2008-4-25 Handout A - Position - Paper - Grading
2008-4-25 Handout A - Position - Paper - Grading
April 5, 2008
On behalf of:
Bob Bennett, Frank Caucci, Kathy Lay, W. Pat Sullivan, & David Westhuis
A Position Paper:
Grades Distributions and Grading Practices in the
MSW Program of the Indiana University School of Social Work
(Rosovsky & Hartley, 2002, pp. 5-6). For example, in November 1995, the Registrar of IUPUI
submitted a report to the campus Grade Inflation Committee regarding grading patterns among
different schools. Derived from that report, Table 1 reveals that the School of Social Work
awarded grades in a more generous manner than most departments. Only Labor Studies, Allied
Health, Military Science (in Fall 1994), and the Honors Program awarded higher grades—as
indicated by average GPAs in the Fall semesters of 1993 and 1994. All other professional
schools awarded lower average grades.
Table 1: IUPUI Registrar’s Report: Grading Patterns among IUPUI Schools (November 7, 1995)
School Fall 1993 Average GPA Fall 1994 Average GPA
Medicine 2.489 n= 216 2.674 n= 139
Science 2.505 n = 12109 2.495 n= 12622
Education 2.679 n= 1632 2.943 n= 1595
Liberal Arts 2.689 n=14616 2.682 n = 13377
SPEA 2.764 n= 1488 2.732 n= 1479
RHIT 2.834 n= 264 2.770 n= 287
Journalism 2.862 n= 190 2.832 n= 187
Engineering & Tech 2.872 n= 5171 2.815 n= 4759
Business 2.883 n= 3268 2.810 n= 3692
Herron 2.957 n= 1903 2.934 n= 1874
Aerospace 3.025 n= 4 4.000 n= 2
Music 3.133 n= 569 3.215 n= 708
Dentistry 3.193 n= 723 3.092 n= 804
Physical Education 3.198 n= 1739 3.156 n= 1619
Nursing 3.255 n= 2609 3.264 n= 2466
Military Science 3.350 n= 111 3.940 n= 128
Social Work 3.406 n= 493 3.416 n= 483
Labor Studies 3.422 n= 67 3.531 n= 52
Allied Health 3.500 n= 2202 3.560 n= 2510
Honors 3.841 n= 27 3.847 n= 17
In December 1995, the Registrar prepared a report comparing undergraduate letter grade
distributions for the fall semesters of 1990 and 1994 for IUPUI schools. Table 2 reflects the
results of that report.
Table 2 suggests that that the faculty of the IU School of Social Work at IUPUI awarded
a much greater proportion of A grades (in both 1990 and 1994) than did the campus at large
(about 17% more in 1990 and about 23% more in 1994). In 1990, about 87.8% of social work
grades were some form of A or B. In 1994, it rose to 91.3%. In 1990 and 1994, only 7.5% and
6.4% respectively of social work grades were some form of C. And, in those years, only 2.7%
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and 1.7% respectively were grades of F. As Table 2 reveals, these percentages differ
substantially from those in other professional programs.
Table 2: Final Grades Awarded Undergraduate Students Enrolled in Undergraduate Courses Summarized
In Percentage Terms By The School Which Offered The Course (Fall 1994 and Fall 1990)
Year A B C D F
Allied Health 1994 63.1 31.7 4.9 0.2 0.1
Allied Health 1990 54.8 38.0 6.5 0.6 0.0
Business 1994 28.8 38.0 24.1 5.2 4.1
Business 1990 21.1 37.8 28.9 7.6 4.6
Dentistry 1994 33.3 45.5 17.9 3.0 0.2
Dentistry 1990 37.0 46.4 13.8 2.1 0.7
Education 1994 49.6 29.3 4.8 0.5 16.4
Education 1990 41.1 34.6 7.6 0.9 15.9
Engineering &Tech 1994 31.6 36.5 21.3 4.7 6.0
Engineering &Tech 1990 30.9 37.1 20.9 5.0 6.2
Herron 1994 37.7 36.4 16.0 3.6 6.4
Herron 1990 30.3 40.7 18.3 4.4 6.2
Journalism 1994 31.6 44.9 11.2 3.7 8.6
Journalism 1990 27.1 43.9 18.6 2.7 7.7
Liberal Arts 1994 27.5 36.9 21.9 5.4 8.7
Liberal Arts 1990 24.5 37.0 24.9 6.1 7.5
Music 1994 62.9 18.8 5.5 3.8 9.2
Music 1990 52.3 27.6 9.9 3.0 7.2
Nursing 1994 43.1 44.2 11.2 0.6 1.1
Nursing 1990 26.5 47.6 21.7 2.4 1.9
Physical Education 1994 50.0 31.5 10.9 1.6 6.1
Physical Education 1990 49.4 30.6 11.7 2.6 5.6
Restaurant Hotel 1994 31.4 35.5 19.9 7.3 5.9
Restaurant Hotel 1990 36.8 34.0 14.0 9.4 5.8
Science 1994 26.0 29.5 26.0 6.4 13.1
Science 1990 23.4 30.1 29.3 6.7 10.4
SPEA 1994 24.7 42.0 21.8 6.2 5.4
SPEA 1990 22.4 38.7 27.0 5.8 6.2
