BEFORE THE HONORABLE SESSIONS COURT OF DELHI

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER SECTION

300 & 302 OF IPC, 1860

SC No. /2020

ARMAAN MALLIK
(PROSECUTION)
V.
RIDHIMA GUPTA
(DEFENCE)

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………..
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………
3. TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………….
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………...................
6. ISSUE RAISED………………………………………………....
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………….
8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………….
9. PRAYER…………………………………………………………
10. ENDNOTE………………………………………………………
 iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

Anr. Another

Cri.LJ Criminal Law Journal

Crl. Criminal

ILR Indian Law Report

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

Ors. Others

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

S.L.P. Special Leave Petition

u/s Under Section

V. Versus
 iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS

1. KD Gaur, Commentary on Indian Penal Code, 2nd Ed. (2013) Universal Law Publishing

2. Dr. K I Vibhute, PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law, 12th Ed. (2014) Lexis Nexis

3. Ram Jethmalani & Prof.D.S.Chopra, The Indian Penal Code, 1st Ed. (2014) Thomson Reuters.

4. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 34th Ed. (2014) Lexis Nexis.

ONLINE ARTICLES

1. Serafettin Demirci, M.D.; Kamil Hakan Dogan, M.D.; and Gursel Gunaydin, M.D., Throat-Cutting of Accidental
Origin, J Forensic Sci, July 2008, Vol. 53, No. 4, doi: 10.1111/j.1556-4029.2008. 00764.x, Available online at:
www.blackwell-synergy.com at
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kamil_Hakan_Dogan/publication/5359997_Throat-
Cutting_of_Accidental_Origin/links/09e415023a71b5a114000000/Throat-Cutting-of-Accidental-Origin.pdf

WEBSITES

1. http://www.juris.nic.in

2. http://www.manupatra.co.in

3. http://www.scconline.com

STATUTES

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

2. The India Penal Code, 1860

 v

TABLE OF CASES
S. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION
NO
.

1. Arun Raj v Union of India and ors. 6 (2010) SCC 457

2. Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2010 SC 1212

3. Gopal and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 2 SCC 188

4. Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753

5. K.M. Nanavati vs State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605)

6. Mahmood vs State AIR 1961 All 538

7. Mano Dutt v. State of UP (2012) 4 SCC 1983

8. Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 AIR 465

9. Wassan Singh vs. The State Of Punjab 1996 SCC (1) 458
 vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Prosecution has approached the Hon’ble Sessions Court of

Delhi under Sec. 177 1 read with Schedule I of Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

1
SECTION 177 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

Ordinary place of inquiry and trial. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within
whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
 viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Armaan Mallik (deceased) and Ridhima Gupta (accused) are students of

CBIT Engineering College, Delhi. They were pursuing their II year.
Ridhima has known to have temper issues. On one occasion, she lost her
temper and slapped Armaan too.

2. On 5th November 2012, Armaan tried to play a prank on Ridhima. At

around 5:45 pm, Armaan texted Ridhima from her friend’s phone asking
her to come to the college auditorium. As soon as she entered, at around
6:00 pm, Armaan turned off all the lights, cut off the power supply and
locked the auditorium from outside.

3. At around 6:30 pm, on hearing someone at the door, she hid behind it,
holding a wooden stick she found in the auditorium. As soon as Armaan
entered, she administered a blow on his head from behind with that stick.
Soon after Armaan collapsed, she dropped the stick, ran out and locked
the door from outside. The CCTV footage obtained from the camera
positioned outside the auditorium, towards the entrance, clearly captured
Ridhima entering, Armaan entering and thereafter Ridhima leaving. The
wooden rod used was recovered from the garbage bin nearby. Ridhima’s
friends stated that on finding her nervous, they questioned her persistently
about what was wrong. However, they said, she refused to answer, took a
tranquilizer and went to sleep.

4. On 6th November, at around 8:00 pm, Armaan Mallik was found lying in
a pool of blood in the auditorium by a group of students. According to the
post mortem report, he gradually bled to his death due to the wound at the
back of his head.
 viii

ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE OF

CULPABLE HOMICIDE AMOUNTING TO MURDER U/S 302 OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860?

