John R. Crane P.O. Box 7185 McLean, VA 22106-7185, E-mail: [email protected] 1-202-372-5321 15 May 2020 Michael J. Regis U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Acting Deputy Director of Management (DDM) New Executive Office Building 725 17" Street, NW Washington, DC 20503 Michael,j,[email protected] Michael J. Regis Acting Director U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Theodore Roosevelt Federal Building 1900 E. Street, NW Washington, DC 20415-0001 Michael [email protected] Michael J. Regis Counsel of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Executive Chairperson Integrity Committee (IC) 1717 H Street, NW Suite 825 Washington, DC 20006 [email protected] SUBJECT: COLLABORATIVE INTER-AGENCY EFFORT TO OBSTRUCT THE FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS (ADMINISTRATIVE AND/OR CRIMINAL) IN ORDER TO DEGRADE THE EVIDENTIARY BASE (WITNESS STATEMENTS & DOCUMENTATION) REQUIRED TO PROPERLY SUBSTANTIATE OR NON- SUBSTANTIATE INDIVIDUAL ALLEGATIONS AND DISCLOSURES OF WRONGDOING MADE AGAINST SENIOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICIALS OPERATING UNDER COLOR OF OFFICE (18 U.S.C. §1505) 1. More than two-million civilian federal employees work in the Executive Branch where every federal employee knows that working for the federal government establishes a public trust that carries a responsibilty to the U.S. Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain: 17‘* federal civilian employees also know the U.S. Congress leveled a statutory obligation upon every employee for reporting waste, fraud, and corruption to appropriate authorities [5 C.F.R. §2635.101(b)(11)]." a. Recognizing the fact that numerous agency Responsible Management Officials (RMOs) continue to subject fellow employees who report waste, fraud, and corruption to appropriate authorities to employment retaliation, the U.S. Congress passed the Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 to establish clear disciplinary standards to: * remove RMOs who engage in employee retaliation against employees fulfilling their statutory duty to report waste, fraud, and corruption to appropriate authorities [P.L. 115-73; 5 U.S.C. §7515(b)(1)(A)/(b)(1)(B]2: b. Unfortunately, senior level Inspector General RMOs continue to intentionally subvert the will and intent of the U.S. Congress by actively engaging in employee retaliation while subverting the federal investigative process (administrative/criminal) intentionally delayinglignoring statutory investigative timelines required to preserve time-sensitive evidentiary base required to substantiate/non-substantiate allegations and disclosures of wrongdoing leveled against senior agency officials operating under Color of Office: + (wrongdoing defined) * Violation of law, rule, and regulation, Gross Waste of Funds®, Gross Mismanagement®, Abuse of Authority’, Substantial and Specific Danger to Public Health or Safety® ' Basic Obligation of Public Service for employees of the Executive Branch, 5 CFR {§ 2635.101(b)(11): "Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.” Accessed at: hitos:/www.law.cornell.eduefi/tex/512635.10% 2 Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, P.L. 115-73/26 Oct 2017. Accessed at: bitps://wwew. conaress.cov/15/plaws/publ73/PLAW-1 1Spubl73.pdt 5 Discipline of Supervisors Based on Retaliation Against Whistleblowers, 5 U.S.C. 7515(b\1)(A)/5 US.C § 7515(b)(1)(B). Accessed at: httos:/winw.lav cornell eduluscodertext/5I7515 * Color of Office: "A claim or assumption of right to do an act by virtue of an office, made by a person who is legally destitute of any such right”. Accessed at httpsi/thelawictionary ord/color-of-ofice! * Gross Waste of Funds: "more than debatable expenditure that is significantly out of proportion to the benefit reasonably expected to accrue to the government.” Van Ee v. EPA, 64 M.S.P.R. 693, 698 (1994) ® Gross Mismanagement: “a management action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency's ability to accomplish its mission.” Kavanagh v. M.S.P.B., 176 F. App'x 133, 135 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2006). 7 Abuse of Authority: “arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a federal official or employee" that harms the rights of any person or that personally benefits the officiallemployee or their preferred associates. See Eikassir . Gen. Servs. Admin., 257 F. App'x 326, 329 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2007) ® Substantial and Specific Danger to Public Health and Safety: To evaluate whether the danger disclosed is “substantial,” courts look to the nature of the potential harm (e.g., failure to properly plan Lead IG oversight for extremely dangerous whole of government (WoG) operations in Afghanistarvireq) and on “the potential consequences.” Chambers v. Dep't of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Ci. 2008); To determine whether the disclosed harm was “specific,” courts look to the likelihood that harm will result (e.g., was there a possibilty that American personnel operating in Afghanistan/Iraq were placed in danger as a result of not conducting comprehensive oversight planning?) & when the harm may occur 247TAKAWAY: The special trust and confidence afforded to the Inspector General Community by the U.S. Congress and the Chief Executive must be reassessed and closely examined considering the stunning loss of independence and objectivity documented across multiple Offices of the Inspectors General (OIG). a. In fact, the balance between managing OIG operational independence and the mandate to proactively keep the agency head informed on the status on all agency programs and operations, including the OIG, has been institutionally degraded. The statutory purpose of the Inspector General process is to act as independent, nonpartisan officials (selected by virtue of demonstrated performance) focused on preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse within the agencies/organizations in which OlGs are established: * OlGs play a key role in government oversight (keeping the assigned agency head informed on the performance of programs/operations) while also supporting the U.S. Congress in establishing structures/authorities required to perform effective government oversight * Members of the federal inspector general community are subject to the same laws, rules, and regulations that govern the rest of the more than 2.1 million federal employees under the merit system * Members of the Federal Inspector General (IG) Community do not enjoy a different level of ethical standards or immunity from the basic accountability standards designed to address ethical lapses andior professional incompetence across the merit system b. Unfortunately, the Inspectors General routinely: ‘+ ignore federal statue governing the federal investigative process (administrative/criminal) [5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §4] * fail to properly keep the agency head informed [5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §2] * aggressively retaliate against OIG employees that properly report wrongdoing (occurring within the OIG) (5 U.S.C. §1213/5 U.S.C. §1214) c. Confident in the knowledge that the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) has usurped exclusive merit system oversight authority statutorily granted to the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC)? which safeguards the merit {e.g., conducting whole of government operations in Afghanistanflraq- the number of U.S. service members killed in Afghanistan rose during FY17 httos:/www. buzzfeednews,comvarticle/verabergenaruen these-us-troops-were-killed-in-combat-during- lrumps-frst; Brian R, Hoke & Nathaniel P. Delemarre (hitosviwww.nytimes. com/2017/09/06/world/asia/cia-afghanistan-war.html). "U.S. Special Counsel (OSC), a statutorily established independent federal investigative and prosecutorial agency with the primary mission of safeguarding the merit system by protecting federal ‘employees from prohibited personnel practices (PPP) especially reprisal for whistleblowing (5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219). Accessed at: httos:/ www law.cornell.edufuscode/text/5/part-lI/chapter-12/subchapter- 347system and protects the individual legal rights of all federal whistleblowers subjected to retaliation by members of the Inspectors General (IG) community: * Despite receipt of several OSC-12 Disclosures of Wrongdoing (DI-18-4904, DI- 18-4945, DI-18-5016) specifically notifying the U.S. Special Counsel of his duty to protect whistleblowers and demand legitimate investigation (criminaladministrative) of his fellow members of the CIGIE, U.S. Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner continues to shield his fellow CIGIE members from legitimate investigation (criminal/administrative) at the expense of the due process rights of all whistleblowers he swore to protect. 2. The CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) run by Scott S. Dahl/Deborah J. Jeffrey have demonstrated a deplorable record with respect to recommending independent and objective CIGIE investigation into reports of misconduct leveled against fellow members of the Federal Inspector General (FIG) community: 111121814 2009 43 36 2 <5% 2010 44 36 4 <3% 2014 51 22 1 <2% 2012 44 8 5 <7% 2013 390, 361 12 <3% 2014 72 30 4 <6% 2015 65 60 0 <1% 2016 68 67 4 <2% 2017 39 37 2 <5% 2018 63 58 2 <3% 2019 57 54 3 <5% Assessing the low number of cases that are actually referred for investigation under the statutory authority of the CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) becomes more problematic *° Statement Scott S. Dahl Chairperson CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) to U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on Government Operations, 18 September 2019. Accessed at: https//docs house. govimestinas/GO/G024/20190918/109944/HHRG-1 16-GO24-Wetate- DahlS-20190918 pat Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R44198: Oversight ofthe Inspectors General Community: The IG Counsel's integrity Committee (IC), 21 September 2015. Accessed at httos/crsreports.conaress..aovioraduct/pdt/RUR44198/3 }®FY2016 CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Annual Report to the President and Congress. Accessed at: hitosi/ianet gov/sites/defaullflesfiles/intearity Committee Annual Report - FY 2015.pd © FY2016 CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Annual Report to the President and Congress. Accessed at: https:/lanet.covisites/defaultflesifiles/2016%4201C%20Annual%20Report. od ¥ FY2017 CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Annual Report to the President and Congress. Accessed at: hitps:/ignet gov/sites/defaullfles/iles/2017%2010%20Annual%20Repor pdf 447when considering the fact that the CIGIE (IC) receives, reviews, and refers allegations of wrongdoing leveled against fellow Inspectors Generals to other Inspectors Generals. In what reflects a major threat to the independence and objectivity of the U.S. Special Counsel's (OSC) ability to safeguard the merit system and protect whistleblowers from retaliation by a CIGIE membership of super-empowered Federal Inspectors General (FIG) is the fact that the Inspector General Community utilized the IG Act to subordinate the U.S. Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner! (OSC)/Principle Deputy U.S. Special Counsel Ellen Chubin Epstein to the adjudicative authority of the Counsel of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Effectiveness (CIGIE) Integrity Committee. * Clearly the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) cannot effectively safeguard and protect the merit system while giving up the statutory authority to demand accountability of all 2 million members of the merit system which includes every member of the Federal Inspector General (FIG) community a. Ina dystopian imbalance of protective status afforded to only a handful of selected members of the Federal Inspectors General (FIG) class, is the fact that the U.S. Counsel/Principal Deputy U.S. Counsel are unwilling/unable to demand independent and objective investigation of allegation(s)/disclosure(s) of wrongdoing leveled against fellow “covered” members of the CIGIE running (74) statutory Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) established across the federal government: #8 * establishment (33), * designated federal entity (DFE) (32), * other permanent (7), and * special (2) b. Currently, the CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) refuses to conduct whistleblower retaliation investigation into allegations/disclosures of wrongdoing leveled against fellow CIGIE members (Inspectors General) ordered under the statutory authority of the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC), see enclosure 1, 2. c. The orchestrated subversion of the federal investigative process (criminal & administrative) coupled w/usurpation of statutory oversight authority vested in the Office of the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) to safeguard the merit system and protect federal whistleblowers is criminal (18 U.S.C. §1505) and: * violates the basic due process rights of all federal whistleblowers denied the right to have a legitimate hearing before an independent and objective trier of *® Congressional Research Service (CRS) R45450 Statutory Inspector General in the Federal Government: A Primer, 03 January 2019, Accessed at: https://crsreports.congress.goviproduct/pdf/R/R45450 517fact while asserting property (employment) rights granted by the U.S. Constitution and taken by illegal retaliatory action. '®"” TAKEAWAY: On 16 December 2016," the U.S. Congress mandated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relinquish control over the federal investigative process. (administrative/criminal) for the membership of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and turn it over to the exclusive membership of the CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC). a. Perhaps more disappointing than the loss of investigative independence and objectivity entrusted to a super empowered class of federal employees (Federal Inspectors General) is the fact that we have ignored the words of James Madison when he explained the need for each branch of government to balance unelected power to protect the interests of the American People. In the words of James Madison: '® “if Men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor intemal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and the next place, oblige it to control itself.” After turning oversight control over to the oversight community, we can now confidently answer the age-old question, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodies,” which translates from Latin to “Who Will Watch the Watchers?” The answer to the age-old question is that federal Inspectors General (IG) “watch themselves” while actively investigating everyone else. © Employees have Due Process Rights, 03 December 2013, Accessed at Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Education (8 Cir. 12/2/13), *" Loudermill Court explained that a ‘root cause” of the Due Process Clause is that, “an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. This principle requires some kind of hearing prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment”. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542,, accessed at: https:/Awww.mspb.gow/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1166935&versior CROBAT ¥® Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, P.L. 114-317/16 Dec 2016, Section 3 made changes to the federal investigative process removing the FBI and installing federal inspectors general in the ‘oversight process over other the membership of the CIGIE. Accessed at: httosu/www.conaress.gov/114/plaws/pubI317/PLAW-1 14pubI317.pdf ‘8 James Madison (08 February 1788). Federalist Paper 51 The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances, Accessed at: https:/avalon law.yale.edu/18th_centuryifed51.asp siness Communicati 1714998application=A 6173. On 26 October 2017, the U.S. Congress passed the Dr Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 to establish measures to ultimately remove Responsible Management Officials (RMOs) from federal government service for engaging in a pattern of retaliation against fellow federal employees performing their statutory duty to report misconduct occurring within the federal government [5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11); 5 U.S.C. § 7515(b)(1)(B)]. a. The Dr Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, named in honor of a brave federal employee who paid the ultimate price for whistleblowing, 2" should have been a welcome relief to the thousands of law-abiding federal employees routinely subjected to life-altering punishment and life-long stigma for simply reporting misconduct occurring within the federal government as directed by the U.S. Congress. b. What is clear is that the U.S. Congress recognized that performing the statutory duty of reporting wrongdoing comes at great personal risk; in fact, the U.S. Congress directed that all agency heads report to the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) the loss of any federal whistleblower to suicide (P.L. 115-73, Sect. 105: Suicide by Employees). TAKEAWAY: Steven P. Luke, a federal investigator assigned to the DoD Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations (Al), managed by Marguerite C. Garrison, became a federal whistleblower when he actively resisted pressure to substantiate an allegation of wrongdoing leveled against the Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) Robert Cardillo despite his firm conviction to the contrary, a fact he addressed to the office of Senator Charles E. Grassley * On 08 January 2019, Steven P. Luke was found dead in the trunk of his red Volvo $60 parked in the garage of the Federal Mark Center located in Alexandria Virginia.2? * 04 February 2019, Investigator Luke was scheduled to meet with Senator Charles E. Grassley’s Senate Whistleblower Investigator Charles Murphy” a. Inan effort to hide the loss of independence and functional breakdown in the federal investigative process under his direct control, Acting DoD Inspector General Glenn A. ® Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, P.L. 115-73/26 Oct 2017, Accessed at: https:/hmww.govinfo, gov/content/pka/PLAW-1 1 Spubl73/pd1/PLAW-1 15pubI73,pdf 21 Doctor Chris Kirkpatrick, a psychologist assigned to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Tomah Medical Center located in Tomah, Wisconsin became a federal whistleblower after raising concern over a policy of overmedicating patients with opiates making the patients untreatable during therapy sessions. Fired and disgraced, Dr. Kirkpatrick lost his fight to suicide. Accessed at: https://dallynorthwestern,com/2017/11/20/campus/northwestern-alumnus-inspires-federal-lav-aimed- rotecting-whistleblowers! 2 Amy Mackinnon (20 March 2020) Death of a Whistleblower Questions raised by a Pentagon investigator went unanswered following his workplace suicide. Accessed at hittos:/Mforeignpolicy, com/2020/03/20/death-of-a-whistleblower-suicide-pentagon-office-inspector-generall 2 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 77Fine elected to ignore Congress, forgo proper agency head notification, and take steps to avoid triggering an independent and objective federal investigation into the death of a federal whistleblower by the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) as demanded by the U.S. Congress (P.L. 115-73, §105: Suicide by Employees). b. Perhaps more troubling than not reporting the loss of a federal employee whistleblower involved in administering the federal investigation (administrative) process is the fact that Glenn A. Fine also elected to not inform his agency head (Secretary of Defense) and Congress on an uninvestigated threat to his workforce reflecting potential abuse and/or deficiency: + The law is clear on the fact that Acting DoD Inspector General Glenn A. Fine had an additional non-negotiable duty to immediately report (seven-calendar- days) a serious and flagrant problem affecting the proper execution of his Investigation (administrative) Program [5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) § 5(d)}° c. Despite the individual mandate for all senior Inspector General Responsible Management Officials to properly report wrongdoing,” no member of Glenn A. Fine’s leadership team took the personal initiative to report a threat to investigative independence (loss of life of a federal investigator under undetermined circumstances) and simply ignored a threat to the independence and objectivity of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG): + Paul Hadjiyane, General Counsel (GC) + Brett A. Mansfield, Senior Advisor to the DoD Inspector General * Steven A. Stebbins, Chief of Staff * Daniel R. Blair, Deputy Chief of Staff (CoS) * Dermot F. O'Reilly, Deputy Inspector General for Criminal Investigations/Director Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) * Kelly P, Mayo, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) Assistant Inspector General (AIG) for Investigative Operations 25 Dr Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-73/26 Oct 2017). Section 5, Accessed at: httos:/imw.qovinfo. aov/content/pka/PLAW-1 15publ73/pdf/PLAW.11Spubl73.pdf £5 U.S.C. Appendix \G Act) § 5(d) Immediate Report on Serious or Flagrant Problems: “ Each Inspector General shall report immediately to the head ofthe establishment involved whenever the Inspector General becomes ‘aware of particularly serious or fiagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations of such establishment. The head of the establishment shall transmit any such report to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress within seven calendar days, together with a report by the head of the establishment containing any comments such head deems appropriate.”. Accessed at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/Sa/complledact-95-452/section. 2 Basic Obligation of Public Service for employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11): “Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.” Accessed at: https:/www.law.cornell.edulcfrltex5/2635.101 2 Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017, P.L. 115-73/26 Oct 2017. Accessed at https: /Awww conaress.cov/116/plaws/publ73/PLAW-1 15oubl73.pdf 8.17+ Marguerite C. Garrison, Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigation (DIG Al) * Jacqueline L. Wicecarver, Deputy Inspector General for Audit * Michael J. Roark, Deputy Inspector General for Evaluations * Michael S. Child Sr., Deputy Inspector General Overseas Contingency Operations s (OCO) + Catherine M. DelPrete, Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)/former Agency Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Release Authority d. In final analysis, Principle Deputy Inspector General Glenn A. Fine established an unacceptable culture of corruption that infected his senior leadership team allowing him to brazenly violate his oath of office and routinely engage in professional behavior that at best reflects gross mismanagement 2 and at worst reflects outright criminal abuse of his authority:2° + Nothing short of immediate removal of the entire senior DoD OIG leadership team coupled with visible accountability measures will restore the independence and objectivity required within an Office of Inspector (OIG) ¢. The personal sacrifice of Steven P. Luke a dedicated federal investigator who performed his duty at great personal price cannot go unanswered: the DoD Inspector General's senior leadership team is not above the law. 4. On 09 February 2015, | filed a disclosure of wrongdoing (DI-15-2333) with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), in which | provided first-hand knowledge of an orchestrated effort to obstruct a criminal investigation into “ongoing leaks of classified information” involving senior administration agency officials as requested by Congressman Peter T. King on 09 August 2011 in his capacity as the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security in violation of 18 U.S.C. §798, see enclosure 3,4. a. As the DoD Assistant Inspector General (AIG) for Communications and Congressional Affairs, | objected to Acting Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks internally coordinating with: * DoD OIG General Counsel (GC) Henry C. Shelley Jr. * DoD OIG Deputy Inspector General for Criminal Investigation James B. Burch * DoD OIG Assistant Inspector General for Criminal Investigation James R. Ives * DoD OIG Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigation Marguerite ©. Garrison 2 Gross Mismanagement: ‘a management action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency's ability to accomplish its mission.” Kavanagh v. M.S.P.B., 176 F. Appx 133, 135 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 2006). 