Social Work 1994 56.2 35.1 6.4 0.6 1.7
Social Work 1990 45.4 42.4 7.5 2.0 2.7
Campus Total 1994 33.2 34.6 19.9 4.6 8.1
Campus Total 1990 28.5 35.5 23.1 5.3 7.7
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*Average undergraduate GPA for Alabama, California-Irvine, Carleton, Duke, Florida, Georgia Tech, Hampden-Sydney, Harvard, Harvey
Mudd, Nebraska-Kearney, North Carolina-Chapel Hill, North Carolina-Greensboro, Northern Michigan, Pomona, Princeton, Purdue, Texas,
University of Washington, Utah, Wheaton (Illinois), Winthrop, and Wisconsin-La Crosse. Note that inclusion in the average does not imply that
an institution has significant inflation. Data on GPAs for each institution can be found at the bottom of this web page. Institutions comprising this
average were chosen strictly because they have either published their data or have sent their data to the author on GPA trends over the last 11
years. (Last update, March 17, 2003). (Rojstaczer, 2004)
Table 6 reveals the average GPA by MSW course during the fall 1995 and spring 1996
semesters. Please recognize that the MSW curriculum is currently quite different from what it
was during the 1995-1996 academic year. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that the average GPA in
MSW courses remains in the range of 3.7 to 3.9.
In recent years, the problem of grade inflation and grade compression has caught the
attention of the wider public, state legislators, and regional collegiate accreditation bodies. As a
result, most universities—particularly those that are state sponsored—have begun to address the
issue of “grade inflation.” For example, in early 1994, the Indiana University Board of Trustees
issued the following resolution:
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Table 5: Average GPAs and Letter Grade Distributions for IU at IUPUI MSW Students for Selected Semesters
Program Year Sem. Avg GPA A B C D F I W WX
Grades
GPA
MSW-IUPUI 1994 Fall 1386 970 252 14 0 1 12 31
MSW-IUPUI 1995 SUM 1 3.707 215 165 47 1 0 0 3 0 2
MSW-IUPUI 1995 SUM 2 3.550 297 190 93 11 0 3 2 4 3
MSW-IUPUI 1995 Fall 3.673 1135 815 304 13 0 3 10 20 43
MSW-IUPUI 1996 Spring 3.740 860 683 164 10 1 2 23 10 25
MSW-IUPUI 1996 SUM 1 3.697 261 203 52 2 3 1 19 3 4
MSW-IUPUI 1996 SUM 2 3.755 184 152 25 7 0 0 7 2 2
MSW-IUPUI 1996 Fall 3.670 1212 881 301 24 3 3 26 5 14
MSW-IUPUI 1997 Spring 3.638 865 622 212 27 0 4 17 18 15
MSW-IUPUI 1997 Fall 3.699 1105 832 242 30 1 0 28 21 32
MSW-IUPUI 1997 SUM 2 3.829 178 158 20 0 0 0 10 2 1
MSW-IUPUI 1998 Spring 3.645 739 538 176 14 2 9 21 13 29
Totals 8437 6209 1888 153 10 26 178 129 170
Percentage 73.6% 22.4% 1.8% 0.1% 0.3% 2.1% 1.5% 2.0%
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Table 6: Average GPA by MSW Course (Fall 1995 & Spring 1996)
Course Average GPAs by course:Fall 1995 & Spring 1996 Semesters
(all sections combined; single section courses excluded) Note: A=4.0; A-=3.7; B+=3.3; B=3.0; B-=2.7; C+=2.3; C=2.0
S500 3.872(n=130)
S510 3.797(n=130)
S511 3.462 (n=131)
S520 3.399(n=94)
S530 3.822(n=97)
S541 3.712 (n=149)
S542 3. 766 (n= 147)
S540 3.649(n=157)
S600 3.904 (n=34)-Fall and 3.853 (n=123)-Spring
In August 1994, an IUPUI Committee on Grade Inflation was formed. The IUPUI
Registrar provided the committee and the campus community with relevant data (Grove, 1995,
December 7, 1995, October 25; Hill & Grove, 1994, June 21). The IUPUI grade inflation
committee analyzed grading data for IUPUI campus schools and departments, and for the
campus as a whole. Based on their analysis of the data, the committee suggested that:
. . . the four largest schools (Liberal Arts, Science, Engineering & Technology,
and Business) have mean GPAs that range from 2.5 to 2.8. . . . Some of the smaller
programs as well as those with a strong performance oriented assessment
component grade somewhat higher. This higher grading could well be caused by
better motivated and higher quality students.
