[No. L-11959.

 October 31, 1959]

ARTURO B. PASCUAL, petitioner and appellant, vs. HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
NUEVA ECIJA, respondent and appellee.
467
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 467
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board, of Nueva Ecija

1. 1.OFFICERS; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE IF QUESTION is PURELY LEGAL.—The
settled rule in this jurisdiction that where the law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse
to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143;
Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil., 938; Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542), is not without exception..
Where the only question to be settled is a purely legal one—whether or not a municipal mayor
may be subjected to an administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly
committed by him during his prior term the rule does not apply.

1. 2.ID.; ID.; REMOVAL OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; ACTS DONE DURING A PREVIOUS

TERM NOT CAUSE FOR REMOVAL.—Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous
term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer
was elected or appointed (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401;
Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 SW. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d.
237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher Country vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388;
In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217). The underlying theory is that each
term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of
the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (43
Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553).

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Makasiar, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Amado G. Salazar, Felicisimo S. Ocampo,  Arturo S. Tomas, Feliciano Bautista and Severo
Ongsiapco for appellant.
Mariano D. Capuyoc for appellee.
468
468 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board\ of Nueva Ecija

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

We are asked in this appeal to revoke an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
denying appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual had been elected mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in
November 1951 and reelected in 1955. On October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor of
that province filed with the Provincial Board three administrative charges against the said
appellant. Charge III was for "Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial
Functions," committed as follows:
"Specification I—That on or about the 18th and 20th day of December, 1954, in the municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, the above-named respondent, being municipal mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and
while the justice of the peace of the said municipality was present therein, did then and there willfully,
feloniously, criminally, without legal authority, and with grave abuse of authority, assumed and usurped
the judicial powers of the said justice of the peace by accepting the criminal complaint filed in Criminal
Case No. 3556, of the said court, conducting the preliminary investigation thereof, fixing the bail bond of
P6,000.00, and issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest; and after the accused in the said criminal case
had been arrested, while the justice of the peace was in his office in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the herein
respondent, in defiance of the express refusal by the justice of the peace to reduce the bail bond of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 1556, acted on the motion to reduce bail and did reduce the bail bond to
P3,000.00.
After the presentation of evidence regarding the first two charges, petitioner-appellant filed with
the respondentappellee, the Provincial Board, a motion to dismiss the third charge above referred
to, on the main ground that the wrongful acts therein alleged had been committed during his
previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second
term. Upon opposition filed by a special counsel for the respond-
469
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 469
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
ent-appellee, the motion to dismiss was denied by resolution of the Board.
After the denial of a motion for reconsideration of that resolution, the appellant filed with this
Court a petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction (G. R. No. L-11730), to
enjoin the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija from taking cognizance of the third charge, but the
petition was denied by minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice to action, if
any, in the Court of First Instance." Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to
inhibit the said Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing of Charge No. III, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent-appellee moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that it states no cause of action because the petitioner-appellant had not complied
with the cardinal principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies before he could appeal to the
courts, and because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over Charge No. III. After responsive
pleadings had been filed by both parties, the court below issued an order dismissing the petition
"for being premature", for the reason that the petitioner had not first appealed to the Executive
Secretary. From that order, the case was brought before us on appeal. Upon urgent petition, a
writ of preliminary injunction was issued restraining the respondent-appellee from investigating
petitioner-appellant on the charge abovementioned.
In his brief, petitioner-appellant claims that the court below erred: (1) in not holding that the
alleged usurpation of judicial functions in December 1954 is not a legal ground for disciplining
the appellant during his second term of office after a reelection, and in not holding that the
respondent patently has no authority or jurisdiction to take cognizance of Charge No. 3; (2) in
holding that
470
470 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
the petition for prohibition is premature and that the appellant must first exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him under the Revised Administrative Code; and (3) in
dismissing the petition for prohibition.
The first question posed is whether or not it was legally proper for petitioner-appellant to
have come to court without first bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review. True it
is that, in this jurisdiction, the settled rule is that where the law has delineated the procedure by
which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before
recourse to judicial action can be initiated (Ang Tuan Kai vs. Import Control Commission, 91
Phil., 143; Coloso vs. Board, 92 Phil., 938; Miguel vs. Reyes, 93 Phil., 542, and several other
cases), but we believe that this rule is not without exceptions, as in a case like the present, where
the only question to be settled in the prohibition proceedings is a purely legal one—whether or
not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an administrative investigation of a charge based on
misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term.
"The rule is inapplicable where no administrative remedy is provided. Likewise, the rule will be relaxed
where there is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy; where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where
although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of form, and the
administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over; or where the administrative remedy is not
exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with
optional administrative process before seeking judicial relief." (73 C.J.S. p. 354) (Italic ours)
On the above authority, we are inclined to agree with the petitioner-appellant that his bringing
the case to court is not a violation of, but merely an exception to, the cardinal rule above referred
to.
471
VOL. 106, OCTOBER 31, 1959 471
Pascual vs. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
In a case (Mondano vs. Silvosa * 51 Off. Gaz., [6], p. 2884), this Court granted a writ of
prohibition against the provincial board of Capiz, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner
therein did not appeal to the Executive Secretary, the only question therein involved being
whether or not the charged filed against the municipal mayor of Calibo, Capiz, constituted any
one of the grounds f or suspension or removal provided for in sec. 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
We now come to the main issue of the controversy—the legality of disciplining an elective
municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term
of office.
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities.
We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes
and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the
question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The
weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
"Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the
term for which the officer was elected or appointed." (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d.
401; Montgomery vs.Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d.
237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs.Blake, 280 P. 388; In re
Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor (43
_______________