2 Abuse of Authority: “arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a federal official or employee" that harms the rights of any person or that personally benefits the official/employee or their preferred associates. See Elkassir v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 257 F. App'x 326, 329 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2007). 0.17* Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessment (ISPA) Patricia A. Brannin * CIA Inspector General David B. Buckley * CIA Deputy Inspector General Christopher R. Sharpley * CIA OIG General Counsel (GC) Christine S. Ruppert * CIA OIG Assistant Inspector General for Investigation Howard W. Cox And, agreeing with CIA IG David B. Buckley to allow a Congressionally mandated criminal investigation to be conducted outside of the DoD IG's criminal investigative process by evaluation/audit personnel that lacked the professional education/certification (OPM Job Series 1811) to conduct an investigation into alleged/suspected criminal violation of Federal law at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. b. The fact that Acting Inspector General Lynne H. Halbrooks steered a high-interest Congressional criminal investigation to the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessment Patricia A. Brannin knowing that Patricia A. Brannin announced her plan to retire from the federal government in June 2013 clearly evidenced an orchestrated inter-agency effort to obstruct the federal investigative process by senior Inspector General (IG) leaders of both the DoD/CIA * Steering a Congressionally directed criminal investigation into “ongoing leaks of classified information” involving senior administration officials out of the federal investigative process and into the auditing & evaluation process clearly indicates a complete loss of Inspector General (IG) independence and objectivity reflecting outright criminal abuse of authority, see enclosures 5 and 6. c. As the DoD Acting Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks was willing to obstruct the federal investigative process, with the cooperation of her senior investigative leadership team (James B. Burch, James R. Ives, Henry C. Shelley Jr., and Marguerite C. Garrison), | had no choice but to make a whistleblower disclosure: * On 13 September 2013, I made a protected disclosure to Charles Murphy in the Office of Senator Charles E. Grassley on an inter-agency effort to obstruct the federal investigative process by senior inspector general personnel attempting to curry favor while using their positions to offer preferential treatment to selected senior agency officials (abuse of authority) while actively defying the will of the U.S. Congress, see enclosure 7. %°%4 ** Basic Obligation of Public Service for employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11): “Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.” Accessed at: hiins:/www.jaw.comell,edulcirtext/5/2635.101 Abuse of Authority: “arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a federal official or employee" that harms the rights of any person or that personally benefits the officallemployee or their preferred associates. See Elkassir v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 257 F. App’x 326, 329 (Fed. Cir. Deo. 10, 2007). 10-17d. As a result of my disclosure of wrongdoing, Senator Charles E. Grassley conducted an investigation into senior leader misconduct within the DoD OIG that clearly demonstrated that Acting IG Lynne M. Halbrooks exercised what can be considered in the most favorable light as gross mismanagement and in the most probable light outright criminal abuse of authority orchestrating the conduct of a criminal investigation outside of the federal investigative process supervised by DoD Assistant Inspector General for Criminal Investigation and Acting Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessment (ISPA) James B. Ives. * e. As unbelievable as it appears, the team of DoD OIG ISPA auditors failed to properly interview the actual subjects of the investigation (Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-|) Michael G. Vickers, and SECDEF Chief of Staff Jeremy B. Bash) while ensuring that the investigative report (DODOIG-2013-092)* did not reference any of the interviewed subjects as part of an intentionally flawed federal investigation. f. While giving false testimony to Senator Charles E. Grassley’s investigative staff, Acting Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks made the “claim” that there was a “long standing policy” of removing vital information from DoD IG investigative reports which in the case of this Congressionally mandated investigation (Project: D2012-DINTO1- 0079.000/Investigative Report-DODOIG 2013-092) into “ongoing leaks of classified information” involving senior administration officials involved removal of the fact that the subject of investigation Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta was never interviewed.°° * On 24 November 2014, DoD Inspector General Jon T. Rymer confirmed to Senator Charles E. Grassley that the DoD Office of Inspector General has, “no policy to ‘remove sensitive information’ from our reports" (see, reference 8) What is clear from the failure of the Inspector General Community to maintain independence and objectivity over the federal investigative process is the fact that Acting Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks provided false testimony to Senator Charles E. Grassley while attempting to hide the fact that there was, “no policy to ® Senator Charles E. Grassley Report on Actions Taken by Former Acting Inspector General (IG) & Principal Deputy Inspector General (PDIG) Lynne H. Halbrooks https:/iwww.crassley,senate,cov/sites/defauiltfles/iudiciarviupload/Zero%20Dark%20Thirty%2C%2012- 02-14%2C%20final%20report%2C%20Redacted.odf ® Final Report for Deputy Inspector General for Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence Special Program Assessments (ISPA) Project D2012-DINT01-0079.001 released by Deputy Inspector General ‘Anthony C. Thomas as an “inquiry” vice federal investigation (DODOIG-2013-092) on14 June 2013. Retrieved at: _httos:/imedia defense. gov/2013/Jun/14/2001712842/-1/-1/ JDODIG-2013-092.pdf senator Charles E, Grassley Report on Actions Taken by Former Acting Inspector General (\G) & Principal Deputy Inspector General (POIG). See Attachment B: Sensitive Information Removed from Report. pg. 14. Accessed at httos://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/iles/iudiciary/upload/Zero)s20Dark%20Thirty%62C%2012-02- 114%2C3.20Final%20report}k2C¥20Redacted. pdf Ibid., pg 11 & 14, see: Conclusion #6- Long-standing OIG Policy Requiring Removal of Certain ‘Substantive Information 1117‘remove sensitive information’ from investigative reports and that there was a collaborative interagency effort to obstruct the federal investigative process by the inspector general community: * Acting Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks provided false information to Senator Charles E. Grassley in the proper performance of his oversight duties (18 US. Code §1001) TAKEAWAY: There is clear and convincing evidence to support a federal criminal investigation into obstruction of justice by senior Inspector General (IG) leadership directly involved in the Congressionally mandated investigation (Project: 02012- DINT01-0079.000/Investigative Report-DODOIG 2013-092) into “ongoing leaks of classified information” involving senior administration officials. 5. On 18 March 2016, after holding my disclosure of wrongdoing (DI-15-2333) for 395 days, the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) made a positive 45-day substantial likelinood finding that required an investigation into a credible report of senior leader misconduct related to the Congressionally mandated investigation (Project: D2012-DINTO1- 0079.000/Investigative Report-DODOIG 2013-092) into “ongoing leaks of classified information” involving senior administration officials; however, the U.S. Special Counsel did not: (see, enclosure 9) * Make agency head notification (Secretary of Defense) in direct violation of 5 US.C. §1213(c) * Did not demand an independent and objective criminal investigation into a disclosure of wrongdoing evidencing a coordinated inter-agency effort to obstruct the federal investigative process that occurred within the DoD IG/CIA IG to protect senior agency officials in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1505%° a. On 19 April 2017, after holding my disclosure of wrongdoing (DI-15-2333) for 791 days, the U.S. Special Counsel made a referral to the Chairperson of the CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Scott S. Dahl/Vice-Chair CIGIE IC Deborah J. Jeffrey demanding investigation of DoD OIG senior leaders: (see enclosure 10) The CIGIE IC under the supervision of CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Scott S. Dahl/Vice-Chair CIGIE IC Deborah J. Jeffrey simply refused the U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) demand to conduct investigation into senior leader misconduct occurring within © 18 U.S. Code § 1505. Obstruction of Proceedings before Departments, Agencies, and Committees. Retrieved at: htios://vwnw.law.corn 12-17the DoD IG by inspector general personnel “covered” by the CIGIE (see, enclosure 4 and 2)77.%8 TAKEAWA\ here is a substantiated breakdown in the independence and objectivity of the Inspector General (IG) community clearly evidenced by the inability/reluctance to hold “covered” members of the Counsel of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) accountable to the same standards vigorously enforced by the Inspector General (IG) community on the rest of the 2 million lay abiding members of the merit system. °° 6. In your role as the Executive Chair of the Counsel of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), | demand: (1) Immediate acknowledgment on the criminal loss of investigative independence and objectivity fostered within the membership of the CIGIE under the leadership of CIGIE Chair, Michael E. Horowitz; CIGIE Vice-Chair, Allison C. Lerner; Executive Director, Alan F. Boehm; and General Counsel Atticus J. Reaser (2) Demand for independent and objective DOJ investigation into criminal obstruction of justice, subversion of the federal investigative process, and interagency inspector general misconduct cover-up (18 U.S.C. §1505) disclosed by John R. Crane involving the following former/current members of the inspector general community: Acting DoD IG, Lynne M. Halbrooks; Acting DoD IG, Glenn A. Fine; DoD OIG GC, Henry C. Shelley Jr.; DoD OIG GC, Brian G. Yonish; DoD OIG FOIA Authority, Catherine M. DelPrete; Senior Advisor DoD IG, Brett A. Mansfield; DoD IG CoS, Michael S. Child Sr.; DoD IG CoS, Steven A. Stebbins; Deputy Chief of Staff (CoS), Daniel R. Blair; Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations (Al), Marguerite C. Garrison; Director Whistleblower Reprisal Investigation, Nilgun Tolek; Assistant Inspector General for Investigation (Criminal)/Deputy Director Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Dermot F. O'Reilly; Deputy Inspector General for Investigation (Criminal)/Director Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), James B. Burch; Principal Deputy Director, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Kelly P. Mayo; and Deputy Inspector General for Investigation (Criminal)/Deputy Director Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), James R. Ives ® Gross Mismanagement: ‘a management action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency's abilty to accomplish its mission.” Kavanagh v. M.S.P.B., 176 F. Appx 433, 135 (Fed, Cir. Apr. 10, 2006). % Abuse of Authority: “arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a federal official or employee” that harms the rights of any person or that personally benefits the officiallemployee or their preferred associates. See Eikassir v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 257 F. App’x 326, 329 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10, 2007). 5° The Inspector General Act (Sa U.S.C, Appendix IG Act §(3)(b). "An Inspector General may be removed from office by the President. I the Inspector General is removed from office or is transferred to another position or location within the establishment, the President shall communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”. Retrieved at: hitos:/vavw.covinfo, cov/contentipkalUSCODE-201 1- titles htm/USCODE-2011-ttle5-app-inspector him 1347(3) Removal of CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) leadership under the authority of Chair, Scott S. Dahl; Vice-Chair, Deborah J. Jeffrey; FBI Assistant Director Office of Integrity and Compliance; Catherine Sheehan Bruno; DOJ Criminal Division Acting Chief Office Public Integrity Section (PIN), AnnaLou T. Tirol (4) Removal of U.S. Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner and his leadership team: Principle Deputy U.S. Special Counsel, Ellen Chubin Epstein; Associate Special Counsel, Louis Lopez; General Counsel, Susan K. Ullman; Associate Special Counse! (Former MSPB Judge), Anne E. Wagner (5) Independent review on the actual disposition (including actions taken by agency heads) of substantiated allegations/disclosures made against members of the CIGIE and directed to agency heads for accountability action during the period 2009-Present [5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §11(4)(8)(B)] Thank you for your time and immediate response to this direct threat to investigative independence and assault on the Chief Executive's Merit System. Very Respecttully, / a n Ron Enclosures: (1) U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) Notification of CIGIE IC Refusal to Investigate Letter to John R. Crane dtd 11 Oct 2017 (2) CIGIE Integrity Committee (IC) Kevin H. Winter Notification of CIGIE IC Refusal to Investigate Letter to John R. Crane dtd 06 Sept 2019 (3) John R. Crane Disclosure of Investigative Wrongdoing Occurring within DoD IG Reported to U.S. Special Counsel (OSC) did 09 Feb 2015 (4) Congressman Peter T. King letter to DoD IG/CIA IG Demand for Investigation into Leaks of Classified Information Regarding Sensitive Military Operations dtd 09 Aug 2011 (5) Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Patricia A. Brannin Memorandum to Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) Michael G. Vickers dtd 10 Dec 2011 (6) Assistant Inspector General for Communications and Congressional Liaison John R. Crane Letter to Congressman Peter T. King Announcing Investigation into Ongoing Leaks of Classified Information Regarding Sensitive Military Operations dtd 23 Dec 2011 (7) E-Mail Whistleblower Status John R. Crane to Charlie Murphy (Senator Grassley) dtd 13 Sept 2012/0912PM (EST) (8) DoD Inspector General Jon T. Rymer Letter to Senator Charles E. Grassley dtd 24 Nov 2014 4-17(9) U.S. Special Counsel Carolyn N. Lerner 45-Day Substantial Likelihood Finding Letter (DI-15-2333) to John R. Crane dtd 18 Mar 2016 (10) U.S. Special Counsel Carolyn N. Lerner 45-Day Substantial Likelihood Finding Letter (DI-15-2333) to John R. Crane dtd 19 Apr 2017 Honorable Ron Johnson Chairman Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 340 Dirksen SOB Washington, DC 20510-6250 Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney Chairwoman Committee on Oversight and Reform 2187 Rayburn HOB Washington, DC 20515-6143 Honorable Chuck Grassley President pro tempore S-312 Capitol Washington, DC 20510-7000 Honorable William P. Barr Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Building 950 Pennsyivania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-2001 Corey R. Amundson Criminal Division Chief, Public Integrity Section (PIN) Bond Building 1400 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 Calvin A. Shivers Assistant Director of Criminal Investigation FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20535-0001 15-17 Honorable Gary Peters Ranking Member Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 340 Dirksen SOB Washington, DC 20510-6250 Honorable James D. Jordan Ranking Member Committee on Oversight and Reform 2056 Rayburn HOB Washington, DC 20515-3504 Honorable Gene L. Dodaro U.S. Comptroller General Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548 Brian A. Benczkowski Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division Robert F. Kennedy Building 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Honorable Christopher A. Wray Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20535-0001 Catherine S. Bruno Director, Office of Integrity and Compliance (OIC) FBI Headquarters 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20535-0001Honorable Henry J. Kerner U.S. Special Counsel 1730 M Street, NW Suite 218 Washington, DC 20036-4505 Anne M. Wagner Associate General Counsel, General Law Division U.S. Special Counsel 1730 M Street, NW Suite 218 Washington, DC 20036-4505 Tristan Leavitt Chief Counsel Merit Systems Protection Board 1615 M Street, NW Washington, DC 20419 Honorable Dr. Mark T. Esper Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000 Honorable Sean W. O’Donnel U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Inspector General Office of Inspector General 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. (24107) Washington, DC 20460 Timothy J. Shea U.S. Attorney for District of Columbia (DC) 555 4" Street, NW Washington, DC 20530 William J. Flynn President & CEO Amtrak Headquarters 400 North Capital Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 16-17 Ellen Epstein Chubin Principle Deputy Special Counsel 1730 M Street, NW Suite 218 Washington, DC 20036-4505 Louis Lopez Associate Special Counsel Investigation & Prosecution Division Principle Deputy Special Counsel 1730 M Street, NW Suite 218 Washington, DC 20036-4505 ‘Adam J. Miles Counsel to the Inspector General 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 4706 Washington, DC 20530 Paul C. Ney Jr. General Counsel (GC) 1600 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1600 Paul Hadjiyane Department of Defense General Counsel to Inspector General 4800 Mark Center Drive Suite 15627 Alexandria, VA 22350-1500 Mark R. Meadows Office of the Chief of Staff The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20500 Kevin H. Winters Inspector General Amtrak Suite 3W-300 10 G Street, NE Washington, DC 20002Barbara Stewart Chief Executive Officer Corporation for National & Community Service (CNCS) 250 E. Street, SW Washington, DC 20525 Eugene Scalia Secretary of Labor Department of Labor 200 Constitution Avenue, NW Room S-2018 Washington, DC 20210 Joseph J. Simmons Chairman Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20580 Emory A. Rounds Ill Director U.S. Office of Government Ethics Suite 500 1201 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 Karen P. Gorman United State Senate Select Committee on Ethics Deputy Chief Counsel 220 Hart SOB Washington, DC 20510-6425 Russell T. Vought Acting Director Office of Management and Budget (OMB) New Executive Office Building 725 17" Street, NW Washington, DC 20503 Deborah J. Jeffrey Inspector General (CNCS-OIG) Corporation for National & Community Service (CNCS) 250 E. Street, SW Suite 4100 Washington, DC 20525 Scott S. Dahl Inspector General Department of Labor (DoL) 200 Constitution Avenue, NW Room S-5502 Washington, DC 20210 Andrew Katsaros Inspector General Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 600 Pennsyivania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20580 Dale A. Christopher Deputy Director for Compliance U.S. Office of Government Ethics Suite 500 1201 New York Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20005 Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) 8601 Adelphi Road College Park Maryland 20740-6001 [email protected]U.S, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL 1730 M Street, NW. Site 218, ‘Washington, D.C. 20036-4505 "02254-3600 October 11, 2017 Mr. John Crane c/o Tom Devine Legal Director Government Accountability Project 1612 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100 ‘Washington, DC 20006 Re: OSC File No. DI-15-2333 Dear Mr. Crane: We are vmiting to report to you on the resolution of your disclosures to OSC, made initially in February 2015, and supplemented since that time. ‘You were the Assistant Inspector General for Communication and Congressional Liaison at Department of Defense (DoD), Office of Inspector General (OIG). In that role, you oversaw the whistleblower outreach program and were the senior official in charge of FOIA and Privacy ‘Act functions, You were also the O1G’s FOIA Appellate Authority. ‘You disclosed that senior DoD OIG officials, particularly former Acting Inspector General Lynn Halbrooks and OIG General Counsel Henry Shelley, engaged in an abuse of authority when they departed from prior OIG practice and determined not to publicly release a report of investigation. You alleged they did this in order to protect a senior DoD official who was the subject of the investigation. You also alleged that, between 2011 and 2014, Ms. Halbrooks and Mr. Shelley: (1) directed an investigative team to depart from normal investigative practices; (2) abruptly canceled scheduled subject interviews; (3) improperly met with subject officials during the investigation; (4) removed key findings or information from the final report; and (5) delayed release of the report for improper reasons. Finally, you alleged that senior O1G employees: (1) applied improper standards to civilian reprisal investigations; (2) failed to correct identified deficiencies in military reprisal programs; (3) abused their authority in numerous investigations; and (4) abused their authority by removing investigative independence in civilian reprisal investigations. In your disclosure, you alleged that the actions of senior OIG officials represented a continuation of a pattem of conduct that Senator Charles Grassley identified in a November 2014 report to then-DoD Inspector General Jon Rymer. Your disclosures to OSC overlapped substantially with the concems raised by Senator Grassley. Although the report addressed many of the issues raised in your disclosures, it left open some questions about the propriety of certain of the actions and decisions of senior DoD OIG officials. 1-3 Enclosure ( 2 )Mr. John Crane October 11, 2017 Page 2 of3 Under 5 U.S.C. § 1213(b), whenever the Special Counsel receives information alleging a disclosure of information from an employee who reasonably believes the information evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, she is required to review the information and determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that it discloses such wrongdoing. If'so, she is required under 1213(c)(1) to transmit the information to the appropriate agency head and require that the agency head conduct an investigation and submit a written report. Under 5 U.S.C. § 1213(g)Q), if the Special Counsel receives information, but does not make a substantial likelihood determination under 1213(b), the Special Counsel may ‘transmit the information to the head of the agency for a response, with the consent of the employee. OSC generally does not refer allegations if a prior investigation already addressed the whistleblower’s disclosures. However, as stated, Senator Grassley’s report identified unresolved questions. In addition, your supplemental disclosures included the new information concerning the OIG’s failure to release a report of investigation derivative of the issues identified in Senator Grassley’s report. Because your disclosures involved the DoD OIG, they posed a unique jurisdictional issue. ‘Transmitting the allegations to the Secretary of Defense and requiring DoD to investigate its OIG would have compromised the independence of the OIG. Under the Inspector General Act of 1978 GG Act), allegations of misconduct by inspectors general and their senior staff are within the jurisdiction of the Integrity Committee (IC) of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).! Thus, to ensure that an impartial and thorough review or investigation was conducted, on April 19, 2017, then-Special Counsel Carolyn Lemer forwarded the allegations to the CIGIE IC pursuant to OSC’s § 1213 authorities. The IC notified OSC that it reviewed this matter, requested and received a response from Mr. Shelley, and that the matter is now closed. Unfortunately, the IC’s decision not to investigate countermanded the Special Counsel's statutory determination that the allegations warranted investigation. As we have discussed with you, this case highlights the challenges OSC faces in addressing allegations of misconduct by inspectors general and their high-level employees under the statutory framework of § 1213. We believe Congress has expressed a clear intent for the IC to review allegations concerning such officials, and since OSC received your allegations, Congress enacted the IG Empowerment Act of 2016 to establish a process aimed at ensuring the efficient resolution of jurisdictional issues ‘between OSC and the IC, Nevertheless, the IC’s processes and procedures and those in 5 U.S.C. § 1213 are not consistent, and without an investigation, OSC is obviously unable to reach a determination, as required by § 1213(e)(2), regarding the reasonableness of any findings. Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, OSC and the IC must consult and coordinate to ensure ‘that jurisdictional issues between OSC and the IC are resolved efficiently and effectively. 2-3Mr. John Crane October 11, 2017 Page 3 of 3 Pursuant to OSC procedures, OSC will take no further action in connection with these allegations. However, your file remains open pending receipt of an investigative report from the Department of Justice OIG regarding other allegations you made, which OSC previously referred for investigation under § 1213. We will continue to provide you with updates on the status of that matter. Please contact me at (202) 254-3677, if you have any questions regarding this matter, Sincerely, Kal mo ‘aren Gorman Chief, Retaliation and Disclosure UnitIntegrity Committee Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency P= 1717 H Street, NW, Suite 825, Washington, DC 20006 « [email protected] September 6, 2019 Via Email John R. Crane [email protected] Re: Complaint to the Integrity Committee Dear Mr. Crane: ‘The Integrity Committee (IC) of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) received and thoroughly reviewed the concerns you submitted to us, the. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and the CIGIE Executive Chairperson on June 11, 2019, regarding the relationship between OSC and the IC and a perceived loss of investigative independence. We want to take this opportunity to address your concerns and explain our process under section 11(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 5 USC app. (IG ‘Act), and the IC Policies and Procedures (2018)! On April 19, 2017, OSC referred your allegations against senior employees in the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General to the IC for investigation under 5 USC 1213(c) and 5 USC 1213(g)(2). Given that the IC is not an agency head under 5 USC 1213, the IC was not permitted to accept the referrals under either 5 USC 1213(c) or 1213(g)(2) because it does not have the authority to impose remedies at agencies and cannot stand in the place of the agency head. However, the IC did accept the allegations for review under its own authority, as described in section 11(d) of the IG Act. After thoroughly reviewing the allegations and supporting documentation under its authorities, the IC determined the allegations did not meet the IC’s threshold standard for investigation. The IC determined no further action was required and closed the matter? On July 21, 2017, the IC Vice Chairperson notified OSC of the IC’s determination? It is important to note that the IC and OSC are separate and independent federal entities ‘with distinct missions, whose legislative authority come from different statutes and whose authorities are not bound by, or otherwise subject to, the other’s determinations. Until December 2016, the Special Counsel was a member of the IC.* However, the Inspector General ‘Empowerment Act of 2016 bolstered the IC’s independent review of OSC cases by removing the " These documents can be found at https:/www.ignet.gov/content/integrity-0. 2 To date, your allegations against Department of Defense Office of Inspector General employees have been reviewed by OSC, the Public Intogrty Section ofthe Department of ustice (DOS), the IC, and investigated by the DO! Office of inspector General, Each review determined there was no evidence to suppor the allegations. 2 The IC Chairperson, Scot Dahl, was recused from these matters and therefore di not participate inthe IC's deliberations of decision. + ‘The Special Counsel was recused from committee proceedings involving allegations against OSC leadership. Enclosure ( 2) “The integrity Committee i compared of four Inspectors General and executives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and te Ofice of Government Ethie, For more Information plans vst Nips //wus lene! onyfcontea/ntosiy.0. eZ9/6/2019 Page 2 OSC official from IC membership and placing limitations on OSC’s authority as a member of the IC’s Allegation Review Group (ARG). The IC is now composed of four Inspectors General, and a designee from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Government Ethics Office. By procedure, if the IC receives allegations of wrongdoing against the Special Counsel or the Deputy Special Counsel, then the OSC member of the ARG is recused. Similarly, if the IC receives allegations against a member of the IC, or if an IC member’s impartiality is otherwise reasonably in question on a matter, then the IC member is recused. As with any matter before the IC, an ARG or IC member who is recused will not receive notice of, nor the ability to consider, those allegations, nor are they privy to the deliberations and voting decisions by non- recused members, thus alleviating any potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, while the Special Counsel is an ex officio member of CIGIE, he is not under the authority of the CIGIE Chairperson. ‘The IC is committed to effective policing of the Federal 1G community and the Special Counsel and Deputy Special Counsel of OSC to maintain the public’s trust, and continues to work closely with our stakeholders, including OSC, to ensure the appropriate coordination and resolution of whistleblower allegations. I trust that you will find this information helpful and I appreciate you bringing your concerns to my attention. Sincerely, LM. Wit — Kevin H. Winters Acting Chairperson Integrity Committee cc: Margaret Weichert CIGIE Executive Chairperson Michael E. Horowitz Gene L. Dodaro CIGIE Chairperson Comptroller General Honorable Ron Johnson Honorable Gary Peters Chairman, Committee on Homeland Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Security and Governmental Affairs Honorable Elijah Cummings Honorable Jim Jordan Chairman, Committee on Oversight Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Reform and Reform Honorable Chuck Grassley Chairman, Senate Finance Committee 2-2(202) 2543640 (900 572-2249 ‘OMB Contrat No. 3255-0002 Bap, Date: 22814 US, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL Porm OSC12 anes NM Be, jet bepLOWER DISCLOSURE ‘efore filling out this Office of Special Counsel (OSC) Disclosure of Information form, please read the! following sections about limitations on OSC's jurisdiction over whistleblower disclosures. Only the =< fequently occurring impediments to OSC jurisdiction are described. OSC may not have jurisdiction over you cr| our disclosure for other reasons not discussed below. COMPLETED DISCLOSURE FORMS CAN BE'SENT TO OSC BY MAIL, AT: DISCLOSURE UNIT, OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1730 M STREET, N.W. (SUITE 218), WASHINGTON, DC 20036- 4505, OR BY FAX: 202-254-3711 BLEASE KEEP A COPY OF DISCLOSURE MATERIALS PROVIDED TO OSC,- REPRODUCTION CHARGES UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT MAY APPLY TO REQUESTS PROCESSED BY OSC FOR COPYING OF COPIES OF MATERIALS IN OSC FILES. os STL DISCLOSURE CHANNEL ‘The OSC Disclosure Unit serves as a secure channel that can be used to disclose - + a Violation of law, rule or regulation; + gross mismanagement; + gross waste of funds; + abuse of authority, or + substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. OSC docs not have authority to investigate the disclosures that it receives. The law provides that OSC will (a) refer protected disclosures that establish a substantial likelihood of wrongdoing to the appropriate agency head, and (b) require the agency head to conduct an investigation, and submit a writen report on the findings of the investigation to the Special Counsel. IFOSC finds no substantial likelihood that the information discloses one or more of the categories of wrongdoing, the Special Counsel must: (e) inform the whistleblower of the reasons why the disclosure may riot be acted on further; and (b) direct the whistleblower to other offices available for receiving disclosures. OSC JURISDICTION ‘The Disclosure Unit has jurisdiction over federal employees, former federal employees, and applicants for federal employment. It is important to note that a disclosure must be related to an event that occurred in connection with the performance of an employee's duties and responsibilities. The Disclosure Unit ener waiE (2) disclosures filed by: 3 (22DDISCLOSURE OP INFORMATION Peel ‘VISIT HTTP://WWW.OSC.GOV FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT OSC JURISDICTION AND DISCLOSURE PROCEDURES INFORMATION ABOUT FILING A WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURE WITH THE OSC (cont'd) employees of the U.S: Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission; members of the armed forces of the United States (i.e., non-civilian military employees); state employees operating under federal grants; and employees of federal contractors. HIRST-HAND INFORMATION REQUIRED In order to make a "substantial likelihood" finding (see previous page), OSC must be in possession of reliable, first-hand information. OSC cannot request an agency head to conduct an investigation based on an employee's (or applicant's) second-hand knowledge of agency wrongdoing, This includes information received from another person, such as when a fellow employee informs you that he/she witnessed some type of wrongdoing. (Anyone With first-hand knowledge of the allegations you Want to report may file a disclosure in writing directly with OSC.) Similarly, speculation about the existence of misconduct does not provide OSC with a sufficient legal basis upon which to send a matter to the head of an agency. If you think that wrongdoing took place, but can provide nothing more than unsubstantiated assertions, OSC will not be able to go forward with the matter. DE (S. GATIONS While an allegation might technically constitute a disclosure, OSC will not review or refer de minimis or trivial matters. ANONYMOUS SOURCES. While OSC will protect the identity of persons who make disclosures, it will not consider anonymous disclosures. Ifa disclosure is filed by an anonymous source, the disclosure will be referred to the Office of Inspector General in the appropriate agency. OSC will take no further action. MATTERS INVESTIGATED RY AN OFFICE. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Itis the general policy of OSC not to transmit allegations of wrongdoing to the head of the agency involved if the agency's Office of Inspector General has fully investigated, or is currently investigating, the same allegations. 2-2Z1 omen or sci cose ny 24340 009 2208 \ ‘ DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION (Please print legibly or type and complete all pertinent items. Enter "N/A" (Not Applicable) or "Unknown" where appropriate.) [ PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ] 1. Name of person seeking OSC action ("Complainant"): _ Mr. (©) Ms. (©) Mrs.(O) Miss (0) John R. Crane : : 2. Status: Current Federal Employee (Applicant for Federal Employment ( ) Former Federal Employee (7) Other (please specify: ee ee 3. Contact Information: Honie or mailing address: PO Box 7185 McLean, VA 22106 Telephone number(s); ¢ P| (Home) c_) (Office) Ext. (202) s7e.580 ain Fax number: Coys E-mail address: [email protected] 4. Current position, title, series, and grade: INVA 5. Agency Name: NVA 6. Agency Address: INA 7. How did you first become aware that you could file a disclosure with OSC? OSC Brochure) OSC Poster ( ) OSC Speaker ( ) OSC Web Site( Agency Personnel Office( ) Union( ) Co-worker ( v) News Story( ) Other (please describe): Date (approximate): 3-22DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Page? 8, Ifyou are filing this complaint as a legal or other representative of the person making a disclosure, please supply the following information: Name /title of filer: © Mr. (®) - Ms. (O) Mrs, (©) Miss (O) [Tom Devine, Legal Director, Government Accountability Project 9. Contact Information: Home or mailing address: 112 K Street, NW. Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 * Telephone nuniber(s): (202 ') 888-4080 (Home) (202 -) 475-0034 (Office) Ext. Fax number: Ca) E-mail address: tomd @whistleblower.org [ PART 2: DETAILS OF YOUR DISCLOSURE 1, know about the information I am disclosing here based on (check all that apply): Thave personal and/or direct knowledge of events or records involved ( v.) Other employees have told me about events or records involved (- ) Other source(s)( ) (please explain): 2, Please identify the U.S. government department or agency involved in your disclosure: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General - 3. Please identify the organizational unit of the department or agency involved: Principal Deputy Inspector General, General Counsel 4, Address of the organizational unit: Department of Defense 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22350-1500 5. Please identify the type of agency wrongdsing that you are alleging (check all shat apply). If you check “violation of law, rule, or regulation," please provide, if you can, the particular law, rule or regulation violated (by name, subject, and/or citation), Violation of law, rule, or regulation (y ) (please specify): 6 USC 1213 Gross mismanagement (¥) — Gross waste of finds (7) Abuse of authority ( v ) Substantial and specific danger to public health ( -) ‘Substantial and specific danger to public safety ( ) YeDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Past 6. Please describe the agency wrongdoing that you are disclosing, indicating how the agency's actions fit within the type(s) of wrongdoing that you checked in item 5. (Be as specific as possible about dates, locations and the identities and positions of all persons named. Also, please attach any documents that might support your disclosure. Continue on a separate sheet of paper if you need more space.) |See attached cover letter (statement of issues); affidavits and exhibits.DISCLOSURE oF INFORMATION Pape ARE TAKING ON YOUR DISCLOSURE 1 Thave previously disclosed (or am disclosing) the violations alleged here to (complete all that apply): (_ ) Inspector General of department / agency involved (.°) Other office of department / agency involved (please specifi): a ( ) Department of Justice Date. / -/ ( )) Other Bxecutive Branch / department / agency Date: |). (lease specify): ee C ) General Accounting Office (GAO) (7) Congress or congressional committee Date: 09°/18 / 12 (please specify member or committee): eS, ‘Senator Grassley/Chairman Levin () Press / media (newspaper, television, other) Dates yy (please specifi): : a een 2. If you disclosed the information reported here through any other channel described in question 1, above, what is the current status of the matter? PART 4: CONSENT, CERTIFICATION, AND SIGNATURE Do you consent to the disclosure of your name to others outside the Office of. Special Counsel if it becomes necessary in taking further action on this matter? T consent to disclosure of my name: Jobnrorane : 02/09/2015 ‘Signature __ Date T do not consent to disclosure of my name: 5 Date Signature 6-22[DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Pages { certify that al of the statemients made in this complaint (including any continuation pages) are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that a false statement or concealment of a material fact is a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, imprisonment for up to five years, or both. 18 USC. § 1001. Johnrerane 02/09/2015 Signature Date f PART 5: PRIVACY ACT / PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENTS Routine Uses. Limited disclosure of information from OSC files is needed to fulfill OSC’s investigative, Prosecutorial and related responsibilities. OSC has described 18 routine uses for information in its files in the Federal Register (FR), at 66 F.R. 36611 (July 12, 2001), and 66F-R. 51095 (October 5, 2001). A copy of the routine uses is available from OSC on request. A summary of the routine uses appears below. OSC may disclose information from its files in the following circumstances: 1. to disclose that an allegation of prohibited personnel practices or other prohibited activity has beea filed; 2, 10 disclose information needed by the Office of Personne] Management (OPM) for inquiries involving civil service laws, rules or regulations, or to obtain an advisory opinion; 3. to disclose information about allegations or complaints of discrimination to-entities concemed with enforcement of anti-discrimination laws: 4. to the MSPB or the President, when seeking disciplinary action; 5. to the involved agency, MSPB, OPM, or the President when OSC has reason to believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists or is to be taken; 6. to disclose information to Congress in OSC's annual rep 7. to disclose information to third partics (without identifying the complainant unless OSC has the complainant's consent) as needed to conduct an investigation; obtain an agency investigation and report on information disclosed to the OSC whistleblower disclosure channel; or to give notice of the status or outcome of the investigation; 8. to disclose information as needed to obtain information about hiring ar retention of an employee; issuance ofa security clearance; conduct of a security or suitability investigation; award of a contract; or issuance ofa license, grant, or other benefit; 9. to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for certain legislative coordination and clearance Purposes; FwDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Pras 6 10. to provide information from an individual's record to a congressional office acting pursuant to the individual's request; °: 11, to furmish information to the National Archives and Records Administration for records management purposes; 12, to produce summary statistics and work force or other studies; 13. to provide information needed by the Department of Justice for certain litigation purposes; 14, to provide information needed by courts or adjudicative bodies for certain litigation purposes; 1. to disclose information to the MSPB as needed in special studies authorized by law; 16, for coordination with an agency's Office of Inspector General or comparable entity, to facilitate the coordination and conduct of investigations and review of allegations; 17. to news media or the public in certain circumstances (except when the Special Counsel determines that disclosure in a particular éase would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy); and 18, to the Department of Labor and others as needed to implement the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, and the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, . An agency may not conduct or sponsor a-collection of information, and Fe de ran oe edited to respond to a collection of information, unless it (a) has been approved by OMB, OSC legal esponsibility (at 5 U.S.C. § 1213) to receive disclosures from current ot former federal employees, or applicants for federal employment, alleging possible wrongdoing by federal agencies, The information will be used FR OSC to determine whether the facts establish that: (2) OSC has jurisdiction over th subject ofthe dsciossre @) there is substantial likelihood that the facts indicate a violation of law, rule, or regulation; grose zalsmanagement; @ gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; ora substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; and (c) referral for investigation by the agency involved, or other appropriate action is wananted. The ‘eorting burden for this collection of information is estimated to be an average of oné hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering the data necled, cad completing and reviewing the form, Please send any comments about this burden estimate, and suggestions for reducing the burden, to the U.S, Office of Special Counsel, Legal Counsel and Policy Division, 1730 M Street, N.W. (Suite 201), ‘Washington, DC 20036- 4505. Use of this form to report disclosures of information is not mandatory. As indicated in part 4 of the form, filers may request that OSC maintain their name in confidence. G-22Protected Disclosure to Congress Zero Dark Thirty Investigation Disclosure: On September 13, 2012, in accordance with Executive Order 12731, | contacted the office of Senator Grassley, and reported that Ms. Halbrooks, in an abuse of authority, was violating standard investigative policies, and procedures, and was manipulating the conduct of an investigation by not interviewing the subject of the investigation who was the Secretary of Defense. In addition, Ms. Halbrooks was delaying release of the report for self-serving political motivation in violation of EO 12731 that states: “Employees shall not use public office for private gain.” In an abuse of authority, Ms. Halbrooks had been attempting to help her prospects to be nominated as the Inspector General with the intent of not releasing the report until after the elections, and after the Secretary had left office. Mr. Charles Murphy, Investigator, Senator Grassley, and Mr. Dan Meyer, Director Whistleblowing and Transparency, were at the meeting. Mr. Charles Murphy provided me e-mail confirming my whistleblower status. (Exhibit 6) Retaliation: | believe that Ms. Halbrooks, in an abuse of authority, acted to retaliate against me when she conducted investigations against me, and then served me a Notice