The grade distribution for Fall 1994 at IUPUI reflects a 55% A/B rate. This figure is
based on a population that includes nearly eleven thousand P/S or W grades. With
those eliminated from the sample space, the A/B rate increases to about 67%.
Representative data on grade distributions suggest that the A/B rate is 47% for
100-level courses, 57.5% for 200-level courses, 66% for 300-level courses and 68% for 400-
level courses. (Orr et al., 1995)
The campus committee also suggested that grade inflation at IUPUI was related to the
following factors:
1. There is an indirect (inverse) relation between student retention and grade
inflation.
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2. The stretching (expanding) of the grade scales creates more A and B grades.
3. Competency based assessment (in which progress for advancement requires
100% mastery of certain skills) contributes to grade inflation whenever such
assessment is incorporated into the overall grading structure.
4. Highly competitive admission standards for some schools create a skewed
student population. In other words, students at good schools should get better
grades as a whole than would students at more "mediocre" schools.
5. A reluctance to "require" faculty to force the average grade in a class to be a C
may eventually result in C no longer being a viable grade.
6. Older students perform better, especially if they are competing against more
traditional students.
7. There is a gender bias that can contribute to grade inflation. Female students
generally perform better in class than male students.
8. An increased number of and/or a relaxing of standards for course withdrawals
enables students whose course performances have been less than average to avoid
receiving a letter grade of C or below.
9. Lack of knowledge on the part of professors concerning good student
assessment strategies can lead to the assignment of a disproportionate number
of A and B grades.
10. Progression standards: freshman level courses tend to filter out weaker students.
11. Part-time faculty grade more leniently because they may not have ever been
taught how to assess students correctly.
12. FX and Other Grade Replacement policies permit students to keep their
graduation GPA index high.
13. Self-imposed pressure by schools that want their students to be acceptable to and
accepted by prestigious graduate schools may result in their faculty
developing more lenient grading policies.
14. Need for students to get good jobs with GPA-oriented firms can lead to
actions on students' part to do whatever they can to get the highest grades
possible. Since graduate employment history is also a measure of a program's
quality, schools may take actions similar to those identified in item 13 to
enhance their students' employability prospects with the more prestigious
firms.
15. Probation rules encourage students to get good grades (or withdraw from classes in
which they are doing poorly) if they are to avoid dismissal.
16. Changes in teaching philosophies that make learning more experiential.
17. Professors get better student evaluations if they grade more leniently.
18. An emerging student attitude is that the payment of tuition "guarantees" decent
grades. (Orr et al., 1995)
In a similar vein, the Mankato State University Center for Excellence in Teaching and
Learning (Schiming, 2007) published the following list of possible “causes” and “implications”
of grade inflation:
1. Institutional pressure to retain students. The easiest way to maintain
enrollment is to keep the students that are already on campus. The professors,
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departments, colleges, and even entire universities may implicitly believe that
giving their students higher grades will improve retention and the
attractiveness of their classes and courses. With students seeing themselves
more as consumers of education and more eager to succeed than to learn, the
pressure on institutions to provide more success can be persuasive (Cole,
1993, January 6).
2. Increased attention and sensitivity to personal crisis situations for
students. The most obvious example was the Vietnam War era. Poor grades
exposed male students to the military draft. Many professors and institutions
adopted liberal grading policies to minimize the likelihood of low grades.
Some sources cite this period as the genesis of recent grade inflation as the
students of that era are now professors.
3. Higher grades used to obtain better student evaluations of teaching. In an
increased effort at faculty accountability, many colleges and universities
mandate frequent student evaluations of faculty that often end up being
published or otherwise disseminated. These same evaluations play an
increasingly important role in tenure and promotion decisions. Faculty
members who find themselves in such situations may attempt to 'buy' better
student evaluations of their teaching by giving higher grades.
4. The increased use of subjective or motivational factors in grading. Factors
such as student effort, student persistence, student improvement, and class
attendance count in favor of the students who possess these desirable
characteristics. This tends to skew grading patterns upwards.
5. Changing grading policies and practices. The increased use of internships,
contract grading, individual study courses, group work within courses, a
liberal withdrawal policy, generous use of the incomplete grade, and the
ability to repeat courses to improve a grade can all contribute to grade
inflation.
6. Faculty attitudes. A faculty member who believes that grades are a vehicle to
please students rather than to recognize and reward performance will tend to
give higher grades. Similarly a professor less willing to distinguish superior
work from good or average work will tend to impart an upward bias to grades.
One source places most of the blame for grade inflation on the shoulders of
faculty who have failed in their traditional role of gatekeepers (Goldman,
1985). The implication here is that it is easier to give a good grade than a bad
grade for the instructor.
7. Content deflation. For large public universities, the temptation might be to
lower both the expectations and demands in individual courses. A fairly
liberal admissions policy, a large number of non-traditional students, and a
large number of working students all tempt professors to lower their
expectations by reducing the number of textbooks, the amount of writing, and
the amount of homework in the course. The goal may be laudable in
responding to the particular needs of a specific student body but the result
may be inflated grades.
