F5 BIG-IP 12.1.3.

4 for LTM+APM
Security Target

Release Date: January 15, 2019

Version: 1.3

Prepared By:
Saffire Systems

PO Box 40295

Indianapolis, IN 46240

Prepared For:
F5 Networks, Inc.

401 Elliott Avenue West

Seattle, WA 98119

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F5 BIG-IP APM 12.1.3.4 APM ST January 15, 2019

Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................1
1.1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................................................................1
1.3 DOCUMENT TERMINOLOGY ...............................................................................................................................3
1.3.1 ST Specific Terminology .........................................................................................................................3
1.3.2 Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE TYPE .........................................................................................................................................................5
1.5 TOE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................5
1.6 TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................................................6
1.6.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................6
1.6.2 Architecture Description .........................................................................................................................7
1.6.3 Physical Boundaries .............................................................................................................................10
1.6.3.1 Physical boundaries .......................................................................................................................................... 10
1.6.3.2 Guidance Documentation.................................................................................................................................. 11
1.6.4 Logical Boundaries ...............................................................................................................................12
1.6.4.1 Security Audit ................................................................................................................................................... 13
1.6.4.2 Cryptographic Support ...................................................................................................................................... 13
1.6.4.3 Identification and Authentication ..................................................................................................................... 14
1.6.4.4 Security Management ....................................................................................................................................... 14
1.6.4.5 Protection of the TSF ........................................................................................................................................ 15
1.6.4.6 TOE access........................................................................................................................................................ 15
1.6.4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ...................................................................................................................................... 15
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ...........................................................................................................................17
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ...........................................................................................................................17
2.2 PP AND PACKAGE CLAIMS ..............................................................................................................................17
2.3 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................................20
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..........................................................................................................21
3.1 THREAT ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................................................21
3.2 THREATS .........................................................................................................................................................22
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ...........................................................................................................23
3.4 ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................................................................................23
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................................................................25
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................25
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ................................................................................................26

6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................................27

6.1 CONVENTIONS .................................................................................................................................................28
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................29
6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) ............................................................................................................................29
6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation ................................................................................................................ 29
6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association ........................................................................................................... 31
6.2.1.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage ...................................................................................................... 31
6.2.1.4 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage .......................................................................................... 31
6.2.1.5 FAU_STG_EXT.3 Display Warning for Local Storage Space ........................................................................ 32
6.2.2 Cryptographic Operations (FCS) .........................................................................................................32
6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation ................................................................................................... 32
6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment .............................................................................................. 32
6.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction .................................................................................................. 32
6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) ................................................ 33

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6.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification) ......................................... 33

6.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (Hash Operation) ............................................................................. 33
6.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) ................................................................. 33
6.2.2.8 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol ............................................................................................................. 33
6.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation ..................................................................................................... 34
6.2.2.10 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol ................................................................................................... 34
6.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[1] TLS Client Protocol with authentication (TLS 1.1) ............................................... 35
6.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[2] TLS Client Protocol with authentication (TLS 1.2) ............................................... 35
6.2.2.13 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server - TLS 1.1) .............................................. 36
6.2.2.14 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[2] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server - TLS 1.2) .............................................. 36
6.2.2.15 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[3] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server - TLS 1.1).......................................... 37
6.2.2.16 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[4] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server - TLS 1.2).......................................... 38
6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)................................................................................................38
6.2.3.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management ...................................................................................................... 38
6.2.3.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication................................................................................ 38
6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism ..................................................................... 39
6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback ............................................................................................. 39
6.2.3.5 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation .............................................................................................. 39
6.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ....................................................................................... 40
6.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests ................................................................................................ 40
6.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ................................................................................................................40
6.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Management of security functions behavior ....................................................... 40
6.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1(2)/ AdminAct Management of security functions behavior ...................................................... 40
6.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate Management of security functions behavior ................................................ 40
6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data .......................................................................................................... 40
6.2.4.5 FMT_MTD.1/AdminAct Management of TSF Data ........................................................................................ 40
6.2.4.6 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions .................................................................................... 40
6.2.4.7 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles ..................................................................................................... 41
6.2.5 Protection of TSF (FPT) .......................................................................................................................41
6.2.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords ............................................................................. 41
6.2.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) .............................................. 41
6.2.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) TSF Testing (Extended)/power-on ................................................................................. 41
6.2.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1(2) TSF Testing (Extended)/on demand ............................................................................... 42
6.2.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update ................................................................................................................... 42
6.2.5.6 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps .................................................................................................................. 42
6.2.6 TOE Access (FTA) ................................................................................................................................42
6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking ........................................................................................... 42
6.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination ............................................................................................................ 42
6.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination ........................................................................................................... 42
6.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners ...................................................................................................... 42
6.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ................................................................................................................42
6.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refined) .............................................................................................. 42
6.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path (Refinement) ............................................................................................................ 43
6.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................43
6.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..........................................................................................................44
6.4.1 Security Functional Requirement Dependencies ..................................................................................44
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .............................................................................................................45
7.1 SECURITY AUDIT .............................................................................................................................................45
7.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ..............................................................................................................................47
7.2.1 Key Generation and Establishment ......................................................................................................47
7.2.2 Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters .........................................................................................48
7.2.3 Cryptographic operations in the TOE ..................................................................................................49
7.2.4 Random Number Generation ................................................................................................................51
7.2.5 SSH ........................................................................................................................................................51
7.2.6 TLS Protocol .........................................................................................................................................52
7.2.7 HTTPS Protocol ....................................................................................................................................53
7.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION .........................................................................................................54
7.3.1 Password policy and user lockout ........................................................................................................54
7.3.2 Certificate Validation............................................................................................................................55

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7.4 SECURITY FUNCTION MANAGEMENT ..............................................................................................................55

7.4.1 Security Roles........................................................................................................................................56
7.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF ................................................................................................................................59
7.5.1 Protection of Sensitive Data .................................................................................................................59
7.5.2 Self-tests ................................................................................................................................................60
7.5.3 Update Verification ...............................................................................................................................60
7.5.4 Time Source ..........................................................................................................................................61
7.6 TOE ACCESS ...................................................................................................................................................61
7.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS .............................................................................................................................61

List of Tables
Table 1: Supported Hardware Models ...........................................................................................................3

Table 2: Cryptographic Algorithm Certificate Numbers ............................................................................13

Table 3: Security Functional Requirements .................................................................................................28

Table 4: Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events ............................................................31

Table 5: Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................................................44

Table 6: Audit Logs and Their Content .......................................................................................................46

Table 7: SFR Mapping to CAVS Certificate Numbers ..............................................................................47

Table 8: Key generation in the TOE ............................................................................................................48

Table 9: Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters ..................................................................................49

Table 10: Cryptographic primitives in the TOE ..........................................................................................51

Table 11: Cipher suites ................................................................................................................................53

Table 12: BIG-IP User Roles .......................................................................................................................59

List of Figures
Figure 1: Schematic example of a BIG-IP network environment..................................................................7

Figure 2: BIG-IP Subsystems ........................................................................................................................8

Figure 3: Architectural aspects of BIG-IP ...................................................................................................10

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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target, Target of Evaluation (TOE), conformance claims, ST
organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated
product.

1.1 Security Target Identification

This section will provide information necessary to identify and control the Security Target and the TOE.

ST Title F5 BIG-IP 12.1.3.4 for LTM+APM Security Target

Version: 1.3

Publication Date: January 15, 2019

Sponsor: F5 Networks, Inc.

Developer: F5 Networks, Inc.

ST Author Michelle Ruppel, Saffire Systems

1.2 TOE Identification

The TOE claiming conformance to this ST is identified as BIG-IP Version 12.1.3.4 LTM+APM Version
12.1.3.4 (build 2) with any of the following hardware appliances installed with the LTM+APM with
application mode software:

SKU VCMP? Part # Model Series

F5-BIG-LTM-I5600 N 200-0396-02 i5000

F5-ADD-BIG-AFM-I5XXX
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-BIG-LTM-I7600 N 500-0003-03 i7000

F5-ADD-BIG-AFM-I7XXX
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC N 400-0028-10 C2400

F5-VPR-LTM-B2250 400-0039-03 B2250
F5-ADD-VPR-AFM-C2400
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C4480-AC N 400-0033-04 C4480

F5-VPR-LTM-B4450N 400-0053-10 B4450N
F5-ADD-VPR-AFM-C4400
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

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SKU VCMP? Part # Model Series

F5-BIG-LTM-I5800 Y 200-0396-02 i5000

F5-ADD-BIG-AFM-I5XXX
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-BIG-LTM-I7800 Y 500-0003-03 i7000

F5-ADD-BIG-AFM-I7XXX
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC Y 400-0028-10 C2400

F5-VPR-LTM-B2250 400-0039-03
B2250
F5-ADD-VPR-AFM-C2400
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE
F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-2400

F5-VPR-LTM-C4480-AC Y 400-0033-04 C4480

F5-VPR-LTM-B4450N 400-0053-10 B4450N
F5-ADD-VPR-AFM-C4400
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE
F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-4480

F5-BIG-LTM-10350V-F Y 200-0398-00 10000 Series

F5-ADD-BIG-AFM-10000 (FIPS)
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-BIG-LTM-I5600 N 200-0396-02 i5000

F5-ADD-BIG-APMI56XXB
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-BIG-LTM-I7600 N 500-0003-03 i7000

F5-ADD-BIG-APMI76XXB
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC N 400-0028-10 C2400

F5-VPR-LTM-B2250 400-0039-03 B2250
F5-ADD-VPRAPM-C2400B
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C4480-AC N 400-0033-04 C4480

F5-VPR-LTM-B4450N 400-0053-10 B4450N
F5-ADD-VPRAPM-C4400B
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

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SKU VCMP? Part # Model Series

F5-BIG-LTM-I5800 Y 200-0396-02 i5000

F5-ADD-BIG-APMI58XXB
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-BIG-LTM-I7800 Y 500-0003-03 i7000

F5-ADD-BIG-APMI78XXB
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC Y 400-0028-10 C2400

F5-VPR-LTM-B2250 400-0039-03 B2250
F5-ADD-VPRAPM-C2400B
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE
F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-4800

F5-VPR-LTM-C4480-AC Y 400-0033-04 C4480

F5-VPR-LTM-B4450N 400-0053-10 B4450N
F5-ADD-VPRAPM-C4400B
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE
F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-4480

F5-BIG-LTM-10350V-F Y 200-0398-00 10000 Series

F5-ADDBIGAPM10200V-B (FIPS)
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE

Table 1: Supported Hardware Models

Each of the hardware platforms includes a third party proprietary cryptographic acceleration card. All
hardware platforms, except the 2250 include the Intel Coleto Creek (8955). The 2250 model includes the
Cavium Nitrox (CN3540-500-C20). Hardware acceleration cards are not included in the TOE.

1.3 Document Terminology

Please refer to CC Part 1 Section 2.3 for definitions of commonly used CC terms.

