-sized and small undertakings in a highly developed
economy in the long run". At the same ceremony the year
before he had said, "The technical achievements and
progress of the twentieth century cannot be imagined with-
out large industrial organisations."
But 1965 would seem destined more likely to go down in
the annals of Krupp history as the year when they finally
tore up the 1953 Agreement, as the year when once and for
all they thumbed their noses at the Allies' long-drawn-out
attempt to make them sell their coal and steel interests-
for if the merger completed in December 1965 between the
Rheinhausen and the Bochumer Verein coal and steel
complexes does not do precisely that, then it is difficult to
know what will, short of course of the Allies actually repudiat-
ing the so-called "Krupp Treaty" themselves. Indeed The
Times declared that the merger amounted to a "tacit
acknowledgement of the fact that the Order will no longer
be enforced-something which the Allies, unofficially at
least, have recognised for some time".
As a further display of his complete disregard for the 1953
Agreement, Alfried even changed the name of the parent
company for his coal and steel holdings from the Hiitten-
und Bergwerke Rheinhausen that the Allies had originally
chosen to that of Friedrich Krupp Hiittenwerke. However,
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
WHITHER KRUPP?
Alfried Krupp is now fifty-nine years old, while Berthold
Beitz is fifty-three. Although Alfried has never mentioned,
publicly at least, at what age he might wish to step down
from the proprietorship of the House of Krupp, Beitz is
certainly on record as stating that he intends to retire when he
reaches sixty, that is in 1973. The House of Krupp is therefore
rapidly taking on a middle-aged look at the top and the
problem of succession is beginning to loom large.
Alfried of course has a son Arndt, from his first marriage,
now aged twenty-eight-though he is not obliged to turn
over the massive inheritance to him. By the strict terms of the
Lex Krupp, Alfried can name as his successor whom he likes,
so long as he does not divide the inheritance and so long as
the inheritor takes the name of Krupp (at the moment Arndt
is called Arndt von Bohlen und Halbach-he will only
become Arndt Krupp if Alfried in fact names him as his
successor). It remains to be seen of course whether or not
Alfried will abide by what is after all a Hitler-signed law.
Equally it remains to be seen whether or not the West
German Government will choose to recognise this relic of the
Third Reich.
Being traditionalists, and since the Lex Krupp was not
imposed on them by the Nazis but is rather a law of in-
heritance originating within the family itself and certainly
following on the will of old Alfred, the Krupps would be
expected to want to keep to the 1943 ruling, particularly as
there do not seem to be any other successors to Alfried within
the family, apart from Arndt.
Arndt was born in a suburb of Berlin on 24January 1938,
THE HOUSE OF KRUPP
also spun off its coal mines together with those of other compa-
nies, into a separate concern that the state was persuaded to fi-
nance. Krupp was back in profit by 1970 and the bankers
relaxed their grip.
Inevitably, Beitz had been the executor of Alfried's will and
had headed the charitable foundation that effectively owned the
company. As the bankers took less interest in day-to-day affairs,
his influence once again increased and the business pages of the
world's press filled with stories of disputes between him and the
new managers (few of whom stayed long).
Elsewhere in those same newspapers, the gossip columnists
occasionally wrote of how Arndt, having devoted himself to a
life of pleasure and having married Princess Henriette von
Auersperg (four years his elder and daughter of one of Austria's
oldest aristocratic families) was allegedly finding it difficult to
make ends meet. His 37,000-acre estate at Bluehnbach, near
Salzburg, with its seventy-two-room castle and seventy ser-
vants, was said to cost almost $70,000 a year to run. His palatial
villa in Marrakesh required $zo,ooo a year to run. His bachelor
flat in Munich, once the residence of the late Pope Pius XII in
his Papal Nuncio days, cost $8,ooo a year, and his yacht, with
its four-man crew, nearly $100,000 a year. Arndt was also paying
annual allowances of $so,ooo to his mother, and $40,000 to his
wife. In 1973 the Austrian government eased his financial wor-
ries by buying the Bluehnbach estate for $8 million, allowing
him to continue living there. He, and his uncles and aunts had
been irritated by their family's unfavorable portrayal, albeit
lightly disguised, in Luchino Visconti' s recently released film
The Damned, a dark view of the rise of Nazism. But Arndt out-
lived his father by less than twenty years, dying on May 12,
1986.
Krupp's profitable spell did not last long and by the mid-
197os it was again in the red. The fault this time, it was claimed,
was that, like other West German steel-makers, they could not
compete readily against producers elsewhere in Europe whose
governments were blatantly subsidizing them, something that
the West German government had refused to do. On this occa-
sion the Shah of Iran bailed out Krupp. He bought twenty-five
percent of the steel-making subsidiary for $100 million in 1974
and then, two years later, twenty-five percent of the whole con-
AFTERWORD 331
cern for $zoo million. It was the first time in its 165-year history
that an outsider had acquired an interest in Krupp. It was also
the Middle East's first major long-term investment in Western
Europe, mounting so-called "petrodollars." At that time, apart
from Iran's share, only five percent of Krupp was in private
hands-so much for the hullabaloo in 1967 over having to go
public.
In 1981 the West German government belatedly came to the
conclusion that some steel subsidies were virtuous. The manag-
ers at Krupp, now merely Germany's third largest steel maker,
were not slow in elbowing their way to the public trough. The
authorities wanted the steel makers to modernize, as well as to
rationalize, and were prepared to pay ten percent of the costs of
doing so. Krupp Stahl was at that time losing $20 million every
month. A merger with Roesch, then the second largest steel-
maker (Thyssen was the biggest), was mooted. The government
in Bonn was courted to subsidize the costs of the takeover, but
nothing came of it.
Krupp now shifted much of its manufacture abroad to cut
costs and to improve access to its markets, fulfilling only about
half of its export orders at home. Its sales to East Germany aver-
aged nearly $40 million a year, paid mainly by East German de-
liveries of steel casings, rolled steel, solid and liquid fuels, and
machine tools. However, its liquidity troubles returned when
the Russians, among others, postponed their debt payments.
A commission appointed by the West German steel industry
to look into the industry's future recommended that the coun-
try's five biggest steel makers be merged into two groups pro~
tected by tariffs from what was claimed to be "the massive
falsification of competition" by other European nations. Imports
now accounted for half of German steel consumption, compared
previously to a third at most. The steel makers were again ar-
guing that they had to compete unfairly with cheap subsidized
steel. Krupp and Thyssen were to form one group, and Roesch,
Kloeckner-Werke and Peine-Salzgitter the other. But after
lengthy negotiations Thyssen decided against the merger, be-
cause it considered Krupp to be in such a mess that a minimum
subsidy of almost $soo million would be ne~ded, which the
West German government was not prepared to pay.
Thwarted by Roesch and Thyssen, Krupp then looked to a
332 AFTERWORD
PETER BATTY
February 2001
Kingston, England
Bibliography