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dominant (emphasis added) role in student evaluations of faculty” (Franklin et al., 1991, April, p.
2).
Academics concerned about grade inflation, diminished academic standards, and
“advancing corporatism” used observational studies to argue that increasing “grading leniency”
explained much of the positive correlation. Those less concerned about grade inflation, tended to
argue that the “teacher effectiveness theory” (i.e., effective teachers secure high ratings
regardless of expected or actual grades) and “student variation” (e.g., interest in the subject or
motivation) explained the positive correlations between grades and SETs. These latter
hypotheses found favor among good teachers who received good ratings and among
administrators who were desperately seeking to find ways to recruit, retain, and maintain or
enhance the satisfaction of their “customer-students” and simultaneously find some
“measurable” way to assess faculty performance. We might also hypothesize that even if the
positive correlations between grades and SETs do not “really” exist, many faculty BELIEVE
they do and, presumably, some adjust their behavior accordingly.
Despite the diverse viewpoints among academics (many of whom had vested interests in
either the grading leniency or the effective teaching argument), the overwhelming majority of
studies have found significant positive correlations between grades and SETs. Johnson (2003)
described and summarized 60 such correlation studies. He observed that “a preponderance of
these report positive correlations between student grades and student evaluations of teaching” (p.
10).
Interestingly, a few studies have found a negative correlation between expected grade and
workload. That is, the more student ratings of workload increased, (e.g., “I had to work hard in
this course”), the lower they expected their grades to be. This challenges explanations of the
grade-SET correlations based on both the teacher effectiveness and student variables theories. If
students anticipate a need to work harder in a particular course, might we reasonably predict that
they will therefore expect to perform better in that course? If students are motivated to work hard
and do so, would they not expect to receive higher grades?
Indeed, there is a longstanding positive correlation between “time-on-task” (i.e., time
studying outside of class) and actual student grades. This finding has been confirmed in
numerous studies over the years. Nonetheless, some students apparently believe that they will
earn lower grades in courses where they have to work hard. We wonder if these findings might
suggest that some students have had so many “easy” courses in which they have received “high”
grades that the idea of having a “challenging course” in which they have to work and study hard
engenders an expectation of a lower grade.
Part of the confusion about the correlation between student grades and SETs among
academics may result from the design and limitations of observational studies. Simple
correlation studies can not readily “tease” out all the potential variables. Therefore, many
professors and administrators within the academy cannot reasonably accept findings based on
correlations alone. We respect and appreciate that position. However, studies that involved
experimental control or manipulation of variables (e.g., expected and actual grades) could and
did provide more clarity to the situation. Some older studies (Blunt, 1991; Chacko, 1983; Vasta
& Sarmiento, 1979; Voeks & French, 1960; Worthington & Wong, 1979) suggested as much.
Grades and Grading 13
More recently, the sophisticated DUET (Duke Undergraduate Evaluation of Teaching) study
(Johnson, 2002) provided additional evidence.
Data collected during the DUET experiment provides a unique glimpse into
the causal nature of student grades on teacher-course evaluations. Although any
number of extraneous factors may act to influence both grades and SETs, the
analysis of the DUET data suggests that there is a direct effect of grading policy
on SETs beyond what can be explained by such extraneous factors.
A unique feature of this analysis was that two student responses were obtained
for each student-course combination. The first response was obtained while
students were still taking their courses and before they had received their final
course grades. The second response was collected after students had completed
their courses and after they had received their final course grades. By contrasting
the two responses obtained from each student, highly significant, substantively
important effects of student grade were discovered on all of the DUET items.
These findings corroborate the findings of earlier grade manipulation studies and
a preponderance of correlation studies. Because the design of the DUET
experiment effectively eliminated the possibility that unobserved environmental
factors were responsible for these effects, the results from this analysis provide
conclusive evidence of a biasing effect of student grades on student evaluations of
teaching.
From a policy viewpoint, the findings of this study are important. As an
increasing number of universities use student evaluations of teaching in
administrative decisions that affect the careers of their faculty, the incentives for
faculty to manipulate their grading policies in order to enhance their evaluations
increase. Because grading policies affect student enrollment decisions and the
amount students learn in their courses, the ultimate consequence of such
manipulations is the degradation of the quality of education in the United States.
(Johnson, 2002, p. 16)
In a recent book on the topic of grade inflation, Johnson (2003) suggested that a major
reason that grading inequities persist is because their consequences are misunderstood. The
author asserts that grading inequities are perpetuated by the following myths:
1. Student grades do not bias student evaluations of teaching.
2. Student evaluations of teaching provide reliable measures of instructional
effectiveness.
3. High course grades imply high levels of student achievement.
4. Student course selection decisions are unaffected by expected grading
practices.
5. Grades assigned in unregulated academic environments have a consistent
meaning across classes, departments, and institutions. (Johnson, 2003, p. 9)
Assumptions Underlying an IUSSW Position on MSW Grades and Grading
We assume that clients of social work services—not students—are the ultimate and
primary consumers and constituents of our educational programs. Unlike academic programs
Grades and Grading 14
We believe that most such failures should occur during the first and/or second semesters
of the foundation curriculum. We believe that students who do not acquire and cannot
demonstrate basic academic and professional social work competencies can and should be
identified and failed no later than the end of the second semester of the foundation curriculum. In
this regard, we believe that full time faculty and MSW administrators bear a greater burden of
responsibility than do part-time instructors in fulfilling our professional gate keeping functions.
We believe that whenever possible full-time MSW faculty or MSW administrators should
assume direct or indirect responsibility (e.g., through mentoring or “lead-teaching”) for assigning
or endorsing unsatisfactory grades.1
We believe that when programs admit a substantial proportion of academically
underprepared students, content deflation almost always results—especially when unsatisfactory
and failing grades are rarely assigned. Professors tend to feel obligated to remediate students
who have not developed basic academic skills or acquired basic general knowledge. As a result,
the nature of the course changes, academic expectations decrease, and better prepared students
feel frustrated over the review of basic material they had learned long ago. In other words, the
“targeted” student audience shifts from the good and superior students to the fair and marginal
students. The quantity and sophistication of assigned readings tend to decline, the lectures and
learning activities become more basic, and the performance expectations tend to diminish.
We hypothesize that grade inflation in the IUSSW MSW program involves both the
assignment of too many unearned grades of A and B, too many W and I grades, and too few
grades of C, D, and F. We believe that students who do not or cannot demonstrate basic
foundational and concentration competencies should not receive Master of Social Work
diplomas from Indiana University.
Although we assume that most professors and associate faculty want to be liked by their
students, we believe that grading patterns in the IU MSW program are at least as much the result
of culture and systemic processes as they are the result of individual professors’ practices.
Although we do not currently have an IUSSW grading data set that allows us to compare the
grade distributions of part-time with those of full-time social work faculty, we hypothesize that,
on average, part-time instructors tend to have less rigorous academic expectations of their
students and assign grades in a more generous manner than their already generous full-time
colleagues. If such differentials exist, mentoring of part-time by full-time faculty may serve to
ameliorate them—at least partially—and especially if full-time faculty assume direct or indirect
responsibility for grade assignments.
We assume that the emphasis on students’ evaluation of teaching for the purposes of
personnel evaluation, promotion, and tenure tends to encourage and perpetuate current grading
patterns. We assume the culture of “students as primary consumers” and “purchasers of services”
(i.e., customers) contributes as well.
1
At this point (Spring 2008), approximately 50% of all MSW courses offered on the IUPUI campus are taught by
part-time faculty. Ideally, gatekeeping functions would be directly fulfilled by full-time faculty teaching foundation
curriculum courses. Given the disproportionately low ratios of full-time faculty to MSW students or full-time faculty
to MSW courses, we do not see how this could occur in the foreseeable future.
Grades and Grading 16
We also assume that the frequency and nature of student grade appeals, where professors
must “defend” their grade assignments and “prove their innocence,” discourages fair, impartial,
and rigorous grading. Indeed, we believe that students who seek to appeal a grade or file a grade-
related grievance should be required to meet some standard of “probable cause.” We think that
before an appeal or grade-related grievance is pursued by a committee, the complaining student
should be required to provide evidence that the professor “probably” made an error in calculating
a grade, “probably” violated school or university standards, or “probably” failed to follow course
syllabus guidelines. Absent such “probable cause,” we believe that the professor should not be
required to defend the legitimacy of any student’s grade.
Despite the systemic and cultural pressures to award unearned grades of A and B, we
strongly believe that it is a fundamental moral and ethical obligation of both full-time and
associate faculty to grade students’ work fairly, rigorously, and accurately. We believe that
awarding A grades for average or satisfactory work represents a form of dishonesty that damages
both students and the professor and, most importantly, increases the likelihood that our ultimate
consumers (i.e., social work clients) will receive unethical, ineffective, or harmful services.
We believe that some of our current MSW students find it difficult to receive honest, fair,
constructive, and critical feedback without experiencing, and often expressing, extreme
emotional, social, and behavioral reactions. Some professors may attempt to prevent or postpone
such reactions by providing neutral or positive feedback to students regardless of their
performance. We wonder whether our own failure to provide fair, direct, critical feedback might
represent a form of dishonesty that deprives students of information needed to grow and learn.
When assigned fairly and honestly, grades can represent a form of constructive feedback. When
students believe they are entitled to, and then actually receive, outstanding grades—even as they
perform at satisfactory, average, or good levels of performance—they can easily maintain
distorted views of themselves, their knowledge, and their abilities. Having received so many ‘A’
grades, they may view the quality of their professional competence as excellent, outstanding, or
exceptional when, in fact, the reality is far different.