* 97 Phil., 143.

472
472 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gallardo and Andres, vs. Hon. Tuason, et al.
Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553. As
held in Conant vs. Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA
(NS) 553—
"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people."
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby revoked; the writ of prohibition
prayed for is hereby granted and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued made permanent.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
Parás, C. J., Bengzon,  Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.
L.,  Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Order revoked.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 768

Aguinaldo vs. Santos
G.R. No. 94115. August 21, 1992. *

RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of the

Department of Local Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of Cagayan,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Re-election renders administrative case moot and academic.—Petitioner’s re-
election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us
moot and academic.
Same; Removal from Office; Except for criminal acts committed, public official can not be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.— Clearly then, the rule is that a public
official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Same; Power of Secretary to remove local government officials; The power of Secretary to remove
government officials has both constitutional and statutory basis.—The power of respondent Secretary to
remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the
legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of
the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. The
statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been enacted by the then
Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2.
Same; Local Government Code; B.P. Blg. 337 not repealed by the 1987 Constitution.—Inasmuch as
the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which provides for the
______________

 EN BANC.
*

769
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 769
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the
1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
Same; Power of Secretary to appoint local government officials; Sec. 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 grants
Secretary power to appoint local government officials in case of incumbent’s removal from office. —As to
petitioner’s argument of the want of authority of respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin
Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the fallacy
of the same.
Same; Suspension or removal from office; Proof required; Not proof beyond reasonable doubt but
substantial evidence is required when not prosecuted criminally but administratively.—Equally without
merit is petitioner’s claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic
which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being
prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end
in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to
the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction to review the
decision of the Secretary of Local Government.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Victor I. Padilla for petitioner.
     Doroteo B. Laguna and Manuel T. Molina for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of
Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as
Governor of Cagayan on the
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 770
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local government
officials under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg.337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
 The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of
Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17,
1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around March 1988.
Shortly after the December 1989 coup d’etat was crushed, respondent Secretary of Local
Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring
him to show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the
Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.
On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable
violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep,
respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan,
against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a
verified answer to the complaint.
On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter from petitioner
dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary’s December 4, 1989 letter requiring
him to explain why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his
letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. 1

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner’s reply letter as his answer to the complaint of
Mayor Veronico Agatep and others.  On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended
2

