Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC

G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.*

PANGANIBAN, J.:**

FACTS:

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; and
(2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941.”

Complying with its constitutional duty (Section 5, Article 6) to provide by law the
“selection or election” of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on
March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration, the State shall “promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.”

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.

2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously
with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties,
organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party- list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to
Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998,
the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes;
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on7September 8, 1998 as
the 14th party-list representative.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a “Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution. It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Thereafter, nine
other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the
same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they
filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL,
KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA’s Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percentvote
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three
“elements of the party-list system,” which should supposedly determine “how the 52
seats should be filled up.” First, “the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives.”
Second, “the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society.”
Third, “it should encourage [the] multi- party system.” (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that “the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at
least one representative.”

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners
on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party- list
system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties. and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11(b) of RA 7941, only parties,
organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list
system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats,
not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as
provided by said Section 11

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties—movants and oppositors alike —had agreed that the twenty
percent membership of party- list representatives in the House “should be filled up,”
the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining
38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified
parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the
Group of 38 —herein private respondents—even if they had not passed the two
percent threshold?

The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement “will mean the concentration of representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban
poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application, of the 2%
‘threshold’ does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature—to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives x x x.” Additionally, it “will also prevent this Commission
from complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.”

Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin
majority—with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting —
affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), “pending the resolution of
petitions for correction of manifest errors.”

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec “to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this
Court.

ISSUES
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for parry-list representatives mentioned in Section

5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time? 

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 


3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined? 


RULING
First Issue: Whether or not the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is
Mandatory.

No.

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant
in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
“twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as
follows: No. of district representatives _______________________ x .20 = No. of party-
list .80 representatives. This formulation means that any increase in the number of
district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that
there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections,
the number of party-list seats would be 52

Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”

The Constitution simply states that “[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.” We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad
power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in
the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that

Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling
for party-list seats in Congress.

Second Issue

Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Yes.
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows: “MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical
formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would
distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a
mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other
parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of “representation.”

Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to “the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio”to ensure meaningful
local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise
and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention

The Three-Seat-Per Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:

“MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single
party that can sit within the allocated under the party list system. This way, we will
open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty.xxx.”

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission’s pronouncements, Congress set the

seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. “Qualified”
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest- representations into the legislature; thus, no single group,
no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.

Third Issue: If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?

The very first step—there is no dispute on this—is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as “parties”) according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that
garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed
seat in the House of Representatives.

Thereafter, “those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.” The problem is how to
distribute additional seats “proportionally,” bearing in mind the three-seat limit further
imposed by the law.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines (Applicable)

The Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally
unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the
parameters of the Filipino party-list system. They are as follows:

First, the twenty percent allocation—the combined number of all party-list

congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold—only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are

“qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives.

Third, the three-seat limit—each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and
two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation—the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate “proportional

representation” into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat
each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats.
The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
“first” party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is
based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled
to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot
be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of
the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second
party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always
be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off
could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of
facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention. The Court has previously
ruled in Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot be converted
into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party’s
fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that “no party can claim more than what it
is entitled to x x x.” In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is
better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law,
neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to
a given set of facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total
votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice
the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s
number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats
to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of = Proportion of
votes
votes of

of first party
first party
——————
relative to

Total votes for

total votes for
party-list system party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is

less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled
to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of
more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. Note
that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of
additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same
formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For
example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast.
According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes—say, twenty percent—to grant it the same number of seats as
the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation,
since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is
to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent,
additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:

 Additional = No. of votes of

x No. of
seats
concerned additional

for concerned
party
seats allocated
party —————— to

—
the first party
Total No. of
votes

for party-list
system

——————
—————

No. of votes of

first party

————

Total No. of

for party list

system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional = No. of votes of

x No. of
seats
concerned additional

for concerned
party
seats allocated
party —————
to

No. of votes of
the first party
first party

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The
end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat,
an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained
earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in
excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two
additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work
within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party
(APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality
of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and
methodology.

In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say,
however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify
RA 7941 to make it “less strict,” then the formula will also be modified to reflect the
changes willed by the lawmakers.

OTHER METHODS

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.
Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes—for example,
when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party
C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats;
Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by
law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the
spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered
nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by
the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the
resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to Thus:

No. of remaining seats to be allocated No. of additional _________________ x No. of

votes of = seats of party

Total No. of votes of party concerned concerned qualified parties (Integer decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. The Niemeyer
formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation.

Conclusion:

In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-
eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a
party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
percent threshold and proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec

effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in
the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent
any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.