1.3.1 ST Specific Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this
document. Terms defined in the CC Part 2 are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Administrators
Administrators are administrative users of the TOE, i.e. those users defined in the TOE to
be authorized to access the configuration interfaces of the TOE. Different roles can be
assigned to administrators, including the Administrator role -- the name of the role is not to

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be confused with the general reference to an administrator being an administrative user of

the TOE in any role.
User
Humans or machines interacting with the TOE via the provided user and programmatic
interfaces. The TOE deals with different types of users -- administrators in charge of
configuring and operating the TOE, traffic users who are subject to the TOE's networking
capabilities. User interactions with the TOE are transparent to the user, and in most cases
the users are not aware of the existence of the TOE.

1.3.2 Acronyms
ADC Application Delivery Controller
CC Common Criteria
CMI Central Management Infrastructure
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CRLDP Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
EAL2 Evaluation Assurance Level 2
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
GUI Graphical User Interface
HSB High-Speed Bridge
HSL High-Speed Logging
LTM Local Traffic Manager
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SOF Strength of Function
TLS Transport Layer Security
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions

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TSP TOE Security Policy

vCMP Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing

1.4 TOE Type

The TOE type is a Networking Device. The TOE is the base configuration of a product from the BIG-IP
family, called Application Delivery Controllers, that contains the core security functionality. The BIG-IP
product family is compliant with the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices(NDcPP).

1.5 TOE Overview

The BIG-IP products subject to this evaluation represent Application Delivery Controllers based on F5's
Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS). In particular,

• Application Delivery Controller, which includes the Local Traffic Manager (LTM) and Access
Policy Manager (APM) modules, provides network traffic management capabilities.

BIG-IP products run on appliance hardware provided by F5. In addition, BIG-IP running as a guest
instance on F5 appliances that support F5's Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment is
included. (vCMP implements a purpose-built hypervisor that allows organizations to run multiple virtual
instances of BIG-IP on the same hardware.)

The TOE's Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM), along with additional software, provides basic
networking functionality, with the TOE operating as a network switch and reverse proxy. This includes
the following security functions:

• Security Audit: BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for security-
relevant events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications
and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.

• Cryptographic Support: In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL

cryptographic module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to
connect over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow
administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for interactions
with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations utilize the cryptographic module
which provides random number generation, key generation, key establishment, key storage, key
destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption operations, and digital signature operations.

• Identification and Authentication: An internal password-based repository is implemented for

authentication of management users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user
accounts after a configured number of failed authentication attempts.

• Security Function Management: A command line interface (available via the traffic
management shell "tmsh"), web-based GUI ("Configuration utility"), a SOAP-based API
("iControl API"), and a REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for
all relevant configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration objects in a
partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authentication of
administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based on pre-defined roles

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and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be defined for individual servers and
classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic from clients to, and for traffic that matches certain
characteristics, determining the kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Management
capabilities offered by the TOE include the definition of templates for certain configuration
options. The management functionality also implements roles for separation of duties.

• Protection of the TSF: BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and
management of its own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of
sensitive data, such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable
time stamping.

• TOE Access: Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-
defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined period of
inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.

• Trusted Path / Channels: The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces
with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using
TLS.

1.6 TOE Description

1.6.1 Introduction
Figure 1 provides a schematic example of the TOE's role and location in a networking environment. The
F5 hardware hosting BIG-IP is depicted by the two redundant network devices in the diagram. In this
example:

• Internet connections (dark red network connection) are mediated by BIG-IP to provide access to
certain resources located in an organization's internal server pool (yellow network connection),
for example to a web-based e-commerce system presenting a storefront to consumers

• Users in the organization's Intranet (orange network connection) also access resources in the
server pools to interact with the internal server pool. Although not included in the TOE, BIG-IP
provides server termination of traffic flowing to a backend server by implementing a TLS client
protocol.

• Network administrators connect to BIG-IP via a dedicated network interface (dark green network
connection) to administer the TOE

• The TOE is set up in a redundant failover configuration, with heartbeat monitoring and reporting
via a data link between the two instances (light green connections)

When deployed as two redundant systems configured in an active/standby failover configuration, the two
systems can synchronize their configuration data and provide state and persistence monitoring. The TOE
will fail over to the redundant system while maintaining a secure configuration if failures the active
device sends a request to the standby device or if the standby device detects missing heartbeats from the
active device. The new active device will continue to enforce security policies for new (and possibly
active) connections mediated by the TOE. BIG-IP uses CMI (Central Management Infrastructure), a
proprietary protocol, for the incremental exchange of configuration data and failover status between TOE
instances; CMI is encapsulated in TLS to provide integrity and confidentiality protections. In this

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configuration a physical network port will be dedicated on each device for the exchange of
synchronization data and failover monitoring with the standby device. Failover / redundancy is not in the
scope of the evaluated configuration.

Figure 1: Schematic example of a BIG-IP network environment

The APM terminates TLS-based VPN connections from remote clients. Internal server resources are
made available to these remote users by offering web-based access for remote users, forwarding certain
application protocols (such as remote desktop protocol (RDP)), and providing transparent VPN tunneling.
The APM subsystem relies upon the Active Directory and/or LDAP external authentication providers to
provide authentication decisions; local authentication is not performed for APM.

1.6.2 Architecture Description

The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane. The control plane
validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary systems. It also provides all administrative
access to the TOE. The data plane passes user traffic through the TOE.

The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and server), SSH,
HTTPS, NTP, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and
TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality implemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.

The TOE is divided into five (5) subsystems: Appliance (hardware or virtual), Traffic Management
Operating System (TMOS), Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM), Local Traffic Manager (LTM),
and Access Policy Manager (APM). F5’s TMOS is a Linux-based operating system customized for
performance and to execute on the TOE appliance hardware or in the TOE Virtual Clustered
Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment. The vCMP is a hypervisor that allows multiple instances of the
TOE to execute on the same underlying hardware. The TMM is the data plane of the product and all data
plane traffic passes through the TMM. The LTM controls network traffic coming into or exiting the local
area network (LAN) and provides the ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traffic. The APM

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module terminates TLS-based VPN connections from remote clients although these features are not
included in the evaluated configuration.

LTM APM Non-vCMP TOE

(Multiple appliances)
TMM
TMOS
Appliance Hardware
BIG-IP LTM+APM

LTM APM vCMP TOE

(Single Appliance)
TMM
TMOS
Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) Hypervisor
Appliance Hardware
BIG-IP LTM+APM

Figure 2: BIG-IP Subsystems

TMOS is a Linux operating system that runs directly on appliance hardware or in a vCMP environment.
TMOS is a modified version of the RedHat Linux kernel 2.6.32-431.56.1.e16. In addition to providing the
standard operating system features (such as process management, file management, etc), the TMOS
provides the following security features for the TOE:

• Auditing functionality, using the host system's syslog capabilities. (In addition, a concept called
"high-speed logging" (HSL) allows TMM instances to send certain log traffic directly to external
audit servers.)

• Time stamping, using NTP servers to obtain accurate time stamps and maintain the system clock

• Management functionality, presented to consumers via a dedicated shell providing a command

line interface (traffic management shell, "tmsh") that can be reached by administrators via SSH
(OpenSSH_5.3p1); and via a web GUI (“Configuration Utility”), a SOAP protocol interface
("iControl API"), or REST interface (“iControl REST API”) that can be reached through a
network interface via HTTPS. Those management interfaces are implemented in the background
by a central management control program daemon (mcpd) that provides configuration
information to individual TOE parts and coordinates its persistent storage.

• Authentication functionality is enforced on all administrative interfaces. Administrative interfaces

implement an internal password-based repository for authentication of administrative users.

• Cryptographic algorithms provided by OpenSSL (OpenSSL1.0.1l-fips 15 Jan 2015).

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• Individual daemons introduced by BIG-IP packages, such as the modules implementing the LTM
and APM logic.

At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM), representing
the data plane of the product when compared to traditional network device architectures. It is
implemented by a daemon running with root privileges, performing its own memory management, and
having direct access to the network hardware. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for
the “client-side” and “server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters implemented in TMM
include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst others. If the hardware provides more than
one CPU, TMM runs multi-threaded (one thread per CPU). In this case, disaggregators implemented in
hardware or, depending on the underlying appliance, firmware, are responsible for de-multiplexing and
multiplexing network traffic for handling by an individual TMM thread. In addition to the actual switch
hardware, F5 appliance hardware also contains a High-Speed Bridge (HSB, implemented by means of an
FPGA) that performs basic traffic filtering functionality as instructed by TMM.

Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages. These plug-ins
typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more complex logic in a counter-part
implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The plug-in modules relevant to this evaluation shown
in Figure 3 include:

• Local Traffic Manager (LTM): authentication of HTTP (based on Apache 2.2.15) traffic and
advanced traffic forwarding directives

• Access Policy Manager (APM): TLS-based client connectivity.

A diagram depicting aspects of the TOE’s architecture and the boundaries of the TOE are provided in
Figure 3.

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Figure 3: Architectural aspects of BIG-IP

1.6.3 Physical Boundaries

This section lists the hardware and software components of the product and denotes which are in the TOE
and which are in the environment.

1.6.3.1 Physical boundaries

The TOE includes the hardware and software components as identified in Section 1.2.
The evaluated configuration of BIG-IP Version 12.1.3.4 LTM+APM represents a licensing option with the
following F5 modules present and operational.

• Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),

• Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM),

• Local Traffic Manager (LTM), and

• Access Policy Manager (APM).

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The following required components can be found in the operating environment of the TOE on systems
other than those hosting the TOE:

• NTP servers

• audit servers.

Client software (e.g., the BIG-IP Client for TLS VPN connections, endpoint inspection software executed
on clients) are optional components that are not part of the TOE.

1.6.3.2 Guidance Documentation

Relevant guidance documents for the secure operation of BIG-IP that are part of the TOE are:
• BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP LTM+AFM and BIG-IP LTM+APM
Release 12.1.3.4
• K80595439: Common Criteria Certification for BIG-IP 12.1.3.4
• BIG-IP Digital Certificates: Administration
• BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Implementations
• BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Monitors Reference
• BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Profiles Reference
• BIG-IP System: Essentials
• BIG-IP System: SSL Administration
• BIG-IP System: User Account Administration
• BIG-IP Systems: Getting Started Guide
• BIG-IP TMOS: Implementations
• BIG-IP TMOS: Routing Administration
• External Monitoring of BIG-IP Systems: Implementations
• iControl SDK
• iControl REST SDK
• K12042624: Restricting access to the configuration utility using client certificates (12.x – 13.x)
• K13092: Overview of securing access the the BIG-IP system
• K13302: Configuring the BIG-IP system to use an SSL chain certificate (11.x – 13.x)
• K13454: Configuring SSH host-based authentication on BIP-IP systems (11.x – 12.x)
• K14620: Managing SSL Certificates for BIG-IP systems using the Configuration utility
• K14783: Overview of the Client SSL profile (11.x – 13.x)
• K14806: Overview of the Server SSL profile (11.x – 13.x)
• K15497: Configuring a secure password policy for the BIG-IP system (11.x – 12.x)
• K15664: Overview of BIG-IP device certificates (11.x – 13.x)
• K42531434: Replacing the Configuration utility’s self-signed SSL certificate with a CA-signed SSL
certificate
• K5532: Configuring the level of information logged for TMM-specific events
• K7752: Licensing the BIG-IP system
• K80425458: Modifying the list of ciphers and MAC algorithms used by the SSH service on the BIG-
IP system or BIG-IQ system
• Platform Guide: 10000 Series
• Platform Guide: i5000/i7000/i10000 Series
• Platform Guide: VIPRION® 2200

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• Platform Guide: VIPRION® 4400 Series

• Traffic Management Shell (tmsh) Reference

1.6.4 Logical Boundaries

The following security functions provided by the TOE are described in more detail in the subsections
below:

• Security Audit

• Cryptographic Support

• Identification and Authentication

• Security Management

• Protection of the TSF

• TOE Access

• Trusted Path/Channels
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE:

• Appliance mode is licensed. This results in root access to the TOE operating system and bash
shell being disabled.

• Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.

• Disabled interfaces:

o All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other user-
serviceable shells are excluded.

o Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.

o Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled.

o Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management1 capabilities of the
system is disabled.

o Serial port console (disabled by policy after the initial power on and communications setup of
the hardware)

o SSH client

1
Lights Out / Always On Management is an add-on module providing a management system for non-security
related features not required for operation of the TOE.

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1.6.4.1 Security Audit

BIG-IP implements auditing functionality based on standard syslog functionality. This includes the
support of remote audit servers for capturing of audit records. Audit records are generated for all security-
relevant events, such as the use of configuration interfaces by administrators, the authentication of traffic,
and the application of network traffic rules.

While the TOE can store audit records locally for cases when an external log server becomes unavailable,
in the evaluated configuration an external log server is used as the primary means of archiving audit
records.

In the evaluated configuration, BIG-IP logs a warning to notify the administrator when the local audit
storage exceeds a configurable maximum size. Once the configurable maximum size is reached, BIG-IP
overwrites the oldest audit records.

1.6.4.2 Cryptographic Support

All cryptographic operations, including algorithms and key generation used by the TOE are provided by
the F5 cryptographic module (OpenSSL) within the TMOS.
Various security functions in BIG-IP rely on cryptographic mechanisms for their effective
implementation. Trusted paths for the TOE administrator are provided by SSH for the tmsh administrative
interface and by TLS for the Configuration utility, iControl API and iControl REST API. For
administrative sessions, the TOE always acts as a server. For traffic sessions, the TOE may act as a TLS
client or server. Trusted channels between the TOE and external entities, such as a syslog server, are
provided by TLS connections.
For TLS sessions, the TOE implements certificate validation using the OpenSSL crypto library.
The TOE utilizes cryptographic algorithms that have been validated using the FIPS-approved and NIST-
recommended algorithms.

Cryptographic CAVP Certificate Numbers

Algorithm
AES #4565, #4566, #4567, #4568, #4569, #4570, #4571, #4572, #4573, #4574,
#4575, #4576
SHA #3742, #3743, #3744, #3745, #3746, #3747, #3748, #3749, #3750,
#3751,#3752, #3753
DRBG #1512, #1513, #1514, #1515, #1516, #1517, #1518, #1519, #1520,
#1521,#1522, #1523
HMAC #3016, #3017, #3018, #3019, #3020, #3021, #3022, #3023, #3024,
#3025,#3026, #3027
RSA #2490, #2491, #2492, #2493, #2494, #2495
ECC / ECDSA #1115, #1116, #1117, #1118, #1119, #1120
KAS ECC CVL #1247, #1248, #1249, #1250, #1251, #1252
Table 2: Cryptographic Algorithm Certificate Numbers

The underlying hardware platforms of the TOE include a third party proprietary cryptographic
acceleration card that is used to provide sufficient entropy to support random number generation (RNG).

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In the evaluated configuration, the cryptographic acceleration cards are not used for acceleration or key
storage. These capabilities that are present on the accelerator cards are disabled in the evaluated
configuration.

1.6.4.2.1 Key Generation

The TOE can generate asymmetric keys using RSA schemes and ECC schemes. The underlying hardware
platforms of the TOE include a third party proprietary cryptographic acceleration card that is used to
provide sufficient entropy to support RNG. The TOE provides a total of four entropy sources. The TOE
can generate keys (and certificates) for a number of uses, including:

• Keypairs for the SSH server functionality

• TLS server and client certificates for the administrative sessions

• Session keys for SSH and TLS sessions

1.6.4.3 Identification and Authentication

1.6.4.3.1 Administrators
The TOE identifies individual administrative users by user name and authenticates them by passwords
stored in a local configuration database; the TOE can enforce a password policy based on overall
minimum length and number of characters of different types required. BIG-IP obscures passwords entered
by users.

Authentication of administrators is enforced at all configuration interfaces, i.e. at the shell (tmsh, via
SSH), the Configuration utility (web-based GUI), iControl API, and iControl REST API.

1.6.4.4 Security Management

The TOE allows administrators to configure all relevant aspects of security functionality implemented by
the TSF. For this purpose, BIG-IP offers multiple interfaces to administrators:

• Configuration utility
The Configuration utility presents a web-based GUI available to administrators via HTTPS that
allows administration of most aspects of the TSF.

• traffic management shell (tmsh)

tmsh is a shell providing a command line interface that is available via SSH. It allows
administration of all aspects of the TSF.

• iControl API
The iControl API is a SOAP based protocol interface that allows programmatic access to the TSF
configuration via HTTPS.

• iControl REST API

The iControl REST API is effectively a front-end to tmsh and is built on the Representational
State Transfer (REST), which allows programmatic access to the TSF via HTTPS.

The TOE provides the ability to administer the TOE both locally and remotely using any of the four

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administrative interfaces. Local administration is performed via a device directly connected to the
management port on the BIG-IP via an Ethernet cable. By default and in the evaluated configuration,
remote access to the management interfaces is only made available on the dedicated management network
port of a BIG-IP system.

BIG-IP implements a hierarchy of roles that are pre-defined to grant administrators varying degrees of
control over the basic configuration of the TOE, and additional roles are introduced for module-specific
tasks. These roles can be assigned to users by authorized administrators.

In addition to roles, the TOE allows the definition of partitions. Configuration objects, such as server
pools or service profiles, can be assigned to individual partitions, as can administrative users. This allows
administrative access of individual administrators to be restricted to configuration objects that belong to
the partition that has been assigned to the user.

1.6.4.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE is designed to protect critical security data, including keys and passwords. In addition, the TOE
includes self-tests that monitor continue operation of the TOE to ensure that it is operating correctly. The
TOE also provides a mechanism to provide trusted updates to the TOE firmware or software and reliable
timestamps in order to support TOE functions, including accurate audit recording.

1.6.4.6 TOE access

The TOE implements session inactivity time-outs for Configuration utility and tmsh sessions and displays
a warning banner before establishing an interactive session between a human user and the TOE.

1.6.4.7 Trusted Path/Channels

This chapter summarizes the security functionality provided by the TOE in order to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of network connections described below.

1.6.4.7.1 Generic network traffic

BIG-IP Version 12.1.3.4 LTM+APM's LTM allows the termination of data plane TLS connections on
behalf of internal servers or server pools. External clients can thus connect via TLS to the TOE, which
acts as a TLS server and decrypts the traffic and then forwards it to internal servers for processing of the
content. It is also possible to (re-) encrypt traffic from the TOE to servers in the organization with TLS,
with the TOE acting as a TLS client.

1.6.4.7.2 Administrative traffic

The TOE secures administrative traffic (i.e., administrators connecting to the TOE in order to configure
and maintain it) as follows:

• Remote access to the traffic management shell (tmsh) is secured via SSH.

• Remote access to the web-based Configuration utility, iControl REST API, and iControl API is
secured via TLS.

1.6.4.7.3 OpenSSH

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The TOE SSH implementation is based on OpenSSH Version OpenSSH_5.3p1; however, the TOE
OpenSSH configuration sets the implementation via the sshd_config as follows:

• Supports two types of authentication, RSA public-key and password-based

• Packets greater than (256*1024) bytes are dropped

• The transport encryption algorithms are limited to AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256

• The transport mechanism is limited to SSH_RSA public key authentication

• The transport data integrity algorithm is limited to HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2-256

• The SSH protocol key exchange mechanism is limited to ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-
nistp384

1.6.4.7.4 Remote logging

The TOE offers the establishment of TLS sessions with external log hosts in the operational environment
for protection of audit records in transfer.

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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claims
This ST was developed to Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation –April
2017 Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001

The ST claims to be:

CC Version 3.1 Part 2 extended

CC Version 3.1 Part 3 conformant

2.2 PP and Package Claims

The ST is claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles:

• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 1.0, 27 February 2015
conformant

The ST is compliant with the following NDcPP technical decision:

NIAP TD Applicability
0291 – NIT Technical Decision for DH14 and FCS_CKM.1 Not Applicable. The TOE does not
include DH group 14.
0290 – NIT Technical Decision for physical interruption of Applicable
trusted/path channel
0289 – NIT Technical Decision for FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.1 Test 5e Applicable
0281 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing both thresholds for SSH Applicable
rekey
0262 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS server testing – Empty Not Applicable. The TOE does not
Certificate Authorities list include FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.
0257 – NIT Technical Decision for Updating Applicable
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.x.2/FCS_TLSC_EXT.x.2 Tests 1-4
0256 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling of TLS connections Applicable
with and without mututal authentication
0255 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server Tests – Issue 3: Applicable
Verification of application of encryption
0235 – NIT Technical Decision adding DH group 14 to the Not Applicable. The TOE does not
selection in FCS_CKM.2 include DH group 14.
0228 – NIT Technical Decision for CA certificates - Applicable
basicConstraints validation
0227 – NIT Technical Decision for TOE acting as a TLS Client and Applicable
RSA key generation

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NIAP TD Applicability
0226 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Encryption Algorithms Applicable
0225 – NIT Technical Decision for Make CBC cipher suites Not Applicable. The TOE does not
optional in IPsec include IPSEC.
0224 – NIT Technical Decision Making DH Group 14 optional in Not Applicable. The TOE does not
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 include IPSEC.
0223 – NIT Technical Decision for "Expected" vs "unexpected" Not Applicable. The TOE does not
DNs for IPsec Communications include IPSEC.
0201 – NIT Technical Decision for Use of intermediate CA Applicable
certificates and certificate hierarchy depth
0200 – NIT Technical Decision for Password authentication for Not Applicable. The TOE does not
SSH clients include FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.
0199 – NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic Curves for Signatures Applicable
0195 – NIT Technical Decision Making DH Group 14 optional in Not Applicable. The TOE does not
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 include IPSEC.
0191 – NIT Technical Decision for Using secp521r1 for TLS Not Applicable. The TOE does not
communication include secp521r1.
0189 – NIT Technical Decision for SSH Server Encryption Applicable
Algorithms
0188 – NIT Technical Decision for Optional use of X.509 Applicable
certificates for digital signatures
0187 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarifying FIA_X509_EXT.1 Applicable
test 1
0186 – NIT Technical Decision for Applicability of X.509 Not Applicable. The TOE does not
certificate testing to IPsec include IPSEC.
0185 – NIT Technical Decision for Channel for Secure Update. Applicable
0184 – NIT Technical Decision for Mandatory use of X.509 Applicable
certificates
0183 – NIT Technical Decision for Use of the Supporting Applicable
Document
0182 – NIT Technical Decision for Handling of X.509 certificates Applicable
related to ssh-rsa and remote comms.
0181 – NIT Technical Decision for Self-testing of integrity of Applicable
firmware and software.
0170 – NIT Technical Decision for SNMPv3 Support Not Applicable. The TOE does not
include SNMPv3 support.
0169 – NIT Technical Decision for Compliance to RFC5759 and Applicable
RFC5280 for using CRLs