______________

1
 See the text of the letter as quoted in the Decision of respondent Secretary, pp. 4-6.
2
 The validity of respondent Secretary’s action was upheld by this Court in Santos vs. Villacete, G.R. No. 91522,
January 25, 1990.
771
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 771
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation into the charges against him.
During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented
testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented
evidence nor even cross-examined the complainants’ witnesses, choosing instead to move that
respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied.
Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process
was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.
Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition, namely: (1) that the power
of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government officials under Section 60,
Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent
Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint
respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty
committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere
preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code.
While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for
his disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the ground that he had been
removed from office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The
Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992. On the
same day, acting upon a “Motion to Clarify” filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled that
inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission become final and executory only after five
(5)days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with this Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for
772
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 772
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
certiorari with this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v. Commission on
Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his
disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporary restraining
order against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution
pending the outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the votes
and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a
winner until this Court has decided the case.
On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting the petition and
annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground that the decision of
respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the petition meritorious.
Petitioner’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of
Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al., supra,:
x x x [T]he certified true xerox copy of the “CERTIFICATE OF VOTES OF CANDIDATES”, attached
to the “VERY URGENT MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE RESOLUTION DATED
MAY 14, 1992 [“] filed by petitioner shows that he received 170,382 votes while the other candidates for
the same position received the following total number of votes: (1) Patricio T. Antonio—54,412, (2)
Paquito F. Castillo—2,198; and (3) Florencio L. Vargas—48,129.
xxx
‘Considering the facts narrated, the expiration of petitioner’s term of office during which the acts charged were
allegedly committed, and his subsequent reelection, the petition must be dismissed for the reason that the issue has
become academic. In Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:
773
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 773
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
‘The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove from office because of
misconduct during a prior term to which we fully subscribe.
‘Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for
removal and this is especially true where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a
term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161 S.W. 2nd
4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd
237; Board of Com’rs Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fedula,
147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43 S.W. 217)
‘The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p.
45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [1887]
6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553 .
‘The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To
do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.’ (Lizares v.
Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974]) 3

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against
______________

3
 G.R. Nos. 105128-30, Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, Florencio Vargas, Luzviminda Villaflor and Alfonso
Purugganan, prom. June 9, 1992, pp. 3, 4-5.
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 774
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration. Petitioner contends that
the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego
of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution
and which is now vested in the courts.
We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is
anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The
constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which
vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and
the power of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the
department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by
him.  The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been
4

enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2
of which specifically provided as follows—
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be
amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties of local government officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of
local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose. 5

_______________

4
 Citizen J. Antonio Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992; Federation of Free Workers
vs. Inciong, 161 SCRA 295 (1988); Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1951).
5
 Emphasis supplied.
775
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 775
 Aguinaldo vs. Santos
A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
‘SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers and functions and duties
of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 6

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which
provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973
Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,  this Court had the occasion to state that
7

B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time
as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remove local
elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337. 8

________________

6
 Emphasis supplied.
7
 G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
8
 SEC. 60. Suspension and Removal; Grounds.—An elective local official may be suspended or removed from office
on any of the following grounds committed while in office:

1. (1)Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

2. (2)Culpable violation of the Constitution;
3. (3)Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office and neglect of duty;
4. (4)Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude;
5. (5)Abuse of authority;
6. (6)Unauthorized absence for three consecutive months.

776
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguinaldo vs. Santos
As to petitioner’s argument of the want of authority of re-spondent Secretary to appoint
respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P.
Blg 337 to show the fallacy of the same, to wit—
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies or
is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office, the vice-governor . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the former. 9

Equally without merit is petitioner’s claim that before he could be suspended or removed from
office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense
of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected
Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence. 10
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent
Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing
petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla,Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea,  Regalado, Davide, Jr., Ro-meroand Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
     Melo, J., Took no part.
Petition granted; decision reversed.
Notes.—Removal from office should be distinguished from
_______________

 Emphasis supplied.
9

 Ang Tibay vs. CIT, 69 Phil. 635; Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489.
10

777
VOL. 212, AUGUST 21, 1992 777
People vs. Mallari
termination by abolition of an office (De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294).
Summary dismissal of an employee without necessity of a formal investigation when charge
is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong (Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439).