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED ACTED UPON PRIVATE DEFENCE?

3. WHETHER THE DECEASED CAUSED SUDDEN AND GRAVE

PROVOCATION TO THE ACCUSED?

4. WHETHER THERE WAS SCOPE FOR PREMEDITATION AND

CALCULATION ?
 ix

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE

OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE AMOUNTING TO
MURDER U/S 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?

It is submitted that the accused is guilty of murder as dealt u/s 300 of IPC
‘thirdly’. That the accused inflicted an injury to the head of the deceased and
leaving him to bleed to death shows her intention of killing the deceased.

2. THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT ACT IN PRIVATE

DEFENCE

It is submitted that the accused did not act within the ambit of her right of
private defence. That the force chosen by the accused for defence is irrational to
what was apprehended. There was no imminent danger to the life of the accused
but she hid behind the door to hit the deceased on the head. That even after
hitting the deceased with the stick, she had the opportunity of saving his life but
instead she chose to conceal the fact that the deceased is left dying in the
auditorium.

3. WHETHER THE DECEASED CAUSED SUUDEN AND

GRAVE PROVOCATION TO THE ACCUSED?

 x

It is submitted that the deceased had not caused grave and sudden provocation

to the accused. The accused, out of grudge towards the deceased, had

premeditatedly decided to hit him while he came near the door of the

auditorium. Unlike the accused, a reasonable man at her place wouldn’t have

sorted to such means and could have dealt with the situation in a different

manner. That the accused had sufficient time to cool- off, however, her motive

was different which was to kill the deceased.

4. WHETHER THERE WAS SCOPE FOR

PREMEDITATION AND CALCULATION?

It is most humbly submitted that in the present case there was a complete scope
for premeditation and calculation in the situation which clearly indicates that the
defense had no pattern set to do the act.
 xii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE OF CULPABLE HOMICIDE
AMOUNTING TO MURDER U/S. 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Ridhima Gupta (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘accused’) is punishable for the offence of murder under S. 302 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’). In order to bring a successful conviction
under this charge, however, it is pertinent for the prosecution to show that the act committed
by the accused is covered under any one of the four clauses of S. 300, IPC. 2 It is contended
that the act of the accused is covered under clause three of S. 300, IPC, which elucidate the
following essentials as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court3:

1) First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present,

2) Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective
investigations,
3) Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other
kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
enquiry proceeds further and,
4) Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the
three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to
do with the intention of the offender.
2
Sec. 300, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, “Murder. —Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide
is murder:
(Firstly) — If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
(Secondly) — If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
(Thirdly) — If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
(Fourthly) — If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”
3
Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465
 xii

It was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that once the above mentioned four
elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under Section 300, "3rdly".

Therefore, it is asserted that in the pertinent case the accused has caused the death of Armaan
Mallik by intentionally causing particular bodily injury i.e. by administering a blow on his
head from behind [1.1] and the injury caused is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature [1.2].

[1.1] THAT THE ACCUSED HAS INTENTIONALLY CAUSED THE PARTICULAR BODILY

INJURY:

It is humbly submitted that at the onset of the case it is very essential to prove that bodily
injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be established, that is to say, whether the
injury is on the leg or the arm or the stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital
organs were cut and so forth.4 It is submitted that in the present case the throat of the
deceased was cut and he died as a result of this injury.5

It is asserted that the next question comes as to the intention to cause the alleged injury and
when it comes to the question of intention, that is subjective to the offender then it must be
proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present. It was
held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an
intention to inflict the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature
but that he had an intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the
body of the deceased.6

It was held that the initial words of second part of S.300(3) is descriptive of the earlier part of
the section, namely, the infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, that is to say,
if the circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on

4
Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465; Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753
5
As mention in FACTSHEET
6
Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753
 xii
the lower part of the leg, or some lesser blow. In that case, the first part of the clause does
not come into play. But once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is
found to be present, then the earlier part of the clause - "and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted" is merely descriptive.7