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NIAP TD Applicability
0168 – NIT Technical Decision for Mandatory requirement for Applicable
CSR generation
0167 – NIT Technical Decision for Testing SSH 2^28 packets Applicable
0165 – NIT Technical Decision for Sending the Applicable
ServerKeyExchange message when using RSA
0164 – NIT Technical Decision for Negative testing for additional Applicable
ciphers for SSH
0160 – NIT Technical Decision for Transport mode and tunnel Not Applicable. The TOE does not
mode in IPSEC communications include IPSEC.
0156 – NIT Technical Decision for SSL/TLS Version Testing in the Applicable
NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0
0155 – NIT Technical Decision for TLSS tests using ECDHE in the Applicable
NDcPP v1.0.
0154 – NIT Technical Decision for Versions of TOE Software in Applicable
the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0
0153 – NIT Technical Decision for Auditing of NTP Time Changes Applicable
in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0
0152 – NIT Technical Decision for Reference identifiers for TLS in Applicable
the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0
0151 – NIT Technical Decision for FCS_TLSS_EXT Testing - Applicable
Issue 1 in NDcPP v1.0.
0150 – NIT Technical Decision for Removal of SSH re-key audit Applicable
events in the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0
0143 – NIT Technical Decision for Failure testing for TLS session Applicable
establishment in NDcPP and FWcPP
0130 – NIT Technical Decision for Requirements for Destruction of Applicable
Cryptographic Keys
0126 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Mutual Authentication Applicable
0125 – NIT Technical Decision for Checking validity of peer Applicable
certificates for HTTPS servers
0117 – NIT Technical Decision for FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 Applicable
Requirement in NDcPP
0116 – NIT Technical Decision for a Typo in reference to Applicable
RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5 in NDcPP and FWcPP
0115 – NIT Technical Decision for Transport mode and tunnel Not Applicable. The TOE does not
mode in IPsec communication in NDcPP and FWcPP include IPSEC.
0114 – NIT Technical Decision for Re-Use of FIPS test results in Applicable
NDcPP and FWcPP

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NIAP TD Applicability
0113 – NIT Technical Decision for testing and trusted updates in Not Applicable. BIG-IP uses
the NDcPP v1.0 and FW cPP v1.0 digital signatures for update
verification.
0112 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS testing in the NDcPP v1.0 Applicable
and FW cPP v1.0.
0111 – NIT Technical Decision for third party libraries and Applicable
FCS_CKM.1 in NDcPP and FWcPP
0096 – NIT Technical Interpretation regarding Virtualization Applicable
0095 – NIT Technical Interpretations regarding audit, random bit Applicable
generation, and entropy in NDcPP
0094 – NIT Technical Decision for validating a published hash in Applicable
NDcPP
0093 – NIT Technical Decision for FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 Applicable
Requirement in NDcPP
0090 – NIT Technical Decision for FMT_SMF.1.1 Requirement in Applicable
NDcPP

The ST was also evaluated against the individual evaluation activities

• Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 1.0, 27 February 2015

2.3 Conformance Rationale

The ST is exactly conformant to the NDcPP.

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3 Security Problem Definition

A network device has a network infrastructure role it is designed to provide. In doing so, the network
device communicates with other network devices and other network entities (an entity not defined as a
network device) over the network. At the same time, it must provide a minimal set of common security
functionality expected by all network devices. The security problem to be addressed by a compliant
network device is defined as this set of common security functionality that addresses the threats that are
common to network devices, as opposed to those that might be targeting the specific functionality of a
specific type of network device. The set of common security functionality addresses communication with
the network device, both authorized and unauthorized, the ability to perform valid or secure updates, the
ability to audit device activity, the ability to securely store and utilize device and administrator credentials
and data, and the ability to self-test critical device components for failures.
The TOE is intended to be used either in environments in which, at most, sensitive but unclassified
information is processed, or the sensitivity level of information in both the internal and external networks
is equivalent.
This security target includes a restatement of the Security Problem Definition (threats, organizational
security policies, and assumptions) from NDcPP. The threats, organizational security policies and
assumptions are repeated here for the convenience of the reader. Refer to the NDcPP for additional detail.

3.1 Threat Environment

This section describes the threat model for the TOE and identifies the individual threats that are
assumed to exist in the operational environment of the TOE. Figure 1 supports the understanding
of the attack scenarios discussed here.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are:
• Organizational data hosted on remote systems in physical and virtual network segments
connected directly or indirectly to the TOE (depicted as "server pools" in Figure 1). (The
TOE can be used to protect the assets on those systems from unauthorized exploitation by
mediating network traffic from remote users before it reaches the systems or networks
hosting those assets.)
• The TSF and TSF data
The threat agents having an interest in manipulating the TOE and TSF behavior to gain access
to these assets can be categorized as:

• Unauthorized third parties (“attackers”, such as malicious remote users, parties, or

external IT entities) which are unknown to the TOE and its runtime environment.
Attackers are traditionally located outside the organizational environment that the TOE is
employed to protect, but may include organizational insiders, too.

• Authorized users of the TOE (i.e., administrators) who try to manipulate configuration
data that they are not authorized to access. TOE administrators, as well as administrators
of the operational environment, are assumed to be trustworthy, trained and to follow the
instructions provided to them with respect to the secure configuration and operation of
the systems under their responsibility. Hence, only inadvertent attempts to manipulate the
safe operation of the TOE are expected from this community.

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The motivation of threat agents is assumed to be commensurate with the assurance level pursued
by this evaluation, i.e., the TOE intends to resist penetration by attackers with an Enhanced-
Basic attack potential.

3.2 Threats
The threats identified in this section may be addressed by the TOE, TOE environment, or a combination
of both. The threat agents are authorized persons/processes, unauthorized persons/processes, or external
IT entities not authorized to use the TOE itself. The threats identified assume that the threat agent is a
person with a low attack potential who possesses an average expertise, few resources, and low to
moderate motivation.

T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access to the network device by nefarious means
such as masquerading as an administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an
administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or
performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session,
or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it
resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY

Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow
attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.

T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling
protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed
protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay
attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the
endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences
are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the administrator or
another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a
loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be
compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which
undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated

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using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious
alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the
network device without administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an
avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the
administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the
network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include replacing existing
credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the
administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged
access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered
access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships
with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
A component of the network device may fail during start-up or during operations causing a
compromise or failure in the security functionality of the network device, leaving the device
susceptible to attackers.

3.3 Organisational Security Policies

The TOE environment must include and comply with the following organizational security policies.

P.ACCESS_BANNER

The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any
other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

3.4 Assumptions
The assumptions are ordered into three categories: personnel assumptions, physical environment
assumptions, and operational assumptions.

A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to
protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements
on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the
product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract
data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY

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The device is assumed to provide networking and filtering functionality as its core function and
not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For
example the device should not provide computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of
traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is
destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is
traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP.
It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices
(e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the
best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when
administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a
malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the
platform on which they reside.

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4 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE’s operating environment (i.e., security
objectives addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means).

4.1 Security Objectives For The Environment

The security objectives for the environment are listed below.

OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided
by the environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications)
available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and
support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection
of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted
manner.
OE.UPDATES
The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to
the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any
other platform on which they reside.

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5 Extended Components Definition

All of the extended components used in this ST are taken from the NDcPP.

TheNDcPP defines the following extended security functional requirements (SFRs). Refer to the NDcPP
for the definition of these extended SFRs since they are not redefined in this ST.

Security Audit (FAU)

FAU_STG_EXT.1

FAU_STG_EXT.3

Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1

FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1

Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA_PMG_EXT.1

FIA_UIA_EXT.1

FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_X509_EXT.1

FIA_X509_EXT.2

FIA_X509_EXT.3

Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1

FPT_APW_EXT.1

FPT_TST_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1

TOE Access (FTA)

FTA_SSL_EXT.1

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6 Security Requirements
The security requirements that are levied on the TOE are specified in this section of the ST. Each of them
are drawn from the NDcPP.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Required Optional Selection-
Based
(from CC Part 2)
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation √
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association √
FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage √
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation √
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment √
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction √
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data √
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (Signature √
Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (Hash √
Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash √
Algorithm)
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback √
FMT_MOF.1(1)/ Management of Security Functions √
AdminAct Behaviour/AdminAct
FMT_MOF.1(2)/ Management of Security Functions √
AdminAct Behaviour/AdminAct
FMT_MOF.1(1)/ Management of Security Functions √
TrustedUpdate Behaviour/TrustedUpdate
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data √
FMT_MTD.1/AdminAct Management of TSF Data/AdminAct √
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions √
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles √
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps √
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination √
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination √
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners √
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel √
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path √

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Extended Security Functional Requirements Require Option Selection

d al -Based

FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage √

FAU_STG_EXT.3 Display Warning for Local Storage Space √
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol √
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation √
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol √
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[1]- TLS Client Protocol with authentication √
[2]
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1]- TLS Server Protocol √
[4]
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management √
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication √
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism √
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation √
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication √
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests √
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all √
symmetric keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords √
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing √
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update √
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking √
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements

6.1 Conventions
The CC defines four operations on security functional requirements. The conventions below
define the conventions used in this ST to identify the operations completed in the PP and the
operations completed in this ST by the ST author. Some of the operations completed in this ST
by the ST author are the completion of selections of assignments relevant to on the PP. All
operations completed in the ST are surrounded by square brackets ([operation]).

Assignment made in PP: indicated with italics text

Selection made in PP: indicated with underlined text

Refinement made in PP: additions indicated with bold text

deletions indicated with strikethrough text

Iteration made in PP: indicated with typical CC requirement naming followed by

iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3) and/or by adding
a string starting with “/”

[Assignment made in ST]: indicated with [italics text within brackets]

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[Selection made in ST]: indicated with [underlined text within brackets]

[Refinement made in ST]: additions indicated with [bold text within brackets]

deletions indicated with [strikethrough bold text within

brackets]

Iteration made in ST: indicated with typical CC requirement naming followed by an

iteration number in brackets, e.g., [1], [2], [3].

6.2 Security Functional Requirements

6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if
individual user accounts are required for administrators).
• Security related configuration changes (in addition to the information
that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in
addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be
logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• Starting and stopping services (if applicable)
• [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in [Table 4].

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column three
of [Table 4].
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.

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Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record

Contents
FAU_STG.1 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.3 Warning about low storage None.
space for audit events.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1(1) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(2) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(3) None. None.
FCS_COP.1(4) None. None.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a HTTPS Reason for failure.
Session
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH Reason for failure.
Session

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[1]-[2] Failure to establish a TLS Reason for failure.

Session
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1]-[4] Failure to establish a TLS Reason for failure.
Session
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and Provided user identity, origin of
authentication mechanism. the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
authentication mechanism. address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Unsuccessful attempt to validate Reason for failure
a certificate
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None None
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Modification of the behavior of None.
the TSF.
FMT_MOF.1(2)/AdminAct Starting and stopping of None.
services.
FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual None.
update
FMT_MTD.1 All management activities of None.
TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/AdminAct Modification, deletion, None.
generation/import of
cryptographic keys
FMT_SMF.1 None. None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.

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Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record

Contents
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the No additional information.
update attempt (success or
failure)
FPT_STM.1 Changes to time. The old and new values for the
time. Origin of the attempt to
change time for success and
failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Any attempts at unlocking of an None.
interactive session.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote None.
session by the session locking
mechanism.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive None.
session.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel. Identification of the initiator and
Termination of the trusted target of failed trusted channels
channel. Failure of the trusted establishment attempt.
channel functions
FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of the trusted path. Identification of the claimed user
Termination of the trusted path. identity.
Failure of the trusted path
functions.
Table 4: Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events

6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

6.2.1.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised
deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.

6.2.1.4 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself.

FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule:
[log files are numbered and the oldest log file is deleted]] when the local storage

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space for audit data is full.

6.2.1.5 FAU_STG_EXT.3 Display Warning for Local Storage Space

FAU_STG_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a warning to inform the user before the local space to
store audit data is used up and/or the TOE will lose audit data due to insufficient
local space.

6.2.2 Cryptographic Operations (FCS)

6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that
meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic keys key establishment in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key distribution establishment method: [

• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography”;
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

6.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method

• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a

[single direct overwrite consisting of [zeroes]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by
the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single]
overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]
that meets the following: No Standard.

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6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1(1) The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, GCM] mode and cryptographic key
sizes [128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO
18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].

6.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

FCS_COP.1.1(2) The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048
bits or greater],
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits
or greater]
]
that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section
5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-
PKCS1v1_ 5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature
scheme 3,
• For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384]; ISO/IEC
14888-3, Section 6.4
].

6.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (Hash Operation)

FCS_COP.1.1(3) The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-
3:2004.

6.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS_COP.1.1(4) The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384] and cryptographic key sizes [for SHA-1 the key size is ≥ 160 bits, for SHA-256
the key size is ≥ 256 bits, for SHA-384 the key size is ≥ 384 bits used in HMAC] and
message digest sizes [160, 256, 384] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-
2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

6.2.2.8 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall establish the connection only if [[when the TOE is acting as a
client] the peer presents a valid certificate during handshake, [or when the TOE is
acting as a server] the peer initiates handshake].

6.2.2.9 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[two] software-based noise source, [two] hardware-based
noise source [for the non-virtualization platforms except 10000 series], [one]
hardware-based noise source [for 10000 series], [one] hardware-based noise source
[for the VCMP guest platforms]] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1
“Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.

6.2.2.10 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, 4254, and [5656, 6668].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the
following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based,
password-based.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than
[256*1024] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc].

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [ssh-rsa] and
[no other public key algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other
public key algorithms.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1,
hmac-sha2-256] and [no other MAC algorithms] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects
all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-nistp384] are the
only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same keys are used for a
threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted
data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

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6.2.2.11 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[1] TLS Client Protocol with authentication (TLS 1.1)

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
].

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall verify that the presented
identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the
peer certificate is valid.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves
Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1,
secp384r1] and no other curves.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall support mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates.

6.2.2.12 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[2] TLS Client Protocol with authentication (TLS 1.2)

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC

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5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
].

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall verify that the presented
identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the
peer certificate is valid.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves
Extension in the Client Hello with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1,
secp384r1] and no other curves.

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall support mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates.

6.2.2.13 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server - TLS 1.1)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ no other ciphersuite].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall deny connections from clients
requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3[1] The [data plane of the] TSF shall [perform RSA key establishment with
key size [2048 bits, 3072 bits]; generate EC Diffie-Hellman parameters over NIST
curves [secp256r1 and secp384r1] and no other curves].

6.2.2.14 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[2] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server - TLS 1.2)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [

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F5 BIG-IP APM 12.1.3.4 APM ST January 15, 2019

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ no other ciphersuite].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall deny connections from clients
requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3[2] The [data plane of the] TSF shall [perform RSA key establishment with
key size [2048 bits, 3072 bits]; generate EC Diffie-Hellman parameters over NIST
curves [secp256r1 and secp384r1] and no other curves].

6.2.2.15 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[3] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server - TLS 1.1)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1[3] The [control plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ no other ciphersuite].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2[3] The [control plane of the] TSF shall deny connections from clients
requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].

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FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3[3] The [control plane of the] TSF shall [perform RSA key establishment
with key size [2048 bits, 3072 bits]; generate EC Diffie-Hellman parameters over
NIST curves [secp256r1 and secp384r1] and no other curves].

6.2.2.16 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[4] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server - TLS 1.2)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1[4] The [control plane of the] TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)]
supporting the following ciphersuites: [

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268

○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
○ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
○ no other ciphersuite].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2[4] The [control plane of the] TSF shall deny connections from clients
requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [none].

FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3[4] The [control plane of the] TSF shall [perform RSA key establishment
with key size [2048 bits, 3072 bits]; generate EC Diffie-Hellman parameters over
NIST curves [secp256r1 and secp384r1] and no other curves].

6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

6.2.3.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:

a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower

case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [ “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”,
“%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [“`”, “~”, “-“, “+”, “=”, “[“, “]”, “{“, “}”, “;”,
“’”, “:”, “””, “, “, “.”, “/”, “<”, “>”, “”, “|”, “\”]];
b) Minimum password length shall be settable by the Security Administrator, and
shall support passwords of 15 characters or greater.

6.2.3.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:

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• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;

• [no other actions]

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.

6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [none]
to perform administrative user authentication.

6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the
authentication is in progress at the local console.

6.2.3.5 FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.

• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the
basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA
certificates.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate
Revocation list (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification
shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

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6.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS, HTTPS], and [no additional uses].

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the
certificate in these cases].

6.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986
and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and
[Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country, Locality, State /
Province, Country, E-mail Address, Subject Alternative Name].

FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving
the CA Certificate Response.

6.2.4 Security Management (FMT)

6.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1(1)/AdminAct The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the functions
TOE Security Functions to Security Administrators.

6.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1(2)/ AdminAct Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1(2)/AdminAct The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable, disable the functions services
to Security Administrators.

6.2.4.3 FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate Management of security functions behavior

FMT_MOF.1.1(1)/TrustedUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to
perform manual update to Security Administrators.

6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

6.2.4.5 FMT_MTD.1/AdminAct Management of TSF Data

FMT_MTD.1.1/AdminAct The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, delete, generate/import the
cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.

6.2.4.6 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

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• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;

• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or
locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates;
•[
o Ability to configure audit behavior;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.]

6.2.4.7 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles

FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.

6.2.5 Protection of TSF (FPT)

6.2.5.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.

6.2.5.2 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.

6.2.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) TSF Testing (Extended)/power-on

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 (1) The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on
power on), at the conditions reboot] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF:
[BIOS Power On at power on only, OpenSSL integrity at power on and reboot,
software integrity at power on and reboot, , cryptographic algorithm at power on and
reboot].

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6.2.5.4 FPT_TST_EXT.1(2) TSF Testing (Extended)/on demand

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 (2) The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [at the request of the
authorised user] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [software integrity].

6.2.5.5 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently
executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [the most recently installed
version of the TOE firmware/software].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.

6.2.5.6 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

6.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)

6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a
Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

6.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

6.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the
Administrator’s own interactive session.

6.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

FTA_TAB.1.1 Refinement: Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall
display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning
message regarding use of the TOE.

6.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

6.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refined)

FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication
channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following

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capabilities: audit server, [no other capabilities] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the
channel data.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transmission of
syslog records to syslog audit servers,].

6.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path (Refinement)

FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, TLS, HTTPS] to provide a communication
path between itself and authorized remote administrators users that is logically
distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides
detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator
authentication and all remote administration actions.

6.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements (SARs) provide grounds for confidence that the TOE meets its
security objectives (for example, configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment). The
table below identifies the security assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements that are required by the NDcPP.

Assurance
Assurance Class Assurance Component Name
Component ID

ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

AGD: Guidance AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

documents AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE

ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims

ASE: Security Target ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition

evaluation ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment

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Assurance
Assurance Class Assurance Component Name
Component ID

ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition

ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – sample

AVA: Vulnerability AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

assessment

Table 5: Security Assurance Requirements

In addition, the TOE will provide the evidence necessary for the evaluators to perform the evaluation
activities defined in the Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP document.

6.4 Security Requirements Rationale

This Security Target makes no modifications or additions to the NDcPP security problem definition,
security objectives, or security assurance requirements. The security functionality requirements claimed
in this ST include all of the required SFRs from the NDcPP, selected optional SFRs from the NDcPP, and
the mandatory selection-based SFRs from the NDcPP. There are no additional SFRs or SARS included in
this ST. Operations performed on the SFRs comply the corresponding Application Notes in the NDcPP.

6.4.1 Security Functional Requirement Dependencies

All of the security functional requirements claimed in this Security Target are taken directly from the
NDcPP version 1.0, and all operations on the SFRs have been completed correctly. Therefore, the
dependency rationale used by the NDcPP version 1.0 is considered applicable and acceptable since the
NDcPP has been validated and approved.

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7 TOE Summary Specification

This section presents a description of how the TOE SFRs are satisfied.

7.1 Security Audit

BIG-IP uses syslog functionality to generate audit records, including the start-up and shut-down of the
audit functions themselves.
BIG-IP systems generate different log types that capture different types of audit records. This audit
records includes:

• audit events
events related to the security and administrative functionality implemented by the TOE; this type
of audit log captures most of the events specified in this ST

• system events
events related to the TOE operating system as well as status of TOE components, such as the
syslog-ng daemon

• packet filter events

events related to packet filtering applied by the TOE

• local traffic events

events related to network traffic handled by the system, including some events related to packet
filtering
The TOE provides the ability to configure syslog levels per daemon that generates the respective audit
records. The Configuration utility GUI and tmsh provide interfaces to set those log levels.
Depending upon the exact audit record, the outcome is included in the description and / or the status code.
Table 6 shows the information included in the different types of audit logs.

Log content Log type

System

Traffic

(other)
Packet

(mcp)
Audit

Audit
Local
Filter

Description The description of the event that caused the X X X X X

system to log the message.

Event A description of the configuration change that X

caused the system to log the message.

Host name The host name of the system that logged the X X X X
event message.

Service The service that generated the event. X X X X

Session ID The ID associated with the user session.

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Log content Log type

System

Traffic

(other)
Packet

(mcp)
Audit

Audit
Local
Filter
Status code The status code associated with the event. X X

Timestamp The time and date that the system logged the X X X X X
event message.

Transaction The identification number of the configuration X

ID change initiated by another recorded event.
This number can be used to trace back to the
initiating audit entry and the associated user
name.

User Name The name of the user who made the X X

configuration change

Table 6: Audit Logs and Their Content

The TOE includes within each audit record the information required by FAU_GEN.1.2 and specified in
Table 4. For changes to time (FPT_STM.1), the TOE records the origin of the change attempt as ntpd
when the time is changed by NTP itself and the username when the change is attempted by an
administrator.
This functionality implements FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2.
BIG-IP supports (and the evaluated configuration mandates) logging to external syslog hosts. Audit
records in transit to the remote host are protected by TLS channels.
The syslog mechanism provided by the underlying Linux system (which is the operating system of the
TOE) is used for the creation and forwarding of audit records. In the evaluated configuration, all audit
records are sent to both local and remote storage automatically. The audit records are sent to the remote
storage immediately. In addition, BIG-IP implements a high-speed logging mechanism for data traffic
(logging packet filter events and local traffic events) in TMM that is compatible with syslog. The TOE
supports TLS channels to audit servers for the protection of audit records sent from the TOE to an
external audit server.
For the case that the remote syslog host becomes unavailable, audit records are stored locally in syslog
files managed, and protected against unauthorized access, by using file permission bits in the underlying
Linux host. The TOE will attempt to periodically reestablish the connection with the remote syslog host
indefinitely. The TOE retries within seconds of each connection failure. The TOE implements a buffer to
store audit records collected during the period of time when the remote syslog host is unavailable. If the
connection is reestablished before the buffers overflow, no audit records are lost. If the connection is
reestablished after the buffers overflow, audit records are lost. Locally stored audit records are also
available for review through the administrative interfaces of the TOE. Only users in the Administrator
role can modify those records. The TOE does not support deletion of audit records by authorized users.
BIG-IP logs a warning if the local space for syslog files on the box exceeds a configurable maximum size.
The TOE implements a local syslog file rotation scheme that numbers the locally archived syslog files.
The TOE will delete the oldest syslog file once the maximum size for local syslog file space is exceeded.
A cron job runs every two minutes to check the audit trail storage partition in order to accomplish this.

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The evaluated configuration requires allocation of 7 GB of audit storage, and a warning to be logged
when 90 % of the storage space are exhausted. The administrator receives the warnings when reviewing
the log files as instructed the CC guidance document.
This functionality implements FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG_EXT.1, and FAU_STG_EXT.3.

7.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE utilitizes cryptographic algorithms that have been validated using the FIPS-approved and NIST-
recommended algorithms. Refer to Table 7: SFR Mapping to CAVS Certificate Numbers for additional
detail.

Higher-level protocol stacks can use the F5 cryptographic module (OpenSSL) in order to implement
trusted traffic communications:
• Management GUI (browser client to TOE)
• SSH session for tmsh (SSH client to SSH server on TOE)
• Remote logging via syslog (TOE to syslog server)
The TLS stack in TMM uses the host-provided library to implement the remaining, traffic-related TLS
functionality use cases described above (also referred to as "traffic TLS").
Replay detection (and rejection) is inherent to the protocols used by BIG-IP to establish communications
of a trusted nature, i.e. TLS/HTTPS and SSH.

SFR Cryptographic Algorithm CAVS Certificate Numbers

FCS_COP.1(1) AES #4565, #4566, #4567, #4568, #4569, #4570,
(128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits) #4571, #4572, #4573, #4574, #4575, #4576
FCS_COP.1(3) SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 #3742, #3743, #3744, #3745, #3746, #3747,
#3748, #3749, #3750, #3751,#3752, #3753
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 DRBG (256 bits) #1512, #1513, #1514, #1515, #1516, #1517,
#1518, #1519, #1520, #1521,#1522, #1523
FCS_COP.1(4) HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, #3016, #3017, #3018, #3019, #3020, #3021,
HMAC-SHA-384 #3022, #3023, #3024, #3025,#3026, #3027
FCS_CKM.1 RSA (2048 bits, 3072 bits) #2490, #2491, #2492, #2493, #2494, #2495
FCS_CKM.2
ECC / ECDSA (curves P-256, P-384) #1115, #1116, #1117, #1118, #1119, #1120
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_CKM.2 KAS ECC CVL (curves P-256, P-384) #1247, #1248, #1249, #1250, #1251, #1252

Table 7: SFR Mapping to CAVS Certificate Numbers

7.2.1 Key Generation and Establishment

The session keys are generated upon the request of an administrator by a Key Generator process that
invokes the OpenSSL library on the Linux host.

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The TOE generates asymmetric cryptographic keys that are compliant with FIPS PUB 186-4 and meet the
following:
Key Key Establishment Key sizes / Usage
Generation Scheme NIST curves
Scheme
RSA RSA Key sizes: TLS certificate
2048, 3072
NIST SP 800-56B TLS ephemeral session keys
SSH key pair
The TLS static keys are created once, imported
to the TOE, and stored on disk until the
Administrator creates a new key. The SSH key
pair is crated on first boot.
The TOE can act as a receiver or both sender
and receiver depending upon the deployment.
When acting as a receiver, decryption errors
are handled in a side channel resistant method
and reported as MAC errors.

ECC ECC NIST curves: For ECDHE and ECDSA in TLS.

P-256, P-384 The TOE can act as a receiver or both sender
NIST SP 800-56A
and receiver depending upon the deployment.

Table 8: Key generation in the TOE

The TOE also generates TLS session keys and SSH session keys.

The TOE offers administrative interfaces for creating a private key and certificate signing request (CSR).
See Section 7.3.2 for more information on CSRs.
This implements FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2.

7.2.2 Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters

“Cryptographic Critical Security Parameters” are defined in FIPS 140-2 as “security-related information
(e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, and authentication data such as passwords and PINs) whose
disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module.” Only the TLS and
SSH session keys are stored in plaintext form. The rest of the keys are stored in encrypted format.
Note: The acceleration cards are used to provide sufficient entropy only. In the evaluated configuration,
the cryptographic acceleration cards are not used for acceleration or key storage so zeroization on the
acceleration cards is not described.
The following table discusses how the F5 cryptographic module (i.e. OpenSSL used by both data plane
and control plane) zeroize critical security parameters that are not needed for operation of the TSF
anymore. OPEN_SSL_cleanse() is used to zeroize data, and this routine has been updated to overwrite
with zeros, not with pseudo-random data. This also includes key material used by the TSF that is stored
outside of the F5 cryptographic module. Keys in volatile and non-volatile storage are destroyed by
performing a single overwrite consisting of zeroes.

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Application Key type Storage Zeroized Description

Location when?

Key seeds, prime Stack/heap After each key These are zeroized in OpenSSL by
generation numbers has been calling OPENSSL_cleanse(), which
generated. overwrites the memory upon
release

TLS Session Stack/heap After session The TLS session keys are created
keys has ended within OpenSSL during session
initiation.

These are zeroized in OpenSSL by

calling OPENSSL_cleanse(), which
overwrites the memory upon
release

TLS private keys On the Upon deletion Private keys are zeroized when they
in TLS disk by are deleted by the administrator.
certificates administrator. Zeroization is done by overwriting
the file once with zeroes and
deleting the file.

SSH Session Stack/heap After session The SSH session keys are created
keys has ended within OpenSSL during session
initiation.

These are zeroized in OpenSSL by

calling OPENSSL_cleanse(), which
overwrites the memory upon
release

SSH SSH keys On the Upon deletion SSH keys are zeroized when using
disk by the key-swap utility. Zeroization is
administrator. done by overwriting the file once
with zeroes and deleting the file.

Table 9: Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters

This implements FCS_CKM.4.

7.2.3 Cryptographic operations in the TOE

The following table summarizes the implementation of cryptographic operations in the TOE:

Algorithm Key length (bits) Purpose Reference SFR

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Algorithm Key length (bits) Purpose Reference SFR

AES (CBC, 128 payload AES as specified by FCS_COP.1(1)

GCM modes) 192 encryption ISO 18033-3
256
CBC as specified in
ISO 10116
GCM as specified in
ISO 19772

RSA Modulus of 2048 or certificate-based FIPS PUB 186-4 FCS_COP.1(2)

greater authentication, Section 5.5 using
key exchange RSASSA-
PKCS1v1_5,
ISO/IEC 9796-2

ECDSA 256 bits or greater certificate-based FIPS PUB 186-4 FCS_COP.1(2)

authentication, Section 6 and
NIST curves: P-256, key exchange Appendix D
P-384, and no other
ISO/IEC 14888-3
Section 6.4

SHA-1 none certificate-based ISO/IEC 10118- FCS_COP.1(3)

SHA-256 authentication / 3:2004
SHA-384 digital signature
verification

HMAC-SHA-1 Key sizes: ≥ 160 bits message ISO/IEC 9797- FCS_COP.1(4)

integrity 2:2011, Section 7
Hash Function:
SHA-1

Message digest
sizes: 160 bits
Block size: 512 bits

Output MAC length:

160 bits

HMAC-SHA- Key sizes: ≥ 256 bits message ISO/IEC 9797- FCS_COP.1(4)

256 integrity 2:2011, Section 7
Hash Function:
SHA-256

Message digest
sizes: 256 bits

Block size: 512 bits

Output MAC length:

256 bits

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Algorithm Key length (bits) Purpose Reference SFR

HMAC-SHA- Key sizes: ≥ 384 bits message ISO/IEC 9797- FCS_COP.1(4)

384 integrity 2:2011, Section 7
Hash Function:
SHA-384

Message digest
sizes: 384 bits

Block size: 1024 bits

Output MAC length:

384 bits

Random Bit none key generation ISO/IEC FCS_RBG_EXT.1

Generation 18031:2011 using
CTR DRBG (AES)

Table 10: Cryptographic primitives in the TOE

7.2.4 Random Number Generation

The TOE transfers one or more random bit-streams from the defined entropy sources to the Linux
operating system’s entropy pool. The entropy pool is used as a seed source for a digital random number
generator (DRNG) via the /dev/random and /dev/urandom special file interfaces. The bit-stream will be
transferred as necessary during system operation. The defined sources will be specific to the hardware
available on each platform but will include one or more of the following: the jitterentropy-engine, Cavium
Nitrox III hardware, Intel QAT hardware, and the Intel rdrand instruction.

The random bit stream from the entropy source will be fed to the Linux DRNG on demand, such that if
the entropy in the Linux DRNG runs low (and thus the threshold that causes /dev/random to block will
reached soon), fresh entropy is inserted and the entropy estimate in the Linux RNG is increased. This will
attempt to ensure that sufficient entropy is available in the Linux DRNG to avoid blocking applications
that read from /dev/random, or will release any applications that have become blocked. Since the
/dev/urandom interface also draws from the Linux kernel entropy pool input of the random bit stream will
also ensure that /dev/urandom is initialized and reseeded. The increase in the entropy estimate caused by
the transfer of the random bit stream is not equal to the number of bits transferred, rather it scaled by a
factor which is dependent on the entropy source.

This implements FCS_RBG_EXT.1.

7.2.5 SSH
The TOE implements a SSH v2 server and a SSH v2 client. The SSH client is not used for
communication with trusted external IT entities and will be disabled in the TOE. Administrators can
connect to the TOE remotely using SSH via a dedicated network interface. Administrators are
authenticated locally by user name and password; remote authentication (via LDAP or AD) is not
supported by the TOE.
The SSH implementation is compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, 6668.

SSH connections to the TOE's command line interface are protected using SSH version 2, using transport
encryption algorithm AES CBC mode with 128 and 256 bit-sizes keys, transport data integrity protection

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hashing algorithm HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2-256, and public key authentication algorithm ssh-
rsa. The SSH implementation monitors packet size on all channels and limits packet size as suggested in
RFC 4253 Section 6.1; the maximum packet size is (256*1024) bytes with larger packets being silently
dropped. Additionally, the SSH implementation has hard-coded ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-
nistp384 key exchange; diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is intentionally disabled.

The SSH connection session key will be renegotiated after either of two thresholds has been reached. SSH
connection session keys will be renegotiated after one hour of use. In addition, the SSH connection
session key will be renegotiated after an administrator-configured maximum amount of data, the
RekeyLimit, is transmitted over the connection. The administrative guidance will instruct the user to not
set the RekeyLimit to a value greater that 1 GB.

This functionality implements FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.

7.2.6 TLS Protocol

The TOE implements both the TLS server and TLS client protocol.
Administrators remotely connect to the TOE via an HTTPS server implementing TLS over a dedicated
network interface used to administer the TOE. Administrators are authenticated locally by user name and
password; remote authentication (via LDAP or AD) is not supported by the TOE. Administrator sessions
that use the web-based Configuration utility, SOAP protocol (iControl API), or the REST API (iControl
REST API) are protected by TLS. TLS sessions are limited to TLS versions 1.2 and 1.1, using the cipher
suites identified in Table 11. The TLS server implementation in the TOE will deny SSL 1.0, SSL 2.0,
SSL 3.0, and TLS 1.0 session requests.
The TOE implementation of TLS client is capable of presenting a certificate to a TLS server for TLS
mutual authentication. The TLS client implemented by the TOE is used to communicate with the external
audit server.
The following table summarizes the cipher suites supported by the evaluated configuration for TLS
connections. All other proposed cipher suites are rejected.

Cipher Data Plane Data Control

Client Plane Plane
Server Server

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

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Cipher Data Plane Data Control

Client Plane Plane
Server Server

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 N/A

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS v1.1 TLS v1.1 N/A

TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 N/A

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 N/A

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 N/A

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 N/A

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2 TLS v1.2

Table 11: Cipher suites

When acting as a TLS server, BIG-IP does not operate on or process reference identifier fields in the
BIG-IP certificate. It's up to an Administrator to load the desired X.509 certificate and up to TLS clients
to verify it.
The BIG-IP TLS server only checks the Common Name (CN) and DNS name in SAN when BIG-IP
performs client authentication. For BIG-IP acting as TLS client, the TOE checks Common Name (CN)
and DNS name. The BIG-IP TLS client supports ECDH in the Client Hello by default. This can
optionally be disabled by removing the corresponding cipher suites, although individual curves cannot be
configured. The DN or SAN in the certificate is compared by requiring an exact match.

Use of wildcards for reference identifiers constructed by the TOE and certificate pinning for TLS client
connections are not supported by the TOE.

When acting as a TLS server, BIG-IP generates key establishment parameters using RSA with key size
2048 and 3072 bits and over NIST curves secp256r1 and secp384r1. The TLS server key exchange
message parameters (ECDH) are as defined / required by the RFC 5246 Section 7.4.3 for TLS 1.2, RFC
4346 Section 7.4.3 for TLS 1.1, and RFC 4492. For example, its classic ECDH using named curves with
predefined parameters. The TOE does not support DHE_RSA cipher suites, so server key exchange
messages are not sent.

This functionality implements FCS_TLSC_EXT.2[1]-[2], FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1]-[4].

7.2.7 HTTPS Protocol

The BIG-IP provides three interfaces for remote administrators that communicate over HTTPS:

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Configuration Utility, iControl API, and iControl REST API. HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) is an application-
level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems transmitted over a TLS
connection. The TOE implements HTTPS per RFC 2818, HTTP over TLS. Checking the validity of peer
certificates is described in Section 7.3.2.

This functionality implements FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.

7.3 Identification and Authentication

Administrative users (i.e., all users authorized to access the TOE's administrative interfaces) are identified
by a user name and authenticated by an individual password associated with that user's account. This is
true regardless of how the administrative user interfaces with the TOE. If the supplied user name and
password match the user name and password pair maintained by the TOE, the administrative session is
successfully established. Otherwise, the user receives an error and the session is not established. In
addition, the TOE displays warning banners for interactive sessions as described in Section 7.6.
This functionality implements FIA_UIA_EXT.1, FIA_UAU_EXT.2.
For interactive user authentication at the web-based Configuration utility via HTTPS and the command
line tmsh via SSH, BIG-IP obscures passwords entered by users.
This functionality implements FIA_UAU.7.

7.3.1 Password policy and user lockout

The TOE can enforce a password policy for all user accounts managed locally, other than those in the
Administrator role. This includes the definition of a minimum password length and required character
types (numeric, uppercase, lowercase, others). The minimum password length default value is 6; the valid
range is from 6 to 255. This policy is enforced when users change their own passwords.
Other aspects of the authentication policy include the minimum and maximum lengths of time that
passwords can be in effect, and the number of previous passwords that BIG-IP should store to prevent
users from re-using former passwords.

• The minimum duration specifies the minimum number of days before which users cannot change
their passwords; the default is 0 and the valid range is from 0 to 255.

• The maximum duration specifies the maximum number of days a password is valid; users must
change their passwords before the maximum duration is reached, the default is 99999 days.

o User accounts whose password has expired, based on the administrator-defined

maximum password duration, are locked and require an administrator to reset them.

• Password memory specifies that the system records the specified number of passwords that the
user has used in the past. Users cannot reuse a password that is in the list. The default is 0 and the
valid range is from 0 to 127.
Access to the TOE for individual users can be disabled ("locked") after a configured number of failed
authentication attempts; which, in the evaluated configuration, the default is 3 with a valid range from 1
to 10. Administrators and User Managers have to manually unlock accounts that have been locked by the
TOE.
This functionality implements FIA_PMG_EXT.1.

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7.3.2 Certificate Validation

For TLS and HTTPS sessions, the TOE implements certificate validation using the OpenSSL crypto
library.
The TOE supports validation of X.509 digital using a certificate revocation list (CRL) as specified in
[RFC5280] Section 5. Administrators create profiles which are used to define the parameters used to
communicate with an external entity. These parameters include the ability to require the use of TLS and
peer or mutual authentication and a definition of the certificate to use for authentication. This capability is
used to create a mutually authenticated connection with the external audit server. The external audit
server provides a certificate to the TOE during establishment of the TLS connection in order to
authenticate the external audit server.

The TOE offers administrative interfaces for creating a private key and certificate signing request (CSR).
The CSR may include the following information: public key, common name, organization, organizational
unit, country, locality, state / province, country, e-mail address, subject alternative name. After the CRS is
created, the administrator must export the CSR outside the TOE. Outside the scope of the TOE, the
administrator provides the CSR to the CA and then the CA returns the certificate to the administrator.
Using the administrative interface, the administrator can then import the certificate into the TOE.
The only method supported by the TOE for obtaining a CA certificate is for the administrator to save a
certificate to a text file and import it into the TOE. The certificates are stored in a text file. The TOE is
capable of importing X.509v3 certificates and certificates in the PKCS12 format. The TOE is also capable
of creating and using a self-signed certificate.
The TOE checks the validity of the certificates when the profile using the certificate is loaded and when
the certificate is used by the TOE, including during authentication. If the certificates are modified, the
digital signature verification would detect that the certificate had been tampered with and the certificate
would be invalid. Administrators can ensure that the certificates presented have not been revoked by
importing a certificate revocation list (CRL) into the TOE.
A certificate chain includes the root CA certificate, certificates of intermediate CAs, and the end entity
certificate. The certificate chain consists of all the certificates necessary to validate the end certificate.
Administrators can upload trusted device certificates (root CA certificates) into the TOE to identify which
certificates are trusted. The TOE performs full certificate chain checking using Public Key Infrastructure
X.509, verifies the expiration of the certificate (assuming a reliable time provided by the NTP server), and
verifies its revocation using CRLs.
When the validity of a certificate cannot be established, the TOE will allow the administrator to choose
whether or not to accept the certificate.
This implements FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2, FIA_X509_EXT.3.

7.4 Security Function Management

The TOE provides the ability to administer the TOE both locally and remotely. Local administration is
performed via a device directly connected to the management port on the BIG-IP via an Ethernet cable.
Remote access to the management interfaces is only made available on the dedicated management
network port of a BIG-IP system.
The TOE offers administrators four different methods to configure and manage the TSF. They are:
• Configuration Utility (Web-based GUI) - browser-based GUI interface with normal GUI panels
and selections. The client browser talks to the Apache HTTP server over HTTPS; then the request
passes through tomcat and to the BIG-IP.

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• tmsh shell commands – provide a command line interface, accessible through an SSH client
• iControl API – SOAP-based programming interface over HTTPS.
• iControl REST API – REST-based programming interface over HTTPS.
The first three interfaces are independent. The tmsh interface is the most complete; though none of the
three are proper subsets of each other. iControl REST APIs utilize tmsh shell command(s) to perform the
desired operation, so it is basically a front-end to the tmsh shell commands. As such, the functions
provided by the iControl REST API are a proper subset of the set of tmsh commands.
These four administrative interfaces require users to identify and authenticate themselves prior to
performing any administrative functions.
The TOE comes with a pre-defined “admin” user with the Administrator role assigned that cannot be
deleted. A password is assigned to the “admin” user during setup of the TOE. Local user accounts are
managed by administrators in the Administrator or User Manager role and stored in the TOE's local user
database. Management includes creating and deleting users, as well as changing another user's password
(every user can change their own password), role, or partition the user has access to, and enabling or
disabling terminal access for the user. However, User Managers that have access to only one partition
cannot change the partition access of other users, and cannot change their own partition access or role.
(More on roles can be found in Section 7.4.1.)
Some general configuration options include the definition of an administrative IP address for the TOE's
management network interface, configuration of remote logging, configuration of auditing, configuration
of TOE security functions, enable/disable services, manage TSF data, configure the login access banner,
configure session inactivity timeout, configure cryptographic functionality, configure the RekeyLimit
which defines how much data can be transmitted within an SSH connection before rekeying, and the
configuration of trusted updates.
BIG-IP uses the concept of virtual servers to define destinations that BIG-IP accepts (client) traffic for.
Virtual servers are represented by an IP address and service (such as HTTP). The actual resources that
BIG-IP forwards the traffic to are referred to as nodes, represented by their IP address. Nodes can be
grouped into pools, for example for the purpose of load balancing. (A client sends an HTTP request to
BIG-IP's virtual server address, and BIG-IP will then select a node from the pool associated with the
virtual server to forward the request to.) Virtual servers are a management tool used to simplify the
configuration of filtering and processing incoming network requests.
In order to determine the treatment of different types of traffic, such as requiring client authentication or
inspection of HTTP code at the application layer, administrators can assign profiles to virtual servers.
Profiles contain detailed instructions on how the different traffic management-related security functions
of the TOE are applied to matching traffic.
This functionality implements FMT_SMF.1.

