SECTION 4: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

United States vs. Bustos

G.R. No. L-12592, 8 March 1918
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the
mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the
mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the
wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various
officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege.

Guingguing vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128959, 30 September 2005
It is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday Post.
The criminal cases listed have indeed been filed. By this reason, the publication of the subject
advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this court to have been done with
actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said publication was true, the
intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at best be subsumed
under the mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. The
advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionally protected
expression under Sec. 4, Art. 3 and thus the acquittal of the petitioner is mandated.

Soriano v. Laguardia
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
The court ruled that the government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and
welfare of the children defeats Soriano’s prayer to continue as a program host of “Ang Dating
Daan” during his suspension. Even if Soriano’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent
speech, he still cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech because the
said statements were in a medium easily accessible to children. It is the duty of the government
to protect and promote the welfare of the youth.
The freedom of speech or expression is one of the fundamental and most vital rights
granted to citizens of the state since without it, a free, stable, effective, and democratic state
would be difficult to attain. Against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the state is constitutionally tasked to promote.
 Fernando v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006
Obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent
materials must justify the regulation or limitation. To be held liable under Art. 201 of the RPC,
the prosecution must prove that: 1) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene;
and 2) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. According to the
Solicitor General, owners of the establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held
liable under Art. 201. Fernando’s ownership was sufficiently proven. The court ruled that the law
does not require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away exhibiting obscene
materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited
to the public. The expiry of the mayor’s permit does not negate the fact that Fernando owned and
operated the establishment.

Chavez vs. Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008
Not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free
speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001
The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has
been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
 U.S. v O’Brien
391 U.S. 367, 1968
When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the
governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms:
compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision
inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it
is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to §12(b)
(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and
consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it.

SECTION 7: RIGHT TO INFORMATION

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 72119, 29 May 1987
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are
without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is
not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody
of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Its
performance cannot be then made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise,
the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any outlandish exercise of
agency discretion.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr.

G.R. No.74930, 13 February 1989
The right to information is not absolute. The people’s right to information and the State’s
policy of full disclosure is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS
the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the petition. Furthermore, it
cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited
right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer
scrutiny.
 Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato
G.R. No. 92541, Date 13 November 1991
As may be gleaned from PD 1986 creating the respondent MTRCB classification board,
there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office created to serve
public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. As held in the
case of Valmonte vs Belmonte, Jr., the right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his
private capacity and not a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is
sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions.

Chavez vs PCGG
G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998
Based on the deliberation by the Constitutional Commission, ‘transactions’ which should
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties is generic and, therefore, it can cover
both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract. Considering the intent of
the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers,
as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-
gotten wealth subject to some of the following recognized restrictions: (1) national security
matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal
matters, and (4) other confidential information.

Akbayan vs. Aquino

G.R. No.170516, July 16, 2008
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final
text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could
impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.”
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public
scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views
during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine
representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any
negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to
obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
 SECTION 12: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

People vs. Pinlac

G.R. Nos. 74123-24, 26 September 1988
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in
part shall be inadmissible in evidence. The court found it meritorious to declare that the
constitutional rights of the accused were violated in the failure of the authorities in making the
accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his
constitutional right to have counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover, the prosecution
merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence
and the other evidence provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The
court acquitted the accused.

People vs. Bolanos

G.R. No. 101808, July 2, 1992
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the
way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should
have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner
by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged
confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction,
besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no
recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.

Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 97214, July 18, 1994
Well-settled is the rule that the rights under Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in
custody investigation," which was defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer
contemplated in the above rule. Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to
sign the auditor's report. Thus petitioner cannot invoke such right for he was not under custodial
investigation.
 People vs. Taliman
G.R. No. 109143, 11 October 2000
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides, “Any person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferable of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” Even assuming that the right to
counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation, still the defect was not cured. The
Constitution expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants did not do this.

People vs. Januario

G.R. No. 98252, 7 February 1997
The extra-judicial confessions of the appellants are inadmissible in evidence for having
been extracted in violation of their constitutional right to counsel. This constitutional provision
requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less
than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the
choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation counsel, thus, he could not have been
the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our Constitution. Furthermore, the right of a
person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to
contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed.
Bearing in mind that appellant Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have
exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.

People vs. Lauga

G.R. No. 186228, 15 March 2010
Pursuant to Section 1(g) of EO 309 and the ruling in People vs Buendia, the Court is
convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the
case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar
as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant which was taken without a counsel, was in violation of
his constitutional right and is inadmissible as evidence.
 People vs Andan
G.R. No. 116437, 3 March 1997
Appellant’s admission to the police cannot be used as an evidence against him because he
was already in custodial investigation and the police failed to inform the appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. However, his confession to the
mayor and to the media were properly admitted. Andan’s confession to the mayor was made
spontaneously and freely when he sought the mayor for a private meeting, thus, the mayor acted
as a confidant and not as a law enforcer. Furthermore, appellant's confessions to the media were
likewise properly admitted since the confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime.

Aquino vs Paiste
G.R. No. 147782, 25 June 2008

Ladiana vs People
G.R. No. 144293, 4 December 2002
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police
from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial
investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the
preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
evidence against the affiant. Petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during
the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation, and it is clear from the
undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or
interrogation. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of
showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.
Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that
for the prosecution.

People vs Pepino
G.R. No.174471, 12 January 2016
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. It has been discussed that the
right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police lineup. At any rate, the appellants' respective
convictions in this case were based on an independent in-court identification made by Edward
and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that
the RTC and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible,
and that there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at arbitrarily. The in-
court identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the police lineup.
 People vs Diaz
G.R. No.186490, June 28, 2017
An extrajudicial confession must be (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of
counsel, (c) express, and (d) in writing, to be admissible as evidence against the accused.