It was further observed by court in considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury
found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example,
whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous part of the body, and
whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of
course, not necessary to inquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the accused
intended to blow the head. It is broad based and simple and based on common sense: the
kind of enquiry that "an ordinary man" could readily appreciate and understand.8

Therefore, it was concluded by court that the question, so far as the intention is concerned, is
not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but
whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is
proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion.9

[1.2] That THE INJURY CAUSED IS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE DEATH IN THE ORDINARY

COURSE OF NATURE:

It is humbly submitted that once it is established that the injury is caused and the accused has
the intention to cause the injury inflicted on the person of the deceased then comes the later
part of the enquiry which is objective in nature to find out that whether the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not. Thus, intention is only linked
up and is restricted to the causing of the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention
of causing such bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.

7
Dhupa Chamar v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 506
8
Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753
9
Jai Prakash vs State (Delhi Administration) 1991 SCC (2) 32
 xii
It was observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that what needs to be proved is that the accused
had an intention to cause the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of
deceased, which was later found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a principle is based on
broad lines of common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury
which is sufficient to cause death; then any person could always plead that he never had an
intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him wrong.10

In the present case the accused have administered a blow on the head of the deceased from
back .It is humble submitted that death from a blow on the head depends on the nature and
extent of local damage to the brain which may result in death in this situation

It is humbly submitted that according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the
intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence
would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

It was observed by the court that no one has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of
murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can
only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or
otherwise unintentional.

Therefore, it is most humbly submitted that the accused has caused the death of Armaan
Mallik by administering a fatal blow on the back portion of the head of the deceased and the
nature of injury was such that it was sufficient to cause the death of a person in ordinary
course of nature and the accused can be held liable for the offence of culpable homicide
amounting to murder u/s 302 IPC.

ISSUE 2: THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT ACT IN PRIVATE DEFENCE

10
Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465; Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753r
 xii

1. It is submitted that the right of private defence to the accused is not applicable. That the
accused without apprehension of imminent danger to life took the stick and hit the
deceased and knowingly left him to die.

2. It is submitted that the right of private defence as granted under IPC is a defensive right
and not a punitive or retributive right. It is submitted that the right of Private defence as
provided under section 100 of IPC runs as follows:

The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in
the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to
the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the
descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely: —
(First) — Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
(Secondly) —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;

3. It is submitted that there was no assault from the part of the deceased. Irrespective of the
behavior of the deceased, the accused, from a pre-meditated mindset, hid behind the door
in order to hit the deceased with the stick.

4. It is submitted that it was neither reasonable nor necessary that the accused acted in such
a manner that she had blown with the wooden stick on the head of the deceased. As soon
as she heard someone approaching the door, she hid behind the door, holding a wooden
stick she found in the auditorium. This reveals her pre-meditated state of mind which she
has made and was ready to hit whoever comes from the door. If instead of the deceased,
someone else had come to the auditorium, the action of the accused and the result of it
would have been the same.

5. In Mano Dutt v. State of UP,i it was held that the right of self-defence has to be
exercised directly in proportion to the extent of aggression.
 xii

6. It is submitted that the right of self-defence of accused is way more than what is
apprehended. There have been previous instances of quarrel between the accused and the
deceased and on one occasion, she had slapped the deceased as well. She acted the way
she did out of her short temper issues and retaliation which she was seeking against the
deceased.

7. It is submitted that after inflicting blow with the wooden stick to the deceased, when she
went back, her friends questioned her persistently about what was wrong. However,
ignoring all the questions, she chose to sleep. Even on the subsequent day, when she had
the opportunity to seek help or confess to her crime, she chose to remain silent and
conceal the incident happened. The accused had the time and opportunity to save the
deceased but she did not even attempt to do so.

8. It is further submitted that it was until 8 pm on the subsequent day that the body of
deceased was found lying in a pool of blood in the auditorium by a group of students.

