Montefalcon et al v.

Vasquez
GR No. 165016
17 June 2008

Facts: Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against Vasquez before RTC Naga. She alleged that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez (birth certificate attached as evidence), thus prayed that the latter be obliged to give
support to Laurence. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born
in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that
she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.

The sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur but it was Vasquez's
grandfather who received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who
informed the court of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for
lack of proper service of summons.

In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at his residence in Taguig upon petitioners' motion. A Taguig deputy sheriff
served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's
surname.

Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer. The second return states that the sheriff caused the service of summons
together with the copy of the complaint and annexes upon Vasquez by substituted service thru his caretaker, Bejer, person of sufficient
discretion, who acknowledged the receipt thereof at No. 10 Int. President Garcia St. Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, as
evidenced by her signature appearing at the lower portion of the original copy of summons.

On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of
summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned
as he had allegedly moved to another place and left no new address.

RTC granted petitioner’s prayers (Php 5k/month and the past support for 8 years) considering that they had no ill-motive. In addition,
Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by his silence. It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a public
document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation.

In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. On
appeal, he argued that trial court erred in trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in
awarding P5k/month support, which was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant."

CA granted Vasquez’ appeal and noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was "defective" as there was no explanation of
impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service. On MR, petitioners argued that any attempt at personal
service of summons was needless as Vasquez already left for abroad. But it was still denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether Vasquez was validly serviced summons through substituted service thus acquiring jurisdiction over his
person?

Ruling: Yes. There was valid service of summons through substituted service.

Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons on
July 19, 2000 in Taguig. Noting that Vasquez's seaman's book indicated that he left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on
October 12, 2000, they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on mere technicality.

Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have been personal or by publication as substituted
service is proper only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that the sheriff's return did not state that he exerted efforts to
personally serve the summons.

As a rule, in order to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this is
not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.

It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts
expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore
common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the
manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates.

In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may
then be taken that he has established a residence in either place.

As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Service of summons on him is governed
by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
 SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. ─ When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court,
be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.)

The preceding section refers to extraterritorial service be be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
publication.

Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons
allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-seaman.

Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. But since personal service of summons was not practicable since the
defendant was temporarily out of the country. To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-seaman who went on
overseas contract work ─ would not only be impractical and futile ─ it would also be absurd.

In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because previous attempts were made by
the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in
the performance of their official duty. The person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at
Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as evidenced by his employment contract, executed
under the supervision and authority of the POEA. Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and seafarer's information
sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the alias summons that Bejer
received. She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his return in October 2000 after finishing his nine-
month contract with Fathom Ship Management.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set aside. The default judgment was rendered on
May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to file an MR. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at
personal service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines Sur to the final substituted service in Metro Manila by a
Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight months, a reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service had failed and was
futile.

SC already ruled in previous cases that the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by
substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning
defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as
domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in personam therein.

"Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may
be temporarily out of the country at the time. The plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or regular
business place. He need not know where a resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to
ensure that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him about it. The law
presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice.

More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff's return of a statement about the
impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice
petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted by the
plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service had Vasquez surfaced when the case was
heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he questioned
the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question the court's jurisdiction
over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.

Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his mother told him about the trial court's
decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving
of more faith and credit. The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in it. Only clear and
convincing evidence may overcome its presumption of regularity. Given the circumstances in the present case, we agree that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the sheriff stands.