of Proposed Removal in reprisal for my stated concerns that she was abusing her authority, and that she was attempting to use her office in pursuit of personal gain. Ms. Halbbrooks reprised against me because she considered me as the whistleblower who had provided information used by Marisa Taylor, McClatchy News, in a December 17, 2012, article entitled: “Bin Laden film leak was referred to Justice: leaker top Obama Official.” Ms. Halbrooks considered me the whistleblower because the article contained information that was known by a limited number of IG employees, including myself. (Link) In addition, Ms. Halbrooks abused her authority by challenging me to identify the whistleblower(s) who were providing information to Senator Grassley, and to interfere with, and stop protected disclosures to Congress in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, as amended. Ms. Halbrooks stated that the whistleblowers were revealing information that was undermining Mr. Vickers who was the candidate that the Secretary was supporting to become the next Director of the CIA. Ms. Halbrooks stated that | was not a team player, since | did not provide whistleblower information to her, and that Mr. Brett Mansfield, the Deputy Chief of Staff, was available to replace me.The abuse of authority by Ms. Halbrooks was an articulated direction to me, as the senior executive responsible for Whistleblowing and Transparency, to abuse my management prerogatives, and in violation of statute, to shut down the regular functioning of the whistleblower program. Ms. Halbrooks also abused her authority by threatening to remove me from my position if | did not violate Whistleblower statute. In response to the newspaper article of December 17, 2012, Ms. Halbrooks met with the Secretary of Defense, and his Chief-of-Staff on December 18, 2012. The newspaper article related to the draft DoD IG report, subsequently released by POGO, in June 2013, in which the Secretary, and the Chief-of-Staff were both subjects of investigation. Ms. Halbrooks informed me that Mr. Vickers was “their” choice (the Secretary of Defense) to become Director of the CIA, and that the report would not be issued while Mr. Panetta was Secretary. In addition, Ms. Halbrooks informed me that she, and Mr. Shelley had made the decision that information related to the CIA, and the actions of both the Secretary, and the Chief-of-Staff would be dropped from the draft report. expressed to Ms. Halbrooks that dropping information relating to two subjects of the report immediately after meeting with the subjects would be unprecedented, and would raise questions regarding the propriety of her actions, and the integrity of the investigative, and report writing process. Ms. Halbrooks again stated that | was not a team player. Narrative: Chairman King in his letter to the DoD/CIA IGs states that: | write to express concern regarding ongoing leaks of classified information regarding sensitive military operations. As reported in a New York Times column on August 6, 2011, Administration officials may have provided filmmakers with details of the raid that successfully killed Usama bin Laden (UBL). According to that report, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. and movie director Kathryn Bigelow received ‘top-level access to the most classified mission in history’ to produce a movie about the raid, due for release in October 2012. Reportedly, a Hollywood filmmaker also attended a CIA ceremony in honor of the team that carried out the raid. Therefore, | request an investigation and classified briefing regarding this, matter from the Defense Department's and CIA Inspectors General "to address five specific issues noted in the letter. (Link) 24 O-vL-As a result of the letter from Chairman King, a meeting was held between Ms. Halbrooks, and Mr. Buckley that resulted in the DoD IG assuming responsibility for most of the responses back to Chairman King in regard to the letter of August 9, 2011. A response was provided to Chairman King on December 23, 2011, that included an announcement memorandum by the DoD IG of December 10, 2011, that stated: We plan to begin subject investigation immediately. The overall objective of this investigation is to address the congressionally requested action found in the letter of the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security to the DoD Inspector General dated August 19, 2011. The memorandum also states: The investigation will be coordinated with affected agencies’ Inspectors General when applicable and may be performed at selected elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense and other DoD organizations, as appropriate. (Link) Fieldwork by the DoD IG in regard to the investigation was initiated on January 27, 2012. The Central Intelligence Agency responded to Chairman King on November 9, 2011, and stated: The Office of Public Affairs is developing a written policy to create a single point of reference that will govern future interactions with the entertainment industry. The Office of Inspector will review the established guidelines once the policy is completed. (Link) With the departure of the then Inspector General on December 24, 2011, Ms. Halbooks became Acting Inspector General, and immediately began both her efforts to be nominated as the next Inspector General, and started her unprecedented involvement in the crafting, and development of the report to respond back to Chairman King. Ms. Halbbrooks, and | candidly, and repeatedly discussed the sensitivity of the investigation in that the allegations touched directly upon the actions of Secretary Panetta, Jeremy Bash, Chief-of-Staff to Secretary Panetta, and George Little, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Both Mr. Bash, and Mr. Little had held equivalent positions with Secretary Panetta when he had been Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. | strongly urged that the intelligence analysts assigned to prepare the report be allowed to conduct their investigation with no influence from Ms. Halbrooks. Ms. Halbrooks stated that Myreshe did not want the investigation to upset the Secretary nor his Chief-of-Staff because they had direct influence on selecting the nominee that would be sent to the White House for approval. In addition, | stated that there should be no appearance of political motivation by Ms. Halbrooks in both the crafting of the report, and the release of the report. The issue of granting inappropriate access to Hollywood producers to release a movie regarding the killing of Usama bin Laden, that was timed for released before the general elections in November 2012, was simply explosive since the film could be seen as trying to influence the general election in support of President Obama. In that regard, | strongly urged Ms. Halbrooks to have a focused effort that would place the issuance of the DoD IG report outside any political considerations. Due to the national political conventions in August, | urged completion, and release of the report before the July 4th time period. Ms. Halbrooks, however, stated that she did not want the report to be issued before the expected departure of Secretary Panetta after the start of either a new Administration, or the second term of the current Administration. Ms. Halbrooks stated that any early release of the report would involve interviews that could upset Secretary Panetta, and his senior aides at the exact time that she was trying to be nominated to be IG. She stated that she would need the support of Secretary Panetta. Ms. Halbrooks stated it was her intent not to interview Secretary Panetta. | strongly objected to that approach stating that the report was about the actions of Secretary Panetta, and so Secretary Panetta needed to have the opportunity to provide exculpatory information. | also noted that DoD IG investigators had interviewed Secretaries of Defense in the past when the actions of the Secretaries were part of the scope of the investigation. | pointed to the interview of Secretary Rumsfeld during the investigation of the Boeing lease issue. In addition, | reminded Ms. Halbrooks that IG investigators had also interviewed Secretary Aspin during the course of an investigation. | stated that a decision not to interview Secretary Panetta was inappropriate, and ran counter to the investigative methodology of the DoD IG. Secretary Panetta as a subject of the investigation was required to be interviewed. The tenor of the extended disclosures to Ms. Halbrooks in connection with decisions on the methodology, and release of the report were tightly intertwined with a series of events including Ms. Halbrooks being interviewed by White House Personnel and questioned on whether she had the military, and departmental experience to be Inspector General, and whether there had been former female Inspectors General. Ms. Halbrooks also shared information with me regarding her interview with the Deputy Secretary, and DoD General Counsel who were interviewing two candidates to be nominated to be Inspector General 414 £2-U2Ms. Halbrooks shared the fact that she had been told that Mr. Buckley, the CIA IG was the other candidate. Ms. Halbrooks shared that phone calls were being made to her references, and that she was hoping her nomination would be announced between Labor Day, and July 4th. In a December 20, 2013, article entitled: “Zero Dark Thirty’ leak investigators now target of leak probe,” Marisa Taylor of McClatchy News, states: Then-acting Pentagon Inspector General Lynne M. Halbrooks, meanwhile found herself smack in the middle of the controversy at an inopportune moment. Halbrooks wanted to be considered for the post permanently, according to current and former officials. Her main competitor was Buckley. Neither got the permanent post. (Emphasis added.) (Link) Because of the congressional, and media aspects of the report being prepared for Chairman King, Ms. Halbrooks asked me to attend briefing sessions with the intelligence analysts as they were crafting a methodology. It was astounding to me, because in almost 25 years as a part of the Front Office | had never witnessed an acting head of agency become so involved in developing the methodology of an investigation, or requesting reviews to ensure the analysts remained ‘on track.” In fact, Ms. Halbrooks was engaging in the very activities | had warned her against. The fieldwork for the report was initiated on January 27, 2012 Repeatedly, after a series of briefings during the summer with the intelligence analysts, | strongly advised Ms. Halbrooks not to delay the issuance of the report, and that the report would lack credibility if the Secretary was not interviewed. Ms. Halbrooks micromanaged the investigative process to the point that she demanded to be informed before any of Secretary Panetta's chief aides were interviewed. Ms. Halbrooks was upset when Mr. Bash was interviewed by Mr. Matthew Bush, an intelligence analyst without her permission, and stated that unapproved briefings of witnesses would not be allowed. (This occurred in the same timeframe when Ms. Halbrooks would not allow the interview of COL Fass! to determine whether he had made a disclosure to the then Inspector General.) During the summer, | urged Ms. Halbrooks to take quick action on the report, and to interview Secretary Panetta. After the intelligence analysts had concluded fieldwork on the report on August 16, 2012, | again expressed my concern that Secretary Panetta had not been interviewed. The dratt of the report entitled: Release of Department of Defense Information to the Media, in response to the request by Chairman King, was sent to my office on September 13, 2012, for review. Ms. Halbrooks continued to state to me, however, that the report would not be issued until after the Secretary had left office, and certainly not (kerebefore the elections in November because the findings would embarrass both Secretary Panetta, and the White House. | told Ms. Halbrooks that after clearance from the classification authorities, and review by myself, and Mr. Shelley, that there would be no obstacles to release before the Secretary had left office. | expressed to Ms. Halbrooks that it was the first time in my experience that political motivations had entered into the crafting of the methodology of an investigation, and it was the first time that political considerations had entered into the timing regarding the release of an investigation. | also noted that it was the first time that personal gain through the pursuit of the IG nomination had ever intruded into the proper, and lawful conduct of DoD IG activities. Ms. Halbrooks stated that | was not being a team player, and that the report would not be issued until she considered the timing to be right, and after the departure of the Secretary. Accordingly, the same day, on September 13, 2012, in accordance with Executive Order 12731, | contacted the office of Senator Grassley, and reported that Ms. Halbrooks, in an abuse of authority, was directly influencing the conduct of an investigation, to include whether to interview the Secretary of Defense, and the timing of the release of the investigation. In an abuse of authority, Ms. Halbrooks was attempting to help her prospects to be nominated as the Inspector General with the intent of not releasing the report until after the elections, and after the Secretary had left office. On October 24, 2012, the report was subsequently sent to the original classification authorities regarding the information contained in the report to identify information that could not be included in a publicly issued version of the report. The classification reviews were completed by November 9, 2012, after which a dialogue began between my Public Affairs officers, and the intelligence analysts on crafting Talking Points in anticipation of public release. The first draft of the Talking Points were started on November 1, 2012, and received by Ms. Margo Poser, and Matthew Bush on November 13, 2012. (Exhibit 38) Thereafter, | received the formal coordination package regarding the report along with the extensively developed Talking Points that would be used both by my office, and the DoD Office of Public Affairs in responding to reporters when the report was issued. The package was in final form, and included a proposed memo from Ms. Halbrooks that would transmit the report to the Secretary, and my transmittal letter to Chairman King. 14 yyyOn December 6, 2012, after a series of earlier edits, to include my own, | received both the FOUO, and public release versions of the report via e-mail. (Link) Both prior to, and immediately after December 6, 2012, | met with Ms. Halbrooks to note some of my observations in regards to those points in the report that would have interest to both Chairman King, and the media. I noted the following Release by Panetta of TOP SECRET Information - During this awards ceremony, Director Panetta specifically recognized the unit that conduct the raid and identified the ground commander by name. Director Panetta also provided DoD information, identified by relevant Original Classification Authorities as TOP SECRET//SI/REL to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL, as well as, SECRET//ACCM. According to the DoD Office of Security Review, the individual's name is protected from public release under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a and 10 U.S.C. Section 130b. (Page 12) Release by Vickers of FOUO, and Privacy Act Information - At this point USD(|) Vickers had given Mr. Boal, and Ms. Bigelow the name of the Special Operations Planner. This individual's name as associated with the operation is “For Official Use Only, not for public release,” protected under 5 U.S.C. Section 552a, the Privacy Act, and 10 U.S.C. Section 130b, Personnel in Overseas, Sensitive, or Routinely Deployable Units: Non-disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information. (Page 11) Panetta Chief-of-Staff Challenged in Version of Events - ‘According to the DoD PAO, the day of the event, the CIA PAO contacted the DoD PAO to state that efforts failed and the “Chief of Staff” directed that the Hollywood executive be given access to the event. Prior to the ceremony, the DoD PAO was unable to communicate with any of the DoD personnel attending the ceremony. The CIA Chief of Staff, at that time, is now the Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff. The Secretary of Defense’s Chief of Staff told us that the attendance authorization of a Hollywood executive at the event was part of the discussions between Hollywood executives and the CIA PAO and that he [Mr. Bash] was not involved. (Page 12) m4 7§-22ADM McRaven Directs Purging of Records - ADM McRaven also directed that the names and photographs associated with the raid not be released. This effort included purging the combatant command's systems of all records related to the operation and providing these records to another Government Agency. (Page 13) Inoted that the report would create a firestorm for Jeremy Bash, Chief-of- Staff, Secretary Panetta, and George Little, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in their response to the media. | pointed out that in regards to the methodology of the report, the DoD IG would be criticized for not having interviewed Secretary Panetta, and for not allowing him the opportunity to provide exculpatory material such as whether Secretary Panetta was aware of the presence of a Hollywood executive at the CIA event. | stated it was incomprehensible for the subject of a report not to be interviewed in regard to his actions, and that failure to interview Secretary Panetta was a violation of the normal procedures, and standards used by the DoD IG in conducting investigations. | told Ms. Halbrooks that it would be difficult to offer a cogent defense on why the Secretary had not been interviewed. | also stated that there was a contradiction in the testimonies regarding the involvement of Mr. Bash in the CIA event. The report stated that: According to the DoD PAO, the day of the event, the CIA PAO contacted the DoD PAO to state that efforts failed and the “Chief of Staff” directed that the Hollywood executive be given access to the event. Yet, the report in the same paragraph stated that: The CIA Chief of Staff, at that time, is now the Secretary of Defense’s Chief of Staff. The Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff told us that the attendance authorization of a Hollywood executive at the event was part of the discussions between Hollywood executives and the CIA PAO, and that he [Mr. Bash] was not involved. | directly asked Ms. Halbrooks whether the contradiction in testimony between Mr. Bash, and the DoD Public Affairs Officer would result in a senior official investigation regarding the two accounts. | stated that failing to resolve the contradiction along with the failure to interview Secretary Panetta would be two instances that constituted a violation of the normal procedures, and standards used by the DoD IG in conducting investigations. 814 fE-2LMs. Halbrooks stated that there was no report to be issued because she had not read the report, and as a result a final report did not exist. Ms. Halbrooks stated that the report would not be issued as long as Mr. Panetta was Secretary. In addition, she stated that she would NOT read the report so there was nothing to issue. | stated that she was developing new criteria for release of a report that had never been used in the history of the agency. In fact, no agency head had ever read more than a small fraction of the reports issued, and her involvement in the report had been extraordinary. explained to Ms. Halbrooks that in any other circumstance the report would be final, and that the report was not final only because Ms. Halbrooks was intervening in an unprecedented manner. | stated to Ms. Halbrooks that she was creating an arbitrary, and ad hoc procedure grounded solely in her own authority to create a departure from normal process in regard to the way the Zero Dark Thirty report was being handled. I noted that refusal to issue the report would be noted by the intelligence analysts because of the nature of the findings, and | expected one or more to make whistleblower disclosures to Congress if the report was not issued. Ms. Halbrooks challenged me whether | would again become a whistleblower, and who among the intelligence analysts could become whistleblowers. As the official responsible for Whistleblowing and Transparency, | refused to answer or speculate regarding the identities of the potential whistleblowers. | also did not deny that | had become a whistleblower. The report was so close to being issued that the discussion within my office centered on what day the report would be issued rather than on whether the report would be issued. (Exhibit 38) Subsequent to my above mentioned discussions with Ms. Halbrooks in early December, a whistleblower from within the DoD IG, in a December 14, 2012, e-mail to Mr. Charlie Murphy, staff of Senator Grassley, expressed their concern in regard to the report being prepared by the intelligence analysts: That effort (D2012-DINTO1-0079) has been controlled and manipulated since inception by the IG Front Office. Can't comment on reason why sitting on it but definitely controlling the entire effort. There is a version ready to hit the street, been long time ready to hit the street...but we will see if that happens anytime soon. Highly unusual tight controls and tactical involvement from senior leadership on this project. The e-mail continues: 9-14 (F221We know IG Schmitz used to sit on reports and efforts so it is plausible the same thing could be happening. In this new system, the oversight components have to get permission to start oversight, what the oversight is, content of the reports, and then approval to issue the reports. IGs are political appointees, now they have too much control over the actual oversight; and politicization of the IGs is a very real concern. (Exhibit 39) The degree of the involvement of Ms. Halbrooks and Mr. Shelley is also demonstrated in the citation of a Team of the Year award given during the 24th Annual Inspector General Honorary Awards Ceremony, to the intelligence analysts who prepared the report. The citation states In an effort to maintain the highest level of awareness among the senior leadership of the OIG, the team organized monthly project updates and briefings to the PDIG [Ms. Halbrooks], OGC [Mr. Shelley], OCCL [Mr. Crane] and IPSA [Intelligence and Special Program Assessments] principals. (Exhibit 40) On December 18, 2012, Ms. Halbrooks called me into her office to report that she had just returned from a meeting in the office of the Secretary that included Mr. Jeremy Bash, and that they had discussed the findings of the draft DoD IG report that had been identified in the December 17, 2012, McClatchy News article by Marisa Taylor, entitled: “Bin Laden film leak was referred to Justice; leaker top Obama official.” (Link) The article stated: Vickers as Candidate to be CIA Director - Pentagon investigators concluded that a senior Defense Department official who's been mentioned as a possible candidate to be the next CIA director leaked restricted information to the makers of an acclaimed film about the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and referred the case to the Justice Department, according to knowledgeable U.S. officials. The Justice Department received the case involving Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers in September, but so far it’s declined to launch a criminal prosecution, said two senior officials who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. The case involved a determination by investigators of the Pentagon’s inspector general's office that Vickers provided the maker of the film Zero Dark Thirty with the restricted name of a U.S. Special Operations 10-14 [§-2L