Judge Dismisses Blackwell's Lawsuit Against Dantonio, Simon
Judge Dismisses Blackwell's Lawsuit Against Dantonio, Simon
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Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:18-cv-1261
v.
HON. JANET T. NEFF
LOU ANNA K. SIMON, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s April 24, 2020 Objections and Appeals (ECF
No. 262) from the Magistrate Judge’s March 3, 2020 combined Report and Recommendation;
Order; Referral (ECF No. 234), which addressed seven motions. On May 8, 2020, Defendants
filed responses to Plaintiff’s Objections and Appeals (ECF Nos. 296 & 297). For the reasons that
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this § 1983 case in November 2018, alleging violations of his Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights arising from his arrest on February 8, 2017 (ECF No. 1). Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Chad Davis and Sam Miller (“the Detective Defendants”) arrested
him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (Count I), and Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants Lou Anna K. Simon, Mark Dantonio and Mark Hollis (“the MSU
Defendants”) violated his Fifth Amendment rights by declining to renew his employment
agreement in retaliation for his exercise of his right to remain silent and to decline to be questioned
by the Michigan State University (MSU) Police Department or MSU’s investigators (Count II).
Defendants answered Plaintiff’s Complaint in January 2019, the same month in which Thomas
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Warnicke began representing Plaintiff. Following the issuance of a Case Management Order in
April 2019, the parties subsequently engaged in discovery. Attorney Andrew A. Paterson, Jr.
On March 3, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a combined Report and Recommendation;
Order; Referral (ECF No. 234), detailing the factual background and the rationale for her
recommendations, Orders, and the matter of referring attorney Paterson for discipline. On April
24, 2020, Plaintiff filed these Objections and Appeals (ECF No. 262), to which Defendants filed
A. Standard of Review
28 U.S.C. § 636 governs the jurisdiction and powers of magistrate judges. See also FED.
R. CIV. P. 72; W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.1. Magistrate judges generally have authority to enter orders
regarding non-dispositive pre-trial motions, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), but they must submit
report and recommendations on case-dispositive matters, see § 636(b)(1)(B). Courts in the Sixth
Circuit generally hold that it is the sanction selected by the magistrate judge, not the sanction
requested by the moving party, that dictates a magistrate judge’s authority over a motion. See
Builders Insulation of Tennessee, LLC v. S. Energy Sols., 2020 WL 265297, at *5 (W.D. Tenn.
The statute further provides that within fourteen days after being served with a copy of a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendations on a case-dispositive matter, “any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objections are made and
The court’s task is to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” W.D. Mich. LCivR
72.3(b). “[T]he court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Analysis
In her Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 234 at PageID.2990-3021), the Magistrate
Judge recommends that this Court grant the MSU Defendants’ Motion to Strike and for Sanctions
(ECF No. 180). The Magistrate Judge first concluded that Plaintiff’s counsel’s violated Rule 11
in filing false and misleading briefs. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge determined that (a)
Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order regarding 30(b)(6) Depositions and Document Subpoenas
(ECF No. 173) misrepresented to the Court the nature of the discovery propounded and who
propounded it (id. at PageID.3007-3009), and (b) Plaintiff’s counsel made no reasonable factual
inquiry before filing Non-Party Michelle Franklin’s Motion for a Protective Order (ECF No. 188)
(id. at PageID.3009-3010).
Second, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s counsel used the Court’s
mandatory processes for improper purposes of harassment in bad faith (ECF No. 234 at
engaged in a pattern of seeking discovery on issues about the recruitment of Auston Robertson or
other MSU football players and alleged NCAA violations, issues that were unrelated to Plaintiff’s
claim against the MSU Defendants but might be relevant to a different claim and that certainly
appeared to be of interest to the press and public (id. at PageID.3012-3016). The Magistrate Judge
opined that the improper purposes of the inquiries appeared to be to “harangue Defendants into
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exhausted compliance in the form of settlement” and “gather discovery for a future claim (which
Having determined that Plaintiff’s counsel violated Rule 11 and engaged in harassing
conduct contrary to the Court’s order, and that sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
and the Court’s inherent authority are appropriate, the Magistrate Judge recommends two
sanctions. First, the Magistrate Judge recommends this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment
claim against the MSU Defendants with prejudice (id. at PageID.3017-3019). The Magistrate
Judge decided not to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the
Detective Defendants because “Plaintiff has not directed the same vexatious and harassing conduct
toward the Detective Defendants that he has against the MSU Defendants” and Plaintiff’s conduct
has not demonstrated that his claim as to the Detective Defendants was prosecuted for an improper
purpose (id.). Second, to ensure the integrity of proceedings before the Court, the Magistrate Judge
recommends that Plaintiff’s counsel (attorneys Paterson and Warnicke) be removed from the case
(id. at PageID.3019-3020). The Magistrate Judge opines that given counsel’s delineated filings of
false and misleading pleadings and statements in Court, failure to correct the record, and disregard
of the Court’s repeated admonitions, she had “no reason to believe that Attorneys Paterson and
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3), the Court has
performed de novo consideration of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which
objections have been made. As Defendants point out (ECF No. 296 at PageID.4532; ECF No. 297
attorneys Warnicke and Paterson be removed as Plaintiff’s counsel. This Court’s review is
Plaintiff’s claim against the MSU Defendants. The Court denies the objections.
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As set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 234 at
following “Regional Refuse factors”: (1) whether the party’s conduct was due to willfulness, bad
faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3)
whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4)
whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. The
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation addresses each of these factors in support of the
recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against the MSU Defendants (id. at PageID.3017-
3018).
Arguably relevant to the first Regional Refuse factor, whether the party’s conduct was due
to willfulness, bad faith, or fault, Plaintiff argues in his objections that the Magistrate Judge
incorrectly assumed that Plaintiff maintained this federal lawsuit for the purpose of adducing
discovery to file a potentially stronger claim in state court, an assumption that Plaintiff argues is
not borne out by the complaint he filed in state court, which is substantially similar to his federal
complaint (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3350-3351). Plaintiff also argues that the Magistrate Judge
incorrectly assumed that Plaintiff’s legal strategy is to harangue the MSU Defendants into
exhausted compliance in the form of settlement (id. at PageID.3350-3351, 3355). Plaintiff opines
that “the only ‘haranguing’ being done is on the part of Defendants, who endeavor to use their
sheer power, money and resources to attempt to bludgeon Plaintiff into submission” (id. at
PageID.3352). Similarly, Plaintiff opines that “it is Defendants’ counsel who have deliberately
and egregiously failed in their duty of candor to this Court by not informing this Court that they in
fact asked Plaintiff in-depth and repeated questions at his deposition about race discrimination,
Plaintiff asserts that defense counsel should not be given “carte blanche to take discovery of certain
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issues on one hand, while Plaintiff gets sanctioned for the same conduct on the other hand” (id. at
PageID.3355). Last, Plaintiff argues that his Motion to Compel the deposition of Dantonio does
not even remotely rise to the level of sanctionable conduct, nor does it justify fees; rather, to the
contrary, it was a “well grounded, good faith, reasonable request for relief that was based on a
prior court order which allowed for a 7-hour deposition” (id. at PageID.3356-3357).
Plaintiff’s objections minimize but do not deny the conduct that the Magistrate Judge
delineated as supporting her recommendation. As the MSU Defendants point out in response (ECF
No. 297 at PageID.4541-4543), Plaintiff’s objections “skate over” the Magistrate Judge’s findings
of fact. And, as the MSU Defendants further point out (id. at PageID.4544), Plaintiff’s claim that
he could take irrelevant discovery because Defendants allegedly did so is wrong, and beside the
point. In short, the record adequately establishes that there was wilfulness, bad faith, and fault on
the part of Plaintiff’s counsel, and Plaintiff’s objections do not ameliorate such finding.
Plaintiff’s objections wholly fail to address the second Regional Refuse factor of prejudice.
As to the third and fourth Regional Refuse factors, Plaintiff does not dispute that less drastic
sanctions have not only been considered but imposed in this case, specifically, a $10,000 sanction
in October 2019; however, Plaintiff argues that “[t]hereafter, there has not been a single Order
entered by the Court that ordered Plaintiff to pay any monetary or other sanction upon Plaintiff to
any of the Defendants” (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3360-3361). Plaintiff describes the Magistrate
Judge’s recommended dismissal sanction as a “colossal and drastic jump” (id. at PageID.3362).
Plaintiff’s objection is disingenuous. As the Magistrate Judge pointed out in her Report
and Recommendation (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3018), she specifically warned Plaintiff’s counsel
on the record at the December motions hearing not to inject salacious and irrelevant material into
briefs, instructing counsel that “if monetary sanctions don’t get your attention, the next step will
be an order to show cause why you shouldn’t be removed as an attorney in this case or why the
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case shouldn’t be dismissed” (12/10/19 Mot. Hrg. Tr., ECF No. 155 at PageID.1708-1714).
Plaintiff was indisputably on notice that continued misconduct could lead to dismissal.
Last, to the extent Plaintiff additionally argues that the sanction of dismissal is unwarranted
where “Plaintiff is an innocent client who did not draft, review, approve or even read the filings
which are at issue” (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3358-3362), Plaintiff’s argument does not compel a
different result. The Magistrate Judge properly indicated that the Supreme Court has rejected that
notion, holding that there “is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner’s
claim because of his counsel’s unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client” (ECF
No. 234 at PageID.3019, quoting Bradley J. Delp Revocable Trust, 665 F. App’x 514, 521 (6th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)).
In this regard, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that dismissal would not work the injustice
to the client that courts generally weigh heavily in declining to dismiss a case with prejudice
because Plaintiff’s claim against the MSU Defendants in this Court “appears to be prosecuted
primarily for the purpose of gaining discovery to use in the other forum” and Plaintiff has since
filed a state-court complaint (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3019). The Magistrate Judge opined that
“[b]ecause Plaintiff has filed a separate cause of action that is more consistent with his counsel’s
theory of the case, the claim in this case is duplicative of that claim” (id.).
Plaintiff argues that “the state and federal court case are not duplicative—they allege
separate and distinct causes of action” (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3359-3360). However, Plaintiff’s
argument again misses the point. The Magistrate Judge did not hold that there was no injustice
because the federal and state court complaints were duplicative, but because the theory of the case
that Plaintiff advanced in federal discovery (that his contract was not renewed for reasons other
than the Fifth Amendment) and the theory underlying his state-law claims were duplicative.
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In sum, Plaintiff’s objections do not serve to identify any error in the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis or her ultimate conclusion that the four Regional Refuse factors, on balance, warrant the
recommended sanctions. Consequently, the Court will deny the objections and approve and adopt
A. Standard of Review
magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required
proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision.” FED. R. CIV. P.
72(a) (Nondispositive Matters). “A party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days
after being served with a copy.” Id. See also W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(a) (Appeal of nondispositive
matters).
This Court will reverse an order of a magistrate judge only where it is shown that the
decision is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(a); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(a). A factual finding is “clearly erroneous” when, “although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C.,
470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)). And “[a]n order is ‘contrary to the law’ when it ‘fails to apply or misapplies relevant
statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.’” Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219
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B. Analysis
As a threshold matter under her authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the Magistrate
Judge ordered monetary sanctions for fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927
for Plaintiff’s counsel’s misconduct for the reasons discussed in the Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 234 at PageID.3021). 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that “[a]ny attorney or other person
admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court
to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because
of such conduct.”
Plaintiff’s appeal supplies no basis for reversing the Magistrate Judge’s Order under
The Magistrate Judge also resolved six discovery motions under her authority under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), noting that some of the motions would be rendered moot if this Court
adopted the recommendation regarding dismissal as a sanction (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3021-
3026). Plaintiff does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s substantive rulings on the discovery
motions, only the shifting of costs and fees pursuant to those specific orders (ECF No. 262 at
PageID.3349-3350). Given that the unchallenged § 1927 order covers the misconduct identified
in the rulings on the specific motions, the Court agrees with Defendants’ observation that
Plaintiff’s arguments that fees cannot be awarded as to those motions under Rule 37 is now mostly
academic. In any event, the Court has briefly considered Plaintiff’s appeals from the Magistrate
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a. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Dantonio’s Deposition (ECF No. 165) and
the MSU Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order (ECF No. 167)
The Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel and granted the MSU
Defendants’ motion for a protective order (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3023). As this Court has
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the claim against the MSU Defendants be
dismissed, both motions are moot. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge expressly indicated that she
did not order additional sanctions under Rule 37 as a result of these motions (id.). In short,
As noted above, the Magistrate Judge found that in his motion for a protective order,
Plaintiff had misrepresented to the Court the nature of the discovery propounded and who
propounded it (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3007). The Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s motion,
indicating that “the subpoenas directed to the Sound Mind Sound Body entities were for a proper
purpose, namely discovery regarding Plaintiff’s claimed damages, and because Plaintiff
Blackwell’s motion is unfounded even in its premise” (id. at PageID.3024). The Magistrate Judge
held that Defendants were entitled to fees and costs under Rule 37(a)(5) for responding to
Again, Plaintiff does not appeal the denial of his motion for a protective order, only the
award of attorneys’ fees and costs pertaining to same (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3349, 3366). In
this regard, Plaintiff argues that he was “substantially justified” in seeking and filing the motion
because he had already testified for nearly 6½ hours about the Sound Mind Sound Body
organizations and the 30(b)(6) subpoenas were a way for the Detective Defendants to circumvent
the federal court rules governing depositions and to further harass Plaintiff (id. at PageID.3366-
3367). Plaintiff also argues that the award of expenses is unjust under Rule 37(a)(5)(B) where
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Defendants received financial documents in 2019 pertaining to the Sound Mind Sound Body
organizations in response to the third-party subpoenas they served upon Sound Mind Sound
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(3), which governs protective orders, indicates that
Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses. Rule 37(a)(5)(C) (Payment of Expenses), in turn,
provides that “the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure
The Detective Defendants reiterate that Plaintiff misrepresented that the discovery was
issued by the MSU Defendants and not, as was actually the case, the Detective Defendants (ECF
No. 296 at PageID.4521-4522). The Detective Defendants also point out that Plaintiff likewise
misrepresented that the depositions were of Plaintiff and not, as was actually the case, corporate
designee depositions under Rule 30(b)(6) (id. at PageID.4522). The Detective Defendants assert
that Plaintiff “falsely bootstrapped that discovery as emanating from the MSU Defendants in order
to take aim at Defendant Dantonio . . . by suggesting that Defendant Dantonio lied at his deposition
The MSU Defendants likewise argue that it is hard to see how Plaintiff can argue that he
was “substantially justified” in filing the motion to prevent the MSU Defendants from deposing
Blackwell individually, when: (1) the MSU Defendants had not issued any subpoenas; (2) the
subpoenas that were issued were not issued to Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff’s counsel lied to the Court
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For the reasons more fully stated by Defendants, Plaintiff’s appeal supplies no reason for
concluding that the Magistrate Judge’s award of costs and fees is either clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
For the reasons stated in her Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge denied in
part and granted in part the Detective Defendants’ motion for sanctions (ECF No. 234 at
PageID.3024). Specifically, the Magistrate Judge does not recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claim against the Detective Defendants and instead recommends removal of counsel and monetary
sanctions (id.).
Plaintiff indicates that he “does appeal the Detective Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions as
it relates to the removal of counsel and monetary sanctions” (ECF No. 262 at PageID.3349).
However, as the Detective Defendants point out (ECF No. 296 at PageID.4530-4531), Plaintiff
did not address the removal sanction and has not identified any basis by which the Court’s decision
to also grant monetary sanctions is either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. This appeal is
d. Non-Party Michelle Franklin’s Motion for a Protective Order (ECF No. 188)
The Magistrate Judge also denied this motion for a protective order, which was filed by
Plaintiff’s counsel. The Magistrate Judge declined, at this juncture, to limit the deposition in
duration but noted her expectation that counsel for the Detective Defendants will not unduly
prolong the questioning of Non-Party Michelle Franklin (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3026). Citing
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) and 26(c)(3), the Magistrate Judge awarded Defendants
Plaintiff does not appeal the Magistrate Judge’s denial of the motion “as it relates to the
deposition but does appeal the portion pertaining to the award of costs and fees” (ECF No. 262 at
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PageID.3349-3350). Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge’s award of costs and fees is “clearly
erroneous” and “contrary to law” because the Court cannot sanction discovery motions under
Rule 11 (id. at PageID.3368-3369). Plaintiff also argues that while the Magistrate Judge implies
that there may be a client conflict for counsel to resolve, it “was not and is not Attorney Paterson’s
Plaintiff’s argument supplies no reason for concluding that the Magistrate Judge’s award
of costs and fees is either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. As Defendants point out in response
(ECF No. 296 at PageID.4529; ECF No. 297 at PageID.4559), the Magistrate Judge did not award
fees and costs for this motion under Rule 11. Plaintiff’s appeal is therefore properly denied.
Last, the Magistrate Judge granted the MSU Defendants’ motion to submit evidence related
to Plaintiff’s filing of an action in state court, finding that the documents submitted are relevant to
the other issues discussed (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3026). Plaintiff does not appeal this order.
At the conclusion of her combined document, the Magistrate Judge ordered that Attorney
Paterson be referred to Chief Judge Jonker for determination of whether Paterson should be
disciplined pursuant to Local General Rule 2.3(d) (ECF No. 234 at PageID.3026-3029).
Pointing out that he has never been referred for discipline in the Eastern District of
Michigan or before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, attorney Paterson argues that the Magistrate
Judge’s referral to the Chief Judge for possible discipline is “clearly erroneous” and “contrary to
This district’s Local General Rule 2.3(d) provides that “[i]f it appears to a Judge of this
court that an attorney practicing before the court has violated the rules of professional conduct or
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is guilty of other conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, any judge may: 1) refer the matter
to the Chief Judge of the district who shall determine whether the attorney should be disciplined
or alternatively refer the matter to a three-judge panel . . . .” W.D. Mich. LGenR 2.3(d).
While Paterson seeks to “appeal” the Magistrate Judge’s referral to this Court, he supplies
no basis for filing such an appeal. As set forth in the Local Rule, a referral is merely the first step
of a procedural process that “any judge,” not just “any district court judge,” is allowed to initiate.
Accordingly:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections and Appeals (ECF No. 262) from
the Magistrate Judge’s March 3, 2020 combined Report and Recommendation; Order; Referral
(ECF No. 234) are DENIED, and the Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation,
that Defendants’ Motion to Strike and for Sanctions (ECF No. 180) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation,
that Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim in Count II against Defendants Lou Anna K. Simon, Mark
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation,
that attorneys Thomas Warnicke and Andrew A. Paterson, Jr. are REMOVED as counsel for
Plaintiff in this case, and Plaintiff shall, not later than June 5, 2020, procure new counsel and an
appearance of such shall be filed, or the Court will presume that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se.