We concur with Johnson’s conclusion that:
1. Differences in grading practices between instructors cause biases in student
evaluations of teaching.
2. Student evaluations of teaching are not reliable indicators of teaching
effectiveness and account for only a small proportion of the variance in
student learning from student to student and course to course.
3. High grade distributions cannot be associated with higher levels of student
achievement.
4. Differences in grading practices have a substantial impact on student
enrollments, and cause fewer students to enroll in those fields that grade more
stringently.
5. Grading practices differ systematically between disciplines and instructors,
and these disparities cause serious inequities in student assessment. (Johnson,
2003, p. 237)
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ii. Require students to meet a “probable cause” threshold for pursuing grade
appeals or grade-related grievances. Faculty should not have to “defend” any
of their assigned grades—unless a student can present tangible evidence that a
professor “probably” made a mistake in grading, or engaged in an unfair
grading practice.
iii. Hold professors accountable for compliance with the grading policy. Do so
through the annual review process.
Implications
If the IUSSW MSW program chooses to implement a grading fairness and integrity
policy, faculty and administration should be aware of the potential systemic effects. If we take
serious steps to increase grading integrity, we can predict several mid-to-long-term positive
outcomes (e.g., higher quality graduates, an enhanced reputation within the university and
academic circles, as well as among the local, regional, and state professional communities).
However, we can also predict several challenging and some potentially negative effects. For
example, we can anticipate that more rigorous grading will probably:
1. Lead to a dramatic jump in the number and percentage of unsatisfactory or failing
students in the MSW program (unless there is a substantial decrease in the number of
underprepared students admitted to the program).
2. Have a differential, negative effect on students in certain programs (i.e., evening,
weekend, and perhaps advanced standing and child welfare) and on those students
who attempt to work full-time while undertaking their studies.
3. Lead to a spike (at least initially) in the number of student grade appeals and
grievances, as well as in complaints from the offices of the chancellor and various
vice-chancellors, and from members of the community, legislators, and, of course,
parents and grandparents.
4. Lead to at least some legal action by one or more (probably graduating) students who
argue that they had every right to expect that the previous de facto policies and
practices on grading would continue throughout the entirety of their educational
program. (This could be mitigated by clear, advanced communication, and consistent
application of changed policies and practices. If policies and procedures are
inconsistently applied, the risk of legal action increases.)
5. Lead to a decrease in the number of applicants and enrollees who might previously
have chosen the IUSSW MSW program because of its reputation for open admission
and lenient grading. Eventually, we might attract greater numbers of better qualified
applicants—but that would be well into the future. In the near term, we may
anticipate lower MSW student enrollments along with a concurrent reduction in
monies tied to enrollments
6. Lead to lower SET ratings (at least during the transition period) and a need to
interpret or explain them to administration and other stakeholders.
7. Result in other, unanticipated consequences.
We should also recognize that the probability of success in increasing grading fairness
and integrity through voluntary means alone is low. Absent strong consensus, faculty approval of
a formal policy, and administration agreement to provide close oversight and to prepare regular
Grades and Grading 19
grade distribution reports, the factors, forces, and incentives to maintain the current grading
practices will overpower most voluntary attempts at correction.
A systemic approach could help support faculty and administration under a new grading
fairness and integrity policy. For example, to improve the quality of our MSW applicant pool,
applications for admission to the MSW program could include a “writing test,” a “general
knowledge test,” a “logic test,” a “critical thinking essay test,” or a simple “problem-solving
test.” The program might require that applicants take the GRE. Adding modest application
requirements could lead to a better—although probably a smaller—applicant pool. Materials
about the program could include a rationale for and description of the university academic
integrity policies and the MSW grading policy. Students admitted to the MSW program could
sign statements that they understand the grading policy and agree to conform to standards of
academic integrity and professionalism. Teaching contracts with part-time faculty could include
a statement of the grading policy, instructions concerning its application, and an agreement to
comply.
Recommendations
The Ad Hoc Committee on Grades and Grading recommends that the Indiana University
School of Social Work MSW Curriculum Committee take strong action to increase the fairness,
rigor, and integrity of grading practices within the MSW program. We suggest that the program
adopt the DO MUCH approach described above and subscribe to a premise that we expect the
average MSW student to perform at a “good” (B) level. We expect that the most common grades
will be in the B range (B-, B, B+)—perhaps in the range of 40-45%. Given the modest academic
qualifications of some of our enrolled students, we also expect that the percentage of students
receiving grades of C and C+ will increase substantially in the next several years—perhaps to
25% while the percentage of unsatisfactory grades (C-, D, F) will increase to the 10-15% range.
We also anticipate that the percentage of superior/excellent grades (A-, A, A+) will decrease to
the 25-30% range.