G.R. No. 198583. June 28, 2017.*

ARLYN ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT and CHITO M. OYARDO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The settled rule is
that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari;
Exceptions.—The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This
rule, however, admits well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Ombudsman; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; The Supreme Court (SC), recognizes only two (2)
instances where a decision of the Ombudsman is considered as final and unappealable and, thus,
immediately executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the charge; and second is, in case
of conviction, where the penalty
_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
284
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1) month salary.—In Ombudsman v. Alano, 516 SCRA 18 (2007), the Court stressed
that Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to,
among others, “promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.” Pursuant to such constitutional authority, Administrative
Order No. 07 (otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman”), dated
April 10, 1990, was issued. Section 7, Rule III thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Finality of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent,
unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of RA 6770. The Court, in interpreting the above constitutional and statutory provisions,
recognizes only two instances where a decision of the Ombudsman is considered as final and
unappealable and, thus, immediately executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the
charge; and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; An independent action for certiorari may be
availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.—Left without any remedy in the
ordinary course of law, Templonuevo was justified in resorting directly to the CA  via a Rule 65 petition.
Indeed, an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed
remedy of appeal. In other words, because petitioner could not avail a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal, her choice of a Rule 65 petition was proper.
Administrative Law; Condonation Doctrine; The condonation doctrine, despite its abandonment in
Conchita Carpio-Morales v.
 
  
285
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 285
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015), still applies in this case
as the effect of the abandonment was made prospective in application.—Templonuevo claimed that the
decision of the Ombudsman was null and void as the penalty imposed could no longer be imposed on
account of her election as Vice Mayor of the same municipality, which to her, operated as forgiveness by
her constituents for the acts done while she was still a Sangguniang Bayan Member. This “theory of
nullity,” in a sense, does not hold water. The Ombudsman decided the case prior to the May 2010
elections. At that time, Templonuevo remained an incumbent and no event had transpired yet which
would have had an effect on her liability for the acts done during her previous term. As the elections for
2010 did not happen yet, nothing could have substantially changed the course of action of the
Ombudsman. The election of 2010, however, became material only when the Ombudsman’s decision was
on appeal. It is at this stage that the CA, should have considered Templonuevo’s election as Vice Mayor
as rendering the imposition of administrative sanctions moot and academic on the basis of the
condonation doctrine. Said doctrine, despite its abandonment in Conchita Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. (Carpio-Morales), 774 SCRA 431 (2015), still applies in this
case as the effect of the abandonment was made prospective in application.
Same; Same; In Giron v. Ochoa, Jr., 819 SCRA 103 (2017), the Supreme Court (SC) recognized
that the condonation doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different position
provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is the same. —In Giron
v. Ochoa, Jr., 819 SCRA 103 (2017), the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public
officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the
person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court ruled: On this issue, considering the ratio
decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals
below that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The underlying
theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations
are the following: first, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public
officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official’s reelection serves as
a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
 
 
286
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life
and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body
politic, who elected him to another office, was the same. [Emphasis supplied] In this case, those who
elected Templonuevo into office as Sangguniang Bayanmember and Vice Mayor were essentially the
same. Stated otherwise, the electorate for the Vice Mayor of a municipality embraces wholly those voting
for a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Logically, the condonation doctrine is applicable in her case.
The Court is, thus, precluded from imposing the administrative penalties of one month suspension on
account of the same people’s decision to elect her again to office.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MENDOZA, J.:
 
 This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the review of
the February 17, 20111 and the September 8, 20112 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116229. The CA issuances dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner Arlyn Almario-Templonuevo (Templonuevo), thus, affirming the
January 6, 2010 Decision3 of Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) in
OMB-L-A-08-0097-B,
_______________

1  Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., and Associate
Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-27.
2  Id., at pp. 28-31.
3  Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Marietta M. Ramirez, with Acting Director Evaluation
Investigation Office Bureau-A Joaquin F. Salazar, concurring. With the recommending approval of Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, Victor C. Fernandez and with such recommendation approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Mark E.
Jalandoni. Id., at pp. 32-41.
 
 
287
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 287
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
finding her administratively liable for simple misconduct. The complaint against her was filed by
respondent Chito M. Oyardo (Oyardo).
 
