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The economic effects of a

pandemic

Simon Wren-Lewis
Oxford University

A little over ten years ago, I was approached by some health experts who wanted to
look at the economic effects of an influenza pandemic. They needed someone with a
macroeconomic model to look at the general equilibrium impacts. In the 1990s, I had
led a small team that constructed a model called COMPACT (Darby et al. 1998), and
these health experts and I completed a paper that was subsequently published in Health
Economics (Keogh-Brown 2009). We reference other studies that had been done earlier
in that paper.

The current coronavirus outbreak will have different characteristics to the pandemic we
studied, and hopefully it will not become a pandemic at all. (In terms of mortality, it
seems to be somewhere in between the ‘base case’ and ‘severe case’ we looked at in our
work.) But I think there were some general lessons from the exercise we did that will be
relevant if this particular coronavirus does become a global pandemic. One proviso is
that a key assumption we made about the pandemic is that it was mainly a three-month
affair, and obviously what I have to say is dependent on it being short-lived.

It is worth saying at the start that the bottom line of all this for me is that the economics
are secondary to the health consequences for any pandemic that has a significant fatality
rate (as COVID-19 so far appears to have). The economics are important in their own
right and as a warning to avoid drastic measures that do not influence the number of
deaths, but beyond that there is no meaningful trade-off between preventing deaths and
losing some percent of GDP for less than half the year. 

Let me start with the least important impact from an economic point of view, and that is
the fall in production due to workers taking more time off sick. It is least important in
part because firms have ways of compensating for this, particularly if illness is spread
over the quarter. For example, those who have been sick and come back to work can
work overtime. This will raise costs and might lead to some temporary inflation, but the
central bank should ignore this.

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This ‘direct’ impact of the pandemic will reduce GDP in that quarter by a few percentage
points. The precise number will depend on what proportion of the population that get
sick, on what the fatality rate in the UK turns out to be, and how many people miss work
in an attempt not to get the disease. The impact on GDP for the whole year following the
pandemic is much less, at around 1% or 2%, partly because output after the pandemic
quarter is higher as firms replenish diminished stocks and meet postponed demand.

All this assumes schools do not close once the pandemic takes hold. School closures
can amplify the reduction in labour supply if some workers are forced to take time off
to look after children. On the basis of the assumptions we made, if schools close for
around four weeks, that can multiply the GDP impacts above by as much as a factor of
three, and if they close for a whole quarter, by twice that. If that seems large, remember
that nationwide school closures impact everyone with children and not just those with
the disease.

But even with all schools closed for three months and many people avoiding work
when they were not sick, the largest impact we got for GDP loss over a year was less
than 5%. That is a one quarter very severe recession, but there is no reason why the
economy cannot bounce back to full strength once the pandemic is over. Unlike a
normal recession, information on the cause of the output loss, and therefore when it
should end, is clear.

All this assumes that consumers who have not yet got the disease do not alter their
behaviour. For a pandemic that spreads gradually, this seems unlikely. The most
important lesson I learnt from doing this study is that the pandemic need not just
be a supply shock; it can also be a demand shock that can hit specific sectors very
hard, depending on how consumers behave. This is because a lot of our consumption
nowadays can be called social, by which I mean doing things that bring you into contact
with other people – things like going to the pub, to restaurants, to football matches or
travel. Other sectors that provide consumption services that involve personal contact
(e.g. haircuts) and can easily be postponed may also be hit.

If people start worrying about getting the disease sufficiently to cut back on this social
consumption, the economic impact will be more severe than any numbers discussed so
far. One reason it is severe is that it is partly a permanent loss. Maybe you will have a
few more meals out once the pandemic is over to make up for what you missed when
you stayed home, but there is likely to be a net fall in your consumption of meals
out over the year. What I realised when I did the analysis was just how much of our
consumption was social.

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 The economic effects of a pandemic
Simon Wren-Lewis

This is why the biggest impacts on GDP occur when we have people reducing their social
consumption in an effort not to get the disease. However, falls in social consumption
do not scale up all scenarios by the same amount, for the simple reason that supply and
demand are complimentary. If school closures and people taking more time off work
increase the size of the supply shock, the demand shock has less scope to do damage.
The largest fall in annual GDP in all the variants we looked at was 6%.

Could conventional monetary or fiscal policy offset the fall in social consumption?
Only partially, because the drop in consumption is focused on specific sectors. What is
more important, and what we didn’t explore in the exercise, is what would happen if the
banks failed to provide bridging finance for the firms having to deal with a sudden fall
in demand. The banks may judge that some businesses that are already indebted may
not be able to cope with any additional short-term loans, leading to business closures
during the pandemic.

It is in this light that we should view the collapse of stock markets around the world. In
macroeconomic terms this is a one-off shock, so Martin Sandbu is right that the recent
stock market reaction looks overblown.1 But if many businesses are at financial risk
from the temporary drop in social consumption, that implies a rise in the equity risk
premia, which helps account for the size of the stock market collapse we have seen. (I
say “helps” deliberately, as much of the impact will be on smaller businesses that do not
find their way into the main stock market indices.)  

If I were running the central bank or government, I would have already started having
conversations with banks about not forcing firms into bankruptcy during any pandemic. 

But economics can also influence health outcomes, and not just in terms of health
service resources. For a minority of self-employed workers there will be no sick-pay,
and those without a financial cushion will be put under stress. One of the concerns as
far as the spread of the pandemic is concerned is that workers will not be able to afford
to self-isolate if they have the disease. So if I were in government, I would be thinking
of setting up something like a sick-leave fund that such workers could apply to if they
get coronavirus symptoms.

The government also needs to think about keeping public services and utilities running
when workers in those services start falling ill. In fact, there are a whole host of things
the government should now be doing to prepare for a pandemic. It is at times like these
that we really need governments to act fast and think ahead. Do we in the UK,2 or US

1 https://www.ft.com/content/e7fd61ee-57ef-11ea-a528-dd0f971febbc
2 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/27/they-have-no-idea-government-failing-on-coronavirus-say-gps

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citizens,3 have confidence that the government will do what is required? One lesson
of coronavirus may be never put into power politicians who have a habit of ignoring
experts.

References

Darby, J, J Ireland, C Leith and S Wren-Lewis (1998), “COMPACT: a rational

expectations, intertemporal model of the United Kingdom economy”, Economic
Modelling 16(1): 1-52.

Keogh‐Brown, M R, S Wren‐Lewis, W J Edmunds, P Beutels and R D Smith (2009),

“The possible macroeconomic impact on the UK of an influenza pandemic”, Health
Economics 19(11).

About the author

Simon Wren-Lewis is a Professor at Oxford University and a Fellow of Merton

College. He began his career as an Economist in H.M.Treasury. In 1981 he moved to
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, where as a Senior Research
Fellow he constructed the first versions of the world model NIGEM. From 1988-1990,
as Head of Macroeconomic Research, he supervised development of this and the
Institute’s domestic model. During this period he published with colleagues a study
suggesting that an entry rate of 1.95 DM/£ into the ERM was too high, which at the
time was a minority view. In 1990 he became a Professor at Strathclyde University, and
built the UK econometric model COMPACT. From 1995 to 2006 he was a Professor at
Exeter University.

He has published papers on macroeconomics in a wide range of academic journals

including the Economic Journal, European Economic Review, and American Economic
Review. He also wrote one of the background papers for the Treasury’s 2003 assessment
of its five economic tests for joining EMU and advised the Bank of England on the
development of its new macromodel. His current research focuses on the analysis
of monetary and fiscal policy in small calibrated macromodels, and on equilibrium
exchange rates.

3 https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/28/trump-says-the-coronavirus-is-the-democrats-new-hoax.html

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