In order to achieve these targets, we recommend that the MSW program adopt a policy
which requires each instructor teaching a required MSW foundation or concentration course to
follow a common grading rubric—perhaps similar to one promulgated by the Foundation for
Critical Thinking (2004)—and produce grade distributions that reflect an average GPA of
between 2.9 and 3.1. Our recommended policy also limits the percentage of A+, A, and A-
grades to 25-30% in each required foundation and concentration course. We also recommend
that all MSW instructors follow scrupulously the IU policy on the assignment of W and I grades.
They should be assigned only in extraordinary circumstances.
At this point, we recommend that pure elective courses remain exempt from the grading
policy. In addition, the MSW grades and grading policy should include provisions and
procedures for exceptions or waivers when needed in unusual circumstances. We suggest that
such exceptions or waivers be requested of the MSW Program Director and the Chair of the
MSW Curriculum Committee for their review and consideration. If they both view the request as
reasonable under the circumstances, then it should be approved.
In essence, these rubrics reflect a position that A grades reflect Excellence. Excellent
scholarly products and academic or professional performances are substantially superior to the
Grades and Grading 20
“good,” “the competent,” or the “satisfactory.” They are unusual, exceptional, and extraordinary.
Criteria for assignments are not only met, they are exceeded. Excellence is a rare phenomenon.
As a result, relatively few MSW students earn A grades.
We believe that in a graduate level educational program of social work, grades of B
signify good quality scholarly products and academic or professional performance. Grades in the
B range reflect work expected of a conscientious graduate student in a professional program.
Criteria for assignments are met in a competent, thoughtful, and professional manner. However,
the criteria are not exceeded and the quality is not substantially superior to other good quality
products or performances. There is a clear distinction between the good and the excellent. We
expect that many, perhaps most, MSW students will earn grades in the B range—reflecting the
good work expected of competent future helping professionals.
Grades of C and C+ signify work that is marginal in nature. The scholarly product or
professional performance meets many but not all of the expected criteria. The work approaches
but does not quite meet the standards of quality expected of a graduate student in a professional
school. Satisfactory in many respects, its quality is not consistently so and cannot be considered
good. We anticipate that a significant minority of MSW students will earn C and C+ grades.
Grades of C- and lower reflect work that is unsatisfactory. The product or performance
does not meet several, many, or most of the criteria. The work fails to approach the standards of
quality expected of a graduate student and a future MSW-level professional. We anticipate that
in the early years following implementation of the grading fairness and integrity policy, a
significant percentage of MSW students will earn unsatisfactory grades of C-, D, and F.
Glossary of Terms
Content Deflation: “Students receive the same grades as students in the past but with less work
required and less learning” (Schiming, 2007). In colloquial terms, content deflation
involves “dumbing-down” subject matter and lowering academic expectations.
Criterion Referenced Grading: “Criterion-Referenced grading measures performance against
defined criteria, so as many students as successfully meet criteria may achieve 'A's”
(University of Lethbridge Faculty of Education, 2005).
Grade Compression: The distribution of grades becomes more narrow—resulting in
nondiscrimination among certain levels of performance. Grade compression tends to
coincide with grade inflation. Instead of an A-to-F grade distribution that approximates
the normal Bell curve with C (or perhaps B) serving to indicate satisfactory or average
performance, the distribution becomes skewed so that the de facto grade range becomes
A-to-B with an odd C, D, or F.
Grade Deflation: The assignment of the same, or lower, grades for levels of academic
performance which previously resulted in higher grades; a leveling or decrease in average
grades during a time when there is an increase in academic performance. (The period
between 1955 and 1965 may well have been a time of grade deflation—as the average
quality of incoming college students increased while the average grades remained the
same).
Grades and Grading 21
Grade Inflation: The assignment of higher grades for levels of academic performance which
previously resulted in lower grades; an increase over time in average grades without a
commensurate increase in academic performance.
Grade Normalization: Process by which assigned grades are “normalized” across sections and/or
courses within an educational program thereby decreasing students’ conclusion that one
professor teaching a section of the same course (or a comparable course) assigns lower
grades than another. Also, decreases the likelihood of litigation due to unfair and
inconsistent practices.
Norm Referenced Grading: “Norm-referenced grading measures performance relative to other
students; consequently only a few students receive 'A's regardless of how many others
successfully complete assignment” (University of Lethbridge Faculty of Education,
2005).
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Grades and Grading 23
Appendix A
The text below defines the outlines of the standards for the grades of A, B, C, D, and F. These
standards are suggestive of common denominator academic values and must be contextualized at
two levels: at the department level (to capture domain-specific variations) and at the course level
(to capture course-specific differences).
High Level Performance
High level performance implies excellence in thinking and performance within the domain of a
subject and course, along with the development of a range of knowledge acquired through the
exercise of thinking skills and abilities.
A level work is, on the whole, not only clear, precise, and well-reasoned, but insightful as well.
Basic terms and distinctions are learned at a level which implies insight into basic concepts and
principles.
The A-level student has internalized the basic intellectual standards appropriate to the assessment
of his/her own work in a subject and demonstrates insight into self-evaluation.
The A-level student often raises important questions and issues, analyzes key questions and
problems clearly and precisely, recognizes key questionable assumptions, clarifies key concepts
effectively, uses language in keeping with educated usage, frequently identifies relevant
competing points of view, and demonstrates a commitment to reason carefully from clearly
stated premises in the subject, as well as marked sensitivity to important implications and
consequences.
A-level work displays excellent reasoning and problem-solving within a field and works
consistently at a high level of intellectual excellence.
The Grade of B
The grade of B implies sound thinking and performance within the domain of a subject and
course, along with the development of a range of knowledge acquired through the exercise of
thinking skills and abilities.
B level work is, on the whole, clear, precise, and well-reasoned., but does not have depth of
insight. Basic terms and distinctions are learned at a level which implies comprehension of basic
concepts and principles.
The B-level student has internalized some of the basic intellectual standards appropriate to the
assessment of his/her own work in a subject and demonstrates competence in self-evaluation.
The B-level student often raises questions and issues, analyzes questions and problems clearly
and precisely, recognizes some questionable assumptions, clarifies key concepts competently ,
typically uses language in keeping with educated usage, sometimes identifies relevant competing
Grades and Grading 24
points of view, and demonstrates the beginnings of a commitment to reason carefully from
clearly stated premises in a subject, as well as some sensitivity to important implications and
consequences. B-level work displays sound reasoning and problem-solving with in a field and
works consistently at a competent level of intellectual performance.
The Grade of C
The grade of C implies mixed thinking and performance within the domain of a subject and
course, along with some development of a range of knowledge acquired through the exercise of
thinking skills and abilities.
C level work is inconsistently clear, precise, and well-reasoned; moreover, it does not display
depth of insight or even consistent competence. Basic terms and distinctions are learned at a
level which implies the beginnings of, but inconsistent comprehension of, basic concepts and
principles.
The C-level student has internalized a few of the basic intellectual standards appropriate to the
assessment of his/her own work in a subject, but demonstrates inconsistency in self-evaluation.
The C-level student sometimes raises questions and issues, sometimes analyzes questions and
problems clearly and precisely, recognizes some questionable assumptions, clarifies some
concepts competently , inconsistently uses language in keeping with educated usage, sometimes
identifies relevant competing points of view, but does not demonstrate a clear commitment to
reason carefully from clearly stated premises in a subject, nor consistent sensitivity to important
implications and consequences.
C-level work displays inconsistent reasoning and problem-solving within a field and works, at
best, at a competent level of intellectual performance.
The Grade of D
The grade of D implies poor thinking and performance within the domain of a subject and
course. On the whole, the student tries to get through the course by means of rote recall,
attempting to acquire knowledge by memorization rather than through comprehension and
understanding.
The student is not developing critical thinking skills and understandings as requisite to
understanding course content. D-level work represents thinking that is typically unclear,
imprecise, and poorly reasoned. The student is achieving competence only on the lowest order of
performance. Basic terms and distinctions are often incorrectly used and reflect a superficial or
mistaken comprehension of, basic concepts and principles.
The D-level student has not internalized the basic intellectual standards appropriate to the
assessment of his/her own work in a subject and does poorly in self-evaluation. The D-level
student rarely raises questions and issues, superficially analyzes questions and problems, does
not recognize his/her assumptions, only partially clarifies concepts , rarely uses language in
keeping with educated usage, rarely identifies relevant competing points of view, and shows no
understanding of the importance of a commitment to reason carefully from clearly stated
premises in a subject,.
Grades and Grading 25
The D-level student is insensitive to important implications and consequences. D-level work
displays poor reasoning and problem-solving within a field and works, at best, at a low level of
intellectual performance.
The Grade of F
The student tries to get through the course by means of rote recall, attempting to acquire
knowledge by memorization rather than through comprehension and understanding. The student
is not developing critical thinking skills and understandings as requisite to understanding course
content.
F-level work represents thinking that is regularly unclear, imprecise, and poorly reasoned. The
student is not achieving competence in his/her academic work. Basic terms and distinctions are
regularly incorrectly used and reflect a mistaken comprehension of, basic concepts and
principles.
The F-level student has not internalized the basic intellectual standards appropriate to the
assessment of his/her own work in a subject and regularly misevaluates his/her own work. The F-
level student does not raise questions or issues, does not analyze questions and problems, does
not recognize his/her assumptions, does not clarify concepts , does not use language in keeping
with educated usage, confuses his/her point of view with the TRUTH, and shows no
understanding of the importance of a commitment to reason carefully from clearly stated
premises in a subject.
The F-level student is oblivious to important implications and consequences. F-level work
displays incompetent reasoning and problem-solving within a field and consistently poor
intellectual performance. (Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2004)
[This article is adapted from the resource: Critical Thinking Basic Theory and Instructional
Structures (Paul & Elder, 2000)]