Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5060             January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without
a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the
provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered
there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such
circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large
cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as
follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the
permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall
require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and
certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded
cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for
which permit to slaughter has been requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no
event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for
human consumption.

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by
him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex,
age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other
marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date
on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the
record, together with date of permit.
 A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner,
together with date of permit.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or
killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor
more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition
contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the
municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition
nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of
large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal
treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to
the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.

It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and
examined apart from the context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the
municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and
the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words "slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for
human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the other whereby the phrase
"at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words "killed
for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and
keeping in mind the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that
the latter construction is that which should be adopted.

The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to
make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or
stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding and
registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily
and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the
contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in
possession, so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it
difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to dispose
of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of identification,
resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal
throughout the Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were
requiring proof of ownership and the production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering
or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals were slaughtered privately or in
a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would appear, sections 30
and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal
slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32
provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also
of the provincial treasurer.

If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it
will readily be seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the
brands and marks of identification of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion,
since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the
fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks
might be scrutinized and proof of ownership required.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of
the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
"killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition
is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption
anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all
possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed to
modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for
the control of municipal slaughterhouse.

Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for
human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in
the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the
statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is clearly
susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make effective the
provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was
denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured
in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional
and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which
provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the
statute constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the basis of his
contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language
of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the
question involved was the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or
carrying away by any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the
beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interest of the community."

It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao
owners in these Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute;
and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is
an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authority, and in some degree
interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the regulations in
question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are
concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we
are satisfied that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as
is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners
to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious private use of the
property, which the legislature had authority to impose."

In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in
Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the
former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent domain from the exercise of the
sovereign police powers of the State, said:

We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and regulations establish
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which
can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. The power
we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same.
 It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to
mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for
human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of
property interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use,
which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that an
examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to
safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the
limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular
provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in
the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police
power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every
species of property within the commonwealth."

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease
had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away
seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of these
animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work
animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the
disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple
food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the impoverished people were
compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact that with
sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could easily be
made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the
Islands was such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people,
and in many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently
hopeless struggle for existence with which they were confronted.

To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the
United States as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish employment in the
provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering
incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the
lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.

Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural
community material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of
the work animals upon which such a community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields
and the transportation of the products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were made by the
Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as appears from the official
reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those animals
which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the
Islands where the need for them was greatest.

At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and
applications of preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved
in some degree successful in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the
gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the
operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving those
sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three
to five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now
adopted prove entirely successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these animals at a high
figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the
crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the
enactment of a special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other
personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that
the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome
provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their
slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding
and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for
food were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police power of the State; and we are of
opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the
slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the due
and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the
right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction
of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and
records of the administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the
material welfare and future prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages
of the disease which swept away the work animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law
under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands as a
civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by
disease or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of
prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and
proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property of the citizen. The police
power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property
by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of
carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a
reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally
conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded
as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the
destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the
demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the
destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities;
the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial
grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary
vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious
deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of
 obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and
places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in
thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under
the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its
determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the
services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that
by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of
the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and
general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or
may be exercised, because the various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his
rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be detrimental to the public order
or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes
necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their
property, and even to destroy it, where the owners themselves have fully observed all their
duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless, some controlling public
necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is
where it becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to
prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or
any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in fault, but his interest
must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of limits within the
denser portions of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable
materials shall not be erected or repaired may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a
destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained
notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good, even
though they prevent the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes
private property. And, whenever the legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a
harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may establish
regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil
 equally with other persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of
property, which the legislature have authority" to impose.

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States
clearly indicate the wide scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our
opinion that the provision of the statute in question being a proper exercise of that power is not in
violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that "no law shall be enacted
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision
which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the
constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
US vs TURIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUIS TORIBIO,
defendant-appellant.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter
of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held:  It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided
for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote
the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to
render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if  they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose of
the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court  think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of
the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of
a valid exercise of police power

The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere
regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest.