SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]

MANUEL BORJA , petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of

the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO
R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I) ,
respondents.

Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. and
Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for respondents.

DECISION

FERNANDO , J : p

The jurisdictional in rmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of

the City Court of Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T.
Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certiorari proceeding was the
absence of an arraignment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight
physical injuries. This notwithstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the
trial in absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found
him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of
twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court of
First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged
that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976
a rming the judgment of the City Court. It is the contention of petitioner that the failure
to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more
speci cally of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 There was thus, at the
very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment,
agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of
the City Court a rmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as
answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed
by this Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for
the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case
against him nds support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It
requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in
accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through
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 Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme Court, identi ed
due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, . . . ." 8 An arraignment thus
becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying
him of the cause he is required to meet . . ." 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice
Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case of United States v. Binayoh. 1 0 He
pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code
[now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and to extend
to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an a rmative one which the court, on
its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 1 1 To emphasize its importance, he
added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the
accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he
must assert himself and the bene ts of which he himself must demand. In other words,
in the arraignment the court must act of its own volition, . . . ." 1 2 In the terse and apt
language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any
criminal prosecution." 1 3 Procedural due process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being
duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by
the Rules, an accused, for the rst time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state
is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter, he is no
longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may not be worded with
su cient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have
such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even
required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an
arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to
him and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital
aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality, much
less an idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge
Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he
was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear,
the case was reset for hearing. When that date came, December 14, 1973, without
petitioner being present, although his bondsmen were noti ed, respondent Judge, as
set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present
its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testi ed, the
offended party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which the
prosecution rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of
the decision on December 28, 1973." 1 4 It could then conclude: "Verily, the records
clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by
counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 1 5 It is
indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard
by himself and counsel. As categorically a rmed by Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the
leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 1 6 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be
heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 1 7 He added further that
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 such "constitutional right is inviolate." 1 8 There is no doubt that it could be waived, but
here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It su ces to refer to
another leading case, People v. Holgado, 1 9 where the then Chief Justice Moran
emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence." 2 0 With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself
and counsel being thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General
agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being
null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in
absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its
language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly noti ed and his failure to appear is unjusti ed." 2 1 As pointed out
then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it
should come "after arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution of
the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the procedural scheme to
accord an accused due process. Without the accused having been arraigned, it
becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this exception to the basic
constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent
Judge Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the
Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance . . . considered the appeal taken
by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City
Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact,
the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of
petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to
bolster his position. Speci cally, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at
anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial."
22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent

Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, nding the accused guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuries, is nulli ed and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, a rming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nulli ed and set aside. The case is remanded
to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries,
with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with
the arraignment of petitioner.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

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 1. Petition, pars. 4-8.
2. Ibid, 9.

3. According to Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution: "No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law."

4. According to Article IV, Section 19: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustified."
5. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Jose E.
Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega.
6. Cf. Vera v. People, L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711.
7. 76 Phil. 72 (1946).

8. Ibid, 87. Reference was made to Rogers v. Peck, 199 US 425 (1905) and Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 US 78 (1908).

9. Ibid.
10. 35 Phil. 23.

11. Ibid, 27.

12. Ibid.

13. Comment of the Solicitor General, 4.

14. Ibid, 2.
15. Ibid, 8.

16. 84 Phil. 525 (1949).

17. Ibid, 529.

18. Ibid, 534.

19. 85 Phil. 752 (1950).

20. Ibid, 756.

21. Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution.
22. Comment of the Solicitor General, 9.

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