9. According to the post mortem report, he gradually bled to his death due to the wound at
the back of his head. The accused had the opportunity but she chose to let him die due to
her grudge against the deceased.

10. In Gopal and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan,ii under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, the burden of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in
the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to presume the truth of the plea of
self-defence. The court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.

11. It is submitted that the onus of proving the plea of self-defence is upon the accused-
defendant and that the prosecution has set forth a strong case that the accused did not
exercise her right of private defence in a just manner.
 xii

ISSUE 3: THAT THE DECEASED DID NOT CAUSE SUDDEN

OR GRAVE PROVOCATION

1. It is submitted that the provision of Murder as stated under Sec. 300 of IPC also states
exceptions wherein culpable homicide does not amount to murder. It runs as:
Exception 1. —When culpable homicide is not murder. —Culpable homicide is not
murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or
causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is
subject to the following provisos: —
(First) —That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender
as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
(Secondly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the
law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
(Thirdly) —That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise
of the right of private defence.
Explanation. —Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the
offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

2. It is submitted that the exceptions deal with cases which amount to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. The first exception states that in case the death is caused
due to grave and sudden provocation caused by the deceased, it shall not amount to
murder. In the given case, Ridhima was locked inside the auditorium for about half an
hour, from 6 pm to 6:30 pm and when she heard some movement near the door she
took up the wooden stick and went up to the door. It is submitted that at this point of
time, there was no provocation from the side of deceased. She was calm and when
she hit deceased on his head with clear intentions, there was no provocation caused to
her by the deceased. Further, she also had the opportunity of saving the deceased by
taking him to the hospital, but instead she left him bleeding until he died and went to
her room to sleep.

3. The Supreme Court in  K.M. Nanavati vs State of Maharashtra ,iii has extensively
discussed the law relating to provocation in India and observed that –
 xii
The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging
to the same class to society as accused, placed in the situation in which the accused
was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.

Words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden
provocation to an accused so as to bring his act under exception.

The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation for committing the offence; and

The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from the
provocation and not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise
giving the accused room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

4. It is submitted that the case in hand does not fall under this exception when the
passion has been cooled down by the lapse of time. There has been a time gap of
half an hour since provocation was caused and the accused had the time to cool off
within that period of time. However, due to her temper issues and grudge towards
the deceased, she hit him in order to kill him.

ISSUE 4: THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR PREMEDITATION AND

CALCULATION

Premeditation can be defined as the active intent to anticipate future events and the planned
consequential reaction to those events. In this case the accused intentionally landed a blow on
the back portion of the head of the deceased and never thought of reviving or complaining of
 xii
the incident to someone. It is very well clear from the fact that the accused’s friends stated
that on finding her nervousness, her friends questioned her persistently about what was wrong
but she refused to answer instead she showed a very careless behavior and went to sleep; this
clearly state that the accused never thought of premeditation and calculation, if she would
have shown a little concern the deceased could have been saved.

As far as the reaction of the accused towards the deceased is concerned, there does not seem
to be any level of premeditation involved, the accused simply lost possession of self-control
and landed a blow on the back portion of the head and left him there to bleed till he
succumbed to death.

This very fact makes it crystal clear that the accused did premeditate his attack and purely did
not acted on her consciousness.
 ix

PRAYE

Wherefore, in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments

advanced, the counsels for the Prosecution humbly pray before this Hon’ble Court to kindly

adjudge and declare:

THAT CHARGE OF S. 302 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 AGAINST THE ACCUSED ARE

PROVED

HENCE, THE ACCUSED, RIDHIMA GUPTA, BE CONVICTED & SENTENCED FOR THE

CHARGE

AND/OR

Pass any other order as it may deem fit in the interest of Equity, Justice & Good Conscience.

All of which is most humbly & respectfully submitted

S/d___________

COUNSELS FOR PROSECUTION

ix
 x

ENDNOTE
i
(2012) 4 SCC 1983
ii
(2013) 2 SCC 188
iii
(AIR 1962 SC 605)
iv
1996 SCC (1) 458
V
(2008) 15 SCC 753