7.4.1 Security Roles

Access of individual users to the web-based Configuration utility, tmsh, iControl API, and iControl REST
API is restricted based on pre-defined roles. These roles define which type of objects a user has access to
and which type of tasks he or she can perform. The role definitions cannot be changed by TOE
administrators. Table 12 contains the definition of user roles.
The TOE allows security administrators to define the type of terminal access that individual users have,
i.e. whether they have access to the tmsh via SSH or not. The TOE can be administered either locally or
remotely. Administering the TOE locally entails connecting a device to the management port on the BIG-
IP via an Ethernet cable

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The tasks that users can perform on objects, depending on their role, are grouped into hierarchical access
levels:

• write: create, modify, enable and disable, and delete an object

• update: modify, enable, and disable an object

• enable/disable: enable and disable an object

• read: view an object

In addition to roles, the TOE implements the concept of partitions for restricting access to objects.
Configuration objects that deal with the individual traffic management functions offered by the TOE are
stored in partitions (either the Common partition, or administrator-defined partitions. Objects (including
users, server pools, etc.) can be created in different partitions by administrators, and users can be assigned
a partition they have access to ("partition access"). As a result, users will only have the type of access
defined by their assigned role to objects in the partition that is defined by their partition access. (With
certain exceptions documented in the tables below.) It is possible to assign a user access to "all"
partitions, in which case the user will have access to objects in all partitions as defined by their role
(referred to in the guidance documentation as "universal access").
Note: The fact that a user account is created in a specific partition does not mean that the user will
automatically have access to other objects in that partition.
The TOE comes with a pre-defined "Common" partition, which cannot be deleted. New objects created
by users are either placed in the user's partition, or - if the user has access to all partitions - are placed in
the Common partition unless the user explicitly chooses otherwise. The pre-defined "admin" user with the
Administrator role is located in the Common partition.
Even users who are located in a partition other than Common have certain access to objects in the
Common partition, as follows:

• Administrator always has access to all objects defined in the TOE.

• User Managers have write access to user account objects in the Common partition, except those
with the Administrator role assigned to them.

• Resource Administrators, Managers, Certificate Managers, Application Editors, Operators, and

Guests have read access to all objects in the Common partition.

Role Associated rights

Administrator This role grants users complete access to all partitioned and non-partitioned objects
on the system, manage remote user accounts and change their own passwords. This
includes trusted updates and the management of all security functions and TSF data.

Resource This role grants users complete access to all partitioned and non-partitioned objects
Administrator on the system, except user account objects. Additionally, users with this role can
change their own passwords. This includes management of all security functions and
TSF data, including remote users, remote roles, but not other user management
functions.

User Manager Users with the User Manager role that have access to all partitions can create,

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Role Associated rights

modify, delete, and view all user accounts except those that are assigned the
Administrator role, or the User Manager role with different partition access.
However, User Managers cannot manage user roles for remote user accounts. Users
with the User Manager role that have access only to a single partition can create,
modify, delete, and view only those user accounts that are in that partition and that
have access to that partition only.

User accounts with the User Manager role can change their own passwords.

Manager This role grants users permission to create, modify, and delete virtual servers, nodes,
pools, pool members, custom profiles, and custom monitors. Users in this role can
view all objects on the system and change their own passwords.

Certificate This role grants users permission to manage device certificates and keys, as well as
Manager perform Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) operations.

Application This role grants users permission to modify nodes, pools, pool members, monitors
Editor and change their own passwords. These users can view all objects on the system.
In addition, the Application Editor has full access to the APM-related configuration
objects in BIG-IP. In particular, this includes the following authorizations with
regard to management capabilities offered by the Configuration utility:

Config Utility (basic network and licensing configuration) - No access

Traffic Summary - Read-only

Reports (reporting on TOE users) - No access

Performance - Read-only

Statistics - Read-only

Local Traffic feature - Read-only access for Virtual Servers, Profiles, iRules, SNATs,
and SSL Certificates; Modification (but not creation or deletion) of Nodes, Pools,
Pool Members, and Monitors; Enabling/Disabling Nodes and Monitors
Access Profiles - Modification (but not Creation/Deletion) and activation of access
policies with the exception of the "Max Concurrent Users" field

AAA Servers - Full access

ACLs - Full access

VLAN Based Routing - Read-only access for VLAN, Self-IP, and VLAN Gateways;
Creation/Modification/Deletion of VLAN Selection Agents

Client IP Allocation - Full access

Network Access Resources - Full access

Customization - Full access

Advanced Customization - No access

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Role Associated rights

Session Variable Management - Creation/Modification/Deletion of Variable

Assignment Agent; Creation/Modification (but not Deletion) of session variables

End User Security - Full access

Network features - No access to ARP configuration; Read-only access to all other

features

System features - Read-only access; can change password for users in Application
Editor role

Operator This role grants users permission to enable or disable nodes and pool members.
These users can view all objects.

Auditor This role grants users permission to view all configuration data on the system,
including logs and archives. Users with this role cannot create, modify, or delete any
data, nor can they view TLS keys or user passwords.

Guest This role grants users permission to view all objects on the system in their partition
and Common partition.

No Access This role prevents users from accessing the system.

Table 12: BIG-IP User Roles

The Security Administrator role as defined in FMT_SMR.2 is considered to include each of the roles
defined in Table 12, except for the Guest and No Access roles.
This functionality implements FMT_MOF.1(1)/AdminAct, FMT_MOF.1(2)/AdminAct,
FMT_MOF.1(1)/TrustedUpdate, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.1/AdminAct, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.2.

7.5 Protection of the TSF

7.5.1 Protection of Sensitive Data

The TOE protects passwords used for the authentication of administrative users as follows:

• In storage for local user authentication, the TOE’s administrative interfaces do not offer any
interface to retrieve user passwords or configuration files.

• In transit between remote users and the TOE, the TOE implements SSH and TLS to protect the
communication.
Pre-shared keys (such as credentials for remote servers), symmetric keys, and private keys are stored in
the TOE's configuration files. The TOE does not offer an interface to retrieve the contents of its
configuration files. Passwords are stored in a salted hashed format.
This functionality implements FPT_APW_EXT.1 and FPT_SKP_EXT.1.

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7.5.2 Self-tests
The following self-tests are implemented by the TOE:
• The BIOS Power-On Self-Test POST test is only run at power on
• The OpenSSL integrity tests are run at power on and reboot (during OpenSSL initialization) for
OpenSSL.
• The software integrity check (i.e., sys-icheck utility) is run at power on and reboot to check the
integrity of the RPMs. This self-test can be run at any time.
• The cryptographic algorithm self-tests provided by OpenSSL are run at power on and.

The BIOS POST is a diagnostic program that checks the basic components required for the hardware to
operate, tests the memory, and checks the disk controller, the attached disks, and the network controllers.
The BIOS POST tests cannot be run on demand.

The fipscheck utility is a standard Open Source utility for verifying the integrity of OpenSSL during
initialization.

The sys-icheck utility provides software integrity testing by comparing the current state of files in the
system to a database created at install time and modified only through authorized system update
mechanisms. When a discrepancy is detected, the utility reports that discrepancy. The utility can be run at
any time during system operation, and will just report errors. However, once the system is placed into the
Common Criteria configuration it is enabled to run at each boot, and will halt the boot if errors are found.
The TOE will execute self-tests at power-on to test the cryptographic algorithms and random number
generation using known answer tests for each of the algorithms. If a power-on test fails, the boot process
will halt.
The self-tests implemented by the TOE which are described in this section cover all aspects of the TSF
are therefore and are sufficient for demonstrating that the TSF is operating correctly in the intended
environment.
This functionality implements FPT_TST_EXT.1(1) and FPT_TST_EXT.1(2).

7.5.3 Update Verification

While the evaluated configuration of the TOE is limited to the specific version and patch level of BIG-IP
covered in this ST, the TOE nevertheless provides functionality that supports administrators in verifying
the integrity and authenticity of updates provided by F5. The Configuration Utility or tmsh can be used to
query the TOE version.
The TOE is able to validate digital signatures of updates provided by F5; F5 places the ISO files (updates)
and signature files on their website. The administrative guidance instructs the customer to:

• Download the ISO and digital signature file

• Verify the ISO using that file

• Install the update

A signature file exists for each software update provided by F5. The content of the signature file is a
digital signature of a SHA256 digest of the ISO image file. The private and public keys are generated
using the OpenSSL utility. The signing key is a 2048 bit RSA private key that is stored at F5 CM and
only available for official F5 builds. The public key is included in the TMOS filesystem and is available

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on the F5 official site adjacent to the software archives. Note: The update verification implementation
does not utilize certificates; only digital signatures.
The BIG-IP verifies the SHA256 hash of software archives, using 2048-bit RSA digital signature
algorithm. If the signature is verified, the software update is installed. If the signature does not verify, the
software update installation fails / aborts. The administrative guidance will instruct the customer to
download the update again or contact F5 support.
This functionality implements FPT_TUD_EXT.1.

7.5.4 Time Source

The TOE provides reliable time stamps for its own use, in particular in audit records and other time-
sensitive security functionality. The TOE is an appliance that includes a hardware-based clock and the
TOE’s operating system makes the real-time clock available through a mcpd-maintained time stamp. The
TOE uses NTP to set and synchronize the hardware-based clock.
The security functions that rely on this time stamp in the evaluated configuration include:

• generation of audit records

• session locking for administrative users

• timeouts for remote sessions

• certificate validation / revocation

This functionality implements FPT_STM.1.

7.6 TOE Access

For interactive user authentication at the web-based Configuration utility via HTTPS and the command
line tmsh via SSH, BIG-IP implements the display of administrator-defined banners to users before they
authenticate.
This functionality implements FTA_TAB.1.
The TOE terminates remote administrative user (Configuration Utility or tmsh) sessions after an
administrator-defined period of inactivity. Users can also actively terminate their sessions (log out).
This functionality implements FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3.
Lastly, administrators are able to actively terminate these sessions (i.e., to log out and therefore close an
authenticated session).
This functionality implements FTA_SSL.4.

7.7 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE acts as the TLS client when communicating with audit servers for the protection of audit
records sent from the TOE to an external audit server. As described in Section 7.3.2, the TOE is
configured to require a mutually authenticated connection with the external audit server. The external
audit server provides a certificate to the TOE during establishment of the TLS connection in order to
authenticate the external audit server.
This functionality implements FTP_ITC.1.

ã 2018,2019 F5 Networks. All Rights Reserved. 61

F5 BIG-IP APM 12.1.3.4 APM ST January 15, 2019

Network administrators connect to the TOE remotely via a dedicated network interface to administer the
TOE. Administrators are authenticated locally by user name and password; remote authentication (via
LDAP or AD) is not supported by the TOE. The TOE implements the following trusted paths, which are
logically distinct from other communication paths and provide assured identification of both end points,
as well as protecting the transmitted data from disclosure and providing detection of modification of the
transmitted data:

• TLS Connections to the TOE via the web-based Configuration utility, iControl API and the
iControl REST API are protected by TLS. TLS sessions are limited to TLS versions 1.1 and 1.2,
using the cipher suites identified in FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[3]-[4].

• SSH Connections to the TOE's command line interface are protected using SSH version 2 as
defined in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1. Additionally, the SSH implementation has hard-coded ecdh-sha2-
nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384 key exchange; diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is
intentionally disabled.
This functionality implements FTP_TRP.1.

ã 2018,2019 F5 Networks. All Rights Reserved. 62