Factual Antecedents
 
Templonuevo was elected as Sangguniang Bayan Member of the Municipality of Caramoan,
Province of Catanduanes, during the May 2007 elections. She served from July 1, 2007 to June
30, 2010. In the elections of May 2010, she was elected as Municipal Vice Mayor of the same
municipality.
In a complaint, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0097-B, Oyardo administratively charged
Templonuevo before the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 2, par. 1 of Republic Act No. 9287.
In its January 6, 2010 Decision, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner guilty of
simple misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of one month suspension without pay. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that ARLYN
ALMARIO-TEMPLONUEVO be adjudged guilty of violation of simple misconduct and is hereby
imposed a penalty of one (1) month suspension from office without pay pursuant to Section 7 Rule III of
the Administrative Order No. 07 as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 in relation to Republic Act
No. 6770.
The Honorable Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno, Department of Interior and Local Government, is hereby
directed to implement this DECISION immediately upon receipt thereof pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2006 dated 11 April 2006 and to
promptly inform this office of the action taken hereon.
SO DECIDED. 4

_______________

4  Id., at p. 40.
 
 
 288
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
At the time Templonuevo received her copy of the January 6, 2010 Decision on September
27, 2010, her term as Sangguniang Bayan Member had expired. She, however, was elected as
Vice Mayor of the same municipality.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Templonuevo directly filed before the CA an
original petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. She claimed
that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering her suspension at a time
when her term of office as Sangguniang BayanMember had already expired and she had been
elected as Vice Mayor in the May 2010 elections.
In its February 17, 2011 Resolution,5 the CA dismissed outright the petition on the ground of
Templonuevo’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the CA, the remedy
of certiorariwill not lie if other plain and speedy remedies in the ordinary course of law such as a
motion for reconsideration are available, which, in this case, was not sought after by
Templonuevo.
Templonuevo moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA in its
September 8, 2011 Resolution.
Aggrieved, Templonuevo elevated the case to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition.
Templonuevo asserts that the CA decided questions of substance contrary to law and the
applicable decisions of this Court when her petition was dismissed outright on the ground of
failure to file a motion for reconsideration. She claims that there was no need to file for
reconsideration considering that the Ombudsman’s decision has become final, executory and
unappealable. She cites, as support, Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07,
otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17,
which provides:
_______________

5  Id., at p. 27.
 
 
289
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 289
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and
in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals in a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of
course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure shall be ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.
 
To Templonuevo, said AO makes a motion for reconsideration unavailable in cases where a
respondent is absolved of the charge or in cases of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine of equivalent to
one month salary. Considering that she was given the penalty of one-month suspension only, her
only remedy then was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In furtherance of her position, Templonuevo cites Office of theOmbudsman v. Alano,6 wherein
the Court ruled that a
_______________

6  544 Phil. 709; 516 SCRA 18 (2007).

 
 
290
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
resolution or order of the Ombudsman becomes final and unappealable in the instances
mentioned by her. The effect of such finality, in her view, is simple — that the motion for
reconsideration is not required before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. This
was, according to her, the same conclusion reached by the Court in Reyes, Jr. v.
Belisario.7 There, it was held that the complainant therein was not entitled to any corrective
recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration, or by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of
the exoneration. The Court further held that despite such a fact, courts are still empowered by the
Constitution to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Templonuevo, thus, believes that because the decision of the Ombudsman in her case was
immediately final, executory and unappealable, the same could no longer be reviewed by the said
office and as such a motion for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. The CA should
have taken note of that fact and such a failure amounts to an error, says petitioner.
Templonuevo likewise calls the Court’s attention to the fact that the misconduct for which
she was penalized was committed when she was still a Sangguniang Bayan Member. As she was
elected Vice Mayor of the same municipality in 2010, she claims that such election resulted in
the condonation of her administrative liability on acts committed during her previous post. She
cites the case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,8 where this Court held that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefrom. Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsman
is in her view a patent nullity.
_______________

7  612 Phil. 937; 596 SCRA 31 (2009).

8  106 Phil. 466 (1959).
 
