Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents Froilan M Bacungan & Associates Seno, Mendoza and Associates Law Offices
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents Froilan M Bacungan & Associates Seno, Mendoza and Associates Law Offices
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MENDOZA , J : p
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Honorable
Secretary of Labor and Employment, declaring (1) wage increases granted by petitioner to
its employees not creditable as compliance by the company with future mandated wage
increases, and (2) the increases to be retroactive, in the case of the fourth year wage
increase, to August 1, 1992 to be implemented until July 31, 1993 and, in the case of the
fth year wage increase, to August 1, 1993 to be implemented until the expiration of the
CBA on July 31, 1994. casia
b. Vacation and Sick Leaves (Article VII, Section 1(c), CBA) — 1,100
hours of aggregate service instead of the existing 1,500 hours within a year to be
entitled to leave bene ts but subject to reversion to the previous CBA if majority
of the gangs average eight (8) vessels a month;
d. 13th Month Pay (Article XIII, Section 1, CBA) — Average of six (6)
vessels instead of the existing eight (8) vessels to be entitled to eleven (11) days
basic pay but subject to reversion to the previous CBA if majority of the gangs
average eight (8) vessels a month,
f. Seniority.
The agreement left only one issue for resolution of the parties, namely, retirement.
Even this issue was soon settled as the parties met before the NCMB on January 14, 1993
and then agreed on an improved Optional Retirement Clause by giving the employees the
option to retire after rendering eighteen (18) years of service instead of the previous
twenty (20) years, and granting the employees retirement bene ts equivalent to sixteen
(16) days for every year of service. Thus, as the Med-Arbiter noted in the record of the
January 14, 1993 conference, "the issues raised by the notice of strike had been settled
and said notice is thus terminated."
But no sooner had he stated this than the Company claimed that the wage increases
which it had agreed to give to the employees should be creditable as compliance with
future mandated wage increases. In addition, it maintained that such increases should not
be retroactive.
Reacting to this development, the Union again led a Notice of Strike on January 28,
1993, with the NCMB. On March 7, 1993, the Union staged a strike.
The NCMB tried to settle the issues of creditability and retroactivity, calling for this
purpose a conciliation conference on March 9, 1993. As conciliation proved futile, the
Company petitioned respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment (hereafter Secretary
of Labor) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On March 10, 1993, respondent
assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ordered the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the two unresolved issues.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
After submission by the parties of their position papers, the Secretary of Labor
issued an Order dated May 14, 1993, ordering the Company and the Union to incorporate
into their existing collective bargaining agreement all improvements reached by them in
the course of renegotiations. The Secretary of Labor held that the wage increases for the
fourth and fth years of the CBA were not to be credited as compliance with future
mandated increases. In addition, the fourth year wage increase was to be retroactive to
August 1992 and was to be implemented until July 31, 1993, while the fth year wage
increase was to take effect on August 1, 1993 until the expiration of the CBA. 1
On May 31, 1993, the Company sought reconsideration of the May 14, 1993 order.
The motion was denied for lack of merit by the Secretary of Labor in a resolution dated
July 7, 1993. Hence, this petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Secretary of Labor.
The petitioner contends that respondent erred in making the fourth year wage
increase retroactive to August 1, 1992. It denies the power of the Secretary of Labor to
decree retroaction of the wage increases, as the respondent herself had stated in her
order subject of this petition, that it had been more than six (6) months since the expiration
of the third anniversary of the CBA and, therefore, the automatic renewal clause of Art.
253-A of the Labor Code had no application. Although petitioner originally opposed giving
retroactive effect to their agreement, it subsequently modi ed its stand and agreed that
the fourth year wage increase and the other provisions of the CBA be made retroactive to
the date the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction of the dispute on March 10, 1993.
The petition is without merit. Art. 253-A of the Labor Code reads:
Terms of a collective bargaining agreement . — Any Collective Bargaining
Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation
aspect is concerned, be for a term of ve (5) years. No petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no
certi cation election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry
of such ve year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three
(3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date
of expiry of the term of such other provisions as xed in such Collective
Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day immediately following such date.
If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree
on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation
of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under
this Code.
The respondent indeed stated in her order of May 14, 1993 that "this case is clearly
beyond the scope of the automatic renewal clause," 2 but she also stated in the same
order that "the parties have reached an agreement on all the renegotiated provisions of the
CBA" on January 14, 1993, i.e., within six (6) months of the expiration of the third year of
the CBA.
The signing of the CBA is not determinative of the question whether "the agreement
was entered into within six months from the date of expiry of the term of such other
provisions as xed in such collective bargaining agreement" within the contemplation of
Art. 253-A.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
As already stated, on November 12, 1992, the Union sent the Company a notice of
deadlock in view of their inability to reconcile their positions on the main issues, 3
particularly on wages. The Union led a notice of strike. However, on December 18, 1992,
in a conference called by the NCMB, the Union and the Company agreed on a number of
provisions of the CBA, including the provision on wage increase, 4 leaving only the issue of
retirement to be threshed out. In time, this, too, was settled, so that in his record of the
January 14, 1993 conference, the Med-Arbiter noted that "the issues raised by the notice
of strike had been settled and said notice is thus terminated." It would therefore seem that
at that point, there was already a meeting of the minds of the parties, which was before the
February 1993 end of the six-month period provided in Art. 253-A.
The fact that no agreement was then signed is of no moment. Art. 253-A refers
merely to an "agreement" which, according to Black's Law Dictionary is "a coming together
of minds; the coming together in accord of two minds on a given proposition." 5 This is
similar to Art. 1305 of the Civil Code's de nition of "contract" as "a meeting of minds
between two persons." prcd
The two terms, "agreement" and "contract," are indeed similar, although the former is
broader than the latter because an agreement may not have all the elements of a contract.
As in the case of contracts, however, agreements may be oral or written. 6 Hence, even
without any written evidence of the Collective Bargaining Agreement made by the parties, a
valid agreement existed in this case from the moment the minds of the parties met on all
matters they set out to discuss. As Art. 1315 of the Civil Code states:
Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment, the
parties are bound not only to the ful llment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law.
The Secretary of Labor found that "as early as January 14, 1993, well within the six
(6) month period provided by law, the Company and the Union have perfected their
agreement." 7 The claim of petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding, this is a nding of an
administrative agency which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be affirmed.
Moreover, the order of the Secretary of Labor may be considered in the nature of an
arbitral award, pursuant to Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, and, therefore, binding on the
parties. After all, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because
petitioner asked the Secretary of Labor to do so after the NCMB failed to make the parties
come to an agreement. It is also conceded that the industry in which the petitioner is
engaged is vital to the national interest. As stated in the Order issued by the Secretary of
Labor on March 10, 1993: 8
The services being provided by the Company evidently re ect their
indispensability to the normal operations of the Davao City Pier where millions of
crates and boxes of goods are loaded and unloaded monthly. The current
disruption, therefore, of the Company's services, if allowed to continue, will cause
serious prejudice and damages to the agricultural exporters, the cargo handlers,
the vessel owners, the foreign buyers of agricultural products and the entire
business sector in the area. These considerations and the dispute's implications
on the national economy warrant the intervention by this O ce to exercise its
power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
In St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc . vs. Torres , 9 a deadlock also developed during the
CBA negotiations between management and the union. The Secretary of Labor assumed
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of their CBA to the date of expiration of the
previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his
discretion in making his award retroactive. In dismissing this contention this Court held:
Therefore, in the absence of a speci c provision of law prohibiting
retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine
the effectivity thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 28.
2. Id., p. 25.
3. Respondent's Comment, p. 2, Rollo, p. 103.
4. Ibid.