 
291
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 291
 Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
On November 16, 2011, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the
petition and also issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.9
On December 2, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and
Motion (in Lieu of Comment),10 stating that the arguments raised by it in its Manifestation and
Motion (in Lieu of Comment), dated April 26, 2011 and filed on April 28, 2011 with the CA,
was exhaustive enough to serve as its comment on the present petition. The OSG in the pleadings
it filed with the CA took the side of Templonuevo. It, thus, asserts that by virtue of AO No. 7, as
amended, a decision of Ombudsman imposing a penalty of not more than one (1) month is final,
executory and unappealable and, as such, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is not an
available remedy. It also claimed that the subsequent reelection of Templonuevo precludes the
imposition and execution of the penalty by virtue of the long standing doctrine of condonation.
In its Comment on the Petition For Review on Certiorari with Leave of Court (With Motion
to Recall the Temporary Restraining Order with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction),11 the Ombudsman submits that Section 7, Rule III, Administrative Order
No. 07, as amended, allows the filing of motions for reconsideration on its decisions that impose
one month suspension; that a plethora of jurisprudence reveals that the Condonation Doctrine
was applied by the Supreme Court only in cases where there was reelection to the same position;
and that, the issuance of a temporary restraining order was erroneous and the error should not be
extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which the law proscribes.
_______________

9   See Rollo, pp. 86-90.

10  Id., at pp. 91-115.
11  Id., at pp. 141-163.
 
 
292
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
In the meantime, Templonuevo filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Compliance 12 with the January
25, 2012 Resolution which ordered her to furnish this Court with the current address of Oyardo.
She stated therein that she did not know the present address of Oyardo, who was not a permanent
resident of Caramoan, and that no forwarding address was left behind.
In its July 18, 2012 Resolution, 13 the Court noted the manifestation and required the
Ombudsman to furnish the address of Oyardo. This was complied with.14
Oyardo still failed to file his Comment on the petition. As such, in the Court’s September 14,
2015 Resolution,15 Oyardo’s right to file his comment was deemed waived. In the same
Resolution, the Court required Templonuevo to file her Reply to the manifestation and motion of
the OSG, dated December 1, 2011, and to the Comment on the Petition for Review
on Certiorari with Leave of Court filed by the Ombudsman.
 
Until now, no reply has been filed by Templonuevo. She is deemed to have waived her right
to file it.
 
Issues
  
A reading of the pleadings filed by the parties reveals that the issues are as follows:
1. Whether the CA committed an error in dismissing outright the petition filed by
Templonuevo on the ground of failure to file a motion for reconsideration from the
decision of the Ombudsman finding her administratively liable and imposing upon her a
penalty of one month suspension.
2. Whether the CA committed an error in not treating the election of Templonuevo as Vice
Mayor of the
_______________

12  Id., at pp. 165-167.

13  Id., at pp. 170-171.
14  Id., at pp. 193-194.
15  Id., at pp. 210-211.
 
 
293
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 293
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
same municipality as an event that precludes the imposition of the one month suspension penalty
following the doctrine of condonation.
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
The Court grants the petition.
 
A motion for reconsideration is not
required where the penalty imposed
by the Ombudsman is one month
suspension before a petition under
Rule 65 can be filed.
 
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari.16 Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.17
This rule, however, admits well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo  has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorariproceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a crimi-
_______________
 16  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, 695 Phil. 55, 61; 680 SCRA 617, 623 (2012); Medado
v. Heirs of Late Antonio Consing, 681 Phil. 536, 548; 665 SCRA 534, 547 (2012), citing Pineda v. Court of Appeals
(Former Ninth Division), 649 Phil. 562, 571; 635 SCRA 274, 281 (2010).
17  Id.
 
 
294
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
nal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.18
Templonuevo contended that her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Ombudsman decision was justified because it would be useless. She claims that the assailed
decision was final, executory and unappealable, hence, beyond the ambit of a motion for
reconsideration following Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. She also argued
that the Ombudsman’s decision was a patent nullity considering that her election as Vice Mayor
of the same municipality precluded the attachment to her of any administrative liability arising
from the acts done while she was a Sangguniang Bayan Member.
The Court agrees with Templonuevo on her first position.
In Ombudsman v. Alano,19 the Court stressed that Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to, among others, “promulgate its rules of
procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.” Pursuant to such constitutional authority, Administrative Order No. 07
(otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman”), dated April 10,
1990, was issued. Section 7, Rule III thereof provides:
_______________

18  Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 137; 638 SCRA 457, 470 (2010). See also Republic
v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI), 682 Phil. 186, 194; 666 SCRA 199, 205-206 (2012). See also Domdom v. Third
and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341, 346; 613 SCRA 528, 533 (2010), citing Tan v. Court of Appeals,
341 Phil. 570, 576-578; 275 SCRA 568, 574-575 (1997).
19  Office of the Ombudsman v. Alano, supra note 6.
 
 
295
VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 295
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
SEC. 7. Finality of decision.—Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10)
days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition
for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770.
 
The Court, in interpreting the above constitutional and statutory provisions, recognizes only
two instances where a decision of the Ombudsman is considered as final and unappealable and,
thus, immediately executory. The first is when the respondent is absolved of the charge;
and second is, in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
In this case, Templonuevo was meted with a penalty of one month suspension. Accordingly,
the decision of the Ombudsman is final, unappealable and immediately executory.
Being the case, the Ombudsman’s decision was beyond the reach of an appeal or even of a
motion for reconsideration. This was the same ruling in Reyes v. Belisario,20 where the Court
explained that a complainant was not entitled to any corrective recourse by motion for
reconsideration in the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts if the penalty imposed was higher
than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to a one month salary.
It was further written:
The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an
administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the
adminis-
_______________

20  Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario, supra note 7.

 
 
296
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
trative charge. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by motion
for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the
exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the
penalty imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or fine equivalent to one
month salary. 21

 
Left without any remedy in the ordinary course of law, Templonuevo was justified in
resorting directly to the CA via a Rule 65 petition. Indeed, an independent action
for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of
appeal.22 In other words, because petitioner could not avail a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal, her choice of a Rule 65 petition was proper.
 
The decision of the Ombuds-
man was not a patent nullity;
Condonation doctrine applies.
 
Templonuevo claimed that the decision of the Ombudsman was null and void as the penalty
imposed could no longer be imposed on account of her election as Vice Mayor of the same
municipality, which to her, operated as forgiveness by her constituents for the acts done while
she was still a Sangguniang Bayan Member. This “theory of nullity,” in a sense, does not hold
water. The Ombudsman decided the case prior to the May 2010 elections. At that time,
Templonuevo remained an incumbent and no event had transpired yet which would have had an
effect on her liability for the acts done during her previous term. As the elections for 2010 did
not
_______________
 21  Id., at p. 954; p. 45.
22  RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 1.
 
 
 
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VOL. 828, JUNE 28, 2017 297
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
happen yet, nothing could have substantially changed the course of action of the Ombudsman.
The election of 2010, however, became material only when the Ombudsman’s decision was
on appeal. It is at this stage that the CA, should have considered Templonuevo’s election as Vice
Mayor as rendering the imposition of administrative sanctions moot and academic on the basis of
the condonation doctrine. Said doctrine, despite its abandonment in Conchita Carpio-Morales v.
Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., (Carpio-Morales),23 still applies in this case as
the effect of the abandonment was made prospective in application.
In Giron v. Ochoa, Jr.,24 the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a public
officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic
electing the person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the
interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the condonation doctrine applies to a
public official elected to another office. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the
penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected
for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official’s reelection serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and third,
courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case, it is a given fact that the body politic,
who elected him to another office, was the same. [Emphasis supplied]
_______________

23  G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

24  G.R. No. 218463, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 103.
 
 
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Almario-Templonuevo vs. Office of the Ombudsman
In this case, those who elected Templonuevo into office as Sangguniang Bayan member and
Vice Mayor were essentially the same. Stated otherwise, the electorate for the Vice Mayor of a
municipality embraces wholly those voting for a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Logically,
the condonation doctrine is applicable in her case. The Court is, thus, precluded from imposing
the administrative penalties of one month suspension on account of the same people’s decision to
elect her again to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011 and September 8, 2011
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116229 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The act committed by petitioner Arlyn Almario-
Templonuevo is deemed CONDONED.
 SO ORDERED.
Peralta** (Acting Chairperson), Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., On Official Leave.
Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. (Salumbides, Jr. vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 619 SCRA 313 [2010])
The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective
in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. (Carpio-
Morales vs. Court of Appeals [Sixth Division], 774 SCRA 431 [2015])